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HISTORICAL DATA

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

Group 3
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DECEMBER 1948 – 30 DECEMBER 1949

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PART 2

VOLUME II

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HISTORY

OF THE

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

1 December 1948 - 31 December 1949

Volume II

Part 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1950 RESERVE PROGRAM, 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1949

Prepared by: Mr. William R. Hoohman
Directorate of Historical Services

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FOREWORD

The organizational framework for the new Reserve Program of Fiscal Year 1950 was virtually completed by 1 July 1949. There were a few Table of Organization units of the old Reserve Program still to be inactivated, the location of one Air Force Reserve Training Center was yet to be determined, and a number of Air Force Reserve Training Center, Corollary and Volunteer Air Reserve Training units remained to be activated or organized. The basic structure, however, had been established. The next step was to put that structure to the use for which it was designed, the training of Air Reservists for post Mobilization-Day needs.

Part 1 of this Volume traced the genesis and the shaping of the Fiscal Year 1950 Reserve Program. Attention was given to the hard lessons of the past which were put to use to formulate a "quality" Program suited to the resources that were at hand. The Reserve Program of Fiscal Year 1950 belonged more to the whole Air Force and less to one Command than did its predecessors of previous Fiscal Years. The Presidential Order of 15 October 1948 with its emphasis on the utilization of Regular resources gave a new cast to the training of the Reserve Forces.

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This part of Volume II is devoted to the Continental Air Command's implementation of its share of the new Program in the first six months of Fiscal Year 1950.

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Chapter Ten

THE AIR FORCE RESERVE TRAINING CENTER PROGRAM: MISSION AND MEANS

I

The site of 22 of the proposed Air Force Reserve Training Centers had been established when the curtain rose on Fiscal Year 1950. Training Centers were situated at air fields where it was anticipated they would be operated economically, measured in cost per individual trained. This meant location in metropolitan areas near the homes of large numbers of Reservists. Only 3 of the 22 Air Force Reserve Training Centers were placed in areas of less than 300,000 population. Similarly, only 3 of the communities where Air Force Reserve Training Centers of the old Program had been discontinued boasted a population greater than that figure. Reserve Training Centers were located at 10 of the 12 largest cities in the country.[402]

The location of the twenty-third Air Force Reserve Training Center was not settled until September, when Mitchel Air Force Base was chosen as its site.[403] That Base had been the

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402/ Memo for Deputy Special Assistant for Reserve Forces prepared in Hq USAF, Subject: Reasons for Discontinuation of AFR Training Centers, 24 Jun 49, incl to Ltr, Brig Gen J P McConnell to Genl Whitehead, 15 Jul 49

403/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: P&O 322, Subject: Designation and Organization of 2233rd AFRTC, To: Cg, 1AF, 29 Sept 49

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home of the 2230th Air Force Reserve Training Center before it was moved to Floyd Bennett Naval Air Station. This transfer, consummated in June, 1949, was prompted by the anticipation of full use of the training facilities at Mitchel Air Force Base by the 52nd Fighter Wing, All Weather, and its Corollary unit.[404] In September, the 52nd Fighter Wing was moved to McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey,[405] and the Corollary unit, the 84th Fighter Wing, All Weather (USAFR), went with it, less personnel and equipment.[406] In the meanwhile, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, using the results of surveys conducted by the six Air Forces, had been studying possible locations for the remaining Air Force Reserve Training Centers. Expected Reserve participation, adequacy of facilities, and estimated initial and operating costs were regarded as of primary importance in this analysis. After the move of the 52nd Fighter Wing, Mitchel Air Force Base was deemed best to meet these criteria. The organization of an Air Force Reserve Training Center at Mitchel Field was calculated to absorb the individuals who had been slated for Corollary training with the 52nd Fighter Wing and to provide spaces for

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404/ See pages 130-131 above

405/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: P&O 370.5, Subject: Movement Order 52nd Fighter Wing (All Weather), To: Cg, 1AF, 15 Sept 49

406/ Hq, 1AF, GO Number 101, 10 Oct 49

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additional Reservists as well.[407] As a result of this decision, metropolitan New York, embracing an area population of some fifteen million,[408] was served, in the last months of 1949, by two Air Force Reserve Training Centers, one at Mitchel Air Force Base and the other at Floyd Bennett Naval Air Station. This was the only metropolitan area in the nation graced by two Training Centers.[409]

The retention of the Reading, Pennsylvania site for the 2237th Air Force Reserve Training Center, forced by the inadequacy of facilities at Philadelphia International Airport,[410] proved an expedient of doubtful value. The declining aircraft in commission rate, little reserve flying training, and paucity of airmen in the Reserve Troop Carrier Wing at Reading pointed to the necessity for a change in location.[411] The preferred location for an Air Force Reserve Training Center in the Philadelphia area was at Philadelphia Northeast Airport. That

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407/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Activation of an AFRTC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 31 Aug 49

408/ Preliminary Report on Census of 1950, The New York Times, 9 Jul 50

409/ The AFRTCs at Los Angeles, California, and Chicago, Illinois, had, of course, two Reserve Wings each. (See page 105 above)

410/ See page 128, above

411/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: DO 322, Subject: Air Force Reserve Training Center Facilities at Reading, Pa, To: C/S, Hq, USAF, 11 Dec 49. This letter was sent over the personal signature of General Whitehead

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possibility was closed, however, until such time as facilities to meet minimum requirements could be provided by the City of Philadelphia at a reasonable rental.[412]

A great many factors made the continuance of operations at Reading impracticable. Space was limited for aircraft maintainance, shops, supply, training aids, administration, barracks, mess hall - in short, for just about every activity essential to the successful prosecution of Reserve Training.[413] McGuire Air Force Base, Fort Dix, New Jersey, and New Castle County Airport, Wilmington, Delaware, both about the same distance from Philadelphia, were suggested as new locations for the 2237th Air Force Reserve Training Center.[414] All facilities at McGuire, however, were required for the use of the 52nd Fighter Wing, transferred to that Base in September.[415] On the other hand, space was to be available at New Castle County Airport after the Veteran's Administration, then entrenched at that

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412/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, File: Instl 686, to Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 23 Sept 49, to Ltr, Hq, 9AF, Subj: Facilities Survey and R & U Cost Analysis for New Castle County Airport, Wilmington, Delaware, To: Cg, ConAC, 22 Aug 49

413/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, To: C/S USAF, op. cit., 11 Dec 49

414/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Reuben Kyle, Jr, DRF, To: DO, Subj: Facilities Survey and R & U Cost Analysis for New Castle County Airport, Wilmington, Del, 6 Sept 49

415/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Brig Gen Herbert B Thatcher, DO, To: DM, same subject, 8 Sept 49

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spot, completed a projected move to a new Veteran's hospital. New Castle was about thirty miles from downtown Philadelphia as contrasted with the fifty miles separating Philadelphia and Reading. Commercial transportation between Philadelphia and New Castle was much better than between Philadelphia and Reading. Convinced by a combination of these and other considerations, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, recommended, near the close of 1949, that the Reading Air Force Reserve Training Center be moved. New Castle was suggested as the most desirable new location.[416/]

A number of surveys had been conducted in the Los Angeles area to determine whether the 2347th Air Force Reserve Training Center could be shifted from the crowded Long Beach Municipal Airport to some other more commodious or less congested location. The conclusions always were, however, that Long Beach offered the best opportunities for the conduct of Reserve Training. An agreement was reached in June 1949 with the City officials of Long Beach which promised satisfactory simultaneous use by the Air Force Reserve Training Center and civil air carriers despite the overtaxed accommodations. This agreement for the exchange of facilities between the Air Force and the City of Long Beach was repudiated by the City in retaliation

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416/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: DO 322, Subj: AFRTC Facilities at Reading, Pa, To: C/S, Hq, USAF, 11 Dec 49

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for which the Air Force took action to reclaim the use of the government-owned hangar which the City had been using under a right of entry permit.[417] A long term solution to the problem of congestion at Los Angeles remained to be found.

A change of location for the Air Force Reserve Training Center at Fairfax Field, Kansas City, Kansas, in the interest of economy, was the subject of negotiations undertaken in the last months of 1949. The projected new site was only thirty miles away, at Olathe Naval Air Station, Olathe, Kansas.[418] This shift involved a joint use agreement with the Navy, similar to that consummated before the 2230th Air Force Reserve Training Center's move to Floyd Bennett Naval Air Station, New York. Joint tenancy at Olathe was attractive because it would permit the Air Force to close the facilities at Fairfax Field. It would cost less to operate the Air Force Reserve Training Center at the Naval Air Station than on a separate basis.[419]

A bus service which the Navy operated for Naval Reserve personnel at Olathe was a minor stumbling block to negotiation of this agreement. The situation was delicate since no funds

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417/ Ltr, Harold C Stuart, Asst Secy of the Air Force to Repres Clyde Doyle, 30 Nov 49

418/ Hq, USAF, PIO Press Release, 31 Jan 50

419/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: PO&R 370.5, Subj: Movement Request, To: Dir of Plans and Operations, Hq, USAF, 28 Apr 50

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were to be had to establish a similar service for Air Reservists. Happily the Navy Department agreed to discontinue the bus service if operation proved embarrassing to the Air Force. Headquarters, Continental Air Command, requested that the Navy buses stop running at some date prior to the movement of the Air Force Reserve Training Center to Olathe.[420] The way was thus cleared to move the Training Center to a new home in 1950.

Every effort had been made to use fiscal year 1949 funds to prepare the Training Centers for operation before 1 July 1949.[421] When that date was passed, however, the need remained for a long term construction program to provide the facilities so necessary to the efficient training of Reservists.[422] There was little likelihood that legislation would be enacted permitting the new construction before the end of Fiscal Year 1950. The Continental Air Command Air Forces were requested in June, 1949, however, to survey the Air Force Reserve Training Centers in their areas in order to plan a future

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420/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: Instl 686, Subj: Survey of Olathe Naval Air Station, To: Cg, 10 AF, 23 Nov 49

421/ See pages 96 - 100, above

422/ See Inclosures to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: MI 322, Subject: Facilities Criteria for Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: Spec Asst to the C/S for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 18 March 49, for discussion of facilities required for a typical Air Force Reserve Training Center operating under the modified Wing Base concept.

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construction and rehabilitation program.[423] Headquarters, United States Air Force, indicated that immediate needs of an urgent nature might be met while a long term project to meet ultimate requirements developed slowly.[424]

II

The Air Force Reserve Training Centers, and the Army Air Force Base Units (Reserve Training) before them, had been burdened in the past with a variety of miscellaneous functions not connected with the training of Air Reservists. Additional non-related tasks could only affect adversely the training potential of Air Reserve Bases. A study undertaken at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, in March 1949 listed thirty-five functions then performed at Air Reserve Training Centers in addition to organizing, administering and training the Air Reserve.[425]

When the Fiscal Year 1950 Program was being planned, there was some question as to the proper way in which to

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423/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: Instl 326, Subject: Facilities Report for Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 3 June 49

424/ Hq, ConAC, Diary, 9 June 49

425/ Tab A to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File DM 326, Subject: Study Pertaining to Air Force Reserve Program, To: C/S USAF, 18 Mar 49

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portray the Air Force Reserve Training Centers to Congress. Were the twenty-three projected Air Force Reserve Training Centers to be maintained exclusively to train the Air Reserve? This question was answered in the negative by General Stratemeyer's planners. In their view, the dictates of economy, efficiency, and location would always make it necessary to assign missions, from time to time, to Reserve Training Centers which were not associated with the training of Reservists. Moreover, Regular funds and resources aided the Reserve Program to a greater extent than Reserve facilities were ever used to support Regular activities. For example, the resources of the Regular Air Force used at Mitchel Air Force Base for the training of Air Reservists were estimated to be capable of manning and providing facilities and services for two All Weather Fighter Squadrons.[426/]

Late in March, Headquarters, United States Air Force, submitted a draft for an Air Force Regulation generally limiting the functions of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers to activities directly connected with Air Reserve training. The draft continued to charge the Air Force Reserve Training Centers with responsibility for servicing transient aircraft, supplying ground transportation to members of the armed forces,

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426/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: DM 326, Subj: Study Pertaining to the Air Force Reserve Program, To: C/S USAF, 18 Mar 49

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and providing equipment and facilities necessary for proficiency flying by rated Air Force personnel who could not easily be attached for that purpose to a Regular station.[427]

Headquarters, Continental Air Command, did not concur with this proposal. It had no wish to see limits arbitrarily prescribed for the Air Force Reserve Training Center Commanders. Experience had shown that the very presence of an Air Force Reserve Training Center in a community involved the discharge of general Air Force responsibilities, most, if not all, of which could be met by the Air Force Reserve Training Center commander without seriously detracting from the conduct of Reserve Training. Actually the titular assumption of United States Air Force responsibilities by the Air Force Reserve Training Center Commander contributed to integration of Reserve activities with the life of the community, a condition regarded as important to the proper conduct of training activities.[428] When only one Air Force activity was found in a particular area, it was usual for the public to regard it as its general contact with the United States Air Force. If this conception were denied, the average citizen might come

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427/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: USAF Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 22 Mar 49/w/inclosure, Proposed Air Force Regulation

428/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, File: DP 326, To: C/S USAF, 15 Apr 49, to Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: USAF Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 22 Mar 49

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to view the Reserve establishment as somehow different from the Regular Air Force. It may be conjectured that Headquarters, Continental Air Command, would have preferred additional funds and resources for the Air Force Reserve Training Centers to limitations on their functions and responsibilities.

It could not be denied, however, that non-training demands on the Air Force Reserve Training Centers did detract from the calibre of the training they were able to offer Reservists. This was particularly true when Reserve aircraft were put to non-Reserve uses. An observer from Headquarters, United States Air Force, noted in November 1949 that a "very substantial" amount of the total flying time being accomplished on the tactical aircraft assigned to the various Air Force Reserve Training Centers was in no way related to the purpose for which the aircraft had been procured except that in some instances Reserve pilots or crews manned the aircraft. This non-training flying took place during the week in order to service the Bases on which the Training Centers were located or for other purposes in connection with the operations of the Continental Air Command Air Forces.[429/] A study of operations at the 2347th Air Force Reserve Training Center at Long Beach, California, revealed that, from January to August 1949, Reserve

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429/ Memo, BG Thomas O Hardin, Ch, AF Res Div, Hq, USAF, for Gen McConnell, 15 Nov 49

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aircraft made 110 non-training flights involving 1006 flying hours and 223 days away from their home stations.[430] In the Tenth Air Force area, use of C-46's by personnel from other than Reserve Table of Organization and Equipment units prevented those aircraft from being available for week-end flying by Reservists.[431]

There were dangers to the Reserve Program inherent in this practice. There were hardly enough maintainance personnel, parts and supplies to keep the aircraft in service for relatively limited use by Reservists. It was unthinkable that the tactical aircraft, so long awaited in sufficient numbers to provide meaningful training, be out of commission and unserviceable during Reserve unit training periods because they had been used during the week for other purposes. "We cannot continue to operate our Air Force Reserve Training Centers and do this [use Reserve aircraft for Regular purposes]", was General Whitehead's comment on the situation.[432]

In October, despite the objections voiced by Headquarters,

430/ Incl to IRS, Hq, ConAC, Lt Col J J Fischer, Asst DO, to O&T, 25 Aug 49, Subj: Airlift Commitments of AFRTCs, File: 373.5

431/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Lt Col James D Kemp, Acting AI, to VC, 10 Nov 49, Subj: Rpt of Investigation of Alleged Injustice to the Personnel of the Former 561st Bomb Sq, Res, Milwaukee, Wisc, File: 333.6

432/ Memo, Hq, ConAC, Lt Gen Ennis C Whitehead to Col Kyle and DO, no date (mid August 49), File: 373.5

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Continental Air Command, an Air Force Regulation was published which limited the functions of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers. This Regulation specified that the Training Centers did not constitute Air Force Bases as defined in the appropriate Manuals. The draft advanced some months before was followed in most details, although the Air Force Reserve Training Center Commanding Officers were allowed broad discretionary powers in community relations.[433]

The new Regulation stipulated that proficiency flying training by rated Regular personnel continue at the Training Centers. Special attention was given at Mitchel Air Force Base to the provision in the Regulation with reference to the B-26's, C-46's and C-47's assigned to the Reserve Light Bombardment and Troop Carrier Wings. Headquarters, Continental Air Command, decreed that tactical aircraft were to be used only to maintain the proficiency of assigned Reserve Table of Organization and Equipment personnel or for other purposes in direct support of the Air Force Reserve Training Center program. In no case was more than one Regular, or extended active duty Reserve, rated officer or airman to participate in a flight in a Reserve tactical type aircraft.[434]

433/ AFR 45-33, USAFRTCs, 3 Oct 49

434/ ConAC Ltr 51-1, Utilization of USAF Reserve Tactical Type Aircraft, 16 Dec 49

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Henceforth Reserve resources, particularly aircraft, were to be used to train Reservists. The provisions of the Air Force Regulation on Air Force Reserve Training Center functions placed the Training Centers in a somewhat different category from other Air Force establishments. The geographical distribution of Reservists required training Bases at places where it was not necessary or practicable to conduct normal Air Force activities.

The ability of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers to realize their potential utility was dependent not only on adequate facilities but also on the presence of sufficient full-time personnel. Fourteen Air Force Reserve Training Centers were located at leased facilities and three were at Air Force Bases where they were the only Air Force activity.[435] More personnel were required at these stations than at the six Training Centers situated at Regular Air Force installations where support functions were furnished by the parent base. It was originally calculated that 28 officers were needed by Air Force Reserve Training Centers at functioning Regular Air Force installations, while 36 officers were required to man Training Centers situated elsewhere. The two Centers charged

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435/ Godman Air Force Base, Kentucky, Marietta Air Force Base, Georgia, and Atterbury Air Force Base, Indiana, were the Bases at which Air Force Reserve Training Centers were the only Air Force Activity. (Hq, ConAC, Directory of Units and Installations, 1 Oct 49)

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with training two Reserve Wings, at Long Beach and at Chicago, each were estimated to need 45 officer spaces.[436] Based on this initial computation, the total officer requirement for the 23 Air Force Reserve Training Centers was 783. Tables of Distribution were published by Headquarters, Continental Air Command, for the Air Force Reserve Training Centers toward the end of 1949. These Tables reduced the officer requirements by 9.3%. The Tables of Distribution authorized a total strength of 710 officers[437] at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers.

Since no additional spaces were to be made available, it was necessary to man the Air Force Reserve Training Centers with officers already assigned to the Continental Air Command.[438] Seven hundred odd, properly qualified officers were not easy to find in a Command chronically short of trained personnel to staff its varied functions.[439]

436/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: OP 326, Subj: Troop Spaces for Air Reserve Program, To: Cgs, ConAC AFS, 26 May 49

437/ See Tables of Distribution for Air Force Reserve Training Centers in P&O files, Hq, ConAC. Most of the Tables were published in December 1949 although the last one was not issued until March 1950. (Captain P. M. Lamitola, Hq, ConAC, P&O, to Senior Historian, 11 Jul 50)

438/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: OP 326, Subj: Troop Spaces for Air Reserve Program, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 26 May 49

439/ See Volume IV, Personnel

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As the new Program opened, the Air Force Reserve Training Centers were slightly worse off personnel-wise than was the Command as a whole. At the end of July 1949, 95.9% of authorized officer spaces in the Continental Air Command were filled while the Training Centers were 91.7% manned. The Tenth Air Force Air Force Reserve Training Centers were the worst off in this regard, with 81.3% of their officer spaces occupied. At the same time, the Training Centers in the area of the Twelfth Air Force, which required approximately one fourth as many officers as did those in the Tenth, actually had one more than the necessary number of officers assigned.[440/]

Early in May, at the same time that the enabling documents on the Fiscal Year 1950 Reserve Program were released, Headquarters, United States Air Force, launched a program to man certain specified positions at the 23 proposed Air Force Reserve Training Centers with Reservists on extended active duty. These individuals were designated "Category R" personnel. They were to be recruited from the membership of the Reserve

---

440/ 1. Hq, ConAC, Office of Stat Svces, Personnel Strength Report, 31 July 49, Tables I & III
2. For a discussion of shortages of personnel at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers in March 1949, see Ltr, Hq, 1AF, File: 322, Subj: Shortage of Officer Personnel - Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 12 April 49, with 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, to Cg 1st AF, 24 May 49.
The officer manning level at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers was slightly better in July than it had been in March

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Table of Organization and Equipment units assigned to the Air Force Reserve Training Centers for training. Category R status involved a three-year tour of active duty with the understanding that, except in the event of emergency, the Reservist was not to be transferred to another assignment. Reserve officers chosen to man the Air Force Reserve Training Centers were preferably individuals well known and established in the local communities in which the training centers were located.[441] This policy was motivated by the desire to aid in the integration of the Training Centers with community activities. Keeping Category R Reservists in one assignment for three years promised a relative degree of stability for Air Force Reserve Training Center operations.[442]

All Reservists who accepted tours of extended active duty in the past had forfeited their Reserve Table of Organization and Equipment unit assignments. Category R personnel, however, retained Reserve Table of Organization status and attended all unit training sessions during their three year service. Although counted in the strength of the Table of

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441/ AFL 45-11, Manning of AFRTCs, 9 May 49. AFRTC positions to be filled with Category R personnel are listed in Attachment to this letter.
AFR 45-22, Voluntary Call to Extended Active Duty of Enlisted Personnel, 9 May 49

442/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Ltr, From Maj Gen Webster, To: Cg, ConAC, 21 Sept 49

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Organization and Equipment Reserve units in computing the attendance prerequisites for inactive duty training pay, they were not eligible to receive such pay.[443] Category R assignments were open to Reserve officers already on extended active duty. All requests for such assignment were submitted through the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, United States Air Force,[444] who undertook to determine whether the skills of each officer applicant were more needed by the Air Force in other than an Air Force Reserve Training Center position.[445]

The Air Force Letter which broached the Category R policy specified that Headquarters, United States Air Force, would provide authorization and quotas for the recall of officers to extended active duty to man the Training Centers. Congressional inaction on the United States Air Force Troop Program for Fiscal Year 1950 forced a delay. For planning purposes, pending a firm Congressional decision, Headquarters, United States Air Force, suggested an estimated recall rate of twenty

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443/ 1. Para 8, AFL 45-11, 9 May 49
2. AFR, 45-22, 9 May 49

444/ 1. TWX, AFPMP-8D 33746, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 14 Jul 49
2. AFL 45-11A, Manning of Air Force Reserve Training Centers, 20 Sept 49

445/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFPMP-1-L, Subj: Officer Manning of Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 17 Jun 49

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officers per month for Category R assignment.[446] By September it was understood that limitations on the Troop Program for 1950 would preclude any extensive recalls to active duty to staff the Air Force Reserve Training Centers. Officers for Air Force Reserve Training Center assignments were to be procured for the most part from Reservists already on active duty. In deference to the publications previously issued on the Category R program, it was planned to recall five officers for each Air Force Reserve Training Center.[447] This was a total of 115 officers to be recalled, or less than one sixth of the officer strength necessary to man the Air Force Reserve Training Centers.[448] The Commanding officers and Operations Officers of the Training Centers were specifically to be chosen from officers already on active duty.[449] Recall of Reservists to extended active duty was scheduled to begin in October and was to proceed at the rate of twenty officers per month.[450]

446/ Ibid.

447/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Officer Manning of Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 2 Sept 49

448/ Attachment to AFL 45-11, 9 May 49

449/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Officer Manning of AFRTCs, To: Cg, ConAC, 2 Sept 49

450/ 1. Ibid.
2. Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: Mil Pers-E-2 210, Subj: Officer Manning of AFRTCs, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 22 Sept 49

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Before this program began, however, it was realized that the recall quota of 115 officers would be insufficient to complete the manning requirements of the Training Centers. Accordingly, the quota was increased to 461 officers, to be recalled at the rate of 40 per month.[451] The number of positions at all the Air Force Reserve Training Centers which Headquarters, United States Air Force had opened to Category R personnel totalled just 461.[452] This quota did not constitute, however, an increase in officer authorizations for the Continental Air Command Air Forces. It did mean that assigned strength within each Air Force might be increased by the recall method up to the authorized strength. If assigned officers in an Air Force were already at the authorized level, recalls could only have been made at the expense of transferring individuals already assigned to some other activity within the Continental Air Command. The Category R Program made possible an increase in assigned, not authorized, strength.[453]

451/ 1. Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Officer Manning of AFRTCs, To: Cg, ConAC, 23 Sept 49
2. TWX AF ConAC 26042, Hq, ConAC, To: Cgs, ConAC, AFs, 28 Sept 49

452/ Incl to AFL 45-11, 9 May 49

453/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: Mil Pers-E-2 210, Subj: Officer Manning of AFRTCs, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 3 Oct 49

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In the early stages of the Category R program, at least one Air Force experienced difficulty in meeting Air Force Reserve Training Center officer personnel requirements from that source. Normal attrition brought about by overseas shipments, school assignments and other causes constantly created vacancies within Air Force Reserve Training Centers. It was impossible to wait for Category R Reservists to fill these vacancies without disrupting the training program. In addition, there were a number of key positions at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers that the Air Force Letter on the subject did not provide would be filled by Category R personnel.[454] At the recommendation of Headquarters, Continental Air Command, Headquarters, United States Air Force, agreed to entertain requisitions for Regular officers to fill other than Category R vacancies at Air Force Reserve Training Centers.[455]

As a result of the Category R Program and other measures taken during the first six months of Fiscal Year 1950, at the end of December 1949, 99.2% of officer spaces at Air Force

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454/ 1st Ind, Hq, 10AF, To: Cg, ConAC, 7 Nov 49 to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Revised Request for Officer Personnel, To: Cg, 10AF, 13 Oct 49

455/ 2d Ind, File: Mil Pers-3-E 210, Hq, ConAC, To: Dir of Mil Pers, Hq, USAF, 21 Nov 49 and 3rd Ind, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 14 Dec 49 to ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Revised Request for Officer Personnel, To: Cg, 10AF, 13 Oct 49

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Reserve Training Centers were filled. This compared favorably with Command-wide officer assignments, that were 97.0% of authorized strength. Four of the Air Forces were actually slightly overstrength in Training Center officer personnel.[456] The recall provisions of the Category R Program were certainly partially responsible for the quantitative achievements made in manning the Air Force Reserve Training Centers. They also contributed to raising the level of assigned strength in the Command as a whole.

The Category R Program meant that Reservists in Air Force Reserve Training Center units would henceforth be administered and trained by a good many other Reservists. Like the distinction made between the functions of the Training Centers and Regular Air Force Bases, the Category R principle placed the Air Force Reserve Training Centers in a special category. It marked a significant difference between the Air Force Reserve Training Program and other sections of the Organized Reserve. Members of Corollary units and Mobilization Assignees received their training from the staffs of Regular units, including of course, some Reservists on extended active duty.

In addition to filling staff positions at Air Force Reserve Training Centers, Reserve personnel on tours of active

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456/ Hq, ConAC, Office of Stat Svces, Personnel Strength Report, 31 Dec 49, Tables I and III

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duty aided Reserve Wing Commanders to administer their units in 1949. Commanders of units in the Reserve Wings were authorized administrative function pay supposedly to compensate them for the performance of administrative duties in connection with their Wings. They were often prevented from devoting sufficient time to the task by the dictates of civilian occupations. As a result, the status of administration in the Reserve Wings left something to be desired. This matter was discussed with the Reserve Wing and Air Force Reserve Training Center Commanders at a convention of the Air Reserve Association, held at Long Beach, California, 12-15 October 1949. One possibility discussed at the Convention was to assign Category R personnel, on a full time basis, directly to the Reserve Wing Commanders to perform administrative chores. This solution was rejected by General Whitehead's staff. Category R people were already filling a necessary function at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers. They could not be spared to the Wing Commanders for administration when they were needed to conduct training. Headquarters, Continental Air Command, recommended, however, that other Reservists be recalled for short tours of duty, one to three years in duration, to be solely responsible to the Wing Commanders for administrative duties on a full time basis.[457]

457/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: DO 326, Subj: Admin Pers for USAFR T/O&E Units, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 9 Dec 49

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The proposition was accepted by higher headquarters with certain modifications. Headquarters, United States Air Force, assented to spending $300,000 of Reserve active duty funds to recall non-rated Reserve officers to tours of duty not exceeding ninety days in duration. Ostensibly, this was allowed in order to provide intensive training in organizational administration for individuals recalled.[458] Actually, it represented utilization of Reserve training funds to accomplish administrative ends.

Military and civilian personnel administration at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers was complicated by the fact that the greater part of Reserve training occured on week-ends, normally days of rest in the work week. This necessitated operating the Training Centers full blast on Saturdays and Sundays, and on reduced scale for two days during the week.[459] An uncomfortable situation arose where Air Force Reserve Training Centers were located at bases of other major Commands. For example, the peak training load for the Ninth Air Force's 2240th Air Force Reserve Training Center, as elsewhere, occured on Saturdays and Sundays. The Air Materiel Command Air Base Unit

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458/ 1. Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Administrative Assistants for Reserve Wing Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 12 Dec 49
2. Ltr, Genl McConnell to Genl Whitehead, 12 Dec 49

459/ See Hq, ConAC, Diary, 30 Sept and 29 Nov, for days of reduced operation during the week at the various Air Force Reserve Training Centers

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at Cleveland Municipal Airport, however, did not work on week-ends.[460] The result was detrimental to the training of Reservists.

The question might have been resolved if a directive had come from the Pentagon requiring the various major Commands to render support for week-end Reserve training.[461] Headquarters, United States Air Force, was unwilling to issue such a directive, however, without additional information. Perhaps there was no desire in Washington to disturb the major Commands, then in the process of wrestling with Corollary unit training. In the meanwhile, it was discreetly suggested that careful advance planning during the week might obviate the necessity for extensive Base support on week-ends. Higher Headquarters also pointed out that the basis on which the Air Force Reserve Training Center at Cleveland was organized presumably made it relatively self-sufficient despite Air Materiel Command jurisdiction of the Base.[462]

As a matter of fact, negotiations for transfer of

460/ TWX 9AFA0527, Hq, 9AF, To: Cg, ConAC, 10 Aug 49

461/ 1. IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col George S Brown, Asst DO, To: O&T, Subj: Support of Reserve Tng, 10 Aug 49
2. Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T, Subj: Support of AF Reserve Tng, To: Spec Asst to Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 15 Aug 49

462/ 1st Ind, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 19 Sept 49 to ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T, Subj: Support of AF Reserve Tng, To: Spec Asst to Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 15 Aug 49

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jurisdiction of the Air Force facilities at Cleveland from the Air Materiel Command to the Continental Air Command were in progress in the summer of 1949. Elsewhere, difficulties involving week-end support to Air Force Reserve Training Centers occupying facilities in a tenant status at Regular Air Force bases were resolved locally.[463]

III

The new Program was hardly launched when Headquarters, United States Air Force, proposed to convert three of the Reserve Wings to different types of aircraft. It was suggested that the Wing at Reading, Pennsylvania, originally scheduled for the better facilities at Philadelphia, be changed from light bombardment to troop carrier aircraft while the Wing at Atterbury Air Force Base, Indiana, shift from troop carrier to light bombardment types. Furthermore, the Wing at Fairfax Field, Kansas, was to be equipped with C-47's rather than C-46's as originally planned.[464] The projected changes did not alter the number of troop carrier and light bombardment Wings.

463/ 2d Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, no date /mid Sept 49/ to: ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T, Subj: Support of AF Reserve Trng, To: Spec Asst to Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 15 Aug 49

464/ TWX AF CONACC 17040, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 10 AF, 11 Jul 49

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Headquarters, Continental Air Command, concurred in these plans.[465] A different stand was taken by Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, whose area of responsibility included Atterbury Air Force Base. The proposed move, Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, made haste to point out in a priority TWX, would result in "an abnormal amount of confusion, and extreme expense to the government". Furthermore, morale would be lowered and an additional burden would be placed on the Air Force and its Training Centers which they were not then prepared to meet. Neither the Air Force Reserve Training Center at Atterbury nor the Tenth Air Force Regular units were experienced with light bombardment types. In fact, there were no Regular Air Force light bombers in the Tenth Air Force at the time. All training directives, personnel requisitions, and assignments had been based on troop carrier operations. The Atterbury Air Force Reserve Training Center was equipped with training aids, supplies, equipment and parachutes for troop carrier aircraft. A shift to light bombers would require full transition of rated and ground crew personnel, both Regular and Reserve. Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, suggested that the B-26's at Reading be transferred to a station in an Air Force which was using that type of aircraft and that the C-46's at Fairfax

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465/ TWX AF CONACC 17040, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 10AF, 11 Jul 49

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Field, Kansas, be moved to Atterbury in exchange for the C-47's then at that Base.[466]

These suggestions were accepted by Headquarters, United States Air Force. Designation of the Wing to receive the light bombers transferred from Reading was postponed until the location of the 23rd Air Force Reserve Training Center was determined.[467] Subsequently, the 512th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium, was activated at Reading Municipal Airport,[468] and the 514th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium, was shifted from the 2587th Air Force Reserve Training Center at Birmingham, Alabama, to the newly established Training Center at Mitchel Air Force Base. The 319th Bombardment Wing, Light, formerly at Reading, was moved to the Birmingham Air Force Training Center[469] where it could train with the Tactical air units and the Army Field forces concentrated

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466/ TWX, Hq, 10AF, To: Cg, ConAC, 13 Jul 49
It may be noted, in reference to these objections to the proposed shift, that Major General Paul L. Williams, the Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, was an old Troop Carrier man.
(Hq, 10AF, Hist Directorate, History of the 10AF, 1 Dec 48 - 30 Jun 49, preface)

467/ 1. TWX AFCRT 86714, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 21 Jul 49
2. TWX AFCONAC 2046, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 9AF, 9 Aug 49

468/ Hq, ConAC, Diary 19 Aug 49

469/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Activation of AFRTC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 31 Aug 49

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in that area.[470]

The aircraft requirement for the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program was estimated in June 1949 to be 1203, of which just over 400 were tactical types.[471] At the end of that month, 244 troop carrier and light bombardment aircraft had been delivered. Eighty-two of these were B-26's. This was two over the quota necessary to equip one Squadron in each of the five light bombardment Wings, although inequities in distribution gave two Wings more planes than were necessary and one Wing several less. There were too few C-47's, however, and the Wings which were to use C-46's, were considerably short. In the months thereafter, the picture changed considerably. Troop carrier aircraft became available in increasing numbers. By the end of October, there were 87 more troop carrier aircraft at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers than there

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470/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: 322, Subj: Activation of the Hq and Hq Sq 319 Bomb Wing Light and other AFRTC Units; Transfer of the Hq and Hq sq 514 Troop Carrier Wing Medium and other AFRTC Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 20 Sept 49, with 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 14 AF, 4 Oct 49

471/ CONFIDENTIAL,
Inc 1 to Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: USAF Reserve Aircraft and Flying Hour Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 27 Jun 49

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had been three months before, and, at the end of December 1949, an additional 69 had been received. At that time, 91 B-26's 276 C46's, and 42 C-47's were available for use by the Reserve Wings, a total of 409 tactical type aircraft.[472] This was nine more than the planned requirement for equipping one squadron in each of the twenty-five Reserve Wings. Moreover, action had been taken to acquire sixty additional C-46's before June 1950 as they became excess to the needs of the Far Eastern Air Force.[473]

These tactical aircraft, so welcome to trainer-stale Reservists, could be utilized effectively over any period of time only if they were supported by adequate maintainance, which was in turn dependent upon availability of spare parts. The situation at the end of Fiscal Year 1949 was not one to breed optimism. At that time, one Air Force reported that approximately 75% of the stock replenishment requisitions for Reserve units on all classes of property were being returned with the notation that the material was available in the first three priorities only. The result was that normal stock levels were fast dissipated, the rate of aircraft out of commission

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472/ Aircraft statistics from Headquarters, Continental Air Command, Stat Svces, Aircraft and Flying Time Report, June to December 1949

473/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Revised USAF Reserve Aircraft and Pilot Hour Program FY 1951, To: Cg, ConAC, 2 Dec 49

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for parts increased, and the Reserve units were existing on a day to day basis for spare parts.[474]

The establishment of the new Program alleviated this condition in some degree through consolidation of the resources of the inactivated Reserve units and discontinued Air Force Reserve Training Centers at locations where Reserve activity was to continue. This process offered little supply aid, however, to the tactical type aircraft which had had small place in the old Program. No stock of spare parts for the newly incorporated aircraft existed at the discontinued Air Force Reserve Training Centers.

To meet this situation, the Air Materiel Command set about procuring a quantity of aircraft and engine spares and accessories, ground handling equipment, and training aids. Headquarters, Continental Air Command, strove to establish adequate stock levels and to arrange automatic shipment of spares for B-26, C-46, and C-47 aircraft.[475] Although Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, refused to authorize S-3 priority action on supply requisitions in support of Air Reserve active duty encampments, the success of which was prejudiced by the critical shortage of spares for troop carrier and light bombardment types, it did agree to supply "maximum" support,

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474/ Ltr, Hq, IAF, File: MS 400, Subj: Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 11 May 49

475/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, IAF, 17 May 49, to ltr, Hq, IAF, File: MS 400, Subj: Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units, To, Cg, ConAC, 11 May 49

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whatever that signified.[476]

By the end of June, it was possible for Headquarters, Continental Air Command, to advise the Air Forces that an initial level of aircraft spares for C-47's and C-46's, with the exception of C-46 airframe items, was being shipped automatically by the Air Materiel Command to each Air Force Reserve Training Center equipped with that type of aircraft. It was then hoped that C-46 airframes would be available by requisition after 1 July 1949. The situation with regard to B-26 spares remained uncertain as contractors were not scheduled to start delivery until the end of August.[477]

Furnishing C-46's and C-47's with troop seats, safety belts and tie-down rings to permit the transport of personnel and equipment presented a further problem. Although action was taken by the Air Materiel Command in September to install such equipment on aircraft being out-processed from storage, it was necessary for the Air Force Reserve Training Centers to perform that function for sizable numbers of aircraft already delivered.[478]

By mid-September 1949 supply support for T-6's, T-7's and

476/ Air Mail Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Air Force Reserve Field Training Requirements, Summer 1949, To: Cg, 12AF, no date /about 1 June 49/

477/ Hq, ConAC, Diary, 23 Jun 49

478/ Hq, USAF, Tig Brief, Vol I, No 62, page 4, 31 Aug 49

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and T-11's in the Reserve Program was characterized as adequate. The same was true for support received from the Air Materiel Command for the three Reserve Wings equipped with C-47's. It was not the case, however, with either the 17 C-46 equipped Wings, or the B-26 Wings, only four of which had then been activated. Although air frame spares for the C-46's had been promised for July, sufficient items were not available by mid-September for establishment of adequate stock levels. Action in transferring air frame spares from Regular Air Force to Air Reserve stock was slow because of the time required to determine the Regular Air Force requirement for each item before the transfer was made. In addition, many of the transferred items were in need of repair before they could be used at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers.[479] Sufficient engines for the C-46's were reported by Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, to be in stock to cover replacement requirements through June 1951.[480]

At the beginning of November 1949, the situation with regard to all C-46 spare parts seemed about to take a turn for the better. Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, anticipated at that time that adequate stock levels of spares for C-46's

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479/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: MAS 400, Subj: Supply Support of Air Reserve and ANG Units, To: Dir for Maint, Supply and Svces, Hq, USAF, 15 Sept 49

480/ Hq, ConAC, Diary, 20 Sept 49

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would be established at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers within six months. Quantity deliveries were expected from contractors after the first of the new year. Furthermore, all C-46 items excess to Air Force requirements had been transferred for Reserve use with the prospect that additional quantities would be available in the future.[481]

Supply support for the B-26's, however, continued to be poor. It was necessary to order these spares from contractors. Since the contractors had to retool for many of the needed items, alleviation of the B-26 spare shortage was not expected before the end of June 1950.[482]

As 1949 came to a close, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, questioned the advisability of continuing training for Reservists on B-26's in five light bombardment Wings. It was necessary to let contracts which required scarce Air Reserve funds in order to procure spare parts for the light bombers. The maintainance of B-26's was more difficult and more costly than for troop carrier aircraft. In addition, B-26 training involved bombs and bombing and gunnery ranges, not necessary for the other types of aircraft used by Reservists. Furthermore, while the aircrew of a B-26 comprised a pilot, a navigator and

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481/ 2nd Ind, Hq, AMC to Dir MS&S, Hq, USAF, 3 Nov 49

482/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: M&S 400, Subj: Supply Support of Air Reserve and ANG Units, To: Dir for MS&S, Hq, USAF, 15 Sept 49

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an enlisted flight maintahnancegunner, two additional Reservists, a co-pilot and a radioman, could train in the troop carrier types.[483] It was also probable that the exigencies of Mobilization Day would witness a greater demand for troop carrier than for light bombardment aviation. The place of light bombers might very well be nil on that fateful day and for some time thereafter while air transport would almost certainly be in heavy demand.[484]

For this variety of reasons, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, recommended that three of the five light bombardment Wings be replaced with troop carrier units. It was suggested that this shift be accomplished in the Wings at Birmingham, Alabama, Marietta Air Force Base, Georgia, and Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.[485] Only the two light bombardment Wings operating at Long Beach, California, were to be retained.[486] Because Air Force requirements for the Air Reserve and the Air National Guard were under study at the Pentagon at the time this recommendation was submitted, Headquarters, United States

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483/ Major Frederick A Campbell, Jr, Hq, ConAC PO&R, To: Senior Historian, 14 Jun 50

484/ Major George S Weart, Hq, ConAC, PO&R, to Senior Historian, 14 Jun 50

485/ SECRET Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: POAR 326, Subj: Revision of the AFRTC Program, To: C/S, Hq, USAF, 18 Dec 49

486/ SECRET Hq, ConAC, Diary, 19 Dec 49

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Air Force, put off consideration of the proposal for the future.[487/]

487/ SECRET 1st Ind, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 16 Jan 50 to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: PO&R 326, Subject: Revision of the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program, 18 Dec 49, To: C/S, USAF

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Chapter Eleven

THE AIR FORCE RESERVE TRAINING CENTER PROGRAM: PAY, PARTICIPATION AND PREPAREDNESS

I

Twenty-four Air Reserve Wings at 22 Air Force Reserve Training Centers had been activated as the new Fiscal Year opened although, as has been seen, changes in their locations occurred subsequently.[488] Organization of the twenty-third Training Center at Mitchel Air Force Base and activation of the 514th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium, brought the number of Reserve Wings in existence to the planned 25.

The assimilation of finance and disbursing functions by the Comptroller section at Wing Headquarters in Regular units[489] was reflected in the Reserve Wing structure as well. In October, instructions were issued to inactivate Reserve Finance and Disbursing units.[490] This change left 12 component units in each of the twenty-five Reserve Wings, and reduced the planned total of units in the Air Force Reserve Training

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488/ See page 170 above

489/ 1. IRS, Hq, ConAC, Brig Gen R C Candee, Compt to DP, Subj: Organization of Wing Comptroller, 7 Oct 49
2. Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: 322, Subj: Reorganization of Hq and Hq Sq, 4th Ftr Wg and other AF units; inactivation of Certain AF units, To: Cg, ConAC, 4 Oct 49

490/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: 322, Subj: Reorganization Hq and Hq Sq 63 Troop Carrier Wing, Med and certain AFRTC units, inactivation of the 63d Finance Disb Unit, Tr Carr Med, and other AFRTC units, To: Cg, ConAC, 3 Oct 49

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Center Program to 300. This total was reached in November when Medical Groups were added to the two Reserve Wings in the Twelfth Air Force area.[491/]

It was easy to establish the 300 units on paper. Manning them with officers and airmen of the necessary grades and specialties was another matter. Officer manning had not been troublesome in the old Program. The location of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers near centers of heavy population in the revised Program made it even easier to fill unit vacancies with officers. By the end of July, one month after the new Program was officially inaugurated, assigned officer strength was 95.4% of that authorized for the twenty-four Wings then activated.[492/] The percentage of authorized officer strength assigned fluctuated within narrow limits thereafter. At the end of December 1949, assigned officers comprised 88.9% of authorized strength.[493/] High officer interest in the program soon precluded the assignment of applicants except those falling in the highly specialized or critical Military Occupational Specialty categories. A scarcity of applicants was noticeable

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491/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, The AFRTC Program, Unit Designation, Location and Strength, Oct, Nov, Dec 49

492/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, Strength of USAF Reserve Program, 31 July 49

493/ Ibid., August-December, 49

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only in the medical field, and to a lesser extent, in a few other specialties.[494]

If the planners of the new Program hoped that the relocation of Air Force Reserve Training Centers and units and the opportunity for inactive duty pay would solve the old problem of airmen participation, they were disappointed. At the end of the first month's operation, slightly more than one third as many airmen had been assigned as had officers. This was in spite of the fact that there were almost three times as many positions authorized for airmen as there were for their commissioned comrades-in-arms in the Reserve Wings.[495] Airmen participation increased slowly as the months went by. At the end of September, 7645 airmen had been assigned. This was 30.4% of then authorized airmen strength. Three months later, 12,429 airmen had been assigned to units of the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program, or 47.0% of authorized strength.[496]

494/ 1. 1st Ind, Hq, 4AF, To: Cg, ConAC, File: Mil Pers-2-2 326, Subj: Reserve Program, no date /Oct 49/
2. Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, The AFRTC Program, Unit Designation, Location and Strength, July-Dec 49
3. TWX AF1 AFRR 1022, Hq, 1AF, To: Cg, ConAC, 23 Jun 49

495/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, Strength of USAF Reserve Program, 31 July 49. At the end of July there were 9013 officers and 3850 airmen assigned to Air Force Reserve Training Center units. At the same time there were authorized positions for 9446 officers and 24365 airmen.

496/ Ibid, 31 Oct and 31 Dec 49

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In light of the experience of the past, it should not have been surprising that airmen were not as easily drawn to Reserve activities as were officers. Officer status was itself an attraction.[497] One factor which diminished the appeal of Reserve training was the limitation on the number of periods of inactive duty training for pay in which unit members might participate. This applied to officers and airmen alike, but it was perhaps more important in its effect on airmen because officers received other intangible compensation.

Under the terms of Public Law 460 of the 80th Congress, which authorized inactive duty pay, "fully organized" units were entitled to receive pay for the same number of unit training assemblies as was the National Guard. Units not fully organized might only be paid for participating in half that number of periods.[498] The Air Force Regulation, which applied the inactive duty pay opportunity to the Fiscal Year 1950 organizational structure, specified that Class A units, designated by Headquarters, United States Air Force, for prompt mobilization on Mobilization-Day, would be authorized a maximum of 48 training assemblies in each fiscal year. Applying the 50% provision of Public Law 460, the Regulation

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497/ See page 19 above

498/ See 4, Public Law 460 - 80th Congress, 25 Mar 48 in joint Army and Air Force Bulletin No. 9, 5 Apr 48

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stipulated that all other units, including Class A units not designated for prompt mobilization, might receive pay for only 24 inactive duty training sessions per fiscal year.[499] Prerequisite to Class A status in the Fiscal Year 1950 Air Force Reserve Training Center Program was an assigned minimum of 80% of officer strength and 80% of airmen strength under the appropriate Table of Organization and Equipment.[500]

Taken together, these provisions meant that some units of a Reserve Wing, having been more successfully manned, might be authorized 48 inactive duty training sessions for pay while other units were eligible for only one half of that number. Moreover, it was possible under the terms of the Air Force Regulation for this disparity of opportunity to exist between two units which had progressed in manning at an equal degree, only one of which, however, had been designated by Headquarters, United States Air Force, for prompt mobilization. In practice, Headquarters, United States Air Force designated all units for prompt mobilization when they were certified to have reached Class "A" status. But this still meant that administrative action in the Pentagon was required before Reservists assigned

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499/ Para 5, AFR 45-10, Subj: AFR Inactive Duty Training Pay and Allowances, 22 Mar 49

500/ Incl #3 to Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: The AFRTC Program, USAF Reserve, Fiscal Year 1950, To: Cg, ConAC, 6 May 49

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to fully manned Air Force Reserve Training Center units were eligible to receive pay for 48 training assemblies, a time consuming process.[501]

The members of a Reserve unit attending a weekend of training were paid for two four-hour training sessions each day. They received four full days pay for 16 hours of training. A Captain, for example, returned home on Sunday night with a comfortable knowledge that he had earned $33.72 since Saturday morning. A Sergeant earned $14.64 over the same period.[502] It was noted that although airmen were willing to join units in order to participate in a full weekend of training and receive pay for four training sessions, training on one day in two pay periods often did not offer sufficient allure.[503]

This gave rise to a puzzling dilemma for which the solution was difficult to find. Airmen participation was necessary to fill enough positions to qualify units for Class "A" status and be designated subsequently for prompt mobilization. Only Class "A" status and prompt mobilization designation would make unit members eligible for 48 pay periods per year.

501/ Capt Charles N Stewart, Hq, ConAC, Unit Control Branch, to Senior Historian, 8 Jul 50

502/ Pay figures from TM-14-509A, Army Pay Tables, Sept 46. Six years service is assumed in each case.

503/ Memorandum for Genl McConnell, from: Brig Genl Thomas C Hardin, Chief AR Division, Hq, USAF, 16 Sept 49

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But airmen were not attracted to join units in sufficient numbers to reach Class "A" when they could only train for pay in 24 sessions per year. The prospect that the unit might reach more favored status in the future was not a strong enough allure. This was particularly so because full manning did not automatically mean designation by Headquarters, United States Air Force, for prompt mobilization.

It was true, of course, that the 24 training period restriction on partially organized units did serve as an incentive for individuals who were already members to recruit additions to their ranks. In fact, one officer within Headquarters, Continental Air Command, voiced the opinion that if this incentive were removed it ought to be replaced by some other to insure that constant effort was directed toward attaining and maintaining desired strength.[504]

II

There was another serious implication inherent in the provisions of the inactive duty pay bill and its promulgating Regulation. The ability of the Reserve Wings to conduct a coordinated training program was affected. Training each of the four tactical Squadrons of the Reserve Wings with appropriate

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504/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Dolf S Muehleisen, C&T, To: DP, no date /mid Oct 48/

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supporting elements of the Base Wing organization on one complete week-end each month had proved a valuable method of achieving realistic and effective training. On such a week-end, two days of active duty might be approximated. One week-end training period each month comprising four training sessions, totaled 48 sessions per year, the maximum number, for which all units were not entitled to receive pay.[505] This disparity among the units within a Wing constituted what Headquarters, United States Air Force, termed a "serious hazard" to the successful prosecution of the Reserve Training program.[506] It was conceivable that units restricted to 24 paid training periods would fall further and further behind the 48 period units and be unable to participate on an equal basis when advance training required Wing maneuvers.[507]

In order to remedy the undesirable results of the difference in eligibility for training pay, the office of the Assistant for Reserve Forces in Headquarters, United States Air Force, recommended, within that headquarters, that all units of the Organized Air Reserve be permitted 48 training

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505/ Memorandum for Brig Genl Jack W Wood, Director of Budget, Hq, USAF, from Col C W Schott, Deputy Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 9 August 49

506/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-1 246, Subj: Uniform Annual Trng Periods for Units of the Organized Air Reserve, To: Cg, ConAC, 11 Oct 49

507/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Dolph E Muehleisen, Dir O&T, To: DF, no date [Oct 49]

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periods for pay annually. No attempt was made to estimate what this might mean in dollars and cents to the Air Reserve budget. However, inactive duty funds had not been expanded as quickly as anticipated because of the retarded rate at which airmen had been brought to participate in the program. It was believed that existing funds would be equal to the additional strain involved in a change of limitations. It would always be possible, in case a shortage of inactive duty pay funds developed, to make an adjustment in the latter part of the fiscal year and reduce the number of training periods for all units.[508]

The Director of the Budget within Headquarters, United States Air Force, did not look kindly on this suggestion. In the initial presentation and subsequent defense of Public Law 460 and Budget Estimates for inactive duty pay before Congress and the Bureau of the Budget, the Air Force had stated its position strongly. At that time an outline was presented of projected Air Force policy on the manning levels which would be required before a unit might be classed as fully organized and designated for prompt mobilization with concomitant eligibility for 48 annual inactive duty training periods for pay. The intent of Congress with respect to inactive duty pay might

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508/ Memorandum for Brig Genl Wood, from Col Schott, 9 Aug 1949

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be circumvented if full pay were authorized all personnel without regard to unit strength. The Director of the Budget, Headquarters, United States Air Force, reaffirmed the incentive value derived from manning prerequisites to eligibility for the maximum number of pay periods. Furthermore, after examining the typesof units included in the Air Force Reserve Training Center program, the Director of the Budget was inclined to minimize the manning problem. Only the tactical and maintainance squadrons required more than 100 individuals, he pointed out, while the remaining units had positions for 7 to 53 Reservists only.[509]

The Reserve Division at Headquarters, United States Air Force, took issue with this view. Supported by an opinion of the Judge Advocate General, it disagreed that it would circumvent the intent of Congress to allow all units to qualify for 48 pay periods per year. This stand was premised on the anticipation that every unit in the Organized Reserve was eventually to be fully manned. Fully organized units, according to Public Law 460, the inactive duty pay bill, were entitled to train on the same minimum basis as prescribed for the National Guard, that is, in 48 training sessions annually. Hence, according to the argument of the Reserve Division, all

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509/ Memo for Col C W Schott, from Col J S Hoover, Office of Director of Budget, 9 Sept 49

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Air Force Reserve Training Center units might be legally authorized 48 paid drills per year.[510] This reasoning would seem to involve declaring all units eligible for 48 training sessions for pay on the grounds that they eventually would be fully organized.

At any rate, early in October, Headquarters, United States Air Force, signified its intent to move further for permission to authorize all Reserve units 48 paid training periods annually regardless of their state of organization.[511] This proposal was discussed by the Continental Air Command Air Force Commanders and staff officers from Headquarters, Continental Air Command, at Long Beach, California, on 15 October. At that meeting, General Whitehead assented to lifting the restrictions on the number of paid training assemblies authorized for units that were partially manned.[512] Headquarters, Continental Air Command, officially concurred in the proposal, however, only with the proviso that adequate funds and logistic support to permit

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510/ Memorandum for General McConnell, from Brig Genl Thomas O Hardin, Chief, AF Reserve Division, Hq, USAF, 16 Sept 49. This memorandum also reaffirmed belief that providing 48 days pay to members of Reserve units would materially assist in reaching a satisfactory degree of manning.

511/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-1246, Subj: Uniform Annual Training Periods for Units of the Organized Air Reserve, To: Cg, ConAC, 11 Oct 49

512/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Landon, DP, To: DRF, 21 Oct 49

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training on an expanded scale be provided.[513]

Permission from higher authority was necessary in order to cancel the limitations on unit training assemblies for pay. It was possible for Headquarters, United States Air Force, itself to take one step to clarify the situation. Headquarters, United States Air Force, signified its intention to designate any unit for prompt mobilization on the date that it was reported Class A status had been achieved, except in the last month of each quarter. Units reaching Class A status during the last month of a quarter were to be designated for prompt mobilization on the first day of the subsequent quarter.[514] Actually this only gave official expression to what had been established in practice. The existing requirements for Class "A" status remained.[515] Thus a manning level of 80% assigned

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513/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, to Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 9 Nov 49 to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF 1246, Subj: Uniform Annual Training Periods for Units of the Organized Air Reserve, To: Cg ConAC 11 Oct 49

514/ 1. 2nd Ind, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 12 Dec 49 to Ltr, Hq, 10AF, Subj: Designation for Prompt Mobilization of T/O&E Reserve Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 17 Nov 49
2. For a recommendation by the Commanding Officer of an Air Force Reserve Training Center that units be designated for prompt mobilization at the time they were upgraded to Class "A" see 1st Ind, Hq, 2347 AFRTC, To: Cg, 4AF, 2 Oct 49

515/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 1AF, 30 Dec 49 to Ltr, Hq, 1AF, File: OP 326, Subj: Recommendations for Designation for Prompt Mobilization, To: Cg, ConAC, 27 Dec 49

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officers and 80% assigned airmen was still necessary for eligibility for the maximum number of training periods for pay.[516]

It was not easy to provide meaningful unit training even for units which were fully organized and eligible for a week-end of training, composed of four assemblies, each month. Each Wing had four tactical Squadrons, plus nine, different Command and Support units.[517] Headquarters, United States Air Force believed it desirable for elements of all Wing Command and Support units to train with each tactical Squadron undergoing a week-end of training. It was suggested that each unit in the Reserve Wings, with the exception of the tactical Squadrons, be divided into teams. The tactical Squadrons might then benefit by the presence of teams representing each Command and Support unit in training periods. The teams were to be considered units themselves for the purposes of computing attendance requirements for inactive duty training pay. The number of pay periods for which each team was eligible was dependent on the number authorized for the unit from which the team

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516/ 1. TWX AFConAC P&O 23649, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 1AF, no date [late December 49]
2. Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: PC&R 326, Subj: The Air Force Reserve Training Center Program, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 16 Dec 49

517/ Inactivation of the Finance and Disbursing Units in October reduced the number of Command and Support elements to eight. See page 179 above.

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was organized.[518]

Although this plan was transmitted to the Continental Air Command Air Forces, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, was not enthusiastic about it. The benefits to be derived from the team, or "split assembly", method were not felt to be as great as those offered by full unit training. Although each tactical Squadron would undoubtedly profit by training with representatives of all the various Support units, the Support units themselves would not have the opportunity to train as complete units. Headquarters, Continental Air Command, suggested that the Command and Support elements of the Reserve Wings drill as full units on a rotating schedule. Of the nine Support units, three could train the first week-end of the month. It would then be possible to schedule the other six units in increments of two each during succeeding week-ends. By rotating the schedule monthly, each Command and Support unit of the Wing, would over a period of time, train with each of the four tactical Squadrons.[519] In mid-December the Continental Air Command Air Forces were directed to discourage the split assembly training in favor of this

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518/ TWX AFCRF-1, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 30 Aug 49

519/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 9AF, 7 Oct 49 to Ltr, Hq, 9AF, File: P&O 326, Subj: The AFRTC Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 24 Aug 49

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rotating plan.[520]

III

Unit training for Reserve Table of Organization and Equipment Wings began slowly because the unit training directives, preparation of which was begun in December 1948, were not available until nearly half of Fiscal Year 1950 had passed. These directives were written by a special group of officers working at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, under the supervision of the Deputy for Operations. Representatives of Regular units, as well as Reservists, assisted in the task.[521] Writing of the directives was completed and delivery was made to the Continental Air Command printing plant at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, in June 1949. Printing was not finished until some six months later and assembly of the material in book form was in progress in November.[522] The Air Force Reserve Training Centers did not actually have the directives in their hands until the

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520/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: PO&R 326, Subj: The AFRTC Program, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 16 Dec 49

521/ Major William T. Douthwaite, Hq, ConAC, O&T, To: Senior Historian, 19 Jun 50. Major Douthwaite was one of the officers who participated in the preparation of the Training Directives.

522/ Ltr, Genl Whitehead, To: Maj Genl Glenn O Barcus, Cg, 1AF, 2 Dec 49

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end of the year.[523]

The training directives contained a phased three year training program for each of the various kinds of units in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Wings. Four different types of training were outlined in the directives. Each year the Reservists were to receive 37 hours of general military training. Combat crew personnel were to participate in 48 hours of ground and 90 hours of flying training annually. Reservists in Support units were scheduled for 48 hours of sectional classroom instruction and 90 hours of ground operational (on the job) training.[524] This training program was predicated on 48 inactive duty training sessions plus a fifteen-day tour of active duty each year. It was possible that a unit which had not been designated for prompt mobilization, and was therefore not eligible for the maximum number of inactive duty training assemblies, would fail to complete the program in the prescribed three years.[525]

Each unit of the twenty-five Reserve Wings was to maintain records of training accomplished. Quarterly reports

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523/ Lt Col Harold G Lund, Hq, ConAC, O&T, To: Senior Historian, 19 Jun 50

524/ See, Hq, ConAC, Training Directives for Reserve T/O&E Units of 20 Series, October 1949

525/ See page 186 above.

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showing the percentage of training completed were required to be forwarded to Headquarters, Continental Air Command.[526] The quarterly reports were to provide a statistical yardstick with which to measure the training progress of each unit. They were quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. A method was still to be devised which would offer systematic indication of the qualitative character of Air Force Reserve Training Center unit training.[527]

In order to provide a guide on which to proceed until the Directives were distributed, a general outline of their contents was distributed in July 1949. The detailed direction of training in the first six months of Fiscal Year 1950 was largely left to the Wing and Air Force Reserve Training Center Commanders.[528] When the Directives were issued, six months after the new Program had been launched, credit was allowed, at the discretion of unit commanders, for training which had been accomplished up to that time.[529]

The organization of the Statistical training reports

526/ The first of the Quarterly Reports of Training were not submitted until the end of the third quarter, Fiscal Year 1950.

527/ Lt Col Harold G Lund, Hq, ConAC, O&T, To: Senior Historian, 19 June 1950

528/ Maj Edward H MacNeill, Hq, ConAC, O&T, to Senior Historian, 9 June 1950

529/ Maj William T Douthwaite, To: Senior Historian,19 Jun 50

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prepared by the Office of Statistical Services at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, lagged behind the inception of the Fiscal Year 1950 organizational plan. Separate statistics for active and inactive duty training accomplished in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program were not prepared until October 1949. It is probable that the larger part of all the Reservists who trained on short tours of active duty in the months before October, however, were members of Air Force Reserve Training Center units.[530] Probably more than 700 Reservists in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program participated in active duty training each month from July to October 1949. The active duty season was over by November. In each of the last two months of 1949, less than fifty Reservists in Air Force Reserve Training Center units received such training.

Perhaps four-fifths of the Reservists estimated, from incomplete statistics, to have trained on active duty from July to October 1949 were officers.[531] This suggests that little

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530/ This is suggested by the October training figures. In October, 849 members of the AFRTC units trained on active duty. At the same time 69 mobilization assignees and two corollary unit members received such training. (Hq, ConAC, Office of Statistical Services, USAF Reserve Active Duty Training Conducted by AFRTC units, by corollary units and by Mobilization Assignees, Oct 49)

531/ Active Duty figures from Hq, ConAC, Office of Stat Svces, USAF Reserve Active Duty Training Conducted by Units of the ConAC, July-Sept 49, and USAF Reserve Active Duty Training Conducted by AFRTC unit Personnel, Oct-Dec 49

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meaningful unit training was accomplished, since that would have required the presence of many more airmen than officers. The absence of the airmen necessary to round out unit rolls meant that the most important result of the summer encampments of 1949 was probably an increase in individual Reservist proficiency, particularly flying proficiency.

Several problems arose to hamper the conduct of training at the Summer encampments. The shortage of mobile training units precluded the assignment of that type of equipment for use by Reservists.[532] The importance of selecting active duty sites with facilities adequate to needs without overcrowding was understood before the Summer of 1949. Command policy to guide such selection had not been set, however, at the time active duty training began. The facilities at Hensley Field, Dallas, Texas, in the area of the Twelfth Air Force, for example, were considerably strained by the load of training Reservists on active duty.[533] The Commanding General of a Reserve Unit stationed at Hensley Field had offered a possible solution in anticipation of this eventuality in March 1949, although the suggestion was not processed for consideration within Headquarters, Continental Air Command, until August.

532/ 3rd Ind, Hq, ConAC, to CG 1AF, Subj: Report of Active Duty Training Provided USAF Reserve Units, 4 May 49

533/ 2nd Ind, Hq, 12AF, to CG, ConAC, Subj: Report of Active Duty Training, 23 July 49

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Brigadier General Robert J. Smith, Commanding Officer of the 309th Air Division, Bombardment,[534] stationed at Hensley Field, recommended that active duty training be conducted at centrally located Air Force Bases which were on stand-by status and which might be specifically re-activated for that purpose.[535] This was exactly the course which was followed in re-activating Atterbury Air Force Base, Columbus, Indiana, as an active duty training site for the Reserve Wings in the area of the Tenth Air Force. The choice of Atterbury was founded in conversations on the location of a Reserve Troop Carrier Training Center which took place in early December 1948 between the Deputies for Operations of Headquarters, Continental Air Command, and Headquarters, Tenth Air Force.[536] Atterbury Air Force Base, then on inactive status, was selected.[537] Only later was the decision

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534/ This was a unit of the old program. General Smith took command of the 443rd Troop Carrier Wing which was activated at the 2596th Air Force Reserve Training Center at Hensley Field in May 1949. (See page 125 above)

535/ Ltr, Hq, 309th Air Division Bombardment, Subj: Re-activation of Stand By Bases for Reserve Unit Active Duty Training, To: C/S USAF, 29 Mar 49. General Smith pointed out in this letter that it was an advantage to have the active duty encampment a considerable distance from the Reservists' places of residence. Location far from home prevented business from interfering with military activities.

536/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O T 353, Subj: Active Duty Training for USAF Res Troop Carr Wings, To: Cg, 10AF, 2 Feb 49

537/ 1. Hq, ConAC, Diary, 25 April 49
2. TWX, AFCRF-5 21770, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 10 May 49

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made to move the 2466th Air Force Reserve Training Center from Stout Field and conduct year 'round Reserve activities at Columbus rather than at Indianapolis.[538]

Headquarters, Continental Air Command, was attracted to the idea of establishing one or more Air Force Bases to serve as an active duty station for training units of all the Reserve Forces, that is, the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps as well as the Air Reserve.[539] The proposal was deemed especially appropriate for the First and Twelfth Air Forces, each of which had less than three Air Force Reserve Training Centers at that time.[540] In those Air Forces, no one Training Center possessed adequate facilities to provide active duty training for a complete Table of Organization and Equipment Wing.[541]

The Continental Air Command Air Forces were directed to make thorough studies of the active duty base problem. General Smith's proposal was brought to the official attention of

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538/ Hq, ConAC, Diary, 30 June 49. See also page 131 above.

539/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Reuben Kyle, Jr, DRF, To VC, 1 Aug 49

540/ Organization of the Twenty-third Air Force Reserve Training Center at Mitchel Air Force Base in September brought the number of Training Centers in the First Air Force area to three.

541/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Dolf H Muehleisen, Dir O&T, to DO, 4 Aug 49

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Headquarters, United States Air Force.[542] There the matter was resolved. General Quesada indicated that there were no funds available for opening, maintaining and closing inactive Air Force Bases for the sole purpose of providing summer active duty sites for the Reserve Forces.[543] Thus, active duty training in the summer of 1950 would continue to be conducted at established Air Force Reserve Training Centers.[544]

Regular personnel necessary to supply essential services to Reservists while training posed another problem at summer encampments. At least one Continental Air Command Air Force regarded this augmentation requirement as prohibitive if all Reserve Wings were to be brought to active duty during the summer months and an increased personnel authorization was not made available. Large numbers of additional personnel were

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542/ 1. IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col George S Brown, Asst DO, to VC, 5 Aug 49
2. 4th Ind, Hq, ConAC, to Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 18 Aug 49 to Ltr, Hq, 309th Air Division Bombardment, Subj: Re-activation of stand-by Bases for Reserve Unit Active Duty Training, to C/S USAF, 29 Mar 49

543/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: CG, 9AF, 18 Nov 49. The expenses for opening Atterbury Air Force Base were met from Fiscal Year 1949 funds. (Hq, ConAC, Diary, 12 May 49). There was no shortage of Rents and Utilities (p-516) funds in the early spring of 1949. In fact some doubt existed at that time as to whether it would be possible to obligate all available funds before the close of the fiscal year. See pages 96-99 above.

544/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T 353, Subj: USAF Reserve Active Duty Training During Calendar Year 1950, To: Cgs 1AF, 1 Dec 49

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needed to compensate for those Support components missing from the Reserve Wings. Thus, if Food Service, Air Installations, and Motor Vehicle Squadrons, not provided for in the Fiscal Year 1950 Plan, were activated within the Reserve structure, the Wings might have been self-supporting to a greater degree and the required augmentation considerably reduced.[545] Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, asked for permission in October to activate more than the prescribed number of units in Reserve Troop Carrier Wings where sufficient qualified Reservists were available.[546] This request was denied on the grounds that programmed funds prohibited any expansion over planned levels in Fiscal Years 1950 and 1951.[547]

It was contemplated that sufficient funds would be available to bring all Reserve Wings to encampments for fifteen days training in the summer of 1950.[548] The experience of 1949 had posed problems, particularly with regard to facilities and personnel, which had important bearing on the effectiveness

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545/ Ltr, Hq, 10AF, File: AF10DR 353, Subj: Active Duty Tng Stations for Reserve Forces Organizations, To: Cg, ConAC, 13 Oct 49

546/ TWX AF10RR 39, Hq, 10AF, To: Cg, ConAC, 3 Oct 49

547/ TWX AFConAC P&O 26635, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 10AF, no date /early Oct 49/

548/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T 353, Subj: USAF Reserve Active Duty Training During Calendar Year 1950, To: Cg, 1AF, 1 Dec 49

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of training. They were certain to present themselves again for solution in 1950.[549]

On a basis of available statistics, it is not possible to compare inactive duty training accomplished in the second quarter of the Fiscal Year with that conducted in the first. In the Month of October, however, of the 19,505 officers and airmen then assigned to Reserve units of the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program, 13,832 or 70.9% participated in inactive duty training. In November, 73.2% of assigned Reservists trained on inactive duty, while, in the last month of 1949, the percentage of assigned Reservists who attended inactive duty training sessions rose to 79.0%. The number of man training periods for pay increased 25.8% from October to December 1949.[550]

549/ The Continental Air Command Air Forces signified their desire to bring eleven troop carrier and three light bombardment wings to fifteen days of active duty prior to 30 June 1950. (Hq, ConAC, History of the Training Division, 1 Jan to 28 Feb 50, page 2).

550/ Reservists participated in 7039 man training periods without pay in November and in 8117 such periods in December. (Reservists assigned to Air Force Reserve Training Center units from Headquarters, Continental Air Command, Office of Statistical Services, Strength of United States Air Force Reserve Program, 31 October, 30 November and 31 December 1949; Inactive duty training figures from Headquarters, Continental Air Command, Office of Statistical Services, United States Air Force Reserve Inactive Duty Training Conducted by Air Force Reserve Training Center Units, Oct, Nov, Dec 49).

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The goal of the Air Force Reserve Training Center and Corollary portions of the Fiscal Year 1950 program was quality unit training for quick post-Mobilization-Day utility. The number of Reservists trained in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program grew steadily in the last three months of 1949. That could not be regarded by itself, however, as an indication that progress to the goal was being made. Many problems had to be solved before meaningful unit training could be provided the 25 Reserve troop carrier and light bombardment Wings. Locating the Training Centers, determining the functions for which they were to be responsible, furnishing personnel for their staffs and supplies for their storage rooms involved questions which were difficult and time consuming. A number of loose ends remained to be tied in 1950.

Flying training, particularly individual proficiency training, was easier to conduct than ground instruction. Yet in flying, as well as in other aspects, the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program was off to a slow start. General Whitehead expressed himself in December as dissatisfied with the progress of the Reserve Wing flying training Program, and specifically with the use to which T-6, T-7 and T-11 aircraft were being put.[551]

551/ "...these Reserve Wings are not 'going' well," General Whitehead wrote his Air Force Commander. "We are beginning to tell you how to do it." (Ltr, Genl Whitehead to ConAC Air Force Commanders, 2 Dec 49).

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One reason for slow progress was that the Reserve Units did not receive detailed directives around which to organize training activities until six months after the inception of the new Program. Another was that airmen were not participating to the degree necessary to make unit training a reality. As one Reservist put it, the whole Reserve Program would succeed or fail in direct proportion to the interest and participation of airmen.[552]

The lack of any systematic method by which higher headquarters could monitor qualitative rather than quantitative training progress was a not unimportant obstacle to the advancement of the quality training that the Fiscal Year 1950 Program was designed to provide. The quarterly training reports required by the belatedly distributed Training Directives promised a record of hours of training accomplished in various subjects, but not information on the actual use to which the hours were put. Headquarters, Continental Air Command, could only depend on subjective and fragmentary observations made on sporadic field visits by staff officers for evaluation of the operational potential of the Air Force Reserve Training Center units.[553] The summer of 1950 promised to bring some light

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552/ Ltr, Lt Col Frederic N Millen, USAFR, To: Cg, IAF, 27 July 49

553/ Lt Col H G Lund, Hq, ConAC, O&T, To: Senior Historian, 19 Jun 1950

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to this area of darkness. At that time, it was planned to test the mettle of Reserve units on active duty with a specially prepared operational readiness test.

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Chapter Twelve

THE VOLUNTEER AIR RESERVE PROGRAM

I

An Air Defense Command staff officer once was commended for characterizing Composite units as "holding" organizations for Reservists for whom it was not possible to provide significant training. Such a definition applied to the Volunteer Air Reserve Training units in 1949 would probably have drawn unfavorable official comment. The Volunteer Air Reserve Training program was not regarded by Headquarters, Continental Air Command, in the summer of 1949, as a paper structure in which Reservists might be domiciled and forgotten. Volunteer Air Reserve Training units were conceived rather as vehicles for training, albeit of a more limited type than offered members of the Organized Reserve.

The Continental Air Command Air Forces were given emphatic instructions that only individuals who desired to take an active part in the Reserve Program were to be assigned to Volunteer Air Reserve Training units.[554] As the new Program officially began, one Air Force assigned more Reservists to Volunteer Air Reserve

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554/ TWX AFConAC PERS MAN-R 17519, Hq ConAC to Cgs, ConAC AFs, 14 July 49

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Training units than the total number that it was planned to train in the whole Volunteer Air Reserve Program.[555] In that Air Force and elsewhere it was necessary to cull records and weed out the less active individuals for transfer to the Inactive Reserve.[556]

More than 36,000 officers and almost 8,000 airmen had been assigned to Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units by the end of the first month of activity in the new Reserve Program. Thereafter the number increased so that at the end of October the planned total of 60,000 had almost been reached and at the end of December that goal had actually been exceeded by 3,000.[557] The Volunteer Air Reservists were grouped in Volunteer Air Reserve Training Wings, Groups, Squadrons and Flights.

The Continental Air Command Air Force Commanders were responsible for designating, organizing, training administering and discontinuing the Volunteer Air Reserve Training units. Headquarters, Continental Air Command, alloted specific blocks of numbers to each of the Air Forces with which to designate a total of 49 Wings, 150 Groups and 800 Squadrons. Squadrons were composed of two to ten Flights, distinguished by letter suffixes

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555/ 1st Ind, Hq ConAC to Cg 1AF, 23 Jul 49. Subj: VART Tng Program

556/ TWX 1AFA 903, Hq 1AF to Cg ConAC, 21 Jul 49

557/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, Strength of USAF Reserve Program, July - Dec. 49

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to the Squadron numbers.[558] The assignment of these blocks of numbers was based on an estimate of the number of interested Reservists who would be available to man the Volunteer Air Reserve units.[559] The blocks of numbers gave the Air Forces a guide as to the number of units to organize. They did not represent, however, a "Program" based on a plan for Mobilization-Day utilization of Volunteer Air Reservists.[560]

Volunteer Air Reserve Training Wings were allocated to the Air Forces on a basis of one Wing for each State and one Wing for the District of Columbia. Air Force Commanders were given latitude to determine Wing areas as might be required by local conditions. Where necessary, organization of a Wing area encompassing two or more States, or the formation of two Wings in larger or more densely populated States, was permitted.[561] Air Force boundaries were not exceeded, however, in determining areas

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558/ ConAC Ltr 45-13, Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, 15 Aug 49

559/ Major Charles W Joachim, Hq ConAC, POAR, to Senior Historian, 8 Jul 50

560/ Capt Charles N Stewart, Hq, ConAC, Unit Control Branch, to Senior Historian, 20 Jun 50

561/ 1. ConAC Ltr, 45-13, 15 Aug 49
2. 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, to Cg 14 AF, File: P&O322, Subj: Org and Establishment of VART Wings, 21 Sept 49

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of unit jurisdiction.[562]

By the end of July 1949, 18 Volunteer Air Reserve Training Wings, 60 Groups, 342 Squadrons and 388 Flights had been organized by the Air Force Commanders. Three months later the number of units of all echelons had increased, although growth was most noticeable in Flights. At the end of December, 19 Wings, 61 Groups, 354 Squadrons and no less than 814 Flights were in existence.[563]

The number, designation and location of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training units were constantly changed to meet shifting problems of assignment and training.[564] In order to avoid the delay and correspondence incident to formal movement requests and directives, the Continental Air Command Air Forces were directed to discontinue Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units and organize new ones whenever it was necessary to relocate units. This was a more expeditious method than moving units already organized.[565] Procedures were shortly eased even further. The Air Force Commanders were delegated authority to order movements of Volunteer

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562/ Para 31, AFR 45-23, USAF Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, 8 July 49

563/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, USAF Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, Planned, Organized and Assigned, July - Dec, 49

564/ Hq, ConAC Diary, 8 Nov 49

565/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File P&O 322, Subj: Movements of VARTUs, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq USAF, 20 Sept 49

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Air Reserve Training Units except when expenditure of funds was involved. When a movement entailed use of funds, approval from Headquarters, United States Air Force, was necessary.[566] Administrative mobility was, of course, one great advantage which Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units had over other types in the Reserve Program. Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units might be organized, discontinued, or moved without the official and time consuming processes necessary for units which had a place in the Air Force Troop Program.

II

Sixty thousand Volunteer Air Reserve Training unit members were not a great many, considering the number of Air Force veterans in the United States or even the total number of Reservists for whom locator cards were maintained at Headquarters, Continental Air Command.[567] But sixty thousand was a very large body of individuals to provide with useful training, particularly when they were of many different grades and specialties. Experience with a lesser number of composite unit members had shown how

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566/ 1. Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: 370.5 Subj: Movement of Volunteer Air Reserve Tng Units, To: Cg ConAC, 27 Sept 49
2. ConAC Ltr, 45-13A, Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, 1 Nov 49

567/ On 30 June 49, there were 380,419 individuals in the Organized, Volunteer, and Inactive Reserves. (Hq, ConAC, Office of Stat Svces, USAFR Personnel Strength, 30 Jun 49)

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perplexing a training assignment could be when necessary resources were not forthcoming. The realistic staff officer knew that success in training Volunteer Air Reservists was likely to be achieved in ratio to the funds, personnel and supplies applied to the task.

The Volunteer Air Reserve Training section of the Fiscal Year 1950 Reserve Plan provided that liaison offices at Wing, Group and Squadron level would discharge important administrative and training responsibilities for Volunteer Air Reserve Training units. These liaison offices were to be responsible for general administration and supervision of training. At Wing level, under the eyes of the Air Force Commanders, they were to prepare training programs and schedules for the various specialized Volunteer Air Reserve Training Flights. Liaison offices at Group and Squadron level were not only to supervise the conduct of training but also to furnish instructors at training sessions.

Responsibility for actual training, including the preparation of a quarterly training schedule, was shared by Volunteer Air Reserve Training unit Commanders, that is, Reservists.[568] The

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568/ 1. ConAC Ltr 45-13, Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, 15 Aug 49
2. 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 23 Sept 49, to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-5, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 1 Sept 49

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relationship between liaison personnel and the Volunteer Air Reserve Training unit Commanders was not unlike that between the Commanding Officers of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers and the Reserve Wing Commanders.

The proposed functions of the liaison officers made it difficult, if not impossible, for them to undertake responsibility for personnel as well as training administration. The Volunteer Air Reserve Training units lacked individuals experienced in maintaining personnel records.[569] Consequently, the administration of Volunteer Air Reserve personnel records was made the responsibility of the Headquarters of each of the Continental Air Command Air Forces. The liaison offices, however, were charged with issuing inactive duty training authorizations (AF Form 40) which permitted Reservists to be officially credited with points for training completed.[570]

In officially promulgating the Fiscal Year 1950 Program, Headquarters, United States Air Force, clearly stated that provision had been made for assignment of 198 military and 186 civilian personnel to the Volunteer Air Reserve Training liaison

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569/ See Memo, Hq, ConAC, Lt Col Arthur P Watts, for: Col Landon, DP, no date (probably late July, 49)

570/ 1. ConAC Ltr, 45-13, Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, 15 Aug 49
2. IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Landon, DP, To: VC, 28 Sept 49

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offices on a phased schedule.[571] Headquarters, Continental Air Command understood this to mean that an additional personnel authorization would be forthcoming from Headquarters, United States Air Force to man the liaison offices.[572] This expectation was soon dashed. No increased authorization was received as the new program opened. Thus, it was necessary to take personnel for liaison duties from existing personnel authorizations.[573] The Continental Air Command Air Forces were asked to compute their liaison requirements based on training and administering active participants in the program only. They were also requested to

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571/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: The USAFR Program for FY 50, To: Cgs, all Major AF Commands (ZI), 9 May 49

572/ As late as 14 September 49, General Whitehead wrote to the VC/S at Headquarters, United States Air Force, that "All planning to date was falsely based upon the statement [in the Hq, USAF letter of May 9] 'personnel and funds for manning 185 Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units are included in the Fiscal Year 1950 Program'". (Ltr, Genl Whitehead, To: Genl Muir S Fairchild, 14 Sept 49) It is probable, however, that the staff at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, was disabused of this notion considerably before that date.

573/ TWX, AFConAC PERS MAN-R 16299, Hq, ConAC, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 30 Jun 49

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estimate their maximum capabilities to provide necessary liaison staffs from already authorized personnel.[574]

Unfortunately, the Air Forces found they had little capability to stretch their personnel resources for this purpose. The shortage of personnel was chronic. Staffs for Volunteer Air Reserve Training liaison offices could not be provided from current authorizations without stripping other activities of needed manpower.[575] The Twelfth Air Force, for example, anticipated that ten officers could be made available from current authorizations for liaison duty. By mid-July, Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force, had organized five Volunteer Air Reserve Training Wings, 15 Groups and 47 Squadrons at 41 cities in its area. One liaison officer for each of the 41 cities was considered by that Headquarters as a minimum requirement. The Twelfth Air Force was then operating on 90 per cent of its authorized officer strength. The question was, of course, from where were the other 31 officers to come?[576]

Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, was similarly unable to meet liaison requirements from officer authorizations. In that Air

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574/ 1. TWX, AFConAC PERS MAN-R 17519, Hq, ConAC, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 14 Jul 49
2. 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 1AF, 23 Jul 49

575/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Maj C. W. Joachim, P&R, To: O&T, 27 Jul 49

576/ TWX PP3 7518, Hq, 12 AF, To: Cg, ConAC, 20 July 49

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Force, airmen familiar with the Reserve Program were assigned to liaison duties as an expedient until officers were available.[577]

The organization of Reservists into Volunteer Air Reserve Training units could not wait on resolution of the liaison problem. This was particularly so because the Volunteer Air Reserve Training units were depended on to absorb many members of Table of Organization and Equipment units of the old program which were inactivated.[578] With the inception of the new Program, Volunteer Air Reserve Training units were quickly organized and the number grew steadily thereafter. The prospect of discontinuing units already in operation for lack of liaison personnel was extremely distasteful. There had been retrenchments enough in the old Reserve Program and in the shift from the old to the new.

It was possible, however, to man the liaison offices on a somewhat lesser scale than originally planned. Headquarters, Continental Air Command, believed that a start might be made if 180 officers, 150 airmen and 14 civilians were available. This was 12 less officers and 28 less airmen and civilians than higher headquarters had originally indicated would be forthcoming. The reduced personnel quota was deemed adequate to man Wing and Group, but not Squadron liaison offices. If one liaison office, composed

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577/ TWX AF10PPR 1279, Hq, 10AF, To: Cg, ConAC, 27 Jul 49

578/ See page 110 above.

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of one officer and one airman, were organized for each of 150 Groups, 30 officers and 14 civilians would remain for distribution for Wing duties among the Air Forces in proportion to the number of Volunteer Air Reserve Training Wings and Volunteer Air Reservists participating in the program.[579] Headquarters, Continental Air Command, planned that these extra officers and civilians be used to man Wing liaison offices. A Wing liaison office was to be established at each Continental Air Command Air Force Headquarters to supervise all Volunteer Air Reserve Training Wings within the Air Force area. The Tenth Air Force was an exception. Because of its broad area and heavy Reserve population, two Wing liaison offices were planned for that Air Force, the second to be located at Kansas City, Kansas.[580]

The Commanding General of the Continental Air Command was convinced that all efforts to train the Volunteer Air Reserve would come to naught unless assistance was forthcoming from liaison offices. Headquarters, United States Air Force, was asked in the middle of September, to increase the Continental Air Command personnel authorization by the amount necessary to meet the

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579/ 1. Memo, Hq, ConAC, Lt Col Watts, To: DP, no date, [late Jul 49]
2. ConAC Ltr 45-13, Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, 15 August 49

580/ 1. 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 23 Sept 49, to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-5, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 1 Sept 49
2. IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Landon, DP, To: VC, 28 October 49

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estimated minimum requirement. In a personal letter to General Muir S. Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters, United States Air Force, General Whitehead plainly stated that only the wide publicity which had been given to the five parts of the Reserve Program would prevent him from asking to be relieved of the Volunteer Air Reserve mission if the increased authorization were not provided.[581] The organization and manning of the liaison offices was held in abeyance pending authorization by Headquarters, United States Air Force, of the required personnel.[582]

Some aid was forthcoming from Washington early in October, although it was accompanied by a proposal that must have brought shallow comfort to the staff officers concerned at Mitchel Air Force Base. Authorization of 164 airmen was promised. Headquarters, United States Air Force, also assented to authorizing, on a temporary basis only, that part of the minimum officer liaison requirement which could not be met from within current Continental Air Command resources without impairing the performance of higher priority missions. In the meanwhile, Headquarters, United States Air Force, proposed to provide additional spaces in the Mobilization Assignment Program sufficient to allow mo-

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581/ General Whitehead to General Fairchild, 14 Sept 49

582/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 23 Sept 49 to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRT-5, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 1 Sept 49

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bilization assignees on inactive duty to discharge administrative and training supervisory duties for Volunteer Air Reserve Training units. The mobilization assignees would be compensated for undertaking these responsibilities by their inactive duty training pay and active duty pay and allowances, allowable for 48 training periods and 14 days respectively annually. When the mobilization assignees were sufficiently trained to undertake liaison duties, the authorization of Air Force officers was to be withdrawn.[583]

Manning liaison offices with Reservists on inactive duty, even when authorized 48 four-hour training periods for pay and a two week tour of active duty each year, did not represent a satisfactory solution to the training problem in the eyes of Headquarters, Continental Air Command. The number and distribution of the units demanded full-time supervisory personnel who were able to travel. In one area of the Midwest, for example, a Group liaison officer at Kansas City, Kansas, might be required to supervise Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadrons throughout Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming. It would hardly be possible for a Reservist whose participation was limited to a few hours one day per week to supervise the training of units with varied meeting times and places over so wide an area. Only

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583/ 1. Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs, To: Cg, ConAC, 12 Oct 49
2. Ltr, Hq, USAF, Liaison Personnel for VARTUs, File: AFCRF-1, To: Cg, ConAC, 20 Oct 49

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full-time active duty officers with full-time active duty airmen to provide assistance and administrative support were deemed able to accomplish such a task.[584]

The mobilization assignee idea suggested another possibility, however. Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadron Commanders played a key role in the organization and training of Reservists. Here was a spot where individuals authorized inactive duty pay and short tours of active duty, which members of the Volunteer Reserve were not, might be used with profit. Opportunity for active and inactive duty pay would place the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadron Commanders in a position similar to that of the Commanders of units of the Organized Reserve, who received administrative function pay for extra duties. Permission was requested from Headquarters, United States Air Force, to establish 500 Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadron Commanders as paid mobilization assignees and a request was made for funds sufficient to cover inactive and active duty training pay. It was estimated that 500 officers of the average grade of Lieutenant Colonel would be necessary to cover the anticipated number of Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadrons.[585]

584/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Landon, DP, to VC, 28 Oct 49

585/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 21 Nov 49, to Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs, To: Cg, ConAC, 20 Oct 49

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At the same time, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, reiterated and added to its former request for an additional authorization for liaison personnel. It now asked to be allowed permanently 180 officers and 164 airmen. Furthermore, an additional 500 airmen were requested for assignment to duty with Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadrons. The new total estimated liaison requirement was thus 180 officers and 664 airmen. If this authorization were granted, it would be possible to assign one liaison officer and one airman to each of 150 Volunteer Air Reserve Training Groups and one mobilization assignee and one airman to each of 500 Volunteer Air Reserve Training Squadrons.[586]

Headquarters, Continental Air Command, was able to find 79 officers and 97 airmen to fill this need within its existing personnel authorization. These officers were obtained by taking 10% of assigned officers from the Air Force Reserve Training Centers. The source of the airmen was the saving effected when the twenty-third Air Force Reserve Training Center was organized as a tenant unit at Mitchel Air Force Base where it was provided with many necessary services by the parent base.[587] This left 101 officers and 567 airmen spaces that could not be filled from personnel already assigned to the Continental Air Command.

586/ Ibid.

587/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: VC/S, Hq, USAF, no date [Oct 49], to Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs, To: Cg, ConAC, 12 Oct 49

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At the end of December, after six months of operation under the new Program, Headquarters, United States Air Force, issued a personnel authorization to the Continental Air Command to make possible the supervision and instruction so essential if the Volunteer Air Reserve Training units were to contribute anything to Mobilization-Day preparedness. Sixty-seven airmen and 101 officers were authorized.[588] Added to the individuals that Headquarters, Continental Air Command, had been able to muster from its own resources, this was adequate to staff the Wing and Group liaison offices on a minimum basis. Actually, in anticipation of its receipt, the Continental Air Command Air Forces had begun to establish liaison offices in advance of this authorization.[589] Not until the eve of the New Year, however, was a firm basis set on which to proceed. Action on liaison manning at Squadron level waited for a later time.

III

Tardy authorization of personnel from which to staff the liaison offices delayed organization of meaningful training for the Volunteer Air Reserve. The situation with reference to supplies for the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program, the other

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588/ Hq, USAF, Personnel Authorization Voucher, No. 11, 30 Dec 49

589/ CWO Harold G Burke, Hq, ConAC, PAO, to Senior Historian, 3 Jul 50

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prerequisite to successful training, did not inspire optimism. The Fiscal Year 1950 Plan had specified that rent or lease funds would be available to activate Volunteer Air Reserve Training units at 100 locations. Of course, Volunteer Air Reserve training might be conducted at any number of additional places where space could be obtained without charge.[590] It was assumed that rental and lease agreements, chargeable against Reserve appropriations, would include utilities and janitorial services unless janitorial functions could be accomplished by Reserve or military personnel.[591]

Once having acquired the facilities, however, acquisition of supplies and equipment was another matter. Headquarters, United States Air Force, had stipulated in its regulation on the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program that Reserve Funds could be used to procure necessary training devices, office equipment and supplies after the requirements of the Organized Reserve had been met. This regulation significantly also specified that every effort was to be made to obtain facilities and equipment without cost locally from educational or other institutions.[592]

590/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: The USAF Reserve Program for Fiscal Year 1950, To: Cgs, All Major AF Commands (ZI), 9 May 49

591/ 1. AFR 45-23, USAF VARTUs, 8 July 49
2. TWX AFCRF-5 31453, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 1 Jul 49

592/ Para 5, AFR 45-23, 8 July 49

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It was soon apparent that no funds would be forthcoming for supplies for the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program. This meant that complete reliance would have to be placed on supplies and equipment made available without cost by the Regular Air Force, the Organized Reserve, or other Governmental agencies.[593] How little might be expected from this quarter was suggested by the items on a sample Table of Allowances prepared at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, in anticipation of the time when Reserve Funds for Volunteer Air Reserve Training units would be available.[594] Very little of the equipment listed on this proposed Table of Allowances was excess to Regular Air Force requirements. Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, questioned the practicality of speaking in terms of Tables of Allowances for the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program at all unless a definite decision was made in favor of government support through specific appropriations as against local support depending on the generosity of

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593/ 1. 2nd Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, AMC, 25 Aug 49
2. Hq, ConAC, Diary, 22 Aug 49

594/ 1. 2nd Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, AMC, 25 Aug 49
2. This sample Table of Allowance was sent to the Continental Air Command Air Forces with instructions that each Air Force prepare Tables of Allowance for required equipment for administration, maintenance and training of Volunteer Air Reserve Training units. (Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: M&S 400, Subj: Supplies and Equipment for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, To: Cgs, 9th, 10th, 12th, 14th AFs, 15 Sept 49)

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local institutions.[595]

A decision was not immediately forthcoming from Headquarters, United States Air Force, on Tables of Allowances for the special issue of equipment to Volunteer Air Reserve Training units. Funds continued to be available in connection with the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program only for the leasing of space and utilities and janitorial services.[596] In the meanwhile, the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program could not exist without supplies. As a stop gap measure, all activities of the Continental Air Command were directed to issue training aids and equipment to Volunteer Air Reserve Training units on a loan basis from available Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, or Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps stock. These issues were only to be made if they did not interfere with the mission of the issuing activity, not an unimportant qualification. Equipment loaned to Volunteer Air Reserve Training units was to be issued to the appropriate Volunteer Air Reserve Training liaison officers on memorandum receipt. Of course, every effort was also to be continued to obtain locally the cooperation of educational institutions and

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595/ 1. Ltr, Hq, AMC, File: MCMSXT, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, To: Dir of Maint, Supply and Svces, Hq, USAF, no date Oct 49
2. See also, 1st Ind, Hq, AMC, To: Cg, ConAC, 2 Nov 49 to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Supplies and Equipment for VARTU Program, To: Cg, AMC, 23 Sept 49

596/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFABF-7d, Subj: Funding of VARTU Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 8 Dec 49

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other agencies in making available equipment without cost.[597]

Since there were no equipment and supplies to spare in either Regular or Organized Reserve units, it is not surprising that this policy provided the Volunteer Air Reserve Training units with little of the material sinews necessary for success. As one staff officer at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, put it, support of the proposed Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program materiel-wise was an impossibility with the limited resources made available for the support of the entire Reserve program during Fiscal Year 1950.[598] By the end of 1949, the question of logistic and funding support for Volunteer Air Reserve Training units was still "under study" at Headquarters, United States Air Force.[599]

IV

Without administrators, instructors and necessary equipment and supplies, little could be expected in the way of training achievement from the Volunteer Air Reserve Training units in the last six months of 1949. The primary training aim of the

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597/ Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: M&S 400, Subj: Logistical Support for VARTUs, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 4 Nov 49

598/ IRS, Hq, ConAC, Lt Col Robt L Petit, Dir Mat Planning, To: DP, 2 Dec 49

599/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 1AF, 6 Jan 50 to Ltr, Hq, 1AF, File: M&S 400, Subj: Logistical Support for VARTUs, To: Cg, ConAC, 9 Dec 49

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Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program, as conceived at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, was to keep 60,000 individuals abreast of new policies, procedures, weapons and techniques of the Air Force.[600] The Reservists would be informed of the new things which they would have to learn in the event of national emergency. This type of training was assumed to have value in preparing the Reservists to play an active role in the event of national emergency with as little delay as possible.[601] It is probable that no one was so sanguine as to imagine that considerable training would not be necessary for Volunteer Air Reservists after Mobilization-Day.

The preparation of training programs for each of the specialized Volunteer Air Reserve Training Flights was the responsibility of the Continental Air Command Air Force Commanders.[602] This arrangement did not provide a standardized training program for Flights of the same specialty from Air Force to Air Force. In October 1949, the Programs and Training Analysis Branch at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, undertook an analysis of the training problem for Volunteer Air Reserve Training units. This study concluded that no formal training program was feasible.

600/ ConAC Ltr 45-13, 15 Aug 49

601/ See, for example, Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Outline for Armament Flights, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 21 Dec 49

602/ ConAC Ltr 45-13, 15 Aug 49

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The changing organizational pattern of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Flights made it impossible to determine the types of Flights which would be maintained and the level of instruction they would require. The decision was made to continue reliance on local improvisations along lines desired by the individual units. Assistance in obtaining reference materials was to be furnished by the Unit Training Guidance Branch of the 2220th Extension Group at Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base.[603] The reliance on local improvisation was reminiscent of the Air Defense Command's much criticized Composite unit policy.

The training value of grouping Volunteer Air Reservists in a Wing and Group structure was questioned at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, in December 1949. It was possible for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Wing and Group headquarters to exercise little of the authority ordinarily attributed to their position in the chain of command. Moreover, it was difficult to say exactly what the Volunteer Air Reserve Training organizational echelons had contributed up to that time,[604] except perhaps to give some officers at Wing and Group headquarters the feeling

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603/ 1. Hq, ConAC, History of the Training Division, 1 Jan to 28 Feb 50, page 5
2. See also, 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 12 AF, 20 Dec 49 to Ltr, Hq, 12AF, File: OR 353, Subj: Training Programs for Specialized VART Flights, To: Cg, ConAC, 1 Dec 49

604/ 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 4AF, 28 Dec 49 to Ltr, Hq, 9009th VART Wing, Subj: Proposed Elimination of Wing and Group Organizational Structure from the VART Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 13 Dec 49

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that they were part of the functioning Air Force.[605] Early in December the Continental Air Command Air Forces were instructed to organize no further Wing and Group Headquarters and to discontinue existing units of that type.[606] This directive was shortly amended to permit the retention of already established organizational echelons pending further study. It was possible that a Volunteer Air Reserve Training chain of command had some validity in a thickly populated area where all the Squadrons of a Group were sufficiently close together for Reservists to accomplish the necessary coordination and supervision of training on an inactive duty status.[607] This matter was left to be resolved in 1950.

In the first days of Fiscal Year 1950, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, reminded General Quesada that "quality" was the watchword of the Reserve training Program, including the Volunteer Air Reserve part of it.[608] The events of the last six months of 1949 held scant promise that quality training would be achieved for Volunteer Air Reservists in the immediate future. Some liaison personnel were available but there seemed little chance that they would be augmented in sufficient numbers to assist individual Flights where they perhaps could do the most

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605/ See, for example, Ltr, Hq, 9009th VART Wing, Subj: Proposed Elimination of Wing and Group Organizational Structure from the VART Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 13 Dec 49

606/ TWX AFConAC DP 41614, Hq, ConAC, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 2 Dec 49

607/ TWX DP 42941, Hq, ConAC, To: Cgs, ConAC, AFs, 20 Dec 49

608/ 4th Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Special Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 25 Jul 49

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good. The supply picture was almost as bleak in December 1949 as it had been in July. Without supplies, training was largely limited to lectures. The effectiveness of lectures was dependent upon lecturers qualified in current Air Force subjects. Only full-time personnel were capable of offering sustained qualified instruction to Volunteer Air Reserve Flights.

It would have been peculiar if the Volunteer Air Reservists themselves had taken anything more than a "show me" attitude toward their program. The development of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training units in 1949 and the history of their Composite predecessors were not conducive to optimism. The circumstances which attended the Volunteer Air Reserve Program in the last six months of 1949 placed the Continental Air Command in what one high ranking officer at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, described as an "untenable position" with respect to the many individuals for whom there were no places in the Organized Air Reserve. In the opinion of Major General Charles T. Myers, Vice Commander at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, the reaction of Volunteer Air Reservists would bear watching closely in the days to come.[609]

609/ Ltr, Maj Genl Charles T. Myers, To: Brig Genl Harry A. Johnson, 18 Nov 49

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Chapter Thirteen

THE COROLLARY UNIT TRAINING PROGRAM

I

The Presidential Order of 15 October 1948 directed each of the Armed Services to use every practicable resource of the Regular components to train Reservists. The United States Air Force complied with this Directive by establishing the Corollary Unit section in the Fiscal Year 1950 Reserve Program.[610]

The original documents on the Fiscal Year 1950 Program designated 57 out of the planned total of 325 Corollary units for training by Regular units of the Continental Air Command. These units were to be attached to selected components of four fighter, one light bombardment, and two troop carrier Wings, and to a tactical reconnaissance Squadron.[611] Accordingly, Continental Air Command Corollary units were activated and attached for training to units of the 33rd Fighter Wing at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts, the 52nd Fighter Wing at Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, and the 58th Fighter Wing at Hamilton Air Force Base, California. The 62nd Troop

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610/ See pages 1-2, 11, above.

611/ Incl to AF Ltr, 45-12, 9 May 49

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Carrier Wing, Medium, at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, the 314th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium, at Smyrna Air Force Base, Tennessee, and the 47th Bomb Wing, Light, at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, provided parent units for other Continental Air Command Corollary units. At Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, a lone Corollary unit was attached to the 161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet.[612] Retention of the 2242nd Air Force Reserve Training Center at Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan, precluded the possibility of conducting Corollary Training at that station. The 13 Corollary units scheduled for attachment to units of the 56th Fighter Wing at Selfridge Air Force Base were never activated.[613]

When a Regular unit to which a Corollary had been attached for training was transferred or inactivated, the members of the Corollary unit were left without training facilities or tenure within the Organized Reserve. Reservists who had once taken part in a unit training program and tasted the fruit of inactive duty training pay did not look with favor on either transfer to inactive status or membership in a Volunteer Air Reserve unit.[614]

612/ 1. Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, USAF Reserve Corollary Units, 30 Sept 49
2. Incl to AF Ltr 45-12, 9 May 49

613/ See page 134 above. See also, TWX AFConACG 12308, Hq, ConAC, To: 10 AF, 26 May 49

614/ See, for example, Ltr, Brig Genl Hugo P Rush, To: Genl Whitehead, 19 Sept 49

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Headquarters, United States Air Force, warned all the major Commands to give particular attention to public relations when inactivating or transferring Regular units which had Corollary responsibilities.[615]

The organization of the twenty-third Air Force Reserve Training Center at Mitchel Air Force Base provided a happy solution to the problem of disposing of Reservists who had been assigned to the Corollary of the 52nd Fighter Wing when that Wing was transferred to McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. There were spaces for the Corollary Unit members as well as many additional Reservists in the Table of Organization of the Troop Carrier Wing which was activated at the Mitchel Air Force Base Training Center.[616]

It was at Barksdale Air Force Base, Shreveport, Louisiana, the home station of the 47th Light Bombardment Wing, that a difficult situation developed. Four Corollary units were activated at Shreveport for attachment to units of the light bombardment Wing. These four were the Headquarters of the 392nd Bomb Wing, Light, (USAFR), with a tactical Group headquarters and two Squadrons.[617] In October 1949, the 47th Bombard-

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615/ TWX AFCRF-1 44621, Hq, USAF, To: Cgs, Major Commands, 9 Sept 49

616/ See pages 144-145 above.

617/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, USAF Reserve Corollary Units, 30 Sept 49

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ment Wing, Light, was inactivated.[618] Since no other Regular light bombardment units were scheduled for Barksdale Air Force Base, the light bombardment Corollary units could no longer be maintained in the Shreveport area and were accordingly inactivated also.[619]

At the time of inactivation, approximately 140 officers and 190 airmen had been assigned to positions in the 392nd Bombardment Wing, Light, and its components units. This represented almost 100% of authorized officer strength and approximately 40% of authorized airmen.[620] The transfer of the Strategic Air Command's 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Photo, from McGuire Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base[621] promised to provide parent units which might undertake the training of these Reservists.

618/ 1. Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: 322, Subj: Inactivation of Certain units of the 47th Bomb Wing Light, To: Cg, ConAC, 2 Sep 49, with 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC to Cg, 12AF, 14 Sep 49
2. Hq, 12AF, GO 93, 17 Sep 49. Inactivation was effective 2 October 1949.

619/ Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: 322, Subj: Inactivation of the 392nd Bomb Wing, Light, and Other Corollary Units, To: Cgs, SAC, ConAC, 11 Oct 49, with 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, to Cg, 12AF, 1 Nov 49

620/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, USAF Reserve Corollary Units, 31 Oct 49

621/ Ltr, Hq, SAC, File: SAC 353, Subj: Corollary Tng at McGuire AFB, To: Spec Asst to C/S for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 24 Jun 49

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Two Corollary units had been originally scheduled for attachment to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Photo, a Strategic Reconnaissance Group and a Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, Electronic.[622] When the move from McGuire was first discussed, doubt existed as to whether there were sufficient Reservists, particularly airmen, in and around Shreveport to fill the Tables of Organization of these units. Highly specialized personnel were required to man a Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, Electronic. It was possible that it would be very difficult to find and arouse the interest of an adequate number of properly qualified Reservists.[623]

Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, believed it impracticable to activate Strategic Air Command Corollary units at Barksdale Air Force Base.[624] The transfer of the Strategic Air Command units, however, was regarded by Headquarters, Continental Air Command, as an excellent answer to the problem of what to do with the Reservists who had been attached for

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622/ Incl to AFL 45-12, 9 May 49.

623/ 4th Ind, Hq, 311 Air Div, To: Cg, SAC, no date [approx late Aug 49] to Ltr, Hq, SAC, To: Spec Asst to C/S for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 24 Jun 49

624/ 5th Ind, Hq, SAC, To: Cg, ConAC, no date [Sept 49] to Ltr, Hq, SAC, To: Spec Asst to C/S for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 24 Jun 49

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training to the inactivated 47th Light Bombardment Wing. The Reservists around Barksdale had shown interest and enthusiasm in the Reserve program. Their morale had previously suffered a blow when the Air Force Reserve Training Center, formerly at Barksdale Air Force Base, was not accorded a place in the Fiscal Year 1950 Program and was consequently discontinued. Headquarters, United States Air Force, was asked to give every consideration to continuing Corollary unit Training at Barksdale Air Force Base using the Regular units of the Strategic Air Command for that purpose.[625]

The matter was temporarily settled in the Pentagon. Four Strategic Air Command Corollary units were moved to Shreveport with the understanding that after the transfers were accomplished, the Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, might submit recommendations for retention, transfer or inactivation.[626]

The number of Corollary units for which the Continental Air Command was itself responsible for training was pared from the originally planned 57 to 40 by the cancellation of the Wing

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625/ 6th Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 5 Oct 49 to Ltr, Hq, SAC, To: Spec Asst to C/S for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 24 Jun 49

626/ 7th Ind, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 26 Oct 49 to Ltr, Hq, SAC, To: Spec Asst to C/S for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 24 Jun 49

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at Selfridge Air Force Base and the inactivation of the units at Shreveport. The number was further diminished by three when Finance Disbursing Units were inactivated in October.[627]

At the end of 1949, Regular units of the Continental Air Command were responsible for training 37 Corollary units, 36 units of which had been activated. The one missing unit was a Medical Group in the 84th Fighter Wing (Corollary) at McGuire Air Force Base.[628]

As was the case with units of the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program, it was much simpler to activate the Corollary units than to fill their Tables of Organization with Reservists. At the close of the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1950, 892 officers and 1335 airmen had been assigned to Corollary units of the Continental Air Command. This was 88.5% of authorized officer strength, and 42.8% of authorized airmen strength. On the same date, for purposes of comparison, 87.2% of officer spaces and 30.4% of authorized airmen spaces in Reserve Wings at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers were filled. At the end of December, 1949, 824 officers and 835 airmen had been assigned to Continental Air Command Corollary units, or 82.0% and 30.6%, respectively, of Table of Organization strength. 88.9% of authorized officers and 47.0% of

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627/ See page 179 above

628/ Hq, Stat Svces, ConAC, USAF Reserve Corollary Units, 31 Dec 49

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authorized airmen had been assigned to the Reserve Wings of the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program at the same time.[629]

It is to be noted that less Reservists were assigned to Corollary units of the Continental Air Command in December than in September 1949. Because of the inactivation of the units at Barksdale Air Force Base, there were less positions to fill in September than there were at the end of the year. Although assigned strength increased slowly in most units in the last three months of 1949, the 84th Fighter Wing (Corollary) found it much harder to fill its ranks at McGuire than it had at Mitchel Air Force Base. The personnel tribulations of the 84th Fighter Wing at McGuire were responsible for the decrease in the percentage of authorized positions occupied by Reservists from September to December.

It is possible that if the 84th Fighter Wing had not been transferred to a less populous area, Continental Air Command Corollary units would not have lagged far behind the Wings at Air Force Reserve Training Centers in manning. The Air Force Reserve Training Center units had an advantage in that they were stationed at centers of heavier population. On the other hand, there were fewer units to man in the Corollary Wings. For example, at Otis, Hamilton and Smyrna Air

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629/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, Strength of USAF Reserve Program, 30 Sep and 31 Dec 49

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Force Bases, units which required specialized personnel, particularly difficult to recruit, were omitted from the Corollary Wing Structure.[630]

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In October 1949, the first month for which separate training statistics for each part of the Reserve Program are available, 878 Corollary unit members, or 54.9% of the then assigned strength, trained on inactive duty. This number rose to 1024, or 75.5% of assigned strength in November, and to 1104, which was 81.2% of assigned strength, in December. These figures may be compared with training accomplished in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program. In October, 70.9% of Reservists assigned to units at the Training Centers participated in inactive duty training. This percentage increased to 73.2% the following month, and to 79.0% in December. Only two Corollary Reservists trained on active duty in October, while 849 participants in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program received such training. There was no active duty training by Corollary unit personnel in either November or December.[631]

630/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, USAF Reserve Corollary Units, 31 Dec 49

631/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, USAF Reserve Inactive and Active Duty Training Conducted by Corollary Units, USAF Reserve Inactive and Active Duty Training Conducted by AFRTC Units, Oct, Nov, Dec 49

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These figures show that although Corollary unit training started more slowly, the percentage of assigned Reservists who participated in inactive duty training was slightly larger in the Corollary than in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program in the last two months of 1949. Continental Air Command Corollary unit members who did receive training, participated in a higher average number of inactive duty training periods per Reservist each month from October to December than did their counterparts in the Wings at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers. The Corollary Reservist took part in an average of 3.53 inactive duty training assemblies in October 1949 while each member of the units of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers who received training attended an average of 2.91 inactive duty sessions. The following month, each Corollary unit member participated in an average of 3.29 inactive duty training assemblies while the average for Reservists in the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program was 2.98. In December, the average number of inactive duty training periods attended by Reservists receiving training in the Continental Air Command Corollary units was 3.35. Each Reservist trained in the light bombardment and troop carrier Wings at the Air Force Reserve Training Centers attended an average of 2.98 inactive duty training periods in the same month.[632]

632/ Ibid.

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Since qualitative training information is available for neither the AirForce Reserve Training Center nor the Corollary Program, accurate comparison of the intrinsic value of the two types of training is not possible. It may be conjectured, however, that Corollary training progressed more slowly qualitatively. No specially prepared training directives were issued for Corollary units in 1949.[633] Personnel and equipment at Air Force Reserve Training Centers existed primarily to train members of Reserve units. The Regular facilities which were used in the Corollary Program had primary missions which came before training Reservists. Just so much training could be conducted by Regular units without seriously detracting from their own operational effectiveness. "The allocation of Air Force flying hours to this command for this fiscal year," General Whitehead told the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at Headquarters, United States Air Force, in November, "is barely sufficient to meet the minimum needs for combat unit training, administrative flying and maintainance of individual pilot proficiency. There is not time available on Air Force aircraft for flying of USAFR personnel in corollary units

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633/ Major William T Douthwaite, Hq, ConAC, C&T, to Senior Historian, 19 Jun 50

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with the possible exception of some added crew member flying in troop carrier aircraft on regularly scheduled missions."[634]

It was assumed, at the inception of the Corollary Program, that each Corollary unit would train on one weekend each month and in a two week tour of active duty each year. This represented a sacrifice of Regular effectiveness which supposedly had been carefully considered before the Program was launched.[635] It was a nice point, however, to determine how much of the combat efficiency of Regular units could safely be dissipated in training duties.[636] Headquarters, Continental Air Command came to the conclusion in November 1949 that at least the tactical Squadrons of combat Wings should not be burdened with Corollary unit training responsibilities. In a letter to Headquarters, United States Air Force, signed by General Whitehead, it was suggested that the tactical Squadrons of all Continental Air Command Corollary units be inactivated and replaced with Aircraft Control and Warning units. Aircraft Control and Warning units were believed to be capable of

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634/ SECRET Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Readjustment of USAFR Corollary Program, To: DC/S-O, Hq, USAF, 2 Nov 49

635/ 2nd Ind, Hq, USAF to Cg, ConAC, 23 Jan 50, to Ltr, Hq, 9AF, Subj: USAFR Unit Training Assemblies for Pay Purposes, To: Cg, ConAC, 9 Dec 49

636/ See, for example, Ltr, Genl Whitehead to Maj Genl J. E. Upston, 8 Sept 49

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training Reservists without materially detracting from their primary missions.[637]

Headquarters, United States Air Force, refused to allow inactivation of Corollary tactical Squadrons. While the relationship between combat potential, limited Regular flying hours, and the training of Corollary Reservists was appreciated at the Pentagon, the existence of a Reserve combat force was regarded as of great importance. That apparently meant continuation of tactical Corollary units. Activation of 18 Aircraft Control and Warning units in addition to the existing Continental Air Command Corollary Program was authorized, however.[638]

Actually tactical units were not well suited to conduct Corollary unit training from the standpoint of the Reservists. While Aircraft Control and Warning units or units of the Air Training or Air Materiel Commands were relatively stable in location, combat units were by nature mobile. In order to derive maximum benefit from limited resources, tactical units were constantly deployed. They were moved from one station to another as strategic or tactical considerations dictated.

637/ SECRET Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Readjustment of USAFR Corollary Program, To: DC/S-O, Hq, USAF, 2 Nov 49

638/ SECRET 1st Ind, Hq, USAF to Cg, ConAC, 21 Dec 49 to SECRET ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Readjustment of USAFR Corollary Program, To: DC/S-O, Hq, USAF, 2 Nov 49

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They were called to participate in exercises and maneuvers which required absences from home Base. Consequently, Corollary Reservists were faced with interruptions or cessations of training. The result was a condition of instability in Corollary Unit Training conducive neither to qualitative achievement nor to the maintainance of Reservist good will. As 1949 came to a close, the requirement existed for a workable compromise between the conflicting need for tactical deployment of Regular units and continuity of training for Reservists - between an Air Force in being and a defense in depth.[639]

639/ See SECRET 2nd Ind, Hq, ConAC to DC/S-O, Hq, USAF, 8 Feb 50 to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Readjustment of USAFR Corollary Program, To: DC/S-O, Hq, USAF, 2 Nov 49

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Chapter Fourteen

A NOTE ON MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENTS

No accurate estimate of the Continental Air Command's Mobilization-Day augmentation needs was in existence in the last six months of 1949. An attempt had been made to compute Mobilization-Day requirements in February 1949, but the factors used were already out of date at the time of the computation.[640] In May, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, directed the six subordinate Air Forces to assume that the number of additional officers they would need in the event of national emergency was the difference between the peace and war strengths of Table of Organization units plus 50% of the peace-time strength of Table of Distributions units.[641] This provided an extremely rough approximation of the number of additional officers that the Continental Air Command would need on Mobilization-Day.

The United States Air Force Troop Program of 1 March 1949 alloted the Continental Air Command a quota of 2090 mobilization assignees for the Fiscal Year 1950.[642] This was

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640/ See pages 53-54 above.

641/ See page 55 above.
See also, Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Mobilization Assignment Positions, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 29 Nov 49

642/ Department of Air Force Troop Program, 1 Mar 49, 230

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1734 less than the augmentation estimate of February.[643] The 2090 figure was actually the quota for which inactive duty pay funds were assumed to be available. Pay funds provided a practical limit to the number of Reservists who might be interested in mobilization assignment training, but they had little relation to augmentation needs.[644]

The number of Reservists assigned to mobilization positions in the Continental Air Command in the last six months of 1949 fell considerably below the inactive duty pay quota and far under estimated Mobilization-Day officer requirements. At the end of September 1949, 1531 Reservists had received mobilization assignments. Three months later there were only 1353 assignees in the Continental Air Command.[645] This was 35.4% of the augmentation requirement calculated some ten and one half months before, and 64.7% of the inactive duty pay quota.[646]

643/ The officer augmentation force estimated in February to be necessary was 3824 Reservists (see page 54 above)

644/ For an optimistic opinion that more Reservists might train in mobilization positions than for whom pay was available see TWX AFConACDP 17595, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 10 AF, 14 Jul 49

645/ Hq, USAF, Stat Svces, Strength of USAF Reserve Program, 31 Dec 49

646/ See Ltr, Hq, AMC, File: MCAT, Subj: The Awarding of Inactive Duty Training Credits to USAFR Officers, To: Cg, ConAC, 8 Aug 49 for an example of slow progress in filling mobilization positions in another major Command

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Of the Reservists with mobilization assignments in the Continental Air Command in December 1949, 820 or 60.6% were non-rated. 56.2% were of company grade. Since 83.8% of the officers in the augmentation estimate of February 1949 were Captains and Lieutenants,[647] apparently more high ranking officers had been assigned in December than the grade distribution of a balanced Mobilization-Day force required. The Fourth and the Fourteenth Air Forces had filled the greatest number of Mobilization positions in December, and the Twelfth Air Force the least.[648]

A smaller percentage of assigned Reservists took part in inactive duty training sessions in the Mobilization Assignment Program than in either the Air Force Reserve Training Center or Corollary Unit Programs. In the month of October, 835 mobilization assignees, or 60.8% of the Continental Air Command's total, took part in inactive duty training. This number increased to 977 in November, while in the last month of 1949, it was 1109, or 82.0% of Reservists in Continental Air Command mobilization positions.[649]

647/ See page 54 above.

648/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, Mobilization Assignments by Air Force, 31 Dec 49

649/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, USAF Reserve Inactive Duty Training by Mobilization Assignee Personnel, Oct, Nov, Dec 49

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Those mobilization assignees who did take part in inactive duty training participated about as frequently as did the Reservists who received training at Air Force Reserve Training Centers or in Corollary Units. Each mobilization assignee who trained in October attended an average of 3.37 assemblies. In November, this average was 3.14 and in December it was 3.22 assemblies.[650] Probably no more than 116 mobilization assignees trained on active duty in the last three months of 1949.[651]

The number of mobilization positions which had been filled and the training in which mobilization assignees participated suggest that the Mobilization Assignment Program fell considerably short, in 1949, of providing the augmentation force for which it had been designed. Headquarters, United States Air Force, stated plainly in December that the results desired had not been achieved.[652] The staff officers in the Pentagon believed that the Program's goals should be altered to fit availability of inactive duty pay funds and the ability of Regular units to offer meaningful training. It was suggested

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650/ Ibid.

651/ Hq, ConAC, Stat Svces, USAF Reserve Active Duty Training by Mobilization Assignee Personnel, Oct, Nov, Dec 49

652/ This presumably referred to the situation in the Air Force as a whole, not in the Continental Air Command alone.

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that Headquarters, Continental Air Command, weed out Reservists who were participating half-heartedly and give assignments within the inactive duty pay quota only to individuals able to participate in regular and frequent training.[653]

Headquarters, United States Air Force, apparently gave greater weight to availability of training resources than to Mobilization-Day utility in its view of the Mobilization Assignment Program. This point was joined with some warmth by Headquarters, Continental Air Command. It was true, of course, that mobilization assignments were a means for training Reservists using Regular facilities and Regular personnel.[654] But the basic theory which lay behind the Mobilization Assignment Program concerned the creation of an augmentation force which would provide the Regular establishment with qualified individuals in the specialties and grades necessary for expansion from peace to war strength. The only valid authority for making mobilization assignments was a troop basis based on a war plan.

653/ SECRET Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-1 735, Subj: USAF Reserve Mobilization Assignment Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 7 Dec 49

654/ See pages 49-50 above.
Like Corollary unit training, the Mobilization Assignment Program placed a considerable workload on Regular units which could not but detract from their ability to fulfill other missions. (See, for example, 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 9AF, 10 Jan 50 to Ltr, Hq, 9AF, File: 353, Subj: Training of USAF Reservists, To: Cg, ConAC, 10 Dec 49

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Until specific war and mobilization plans for the Air Force were formulated, which they were not in 1949, neither the Continental Air Command nor any other command could know what its Mobilization-Day augmentation requirement would be. After mobilization requirements were established, then it would be possible to authorize a given portion of spaces to be filled on an inactive duty pay status. To allow inactive duty pay funds or other resources to determine the size of the augmentation requirement was putting the cart before the horse.[655] As one staff officer remarked, such a procedure would be "contrary to the fundamental concept of mobilization assignment, ...[656]"

It was possible for Headquarters, Continental Air Command, to use its own war plans to estimate augmentation needs as a basis for assigning Reservists to mobilization positions. Such an estimate would be of limited validity, however, until an Air Force war plan, troop basis, and mobilization plan was formulated for all major commands. Publication of a mobilization

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655/ SECRET 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: C/S USAF, 13 Jan 50 to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-1 735, Subj: USAF Reserve Mobilization Assignment Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 7 Dec 49 This indorsement was a toned down version of a more outspoken draft that was originally prepared.(See, SECRET IRS, Hq, ConAC, Brig Genl Herbert B Thatcher, DO, To: DP, 6 Jan 50.)

656/ SECRET IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col C R Landon, DF, To: VC 23 Dec 49

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plan was necessary to place the Mobilization Assignment Program on a firm basis and provide the entire Reserve Program with what General Whitehead called "a new and much needed assurance."[657]

657/ SECRET 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: C/S USAF, 13 Jan 50 to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-1 735, Subj: USAF Reserve Mobilization Assignment Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 7 Dec 49

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Document numbers correspond to Footnote numbers in the text.

No.	Document
402	Memo for Deputy Special Assistant for Reserve Forces prepared in Hq, USAF, Subject: Reasons for Discontinuation of AFR Training Centers, 24 Jun 49, incl to Ltr, Brig Gen J P McConnell to Gen Whitehead, 15 Jul 49.
412	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, File: Instl 686, to Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 23 Sept 49, to Ltr, Hq, 9AF, Subj: Facilities Survey and R & U Cost Analysis for New Castle County Airport, Wilmington, Delaware, To: Cg, ConAC, 22 Aug 49.
414	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Reuben Kyle, Jr, DRF, To: DO, Subj: Facilities Survey and R & U Cost Analysis for New Castle County Airport, Wilmington, Del, 6 Sept 49.
415	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Brig Gen Herbert B Thatcher, DO, To: DM, same subject, 8 Sept 49.
417	Ltr, Harold C Stuart, Asst Secy of the Air Force to Repres Clyde Doyle, 30 Nov 49.
420	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: Instl 686, Subj: Survey of Olathe Naval Air Station, To: Cg, 10AF, 23 Nov 49.
422	Incl to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: MI 322, Subject: Facilities Criteria for Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: Spec Asst to the C/S for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 18 Mar 49.
425	Tab A to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: DM 326, Subject: Study Pertaining to Air Force Reserve Program, To: C/S USAF, 18 Mar 49.
427	Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: USAF Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 22 Mar 49/w/inclosure, Proposed Air Force Regulation.
428	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, File: DP 326, To: C/S USAF, 15 Apr 49, to Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: USAF Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 22 Mar 49.
431	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Lt Col James D Kemp, Acting AI, to VC, 10 Nov 49, Subj: Rpt of Investigation of Alleged Injustice to the Personnel of the Former 561st Bomb Sq, Res, Milwaukee, Wisc, File: 335.5

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No.	Document
432	Memo, Hq, ConAC, Lt Gen Ennis C Whitehead to Col Kyle and DO, no date [mid August 49], File: 373.5.
436	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: OP 326, Subj: Troop Spaces for Air Reserve Program, To: Cgs, ConAC Afs, 26 May 49.
442	Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Ltr, from Maj Gen Webster, To: Cg, ConAC, 21 Sept 49.
445	Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFPMP-1-L, Subj: Officer Manning of Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 17 Jun 49.
447	Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Officer Manning of Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: Cg, ConAC, 2 Sept 49.
457	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: DO 326, Subj: Admin Pers for USAFR T/O&E Units, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 9 Dec 49.
461	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col George S Brown, Asst DO, To: O&T, Subj: Support of Reserve Tng, 10 Aug 49.
465	TWX AF CONACC 17040, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 10AF, 11 Jul 49.
473	Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Revised USAF Reserve Aircraft and Pilot Hour Program FY 1951, To: Cg, ConAC, 2 Dec 49.
474	Ltr, Hq, 1AF, File: MS 400, Subj: Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 11 May 49.
475	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 1AF, 17 May 49, to ltr, Hq, 1AF, File: MS 400, Subj: Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 11 May 49.
476	Air Mail Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Air Force Reserve Field Training Requirements, Summer 1949, To: Cg, 12AF, no date [about 1 June 49].
479	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: M&S 400, Subj: Supply Support of Air Reserve and ANG Units, To: Dir for Maint, Supply and Svces, Hq, USAF, 15 Sept 49.
486	SECRET Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: POR 326, Subj: Revision of the AFRTC Program, To: C/S, Hq, USAF, 18 Dec 49.

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No.	Document
487	SECRET 1st Ind, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 16 Jan 50 to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: PO&R 326, Subject: Revision of the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program, 18 Dec 49, To: C/S, USAF.
494	1st Ind, Hq, 4AF, To: Cg, ConAC, File: Mil Pers-2-2 326, Subj: Reserve Program, no date [Oct 49]
503	Memorandum for Genl McConnell, from: Brig Genl Thomas O Hardin, Chief AR Division, Hq, USAF, 16 Sept 49.
504	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Dolf E Muehleisen, O&T, To: DP, no date [mid Oct 49]
505	Memorandum for Brig Genl Jack W Wood, Director of Budget, Hq, USAF, from Col C W Schott, Deputy Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 9 Aug 49.
506	Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-1 246, Subj: Uniform Annual Trng Periods for Units of the Organized Air Reserve, To: Cg, ConAC, 11 Oct 49.
509	Memo for Col C W Schott, from Col J S Hoover, Office of Director of Budget, 9 Sept 49.
513	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, to Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 9 Nov 49 to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF 1246, Subj: Uniform Annual Training Periods for Units of the Organized Air Reserve, To: ConAC, Cg, 11 Oct 49.
514	1. 2nd Ind, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 12 Dec 49 to Ltr, Hq, 10AF, Subj: Designation for Prompt Mobilization of T/O&E Reserve Units, To: Cg, ConAC, 17 Nov 49. 2. 1st Ind, Hq, 2347 AFRTC, To: Cg, 4AF, 2 Oct 49.
515	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 1AF, 30 Dec 49 to Ltr, Hq, 1AF, File: OP 326, Subj: Recommendations for Designation for Prompt Mobilization, To: Cg, ConAC, 27 Dec 49.
516	1. TWX AFConAC P&O 23649, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 1AF, no date [Late December 49] 2. Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: PO&R 326, Subj: The Air Force Reserve Training Center Program, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 16 Dec 49.
519	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 9AF, 7 Oct 49 to Ltr, Hq, 9AF, File: P&O 326, Subj: The AFRTC Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 24 Aug 49.

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522	Ltr, Genl Whitehead, To: Maj Genl Glenn O Barcus, Cg, 1AF, 2 Dec 49
532	3rd Ind, Hq, ConAC, to: Cg, 1AF, Subj: Report of Active Duty Training Provided USAF Reserve Units, 4 May 49.
533	2nd Ind, Hq, 12AF, to Cg, ConAC, Subj: Report of Active Duty Training, 23 July 49.
536	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T 353, Subj: Active Duty Training for USAF Res Troop Carrier Wings, To: Cg, 10AF, 2 Feb 49.
537	TWX, AFCRF-5 21770, Hq, USAF, To: Cg, ConAC, 10 May 49.
539	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Reuben Kyle, Jr, DRF, To VC, 1 Aug 49
543	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 9AF, 18 Nov 49.
544	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T 353, Subj: USAF Reserve Active Duty Training During Calendar Year 1950, To: Cgs 1AF, 1 Dec 49.
545	Ltr, Hq, 10AF, File: AF10DR 353, Subj: Active Duty Tng Stations for Reserve Forces Organizations, To: Cg, ConAC, 13 Oct 49.
546	TWX AF10RR 39, Hq, 10AF, To: Cg, ConAC, 3 Oct 49
547	TWX AFConAC P&O 28635, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 10AF, no date [early Oct 49]
552	Ltr, Lt Col Frederic N Millen, USAFR, To: Cg, 1AF, 27 July 49.
554	TWX AFConAC PERS MAN-R 17519, Hq, ConAC, to Cgs, ConAC AFs, 14 July 49.
555	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC to Cg 1AF, 23 Jul 49, Subj: VART Tng Program.
561	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, to Cg 14 AF, File: P&O 322, Subj: Org and Establishment of VART Wings, 21 Sept 49.
565	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: P&O 322, Subj: Movement of VARTUs, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 20 Sept 49.
568	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 23 Sept 49, to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-5, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, To: Cg, ConAC, Sep 1 49.

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569	Memo, Hq, ConAC, Lt Col Arthur P Watts, for: Col Landon, DP, no date [probably late July 49]
572	Ltr, Genl Whitehead, To: Genl Muir S Fairchild, 14 Sep 49.
573	TWX, AFConAC PERS MAN-R 16299, Hq, ConAC, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 30 Jun 49.
575	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Maj C W Joachim, P&R, To: CMT, 27 Jul 49.
580	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col Landon, DP, To: VC, 28 Oct 49
583	1. Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs, To: Cg, ConAC, 12 Oct 49. 2. Ltr, Hq, USAF, Liaison Personnel for VARTUs, File: AFCRF-1, To: Cg, ConAC, 20 Oct 49.
585	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Spec Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 21 Nov 49, to Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs, To: Cg, ConAC, 20 Oct 49.
587	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: VC/S, Hq, USAF, no date [Oct 49] to Ltr, Hq, USAF, Subj: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs, To: Cg, ConAC, 12 Oct 49.
593	2nd Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, AMC, 25 Aug 49.
594	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: M&S 400, Subj: Supplies and Equipment for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, to: Cgs, 9th, 10th, 12th, 14th AFs, 15 Sept 49.
595	1. Ltr, Hq, AMC, File: MCMEXT, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, To: Dir of Maint, Supply and Svces, Hq, USAF, no date [Oct 49] 2. 1st Ind, Hq, AMC, To: Cg, ConAC, 2 Nov 49 to Ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subj: Supplies and Equipment for VARTU Program, To: Cg, AMC, 23 Sept 49.
596	Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFABF-7d, Subj: Funding of VARTU Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 8 Dec 49.
597	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: M&S 400, Subj: Logistical Support for VARTUs, To: Cgs, ConAC Afs, 4 Nov 49.
598	IRS, Hq, ConAC, Lt Col Robt L Petit, Dir Mat Planning, To: DP, 2 Dec 49.

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599	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 1AF, 6 Jan 50 to Ltr, Hq, 1AF, File: M&S 400, Subj: Logistical Support for VARTUs, To: Cg, ConAC, 9 Dec 49.
601	Ltr, Hq, ConAC, File: O&T, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Outline for Armament Flights, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 21 Dec 49.
603	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 12AF, 20 Dec 49 to Ltr, Hq, 12AF, File: OR 353, Subj: Training Programs for Specialized VART Flights, To: Cg, ConAC, 1 Dec 49.
604	1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 4AF, 28 Dec 49 to Ltr, Hq, 9009th VART Wing, Subj: Proposed Elimination of Wing and Group Organizational Structure from the VART Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 13 Dec 49.
605	Ltr, Hq, 9009th VART Wing, Subj: Proposed Elimination of Wing and Group Organizational Structure from the VART Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 13 Dec 49.
606	TWX AFConAC DP 41614, Hq, ConAC, To: Cgs, ConAC AFs, 2 Dec 49.
607	TWX DP 42941, Hq, ConAC, To: Cgs, ConAC, AFs, 20 Dec 49.
608	4th Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: Special Asst for Res Forces, Hq, USAF, 25 Jul 49.
609	Ltr, Maj Genl Charles T.Myers, To: Brig Genl Harry A. Johnson, 18 Nov 49.
635	2nd Ind, Hq, USAF to Cg, ConAC, 23 Jan 50, to Ltr, Hq, 9AF, Subj: USAFR Unit Training Assemblies for Pay Purposes, To: Cg, ConAC, 9 Dec 49.
636	Ltr, Genl Whitehead to Maj Genl J. E. Upston, 8 Sep 49.
644	TWX AFConACDP 17595, Hq, ConAC, To: Cg, 10AF, 14 Jul 49.
646	Ltr, Hq, AMC, File: MCAT, Subj: The Awarding of Inactive Duty Training Credits to USAFR Officers, To: Cg, ConAC, 8 Aug 49.
653	SECRET Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-1 735, Subj: USAF Reserve Mobilization Assignment Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 7 Dec 49.

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655	SECRET 1st Ind, Hq, ConAC, To: C/S USAF, 13 Jan 50 to Ltr, Hq, USAF, File: AFCRF-1 735, Subj: USAF Reserve Mobilization Assignment Program, To: Cg, ConAC, 7 Dec 49.
656	SECRET IRS, Hq, ConAC, Col C R Landon, DP, To: VC 23 Dec 49.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

24 June 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR RESERVE FORCES:

SUBJECT: Reasons for Discontinuations of AFR Training Centers

1. This memorandum is submitted in accordance with verbal instructions to prepare a comprehensive and detailed analysis of circumstances involving the discontinuance of AFR training centers affected by the recent revision of the AFR program.

2. It must be acknowledged initially that the decisions as to discontinuance of training centers can be neither conclusively proven nor sufficiently defended to the satisfaction of all concerned either by statistical expositions or by any other method. It should be remembered that the final selections, although approved by this headquarters, were not based on mathematical conclusions drawn from indisputable statistics, for the reason that no such statistics were available. In the final analysis, the selections were based on the studied recommendations of the individulas most familiar with each locality and best qualified to make such recommendations, i.e., the representatives of the numbered air forces who had immediate responsibility for supervising training in the respective areas. It is believed, however, that the statistics developed in connection with this study represent the soundest available means of depicting the relative values of each RTC. They are based on actual reports for the period October-November-December 1948. The criteria outlined below were considered of primary importance in determining whether or not to continue an AFRTC. It was concluded that the existence of combinations of unfavorable situations as indicated not only justified, but made mandatory the discontinuances decided upon.

a. Over-all economy of operation. The term, "economy of operation", refers not to the internal administration and operation of the AFRTC, but to the fact that the cost per individual trained is relatively high. At certain AFRTCs there was a very large number of permanent party personnel. This is satisfactory for locations training a large number of Reservists, such as Chicago or Los Angeles, but is a waste of resources where the ratio of permanent party to Reservists trained is too high. A certain minimum outlay of personnel and equipment is required to operate any AFRTC, however small it may be. Therefore, it was determined that maximum efficiency and greatest

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Memo for Deputy Special Assistant for Reserve Forces
Subject: Reasons for Discontinuations of AFR Training Centers

return for investment could be realized only by maintaining AFRTCs where sufficient Reservists were available to utilize completely the facilities provided. Consequently, if experience factors gained in past operation indicated that a complete wing could not be manned at any particular location, continued operation was considered unjustified. (The AFRTC at Reading was considered unsatisfactory and is continued only as a temporary substitute for Philadelphia.)

(1) City (or immediate area) population was considered to have a direct proportional bearing on the potential availability of Reservists. This is reflected in the fact that only 3 of the currently planned AFRTC city-locations fall below a population figure of 300,000. By contrast, only 3 of the city-locations of the AFRTCs discontinued partially or entirely for reasons of uneconomical operation have a population greater than 300,000; at two of these three (3), corollary positions are provided for more than twice the number of formerly participating Reservists; at the third, positions are provided for over 50% of Reservists. In this connection, it will be noted that all of the currently planned AFRTCs are, or will be, located at cities of over 100,000 population. This considered convincing evidence that an effective population coverage has been achieved.

b. Number of corollary unit and mobilization assignment vacancies provided in the area concerned. In considering the discontinuations, it should be borne in mind that not all of the training centers discussed herein were discontinued solely because of uneconomical operation or other unfavorable conditions. Some were discontinued with full knowledge that a training center or other form of Reserv activity was justified by the Reserve population; in these instances, however, it was provided that regular bases would train all or the majority of available Reservists by means of corollary units or mobilization assignments. Further, corollary vacancies to be available at former satellite and pickup locations in certain georgraphical AFRTC areas mitigated, to some extent, the effect of discontinuation.

c. Existence of Air National Guard units. Inasmuch as both Reservists and Air National Guard members are procured from essentially the same sources and since both are supported by and for the USAF, this factor has a twofold bearing; first, an attempt to organize units of both components in a sparsely populated area would tend to detract from the successful operation of either; second, the ANG provides a vehicle for training Reserve forces of the USAF at many localities, minimizing the requirement for AF Reserve units at such locations. (Because of state rights and privileges and the M-day mission of the ANG, priority for locations in several instances has gone to ANG units over AFR units.)

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Memo for Deputy Special Assistant for Reserve Forces
Subject: Reasons for Discontinuations of AFR Training Centers

d. Inadequacy of facilities. This was due, in some cases involving AFB locations, to priority of Regular Air Force activities; on certain civilian fields there was a lack of any usable facilities at all. In other instances, a lack of facilities resulted from the desire of civilian authorities to remove all military flying from airports concerned.

e. Other miscellaneous factors involving complex and almost intangible considerations, which were necessarily resolved, for the most part, by a concensus of experienced personnel. Included here must be the influence that was exerted, in some measure, by public relations aspects. Although AFRTCs are located at 10 of the 12 largest cities in the United States over a nationwide area, there remain several states and many sizeable cities which have no Reserve training facilities whatever. Therefore, other factors being approximately equal, AFRTCs were located throughout as large an area as was feasible. If, for example, 3 desirable cities located in 2 states were being considered, preference was given to the provision of a center in each of the two states.

3. Details of this analysis are presented in 2 sections: (a) analysis of circumstances by individual AFRTC (Tab A); (b) statistical chart showing mathematical factors based on actual operation of discontinued AFRTCs during the period October,-November-December, 1949 (Tab B).

2 Incls.
Tabs A and B

/s/ Thomas O. Hardin
/st/ THOMAS O. HARDIN
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief, AF Reserve Division
Office of Spec. Asst. for Reserve Forces

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Tab A Analysis of Statistical Factors Affecting Individual AFRTCs

(All statistics are derived from training reports covering the period October-November-December, 1948, unless otherwise stated)

1. Explanation of application of statistics:

a. In determining whether or not the respective AFRTCs were economical operations (as defined in preceding memorandum) four (4) mathematical factors were utilized:

(1) Cost of training one Reservist in terms of dollars.
(2) Cost of training Reservists in terms of number of permanent party personnel.
(3) Percent by each base of the total number of Reservists trained at all AFRTCs.
(4) The population of each city concerned, including only the immediate surrounding area.

b. In application, each of the above factors for the respective AFRTCs was compared with corresponding average factors computed for all training centers which were considered satisfactory. The values for these averages are: cost per Reservist - $46; cost in terms of permanent party personnel for training one Reservist - .26; percent of total Reservists trained - 3.07. It was also estimated that the minimum desirable population for an AFRTC location was approximately 300,000 (reference subparagraph 2a (1) in foregoing memorandum).

c. In paragraphs pertaining to individual AFRTCs, the values of the statistical factors enumerated in par. 1a above will be stated in the order given above, for each AFRTC discontinued primarily because of unsatisfactory operation. Unsatisfactory value is indicated by the symbol "U". Corresponding values for training centers such as those at Andrews or Mitchel, which were not discontinued for unsatisfactory operation, will not be stated, inasmuch as the purpose of this paper is to justify discontinuation of those AFRTCs where no substantial substitute training vehicle is provided.

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Facilities Survey and R and U Cost Analysis for New Castle County Airport, Wilmington, Delaware

Instl 686 (22 Aug 49) 1st Ind 23 Sep 49

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Special Assistant for Reserve Forces, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. This headquarters concurs in the findings and conclusions of the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, as stated in paragraph 4, basic letter.

2. It is recommended that:

a. Authority be given this headquarters to relocate the 2237th AFTC to an installation where facilities, adequate to meet the requirements for training, can be provided.

b. New Castle County Airport be approved as an interim installation and permission granted to effect the move of the AFRTC thereto at the earliest practicable date.

c. The permanent location of this AFRTC be Philadelphia Northeast Airport in the event facilities to meet the minimum requirements, as delineated in 1st Indorsement, Instl 322, Headquarters Continental Air Command to Headquarters United States Air Force, 30 August 1949 to letter, 326, Headquarters Ninth Air Force, 10 August 1949, subject: "Minimum Requirements for Northeast Philadelphia" can be provided by the City of Philadelphia at a rental cost not to exceed $100,000.00 annually.

1 Incl:
2 cys w/d

Info cy to:
CG, Ninth AF

s/ Robert M. Webster
t/ ROBERT M. WEBSTER
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Inter-Office Routing Slip

SUBJECT: Facilities Survey and R&U Cost Analysis for New Castle County Airport, Wilmington, Delaware

* * * * *

2 6 Sep DRF P&O DO VC CG

I don't concur w/1st Ind. There is no money for New Construction at Philadelphia, N/E, now will the City of Philadelphia supply adequate facilities for an AFRTC (per Gen Old)

Reading is totally inadequate now, so the 2237th AFRTC should be moved immediately either to New Castle or McGuire AFB.

s/ Reuben Kyle, Jr.
REUBEN KYLE, Jr.

---

4 8 Sep DO DM

1. Concur with Note #2.

2. Comparison of the following cost figures indicates that this headquarters should strongly recommend the move of the AFRTC from Reading to New Castle:

a. Cost of new construction at Philadelphia North East Airport	$3,700,000
b. Cost of new construction and acquisition of land required to make Reading suitable as AFRTC	Undetermined
R&U at Reading (FY '49)	210,000
c. Rehabilitation of New Castle County Apt	47,260
R&U at New Castle County Airport	203,670

3. While McGuire AFB is approximately the same distance from Philadelphia as New Castle, the 52nd will use available space.

4. Recommend attached letter be rewrittento give Hq USAF a more positive indication of our position.

s/ HERBERT B. THATCHER, Brig Gen USAF
Deputy for Operations, Ext 1220

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

Office of the Assistant Secretary

30 November 1949

Honorable Clyde Doyle
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Doyle:

Reference is made to my letter of 3 November 1949, and our subsequent telephone conversation regarding the necessity for the retention and utilization of Air Force Reserve training facilities at Long Beach Municipal Airport.

As I explained in the cited letter, the Air Force has made numerous surveys of flying facilities in the Los Angles area to determine whether the Air Force Reserve Training Program could be moved from Long Beach to some other location. As you know, these surveys and subsequent studies convinced us that it will not be possible to relinquish the facilities at Long Beach.

We had confidence, as a result of an agreement reached in June, 1949, between representatives of the Air Forces and City officials of Long Beach, that we would be able to conduct our Reserve training activities, and the civil carriers would be able to conduct commercial operationsto the staisfaction of all concerned. Under this agreement, the City was to make certain facilities available to the Air Force in lieu of facilities which would be made available to the City by the Air Force. We now understand that the City does not plan to proceed with its expansion plans, nor to effect the exchange of facilities originally agreed upon.

Under the circumstances, we can no longer wait for an exchange. The USAF Reserve Program must be implemented--the training programs can no longer be delayed. We have a responsibility and obligation to the people and to Congress. Because the agreement of June 1949 has not been consummated, it will be necessary to reclaim the use of the government-owned Butler hangar which the City of Long Beach has been using under a right-of-entry permit from the Air Force.

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The Air Force has no alternative other than to request the Chief of Engineers to take necessary action to reclaim occupancy of the existing Air Force facilities required to accommodate the Air Force Reserve activities at the Long Beach Airport.

We are sending a copy of this letter to the City Clerk of the City of Long Beach. We are assuring him again of the sincere desire of the Air Force to cooperate with the City in working out the details of joint occupancy in any way which will result in the most efficient utilization of the airport.

Sincerely,

/s/

HAROLD C. STUART

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

23 November 1949

Instl 686

SUBJECT: Survey of Olathe Naval Air Station

TO : Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

* * * *

2. A conference is presently being scheduled between representatives of the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force, to be convened in Washington on 12 December 1949, to formalize the terms of the joint occupancy. Attached for information and guidance is a copy of the permit from the Navy Department to the Air Force for AFRTC occupancy of facilities at Floyd Bennett Naval Air Station, New York. This is the form of permit the Navy Department is expected to issue for joint occupancy of facilities at Olathe Naval Air Station. The terms of this permit are very general in nature, leaving the specific details of the joint occupancy, to be resulved by the AFRTC Commander and the Navy Commandant.

* * * *

5. One of the conditions of the transfer of AF Reserve activities from Fairfax Field to Olathe Naval Air Station was that the Navy would discontinue the present bus service furnished Naval Reserve personnel. A commitment was made by the Navy Department to the Deputy Special Assistant for Reserve Forces, Hq USAF that the bus service would be discontinued if continued operation by the Navy would prove embarrassing to the Air Force. The Air Force cannot establish a similar service and the continuance of such service by the Navy would therefore prove embarrassing to the Air Force. At the time the bus service was established by the Navy, commercial facilities were not available; since the service was established, commercial facilities have become available, and the Navy is continuing its operation more or less as a token proposition. It is suggested that the date for discontinuance of the bus service be discussed with the Station Commandant, and if practicable, the time of its discontinuance be established for a date prior to the movement of the AFRTC to Olathe Naval Air Station.

* * * *

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl
Revocable Permit
(without Exhibit "A")

s/ V. H. Murphy
V. H. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj

0135

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C O P Y - (Extract)
322

422

STAFF STUDY: Facilities Criteria for Air Force Reserve Training Centers

1. Problem - The purpose of the study is to develop and determine adequate facilities criteria for the requirements of an Air Force Reserve Training Center in accordance with the "Proposed FY 1950 Reserve Program".

2. Discussion - The basic planning assumptions are that:

a. AFRTC facilities requirements are based upon a modified Wing Base plan.

b. Each AFRTC will support one type of training activity, such as Medium Troop Carrier Wing (without gliders), or Light Bombardment Wing.

c. Twenty-five (25) Reserve Wings will be trained at twenty-three (23) AFRTC's.

d. The AFRTC will be provided with T/D&E equipment for one squadron plus certain T/A base equipment required for the training of all units of a Reserve Wing.

3. General Considerations.

a. The types of installations to be utilized in the Reserve Program vary widely. In general, they will include the following types:

(1) Regular Air Force Bases

(2) Other Federally-owned installations.

(3) State-owned installations

(4) Installations owned by other interests.

b. There will be variations in the manner and extent of the AFRTC's operations. Some will operate independently and others will operate in varying degrees on a joint-use basis, sharing available facilities with the regular Air Force, Air National Guard, Navy and/or other organizations. Accordingly, the base complement structure of the various AFRTC's will vary as to strength and composition in line with the scope of operational, administrative and maintenance activities and responsibilities encompassed at each specific location.

c. Flexibility is therefore of paramount importance in all phases of this problem, and accordingly, this study has been directed to develop and determine, insofar as practicable, basis criteria for essential facilities of all types of installations that will be involved in the Reserve Program. In this connection, space requirements are expressed in unit space scales wherever possible together with the basis on which these space scales have been developed. In the event it becomes necessary to develop standards for any modification of these reserve wings, the unit space scales shown provide a basis for establishing suitable standards.

* * * *

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TAB "A"

Functions being performed at Air Reserve Base in addition to organizing, administering and training the Air Reserve.

1. Administration of base and regular Air Forces personnel conducting training.
2. Security and Military Police Service
3. Budget and Fiscal Services
4. Medical Services
5. Repairs and Utilities Services
6. Property Accountability
7. Administration of Civilian Personnel
8. Public Relations and Information
9. Army Exchange Services
10. Commissary Services
11. Transportation Services (Commercial)
12. Base Operations
13. Local Purchasing and Contracting
14. Packing and Crating
15. Fire Protection and Aircraft Crash Rescue Activity
16. Communication Services
17. Inspection Responsibility (Base)
18. Salvage Responsibility (Base)
19. Reclamation Responsibility (Base)
20. Transient Aircraft Servicing
21. Proficiency Flying for Military Personnel Attached for Flying
22. Recruiting Activities
23. Repatriation of World War II Dead Program

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24. Storage and Maintenance of Surplus Property

25. Issue of Technical Publications to ANG Units

26. Furnish Local Assistance to Civil Air Patrol

27. Casualty Assistance

28. Vehicle Maintenance for Air Scout Liaison Officer, CAP, and Recruiting Personnel

29. Support Units of Other Commands Assigned to AF Base Unit (RT) Stations

30. Field Maintenance Support for U. S. Army Vehicles

31. Transportation for Transient Personnel

32. Messing Facilities

33. Apprehension of Air Force Absentees

34. Supporting Aviation Cadet and Officer Candidate School Procurement Program

35. Representation on Army-Navy-Air Force Joint Utilization Boards

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DEPARTMENT of the AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

22 March 1949

SUBJECT: U. S. Air Force Reserve Training Centers

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. There is submitted herewith for your comments or concurrence a proposed Air Force Reglation pertaining to the functions and responsibilities of Air Force Reserve Training Centers. This proposed regulation was developed as a result of a conference between a representative of this Headquarters and personnel of your staff.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ J. P. McCONNELL
t/ J. P. McCONNELL
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy, Special Assistant
for Reserve Forces

1 Incl
Proposed AFR
subj as above

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U. S. Air Force Reserve Training Centers
DF 326 (22 Mar 49) 1st Ind 15 Apr 1949

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.
ATTN: Special Assistant for Reserve Forces

1. This headquarters is of the opinion that the publication of a restrictive regulation of this nature is both unnecessary and undesirable; unnecessary because the desired freedom of AFRTC commanders from extraneous detail can readily be accomplished by administrative action, and undesirable because it is practically impossible to prescribe in advance the specific things which a commander in a community may or may not do. It has been the experience of this Command in the operation of AFRTC's to date that the presence of an AFRTC in a community creates many USAF responsibilities which must be met by someone, and that most of these responsibilities can be met more expeditiously, efficiently and economically by the AFRTC commander than by anyone else, and this without actual interference with, or distraction from, the Reserve Training Program. As a matter of fact, the complete integration of the AFRTC commander to the community in which he finds himself is indispensible to the proper operation of his command. It is impossible to enumerate in advance just what these responsibilities are. Hence, my regulation on the subject must of necessity be under constant revision.

2. However, if it is determined that such a regulation be issued, the attached draft is concurred in, with the following revision.

a. Par 3c, delete "during duty hours",
(A commander is responsible for discipline, courtesy, etc. 24 hours a day.)

b. Par 4c, add "Air Force absentees delivered to the AFRTC will be received and reported to the ConAC Air Force commander for disposition."
(The AFRTC commander may well be relieved of the requirement to seek out and deliver absentees, but it will cause him no additional work to receive those who are delivered to him, and if he does not so receive them there is certain to be adverse public reaction.)

c. Par 4k, amend to read "investigations other than those pertaining to the USAF Reserve Training Program in the vicinity of the Air Force Reserve training center."
(The AFRTC commander ought not to be required to devote time and attention to investigations not concerned with Reserve training, but to limit him to these pertaining to units and individuals assigned or attached to his AFRTC is too restrictive. There are many Reserve training questions which require inquiry in a community which contains an AFRTC which do not pertain to individuals or units assigned to the AFRTC. No one can make such inquiries better than the AFRTC commander.)

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d. Par 6b, amend to read "Except as provided in Par 5 above, personnel primarily assigned to Air Force Reserve training duties will not be employed other than in the prosecution of those duties."
(This accomplishes the same result as the original draft and obviates the constant revision of Par 2 in the draft.)

s/t/ H. M. TURNER
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

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C O P Y
333.5

431

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Inter-Office Routing Slip

SUBJECT: Rpt of Investigation of Alleged Injustice to the Personnel of the Former 561st Bomb Sq, Reserve, Milwaukee, Wis.

1 10Nov IG VC

1. Attached is a Report of Investigation of Alleged Injustice to the Personnel of the Former 561st Bomb Sq, Reserve, Milwaukee, Wis., made by Director Air Force Reserve, Hq Tenth Air Force, during the period 26-31 October. Allegations made by Mr. William G. Wachs, Chairman, Grievance Committee, Milwaukee Chapter, Air Reserve Association, were as follows:

a. The 561st Bomb Squadron (VH) had a splendid record.

b. This squadron when deactivated was promised that the personnel of the unit kept together forming a troop carrier squadron and this promise was not kept.

c. As a result of this unit being divided and spread throughout the other squadrons, the airmen, as a body, dropped out of the reserve program.

d. Personnel assigned to the new squadron are not qualified, while former active members of TO&E units were not assigned to this unit.

e. Training program of the 437th Troop Carrier Wing (Medium) at O'Hare International Airport, Park Ridge, Illinois, does not remotely resemble a training program.

f. There are not sufficient C-46's available on week-ends for reserve training.

g. Use of the C-46 aircraft by other than reserve personnel is preventing these aircraft from being available in lfying condition to the Reserve personnel during the training period.

h. Reserve C-46's were used to transport ANG personnel to summer camp.

i. Maintenance in above unit is far from adequate.

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(continued) 431

2. There does not appear to be sufficient evidence to support any of the allegations in the complaint letter with the exception that use of C-46 aircraft by personnel from other than the Reserve T/O&E units appear to have prevented these aircraft from being available for weekend flying by the reservists. This hq has published the policy that aircraft assigned for USAF Reserve training at ConAC bases will be utilized on a first priority basis for reserve training. (ConAC Reg 55-3).

3. Director O&T, this Hq, has been requested to insure corrective action by Hq 10th AF, of the above irregularity.

s/ JDK
t/ JAMES D. KEMP
Lt Col., USAF
Actg Air Inspector
Ext 3234

s/ D. S. MacCaslin
for C. E. THOMAS, Jr.,
Brig Gen., USAF
Inspector General
Ext 2138

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C O P Y
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TO: Col Kyle and DO

1. Attached are details of the airlift which the 2347 AFRTC has been called upon to do since 1 Jan 49.

2. We cannot continue to operate our AFRTCs and do this.

s/ W

t/ ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lt Gen USA

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C O P Y
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2347th AFRTS
Long Beach

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE FLIGHTS

MONTH	NO. OF FLIGHTS	FLYING HOURS	DAYS AWAY FROM HOME STATION
Jan	3	13*	19
Feb	4	35	7
Mar	7	66	15
Apr	15	99	23
May	25	179	39
Jun	28	289	55
Jul	19	207	40
Aug	9	118	25
Totals	110	1006	223

*Number of hours on Operation Haylift not known.

s/ P. Mesaris

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

OP 326

PJI/191/P&R
26 May 1949

SUBJECT: Troop Spaces for Air Reserve Program

TO : Commanding General, First, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, & Fourteenth Air Forces

1. Reference letter Headquarters United States Air Force, "The Air Force Reserve Training Center Program, United States Air Force Reserve Fiscal Year 1950", 6 May 1949, and 1st Indorsement thereto. Attached as inclosure #1 are the projected troop spaces for the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program. These figures are to be used forplanning purposes only.

2. Total troop spaces by air force are shown, and individual strengths of Air Force Reserve Training Centers will be determined by the Air Force Commander contingent upon aircraft allocation. Sufficient personnel have been included to maintain total number of aircraft shown in inclosure #1. When the location for the remaining Air Force Reserve Training Center is determined, personnel estimates will be adjusted accordingly.

3. Estimates for officer spaces were based on the following averages:

a. Non-tenant Single Wing - 35 officers

b. Tenant Single Wing - 28 officers

c. Double Wings - 45 officers

No additional officer spaces can be expected for this program.

4. Estimates for tenant type bases were computed, making each tenant Air Force Reserve Training Center completely dependent upon the parent organization for all base support functions.

5. Attached as inclosures #2 and #3 are table of distribution formats to be used for Air Force Reserve Training Centers. Two samples are shown; inclosure #2 for non-tenant operation and inclosure #3 for tenant operation. It is requested that function of unit, aircraft allocation, and any other pertinent remarks be included in remarks column on each table of distribution.

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Ltr, Hq ConAC, OP 326, Troop Spaces for Air Reserve Program

6. Organizational charts will be submitted with each table of distribution in same number of copies as tables of distribution. No recapitulation will be required for these tables of distribution.

7. Revised instructions for submission of all tables of distribution will be furnished as soon as new authorizations are received from Headquarters United States Air Force.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

3 Incls
1. Projected Troop Spaces for AFRTC Program
2. T/D AFRTCs (non-tenant)
3. T/D AFRTCs (tenant)

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DEPARTMENT of the AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

21 September 1949

SUBJECT: Letter from Major General Robert M. Webster

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. The statements in the attached letter from Major General Webster are acknowledged as covering certain fundamental obstacles to the development of a more effective reserve forces program. These obstacles are not the result of low interest in reserve activities but are attributable to limited capabilities of the USAF in meeting world-wide manning needs with available resources. The price of an effective Air Force in being, with particular emphasis on vital strategic striking force units, has been the relatively lower precedence of the reserve forces.

* 2. * * *

(1) Instructions were forwarded to your command on 2 September 1949 which provide for full implementation of Air Force Letter 45-11. A limited number of well qualified officers, including field grade, may be recalled by your Headquarters for specific assignment to Air Force Reserve Training Centers. In addition, reserve officers now on active duty are eligible to apply for such assignments. Officers selected for this program will be designated Category "R" personnel and will serve a three year tour of duty in one locality. This will provide a high degree of stability of personnel assigned to Reserve Training Centers.

(2) A constant screening is being conducted by this Headquarters to obtain qualified instructors for the Air National Guard and Air ROTC Programs.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/st/ I. M. Edwards
I. M. EDWARDS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel

1 Incl
Ltr fr Maj Gen Webster
First Air Force, dtd 21 Jun 49

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DEPARTMENT of the AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPMP-1-L

17 June 1950

SUBJECT: Officer Manning of Air Force Reserve Training Centers

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, New York

1. Reference is made to AF Letter 45-11 dated 9 May 1949.

2. Paragraph 7a of cited letter specifies that this Headquarters will provide your command with authorization and quota for recall of officers to extended active duty to man Air Force Reserve Training Centers. No specific authorization and quota can be established until the USAF Troop Program for Fiscal Year 1950 has received complete congressional action. For planning purposes, however, it is suggested that your command use an estimated recall rate of twenty (20) officers per month for this type of assignment.

3. Paragraph 7b of cited letter specifies that this Headquarters will be responsible for the reassignment of USAFR officers now on extended active duty to this program. This paragraph will be superseded in an amendment to cited letter which will provide for application from such officers to be processed through this Headquarters to your command. The function of this Headquarters will be approval or disapproval of the officer's applications solely based on requirements of the USAF for his skills in other than Reserve Training Center activities. Approved applications will be forwarded to your command for selection or non-selection of the individual for assignment to a Reserve Training Center based on your requirements in such centers. If the applicant is selected by you, a request for issuance of appropriate orders will be forwarded direct from your command to the losing ZI command or to this Headquarters if the officer is forecast for return from overseas.

4. Paragraph 3 of cited letter is also in process of revision. Complete instructions governing the form of applications and attachment of allied papers will be included in order to provide your Headquarters with adequate information upon which selection of non-selection of the applicant can be based.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ A. W. Tinges
t/ A. W. TINGES
Major, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

2 September 1949

SUBJECT: Officer Manning of Air Force Reserve Taining Centers

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. Reference is made to letter, this Headquarters, subject as above, dated 17 June 1949.

2. Officer personnel for manning the Reserve Training Centers will be procured from the following resources:

a. Air Force Reserve officers now serving on active duty with reserve units who desire and are qualified for assignment to an AFRTC.

b. Air Force Reserve officers now on active duty who apply and are accepted for AFRTC duty under provisions of Air Force Letter 45-11.

c. A limited number of Air Force Reserve Officers to be recalled by your Headquarters specifically for this program.

3. Limitations of the projected Troop Program for Fiscal Year 1950 require that officer needs of the Reserve Training Centers be filled primarily from officers now on active duty. However, in view of publications that have been issued regarding this program, it is planned to recall five (5) officers for each Air Force Reserve Training Center, a total of one-hundred-fifteen (115) officers.

4. It is requested that your Headquarters take action to implement this program. Authority is granted for recall of officers at the rate of twenty (20) per month until the quota of one-hundred-fifteen (115) has been met.

5. Letter, this Headquarters, Subject: "Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty", dated 5 August 1949, establishes general recall criteria. Officers recalled specifically for AFRTC duty will be required to meet criteria as set forth in paragraph 3b of cited letter except as modified herein:

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a. Officers with scarce skills. A list of Air Force skills which are currently considered critical is included in letter, this Headquarters, Subject: "Procedure for Cll or Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty", dated 1 September 1949. In addition to these skills, a total of one-hundred-fifteen (115) officers meeting requirements of residence, membership in civic organizations and community activities as outlined in Book Message AFPMP-8D 53746, 13 July 1949, will be construed as possessing skills within the scarce category. Officers not having a college degree may submit requests for waivers to the numbered AirForce for review. The degree of experience and proficiency of those officers meeting requisites of above book message are factors which may be considered in lieu of a college degree. Wivers may be granted by this Headquarters in the event will qualified officers are hampered by a non-existent degree.

6. In order to promote consistency of operation, it is desired that commanding officers and operations officers of Air Force Reserve Training Wings be selected from officers on active duty. Other positions as set forth in attachment to AF letter 45-11 may be readily open to personnel selected from resources available to your command.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ Frederick J. Sutterlin
t/ FREDERICK J. SUTTERLIN
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

9 Dec 1949

DO 326

SUBJECT: Administrative Personnel for USAFR T/O&E Units

TO : Special Assistant for Reserve Forces, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The status of the administration in the United States Air Force Reserve Wings is unsatisfactory. This has had an adverse effect on organization, manning, training and other activities wherever the Reserve wing commander has responsibilities. Whereas the Reserve commanders are currently authorized a small compensation for extra administrative duties within the unit, it is more often the case that their civilian occupations will not allow them to devote sufficient time to the administration problem. This matter was discussed in detail with the Reserve wing commanders and AFRTC commanders at the Air Reserve Association Convention, Long Beach, 12 to 16 October this year.

2. A prposed solution at that time to the administration workload now evident in all organizations, was the assignment of the category "R" personnel on a full-time basis directly to the Reserve wing commander. This I have disapproved, since these individuals are filling a TD vacancy in the AFRTC organization and are not available to the Reserve wing commander except during training periods. I am convinced that this decision is correct and also that an alternate means must be established to carry the administrative workload.

3. In order to provide Reserve unit commanders with personnel responsible solely to that commander for administrative purposes on a full-time basis, the following requirements exist:

a. Administrative personnel on extended active duty for a minimum of one (1) year and preferably for a three (3) year period.

b. A provision whereby the renewal of such tours, with the concurrence of the unit commander, is possible.

c. Administrative personnel charged directly to the Air Force Reserve Program and paid from USAFR funds rather than from Regular Air Force sources and funds.

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Ltr to Spec. Asst for Res. Forces, Hqs USAF, file DO 326 (cont'd)

4. In view of the above, I recommend that:

a. USAFR units (AFRTC) be provided full-time active duty administrative personnel as follows:

(1) Each USAFR Wing headquarters (to include medical group) - one (1) officer (Lt Colonel or Major) and one (1) airman (Master or Technical Sergeant).

(2) Each Tactical Group - one (1) officer (Major or Captain) and one (1) airman (Master or Technical Sergeant).

(3) Each Tactical Squadron (four (4) per Tactical Group) - one (1) airman (Master or Technical Sergeant).

(4) Each Maintenance and Supply Group (including Maintenance and Supply Squadrons) - one (1) officer (Major or Captain) and one (1) airman (Master or Technical Sergeant).

(5) Each Air Base Group (including Communications Squadron) - one (1) officer (Major or Captain) and one (1) airman (Master or Technical Sergeant).

(6) Total authorization for Continental Air Command USAFR units - one hundred (100) officers and two hundred (200) airmen.

b. Headquarters, United States Air Force take necessary action to include above active duty spaces and necessary funds therefor, in appropriate Air Force Reserve legislation commencing with Fiscal Year 1951.

s/t/ ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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FILE: C O P Y
353

SUBJECT: Suppot of Reserve Training

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

REGISTER TO	
SUSPENSE TO	461
EXTENDED TO	
CLASS / ADM / MISC / HIST / PERS	

No.	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
1	10Aug	DO	O&T	1. Please prepare a letter to Hq USAF recommending that they direct each major command to render the required support to USAF Reserve Training on weekends. A specific example is that AMC (2757th Base Unit) at Cleveland Municipal Airport does not work on Saturdays and Sundays. Therefore, the AFRTC is not fully effective in that the peak of their activity is on weekends and the Base Supply etc operated by AMC is closed. 2. Send information copy to CG, Ninth Air Force. 3. Would like to get this letter out 15 August 1949. s/ G. S. Brown t/ GEORGE S. BROWN Colonel, USAF Assistant Deputy for Operations - 1220
*		*	*	* * * *

ConAC FORM 82-AC 1
10 December 1948

Do not detach from correspondence

This is in reply to correspondence bearing AC Register No. _____ which was suspended to (date) _____

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C O P Y
SEC

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11 July 1949

HQS CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND MITCHEL AIR FORCE BASE UNCLASSIFIED
CG NINTH AF LANGLEY AFB VA

CG TENTH AF FT BENJAMIN HARRISON INDIANA ROUTINE

AF COMACC 17040 PD FOR YOUR INFORMATION HQS USAF PROPOSED TO
REDESIGNATE AND EQUIP FOLLOWING RESERVE UNITS COLOR FAIRCH ABLE FAIRCH
RESERVE WING AT ATTERBURY INDIANA TO BE REDESIGNATED LIGHT BOMB AND
EQUIPPED WITH BAKER DASH TWENTY SIX TYPE AIRCRAFT PD FAIRCH BAKER FAIRCH
RESERVE WING AT READING MUNICIPAL AIRPORT PENNSYLVANIA TO BE REDESIGNATED
TROOP CARRIER AND EQUIPPED WITH CHARLIE DASH FORTY SIX TYPE AIRCRAFT
PD FAIRCH CHARLIE FAIRCH RESERVE TROOP CARRIER WING AT FAIRFAX FIELD
KANSAS TO BE EQUIPPED WITH CHARLIE DASH FORTY SEVEN TYPE AIRCRAFT
PD THIS HQS CONCURRED THIS DATE PD APPROPRIATE ORDERS WILL BE ISSUED
BY HQS USAF

CG CONAC

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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DO/JJFischer/lpl/87 1220 11 July 1949

ALLEN D. FRANKLY
Captain, USAF
Adst Adj Gen

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DEPARTMENT of the AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 24, D.C.

473

EXTRACT COPY
326

2 Dec 1949

SUBJECT: Revised USAF Reserve Aircraft and Pilot Hour Program FY 1951

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel AFB, New York

* * * * * *

2. In regard to the requirement for sixty (60) additional C-46 aircraft, action has been taken to effect delivery of the aircraft as they become excess to requirements of USAF. A delivery schedule has not been set up as yet but plans are to transfer the aircraft between the latter part of December and 30 June 1950. Plans for the distribution of the aircraft should be developed by your headquarters indicating the bases to which the aircraft will be assigned and the order of priority of assignment pending conversion of the C-47 Wing to a C-46 Wing. In this connection, one C-46 aircraft should be assigned to each Light Bombardment Wing until such time as C-47 aircraft become available as the result of the conversion.

3. With reference to the requirements for four (4) additional B-26 aircraft, it is advised that five (5) tow-target equipped B-26 aircraft will be transferred from USAF service instead of four to permit assignment of one tow-target aircraft to each Light Bombardment Wing.

* * * * * *

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

S/S/ LAWRENCE P. McGUIRE
Major, USAF
Asst Exec. Office of Spec Asst
for Reserve Forces

cc: CG AMC

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
FORT SLOCUM, N. Y.

MS 400

11 May 1949

SUBJECT: Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units

TO : OC ConAC Mitchel AFB NY

1. Reference second ind., your hqs., to letter from 2230th AF Reserve Training Center, file 400.312, 15 Dec 1948, Subject: "Critical Supply Situation."

2. A recent check made on status of supplies, including spare parts of Air Force Reserve Training Center units of this command discloses alarming deficiencies in stock levels being maintained by the units. Approximately 75% of the stock replenishment requisitions for ORC units on all classes of property are being returned with the notation that the material is available in the first three priorities only. As a result of this practice, normal stock levels are disappearing, AOCF rates are climbing and the ORC units are existing on a "day to day" basis for their spare parts.

3. It is recognized that the new Reserve program will tend to alleviate the supply situation on common items by consolidating the stocks of the de-activated Reserve units with the Reserve units still in existence. There still remains the problem of spare parts for aircraft that have not been in the Reserve program prior to the present time and consequently no stock exists of these spare parts for tranafer from de-activated Air Force Reserve Training Centers.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ R. J. ERICKSON
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

12 Incls
1. Reqn No. 02H-49-70
2. Reqn No. 02H-49-84
3. Reqn No. 02H-49-86
4. Reqn No. 02H-49-89
5. Reqn No. 05D-49-125
6. Reqn No. 01C-49-298
7. Reqn No. 01C-49-316
8. Reqn No. 01C-49-322
9. Reqn No. 01C-49-323
10. Reqn No. 03B-49-366
11. Reqn No. 03H-49-372
12. Reqn No. 03D-49-375

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Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units
MS400 (11 May 49) 1st Ind ACP/282

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 17 May 1949

TO: Commanding General, First Air Force, Fort Slocum, New York

1. Every possible action has been taken by this command to expedite the establishment of adequate stock levels in ORC accounts and to effect automatic shipment of spares for B-26, C-46 and C-47 aircraft.

2. The Air Materiel Command is now in the process of procuring a quantity of aircraft and engine spares and accessories, ground handling equipment, training aids and furniture for the Air Reserve. Additional quantities of Air Force Class 17 equipment and Air Force Class 29 supplies will be procured immediately upon recipt of Fiscaly Year 1950 funds.

3. It is desired that action be taken by your headquarters to insure that the AOCP rate of aircraft under your jurisdiction is maintained at the lowest level possible under the circumstances.

4. Every possible action should be taken by your headquarters to expedite deliverance from the Air Materiel Area by the maintenance of close liaison with those organizations and to establish sources of supply of those items not available by local manufacture or local repair at any base under your jurisdiction and by redistribution where practicable.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

12 Incls
n/c

/st/ L. J. WINDSOR
Captain, USAF
Asst Adjutant General

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HQ. CONTINENTAL AIR CMD, MITCHEL AFB, NY N/C

COMMANDING GENERAL
TWELFTH AIR FORCE AIR MAIL RRT
BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS

MS 8068 & MS1-9056 N/C

SUBJECT: Air Force Reserve Field Training Requirement, Summer 1949

* * * * *

2. Headquarters Air Materiel Command has advised that requests for S-3 priority action on requisitions for the support of Air Reserve Field Training Exercises cannot be authorized due to the critical shortage of C-46, C-47 and B-26 aircraft spares. However, Headquarters Air Materiel Command has agreed to furnish maximum support for all aircraft assigned to Air Force Reserve units participating in field training during summer 1949. In consonance with the above, the attached letter, Inclosure #1, has been dispatched to all Air Materiel Areas.

* * * * *

1 Incl:
Ltr Hq. AMC,
25 May 49.

CG CONAC

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n/c

MS 353--121
M/Sgt R R Treglia/4136

JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt. USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Form No. 49-46 A
24 March 1948

Adjutant General's Central File Copy

1-49-248

8 SEP 1949

MAS 400

ACP:285

SUBJECT: Supply Support of Air Reserve and Air National Guard Units

TO : Director for Maintenance, Supply and Services, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference message, your headquarters, AFMSPS-41798, 22 August 1949.

2. The difficulties that have been encountered by the 2500th AFRTC, Hensley Air Force Base, Texas, and other Air Force Reserve Training Centers, in furnishing adequate supply support for the C-46 aircraft assigned, have been due to the fact that no Class 01-C items (airframe spares for C-46 aircraft) have been available in Air Force stock for the establishment of adequate stock levels of these items.

3. These Air Force Reserve Training Centers were restricted from requisitioning normal stock levels of Class 01-C spares for C-46 aircraft by letter, Headquarters Air Materiel Command, MCMSXO, 17 May 1949, subject: "Supply Table II for C-46D Aircraft". This restriction was withdrawn by letter, Headquarters Air Materiel Command, MCMSXO, 5 August 1949, subject: "Automatic Supply of Aircraft Spares and Engines for C-46, C-47 and B-26 Aircraft". All Air Force Reserve Training Centers have been directed to submit requisitions for adequate stock levels of all classes and sub-classes of Air Force property required for the support of Air Reserve aircraft.

4. Engine spares, aircraft accessories, aircraft hardware and aircraft instruments are being supplied this unit, and other Air Force Reserve Training Centers equipped with C-46 aircraft, by automatic shipments from the Air Materiel Command Zonal Depots. This equipment is now being received at Hensley Air Force Base. The Air Materiel Command is now in the process of transferring quantities of Class 01-C airframe spares from Regular Air Force stock to Air Reserve stock. Action on this matter is slow inasmuch as the Regular Air Force requirement for each item must be determined before the remainder can be transferred to Air Reserve stock. Many of the items being transferred to Air Reserve stock are reparable. The Air Material Command is taking action to expedite the repair of these items.

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Supply Support of Air Reserve and Air National Guard Units (Cont'd)

5. The ADCP rate of the C-46 aircraft assigned to the 2596th AFRTC, Hensley Air Force Base, during the period 29 August 1949 to 8 September 1949 was one (1) per day of the nineteen (19) aircraft assigned, or 5.3%.

6. The supply difficulties of the Air Reserve program are being eliminated gradually. The Air Materiel Command has continually furnished adequate supply support for the T-6, T-7 and T-11 aircraft assigned to the Reserve Wings. The three (3) Reserve Wings equipped with C-47 aircraft are receiving adequate supply support for these aircraft. The four (4) Reserve Wings equipped with B-26 aircraft are receiving very poor supply support for these aircraft. Deliveries of additional B-26 spares, which are being procured from FY 1949 Reserve Funds, are not expected to completely eliminate this problem before the end of this fiscal year. One (1) additional B-26 wing is to be activated at a later date. The Air Materiel Command has informed this headquarters that every effort is being made to expedite delivery of these spares from the contractor but that it has been necessary for the contractor to retool for most items. Inasmuch as no B-26 spares are available for the establishment of normal stock levels, it will be necessary to support these aircraft by requisitioning each item required until such time as deliveries are received from the contractor. The seventeen (17) Reserve Wings equipped with C-46 aircraft received poor supply support for the first few months of operation. The action indicated in paragraphs 3 and 4 above will eliminate difficulties that are presently hindering the efficient operation of these wings.

7. Additional maintenance, housekeeping, and administrative equipment and training aids for the support of the Air Reserve Program are on procurement from FY 1949 funds. Deliveries of training aids are now being made on contracts negotiated during the last half of FY 1949. The Air Materiel Command, in coordination with this command, is now preparing to take an inventory of all equipment that has been issued to the Air Reserve Wings, to facilitate the efficient expenditure of those FY 1950 funds that are made available.

8. TO&E equipment on hand within the 63rd Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard, is adequate for training with the exception of Radar Control and Warning Sets; however, this and all other ANG units are only partially equipped with authorized TO&E equipment.

9. Required signal equipment has been received but much of the property has not been uncrated, identified, or issued due to the lack of personnel to perform these tasks. Property not yet received by the units of the 63rd Fighter Wing is not being followed-up due to a shortage of

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26 March 1946

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Supply Support of Air Reserve and Air National Guard Units (Cont'd)

clerical personnel. Presently assigned personnel are untilized primarily in maintaining aircraft in flyable status.

10. The Air Materiel Command has been requested to furnish this command additional information on the current status of the program for the equipping of the 514 units of the Air National Guard program. The recommendations of this command on the action that should be taken on this matter will be furnished your headquarters at the earliest practicable date, after the receipt of this information.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CHARLES T. MEYERS
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
VICE COMMANDER

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ConAC Form No. AG 5
28 March 1946

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

18 December 1949

PO&R 326

SUBJECT: Revision of the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program

TO : Chief of Staff, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. It is recommended that the Air Force Reserve Training Center Program be revised to replace three of the present five Bomb Wings (L) with Troop Carrier Wings (M). This proposal is motivated by the high comparative cost of operating the B-26 type aircraft; the anticipated greater need for Troop Carrier Types on "M" Day; and the greater amount of total training time available to the USAF Reserve when using troop carrier type aircraft.

2. The recommended priority for this proposed reequipping is:

2587th AFRTC	-	Birmingham, Ala.
2589th AFRTC	-	Marietta Air Force Base, Ga.
2592d AFRTC	-	Tinker Air Force Base, Okla.

3. At the present time there are six C-46 aircraft remaining at Birmingham. These aircraft have been frozen by separate action pending decision in this matter. There are sufficient C-46 aircraft presently in the AFRTC program to permit the complete equipping of the Birmingham AFRTC.

4. This proposal, of approved, will permit this command to meet the light bombardment requirements of the present War Plan by providing a trained nucleus for the establishment of an Operational Training Unit while at the same time meeting the early post D-Day overseas commitments. An early decision in this matter is desired.

s/ Charles T. Myers
t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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AFODP 1st Ind

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C. 16 Jan 1950

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, New York

1. This Headquarters is now in the process of revising force requirements for both the Air National Guard and the USAF Reserve.

2. When these requirements have been developed and assessed against the capabilities of the Air Force to sustain them, together with the capabilities of the Reserve Forces to meet them, consideration will be given to your recommendation.

3. Until such time, it is not deemed advisable to make such changes as you recommend.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ F. H. Smith, Jr.
t/ F. H. SMITH, Jr.
Major General, USAF
Assistant for Programming

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Reserve Program
MAI Pers-E-2 326 (30 Sep 49) 1st Ind

Headquarters Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Field, New York

* * * *

b. Reference paragraph 3b: The few officer vacancies remaining in T/O&E and Corollary units very nearly preclude the assignment of applicants except those falling into the highly specialized or critical MOS categories. A scarcity of applicants is noticeable only the medical and communications field. There has been an abundance of applicants for the few remaining unoccupied spaces and these are being scrutinized closely by interested unit commanders. In the case of airmen, a great number of vacancies still exist. Where officer and airmen vacancies do exist or occur, assignments to them are completed within seventy-two (72) hours after their requests have been received by this headquarters.

* * * *

s/ John E. Upston
t/ JOHN E. UPSTON
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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C O P Y
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503

16 September 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McCONNELL

SUBJECT: Inactive Duty Training Pay

1. On 9 August 1949, a memo, subject as above, was forwarded to the Director of the Budget. The memorandum requested that office to obtain the approval of the Bureau of the Budget for increasing the payment of inactive duty training pay of individuals who are members of partially organized units from the maximum of 24 periods annually to 48. Our memorandum indicated that this chage was considered desirable because in some instances some of the units of an AFRTC wing are authorized 48 paid training periods annually, whereas, other units of the same wing are authorized a maximum of 24. It further stated that reports from the Field indicate that while Airman Reservists are willing to join and participate in the activities of those units receiving pay for all 4 periods of the weekend, they are often reluctant to giving up thier Saturday pay in their civilian occupation and to bear the expense of traveling to the place of training when they can only receive pay for one day rather than for the full weekend. In view of the highly desirable aspects of having a balanced organization present for training and a substantially complete manning of Airmen, this presents a major obstacle. We indicated that due to the present slow rate of manning the Reserve units, we believe the funds presently available for inactive duty training pay of FY 1950 would suffice. However, in the event this should not be the case and in the event additional funds were not made available, provided they were needed toward the end of the Fiscal Year, it would be possible to reduce the number of authorized training periods for all units equally to the extent required to maintain the cost within the funds available. We stated that we believe this alternative to be more acceptable than the present system of maintaining the authorized paid training periods of partially organized units at a maximum of 24 annually.

2. On 9 September a memo, subject as above, signed by Colonel Hoover ofr General Wood was forwarded to this office. The memorandum states in part that the Office of the Director of the Budget believes it would be a circumvention of the intent of PL 460 to provide for a maximum of 48 paid periods annually unless the units are actually fully organized and designated for prompt mobilization. However, a JAG Opinion in our files states that "It" is understood that under the Air Force program all units

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MEMO FOR GENERAL McCONNELL

SUBJ: Inactive Duty Training Pay

will be of the fully organized type. As they are considered necessary for prompt mobilization they will train on the same minimum basis prescribed for the National Guard (Sec. 4 PL 460 80th Congress). Hence, they may legally be authorized 48 paid drill periods per year. Another paragraph of the memorandum questions whether or not the provision of 48 days inactive duty pay to all personnel would permit realistic training unless a workable complement of personnel are assigned to the units involved. It is our contention that the provision of 48 days pay to such units would materially assist in the problem of reaching a satisfactory degree of manning. The memorandum presents several other less pointed factors. Copies of both of the above memtioned memoranda are attached.

3. It is recommended that you contact General Wood personally and attempt to secure a reconsideration of this matter.

THOMAS O HARDIN
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief, AF Reserve Division
Office of Spec Asst for Reserve Forces

2 Incls
1- Memo dtd 9 Aug 49
2- Memo dtd 9 Sep 49

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C O P Y - 353

FILE:

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

SUBJECT: Uniform Annual Training Periods for Units of The Organized Air Reserve

REGISTER TO	
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CLASS	ADM	MISC	HIST	PERS

No.	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
1		O&T	DP DRF	1. Equal training periods are desirable for all units of a particular wing in order to coordinate the overall training program. Under the present program, units restricted to twenty-four (24) paid training periods will fall farther and farther behind the forty-eight (48) training period units and will be unable to participate on an equal basis when advance training requires wing maneuvers. 2. The present twenty-four (24) training period restriction for partially organized units acts as an incentive for recruiting and better attendance in order to become fully organized. If the above restriction is lifted, some other incentive should be added to insure that constant effort is being directed toward attaining and maintaining desired strength. 3. Request Deputy for Personnel furnish data required to answer Par 2 of basic letter. s/t/ L.R. BRAMSTETTER Lt Col, USAF Ext 5142 s/t/ DOLF E. MUEHLEISEN Colonel, USAF Director, Opns & Trng
2	21Oct	DP	DRF O&T Inturn	1. The matter discussed in attached correspondence was presented for public discussion during the Commander' Conference at Long Beach on 15 October. At that time the Commanding General personally agreed that he would withdraw any objections he might have towards the lifting of restrictions on the number of paid assemblies which Class "B" AFRTC or Corollary units not fully organized are authorized. It is agreed that limitations heretofore imposed serve as an incentive for recruiting and result in attainment of higher classification. In view of the public approval of the proposals made in attached correspondence, however, it is believed that this headquarters must now go on record with the same view. 2. Reference par 3, comment 1, data requested is a matter of record within the P&O Directorate and should be required therefrom s/ LANDON 1102

ConAC FORM NO-AG 1
10 December 1945

Do not detach from correspondence

This is in reply to correspondence bearing AF Register No. _____ which was suspended to (date) _____

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AFCRF-1a 9 August 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WOOD, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET

SUBJECT: Inactive Duty Training Pay

1. Present Air Force Regulations authorize the payment of 48 days inactive duty training pay annually to members of fully organized units of the Air Force Reserve. The members of units which have not yet achieved the minimum strength required to be considered fully organized are authorized 24 days pay annually. This is the basis upon which the request for the Fiscal Year 1950 appropriation for this purpose was defended.

2. Subsequent to the initiation of the FY 1950 Air Force Reserve program, the fallacies of this policy have come to light. In order to make the training of units as realistic and effective as possible, the training program has been designed so that one tactical squadron plus the appropirate supporting elements of its base wing organization will conduct inactive duty training on one week end of each month. By qualifying for four pay periods during each of these week end training periods, the 48 annual authorized periods are accomplished. However, in some instances some of the units of a wing are fully organized and hence the same wing are not fully organized and consequently authorized a maximum of 24. Reports from the field indicate that while airman Reservists are willing to join and participate in the activities of those units receiving pay for all four periods of the week end, they are often reluctant to give up a Saturday's pay in their civilian occupation and to bear the expense of traveling to the place of training when they can only receive pay for one day rather than for the full week end. In view of the highly desirable aspects of having a balanced organization present for training and substantially complete manning of airmen, this presents a major obstacle.

3. In view of the foregoing, we propose to revise the applicable Air Force Regulation to permit the payment of 48 training periods annually to all units of the Organized Air Force Reserve. There are no experience factors nor is there concrete information to which we may turn to definitely determine the rate at which these units will progress to full strength, if they are all authorized 48 days pay. Consequintly, there is no possible source of determining the exact cost involved. However, owing to retarded rate at which the airman portions of the organization are being manned, it is our belief that the funds presently available for inactive duty training pay for FY 1950 will meet the requirements. In the event this is not the case, and if additional funds cannot be made

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available providing they are needed toward the end of the fiscalyear, it will be possible to reduce the number of authorized training periods for all units by the number required to maintain the cost within the funds available. This adjustment will be made during the last part of the fiscal year. We feel that this alternative would be more acceptable than the present system of maintaining the authorized paid training periods of partially organized units at a maximum of 24 annually.

4. This change in plans does not, in itself, involve an increase in cost of the Air Force Reserve program nor is it anticipated that additional funds will be required. Nevertheless, because it represents a fundamental change in the distribution of funds, it is requested that your office obtain an approval of the change from the Bureau of the Budget.

C. W. SCHOTT
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Spc. Asst. for Reserve Forces

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C O P Y
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DEPARTMENT of the AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D.C.

11 October 1949

AFCRP-1 246

SUBJECT: Uniform Annual Training Periods for Units of the Organized Air Reserve

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. On recent visits to AFRTCs, representatives of this Headquarters, have noted considerable dissatisfaction on the part of AFRTC and AFR unit commanders arising from the fact that effective weekend unit training is handicapped to a serious degree due to the fact that certain units are authorized 48 paid training periods annually while other units are restricted to a minimum of 24. Obviously, such disparity within a wing constitutes a serious hazard to the successful prosecution of the Reserve training program, if this condition is generally prevalent.

2. In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters contemplates requesting authority to authorize all USAFR units 48 paid training periods annually regardless of the state of organization. In the event your headquarters concurs in this proposed action, it is requested that you furnish specific data concerning the numbers of units involved, ie., within each wing, how many of the units are currently authorized 48 pay periods annually and how many are authorized only 24. Any other information considered to be valuable in defending a request for authority to grant 48 pay periods to all units should also be forwarded. It is requested that your comments on this proposal and the above requested information be forwarded with the least practicable delay.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ C. W. Schott
t/ C. W. SCHOTT
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Spec. Asst. for Reserve Forces

3 Incls:
1. Cy of Memo to Gen McConnell, 16 Sep 49 subj: Inact Duty Tng Pay
2. Memo to Gen Wood, same subj, dtd 9 Aug 49
3. Memo to Col Schott, same subj, dtd 9 Sep 49

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9 September 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL C. W. SCHOTT, Office of Spec Asst for Reserve Forces

SUBJECT: Inactive Duty Training Pay

1. The Comptroller appreciates the conditions mentioned in paragraph 2 of your memorandum concerning above subject, but in view of the following information, the proposal to permit all Air Force reservists to qualify for pay without regard to the status of the unit to which they are assigned is not favorably considered.

a. The Bureau of the Budget specifically directed that funds for inactive duty pay be calculated, with lapse rates of 30% for officers and 70% for enlisted personnel, on the basis of 50% drawing 48 days pay and 50% drawing 24days pay annually. The reason given for this was - all USAF Reserve units would not reach minimum organizational personnel requirements throughout the year.

b. Public law 460, 80th Congress, specifies that units of the Organized Reserve Corps will be of three classes. The highest classification for units was given to "Those combat and service types organized with a full complement of officers and men: Provided, that there will be included in this category only those units which are considered for prompt mobilization." It is true that all USAFR units have been designated for prompt mobilization, but certain personnel requirements must be obtained as established by Air Force policy before they can be classed as "fully organized" units. This policy was based on the initial and subsequent defense of Public Law 460 and Budget Estimates before Congress and the Bureau of the Budget. Thus, the intent of Congress with respect to inactive duty pay would be circumvented if full pay were authorized all personnel without regard to unit strength.

c. To offer 48 days' inactive duty pay to all personnel in order to permit "week-end" training will not necessarily permit realistic training if the units involved do not have a workable complement of personnel to attend such training. In other words, it is felt that a balanced organization might be present for duty in name only.

d. A review of the ten (10) different types of units that will be organized under the USAFR wing base reveals that only the tactical and maintenance squadrons have a requirement of more than 100 individuals. The remaining units have an aggregate ranging from 7 to 53 individuals. When the 30% officer and 70% enlisted rule is applied against these various totals, the personnel manning problem does not appear to be too difficult.

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However, if actual experience demonstrates that airmen cannot be enrolled in sufficient number to meet existing minimum organizational requirements, seemingly, a re-examination of said requirements should be made for the purpose of appropriate revision consonant with mission.

c. Further, it is believed that the desire of the USAF is to obtain workable organized units that have sufficient personnel to permit realistic training. Adequate facilities and supplies and equipment must also be available for this training. The requirement of minimum personnel manning before certain pay criteria will apply should act as a great incentive rather than a detriment to the program.

2. This office will be available to review in detail the points mentioned herein, if, in your opinion, further action is desirable.

J. S. HOOVER, Colonel, USAF
For JACK W. WOOD
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Budget
Comptroller

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C O P Y

353

513

AFCRF-1 246, 11 October 1949
Subject: Uniform Annual Training Periods for Units of the Organized Air Reserve

9 Nov 49

O&T 353 (11 Oct 49) 1st Ind RBL/mfn

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Special Assistant for Reserve Forces, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. This headquarters concurs with the proposal to authorize all United States Air Force Reserve Units forty-eight (48) paid drills annually regardless of their state of organization under the following conditions:

a. Providing sufficient funds are made available to the United States Air Force Reserve program, immediately or in the near future, to permit all T/O&E units to receive forty-eight (48) inactive duty training pay periods per year.

b. Providing Air Force Reserve Training Center units are authorized the same personnel requirements as established for corollary units in paragraph 4b, Air Force Letter 45-12, 9 May 1949. Detailed recommendations in this connection are contained in letter, this headquarters, "Manning Requirements for AFRTC Units", 5 November 1949.

2. It is pointed out that this proposal to increase to forty-eight (48) the authorized paid training periods will be feasible only if adequate logistic support is afforded the Reserve program by the United States Air Force. This point was made in paragraph 1e of Brig Gen Jack W Wood's Memorandum to Col. Schott (Inclosure 3).

3. The information requested in paragraph 2 of the basic letter is included as Inclosure 4. Asterisk units are designated for prompt mobilization or as fully organized units and are entitled to forty-eight (48) drill periods per year. All other units are now entitled to twenty-four (24) drill periods per year.

CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

4 Incls:
1,2,3 - n/c
Added - 1 Incl
4. Strength of USAF Reserve Program

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B/L fr Hq Tenth Air Force, Benj Harrison AFB, Indiana, dtd 17 Nov 1949
Subj: Designation for Prompt Mobilization of T/O&E Reserve Units

AFOCR 2nd Ind 12 Dec 1949

Dept of the Air Force, Hq. USAF, Washington 25, D.C.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

* * * *

2. For your information, a unit will be designated for pompt mobilization by this Headquarters on the date reported by your Command that it has achieved Class A Status except in the last month in each quarter. Units reaching Class A Status during the last month of each quarter will be designated for prompt mobilization on the first day of the subsequent quarter. In no event will designations for prompt mobilization be made retroactive beyond the first day of any fiscal quarter.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/ ROBERT B. DAVENPORT

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1st Ind

514 Apl

Subject: Designation of Reserve Unit for Prompt Mobilization Hq 2347th AFRTC Long Beach Arpt, Long Beach, Calif.

2 Oct 49

TO: Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton AF Base, Hamilton, California

* * * *

3. It is further recommended that Class "A" Units of the above Wings be designated for prompt mobilization effective the same date of upgrading to Class "A", and that in the future, Units be designated for prompt mobilization at the time they are upgraded to Class "A".

* * * *

5. It appears that the main incentive behind the effort on the part of Unit Commanders to obtain Class "A" strengths has been to qualify for 48 training periods each year. They have made a concerted effort to bring airmen into the program by personal solicitation and other methods. If Units which meet Class "A" strengths are denied 48 pay periods per year authorization, the morale effect will undoubtedly be detrimental to the program. For this reason, it is urgently requested this subject be given favorable consideration.

s/t C. [illegible]. DUNCAN
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

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Capt Stewart/4145/vm
30dec49 545

OP 326/04 (27 Dec 49)
Subject: Recommendations for Designation for Prompt Mobilization

PO&R 320.3 (27 Dec 49) 1st Ind 30 Dec 1949

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

* * * * * *

2. To attain a Class "A" (not designated for prompt mobilization) status, unit must have 80% assigned officer personnel and 80% assigned enlisted personnel. Authorized strength of this unit is 4 officers and 10 airmen, therefore to be designated Class "A", u it must have 4 officers and 8 airmen assigned.

* * * * * *

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl
n/c

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HQ CONAC MITCHEL AFB NY nc

CO, 1st AF, Slocum AFB, New Rochelle, NY

Routine

AF1AFRR 1445

AFConACP&O 23649. Reference your message AF1AFRR 1445. No tests will be required for designation for prompt mobilization. Immediately upon classification of unit as Class A recommendations will be submitted to this hqs for designation for prompt mobilization.

CG ConAC

Official Business

NC

Unit Control/4145/215
Capt Stewart

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PO&R/GSW/kfe

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

16 Dec 1949

PO&R 326

SUBJECT: The Air Force Reserve Training Center Progam

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
(Same letter to all ConAC Air Forces)

1. The following information pertinent to the USAF Reserve program is set forth to clarify certain points of the program as it is now being implemented.

2. Eventually all qualified USAF Reserve T/O&E units will be "designated for prompt mobilization". Therefore, when a USAF Reserve T/O&E unit has qualified for, and been designated as, a Class "A" unit the ConAC air force should recommend that unit for such designation.

3. In furtherance of a USAF message, this headquarters dispatched a message to the ConAC air forces, 1 September 1949, AFConAC FIN 23063, which authorized for pay purposes the split of Command and Service T/O&E units into teams so that these teams could train with the tactical squadrons. This practice of "split-assembly" should be discouraged; it is the policy of this command that whenever possible all T/O&E units of a USAF Reserve Wing will train as complete units. In order to accomplish this and yet not overload existing facilities during any one training period, it is suggested that the various command and service elements of the USAF Reserve Wing organization train as complete units during separate periods; i.e., of these nine T/O&E units, three could be scheduled for the first week's drill with the other six scheduled in increments of two each for drill during successive weeks. This schedule should be rotated monthly so that each command and service unit of a wing will, over a period of time, train with each of the tactical squadrons.

4. The Medical Group of the USAF Reserve Wing is organized under T/O&E 1-9012, 18 October 1948. Letter, this headquarters, subject: "Redesignation and Activation of AFRTC Units", file G322, 13 May 1949, further designated Column 5 of T/O&E 1-9012 as the criteria for personnel strength. Since no cadre is detailed in the T/O&E for this unit, it is desired that a figure equal to 15% of the total authorized airmen strength (or 10 airmen) be utilized as the airmen personnel strength requirements for upgrading to Class "B".

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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GSW/3h/7 Oct 49 519

The AFRTC Program
P&O 326 (24 Aug 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York 7 Oct 49

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Langley Field, Virginia

1. Current planning indicates that all the USAF Reserve T/O&E units will eventually be "designated for prompt mobilization". Therefore, when a USAF Reserve T/O&E unit has qualified for and been designated a Class "A" unit, the ConAC air force should recommend that unit for "designation for prompt mobilization".

2. A recent message AFConACFIN 23063, 1 September 1949, authorized drill by individuals as proposed in paragraph 1b of the basic correspondence, this authorization was primarily for pay purposes; however, it is the policy of this command to discourage this type of training. It is desired that wherever possible USAF Reserve T/O&E units drill as complete units. In order to accomplish this and yet not overload existing facilities during any one training period, it is suggested that the various command and service elements of the USAF Reserve Wing organization drill as complete units during separate periods, i.e. of these nine T/O&E units, three could be scheduled for the first week's drill with the other six scheduled in increments of two each for drill during successive weeks. This schedule should be rotated monthly so that each command and service unit of a wing will, over a period time, train with each of the tactical squadrons.

3. The Medical Group of the USAF Reserve Wing is organized under T/O&E 1-9012, 18 October 1948. Letter, this headquarters, subject: "Redesignation and Activation of AFRTC Units", file G322, 13 May 1949, further designated Column 5 of T/O&E 1-9012 as the criteria for personnel strength. Since no cadre is detailed in the T/O&E for this unit, it is desired that a figure equal to 15% of the total authorized airmen strength (of 10 airmen) be utilized as the airmen personnel strength requirements for upgrading to Class "B".

4. The Finance Disbursing unit of the USAF Reserve Wing organized under T/O&E 1-8019, 24 March 1948, manned under Column 4 (Letter, this headquarters, "Redesignation and Activation of AFRTC Units", file G322, 13 May 1949), similarly has no specific cadre. In this case, it is desired that the airmen strength requirement for upgrading to Class "B" shall be two airmen.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WEBSTER:

st/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col, AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

2 December 1949

Dear Glenn:

I am writing you concerning AFRTC flying training. This is an extention of my message (inclosure No. 1) in which I stated that, in general, progress made in the Reserve Wing flying training program is unsatisfactory.

* * * * *

I realize that the ConAC AFRTC training directives have not yet been distributed. These directives were completed and were delivered to the ConAC printing plant at Ft. Benjamin Harrison in June. On 16 November the printing had been completed and assembly of the material in book form was in progress. It was estimated that the directives would be available for distribution by 30 November 1949.

The transition of AFRTC and Air Reserve Wing crews to C-46 or C-47 aircraft is, however, adequately covered in USAF and ConAC regulations. Any AFRTC Commander can, from these data, outline and execute this transition. Your DO should give assistance where needed.

I might add that none of your AFRTCs are making good utilization of the T-6, T-7 and T-11 aircraft.

In short, your AFRTCs are not doing their flying job.

Perhaps some Air Reserve officers are not interested in flying. Each AFRTC Commander should, each month, study the flying training status of all combat crew personnel in the Wing and call the Wing Commander's attention to those personnel who are behind the average with a view to improving their status or changing personnel.

* * * * *

My message stops miscellaneous use of AFRTC C-46 and C-47 aircraft. If, at some future date, I feel it necessary I shall do the same for T-7 and T-11 aircraft.

* * * * *

I want all your AFRTC Commanders given a copy of this letter. I want it required reading for all AFRTC Officers. I want First Air Force Hq staff officers to inspect one-third of your AFRTCs each Saturday until 15 January and a copy of their reports to be forwarded ConAC attention:

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Assistant for Reserve Forces. One officer to inspect AFRTC is enough. He can arrive at the AFRTC by seven AM on Saturday and fly back to Headquarters on Saturday night.

An AFRTC is primarily to make the Reserve Wing go. As I said above, these Reserve Wings are not "going" well. We are beginning to tell you how to do it.

Sincerely,

ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Commanding

1 Incl

Major General G. O. Barcus
Commanding General, First Air Force
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

(Similar Letter to other AF Commanders)

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C O P Y
210.455

20 Apr 49
OT/CWH/[illegible]

Report of Active Duty Training Provided USAF Reserve Units, RCS: ADC-OT-T7

OT 210.455 (2 Mar 49) 3rd Ind

4 May 1949

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, First Air Force, Fort Slocum, New York

1. The following observations and commands are offered by this headquarters:

a. Reference paragraph 1k(3): Due to current shortage of Mobile Training Units it is not now possible to assign these units for fifteen (15) day active duty training to United States Air Force Reserves. Reassignment of existing Mobile Training Units to locations where Reserve Forces are undergoing fifteen (15) day active duty training would necessitate the interruption of the Course of Training at another base.

b. Reference paragraph 1k(5): This headquarters concurs in the recommendation that when proficient, Reserve Troop Carrier Units be assigned the mission of furnishing transportation of Air Force Reserve to active duty training stations.

c. Reference paragraph 1k (6): Current planning indicates authorization of dual controlled tactical aircraft to those units equipped with F-80 type aircraft.

d. Reference paragraph 1k(7): Training films of classification Confidential or less are authorized for loan to authorized Reserve units under the provisions of Air Force Letter 205-25.

3. Reference paragraph 1k(8): This headquarters has no objection to affording non-rated officers and airmen flights in tactical type aircraft when available.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

st/ FREDERICK W. GERHARD, Jr.
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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27 Jun 49

Subj: Report of Active Duty Training (ADC-OT-T7)

2nd Ind

HQ TWELFTH AIR FORCE, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

23 Jul 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force, Base, New York

* * * *

3. Through personal visits to Hensley Field, through Staff Visits and Staff Studies, I have been well aware that facilities and equipment were not entirely adequate to conduct active duty training for a Reserve Air Division and Units assigned thereto. Also, the additional workload imposed upon personnel assigned to the 2596th AFRTC was realized. The three active duty training periods at Hensley, Field, each of two weeks duration, represented a maximum effort of this Command, in view of commitments to afford simultaneous training at two RTC Encampments and one additional Air Division encampment. The basic fact that under such circumstances the only personnel, equipment and facilities available to this headquarters for training the 309th Air Division were at Hensley Field, was pointed out with certainty to the Training Project Officer, a representative of the Commanding General, 309th Air Division. Further, the difficulties to be expected, the limitations imposed and the lack of ideal conditions were made known. The prime factor in holding the encampment was that training necessarily would be conducted with only facilities, equipment and personnel within the 12th Air Force.

* * * *

s/ Glenn O. Barcus
t/ GLENN O. BARCUS
Major General, USAF
Commanding

4 Incls
3 Incls - n/c
Incl 4 - Added
Rpt of AD Trng (ADC-OY-27)
CO, 2496th AFRTC, 20 Jul 49

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

2 February 1949

OT 353

SUBJECT: Active Duty Training for USAF Reserve Troop Carrier Units

TO : Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis, Indiana.

1. Reference is made to the discussion in early December 1948 between the Deputy for Operations, your headquarters, and the Deputy for Operations, this headquarters, concerning the feasibility of operating a Reserve Troop Carrier Training Center at Casper Air Force Base, Wyoming. A study of this proposal has been completed by this headquarters. This study indicates:

a. Since there are no gliders authorized the Reserve Units, it is not considered feasible to utilize airborne troops as, at the present time, it is the established policy to use only carefully trained regular airplane crews to drop paratroopers. If it is deemed essential for parachutes to be dropped, packaged goods or dummies should be utilized.

b. The proposal to form a provisional wing from two Reserve Troop Carrier Wings for the purpose of training during active duty periods appears to have certain disadvantages.

(1) The active duty training period is normally the only annual opportunity for the Reserves to function as a unit and this period can be used most advantageously in organizing, establishing administrative procedures, promoting pride in outfit, and welding a homogeneous organization by intensive unit training. The forming of one provisional wing from two wings would nulify the possibility of achieving these objectives.

(2) It would be difficult to measure the operational proficiency of any one Reserve Troop Carrier Wing.

c. Due to other commitments and possible conflict with the Corollary Program, it is not considered advisable to utilize Regular Troop Carrier Units for the training of Reserve Troop Carrier Wings.

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25 Jan 42
OT/CHM/396

OT 353 Subj: Active Duty Training for USAF Reserve Troop Carrier Units

In this connection, it is pointed out that the Regular and the Reserve Units are equipped with different type aircraft.

2. In view of the above, it is recommended that consideration be given to the selection of one training site within your Air Force, preferably at a regularly established troop carrier type AFRTC, for the training of all Reserve Troop Carrier Wings of your Air Force during the summer active duty training periods. This method would appear to have the following advantages:

a. Training can be accomplished at an established base with maintenance equipment, stock level, and channel of supply peculiar to the type of cargo aircraft used by the Reserves.

b. Troop carrier aircraft and allied equipment assigned to the Reserve Troop Carrier AFRTC's within your Air Force could be pooled for successive use by all of your Reserve Troop Carrier Wings during their respective active duty training periods.

c. Provided you so desire, this headquarters will consider a request to place a limited number of key personnel from Regualr Troop Carrier Units on TDY with your Air Force for the summer period of active duty training to assist in establishing and operating an effective training center.

3. If you do not consider the method outlined in paragraph 2 a solution to your problem, this headquarters will consider any reasonable proposal that can be accomplished with the resources available.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

/t/ JACOB E. SMART
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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TO COMGENConAC MITCHEL AFB HEMPSTEAD NY
AF ORMC

FROM AFCRF-5 2177Ø CITE AFCONACRR 9416 PD YOUR COMMAND IS AUTHORIZED TO USE ATTERBURY AFB AS REQUESTED IN CITED MESSAGE PD AS DETERMINED BY CG CMA CONAC CMA COST RELATIVE TO SUCH UTILIZATION DURING FY 1949 WILL BE BORNE FROM FY 1949 OR P516 FUNDS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO YOUR COMMAND PD AS DETERMINED BY CG CMA CONAC CMA COSTS RELATIVE TO SUCH UTILIZATION DURING FY 195Ø WILL BE BORNE FROM FY 195Ø AIR FORCE RESERVE FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE TO YOUR COMMAND FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE 23 AFRTC PROGRAM

CFN AFCRF-5 2177Ø 9416 1949 1949 P516 195Ø 195Ø 23

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FILE: EXTRACT COPY 322

SUBJECT: Reactivation of Standby Bases for USAF Reserve Units Active Duty Training

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

REGISTER NO	
SUSPENDED TO	539
EXTENDED TO	
CLASS / ADM / MISC / HIST / PERS	

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
1	1 Aug 1949	DRF	VC	1. I concur with the comments of General Barcus. There is a need for one or two bases in each ConAC Air Force area which can be utilized for summer training of Reserve, Air National Guard and ROTC Units. 2. A base similar to Dover Air Force Base, where year-round bombing and gunnery training could be accomplished, would do a tremendous amount of good. /s/Reuben Kyle, Jr. /t/REUBEN KYLE, JR Colonel, USAF
*	*	*	*	* * * *
	1 Aug	O&T	DO	1. This directorate concurs with the recommendation that one (1) or more Air Force bases within each ConAC Air Force be established as locations for active duty training of units of the USAF Reserve Components. 2. This recommendation is especially appropriate to ConAC Air Forces having less than three (3) AFRTCs each, such as the First and Twelfth Air Forces. In such instances established AFRTCs do not have adequate facilities to provide active duty training for complete USAFR T/O & E wing at one location. In addition, there will be active duty training for units of the ANG and AROTC for which training locations will have to be furnished. Utilization of active duty training sites could be staggered so that one (1) component of the Reserve Forces within each ConAC Air Force would be using the training location at one time during the summer encampment period. 3. Reference 1st Indorsement, letter, Headquarters, 310th Air Division-Bombardment, subject: "Report of Unit Active Duty Training", 12 July 1949. San Marcos AFB was ideally suited as an active duty training location for the 310th Air Division (L) (USAFR) with the exception that there were no synthetic trainers (link trainers) available. The quality of ground and flying training accomplished during this active duty training period is considered to be excellent. The success of this training

ConAC FORM RQ-AG 1
10 December 1948

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This is is reply to correspondence bearing AG Register No._____ which was suspended to (date)_____

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FILE:

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

REGISTER NO				
SUSPENDED TO	539			
EXTENDED TO				
CLASS	ADM	MISC	HIST	PERS

SUBJECT: Reactivation of Standby Bases for USAF Reserve Units Active Duty Training

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
3	4 Aug	O&T	DO	(Cont'd)

period is due in large measure to the initiative and comprehensive planning accomplished by supervisory personnel.

4. Request decision pertaining to recommendation in par 15, 1st Indorsement, referenced letter mentioned in par 3 above.

5. In view of the fact that the recommendation mentioned in par 1 above, is an item of future planning, it is recommended that the Directorate of Plans and Requirements establish a project and take appropriate action to determine possible active duty training locations within each ConAC Air Force for independent and/or joint use by units of the USAF Reserve, ANG and AROTC scheduled to receive future active duty training.

/s/E. H. M.
/t/E. H. MacNEILL,
Major, USAF

/s/Howard F. Nichols
forDOLF L. MUEHLEISEN,
Colonel, USAF
Director of Opns & Trng.

* * * * * * * * *

4	5 Aug	DO	VC	

1. This Office concurs in the desirability of acting on General Barcus' recommendation, but is not in a position to discuss the feasibility of this action. It is recommended that this correspondence be indorsed to USAF advising them of our general concurrence with General Smith's proposal and that we will give them specific recommendations after a thorough study of facilities required, the cost of renovation, operation, and closing of the stations selected.

2. It is proposed to direct the Air Forces to study the feasibility of this proposal and to report to us the station or stations required, and the cost in funds and personnel to support such a program.

/s/G. S. Brown
/t/GEORGE S. BROWN,
Colonel, USAF
Acting Deputy for Operations

* * * * * * * * *

This is in reply to correspondence bearing AG Register No._____ which was suspended to (date)_____

ConAC FORM NO. 49 1
10 December 1948

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17 Nov 49 543

O&T 353A (3 Nov 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. The following information is furnished as requested in paragraph 3, basic communication:

a. Reference paragraph 3a, basic: Definite information has not been received to indicate the amount of USAFR T/O&E unit active duty funds to be allocated this command for the 3rd and 4th quarters, FY 1950 and the 1st and 2nd quarter, FY 1951. However, it is contemplated that sufficient funds will be made available to permit each USAFR T/O&E Wing to receive one (1) fifteen (15) day active duty tour during calendar year 1950. Such active duty training will be conducted, for the most part, at existing AFRTCs where like units are located. It is planned that two (2) squadrons worth of equipment (aircraft) will be utilized by USAFR T/O&E Wings during their active duty training period. Additional equipment required during such periods will be borrowed from USAFR sources within your command.

b. Reference paragraph 3b basic: The Special Assistant for Reserve Forces, Headquarters USAF, has indicated that there will be no funds made available for opening, maintaining and closing of inactive USAF bases to be used for the sole purpose of USAFR T/O&E Wing summer active duty training. This will preclude the use of Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, as an active duty site for USAFR T/O&E Wings within your command. There is no information available as to the exact amount of funds to be allocated this command during the balance of FY 1950 and 1st and 2nd quarter, FY 1951, for travel, movement of equipment and other expenses incidental to USAFR T/O&E Wing active duty training.

c. Reference paragraph 3c, basic: Present plans do not include ORTs or similar evaluation tests of USAFR T/O&E Wings during their forthcoming calendar year 1950 active duty training periods.

d. Reference paragraph 3d, basic: Necessary additional training equipment required by USAFR T/O&E Wings during their active duty training period will be borrowed from USAFR sources previously allocated your command.

2. Your headquarters will be advised accordingly as soon as the above proposed calendar year 1950 USAFR plan has been firmed and definite supporting fund allocations have been received.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/ J. H. Bloss
t/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst. Adj Gen

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Lt. Col. CMorgan/3139/bjm
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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1 Dec 1949

O&T 353

SUBJECT: USAF Reserve Active Duty Training During Calendar Year 1950

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Attached is a proposed active duty training program for USAFR T/O&E Wings. This program is tentative and is based on the assumption that sufficient funds will be made available to permit each of the presently activated USAFR T/O&E Wings to secure fifteen (15) days active duty training during the Calendar Year 1950.

2. The following are established as policies of this headquarters and will not be deviated from except for cogent reasons:

a. Each T/O&E Wing will be ordered to active duty as a complete Wing at one location.

b. Wherever possible, units will receive active duty training at an established AFRTC having like type aircraft.

c. During the active duty period, each Wing will be augmented with aircraft and equipment from other AFRTC's sufficient to equip at least two (2) squadrons of the Wing completely.

d. Wings which have not received a tour of fifteen (15) days' active duty training during the current fiscal year will be scheduled to receive such training prior to 1 July 1950.

3. The attached plan is subject to such changes as may be dictated by circumstances or the desires of the T/O&E Wing and/or Air Force commanders concerned, provided the broad policies set forth in paragraph 2 are not abrogated thereby.

4. The following will be considered in planning for the utilization of selected sites to conduct the active duty training.

a. The availability of necessary housing without extensive rehabilitation.

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b. The availability of equipment. Is necessary equipment available at the training location, or will augmentation be required? If augmentation is necessary, can the equipment be airlifted or will it have to be transported by other means?

c. The availability of vehicular equipment in view of the reduced T/A allowances and storage of T/O&E vehicles.

5. Immediately upon receipt of this letter, it is desired that the views of the various T/O&E Wing Commanders be secured and conferences convened by the responsible AF commanders designated in paragraph 6 hereof. At these conferences, definite dates will be established for the active duty period of each USAFR T/O&E Wing, the sites and units to be trained thereat will be firmly resolved, and agreements reached as to the mutual exchange of personnel and equipment between Air Forces concerned in order to implement the plan agreed upon. It is not anticipated that there will be any matters which cannot be resolved by the commanders concerned.

6. Air Force commanders are responsible for continuance of action as indicated below:

a. The Commanding General, Ninth Air Force will convene a conference with representatives of the First and Tenth Air Forces to make detailed plans for those units which are scheduled to receive active duty training at Godman AFB in accordance with Inclosure 1.

b. The Commanding General, Tenth Air Force will convene a conference with representatives of the Ninth Air Force to make detailed plans for those units which are scheduled to receive active duty training at Atterbury AF Base in accordance with Inclosure 1.

c. The Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force will:

(1) Convene a conference with representatives of the Ninth, Tenth, and Twelfth Air Forces to make detailed plans for those units which are scheduled to receive active duty training at Memphis AF Base in accordance with Inclosure 1.

(2) Convene a conference with representatives of the Twelfth Air Force for those units which are scheduled to receive active duty training at Eglin No. 2.

(3) Prepare an estimate as to the additional costs, if any, which will be incurred as a result of using Eglin Auxiliary Field No. 2, over and above those which would be normal were a B-26 AFRTC base utilized.

7. Each Air Force commander will:

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O&T 353, subj "USAF Res Active Dty Tng During CY 50" (Cont'd)

a. Appoint a project officer to monitor the logistical aspects of the program. This project officer will insure that the necessary requisitions are submitted at least one hundred and twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the active duty training period.

b. Render a complete report to this headquarters indicating the date and site each USAFR T/O&E Wing will conduct active duty training. This report will be submitted in sufficient time to reach this headquarters on or before 3 January 1950.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

1 Incl
"Proposed USAF Res Active
Dty Tng Sites (CY 50)"

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HEADQUARTERS TENTH AIR FORCE
BENJAMIN HARRISON AIR FORCE BASE, IND.

AFIODR 353 13 Oct 49

SUBJECT: Active Duty Training Stations for Reserve Forces Organizations Reference Letter Headquarters, Continental Air Command, O&T 210.455, 22 August 1949

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. No one station in this Air Force area is considered suitable for the active duty training of all Reserve Forces organizations. The location of air-to-air and air-to-ground ranges in this area, together with suitable fields from which to operate at a reasonable distance from the ranges, makes it mandatory that Air National Guard organizations train in the immediate vicinity of the Great Lakes region. No stations in this region are available for the operation of Reserve Wings, except for very short periods of time between National Guard Encampments. The number of Reserve Wings, together with the number of Air National Guard organizations which have to be brought to summer camp in approximately the same period, precludes the use of those stations jointly by all Reserve Forces.

2. Attention is invited to Tab "B", which is a survey of ten National Guard Fighter Squadrons in the Tenth Air Force area, with a view toward determination of the sources of personnel available to Reserve Forces organizations. This tab shows that in some cases a figure as high as 25%, or higher, of the assigned strength of a National Guard Squadron comes from personnel who are attending schools. Unless summer camp for Reserve Forces is held during the summer months when schools and colleges are on vacation, this percentage of personnel will be denied a summer camp period of concentrated training or the units themselves will be denied utilization of this category of personnel. Even though it were possible to recruit a Reserve unit to suitable strength from sources other than personnel attending schools, it is extremely doubtful if this would be advisable in view of the age brackets involved and the mental scope of the enlistees. Therefore, it is recommended that year-round training of Reserve Forces be deleted from consideration.

* * * * * *

4. Assuming that all Reserve Wings should be brought to active duty within the three months school vacation period, it would be necessary to bring two wings to active duty at the same time to enable all wings to be brought to active duty during this period. A study of TAB "A" indicates that the cheapest requirement in personnel would be to bring all Reserve

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AFIODR 353, Subj: Active Duty Training Stations for Reserve Forces Organizations Reference Letter Hq. ConAC, O&T 210.455, 22 Aug 49

Wings to active duty at Atterbury Air Force Base and Campbell Air Force Base during the summer vacation period. However, the requirement in personnel augmentation is prohibitive unless augmentation is effected from a source outside of that now available to the Tenth Air Force or some other suitable action is taken at a higher level to reduce augmentation requirements. It will be noted from the table that the heavy requirements in augmentation are those components which are missing from the Reserve T/O&E structure. If Food Service, Air Installations, Motor Vehicle, and Air Base Units are organized within the Reserve structure where they can be trained effectively, the Reserve Wing will become more self-supporting and, therefore, required augmentations will be considerably reduced and, it is believed, can be brought within the capabilities of the regular establishment to support.

* * * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

545

a/ H. O. Allison
t/ H. O. ALLISON
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

3 Incls (in trip)
1. Tab A - Personnel Requirements & Costs
2. Tab B - ANG Personnel Survey
3. Tab C - Site Survey

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HR JEOC

DE JEDGA 02

R [illegible]

FM CG 10 AF Benj Harrison AFB Ind

TO CG ConAC Mitchel AFB NY

AF [illegible]

AFIORR 39. Request information as to whether your headquarters will consider requests for activation of additional units in Reserve Troop Carrier Wings. For example, if an AFRTC Commander determines there are sufficient qualified Reservists in the area, may he request activation of a motor vehicle sq., food service sq, etc. End

CPH AFIORR 39

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Hq ConAC Mitchel AFB NY UNCLASSIFIED

CG Tenth AF Benj Harrison AFB Ft Benj Harrison Ind ROUTINE

AFIORR 39 MC

AFConAC P&O 26835. Reurmsg AFIORR 39, 3 Oct 49, requests for additional AFRTC Wing support units will not be considered. Funds Programmed to support the AFRTC program preclude any such expansion during FY 1950 and 1951. End

CG: ConAC

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s/t/ BRUCE H GENGEL
Capt USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Major CWJoachim/tm
P&O Ext 2231

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FAIR FIELD
Bernardsville, New Jersey

27 July 1949

Commanding General
First Air Force
Slocum Air Force Base
Fort Slocum, New York

Dear General Webster:

On Saturday, 23 July 1949, nearly 1,000 Air Force Reserve officers and airmen met at McGuire Air Force Base in response to the enclosed letter.

Approximately 10,000 New Jersey reservists were circularized. Of these, nearly 4,000 were airmen and about 6,000 were officers. Percentage-wise, there was more response from the airmen than the officers since over one third of the reservists at the meeting were airmen. We believe this to be significant. The whole Reserve Program can succeed or fail in direct proportion to the interest and participation of the reserve airmen. And, of the 5 part USAF Reserve Program for F.Y. 1950, only 2 phases are open to airmen; -- The AFRTC Program and the Corollary Unit program.

As you know, the F.Y. 1950 Program eliminated all T/O & E reserve units in New Jersey, except for the Corollary units at McGuire. These units, were they to remain in existence in present form or under different parent units, we believe to be inadequate for the reserve population in the state. We feel that relegation to the Volunteer Air Reserve is a waste of the reserve potential in the area. And yet, this is the proposed fate of these reservists under the F.Y. 1950 Program, as now set up.

* * * * *

Respectfully, submitted,
s/ Frederic N. Millen
t/ FREDERIC N. MILLEN
Lt. Colonel, USAFR

FNM:s

Encl-2

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CG CONAC MITCHEL AFB NY NC
CG FIRST AF SLOCUM AFB FT SLOCUM NY
CG FOURTH AF HAMILTON AFB HAMILTON CALIF ROUTINE
CG NINTH AF LANGLEY AFB VA X to 1,4,9,10,14.
CG TENTH AF BENJ HARRISON AFB FT BENJ HARRISON, IND
CG TWELFTH AF BROOKE AFB TEX PP3 7510 - 12th AF
CG FOURTEENTH AF ORLANDO AFB ORLANDO FLA

AF CONAC PERS MAN-R 17519 PD SUBJ IS VOLUNTEER AIR RESERVE TRAINING UNITS PD

AFR FOUR FIVE DASH TWO THREE IS PUBLISHED AND IN DISTR PD ONLY ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS

IN THE VOLUNTEER PROGRAM WILL BE ASSIGNED TO VARTUS PD VARTUS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT

BE USED AS HOLDING ORGANIZATIONS FOR NON PARTICIPATING RESERVISTS PD CONAC REG

FOUR FIVE DASH FIVE IS BEING REVISED ACCORDINGLY PD THIS HQ HAS RECEIVED NO

AUTHORIZATIONS FOR LIAISON PERS FOR FY FIVE ZERO PD CONSEQUENTLY LIAISON PERS

MUST BE PROVIDED FR WITHIN CURRENT RESOURCES AT THIS TIME PD REQ YOU INFORM

THIS HQ OF THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF LIAISON PERS REQUIRED TO ADMINISTER THE

VOLUNTEER UNIT PROGRAM BY QUARTER PROVIDED ONLY ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING

RESERVISTS ARE ASSIGNED SO SUCH UNITS CMA AND ALSO YR MAXIMUM CAPABILITY OF

PROVIDING THE REQUIRED LIAISON PERS FR WITHIN YR CURRENT AUTHORIZATION PD

LIAISON AUTHORIZATIONS WHEN AND IF RECEIVED WILL BE PROVIDED YR COMD WITHOUT

DELAY PD END

CG TWELFTH AF: REURMSG PP THREE CMA SEVEN FIVE ONE ZERO

CG: CONAC

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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COL R. W. FELLOWS/68
Pers Man-R Ext 1130

14 July 1949

RICHARD W. GEUSS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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VOLUNTEER AIR RESERVE TRAINING PROGRAM
Pers Man-R 353 (8 Jul 49) 1st Ind. 23 Jul 1949

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, First Air Force, Slocum Air Force Base, New Rochelle, New York

1. Correspondence mentioned in paragraph 1, above, received and referred to appropriate staff agencies for detailed study.

2. The number of reservists assigned to Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units in First Air Force is excessive. Only active participants in the program should be assigned to the volunteer units. Units should not be burdened with the maintenance and administration of the records of non-participating reservists. It was planned to train only 60,000 reservists in FY 50 in Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units throughout ConAC. You state that you have more than 65,000 Air Reservists assigned to units in the First Air Force area alone. Culling this number to those reservists who are active participants in the program should be initiated immediately.

555

3. This headquarters has received no additional troop space authorization from Hq Usaf to provide for liaison personnel for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units. You will be informed immediately when and if liaison authorizations are received. Every effort should be made to provide the minimum number of liaison personnel required to support the Volunteer Program from within your current personnel authorization.

ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Commanding

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Rewrtn:
IEC/7E/[illegible]Sep 49

Organization and Establishment of VART Wings
(P&O322) (7 Sep 49) 1st Ind 21 Sep 49
HQ, CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida

1. Paragraph 6a, ConAC letter 45-13, 15 August 1949 charges the numbered air force commanders with the responsibility for the designation and organization of Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units. This is to be interpreted as including wings, within the criteria established by paragraphs 5b, 7a (1) and 7f of the same numbered letter.

2. Specifically referring to paragraph 3i, of AFR 45-23, 9 July 1949, the composition of wings, groups and squadrons was established by paragraph 5b of above quoted ConAC Letter and the wing area of juridiction was established by paragraph 7f of the same document. This headquarters desired to give the air force commanders as much flexibility as possible in the determination of the exact wing areas because of variances in local conditions. Group and squadron areas will be determined by your headquarters and will be within the wing area as established by your headquarters.

3. With reference to paragraph 4 of basic communication, your attention is directed to the wording of paragraph 1, attachment 1 to ConAC letter 45-13. This indicates clearly that the Fourteenth Air Force will set up <u>one</u> Wing Liaison office to supervise the activities of <u>all</u> the wings allocated to its command and that this Wing Liaison office shall consist of 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, 2 captains, and 2 civilians. In this connection attention is specifically invited to message ConAC DF 21317.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WEBSTER:

st/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Mitchel Field, New York

Rewrtn
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20 September 1949

P&O 322

SUBJECT: Movements of Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units

TO : Special Assistant for Reserve Forces, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

* * * *

3. All numbered Air Forces of this Command are being directed to discontinue a Volunteer Air Reserve Training Unit at its current location and to organize a Volunteer Air Reserve Training Unit at the new location whenever it becomes necessary to relocate a unit for any reason; rather than moving a unit which is already organized. This to avoid the delay and correspondence incident to a formal movement request and directive.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAR)
Asst Adj Gen

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Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units
MAS 326 (1 Sep 49) 1st Ind 23 Sep 49

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Special Assistant for Reserve Forces, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. With reference to instructions contained in basic communication, the following information is submitted:

a. Reference paragraph 3: This headquarters has directed each ConAC air force to receive their fund requirements for the acquisition of facilities in the implementation of the VARTU Program and to expedite a full report thereon, incorporating the detailed information requested in cited paragraph. When these reports are received, a compilation thereof will be made and immediately forwarded to your headquarters by separate correspondence.

b. Reference paragraph 4: This headquarters has prepared a proposed T/A prescribing allowances of equipment deemed essential for administration, maintenance and training of VARTU's and liaison offices described in AFR 45-23, "United States Air Force Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units," 8 July 1949. This Table is attached as Inclosure #1. Cited proposed T/A is being coordinated within this command for recommended changes and will be forwarded to Headquarters, Air Materiel Command at the earliest practicable date.

c. Reference paragraph 5: The administrative and training responsibilities of the VARTU commander and the paralleling USAF Liaison Officers have been delineated in ConAC Letter 45-13, 15 August 1949, which is attached as Inclosure #2. The VARTU commander is responsible for the conduct of Air Reserve training within Reserve units. The ConAC air force commanders are charged with responsibility for the preparation and supervision of training programs. At the present time, this command is preparing detailed training directives for the VARTU Program. The VARTU commander and his staff will participate as supervisors and instructors in the resulting training programs and will be responsible for training administration as differentiated from normal personnel administration which remains a ConAC air force responsibility.

d. Reference paragraph 6: Letter, this headquarters, MAS 400, 23 September 1949, subject: "Supplies and Equipment for the VARTU Program," outlines recommended procedures for the requisitioning, accounting and supplying of property to VARTU's and is attached as Inclosure #3.

2. Pending the publication of an appropriate T/A for VARTU's and liaison offices, the Air Materiel Command has been requested to approve the special issue of supplies and equipment necessary for the efficient support of this program.

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Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units (Cont'd)

3. To implement AFR 45-23, it is planned to organize seven (7) Wing Liaison Offices and one hundred and fifty (150) Group Liaison Offices.

4. One hundred and eighty (180) officers, one hundred and fifty (150) airmen and fourteen (14) civilians utilized as outlined in ConAC Letter 45-13 and Attachment I thereto are considered the minimum necessary to service the sixty thousand (60,000) Volunteer Air Reservists programmed in letter, DAF, "The USAF Reserve Program for Fiscal Year 1950," 9 May 1949. As of 31 August 1950 there were fifty-eight thousand, two hundred and twenty-five (58,225) Volunteer Air Reservists assigned to Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units.

5. Proposed locations of Wing and Group Liaison Offices are listed in Inclosure #4. One (1) Wing Liaison Office is located at each ConAC Air Force Headquarters to supervise all VARTU Wings within the Air Force area with exception of the Tenth Air Force which will have a second Wing Liaison Office planned tentatively for Kansas City, Kansas. Group Liaison Offices will be placed where active VARTU's are located and will supervise the training of an average of three (3) squadrons and their flights.

6. Organization and manning of Liaison Offices has been held in abeyance pending decision on authorization of required personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ Neal J. O'Brien
t/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

4 Incls
1 - Proposed T/A
2 - ConAC Ltr 45-13
3 - Ltr, ConAC MES 400
4 0 Proposed Loctions of VARTU Wgs & Gps

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office of the deputy for personnel

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Subject Proposed draft of ConAC Ltr 45-xx VARTU's

FROM: Lt Col Batts

REMARKS: Col Landon:

PART I

Liaison Offices

1. Discussion:

a. The organization of VARTU Liaison office on the basis of par 4b AFR 45-23, 8 July 1949 is utterly impossible in view of the fact that "manning" can only find 100 officers, 150 airmen, and 14 civilians available to staff the 49 wings, 150 Groups, and 799 Squadrons being activated under the provisions of 1st ind., this headquarters, to USAF ltr, "The AFRTC USAF Reserve, Remainder of FY 1949", 6 May 1949.

b. Since the ConAC air forces have already activated many Wings, Groups, and Squadrons under the provisions of the 1st Ind. cited above, it would only cause confusion to alter the allocation of units.

c. Therefore, it will be necessary to allocate the personnel available in a manner to attain the greatest possible efficiency (in spite of the provisions of AFR 45-23). It is believed this is provided for in attachment #1 of the attached Draft of ConAC Ltr. 45-xx.

2. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. Liaison offices be established for Wings and Groups - but not for Squadrons.

b. One Liaison office be organized for each of the 150 Groups; each office to be composed of 1 officer and 1 airman.

c. The remaining 30 officers and 14 civilians be apportioned among the six air forces in proportion to their responsibilities as indicated by the number of their VARTU Wings and the estimated number of VA Reservists participating.

(1) The most feasible plan to accomplish this seemed to be to organize 1 Liaison Office to supervise the wings allocated to each of the air forces with the exception of the Tenth AF which, on account of the number of its Wings, should have 2 Liaison Offices.

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(2) The size of the Liaison Office was varied in proportion to the number of wings allocated to each Air Force.

* * * *

PART II

Administration of Records

1. Discussion: (Re Par. 11b of proposed letter 45-xx)

a. In view of the responsibilities and functions of the liaison personnel it would be difficult if not impossible for them to maintain the records of the VARTU personnel.

b. Because of the various specialities into which many of the VARTU's are organized and the consequent inexperience of many of the Reservists in maintaining personnel records, such maintenance by them is neither practicable nor desirable.

c. Therefore, it is inadvisable to have the maintenance of the records placed in the hands of either the liaison personnel or the Volunteer Reservists.

2. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. The records be maintained by a small record section set up at the headquarters of each ConAC air force; the section personnel to be drawn from personnel authorizations currently assigned to each air force.

b. In order to facilitate this work and minimize confusion the Field 201 Files and allied papers should not be consolidated with the Master 201 Files.

Attachments:
Copy of Proposed ConAGL 45-xx
Copy of AFH 45-23, 8 July 1948
Copy of 1st Ind. this Hq, 12 May 1949

s/s/ A.P.H.
ARTHUR P. HAYES
Ext 7207

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

14 Sep 1949

Dear Senty:

For some time my staff has been trying to develop a sound plan for the training of Volunteer Air Reservists as announced in letter, Department of the Air Force, subject "The USAF Reserve Program for FY 1950", 9 May 1949. This letter was published and given wide publicity. AF Regulation 45-23 directs the implementation of this program by this command.

All planning to date was falsely based upon the statement "personnel and funds for manning 185 Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units are included in the Fiscal Year 1950 Program," included in paragraph 3c (4) of above-referenced letter. No sound basis can be established until we know just where we stand on authorizations for liaison personnel.

I have looked this proposition over thoroughly and I am convinced that all efforts to accomplish effective training of the Volunteer Air Reserve will amount to absolutely nothing unless we give the Volunteer Units some help in the form of liaison assistance.

Frankly, I don't believe that we need to man the units to the extent contemplated in your regulation. A minimum of 180 officers and 164 airmen or civilians can implement this program initially. The extent of additional authorization above the foregoing will depend on the reception given this program. I ask therefore, that my personnel authorization be increased immediately by this amount.

Since publicity has already committed me to the five point Air Reserve program for Fiscal Year 1950, I will not ask relief from the Volunteer Reserve mission if the increased authorization is not made. I have been given the mission and I will carry it out. This can be done, however, only at the expense of other missions. I am certain that procedence and priorities of all missions would not be best served by such action.

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Ltr fm Gen Whitehead to Gen Fairchild re Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, continued

My plan to use the increased authorization is outlined in ConAC Letter 46-13, a copy of which is inclosed. Necessarily, implementation of this letter has been suspended.

I urge your favorable consideration of this problem,

Sincerely,

ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant, General, United States Air Force
Commanding

1 Incl
ConAC Ltr
46-13

General Muir S. Fairchild
Vice Chief of Staff
Office of the Vice Chief of Staff
Hq United States Air Force
Washington 25, D.C.

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CG FIRST AF SLOCUM AFB FT SLOCUM NY
CG FOURTH AF HAMILTON AFB HAMILTON CALIF
CG NINTH AF LANGLEY AFB VA ROUTINE
CG TENTH AF BENJAMIN HARRISON AFB
FT BENJAMIN HARRISON INDIANA
CG TWELFTH AF BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE TEXAS

CG FOURTEENTH AFB ORLANDO AFB ORLANDO FLA

AFCon\CPersMan-R 16299 FD DUE TO NON RECEIPT OF AUTHORIZATIONS FROM HQ USAF FOR THE VOLUNTEER AIR RESERVE TRAINING UNIT LIAISON PERSONNEL CMA YOU WILL NEED TO MAKE SUCH PERSONNEL AVAILABLE OUT OF YOUR CURRENT AUTHORIZATIONS FD ANY CIVILIANS EMPLOYED FOR THIS PROGRAM WILL BE PAID FROM RESERVE FUNDS FD END

CG:ConAC

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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CWO H.G.BURKE/315
Pers Man-R Ext 1130

30 Jun 49

FREDERICK W. GERHARD, JR.
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Inter-Office Routing Slip

SUBJECT: VARTUS

1 27 Jul P&R O&T

1. Message AFIOPPR 1279, 26 July from Tenth AF and our reply are attached hereto for your information and recommendations.

2. The following number of VARTUs have been organized as of 27 July 1949:

Wings	18 (authorized 49)
Groups	80
Squadrons	337
Flights	338

3. It is requested that this office be furnished the following information:

a. Can the VARTUs be properly trained without the liaison and instructor personnel specified in Par 4, AFR 45-23, 8 July 1949? To date this headquarters has received no additional troop spaces to provide such personnel, and the ConAC Air Forces cannot provide personnel from their existing authorized bulk allotments.

* * * *

s/ C. W. Joachim
t/ C. W. JOACHIM
Major, USAF
Ext 2231/80

s/ W. T. Cumiskey
for W. A. DANIEL
Colonel, USAF
D/P&R

2 Incls
1-Cy msg from 10th AF
2-ConAC reply thereto

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

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28 October 1949

FROM: DEPUTY OF PERSONNEL
TO: VICE COMMANDER

1. Basic reference for volunteer Air Reserve Units are AFR 45-23 and ConAc Letter 45-13. Neither of these has been implemented due to lack of liaison personnel authorization. (The authorizations did come in on 12 October).

2. To set the VAR up and insure proper training, a minimum requirement exists for 180 full time extended active duty officers and 864 regular airmen. In addition, a requirement exists for approximately 500 Reserve officers, not on active duty, who will be authorized to receive inactive duty training pay and who will be eligible for two weeks active duty annually.

3. At the present time USAF has authorized a temporary increase of 180 officers and an undetermined number of airmen. We were instructed to determine how many of the 180 officers we can provide from current resources. USAF will provide the remainder. These officers and airmen are intended to be Group and Wing Liaison people.

4. The long range plan of USAF provides for the replacement of the 180 active duty officers by a like number of Reserve officers, not on active duty, who will be authorized inactive duty training pay.

5. It is my opinion that any plan to use inactive duty people as Group and Wing Liaison officers will not provide useful supervision. It is not possible for any Reservist whose participation is limited to one day per week to supervise the activities of several groups whose meeting times and places are varied. We find a very good example of this in the Midwest where a Group Liaison officer at Kansas City, Kansas might be required to supervise squadrons throughout Kansas, Colorado and Wyoming. We must have full time active duty officers, and we must have full time active duty airmen to provide the assistance and administrative support which such Liaison officers will require. I propose that the following discussed plan be adopted:

a. This command through its six (6) Air Forces will man a total of 150 Group Liaison offices. Each will have one (1) officer and one (1) airman assigned. These Group Liaison offices will be responsible for the scheduling and supervision of squadron training. In addition, they will have the administrative function of accomplishing the inactive duty training authorization (AF Form 40) for the volunteer Reservists assigned to various squadrons. The Group Liaison will not have the administrative function of maintaining records. The Group Liaison will not have the administrative function of maintaining records. This function will be performed at the numbered Air Force level.

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From DP to VC 28 Oct. 49 cont.

b. Each Air Force will be provided with one overall supervisory Liaison office (for the want of a better name, we might refer to it as Wing Liaison) composed of three (3) officers and two (2) airmen. The Tenth Air Force, as an exception, should be authorized two (2) such Wing Liaison offices because of its broad area and heavy reserve population.

c. Each individual squadron will be authorized one Regular Air Force airman, as a Sergeant instructor, and should be further authorized one (1) Reserve officer, not on active duty, who will receive 48 paid training periods and two (2) weeks active duty annually.

6. Review of the foregoing shows a total requirement of 180 active duty officers, approximately 664 Regular airmen and approximately 500 Reservists, not on active duty, who are authorized inactive duty pay.

7. This office is presently preparing necessary staff action to present our requirements to Headquarters USAF, based on above. We will go ahead on the use of 180 officers and 164 airmen. Action either way by USAF would not disturb the basic structure.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 October 1949

SUBJECT: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, New York

1. Reference is made to letter from your headquarters dated 14 September 1949 concerning the above subject. The 164 airmen you request to support the VARTU program will be authorized. The officer requirement poses a difficult problem due to reduced troop ceilings and to other critical requirements.

2. It is desired that you review your current and projected troop authorizations and report to this headquarters immediately the number of officers you can assign to this duty without seriously impairing the performance of higher priority missions. The difference in this number and your stated requirements of 180 officers will be provided you from Air Force resources.

3. It is planned to provide additional spaces in the mobilization assignment program sufficient to provide administrative and ttraining supervisors for the VARTU locations now programmed from reserve officers on an inactive duty status assigned as mobilization assignees in the capacity of "VARTU supervisors" who will be credited with 48 paid drill periods and 2 weeks active duty per year.

4. When this proposal has been implemented and the officers are sufficiently trained to undertake their duties, the authorization of Air Force officers will be withdrawn.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ William F. McKee
WILLIAM F. MCKEE
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

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AFCRF-1 (300X736) OCT 20 1949

SUBJECT: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, New York

1. Reference is made to letter from this headquarters, subject as above, dated 12 October 1949, which states that this headquarters plans to provide additional spaces in the mobilization assignment program sufficient to provide administrative and training supervisors for the VARTU locations now programmed. The purpose of these assignments will be to replace active duty officers who will be assigned your command temporarily for the purpose of implementing the VARTU program. It is planned to authorize these mobilization assignees 48 paid drill periods and two weeks active duty per year. Funds and facilities do not exist for providing flying time for these officers.

2. It is desired that you submit a detailed plan of utilization indicating the locations at which the officers will be used, the number, the estimated ranks, and an estimate on the number of inactive duty training periods these officers will participate in if it does not appear feasible for them to accomplish the full 48. A statement is desired as to how the certification on the Form 40 will be accomplished for these officers. In cases where the same officer is not considered qualified to perform both the administrative and training functions necessary to the administration of the VARTU program, this headquarters will consider the utilization of one officer for each duty. However, it is anticipated that this will occur only in exceptional cases. Officers for this purpose should be included in the estimates referred to above.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

J. P. McCONNELL
[illegible], USAF
Deputy Spec. Asst. for Reserve Forces

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Liaison Personnel for VARTU's
AP 210.3 (20 Oct 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Special Assistant for Reserve Forces, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. This headquarters does not concur in the plan to use Reserve officers not on active duty as VAR liaison officers at the echelons for which personnel authorizations were requested by letter of 14 September 1949.

2. The one hundred and eighty (180) officers and one hundred and sixty-four (164) airmen are required to establish group and wing liaison offices. These offices have the following functions:

a. Issuance of Training Authorizations, AF Form 40.

b. Attendance, in supervisory capacity, at squadron and flight training periods from time to time.

c. Assistance in the procurement of training aids, materials, and equipment.

d. Assistance to squadron commanders in planning training of the units.

Because of the magnitude of the program, considerable travel and full time duty are required to perform these functions. As an example, the 9144 VAR Group Liaison Office at Minneapolis supervises all units in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Only by providing full time liaison will effective supervision be afforded.

3. Reserve officers who are authorized inactive duty pay and active duty training can be utilized most effectively as VAR Squadron Commanders. To do so would recognize the role of squadron commander as a key one in the organization and training of Volunteer Air Reservists. The pay and active duty training authorized him, (but denied all other Volunteer Reservists), corresponds closely to the administrative function pay which commanders of Organized Air Reserve units receive. Each squadron requires, in addition, the fulltime services of one MCO for general administrative duties, except that in some instances one MCO can serve more than one squadron where squadrons are so located as to make this feasible.

4. There are now three hundred and forty-four (344) VAR squadrons in training within this command. It is estimated that approximately five hundred (500) such squadrons will be active by 30 June 1950.

5. In accordance with paragraph 2, basic communication, pertinent information regarding the use of Reservists as VAR Squadron Commanders follows:

a. Locations at which utilized will correspond to squadron locations. These are reported to your headquarters monthly in Part IV, Organization Strength Summaries (Reports Control Symbol AF-RC-P164).

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Liaison Personnel for VARTU's (Cont'd)

b. A total of five hundred (500) officers in the average grade of lieutenant colonel will be required.

c. It is estimated that three hundred and forty-four (344) of these will qualify for forty-two (42) training periods and one hundred and fifty-six (156) will qualify for an average of eighteen (18) training periods during remainder of FY 1950. During FY 1951 all five hundred (500) should qualify for forty-eight (48) training periods.

d. Certification of the form 40 will be accomplished by the VAR squadron commander himself. Issuance of the training authorization will be in the name of the Air Force commander by the appropriate liaison office.

6. In summary of the above, it is requested that this Command be authorized permanently an additional one hundred and eighty (180) officer and one hundred and sixty-four (164) airmen troop spaces in the grades shown in attachment 1 to ConAC letter 45-13, and an additional five hundred (500) airmen troop spaces in the first three grades, preferably the first, for duty with the VAR squadrons [illegible] totali 180 officers and 564 airmen troop spaces. Of these, seventy-nine (79) officer and ninety-seven (97) airmen spaces can be obtained from savings in the present personnel authorization of this Command. Details of this are furnished in first indorsement, this headquarters, to letter your headquarters, 12 October 1949, subject as above.

7. It is further requested that authority be granted to establish VAR squadron commanders as paid mobilization assignees and that funds sufficient to cover active and inactive duty training be made available.

[illegible] Incls
1. ConAC Ltr 45-13, 15 Aug 49
2. ConAC Ltr 45-13A, 1 Nov 49

[illegible] AYRES
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

Inclosures not required for AG File

Form No. 5
28 March 1946

Adjutant General's Office

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DFL/tm 587

12 Oct 49
Subject: Liaison Personnel for VARTUs

P&O 326 (12 Oct 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Confirming telephone conference, Captain Reniek, Headquarters United States Air Force, and Colonel Price of this headquarters, following information is submitted.

a. After review of our current projected troop authorizations, this headquarters can assign seventy-nine (79) officers to VARTU liaison duty without seriously impairing the performance of higher priority missions. Source of these spaces is: ten percent (10%) of the total officers presently assigned to Air Force Reserve Training Centers.

b. In compliance with a request made in the above mentioned telephone conference, a review of our current troop spaces authorization was made and ninety-seven (97) airmen can be assigned to VARTU liaison duty without seriously impairing the p rformance of higher priority missions. Source of these spaces is: a saving resulting from establishing the 2233rd AFRTC as a tenant organization rather than non-tenant.

2. It is requested that the grade spread for VARTU liaison personnel be as indicated on attachment 1 to ConAC Letter 45-13, 15 August 1949, (copy attached) and that seven (7) Master Sergeants SSN 502 and seven (7) Technical Sergeants SSN 502 be authorized in lieu of the fourteen (14) civilians indicated therein. This will result in the following grades: seven (7) Lieutenant Colonels, ten (10) Majors, eighty-eight (88) Captains, seventy-five (75) Lieutenants, seven (7) Master Sergeants, fifty-seven (57) Technical Sergeants and one hundred (100) Staff Sergeants.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t VANCE H. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl
ConAC Letter 45-13

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Supplies for Reserve Training
M&S 400 (17 Jun 49) 2nd Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 25 Aug 1949

TO: Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio Attn: MCMSXO45

1. With reference to paragraph 2, preceding indorsement, attention is invited to paragraphs 5 and 7f, AF Regulation 45-23, "United States Air Force Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units", 8 July 1949. No funds are available to support the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program, nor can it be determined at this time when such funds will be available. This is also applicable to the requirements of the Volunteer Air Force Reserve Liaison Offices.

2. It will, therefore, be necessary for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units to make use of supplies, equipment and facilities that can be made available, without cost, by the regular Air Force, the Organized Air Force Reserve, governmental, and other agencies.

3. With reference to paragraph 3, preceding indorsement, a proposed Table of Allowance for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units is presently being prepared by this headquarters so that administrative and training equipment requirements, based on authorization therein, may be procured with Air Reserve funds when available.

4. With reference to expendable office supplies, the allowances contained in T/A 10-100-3 may be used as a guide, and authority for requisitioning requirements of this type material for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units and liaison offices. Since the office staffs of the liaison offices mentioned above are limited, requirements for this type material will be small and should have no diredt effect on existing Air Force Reserve stocks.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/st/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

15 September 1949

M&S 400

SUBJECT: Supplies and Equipment for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units

TO : Commanding General, 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th AFs

1. This headquarters is presently in the process of establishing procedures for the issue of supplies and equipment to the VARTUs. When such procedures have been established and coordinated with the Air Materiel Command, your headquarters will be immediately advised.

2. With a view toward providing adequate support for the development of the VARTU program and in order to establish the basis on which quantitative and budgetary requirements for supplies and equipment required to conduct the VARTU program can be computed, it is desired that a recommended Table of Allowances be prepared by your headquarters, prescribing allowances of equipment normally required for the purpose of administration, maintenance and training of VARTUs. In the connection, cognisance should be taken of facilities available for the utilization of such equipment and other supplies and equipment that may be made available by other agencies by gift or loan in accordance with paragraphs 5b, 7f and 7g, AF Regulation 45-23, 8 July 1949. The attached proposed Table, which has been prepared in consonance with the above, may be used as a guide in preparing a recommended Table of Allowances. The basis of issue should also take into consideration the various specialties, types of units, and liaison offices described in paragraphs 3b and 4b of AF Regulation 45-23, 8 July 1949, as implemented by ConAC Letter 45-13, 15 August 1949.

3. It is requested that the proposed Table of Allowances for VARTUs be prepared be prepared by your headquarters at the earliest practicable date and forwarded to reach this headquarters not later than 7 October 1949.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl
Proposed TA

/s/ EDMUND LAUDER
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR MATERIEL COMMAND
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

MCMEXT

SUBJECT: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units

TO: Director of Maintenance, Supply, and Services
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Plans and Policy Office

1. Headquarters, Continental Air Command has requested this Headquarters to approve special issue of supplies and equipment required for the support of Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units. An advance copy of a proposed T/A listing this equipment has been forwarded this Headquarters.

2. This Headquarters does not recommend that Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units be authorized to submit special issue requisitions for equipment for the following reasons:

a. Only equipment which is excess to requirements of the regular Air Force can be supplied from regular Air Force stocks to reserve units. Very little, if any, equipment listed in the proposed T/A for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units is excess to regular Air Force requirements.

b. AF Regulation 45-23 specifies that only to the extent available after requirements of the organized reserve have been met, can reserve funds be utilized for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units equipment. It is conceivable that no funds whatsoever would be available under this provision.

c. AF Regulation 45-23 specifies that every effort will be made locally to obtain the cooperation of educational institutions and other agencies in making available to Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, without cost, facilities and equipment for training purposes.

3. For reasons stated above, the advisability of publishing a T/A for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units is questioned. Unless it is anticipated that the concept of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units program will be changed, i.e., from local support through civic and educational organizations, to government support through specific appropriation, and that AF Regulation 45-23 will be revised accordingly, the practical value of a T/A is not apparent.

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Basic: Ltr fr WPAFB, Subj: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units (Continued)

4. In the event it is determined that T/A authority will be provided for the support of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units program, it is recommended that necessary authorization be included in T/A 1-85, rather than by publication of a separate T/A.

5. Request that this Headquarters be advised of your decisions relative to the foregoing.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ C. O. MOFFETT
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Chief, Organizational Equipment
Authorization Office
Directorate, Supply and Maintenance

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Bsc ltr fr Hq ConAC, Mitchel AFB, New York to Hq AMC, Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio, dtd 23 Sep 49 subj: "Supplies and Equipment for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Unit Program

1st Ind MCMSXO45/RR/lsm

Hq AMC, Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio, 2 November 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Before Headquarters, Air Materiel Command can disseminate supply procedures on the VARTU Program, further information will be required from Headquarters, United States Air Force. Accordingly, the inclosed letter was dispatched to Headquarters, United States Air Force requesting clarification on this program. Upon receipt of reply fromHeadquarters, United States Air Force, supply support to these units will be given further consideration and Headquarters, Continental Air Command will be advised of action being taken.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

3 Incls:
1 - w/d
2 - w/d
added 1 Incl
3 - Ltr to Hq, USAF

/s/ C. W. HAHN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant for Operations
Supply Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

8 December 1949

AFABF-7d

SUBJECT: Funding of VARTU Program

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York
Attention: Comptroller's Division

1. Reference is made to Wire AF CONACBUD 27579, dated 13 October 1949, requesting confirmation of your interpretation of AF Regulation 45-23 as it pertains to the operation of the VARTU program.

2. Pending publication of an appropriate T/A, Air Force Reserve funds will be utilized to include obligations in connection with the VARTU program only for the leasing of space, utilities services, and janitorial services at VARTU locations. In the event that your Command has a requirement for funds for other than these items, it is requested that this Headquarters be advised.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/ G. S. Hoover
/t/ JACK W. WOOD
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Budget
DCS/Comptroller

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

4 November 1949

M&S 400

SUBJECT: Logistical Support for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
(Identical letters to CGs, 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th & 14th AFS)

1. The responsibility for the implementation of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Unit Program has been charged to the Commanding General, Continental Air Command by paragraph 4a, AFR 45-23, 8 July 1949. In turn, this responsibility, with respect to all VARTU activities within your jurisdiction, has been delegated to you by paragraph 6a, ConAC Letter 45-13, 15 August 1949. To effectively carry out this responsibility, it is essential that aggressive and timely logistical support be afforded the VARTU Program. Accordingly, it is desired that you insure that all your subordinate activities aggressively support this program and render all possible assistance to VARTUs in the accomplishment of their individual mission.

2. Pending the publication of an appropriate table of allowances or receipt of authority from Hq USAF for the special issue of equipment to VARTUs, all activities of this command will issue training aids and equipment required for the training and administration of VARTUs on a loan basis from available Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve and/or Air Force ROTC stocks, provided such issues do not interfere with the mission of the issuing activity. Such equipment will be issued to the authorized VARTU Liaison Officer on Memorandum Receipt.

3. The lists of available Class 26 equipment which are being periodically furnished to your headquarters will be closely screened to insure that items suitable for use in the VARTU Program are selected and requested. Requests submitted by your headquarters for Class 26 equipment will include numerical designation of VARTU and AF base or AFRTC accountable officer to whom equipment will be shipped. These requests for Class 26 equipment will supplement requirements submitted by your headquarters for Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve Training Center and Air Force ROTC activities.

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Ltr to CG, 1st AF, Mitchel AFB, N.Y., File M&S 400, Subj: "Logistical Support for Volunteer Air Res Tng Units" (Cont'd)

4. Every effort will be made locally to obtain the cooperation of educational institutions and other agencies in making available to VARTUs, without cost, equipment which will assist in the creation and retention of active interest, on the part of these Reservists, as required for an effective training program.

/t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Interroffice Routing Slip

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program

3 2 Dec MatP DP

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2. Support of the proposed program, materiel-wise, is an impossibility with the limited resources made available to date for the support of the Reserve Program during FY-50.

3. In accordance with par 4, Comment 1, it is suggested the following be incorporated in the reply to the 10th Air Force:

"Action to effect the issuance of supplies necessary to support the VARTU program has been taken with the preparation and submission to AMC of proposed TA 1-87, "Administration, Maintenance and Training Equipment for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units."

"Headquarters USAF is cognizant of the fact that little, if any, of the items appearing in this proposed table are excess to the requirements of the Regular Air Force. Support through appropriations for the purpose will be required if approval and supply of these items to VARTU units is to be effected. Efforts to improve the present supply support situation for these units will continue."

s/t Michael J. Brady
MICHAEL J. BRADY
Major USAF
Ext 7127

s/
t/ Robert L. Petit
ROBERT L. PETIT
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel Planning

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

9 December 1949

M&S 400

SUBJECT: Logistical Support for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

* *

2. Notwithstanding the clarification and information concerning the support to be given the VART program, it is still felt that satisfactory servicing of the units in lacking for the following reasons:

a. Absence of a Table of Allowance authorizing and controlling the issue of equipment to VART units. Incloased is a request from the 9003rd VART Wing (Incl. 1) which is indicative of the requirements of a VART unit. The figures represent one wing, group or squadron, and would reach tremendous amounts if multiplied by the 8 Wings, 25 Groups and 88 Squadrons presently assigned this headquarters.

b. Lack of funds for transportation of supplies and equipment from the nearest supply point to the unit, or to the liaison office.

c. Lack of funds for normal administrative overhead requirements for the VART unit liaison offices, such as equipment repairs and personnel travel funds.

d. Lack of authorization for expendable supplies for VART unit or liaison offices to accomplish the minimum administrative work necessary in the operation of such units. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, your headquarters, M&S 400, 29 October 1949, subject: "Issue of Expendable Supplies to VART units".

* *

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ R J ERICKSON
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

1 Incl.
cy ltr 9003rd VART Wg
16 Nov 49

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MS&S-3 400 (9 Dec 49) 1st Ind.

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 6 Jan 1950

To: Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, N.Y.

1. The problem of providing logistical and funding support for the VART Program is under study at Headquarters USAF. Your headquarters will be advised upon receipt of information about this program.

2. Letter, M&S 400, this headquarters, 4 Nov 49, "Logistical Support for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units", outlines the only logistical support that can be provided the VART Program at this time.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl.
n/c

/st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst. Air Adj. Gen.

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Major J. Blaum 1249/bjm
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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 353 21 Dec 1949

SUBJECT: Volunteer Air Reserve Training Outline for Armament Flights

TO : CG's, First, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth & Fourteenth AF's

1. In accordance with AF Regulation 45-23, 8 July 1949, ConAC Letter 45-13, 15 August 1949, and letter, O&T 353, this headquarters, 30 August 1949, subject, "Training Programs for Armament and Photographic Volunteer Reserve Training Flights", twenty (20) copies of subject outline have been forwarded your headquarters under separate cover. This outline contains curricula upon which training schedules for Armament Volunteer Air Reserve Training Flights may be based. Sufficient material is included to provide these flights with four (4) hours' training per month for a period of three (3) years.

* * * * * *

3. The ever-increasing importance of the VART program to national defense requires that the air reservist be kept abreast of every development so that in the event of a national emergency reserve personnel may assume active participation rolls with the least practicable delay. Therefore, every effort should be made to encourage participation in the program within units already established, and to press for the activation of additional flights. To this end, each program lists former and current air force military occupational specialties which might be included in armament flights. These lists will indicate a considerably broadened coverage of personnel that might be incorporated into these flights since the present concept of armament within the USAF includes the functions of what were formerly known as Air Corps Armament, Air Chemical, and Aviation Ordnance. A renewal of effort directed at the more heavily populated districts within your command should produce gratifying results.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/ V. E. Murphy
t/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

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OR 353, Dec 1 1949, Hq Twelfth Air Force, subject: "Training Programs for Specialized VART Flights".

O&T 353 (1 Dec 49) 1st Ind Maj W. D. Henderson/4248/mw

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, N.Y. 20 Dec 49

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

* * * * *

3. This headquarters does not presently contemplate writing detailed training programs for each specialized flight as outlined in AF Regulation 45-23. ConAC Letter 50-4, dated 6 October 1949, clarifies and encourages the use of USAF Extension Courses for unit instruction. Paragraph 10d, ConAC Letter 45-13, dated 15 August 1949, establishes the responsibility for the preparation of training programs for VART units.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/s/ BRUCE H. GEISEL
Capt., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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13 Dec 49
Subject: Proposed Elimination of Wing and Group Organizational Structure from the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program

PTM-R 322 (13 Dec 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, N.Y. 28 December 1949

TO: Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton California

1. Before the decision to eliminate wing and group organizational structure in the VARTU program was made, full consideration was given to the effect of such action and to reasons which might exist justifying retention of this organizational structure. After careful consideration the decision was made to eliminate these organizational echelons in this program except as provided for in message, this headquarters, DP 42941, 21 December 1949.

2. The decision which this headquarters has made was based not on the experience of one wing but on the experiences of several. There was no conclusive indication that the establishment of the organizational structure within the VARTU program was desirable. The contrary was true. It was determined that intermediate command echelons were not required and actually could not and should not exercise the authority properly attributed to command. The organizational structure was determined to be unnecessary, illogical and undesirable, except where, as defined in the message cited above, the squadron, group and wing headquarters are so located that supervision and coordination by these higher organizational echelons is practicable.

3. It is requested that you notify the writer of the basic letter that you have been directed to acknowledge his communication on this subject. You are authorized to include any of the above information in your reply.

s/t CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, U.S.Air Force
Vice Commander

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HEADQUARTERS UNKNOWN

13 December 1949

SUBJECT: Proposed Elimination of Wing and Group Organizational Structure from the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Reference is made to the dispatch directive to the numbered Air Forces under your jurisdiction, instructing them that no additional Wings and Groups will be established in the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program and that the existing Wings and Groups will be deactivated. The reason given is that the existence of these organizational units contributes nothing to the training program. There is also an inference that economy is a factor. This office questions both of these reasons and vigorously protests the proposed action.

2. The experience of the 9009th Wing and its four Groups since their establishment 1 July 1949 has demonstrated conclusively that the establishment of these organizational units is the most constructive step which has been taken in what is otherwise considered to be a bungling and inefficient Volunteer Air Reserve Program. The thousands of volunteer Air Reserve officers who by virtue of a logical military organizational structure now feel that they belong, under the proposed action will feel that they are no longer wanted, and the results will be disastrous to this valuable portion of the Reserve component.

3. From the standpoint of economy this program is not costing anything, and if the organizational units are discontinued no savings will be effected. In fact, implementation of the proposed Liaison Officer Program at the Squadron level might well introduce an increase in costs. Our experience indicates that one Liaison Officer at Group level can satisfactorily perform the liaison function for all of the Squadrons of that Group.

4. It is therefore strongly requested that this directive ordering discontinuance of these organizational units be cancelled, and that this logical organizational structure be retained.

s/t J. S. MINNIOTT
Colonel, USAFR
Commanding

Cc: Fourth Air Force

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POR UNIT CONTROL 606

C O P Y

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel AFB New York N/C

CG, 1st AF Mitchel AFB NY
CG, 4th AF Hamilton AFB Hamilton Calif
CG, 9th AF Langley AFB Va
CG, 10th AF Benj Harrison AFB Ft Ben Harrison Ind
CG, 12th AF Brooks AFB Texas
CG, 14th AF Robins AFB Ga

Routine

10AF RR 921

AFConACDP 41614. Subject is Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units. Reference are AF Reg 45-23, 8 Jul 49, and ConAc Ltr 45-13, 15 Aug 49. The objective of the Volunteer program is to provide training units for those Reservists who cannot be accommodated in the CAR program. This objective is not well served by the organization of Wing and Group Hq units manned by Reservists. Accordingly, no additional such units will be organized and existing units will be inactivated. The necessary supervision and support for the individual squadrons will be exercised by the Liaison offices authorized by ConAC Ltr 45-13. Sufficient personnel authorizations are not available to allow the establishment of a Wing Liaison office for each state. Only one such office will be organized in each Air Force area except in the Tenth AF where two Wing Liaison offices are authorized due to heavy population and large area. There is no objection to the assignment of Reservists to the Liaison offices in numbers not to exceed twice the authorized Regular strength. Conflicting provisions of above references will be amended accordingly.

For CG 10th AF only. This replies to your RR 921, 23 Dec 49.

CG, ConAC

Official Business

N/C
Maj J O Gray/erc 2 Dec 49

V. E. MURPHY
Lt Col USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel AFB, N.Y. UNCLASSIFIED

CG 1st AF MITCHEL AFB NY (COURIER)
CG 4ht AF HAMILTON AFB HAMILTON CALIF ROUTINE
CG 9th AF LANGLEY AFB, VA.
CG 10th AF BENJ HARRISON AFB FT BENJ HARRISON, IND.
CG 12th AF BROOKS AFB, TEXAS
CG 14th AF ROBINS AFB GA

DP 41614 UNCLASSIFIED

DP 42941 . Recurmsg DP 41614, 2 Dec 49, which is amended as follows. Pending further instructions existing VAR wing and group structure may be retained. Future instructions contemplate continued retention and use of VAR group and possibly wing structure manned by Reservists in thickly populated areas where all squadrons of group are sufficiently close together for Reservists to accomplish necessary coordination and supervision of training on inactive duty status but that VAR group and wing structure manned by Reservists will not be used elsewhere. VAR liaison offices established to provide necessary supervision of training of VAR squadrons which have no Wing or Gp assignment will be designated as "VAR Liaison Offices (Prov.)"with a geographical prefix. For example: "Portland VAR Liaison Office (Prov.)". This replaces 10th AF RR 414 and 4th AF CAG 1495.

CG, ConAC

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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Col C. R. Landon/erc 20 Dec 49

BRUCE H. GEMMEL
Captain, USAF
Asst. Air Adj Gen

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Training Program
OT 353 (17 June 49) 4th Ind. 19 Jul 49
OT/SMR/180/6136

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York 28 Jul 1949

TO: Special Assistant for Reserve Forces,
Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Forwarded for action deemed appropriate.

2. This headquarters is presently in the process of preparing Training directives for Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units, which it is contemplated will be completed by 30 October 1949. These training directives will be designed to provide a progressive training program directed towards the improvement of the technical ability and proficiency of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units.

3. Reference paragraph 5, basic: The United States Air Force Reserve Program for Fiscal Year 1950, of which the Volunteer Air Reserve is an important part, is designed to provide quality training for members of the United States Air Force Reserve within current limitations of funds, facilities and equipment.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

W.W. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj. Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

16 November 1949

Brig General Harry A Johnson
Tenth Air Force
Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base
Ft Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

Dear Harry:

* * * *

We can dismiss this particular incident without further worry, but I believe it would be dangerous not to heed its implications. To me (and the Commanding General joins me in my conviction) this case is just one more indication of the untenable position we find ourselves in with respect to the many Reservists who can't be provided a place in the organized Air Reserve. We have to watch these people closely.

I believe that recent staff work done here will, if approved, provide a reasonable administration of the Volunteer Reserve. The recommendations we are making to USAF don't measure up, personnel-wise, to those which you made in the letter of 20 October signed by deFord. We just can't get that many people. General Whitehead gave you the complete picture on this in his letter of 16 November. As a matter of fact, he and I were both preparing separate letters, each unknown to the other, along this same line. He finished his first and thereby "stole the thunder" of this one.

If you have any suggestions that will improve the plan of ConAC Letter 45-13, and still not sacrifice its economies, we would be pleased to have them.

* * * *

Sincerely,

s/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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Basic Ltr fm Hq 9th Air Force, dtd 8 Dec 49, subject: "USAFR Unit Training Assemblies for Pay Purposes"

2nd Ind 23 Jan 1950

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Air Staff action is pending which will rescind par 8, AFL 45-12.

2. The Corollary Unit Program was established on the basis of a calculated sacrifice in the training of and utilization of equipment by the Regular Air Force. In addition to costs involved in utilizing Regular Air Force equipment and facilities in corollary unit training, this sacrifice was computed to include the time required to give these units four training assemblies (one week-end) per month. For that reason, par. 5a, AFL 45-12, specifies that corollary units will be scheduled for that number of unit training assemblies per month. It is to be noted that this paragraph makes no mention of pay nor was such intended. The inference is solely that, insofar as the maintenance of training proficiency is concerned, corollary units require and will be scheduled for four unit training assemblies per month. Eligibility for a unit training assembly to count for purposes of pay is then determined by reference to par. 7, AFR 45-10.

3. In accordance with the foregoing, a fully organized corollary unit would be scheduled for and would conduct four unit training assemblies per month all of which would count for pay purposes up to a total of 48 per year. A corollary unit categorized as "not fully organized," similarly would be scheduled for and conduct four unit training assemblies per month but, in determining which of these might count for purposes of pay, par 7a (2) AFR 45-10 must be consulted. This reference requires that a minimum of three paid assemblies be conducted per calendar quarter and that amaximum of 24 paid assemblies be allowed for the year. Thus, considering only the first quarter during which 12 training assemblies will have been conducted, the command must reserve 9 of the over-all authorization of 24 paid assemblies for the remaining 3 quarters of the year which leaves 15 paid assemblies to be distributed as the command deems most proper. Therefore, at the discretion of the major air command concerned, a minimum of 3 and a maximum of all 12 could have been ordered as paid assemblies during the first quarter. The maximum and minimum figure for the second and subsequent quarters would be determined similarly always reserving a minimum of three paid assemblies for each remaining quarter and considering the total actually conducted for pay during previous quarters. As soon as a unit attains a "fully organized" status, however, the provisions of par. 7a (1), AFL 45-10 would apply and accordingly, from that data, all four (but not less than two) unit training assemblies per month could be counted for pay purposes not to

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Basic Ltr fm Hq 9th Air Force, dtd 8 Dec 49, subject: "USAFR Unit Training Assemblies for Pay Purposes"

2nd Ind (Cont'd)

exceed a total of 48 per year. It is pointed out in this connection, that the four monthly unit training assemblies prescribed in par. 5a, AFL 45-12 were intended as a maximum figure since they represent the limiting point beyond which it was not deemed acceptable to commit the regular establishment in accomplishing the training of corollary units.

4. For your information, Air Staff action is pending which will, in the interest of flexibility in scheduling, amend par 5a, AFL 45-12, so as to require major air commands to schedule not less than two nor more than six unit training assemblies per month for corollary units.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

st/ C. W. SCHOTT
Colonel, USAF
Deputy, Spec. Asst for
Reserve Forces

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

8 September 1949

Dear Jack,

* * * *

The 62nd Troop Carrier Wing is being re-equipped with 4-engine aircraft. At the time it is re-equipped, it will be necessary to re-designate the Corollary Unit assigned to it. At that time, I feel that the Corollary Wing should be reduced to not more than one Troop Carrier Squadron in the Troop Carrier Corollary Group. It costs a lot of money to fly four engine aircraft, and we simply cannot afford to knock down the combat efficiency of our units enough to do all of this flying.

* * * *

At the time the change to four engine aircraft occurs, Nelson will have to rework his mobilization assignee lists, and in my judgment he should take no mobilization assignees excepting men who are experienced four engine pilots, and furthermore, I believe that you should limit him in rated mobilization assignees to 24 pilots and 12 navigators total. That is what is required in pilots and navigators to bring a Troop Carrier Group (Heavy) to war strength from peach strength. Furthermore, Nelson should not take on mobilization assignees in the rated categories unless these officers can do their flying during the 62nd Troop Carrier Wing's regular operations. There is no need to have any illusions that the 62nd Troop Carrier Wing can do weekend flying for mobilization assignees, and also the training of its Corollary Wing less 2 Troop Carrier Squadrons, and what is most important, reach and maintain an operational efficiency of 80% or better.

* * * *

Sincerely,

ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Commanding

Major General J. S. Upston
Commanding, Fourth Air Force
Hamilton Air Force Base, California

cc: Major General Earl S. Hoag
Special Asst for Reserve Sources
Hq United States Air Force
Washington 24, D.C.

CC: VC, DO, DRF, IG AG (CG file)

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HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, MITCHEL AFB, N.Y.

CG, TENTH AF, BEN HARRISON AFB, FT BEN HARRISON, IND.

NC

ROUTINE

AF1OPPR 474

AFConACHP 17595 PD REURMSG PPR 474 CMA 11 JUL 49 PD ASSUMPTION THAT AUTHORIZATION FOR MOB ASSIGNESS TO BE 50 PER CENT OF TD AUTH WILL RESULT IN PAY FOR ALL SUCH ASSIGNESS IS ERR PD OUR MSG AFConACHP 11086 CONTEMPLATES AUTH FOR ADD M DAY ASSIGNESS ABOVE THE NO. AUTH FOR PAY PURPOSES PD THE EFF OF THIS MSG IS THAT ALL M DAY ASSIGNESS SO AUTH IN EXCESS OF THOSE AUTH FOR PAY MAY PARTICIPATE IN ALL OAR ACTIVITIES CMA BUT WILL NOT BE CERT FOR PAY PURPOSES BY AF FORM 40 PD END

CG:ConAC

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Capt Jay O. Gray/186
Project Officer - Ext 7207 14 Jul 49

RICHARD W. GEUSS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR MATERIEL COMMAND
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

LIS/hew

MCAT 8 August 1949

SUBJECT: The Awarding of Inactive Duty Training Credits to USAFR Officers

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Reference is made to AF Regulation 45-3, 8 October 1948, and to letter, this Headquarters, 1 August 1949, Subject: Transfer of Miblization Assignee Personnel to AMC.

2. In many cases the numbered Air Forces of your Command are unable, due to their administrative workload, to expedite the publication of orders upon individual USAFR officers whose transfer to this Command under the provisions of AF Regulation 45-3 has been requested for mobilization assignment purposes.

3. These individual USAFR officers have been qualified and accepted for mobilization assignments with this Command and are most anxious to participate in the AMC inactive duty mobilization assignment training program in order to maintain their proficiency and to accrue the necessary promotion and retirement credits. This Command cannot authorize the participation of these individuals in inactive duty training programs conducted by this Command until such time as they have been transferred to this Command and placed upon mobilization assignment orders issued by this Headquarters.

4. To alleviate this condition and to permit individuals qualified and accepted for mobilization assignments with this Command to participate in in-active duty training in thier proposed AMC mobilization assignment, your concurrence is requested in establishing the following interim procedure for individual USAFR officers whose transfer to this Command has been requested:

a. This Headquarters to advise requested individuals that they may participate in the inactive duty mobilization assignment training program of this Command for credit purposes only, subject to the following conditions:

(1) That the inactive duty training participated in is in each individual's mobilization assignment.

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Hqs AMC Ltr to CG, ConAC, Mitchel AFB, New York, 8 August 1949, Subj: The Awarding of Inactive Duty Training Credits to USAFR officers

(2) That each officer who participates in such inactive duty training accomplish a certificate upon completion thereof, indicating the date, place, time and duration of the training period.

(3) That each individual officer's certificate be certified or countersigned by the officer in charge of the training period.

b. That each individual who complies with the above procedure be instructed by this Headquarters to forward certificate or countersigned certificates of inactive duty mobilization assignment training to the appropriate numbered Air Force Headquarters.

c. That your Headquarters instruct the numbered Air Forces of your Command to honor and accept certificates accomplished in accordance with the foregoing provisions and to record the inactive duty mobilization assignment training reported thereby to each individual's training or credit record.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

(signed)
H. E. HURST
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Air Force Reserve
Military Training Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, DC

AFCRF-1 735 DEC 7 1949

SUBJECT: USAF Reserve Mobilization Assignment Program

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, New York

1. the USAF Reserve Mobilization Assignment Program has not yet achieved the results desired.

2. In an effort to remedy the situation, three courses of action will be taken:

a. Initiation of the specific procedures set forth in par. 3 below.

b. Reallocation of existing quotas of mobilization assignments for pay.

c. Consideration of the elimination of mobilization assignees without pay and conjunctive provision of two-week active duty tours for certain selected mobilization assignees.

3. It is desired that the following actions be initiated immediately within your command:

a. Examine the quality of training provided for mobilization assignees and training attachees to assure that such training is interesting and effective. In this connection, it is pointed out that training attachments are not to be made without the concurrence of the command to which the individual is to be attached and that such command must be furnished adequate guidance as to the nature and scope of training expected to be furnished.

b. Insure that adequate night and/or weekend training periods are provided for reservists who need and are willing to participate in training but who are precluded by their civil occupation from participating during normal duty periods.

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c. Give mobilization assignments for pay only to individuals who need and can participate in regular and frequent training.

d. If, after having taken the steps recommended above, it is determined that an individual is unable or unwilling to participate in an average of nine training periods per quarter (minimum), relieve such individual of his assignment and give him a mobilization designation or a position in a Volunteer Air Reserve training unit, as appropriate.

4. As a basis for the above-mentioned reallocation of quotas, it is requested that you submit an estimate of the number of mobilization assignees with pay desired for your command (breakdown by grade and rating, i.e., pilot, other-rated and non-rated). This estimate will pertain to the current program, as modified by the provisions of par. 3 above, and will be based upon the adequacy of training facilities available to your command (or available through training attachments), and the availability of qualified reserve personnel.

5. As an addition to the current mobilization assignment program, consideration is being given to the provision of two-week active duty tours only (without year-round inactive duty training) for certain selected mobilization designees. The present category of mobilization assignees without pay would be eliminated and a minimum average requirement of 9 inactive duty training periods per assignee per quarter would be in effect. Under this plan and subject to training capabilities and the availability of reservists, how many mobilization assignees and designees would be desired for your command? (Breakdown by grade and rating, i.e., pilot, other-rated and non-rated)

6. The following supplementary instructions are provided in regard to the allocation of funds covering pay of mobilization assignees: The funds presently provided for your command will not permit a total of 48 inactive duty training periods and one 15-day active duty tour per year for each mobilization assignee authorized your command on a pay status; however, in the event that the number of assignees actually participating in training increases to such an extent that additional funds are needed to implement the current program, a supplementary allocation may be requested.

7. It is desired that the information requested be forwarded to this headquarters by 31 January 1950. The comments requested herein are exempt from reports control symbol, under provisions of par 9b (4), AFR 174-1, 29 August 1949.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/ J. P. McConnell
J. P. MCCONNELL
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Spec.Asst.for Res Forces

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10 Jan 1950

Hq Ninth AF, 9AF 353
Subject: Training of USAF Reservists

O&T 353 (10 Dec 49) 1st Ind Capt RBLibbey/5142/mfn

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

* * * * *

2. The intent of the mobilization assignment training program is to offer interesting and effective training to Air Reservists in areas of dense population. That this places a heavy workload on Regular Air Force personnel is undeniable. The Regular Officer must be available on certain evenings or weekends for it is usually the case that the Air Reservist is not available to receive training during normal duty hours.

* * * * *

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOYSRAD:

s/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Vice Commander

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28 JAN 1950

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

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ConAC Form No. 49-A
10 December 1948

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
CLASSIFIED INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: USAFR Mob Augmt Program

SECRET

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	
				NO person is entitled solely by virtue of his grade or position to knowledge or possession of classified matter. Such matter is entrusted only to those individuals whose official duties require such knowledge or possession.
7	6 Jan 50	DO	DP	The concept and ideas expressed in the 1st Indorsement to the attached correspondence is agreed with wholeheartedly. It is recommended however that the tone of the indorsement be scaled down somewhat as indicated in the attached proposed rewrite of your original 1st Indorsement. HERBERT B. THATCHER Brig. General, USAF Deputy for Operations Rm. 1230
8	[illegible]	AC-C	DP	Brief was AC-C [illegible] DO on 16 Jan 50. [illegible] JOHN W. SMITH Captain, USAF [illegible]
9	11 Jan	DP	[illegible]	1st Indorsement has been rewritten in accordance with Comment #7 above. Since the intent has not been changed additional coordination with agencies who have previously seen this paper is not necessary.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

FILE:

SUBJECT: USAF Reserve Mobilization Assignment Program

REGISTER NO	
SUSPENDED TO	
EXTENDED TO	
CLASS	ADM / MISC / HIST / PERS

SECRET

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
1	23 Dec	DP	VC	1. I do not concur in the dispatch of this letter in its present form. I object strenuously to some of the items which are included in the letter from Headquarters USAF. They are contrary to the fundamental concept of mobilization assignment, on which our planning is based. To transmit such questionable items to our Air Forces does nothing but jeopardize what we are trying to do and confuse the people in the field. 2. We must get some of this information but it can be done in a more effective manner. Specifically, we should: a. Prepare a letter to USAF for signature by the Commanding General objecting to several of the points of view expressed in basic letter. I refer to those points which disregard the question of requirements and which threaten once more to throw the program into a state of turmoil. b. Prepare another letter to the Air Forces requesting certain of the factual information requested in the USAF letter. Some of the USAF requirement should be disregarded and we must tell them that we are disregarding it in the letter which we sent to Washington. 3. As near as I can tell, this paper was recharged to DO in your office after it had been initially charged to DP but before it reached here. Request that it now be recharged to DP(PPM) for action in order that a comprehensive study of it may be made. LANDON 1102
		VC	DP	This belongs to you E.D.L.
2	23 Dec	DP	PPM	For action.

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This is in reply to correspondence bearing AF Register No. which was suspended to (date)

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

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HISTORY

of the

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

1 December 1948 - 31 December 1949

III OPERATIONS AND TRAINING



Prepared by: Mr. Thomas A. Sturm
Directorate of Historical
Services

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I. PROSPECTUS

As related in the first chapter of the history, the Continental Air Command took on several important jobs upon its establishment in December 1948, among them being: the administration and training of the Reserve Forces; the setting up of an active air defense system in the United States; and the providing of air cooperation for ground and amphibious operations. How the Continental Air Command was organized to conduct these assignments has been discussed. What has happened in the Reserve Forces programs will be related in a subsequent section. What this chapter will be concerned with is operations and training of the regular air force units in the Continental Air Command from 1 December 1948 through December 1949.

Training may be defined as the educating of individuals in the skills essential to the prompt and efficient execution of their unit's mission. This definition accepted, it follows that all training within the Continental Air Command is directed toward building an air force capable of intercepting and destroying an attacking armada of enemy aircraft before it releases its bombs on our strategic areas, and of providing close air support of our surface forces. For purposes of this chapter, "Operations", the second word in the chapter-topic, is defined as those activities engaged in by the Continental Air Command, in support of its missions, in which training plays a secondary role. An example of this type of activity is the operating of radar scopes by personnel assigned the warning units within the Continental Air Command. The men occupied in these duties were training during the

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period, but they were, at the same time, on the alert for unidentified aircraft approaching America's boundaries. They were, in other words, actually engaged in air defense operations, not just training for the day when they may have to assume an air defense role. What these scope operators were doing parallels the activities of our Army back in the early part of the 19th century when it afforded protection to settlers and travelers against Indian attack. No open war existed between our government and the native tribes, at least, no declared hostilities, yet it was necessary that our military men be constantly alert against danger. Then as now, men were assigned outpost duty where they both trained and operated simultaneously. Consequently, now as then, operations is inseperably aligned with training and the two functions, while subtly different, must be discussed as one if sense is to be made of either.

This chapter, then, while an account of training in the Continental Air Command, is also the story of the developments within the organization in the readying of a cadre of trained men as a first line of defense in a war, which, if it comes, will come without warning, savagely and viciously -- and disastrously, if we are not prepared for it. Whether its initial commitment will be air defense or tactical support of ground and sea forces to fight off a land invasion, the Continental Air Command must be prepared. Accounts of training exercises, or maneuvers, constitute a large part of the story, for through these scheduled "games" the peacetime Air Force attempts to apply skills acquired in training to "war like" conditions. Action taken to keep

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abreast of technological advances is another integral point of discussion, as are the remainder of the factors that have influenced training during this period. It is hoped that from this chapter the reader will get a reasonable conception of the planning and training that has taken place within the Continental Air Command in the establishment of air defense systems and preparations for air support of the other services. It is hoped also that this chapter will reveal the complexity of training in this so-called "peacetime" command. 1/

1/ Historian's Note: The peacetime Air Force has, for the most part, only indirect criteria by which to evaluate the effectiveness of its training program. This is natural, considering the unusual characteristics of the military trade. Training of the professional soldier is dissimilar from training of other professional men in that there are no "job openings" for the combat soldier in peacetime after he has completed his apprenticeship. Certainly, the clerk typist finds sufficient typing awaiting him when he completes his training, and the carpenters, plumbers, maintenance men and other non-combat personnel perform in peacetime practically the same duties they will be called upon to engage in if the nation is committed to war; but the men in the key positions, the combat unit commanders and their pilots, gunners, bombardiers and other crewmen, train even unto eternity if peace prevails. They are like doctors working on cadavers all their lives never experiencing the thrill or anguish of cutting into the living body; or like lawyers debating hypothetical cases before dispassionate professors throughout their careers -- never facing a jury. Never knowing if what they have learned will be practicable under realistic "working" conditions. Their only recourse is to substitute maneuvers and training exercises for actual combat, and schedule and perform them at frequent intervals. These "games" are their only means of discovering what the capabilities of individuals and units will be if they have to apply their training to a wartime situation. If they, the high command, have analyzed correctly the sort of mission they will be called upon to perform on D-Day, then those shortcomings observed in training exercises and corrected in future training programs will have value in readying our Air Force for carrying out its duties. But if the basic concepts are erroneous, as for example was the Maginot Line concept as adopted by the French before the last war in tragic error as later developments proved, then training conducted is futile and absurd.

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That is why an analysis of "how prepared we are" or "how well the Air Force is doing its job" is dangerous or a waste of time unless these analyses are predicated on the training concepts presently in being. One can only inform the reader of the basic concepts concerning the readying of such forces as those under the Continental Air Command, of the type of training the organization has engaged in to prepare itself to carry out its missions, and of the progress of that organization in attaining the goals that have been set for it by higher headquarters. If that is done adequately, that will be sufficient "analysis" of operations and training in the history of that organization.

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II. INTRODUCTION

Establishment of the Continental Air Command and the resultant assignment to it of the resources and functions of the Air Defense Command and the Tactical Air Command had no serious affect on the unit and individual training programs of the regular air force outfits formerly assigned the latter two organizations. For example, when Continental Air Command took over the units of the Tactical Air Command, it learned that due to the loss Tactical Air Command had suffered of a great number of trained personnel during the months immediately preceding the establishment of Continental Air Command that the status of unit and individual training under its command was at a "low ebb".[1] To alleviate the problem, Tactical Air Command had instructed its bases to institute a three month full scale unit training program during the period 16 November 1948 - 18 February 1949 to raise the status of unit training to the optimum set by Headquarters United States Air Force and Tactical Air Command standards.[2] With higher headquarters' acquiescence,[3] the Tactical Air Command told its units to restrict their operational commitments to those which were absolutely essential, to coordinate and schedule all flying so that it would directly support the fulfillment of both unit and individual flight proficiency

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1/ Ltr TAC to USAF, subj: "Unit Training Period," 12 Aug 48.
2/ Ltr TAC to Sherman AFB, subj: "Unit Training Period," 5 Nov 48.
3/ 1st Ind, USAF to TAC, 1 Sept 48, to TAC Ltr To Sherman AFB, op. cit., 5 Nov 48.

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requirements, to accomplish all training requirements applicable to their particular units, and to train and qualify the basic airmen, who had replaced the skilled personnel who had departed the command, in a usable skill specialty, using the Tactical Air Command training directives as their guide.[4] Headquarters Continental Air Command, upon receipt of this information, merely informed its six numbered air forces of what was taking place in the former Tactical Air Command units now under their jurisdiction, and requested each commander to do all within his power to facilitate this program as Tactical Air Command had originally planned it.[5] In short, assignment of the regular air force units from one major command to another called for no drastic reorganization of unit training procedures within the units, no lessening of the emphasis placed on proficiency training. The units merely transferred their allegiances from Tactical Air Command, Air Defense Command and Strategic Air Command (for three fighter wings, the 4th, 33rd and 56th, were transferred from Strategic Air Command to further bolster the air defense system[6]) to the numbered air forces, ordered a new supply of shoulder patches, and continued the serious business of mastering the tricky jet aircraft and the new type cargo planes that were coming to them in increasing numbers and changing designs.

But while station training was not disrupted, types of flying training conducted was drastically altered for certain of the fighter

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4/ Regulation 50-44. TAC Training Standard 80-1 and TAC
5/ Ltr ConAC to 14th AF, subj: "Unit Training Period ", 24 Dec 48 and 1st Ind, 14th AF to ConAC.
6/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Reassignment of the 4th, 33rd and 56th Fighter Wings, 22 Nov 48.

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units . As discussed in the first chapter, emphasis was shifted from tactical air aviation late in 1948 to air defense. In order to have an air defense "in-being", it was necessary that additional interceptor aircraft be obtained and placed at the disposal of the organization responsible for setting up a realistic air defense system. Since it was impossible to organize additional fighter units under current budgetary restrictions, Headquarters United States Air Force took what seemed the logical step and combined the resources of Tactical Air Command and the Air Defense Command under one administrative headquarters, and obtained the aforementioned three fighter units from Strategic Air Command. How these units were to be deployed to strengthen air defense was made evident when, in July, the first Continental Air Command regulation setting forth the missions of the regular air force units under Continental Air Command was published. Eight fighter units were assigned air defense as a primary mission and tactical (Penetration) as a secondary mission. Only two of the former Tactical Air Command fighter units retained tactical as a primary mission, and they were assigned air defense as a secondary mission.[7] The other regular air force units - the troop carrier, bombardment and tactical reconnaissance - retained, of course, the same functions they had had under the Tactical Air Command.

To place training on a uniform and firm basis throughout the command, officers from the Headquarters and representatives from the regular units within the command set up a special project for drafting

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7/ ConAC Reg 24-1, 21 July 49.

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training standards and training directives, early in 1949.[8] While the purpose of these publications seems evident, their importance and the reasons for their importance bear repeating in the history. Briefly, training standards, in the Continental Air Command, serve to establish standards of proficiency that must be attained in order for the individual or unit to carry out their assigned duties. Specifically, they serve to guide unit and individual training so that the unit will be capable of functioning as an element of the air defense team, comprised of fighter and aircraft control and warning units or for the development of effective tactics and techniques for offensive and defensive air-to-air and air-to-ground operations in cooperation with friendly surface forces, depending upon the mission of the unit.[9] Training directives, on the other hand, as differentiated from training standards, tell explicitly how each organization and unit is to achieve the requirements set forth in the standards; how the individual is to go about his work to attain minimum proficiency in his duties; and how uniform flying training and ground training programs for all personnel and specialized ground training programs for air crews are to be established. The objective of training directives, as stated by one unit, is: "To attain acceptable standards of proficiency necessary for tactical units to conduct successfully the primary and secondary missions against an enemy of the United

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8/ 3rd Ind, ConAC to 1st Av, 24 Mar 49 to Ltr 1st AF to ConAC, subj: "Aircraft Recognition Training," 4 Jan 49.

9/ Paraphrased from the definitions appearing on the several training standards published by the ConAC during 1949.

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States."[10]

During the year, training standards were prepared by Headquarters Continental Air Command for all the various units, but it was impossible for the headquarters to publish training directives to implement the training outlined in the standards. Although many of the directives were written, the large volume of high priority printing projects on hand at the Continental Air Command's "print shop", the 2220th Extension Group at Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base, Indiana, prevented them from being published. To compensate for this, each of the numbered air forces was instructed to prepare interim training directives to guide the training of their regular units.[11]

One general criticism of the training standards prepared early in the year by Headquarters Continental Air Command was that too much emphasis and time was devoted to the training of personnel in general military subjects, with a resulting detrimental effect on the accomplishment of the primary mission of the units. To correct this, the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Continental Air Command, recommended in March that future panels of officers convened to prepare training guides do so "with a view toward converting the present generalities into specific measurable standards of proficiencies."[12]

Since, as General Vandenberg stated in a letter to General

10/ 52nd Fighter Wing Reg 50-4, subj: "Training", 17 Jan 50.
11/ Ltr 14th AF to ConAC, subj: "Implementation of Training Standards", 12 Sept 49, and 1st Ind ConAC to 14th AF, 20 Sep 49.
12/ IRS, Col R.H. Smith, Dir of Int, to Col. D.E. Muehleisen, Dir Oper & Trng, subj: "AC&W Training Standards," 31 Mar 49.

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Stratemeyer, training and operations must be made a matter of close command attention to be supervised from the "top through all echelons of command"[13], the formulation and implementation of training standards and directives is a matter of great importance, deserving of the amount of attention the staff of the headquarters and the commanders of the air forces and lower echelons have given the subject during this past year. Individual attention by commanders to the work each of his men is doing is impossible, but through carefully prepared training guides, correct training methods can be passed down through each echelon with increasing rather than diminishing value. To make certain that training standards and directives reflected the latest techniques to be applied to training procedures, officers within the command were constantly employed revising and amending the standards and directives pertinent to training[14]. It is a less exciting job than many, but it is one of the most important ones the headquarters is charged with in carrying out the missions of the command.

The philosophy of training during this period might be said to have been the promoting of the proficiency of personnel in the use of the equipment they have at their disposal for conducting the varied

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13/ Ltr Gen Vandenberg to Gen Stratemeyer, 21 Mar 49, in which he stated: "During this time of comparative peace we must return to and constantly stress the idea of a comparatively small but especially well trained force. Supervision of all elements of training and of operations must be enforced from the top through all echelons of command down to individuals who make up the aircraft crews and those individuals such as mess, supply, and administrative personnel who support the combat crews."

14/ History of the Training Division, Dir of Oper and Trng, Mar 1950.

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missions of the Continental Air Command. While this might very well be the philosophy of all training at any period in the history of any military service, certain facts emphasize the special need which existed for such a training philosophy in the tactical units of the Continental Air Command during this first year of operation. Early in 1949, Colonel Charles Q. Lindbergh, at General Vandenberg's request, made a ten week's tour of the air bases in Alaska, the Far East, Europe, and the United States. The purpose of his trip was to make recommendations for improving conditions and to search for weaknesses in the Air Force organization. The conclusion Colonel Lindbergh reached was that the "actual striking power of the United States Air Force was much lower than its numerical strength and material indicated."[15] General Vandenberg agreed with this appraisal and stated that the major cause of this inadequacy was the unsatisfactory degree of proficiency our pilots possessed in high performance aircraft. There were other causes, of course, for this poor showing - inadequate facilities and excessive personnel turnover, for example - which only Air Force Headquarters could cope with within limits of its resources, but the most important cause, low pilot proficiency, could be corrected only by group and squadron commanders. It was their responsibility to pay closer attention to the landing techniques, gunnery and bombing accuracy, instrument approach techniques, and tactical proficiency in general of their pilots.[16] Consequently,

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15/ Ltr Gen Vandenberg to Gen Whitehead, 21 Sep 49.
16/ Ibid.

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esch commander was instructed to give personal attention to "vigorous and positive" action to improve the ability of their pilot's overall proficiency in high performance aircraft. The purpose of this training was to attain, then maintain, a higher degree of combat effectiveness in the tactical units.[17/]

In the following pages, the training structure within the Continental Air Command, including certain general types of operations and training conducted this past year, is discussed under one section. Factors affecting training is made the subject of another section. And separate sections are devoted to the planning for and development of air defense and tactical air support and the maneuvers conducted for operational training of the combat units assigned these missions.

17/ Ltr ConAC to All Numbered Air Forces, subj: "Aircraft Assignment and Utilization," 18 May 48.

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III. GENERAL

Relations with the Air Training Command

As in any other profession, the officer and airman must undergo a period of intensive basic training before he goes into the "field" for training and assignment to a specific role in the Air Force. This education he receives under the auspices of the Air Training Command. After he completes his preparatory work, he may either be enrolled in a formal course of study, again under the Air Training Command, or he may be assigned directly to an operational command where he goes into training on a job where he is needed and where his interests and abilities seem to warrant his placement. First, let us look at the role the Air Training Command plays in the training of Continental Air Command personnel.

Technical training courses are established and conducted by the Air Training Command at the direction of Headquarters United States Air Force. The purpose of each course is to produce technically qualified specialists to satisfy the overall needs of the Air Force.[1] Quotas to these schools are allotted each numbered air force within the Continental Air Command in proportion to the needs of the particular air force and according to the need for men trained in certain skills within the United States Air Force as a whole. In other words, the needs of the entire Air Force are kept uppermost in this formal training program to make certain that the limited resources for formal training

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1/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Technical Training Courses", 15 Aug 49

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are used to the best advantage.[2] In the Continental Air Command's numbered air forces, individuals are selected for schooling on the basis of merit and their availability for training.[3] The air forces are advised approximately forty-five days after submission of their requests as to the availability of quotas for training men in the various types of courses requested.[4] To obtain these quotas, commanders of units submit monthly requests listing the requirements of the unit for which no applications for schooling have been made, eligibles who have applied for training, and so forth.[5] As outlined in the United States Air Force booklet titled "Training Prospectus for USAF Personnel," individuals selected for schools have to possess the prerequisites for the type of schooling for which they have applied. If they fail to qualify, there is no other recourse for the Air Training Command but to send them back to their home stations immediately, an expensive and retarding process.[6]

For the most part, quotas sent down to the numbered air forces are filled with volunteers, but non-volunteers were selected on occasions during this period when such action was justified by the needs of the Air Force and when the individual's qualifications offered reasonable assurance that he could successfully complete the course.[7] This, of course, is not entirely satisfactory, for individual desire is a key

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2/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Technical Training Courses", 9 Aug 49
3/ ConAC Ltr 53-5, 22 Sep 49
4/ Ltr Hqs ConAC to 4th AF, 9 Dec 49
5/ ConAC Ltr 53-1, op.cit., 22 Sep 49
6/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, op.cit., 15 Aug 49
7/ TWX USAF to ConAC, 16 Dec 49

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factor in attaining success in any venture, and care had to be taken not to select men who showed antipathy toward the type of training to be received to avoid excessive and costly elimination rates at the schools. Officers making the selections had the reponsibility of exercising judgment in these cases. When a non-volunteer was chosen for training, the reasons for such action had to be fully explained to him. This policy was initiated because it was apparent that airmen in surplus SSN's had to be trained in critical or acute specialties to meet worldwide requirements in a United States Air Force which is steadily becoming more technical.

In the past, the Air Force disapproved requests from Continental Air Command and the other major commands for formal training of personnel who had already earned a specialty number through on-the-job training. This had been necessary because the Air Training Command did not have adequate facilities to offer this training in addition to its other commitments. However, late in 1949, Air Training Command informed Continental Air Command Headquarters that because of difficulties the major commands were having in meeting quotas for certain courses, men who required formal training could be selected for training regardless of their present classifications.[8] The decision as to whether the expense of formal training was justified was left up to unit commanders to make. The important factors to be considered by officers selecting candidates for training was how critical the individual's specialty number was. Officers and airmen possessing a critical specialty number or an acutely short SSN were not to be trained into an SSN which was

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8/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Training of Assigned Personnel", 22 Dec 49

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less critical. Cross training of men (training from critical or acutely short SSN's into other critical or acutely short SSN's) was limited to related SSN's in the same field or skill.[9]

Air Training Command, then, has the responsibility of providing formal training to individuals assigned the Continental Air Command[10] and the latter headquarters has the responsibility of selecting qualified individuals to be trained to fill positions to alleviate world-wide skill shortages and for analysing its mission requirements and requesting quotas for training individuals in badly needed skills that are best learned in the formal school programs. As to how well the Continental Air Command availed itself of the resources for training its members at Air Training Command schools and filled those quotas assigned it by Headquarters United States Air Force, this can best be adjudged by quoting the latter headquarters: "Support of the accelerated training program by major continental air commanders thus far has, in the main, been remarkable. As a result, virtually 100 per cent of all Air Force training facilities from 1 April 1949 through 31 August 1949 were utilized . . .".[11]

Station Training

When a man is assigned duty with the Continental Air Command from

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9/ Ltr ConAC to 4th AF, subj: "Cross Training of Critical and Acutely Short Specialists", 14 July 49.

10/ In an attempt to provide a basis for improvement in the current training programs which will improve the quality of its graduates, teams from the Air Training Command visited ConAC installations during this period to analyse and evaluate the effectiveness of training given. Ltr Hq Chanute AFB to ConAC subj: "Technical Instruction Analysis and Evaluation Visits," 13 Jul 49

11/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Training of Assigned Personnel," 20 Oct 49

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formal school training or directly from basic training, Continental Air Command's training responsibilities toward that individual commence. If from school, the individual is in a semi-skilled status only; if from basic, he is totally unskilled and must be trained through the station training program.

There are, of course, as many different types of training conducted in the Continental Air Command as there are types of jobs to be filled. Since the ultimate goal of a good training program is to bring about flexibility of duty assignment of personnel, thereby allowing a commander to meet divergent commitments with confidence, training of each member of the several types of units must proceed toward qualifying each individual in as many related specialties as his education, aptitude and experience will allow. Station training is conducted at each Continental Air Command base and consists of two principal types of programs - group classroom training and on-the-job training.[12] Group classroom training is training of a general sort, encompassing a great variety of subjects in which all or a sizeable section of the unit's

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12/ Two other station type training programs are the Troop Training Program and the Physical Training Program, governed by ConAC Regs 50-4, 16 Sep 49 and 50-5, 12 Apr 49, respectively. The former regulation states: "Purpose: The large number of officers and airmen whose entire service has been performed without benefit of direct personal supervision and guidance of experienced leaders necessitates the maintenance of a program to raise the level of military training within the ConAC. This training will be conducted so as not to interfere with the primary mission of the unit or maximum utilization of civilian personnel." The objectives of this type training, again quoting from the directive, are: "(1) To improve the military bearing and discipline of the command; (2) To insure that all military personnel are well and properly equipped; (3) To promote good housekeeping and proper maintenance of equipment and facilities; (4) To Provide training in close order drill and troop command; and (5) To offer such other instructions to military personnel as is deemed appropriate by local commanders.

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activities are taught irrespective of individual specialty numbers. This type of training consists of basic principles and theories which cannot be readily taught through formal or on-the-job training. On-the-job training is work accomplished by an individual while he is performing duty which will qualify him in a military occupational specialty or increase his proficiency in his present assignment. Air Force Manual 35-1 is the governing directive for the classification and duty assignment of all individuals except crew members. This publication states: "the on-the-job training requirement is each organization's own analysis of the number of personnel by SSN which will not be available from other sources and for which no provision for school training has been made, as compared to the current and projected requirements." This places, in other words, the responsibility for the necessary study for on-the-job training, planning and conduct of unit training programs directly upon the shoulders of each unit's commander. He is the one responsible for seeing to it that the Air Force's aim of building "an especially well-trained force," is carried out. Beginning in the closing months of 1949, Headquarters Continental Air Command directed its numbered air force commanders to intensify their on-the-job training programs to further supplement the formalized training conducted by the Air Training Command, at the same time continuing to utilize to the maximum extent the formalized courses of instruction open. Specialties that were critically short and that were adversely affecting the missions of the command were to receive particular emphasis. While this intensified on-the-job training program had been in effect just a short time prior to

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the end of 1949, some headway, it was reported, had already been made in alleviating critically short specialties through effective management and concentrated periods of training.[13]

Tactical Training Of Pilot Graduates

All newly graduated pilot officers must receive at least one year of flying experience as duty pilots in tactical or transport units before they can be considered ready for tactical operation. This training has to be given within the major operational commands since gunnery, tactical and unit flying training are not a part of the Air Force undergraduate flying training curriculum.[14]

Headquarters Continental Air Command, in response to a request that it estimate for higher headquarters the number of pilot graduates that it could accomodate, replied that the impact this training program would have on the accomplishment of its primary mission of readying an "H" hour air defense force had to be given first consideration. Any requirements increasing training of new pilots would automatically cause a corresponding decrease in combat capability of the units assigned this additional responsibility. During 1949, as we shall see later, the conversion of the combat units to new type aircraft and the lowering of the number of flying hours allocated per aircraft and not per pilot had restricted pilot training considerably. Too, during the year, there was a constant overage of pilots in the units, there being 1,562

13/ Ltr ConAC to ATC, subj: "Request for Lesson Outlines," March 50
14/ SECRET Ltr USAF to ConAC, Subject: "Tactical Training for Pilot Graduates," 28 Dec 49

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pilots assigned the tactical units in December 1949 as against an authorization of 1,093. Of the assigned pilots, 577 were pilot graduates with less than twelve months service.[15]

Continental Air Command's final estimate of the number of pilots it could train was 289. Of this number, 168 could be trained in the fighter squadrons, at the ratio of eight per squadron per year. The remainder of the number could be trained in the Troop Carrier and reconnaissance squadrons. Assignment over this number would lessen the degree of combat efficiency in the units. And in order for the Command to absorb this number and still maintain maximum operational capability, the flow of replacements would have to be controlled by the command and the allocation of flying hours would have to be increased by 18,800 to permit accelerated training.[16]

Ground Control Approach Training

Ground Control Approach (GCA) training during the period was hampered by a continued lack of GCA units at many air bases and instrument trainer operators qualified in GCA fundamentals.[17] These shortages, of personnel and equipment, imposed a serious hardship on pilots both in gaining the minimum required hours of GCA approach training and in acquiring them

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15/ Ibid.,1st Ind., ConAC to USAF, 3 Feb 50
16/ Ibid.
17/ 2nd Ind, 56th Ftr Wng to 10th AF, 6 Jun 49, to Ltr ConAC, subj: "GCA Training," 11 May 49, reveals certain reasons for that unit's low number of GCA approaches during early part of year.

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in the type aircraft they will fly in the event of a national emergency. The long wait above those bases equipped with GCA units for the pilots whose home stations did not have the units, the limited cruising time in the F-84's and other jets[18] and the lack of dual controls in the fighter craft made it necessary for those fighter pilots to get their GCA hours in other type aircraft than those they normally fly. In an attempt to remedy this, Headquarters Continental Air Command requested and received permission to waive one paragraph of the Air Force regulation covering GCA training to permit the all weather fighter pilots to make hooded practice flight in tactical type aircraft, not equipped with dual controls, by using the radar observer as safety observer, and practice minimum low level approaches to the field under instrument flights.[19] Prior to the waiving of this regulation, the all-weather squadrons had to fly B-25's for this training.[20] The only conditions set by Headquarters United States Air Force for this deviation from established regulations was that hooded low level approaches would be made only during daylight hours and VFR conditions and that approaches would be made at sufficient altitude to clear all obstacles to flight by a minimum of 500 feet.[21] Through inference, Headquarters United States Air Force suggested that the units qualify additional instrument trainer operators in the fundamentals and use of GCA operation, using as their guide Air Force Regulation 60-9, "Standard

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18/ Ltr 31 Ftr Wng to 4th AF, subj: "GCA Unit," 16 Aug 49.
19/ Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Waiver of AF Reg 60-4," 1 Nov 48," 15 Dec 49.
20/ Ibid.
21/ Ibid., 1st Ind, 10 Jan 49.

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Radio Telephone Procedure for GCA," as another means of alleviating the difficulties they were having keeping current with GCA requirements.[22] For its part, Headquarters Continental Air Command sought to expedite the flow of GCA units to those bases where they were most urgently needed by asking Headquarters United States Air Force to revise Continental Air Command's GCA priority list.[23]

At those bases where Ground Control Approach units were located, a procedure was established, commencing in May, to insure continuous training of the GCA team on duty. During all periods of operation of the GCA units, the control tower operators were instructed to request inbound aircraft, whether the planes were local or transient did not matter so long as they were of the proper type and were adequately equipped, to make a GCA approach.[24] (All control tower operators at those stations were provided with a list of types of aircraft which were authorized to make practice approaches. Pilots who refused to avail themselves of this opportunity for training were reported to higher headquarters.[25]) This emphasis on GCA training, from the standpoint of the operators, was necessary because a total of 150 GCA approaches - fifty of which must be as Final Controller - are the minimum runs necessary for proficiency. Although it is possible to train both GCA Trackers and Final Controllers sumultaneously, the length of time involved in the complete training of a GCA final controller is primarily dependent upon the number of practice

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22/ 2nd Ind, USAF to ADC, 12 Oct 48, to Ltr 1st AF to ADC, subj: "Recommended Revision of Air Force Reg 60-4A," 23 Sep 48
23/ Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Revision of GCA Priority List," 17 Aug 49
24/ Ltr ConAC to 4th AF, subj: "GCA Team Training," 11 May 49
25/ Ibid.

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approaches he makes. In fact, according to Air Force standards, a minimum of 200 approaches per month are necessary to maintain the operating skill of a qualified GCA team and at least 300 approaches per month are required in the training of a GCA team.[26] Constant emphasis on this type of training for the combat pilot, on the other hand, is equally as important. Present-day emphasis on air defense, immediate readiness, entails the building up of a strong force of all-weather interceptors. Sustained and continuous emphasis on Ground Control Approach (including both landing and take-off procedures) is a necessary factor in the training of these all-weather units.

Bombing and Gunnery Training

A fighter gunnery meet to determine the overall tactical efficiency of United States Air Force fighter groups (both jet and conventional) in all phases of fighter gunnery was held at Las Vegas Air Force Base from 2 May through 12 May 1949.[27] All of the Zone of the Interior fighter units were entered in the meet with the exception of the 31st and 78th Fighter Groups. The jet groups participated in four aerial fighter events, two at 12,000 feet and two at 20,000 feet; three strafing missions; and three dive and three skip bombing missions.[28] The conventional groups participated in the same events, plus two missions of rocketry.

26/ Ltr, AACS (Airways & Air Communications Service) to ADC, subj: "Acceleration of GCA Training," 13 Oct 48.

27/ Ltr ConAC to All Numbered Air Forces, subj: "Air Force Gunnery Meet," 28 Sep 48.

28/ For the several type bombing tactics and techniques air crews engaged in tactical support have to master, See: 2nd Ind, TAC to ConAC, 16 Nov 49 to Ltr Hq ATC, subj: "Requirement for Bomb Scoring Device," 30 Sep 49.

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Upon conclusion of the meet it was found that the scores were below what officials had expected. To the Arbitration Committe adjudging the results of the meet, the scores proved that there has been serious lack of impetus placed upon fighter gunnery since the end of World War II, and that Headquarters United States Air Force has to make more range facilities available in order that a more continuous gunnery training program can be carried out by each fighter group. Also, the Committee felt that the aerial demonstrations, joint maneuvers and rotation commitments imposed on the fighter units have been too high to allow them to maintain minimum proficiency to accomplish their primary missions; i.e., "to destroy the enemy wherever it may be found."[29]

Factors affecting gunnery training in the Continental Air Command, other than those indicated above, were the transition to jet aircraft in the fighter units and the assignment of new missions to those fighter units formerly under the Tactical Air Command. While an extensive bombing and gunnery training program was engaged in by the 20th and 31st Fighter Wings, the two units having tactical air support as their primary missions, at Eglin Field during the period 15 February to 1 October,[30] and "continuous" aerial gunnery was conducted by the fighter units concerned primarily with air defense throughout the period,[31] it can be stated with reasonable assurance that the amount of training of the

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29/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Air Force Gunnery Meet," 18 May 49; the recommendations for the 1950 Gunnery Meet made by the Arbitration Committe upon the completion of the 1949 meet are included in the appendix.

30/ 1. TWX 12th AF to 1st Tow Target, 5 Feb 49.
2. Ltr 4th AF to ConAC, subj: "Monthly Ltr of Armament Oper" 21 Nov 49

31/ TWX 9th AF to ConAC, 19 Jan 49.

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individual fighter units in all phases of bombing and gunnery was far less than the amount required for the pilots to acquire combat accuracy. In most of the units, the emphasis in training was placed on the attainment of proficiency in primary mission; attention to secondary mission, for lack of time, consisted of little more than familiarization with techniques.[32] In other words, the fighter units practiced regularly their aerial gunnery if they were assigned air defense as a primary mission but they had no established requirements for training in their secondary missions of tactical support aviation, which calls for air-to-ground bombing and gunnery. Presumably, the same held true in reverse for the two units having tactical as their primary mission and air defense as their secondary mission. Whether the requirements will be established for training in secondary missions in the future will depend mostly on training priorities and the suitability of aircraft for dual performance.

Thus, the need for additional bombing and gunnery training exists for all the combat units, both in their primary missions and, especially, in their secondary missions. Before this can be accomplished, however, more range space will have to be obtained by Headquarters United States Air Force and more time will have to be set aside for the units to engage in this training. In short, it is up to higher headquarters to study the requirements for gunnery and bombing training and place at the disposal of the major commands space and time to perform this training.

32/ 1st Ind 4th AF to ConAC, 10 Jan 50 to Ltr ConAC to 4th AF, subj: "Air Chemical Warfare Training," 27 Dec 49.

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Notification that Air Force Gunnery Meet II would be held on or about 13 March 1950 was sent to the Headquarters Continental Air Command in September.[33] In its letter informing the numbered air forces of the above schedule, Headquarters Continental Air Command stated it "anticipated that teams representing the Continental Air Command fighter groups will excel the results obtained in last year's gunnery meet."[34]

Allied to the subject of bombing and gunnery training is the matter of trained armament inspectors, a shortage of which existed in the Continental Air Command during the period. Due to the existing complexity of armament equipment, Headquarters Continental Air Command felt that the number of hours allotted to the aircraft armament phase of air inspection was not enough to cope with the increasing complexity of armament equipment.[35] Consequently, Continental Air Command recommended to higher headquarters that additional emphasis and time be placed on inspector's procedures in the General Air Inspector's Course at the Air Force Special Staff School.[36] Headquarters United States Air Force referred the matter to the Air University, then informed Headquarters Continental Air Command that because introductions of new armament equipment - A-1B Gun Bomb Rocket Sight, A-1 fire control equipment, APQ 24 bombsight and K-1 bombing system - will change future subject matter of the course that the recommendation to increase the hours of the present armament

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33/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Air Force Fighter Gunnery Meet II," 26 Sep 49
34/ 1. Ltr ConAC, to All Numbered AF's, subj: "Air Force Gunnery Meet II" 3 Oct 49
2. Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Air Force Gunnery Meet II" 19 Dec 49
35/ Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Training Requirements," 27 Jun 49
36/ Ibid.

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training course would have to be disapproved.[37]

Other Types of Training Programs

While there is not much to say about the two types of training programs - Special Weapon, and Fire Protection and Aircraft Crash Rescue - in the text of the history, the directives and other publications regulating them are of sufficient importance to warrant inclusion in the appendix.

Quoting the Continental Air Command Regulation pertaining to Special Weapons Training:

> ". . . special weapons training is defined as training in radiological defense, biological defense, and chemical warfare. Although training directives in radiological and biological defense have not been disseminated as yet, it must be understood that the defensive measure and protective equipment to be used against these new types of warfare have a great similarity and distinct relationship to those for defense against chemical attack. Training in one field is of definite value in the other fields, and chemical warfare training will be considered as the preliminary basis for training in the other two. It is necessary that all personnel and units of this command become fully proficient in the offensive and defensive aspects of chemical warfare training in the immediate future, so that the proper emphasis can be given to the training programs for radiological and biological defense when initiated. Training outlines for radiological defense training will be disseminated to troop level in the near future, but the implementation of a biological defense program cannot be predicated at the present time."[38]

The lack of instructors in radiological defense and biological defense, new concepts of training, and the acute shortage of armament officers

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37/ SECRET Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Special Training, AN/APG-5C and ANAPG -30," 18 Nov 49, and 1st Ind ConAC to USAF, 18 Dec 49.
38/ ConAC Reg 52-1, subj: "Special Weapons Training," 22 Jun 49.

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and special munitions officers was alleviated by assigning unit gas officers and non-commissioned officers the additonal duty of handling instruction in these training programs.[39] In an attempt to plan an adequate radiological defense training program, Headquarters Continental Air Command requested information from higher headquarters on what steps had been taken for training specialists in this field and for establishing T/O&E vacancies for this type specialist in the units.[40] The reply, in December, was that no plans had been firmed up for establishing an Air Training Command course to produce this specialty but that after this course had been set up and personnel trained it was expected that one radiological specialist would be assigned each wing base to assist the base radiological officer.[41]

Fire and crash rescue training programs were emphasized throughout the year, stressing team training in the control and extinguishing of fires and in the rescuing of personnel from crashed and burning aircraft and other structures.[42] A Continental Air Command letter, published in March, provided the standard training program for training fire-fighter personnel.[43] Because of its limited facilities for training fire-fighters and crash rescuemen, Air Materiel Command placed its former course on this subject on standby status, late in the year, and commenced the

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39/ Ltr ConAC to 4th AF, subj: "Special Weapons Training."
40/ Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Training of Radiological Specialist," 28 Nov 49
41/ Ibid., 1st Ind, USAF to ConAC, 14 Dec 49
42/ 1st Ind, ConAC to All Numbered AF's, subj: "Fire and Crash Rescue Training Program," 29 Jun 49.
43/ ConAC Ltr 92-1, 22 Mar 49

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training of two-hundred instructors, at the rate of forty every ten weeks. Once this number of trained men are circulated throughout the Air Force to conduct comprehensive on-the-job training programs in fire-fighter and crash rescue tactics in the several units, perhaps the critical shortage which has existed in this field since the end of the war will be alleviated.[44]

Civil Relief Operations

> "These operations are outside the normal sphere of the routine peacetime mission of the Air Force, and are such that they cannot be planned for, or be included in the budget. Yet, the personnel, aircraft, equipment, and installations of the Air Force must be utilized to perform these emergency operations in addition to the normal routine mission."[45]

Continental Air Command's Domestic Emergency Plan, with its command arrangements and inter-command relationships, was tested in part during the disaster relief operations in the western states this past winter.[46] "Operation Hayride," the story of which is told in detail in the histories of the Fourth and Tenth Air Forces for 1 December 1948-30 June 1949, occurred in late January, February and early March of 1949 when heavy snow-falls and abnormally severe cold virtually separated ranchers, their families, and their cattle from the rest of the nation. Prior to the issuance of the Presidential proclamation decreeing the western states a disaster area,[47] and the resultant opening of the roads by the Army, the Air Force alone brought relief

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44/ 1. TWX, ConAC to All Numbered AF's, 25 Aug 49.
2. Ltr 31st Ftr Wng subj: "Fire Protection and Aircraft Crash Rescue Training Program, 3 Dec 49.

45/ AF Ltr 55-12, subj: "Report for a Civil Relief Type Operation" 17 Aug 49

46/ Ltr Gen Whitehead to Maj Gen John DeF. Barker, Deputy Director Continental U. S. Defense Planning Group, 18 May 49.

47/ TWX, USAF to All Major Air Commands in ZI, 30 Jan 49.

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to both humans and animals. Hay was airlifted and dropped to marooned herds from cargo type aircraft and contact was established with persons isolated in their homes or in stalled vehicles in smaller planes and helicopters. Later, when the entire resources of the Military Establishment were dedicated to relief, the Air Force worked with the Army, moving supplies and foodstuffs to those areas where the Army's snowplows could not forge through. The first sorties were flown on 24 January by the Fourth Air Force; in one month, the duration of participation of that organization, it delivered a total of 2444 tons of hay, fifty-nine tons of food, and twenty-nine tons of miscellaneous items throughout its area.[48] In the five states stricken by the blizzard in its region, the Tenth Air Force dropped almost two-thousand tons of hay, and approximately four-hundred tons of food, clothing, blankets and medical supplies.[49] The total cost of the operation to the Air Force was approximately $818,461, or an average cost per day of about $16,400.[50] Coordination with the units of the five Air Force commands participating in the operation under the direction of the two Continental Air Command air forces was accomplished "smoothly and without confusion."[51] The only incident which might have marred the splendid record made by the Air Force on this operation, rumors of uneconomical and misuse of aircraft and discrimination in distribution of air drop during the operation in

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48/ Ltr 4th AF to ConAC subj: "Final Report Operation Hayride," 12 Mar 49
49/ Ltr 10th AF to ConAC, subj: "Report of Operations Hayride," 22 Mar 49
50/ Comptroller, ConAC Diary, 22 Mar 49.
51/ Ltr Gen Whitehead to Gen Barker, op.cit., 18 May 49

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the Fourth Air Force area, were investigated and proved unfounded on fact.[52]

Of "Operation Hayride," General Stratemeyer said:

> "This first real test of our Domestic Emergency Plan was, judging from my personal observations and reports reaching this headquarters, highly successful. The lessons learned during the operation are being incorporated in a revised edition of the plan which would be ready for publication shortly."[53]

The Domestic Emergency Plan governs United States Air Force participation in domestic emergencies, including such disaster relief as that afforded on "Operations Hayride," and is published by the Continental Air Command, Each air force base in the Continental United States, irrespective of the major command to which it is assigned, is required to prepare plans for and be prepared to conduct operations in domestic emergencies under the operational control of a Continental Air Command numbered air force commander. The regulation and plan provide that Continental Air Command air forces are authorized direct communications with other services, agencies and air force bases within their geographic areas of responsibility for domestic emergency purposes.[54]

In summary, while "Operation Hayride" was concerned with civil relief type operations, the same plan of action followed in carrying that operation to such a successful finale will prevail in coping with domestic emergencies of an even graver nature. Consequently, the

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52/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr Maj Gen J.E. Upston, CG 4th AF, to General Stratemeyer, 2 Mar 49
2. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr IG, Second Region, subj: "Operations Hayride," 10 Feb 49
3. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr IG USAF to IG, Second Region, subj: "Operation Hqyride," 18 Feb 49

53/ Ltr Gen Stratemeyer to Gen Muir S. Fairchild, VC USAF, 14 Apr 49

54/ Ltr, Lt Gen Whitehead to Gen Barker, op.cit., 18 May 49

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training and discipline acquired through this disaster, and the observations made which resulted in certain changes in the overall emergency plan[55], were perhaps as valuable to the Continental Air Command as was the assistance the command gave the ranchers during the blizzard disaster.

55/ Ltr ConAC to DCS/O USAF subj: "Domestic Emergencies," 7 Oct 49.

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IV. FACTORS AFFECTING TRAINING

"Since we have more missions and more requirements that we have personnel to fill same, it looks as though the immediate future does not offer any real hope to stability. I would suggest that your people take this into consideration in their planning and cause training to attain the status we had in 1941 where we had to expect everyday to be assigned a new mission and lose some of our key personnel, at the same time gaining inexperienced personnel. Only with such an approach to the total problem will we be able to carry on effectively until such time as the remaining turmoil left over from the transition from war to peace status can be brought further into line and the entire operation made more orderly." 1/

To train and equip an air force capable of defending the nation against attack, the United States Air Force had to pare its expenditures to the bone in order to meet its commitments in the face of a steadily diminishing exchequer during 1949. One of the major results of this restriction of funds was the reduction, late in the year, of the number of flying hours allocated the Continental Air Command for training and administrative flying. This had an inhibiting affect not only on flying training, but on the remainder of those training activities within the command whose raison d'etre is to put and keep planes in the sky.

Affecting training, also, but not necessarily in an adverse sense, was the conversion of the tactical units to new type aircraft - from conventional type aircraft to jets or from one type jet to another in the fighter units, and from "obsolete" planes to more modern types in the remainder of the combat units. Naturally, the United States Air Force has to keep abreast of technological advances,

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1/ Ltr, Maj Gen Charles T. Myers, VC ConAC, to Brig Gen Hugo P. Rush, VC 4AF, 22 Aug 49

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in aircraft and in the various other types of equipment it requires to perform its mission; this point is made clear by remembrance of the poignant, near tragic, mistake made prior to the last war when pacificists or myopicists, as you prefer, refused to acknowledge the great lack of modern equipment in the American military establishment. Conversion to new type equipment must be a constant process, continuing so long as more effectiveweapons exist than the ones presently in use. Naturally, training, depicted on statistical charts reflecting flying time, goes down during the periods devoted to transitioning, but the improved aircraft more than compensate for the time lost, the materiel and supply difficulties which arise in the support units, and the disruption of established training standards once our pilots have mastered the new planes.

Another factor affecting training was aerial demonstrations, in the sense that they, at times, imposed terrific workloads on the several units that had to comply with requests for "fly-bys" and displays while still continuing to meet their normal training requirements. However, the demonstrations were a necessary evil, for it was the policy of the United States Air Force to demonstrate its equipment and its proficiency in the use of that equipment whenever the public requested a performance. The logic behind meeting as many requests as possible was that if the Air Force is going to ask the American people to support it, it is going to have to show them occasionally just what they are getting

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for their money.

Remaining factors affecting training were the continued lack of gunnery ranges, inadequacies of facilities, turnover in personnel, and difficulties in obtaining certain supplies and training equipment. Because these deterring factors are closely tied in with budgetary restrictions and are, therefore, the primary concern of Headquarters United States Air Force, not much space will be devoted to their discussion in the history. These problems have existed since the end of the war (as General Myers pointed out in a letter to one of the air force commanders, a portion of which was quoted at the beginning of this chapter), and higher headquarters is cognizant of the existence of the problems and is making every effort to resolve them, according to reports received from that body. Whenever Headquarters Continental Air Command could alleviate the problems, it did, of course. In the matter of maintenance, for example, the tactical units throughout the period were consistently short of maintenance personnel, while their maintenance problems with the new types of aircraft increased tremendously.[2/] With the transition from one type aircraft to another which took place in the fighter units and with the greatly increased requirements for aircraft maintenance personnel brought about by the change-over of the Troop Carrier units in the type aircraft they were using, the maintenance workload had to be reduced as much as possible in the non-tactical units to provide

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2/ Ltr, Gen Myers to Brig Gen Harry A Johnson, VC 10AF, 16 Nov 49

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maintenance personnel for the tactical units. The policy adopted by Headquarters Continental Air Command to alleviate this problem was to man the tactical units to their T/O&E strength as much as possible and to put into on-the-job training the additional personnel needed to fully staff the tactical units. And to correct the resultant lack of maintenance personnel in the non-tactical units, they were relieved of any administrative aircraft which Headquarters Continental Air Command believed not essential for them to carry out their missions.[3] To meet the problem of scarcity of spare parts and supplies, the simplest type of aircraft were used, whenever possible, and as few different types aircraft were stationed at each base as practicable.[4] Those aircraft which were especially difficult to maintain and those for which spare parts were scarce - in short, those planes which for any reason provided little return in flying hours for resources expended to maintain them - were gotten rid of if it was possible to do so.[5] Training type aircraft, for instance, were less costly to maintain and more easily kept in condition than other types of planes. Consequently, they were used by those rated individuals not assigned to tactical units for keeping up their individual flying proficiency. In the matter of securing better installations, the Headquarters Continental Air Com-

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3/ Ibid

4/ Ltr ConAC to all numbered AF's, op.cit., 18 May 49 (See Sup. Doc. #17, Appendix II)

5/ Ibid

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mand could do little but call higher headquarter's attention to existing dificiencies and request that action be taken to effect improvement. 6/

Allocation of Flying Hours for Continental Air Command

"If we are to retain an Air Force which has a reasonable degree of effectiveness, it is mandatory that we control with extreme care our flying hour programs; both those in the field of administrative and flying proficiency and those in the field of combat training. ... In addition to a reduction of administrative aircraft, it will be necessary to reduce the assignment of aircraft for the maintenance of individual proficiency. The reduction in the inventory in this category during fiscal year 1950 will effect savings in that year and will permit us in fiscal year 1951 to remain within the budgetary limitations which have been indicated by higher authority." 7/

Lack of funds forced Air Force Headquarters to inaugurate a system of allocation of flying hours within the Continental Air Command late in 1949 as a measure of economy. In August, Headquarters United States Air Force forwarded to Continental Air Command a tentative allocation (by model aircraft by utilization) of aircraft flying hours for the command for Fiscal Year 1950. The

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6/ 1. Ltr ConAC to TAC, subj: "Airfield Requirements for Jet Fighter Aircraft in Support of Army Field Forces," 28 July 49 and 1st Ind, TAC to ConAC, 12 Aug 49 RESTRICTED

2. IRS, O&T to Do and DM, ConAC, subj: "Requirements for Jet Fighter Aircraft in Support of Army Field Forces," 19 Aug 49.

7/ TWX USAF to all Major Commands, 21 July 49. (AFODP 56722)

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overall allocation, apportioned among the several major commands, was extracted from ninety percent of the United States Air Force flying hours in the budget program for that period. Ten percent of the hours for each command were withheld as a "cushion" to permit adjustment of any corrections which might have to be made after Continental Air Command had applied them and after a more detailed computation was made and distributed by higher headquarters. The initial allocation, therefore, quoting higher headquarters, was to be a "service test". However, pending revisions or changes, the allocation was to be treated as an indication of both the upper and lower limits of flying activities.[8] In making out the allocation, higher headquarters estimated that the average pilot flying Minimum Individual Proficiency Training[9] (MIT) aircraft would receive eighty first pilot hours per year. An absolute ceiling of 250 actual pilot and co-pilot hours for any individual in the MIT category was imposed. This ceiling, Headquarters United States Air Force directed, was to be adhered to in all cases with the exception of instructor pilot time, to be recorded in compliance with Air Force Regulation 60-7.[10]

After reviewing the allocation of flying hours accorded it for operation, examining them in the light of planning factors

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8/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Allocation of Flying Hours", 19 Aug 49

9/ MIT flying is: "that flying performed on aircraft specifically allocated for that purpose by those pilots who cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the minimum flying requirements of Air Force Regulation 60-2 in aircraft assigned for any other purpose."

10/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, op.cit., 19 Aug 49 SECRET

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cited in Air Force Letter 150-10, present aircraft allocation figures, and past experience, Headquarters Continental Air Command felt it could keep within them but requested the following corrections be made: (1) B-29 hours increased to permit use of the eight (8) B-29's equipped for radar calibration; (2) B-26's hours reduced in accordance with Continental Air Command's plans for using less C-47's than formerly for tactical and MTT flying; and (3) total elimination of C-46 and B-26 flying hours since the command no longer used those types of aircraft for tactical operation.[11] Headquarters Continental Air Command further stated that it would take all possible action to match allocated flying hours with actual performance.[12] Then, in keeping with Headquarters United States Air Force's wish that each major command review its requirements carefully, Headquarters Continental Air Command sent out explicit directions to its air forces for making individual studies of their flying hour requirements.[13] After these reports had come in to the headquarters and been reviewed and correlated, they were sent to higher headquarters with the following observation:

> "A study of flying hour requirements from Continental Air Command field units discloses that the plan-

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11/ Ibid. 1st Ind, ConAC to USAF, 27 Sep 49

12/ Ibid

13/ Ltr ConAC to all numbered AF's, subj: "Flying Hour Requirements", 30 Aug 49

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> ning for future budgets on a flying hour basis is not practical insofar as regular units of this command are concerned. Any attempt to forecast MTF and tactical flying on the basis of eighty (80) hours per pilot per year is purely an estimate and it is felt that by using past experience and controlled administrative scheduling that a more accurate and worthwhile report could be compiled .... This headquarters also feels that the present 100 hours per year as set forth by AF Reg 66-2 is in the best interests of flying safety and proficiency and any reduction of these factors would be detrimental to the Air Force. In connection with this, Continental Air Command proposes to solve the problem by increasing maintenance and operational efficiency to appoint where desired aircraft utilization figures are exceeded."14/

In October, the more detailed allocation of flying hours promised when the tentative allocation was published, was sent out by higher headquarters. It stated that future allocations would be published each quarter year to reflect all program changes.15/ It also warned:

> "Restrictions more drastic than embodied in this allocation may have to be imposed if funds expected to be available for the operation of the Air Force are further curtailed. You should, therefore, establish a system of sub-allocation of flying hours which will permit the imposition of controls upon the individual operating unit and will insure that the allocated hours are not exceeded."16/

Headquarters Continental Air Command was directed to notify higher headquarters immediately if it became apparent that the allocation was either in excess or deficient to the command's needs. Since

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14/ Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Flying Hour Requirements," 5 Oct 49

15/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Allocation of Flying Hours," 24 Oct 49. RESTRICTED

16/ Ibid

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any additional allocation of flying hours to the Continental Air Command would have to be met at the expense of some other major command, requests for such action would have to be accompanied by full justification.[17]

Headquarters Continental Air Command then made a thorough analysis of the flying hours allocated it in relation to its needs for Fiscal Year 1950. The two (2) major requirements were considered: (1) the minimum number of MIT and Administrative (ADM) aircraft hours necessary to permit the pilots to meet Air Force Regulation 60-2 requirements and to accomplish minimum administrative missions; and (2) the minimum number of hours required to carry out Continental Air Command's tactical missions - including training, training exercises, Army Field Force commitments, and air shows or demonstrations.[18] The MIT and ADM hours, computed on the basis of 8.3 hours per month for each pilot, produced a total of fifty (50) first pilot hours per pilot as opposed to the eighty (80) budgeted. To this total was added an administrative buffer of 2800 hours per month for flying administrative flights. This latter figure was to permit the headquarters a little leeway in scheduling inspection trips and ferry missions. The total number of flying hours estimated for MIT and ADM flying in the Continental Air Command for Fiscal Year 1950 was 287,867. This included the 177,883 hours which had

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17/ Ibid

18/ Ibid

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been flown in this category prior to 1 November 1949. Tactical hour requirements were then estimated three (3) separate ways: The first estimate was made by merely subtracting the basic requirements other than tactical (287,867, as was stated previously) from the total number of hours allocated (419,276). This left a total of 131,409 hours for the tactical units for the remaining eight (8) months. Certainly, this figure, when broken down, was far too low for the tactical units to accomplish their missions. The second method, utilizing factors as set forth in Air Force Letter 150-10, gave the Continental Air Command 514,734 hours as an estimation of the flying time the tactical units would require to accomplish their missions. The third and final estimate, made by computing the number of hours needed on the basis of minimum training standards for assigned tactical pilots, produced a total of 501,940 hours.[19/]

A final analysis was then prepared which took into consideration the factors discussed above, and reductions by specific type aircraft based on current operating experience and estimated performance for the remainder of the Fiscal Year. After applying these cuts, a new total of 483,921 hours for all categories of flying was established. The final estimate was 64,645 hours over that allocated by higher headquarters. Continental Air Command requested that these additional hours be provided, stating that any allocation below that number would prevent the Continental Air Command

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19/ Ibid

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from accomplishing its minimum flying commitments.[20]

On 5 November, Headquarters Continental Air Command, in carrying out its orders to keep close check on its units to see that they kept within their allocated number of flying hours, told its numbered air forces:

> "It is the responsibility of the Air Force commander to suballocate a proportionate share of hours allocated among units assigned. Sufficient accounting will be established at each air force headquarters to insure that the quota per type aircraft is not exceeded. Shifting of hours allocated between types is not permitted. All maneuvers, air shows, demonstrations, etc, must be accomplished within the allocation furnished. There is no additional time available for this purpose. For your information and planning purposes, the allocation of hours for MIT and ADM aircraft was based on providing each assigned and attached pilot, other than tactical pilots, with an average of four (4) pilot hours and four (4) co-pilot hours per month for Fiscal Year 1950."[21]

A slight lessening of the restrictions imposed on flying hours was forthcoming in November when higher headquarters admitted that while it was necessary that the allocated flying hour program be followed in detail, it was nevertheless recognized that it might be impossible for all commands to adhere to the allocation of flying hours within detail by model aircraft, and, at the same time, continue to perform essential portions of their mission. In order, therefore, that allocated hours could be transferred

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20/ Ibid.

21/ TWX ConAC to all numbered AF's, 5 Nov 49 RESTRICTED.

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from one model plane to another, whenever it was so deemed necessary for the carrying out of the mission, a conversion table had been prepared by Headquarters United States Air Force for switching the hours about a little. However, there were certain conditions imposed on the use of the table: (1) no transfer of hours was to be made between allocated utilization categories. For example, no unit training hours were to be transferred to or from minimum individual training or administrative flying, etc.; (2) all transference of flying hours between models of planes for Fiscal Year 1950 had to be made prior to 1 January 1950. After the 31 January 1950 allocation list of hours was published new changes could be made, but not until that time could hours be transferred after the changes for the second quarter had been made. After these changes had been authorized, higher headquarters closed its message with the warning that in no way was the authority granted to transfer hours between models of planes within categories an indication of an abandonment of the flying hour program. It was simply a means of effecting certain changes which had been found requisite to efficient operation.[22]

In December, Headquarters Continental Air Command issued to its numbered air forces the sub-allocations of flying hours for the period 1 November 1949 to 30 June 1950, thereby firming up instructions for conducting the flying training programs forwarded the units

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22/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Allocation of Flying Hours," 18 Nov 49 RESTRICTED

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previously by telemessage. This directive left no doubt in the unit commander's minds as to what they would have to do to carry out their share of the economy program.[23] It was at this time that Headquarters Continental Air Command received from higher headquarters the reply to its request for additional flying hour allocations:

> "As was indicated by members of this headquarters in a meeting at your headquarters on 21 November 1949, the flying hours allocated to your command represent a portion of the total USAF flying hour program for Fiscal Year 1950 which is limited by a dollar ceiling. In order to satisfy the deficiencies presented in your 1st Indorsement, any increase in your allocation of hours or in dollar cost related thereto, must necessarily be at the expense of another command. Obviously, such an adjustment cannot and should not be made arbitrarily. Your headquarters has been furnished a table of factors for use in converting hours of one type aircraft to another. It is believed that use of this conversion table will at least partially satisfy your requirements for additional hours. It is requested that you recompute the flying hour deficiencies of your command after implementation of the changes which can be effected with the conversion table, and submit a revised table of deficiencies. It is hoped that by that time this headquarters will have been able to have ascertained overages in other commands with which to permit further alleviation of your deficiencies.[24]

A final study prepared by Headquarters Continental Air Command at the end of the year and forwarded to higher headquarters in early January 1950 on the effects of the flying hour program on Contin-

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23/ Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Allocation of Flying Hours," 2 Dec 49 RESTRICTED - Inclosed are sub-allocations of flying hours to each unit.

24/ 2nd Ind, USAF to ConAC, 2 Dec 49 to Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Allocation of Flying Hours," 24 Oct 49 and 3d Ind, ConAC to USAF, 23 Dec 49. RESTRICTED

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ental Air Command units, showed that the command would fall short of a necessary required minimum of performance if it had to adhere to categorical allocation of flying hours. Although Headquarters Continental Air Command agreed with the necessity for the imposing of restrictions on flying time, it failed to agree with an allocation which, in its estimation, did not permit the organization to meet the minimum training standards desired of combat units and did not include sufficient flying hours to perform additional missions assigned it - such as air shows, training exercises, ferry missions, tests, and miscellaneous flights to support its operations. The headquarters also noted that the allocation of flying hours to tactical units on an aircraft basis was not entirely acceptable due to the current overage of pilots assigned as compared to the number of planes on hand. This relative assignment, in most cases, limited the tactical pilots, particularly fighter pilots, to approximately ten (10) hours per month. If budget limitations prevented sufficient allocation of flying time to the tactical units, an increased allocation of time to cover the MTT category would be vitally necessary to enable tactical pilots who could not obtain their minimum training on tactical aircraft to accomplish it in the other type aircraft. At least, that was Headquarters Continental Air Command's opinion on the matter.[25/]

25/ Ltr Hq ConAC to USAF, subj: "Allocation of Flying Hours" 14 Jan 50 RESTRICTED

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Thus, for reasons noted in the previous paragraph, the restrictions imposed on flying time in the Continental Air Command toward the end of 1949 seriously impaired its former mode of operation. Just how seriously the operations and training of the command will be affected will be a subject of importance in the next volume of the history. If a more liberal policy of utilizing the total number of hours allocated the command is permitted by Headquarters United States Air Force, the Continental Air Command should be able to achieve minimum training standards in tactical type aircraft and perform the minimum number of administrative flights it has to make to carry out its missions. In any event, extreme care will have to be taken in the scheduling of flights and a maximum utilization of aircraft be made in the months ahead for Continental Air Command to uphold its end of the economy program.

Conversion

A comparison between the models of combat type aircraft in use in the Continental Air Command in December 1949 and those in use in January of that year reveals certain general but interesting trends in the types of planes assigned the command to perform its air defense and tactical missions.[26] In the Bomber Class, there were eight more B-29's and thirty-three (33) more B-45's on hand

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26/ Chart titled "Total Regular Activity Aircraft in the Continental Air Command" (by month), extracted from Hq ConAC, Statistical Services Reports

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and 146 fewer B-26's in December than in January. There is, evidently, no longer any great use in the command for B-17's, B-25's or B-26's but there is an increasing demand for B-45's. In the Fighter Group, there was a general reduction of all types with the exception of the F-86 of which there were 142 more in December than in January. Of the remaining type fighters in existence in January, the F-47 and F-61 went out of the picture entirely; there were drastic reductions in the number of F-51's and F-80's; and the F-82's and F-84's continued to hold their own. In the Cargo Class, there were general reductions with the exception of two new models which came onto the scene late in the year - the C-54 and C-119. And as far as Reconnaissance type aircraft were concerned, there was a great reduction of all types.

The above statistics indicate several matters of possible historical interest: (1) there was a decided decrease in the number of planes assigned Continental Air Command during 1949; (2) new type aircraft were made available to the bomber and troop carrier units; and (3) the fighter units completely transitioned from conventional type aircraft to jet and, more than that, transitioned within the jet class in their unceasing search for the best type aircraft with which to carry out their missions.

Those units assigned air defense as their primary mission commenced transition training in the F-86A, purportedly the best available aircraft for high altitude interception. Because of difficulties in obtaining ground ranges in certain areas and because of the

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undetermined suitability of this model fighter for air-to-ground gunnery, bombing and rocketry, dual-mission training for the F-86 pilots was restricted. While Headquarters United States Air Force went ahead to attempt to find additional facilities for air-ground gunnery, Headquarters Continental Air Command was directed to revise the mission of the units equipped with this type aircraft, striking out the secondary mission of tactical aviation.[27] While several of the fighter units assigned air defense were still equipped with F-84's or F-80's at the end of the year, plans to furnish them with the newer type fighter was sufficient motive to bring about revision of the Continental Air Command regulation setting forth the mission of the tactical units at which time the secondary mission of tactical operations was dropped for all the air defense fighter units.[28]

Two units, the 20th and 31st Fighter Wings, were equipped with F-84'Ds and continued the project commenced by Tactical Air Command in 1948 of making field tests to determine the capability of jet aircraft to perform tactical air support activities.[29]

Pilots whose primary mission was to fly the new jet aircraft were not the only ones required to take transition training, how-

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27/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Mission of 33d Fighter Wing", 28 Nov 49 and 1st Ind, ConAC to USAF, 30 Dec 49

28/ ConAC Reg 24-1, 17 Feb 50. Compare with ConAC Reg 24-1, 17 Aug 49

29/ Memo CG TAC to CG ConAC, subj: "Current Activities of the Tactical Air Command," 12 May 49 SECRET (See Sup Doc # , Chapter I) Also TWX TAC to 9AF, 16 Nov 48 and TWX 9AF to TAC, 4 Nov 49

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ever. Key staff officers could better perform their duties if they knew the type of aircraft intimately, it was reasoned. Consequently, selected officers of air defense and tactical headquarters were "checked out" in the new types of planes whenever it was feasible to give them training without imposing too great a burden on the fighter units.[30/]

The troop carrier units of the command commenced conversion to C-54's and C-119's but only a relatively small number of either type plane was in use at the end of the year. The 314th Troop Carrier Wing received the initial increment of C-119's[31/] and the 62nd Troop Carrier Wing the C-54's. Conversion to C-54's, in the opinion of the commander of the 62nd Troop Carrier Wing, caused certain difficulties not envisioned when Air Force Training Standard 120-2 was written.[32/] That unit asked that certain requirements of the regulation governing troop carrier training be waived, including: day and night minimum altitude navigation; formation flying at all operating altitudes and speeds, with emphasis on operating at minimum altitude; dropping of supplies, both free and parachuted; proficiency of three crews per squadron in the equipment and techniques of path finder operations; and dropping of paratroopers both day and night. These training activities the 62nd Troop Carrier Wing

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30/ Ltr ConAC to ADC, subj: "Check-Out and Maintenance of Proficiency in New Types of Tactical Aircraft," 4 May 49.

31/ Ltr ConAC to 4AF, subj: "Transition Program for C-119B Aircraft"

32/ Ltr 4AF to ConAC, subj: "Troop Carrier Training Standards" 10 Dec 49.

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felt it could no longer conduct flying C-54's and it asked that it be relieved of participating in them.[33] Continental Air Command directed the Commander of the Tactical Air Command to revise the training standard, not solely from the standpoint of the capabilities of the C-54 but taking into consideration the Army and Air Force's contemplated requirements for troop carrier units, heavy.[34] Tactical Air Command answered that, everything considered, the Air Force training standard needed no revision, that "wartime employment of heavy troop carrier units will require" the troop carrier units to engage in the activities the 62d Troop Carrier Wing had requested to be eliminated. But, Tactical Air Command concluded, "since the C-54 is not suited to the above operations, training must necessarily be limited."[35] Headquarters Continental Air Command wrote to higher headquarters, following receipt of this information, and requested that units equipped with C-54's be exempt from dropping supplies and paratroopers.[36] However, the headquarters informed the Fourth Air Force, parent organization of the 62nd Troop Carrier Wing, that the remainder of the requirements set forth for troop carrier training should be met by units equipped with C-54's insofar as possible.

33/ Ibid.

34/ Ibid., 1st Ind, ConAC to TAC, 24 Dec 49.

35/ Ibid., 2nd Ind, TAC to ConAC, 18 Jan 50.

36/ Ibid., 3rd Ind, ConAC to 4AF, 2 Feb 50.

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It was then indicated that the C-54's would be replaced by other aircraft whose operational capabilities would allow for the complete accomplishment of the troop carrier mission. 37/

Thus, in spite of the fact that conversion to new type aircraft has taken place within each of the three (3) primary types of combat units in the Continental Air Command during the year - air defense, troop carrier, and tactical support - there are still many shortcomings in the types of aircraft employed. While there seems to have been an abandonment of the original plan of combining the fighter resources of the Air Defense Command and the Tactical Air Command by equipping each fighter unit to be able to perform both air defense and tactical air support operations, there is still a suggestion that perhaps one certain type fighter craft can be evolved which will be equally capable of performing both missions. And while the C-54 has proved superior to older type cargo aircraft for certain aspects of troop and cargo transportation it has proved incapable of performing certain of the basic Troop Carrier type missions that will have to be conducted in the event of emergency, such as aerial resupply and paradrop.

Demonstrations

Air force demonstrations are different from training exercises in that while certain training is achieved in conduct-

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37/ Ibid.

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ing them their primary intent is to enheighten the impressiveness of a public gathering, upon request, with a show of Air Force equipment and proficiency in handling that equipment. Requests for participation of Continental Air Command units in aerial demonstrations during this period were divided into two (2) classes: (1) local civic sponsored events; and (2) events of national interest, or "air shows". The policy of Headquarters United States Air Force in regard to the above projects was to comply with as many of them as did not seriously hamper established training commitments.[38] While perhaps none of them "seriously" affected training, compliance with many of them certainly taxed the ability of the combat units on several occasions to conduct them and, at the same time carry on with their assigned duties.

Demonstrations for support of local civic-sponsored events, such as parades, ceremonies, and dedications, were made a part of normal training and were scheduled and carried out under the auspices of the numbered air forces.[39] After amendment of the directive governing the procedure to be followed in processing these types of requests,[40] numbered air force commanders assumed the responsibility of approving or disapproving them. Usually,

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38/ IRS, C&T to DO, 3 May 49.

39/ ConAC Ltr 190-2, 4 Nov 49.

40/ Ltr 9AF to ConAC, subj: "Authorization of Aircraft Flights for Ceremonies and Special Events," 30 Mar 49 and 1st Ind ConAC to 9AF, 18 Apr 49.

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"fly-bys" could be performed in normal training flights at no additional expense and with no interference to the normal training program.[41] When other commitments prevented the commanders from meeting a request, disapproval of the request was coordinated with Headquarters Continental Air Command and a polite note dispatched to the requesting agency stating the reasons why the request could not be met. Usually, the factors governing whether such type requests could be carried out were time, distance and whether or not per diem payment would have to be made to the crews.[42] Although oftentimes pilots and airmen participated in these missions at their own expense, the popularity of such demonstrations and the frequency of requests was so great that to expect these men to pay their own way became an imposition.[43] The transporting of equipment and maintenance personnel to other bases from the home stations to conduct demonstrations requiring several days preparation were also determing factors to be considered before requests for demonstrations of this type could be approved.[44] Only in a few isolated cases where requests were misplaced along the chain of command were there any difficulties experienced in handling this type of demonstration. Corrective action in the method employed in hand-

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41/ Ibid.

42/ 1st Ind, ConAC to 12AF, 11 Aug 49 to Ltr 12AF to ConAC, "Request for Air Show," 2 Aug 49.

43/ Ltr 4th Ftr Wg to 4th Ftr Gp, subj: "Air Shows and Aerial Demonstrations," 23 Jun 49.

44/ Ltr 4th Ftr Gp to ConAC, subj: "Reduction of Air Show Participation," 22 Sep 49 and two (2) Indorsements.

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ling the requests quickly eliminated this problem, however.[45] Everything considered, the Continental Air Command probably received as much as it gave in carrying out requests for local demonstrations during this period. Training procedures were not disrupted, and much good will was created between the several units and the local populace.

The second type of demonstrations, events of national interest or "air shows", however, required much greater planning than the local affairs and interfered at times with scheduled training programs. This type of demonstration was directed by Headquarters United States Air Force, and in spite of the fact that they sometimes "seriously curtailed the assigned missions of the combat groups"[46] they had to be met. Quoting United States Air Force, "relief from participation in ... Air Shows ... [could] not be granted due to the demand by the public for opportunities to view the latest Air Force equipment."[47] A good example of this type of demonstration which took precedence over scheduled training programs was the mission flown by Continental Air Command and other major command's units in January

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45/ Ltr 4AF to ConAC, subj: "Lack of Coordination within the USAF while participating in a Civic Event with an Aerial Demonstration at Concord, California, 14 Aug 49," 28 Sep 49.

46/ TWX, ConAC to USAF, 26 Apr 49.

47/ TWX, USAF to ConAC, 30 Apr 49.

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in support of the Presidential Inaugural Parade.[48] So high a value was placed on these demonstrations by Headquarters United States Air Force that on at least one occasion an aircraft operational policy of Continental Air Command was set aside.[49] Because of the complexity of carrying out the types of demonstations called for by Headquarters United States Air Force, the Tactical Air Command was frequently called in to plan, schedule and carry them out. This was in addition to its normal assigned duty of planning close air support demonstrations for the benefit of the surface forces.[50]

Thus, while locally scheduled demonstrations conducted by the numbered air forces had little affect on training in the Continental Air Command, the major demonstrations performed on directive of United States Air Force oftentimes interfered with training and other commitments of the combat units. Al-

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48/ 1. TWX, ConAC to all numbered AF's and Info Copy to SAC, 3 Jan 49.
2. IRS, DO to CG ConAC, subj: "Briefing of USAF Participation in Aerial Review for Presidential Inauguration," 19 Jan 49.

49/ IRS, O&T to DO ConAC, 29 Sep 49 and TWX to IAF, 28 Sep 49.

50/ While training exercises scheduled and performed by the Tactical Air Command in conjunction with the surface forces during 1949 will be discussed in Part VI of this chapter of the history, routine demonstrations performed by that headquarters for the benefit of ground observers will not be discussed in detail. Consequently, two (2) directives from the Tactical Air Command to its units describing demonstrations to be conducted by Continental Air Command combat units on tactical air support are included in the appendix at this time.

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though higher headquarters was aware of the disruptive affect major public demonstrations had on training and did all possible to keep them at a minimum, that headquarters felt that the value of aerial participation in public ceremonies from the standpoint of the publicity received and the good impression made in the minds of the tax-paying observers outweighed other considerations.

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V. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING FOR AIR DEFENSE

Development of an air defense system in the United State and the training of the units and individuals making up the system were matters of prime importance in the Continental Air Command in 1949. To the Air Defense Command, the old Air Defense Command of 1946 - 1948 shorn of administrative and logistical responsibilities, was delegated the initial task of working out the plans for air defense and for conducting operational training of the units assigned those duties.[1] While the story of how the air defense system has developed under Continental Air Command properly resides in the bailiwick of the historians of the air defense commands, a brief summary of that story is considered essential to a logical presentation of operations and training of the component units within the system.

One of the first steps which had to be taken in setting up a "realistic" air defense system was the transference of air defense responsibility from the numbered air forces, where it had rested since 1946, to the Air Defense Command. This was a slow process for the Air Defense Command initially did not have sufficient trained personnel to permit it to assume this obligation.[2] However, with the creation of eastern and western planning and training liaison groups, under the Air Defense Command, in March, it became possible to take air defense

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1/ ConAC Reg 25-1, 31 Jan 49.
2/ SECRET Ltr ConAC to Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, subj: "Planning for Emergencies," 25 Jan 49.

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matters from the numbered air forces and give them to these organizations.[3]

The liaison groups were cadres only, organized to pave the way for the establishment of the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces which took place in September - the Eastern Air Defense Force assuming responsibility for air defense in the area west of 103 degrees west longitute and the Western Air Defense Force taking charge of air defense west of that line of demarcation.[4]

In order for the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces to conduct the air defense systems training required for them to reach the desired stage of preparedness, it was necessary to allocate certain regular air force fighter units to them for continuous operational control. This was done in Continental Air Command General Order 122, 10 November 1949, which authorized the defense forces to define and prescribe any conditions of readiness which they considered advisable and necessary and which permitted them to commit to actual air defense operations or systems training any size intercoption force from within those on hand.[5] Responsibility for the individual and unit training of these units, however, as distinguished from "systems" training conducted by the defense forces, remained with the numbered air forces to which the units were assigned.

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3 / 1. Ltr Hq ConAC to 4th AF and 1st AF's, subj: "Air Defense Responsibilities," 9 Mar 49
2. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr 1st AF to CG 67th Wing, Mass, NG, subj: "Initial Tactical Operations in Air Defense," 29 Apr 49.

4 / ConAC Regs 25-1 and 25-2, subj: "Organization and Mission of the EADF and WADF," 2 Nov 49.

5 / Ltr ConAC to CG's all AF's and WADF and EADF, subj: "Operational Control in the Conduct of Air Defense and Air Defense Systems Training," 9 Nov 49.

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The defense commands were then given permission to recommend directly to the numbered air forces any suggestions for improvements in unit or individual training or other matters which they deemed necessary to improve the overall air defense structure.[6]

Because of the workload imposed on the tactical units, the size of the interceptor fighter forces employed continuously by the defense forces had to be limited during 1949. In some instances and under certain circumstances, it was not possible for all component parts of the air defense system to achieve a readiness status. Thus, while the achievement of twenty-four hour complete readiness for all units in the system was the air defense organizations' prime objective, the attainment of this objective required additional time than the one-year period covered by this history.[7]

Beginning in December, the Western Air Defense Force was permitted to employ the total availability of one fighter squadron per day from each the 78th and 81st Fighter Wings, plus six aircraft and crews per day from the 325th Fighter Wing.[8] The Eastern Air Defense Command was authorized control over one fighter squadron of the 4th, 33rd, and 56th Fighter Wings, plus four aircraft and crews of the 52nd Fighter Wing per day.[9] The commanders of the defense forces were given

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6/ SECRET 1st Ind, ConAC to EADF, 5 Dec 49 to SECRET Ltr EADF to ConAC, subj: "ConAC Fighter Forces Committed to EADF Emergency Air Defense," 21 Oct 49

7/ SECRET Ltr EADF to ConAC, subj: "ConAC Fighter Forces Commited to EADF for Emergency Air Defense Operations," 21 Oct 49.

8/ 1. SECRET Ltr ConAC to WADF subj: "ConAC Ftr Forces Committed to the Western Air Defense, 29 Dec 49.
2. SECRET Ltr ConAC to 12th AF, subj: "Commitment of Interceptor-Forces to Western Air Defense Force," 29 Dec 49

9/ SECRET Ltr ConAC to EADF, subj: "Commitments of Interceptor-Fighter Forces to EADF," 1 Dec 49

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authority to operate these units as they directed in the air defense of their respective areas and in the systems training for that defense. Squadrons of the several combat units were rotated to take advantage of this training. When the air defense forces become in a position to effectively employ on a continuous systems training basis a larger force than that given them at the end of this period, the plans are, they will notify Headquarters Continental Air Command of that fact and steps will be taken to increase their control. By the same token, if they do not require nor cannot put to training these units at any time, they are to release them from air defense commitments and permit them to continue in unit training.[10]

The above developments were predicated on the concept that an air defense force commander has to have continuous operational control over those elements of air defense (the control centers, ground control intercept stations, ground observer corps, and fighter units) as will be committed to air defense operations in the event of emergency.[11] The minimum force that will be available for the first operations, the theory is, if the nation is attacked, must be readied and trained during this time of peace. To accomplish this, the commanders of the two defense commands have to exercise continuous operational control over the defense forces at their own discretion.[12] In other words, anything

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10/ Ibid.
11/ SECRET Ltr EADF to ConAC, op. cit., 21 Oct 49.
12/ Ibid.

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less than a committed, "ready" force must of necessity include a time interval to achieve combat readiness. That "time interval," according to today's thinking of how the future war will start, will not permit us to prepare additional forces before the initial onslaught. What we have ready for commitment, will be, in most probability, the entire force available for turning back an aggressor during the crucial period.

Thus, command of the regular air force units assigned air defense missions, remained with the commanders of the numbered air forces, but permanent operational control of the units for systems training was delegated to the air defense forces during this period. This separation of authority can prove dangerous in a crisis, according to some commentators, if close coordination between the air defense forces and the numbered air forces is not maintained.[13]

Training of the Aircraft Control and Warning Units

From 31 January through 10 February 1949, a panel of officers convened at Mitchel Air Force Base to prepare training standards, standard operating procedures, training schedules and course outlines and curricula for each skill specialty and team within the various types of units in the aircraft control and warning organizations. Due to lack of time and scarcity of reference materials, it was possible to prepare training standards for only certain individual specialties at this time.[14]

13/ SECRET "Special Report on Exercise Drummerboy," 2 Dec 49 (See sup. doc. # 70.)

14/ Ltr ConAC to 14th AF, subj: "Aircraft Control and Warning Seminar," 1 Mar 49.

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To accomplish the original objectives, a seminar of officers met at Orlando Air Force Base on 10 March 1949 for thirty days to complete the above project and prepare Standard Operating Procedures for the several type units within the AC&W structure.[16] To eliminate considerable duplication, general information applicable to all the various teams, detachments and squadrons was included in a general section in each of the several training standards drawn up at this time.[16]

The plan in January 1949 was to deploy radar teams and control squadrons in a precise schedule geared to the expected production of equipment and to the rate of construction of the radar sites in the permanent air defense system.[17] When a radar site was made operational, teams to man that installation had to be sent out despite the status of their training. This pointed out an immediate requirement that the training program be very flexible in nature, capable of turning out either partically trained or fully trained teams as dictated by the development of the system. It was felt that the bulk of the AC&W units required in the expanded air defense structure of the Continental Air Command would be those units required in Air Defense operations. This task it was estimated involve ultimate processing and training of about 5,000 personnel.[18]

15/ Ltr ConAC to All Numbered AF's, subj: "Aircraft Control and Warning Panel," 1 Mar 49.

16/ IRS, Col C.S. Miller, Chairman ConAC Aircraft Control and Warning Planning Seminar, to O&T, 13 May 49.

17/ SECRET Ltr ConAC to 14th AF, subj: "AC&W Center at Orlando AFB," 27 Jan 49.

18/ Ibid. It was the comment of Lt. Col. Harold G. Lund of the Dir of Oper and Train, Hq ConAC, that the number of AC&W personnel to be trained would be "much greater" than the figure given in the text. (8 May 50)

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Plans, in the early part of the year, were to establish an AC&W training center at Orlando Air Force Base. Administrative and Training overhead for the training center would be furnished by the 539th AC&W Group. The mission of the training center would be to receive trained technicians from the Air Training Command and basics from other sources within the United States Air Force and screen them and organize them into teams. The unit would then train these teams to the highest possible level of proficiency, consistent with the requirements of the system as dictated by the rate installations were completed and became operational. In the expansion of the AC&W establishment, it was not contemplated that complete groups and squadrons would be formed at Orlando, but rather that requisite complete teams for operation at any particular site would be formed and trained. Accordingly, the bulk of the training to be given was to be systems and team training.[19] Lack of funds and personnel, however, prevented establishment of this school.

The Air Training Command informed Continental Air Command that it could provide approximately fifty percent of the 5,000 men needed to man the AC&W units. Therefore, individual training of specialists, particularly in the basic radio and radar fields had to be given on-the-job at the AC&W units in conjunction with their team training activities.[20]

The accelerated Air Training Command program for training of AC&W

19/ Ibid.
20/ Ibid.

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skill specialties was designed to eliminate shortages in this field in about twelve months. An increasing number of graduates of these schools became available for assignment as the year progressed.[21] These graduates required both on-the-job and unit training before their full capabilities could be utilized in the warning organizations, and the responsibility for further training of them remained with the AC&W organizations. The reason for this was that during the period when the warning system was expanding it was necessary for the active warning units to provide team training so that complete teams could be sent out to man other radar installations when they became available. And this team training could be taught only through extensive station training programs.[22]

Systems Training

There was a need for the initiation of an agressive, coordinated training program between the fighter units and the warning units at the beginning of the year.[23] No air defense system can be efficient, it was

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21/ 1st Ind, ConAC to 4th AF, 7 Dec 49 to Ltr 4th AF to ConAC subj: "Training of AC&W Personnel," 21 Nov 49. A peak flow of graduates to the field was expected to be reached about March 1950.

22/ IRS, DAD to O&t, Hq ConAC, subj: "Staff Study, AC&W Training Center," 7 Sept 49.

23/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Rotation of Fighter Squadrons at Tyndall AFB for Cooperative GCI Training Missions with the Controllers Course," 15 Dec 48, and 1st Ind ConAC to USAF, 28 Feb 49. Prior to the time the AC&W organizations became fully operational, much valuable training in control procedures was accomplished by the fighter squadrons by rotating for short periods of temporary duty at Tyndall AFB and cooperating in Ground Control Intercept training missions at the Air Training Command's Controllers Course. It also benefited the Controllers Course because officials were experiencing considerable difficulty in scheduling sufficient aircraft and pilots to conduct their necessary Ground Control Intercept training missions in the latter months of 1948. This training provided training for the fighter units in squadron mobility and in operations away from home bases.

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reasoned, unless there is mutual confidence between the fighter pilots and the men who operate the warning centers. To build up this confidence, air force commanders were instructed to make arrangements for air crews and warning units to become conversant with each other's problems by exchanges of visits and through "systems" training; i.e., through training scheduled by the numbered air forces between the fighter and warning units in their commands; this training to be monitored by the air defense commands. In the beginning, it was mandatory that action be taken to institute a program which would increase the operational proficiency of both the Aircraft Control and Warning units and the fighter units. Daily interception problems utilizing airplanes of the fighter groups and warning facilities with emphasis on night and actual instrument flying was to be the keystone of the program.[24] The systems and training, however, was not to interfere with the accelerated training program within the warning groups for the period 18 January - 15 January 1949: on the contrary, it was expected that the missions conducted would be planned and scheduled to complement those phases of that training program which required fighter support.[25]

The first move in this direction was the integration of air defense training of the 52nd Fighter Wing and the 503rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group. No actual interception problems could be conducted at

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24/ SECRET Ltr ConAC to 1st AF, subj: "Coordinating Interception and Allied Training," 7 Jan 49.

25/ 1. SECRET Ltr 1st AF thru ConAC to ADC, subj: "Special Field Exercise," 18 Jan 49
2. SECRET Field Exercise Directive #1, Hq 503 AC&W Gp, 6 Jan 49

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the outset because the scope of training within the 503d AC&W Group at that time was at a level which only introduced the basic soldier to the radar scope and the fundamental principles of plotting and telling. Approximately ninety percent of the men being trained as scope operators, plotters and tellers at that time were basic soldiers; therefore, the coordinated training of necessity had to take the form of an orientation course. However, immediately following the completion of this accelerated training period and as soon as the 503d AC&W Group had completed its troop movements to permanent installations and become operational, daily ground control interception problems were scheduled and carried out with the fighter units, emphasizing night and actual instrument conditions. All tactical wings under the jurisdiction of the First Air Force were required to participate in these coordinated training problems.[26]

Later, the integration of fighter training with that of the control stations was expanded when the First Air Force notified the Ninth Air Force, through Headquarters Continental Air Command, that a continuous requirement existed in the First Air Force for the training of control teams at the various radar sites under the jurisdiction of the 503d AC&W Group in ground control intercept. Since some of the sites were located near flying units under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Air Force it was requested that direct communication between the commanders of the First Air Force radar units and the Ninth Air Force fighter units be permitted in order to furnish aircraft for training flights under GCI control. This request was approved, effecting for the first time

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26/ Ibid. SECRET 1st Ind, 1st AF to ConAC, 18 Jan 49.

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a realistic method of providing an air defense system in which warning units have fighter squadrons at their control for intercepting attacking aircraft.[27]

When the Aircraft Control and Warning units were better staffed with trained persons and sufficiently equipped to carry on more extensive training, a new program for systems training was initiated. This was the so-called operations "Wednesday" training between the fighter and warning units. On the 14th of September, twenty units of the First Air Force passed to the 26th Air Division's (Defense) control for air defense training.[28] These units were: the 503d AC&W Group; the 14th, 33d and 82nd Fighter Wings; and the 52nd Fighter Wing, All Weather. A directive was published for continuing operations each Wednesday for all the above units except the 14th and 82nd Fighter Wings.[29] This training continued for several months and a reporting system was set up between the 26th Air Divison (Defense) and the Continental Air Command to keep the latter organization posted on the effectiveness of the training. This weekly summary submitted described operation, accomplishments and progress of

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27/ 1. Ltr 1st AF to 9th AF, subj:"Training for GCI Facilities," 26 Aug 49.
2. TWX ConAC to 9th AF, 25 Feb 49.

28/ Air Division (Defense) Headquarters are the field operational control agencies of the defense forces, as explained in ConAC Reg 20-4, 16 Dec 49. The air control, warning and communication system is the primary means of exercising this operational control; consequently, AC&W units have been assigned to Air Divisions (Defense) since these units man and operate the air control, warning and communications to provide a continuous service to the command agencies charged with air defense.

29/ TWX 484, 1st AF to 26th Air Division (Defense) 13 Sep 49.

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the training, as well as any difficulties encountered.[30]

Training operations "Wednesday" had as its objective the increasing of the overall proficiency of the air defense system, embracing all elements that could progressively be brought into the scope of activity. The immediate objective in the initial stages was to develop further the confidence of fighter pilots in radar control capability and to increase the team spirit between the two air defense factions. Interceptions of simulated strike forces were conducted whenever possible, on Strategic Air Command aircraft when they were available, and one fighter squadron on another when the Strategic Air Command units could not participate. Trailer aircraft operations, the techniques of broadcast control, pilot use of the air defense grid system and internal procedures as well as normal GCI control were all practiced during these periods and corrected methods instituted whenever necessary.[31]

There are then, three elements in air defense "systems" training: radar and communications units; fighter units; and strike elements.

30/ 1. Ltr 26th Air Div (Def) to ConAC, subj: "Air Defense Training
2. Ibid., 11 Oct 49.
3. Ibid., SECRET, 17 Oct 49.
4. Ibid., SECRET, 21 Oct 49.
5. Ibid., SECRET, 1 Nov 49.
6. Ibid., SECRET, 8 Nov 49.
7. Ltr ConAC to All Numbered AF's, subj: "Air Defense Training," 1 Sep 49.

31/ Ibid.

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To conduct a training exercise properly, all three of these elements have to be present. The lack of strike aircraft hampered training on many occasions during the year but it was never accepted as an excuse for training. As a substitute, fighter units alternated between intercept and simulation of strike aircraft when Air National Guard units or Strategic Air Command units found it impossible to furnish strike elements; or the control centers and nets practiced tracking the fighters across their screens, vectoring them around the radar areas and passing control from one station to another. Other hindrances to this type training were: lack of direct communications between warning units in some areas, making for loose division control; lack of blanket clearances for aircraft in the areas where training was conducted; and erratic performance of radar and VHF at certain times in certain areas.[32/] In all, however, these difficulties were not of significant magnitude to drastically hinder training.

One major problem arising during the period was the failure of base commanders to exercise the authority given them in Air Force Regulation 55-19 to extend their local flying areas and permit the jet aircraft to make intercept on strike forces before the latter crossed the boundaries of the areas. Jets flying at altitude required only about twelve minutes to fly from the center of the 100 mile normal flying area and a bomber at high altitude, acting as target for a GCI training mission easily flew through a section of the local flying areas before successful interception could be made. Since the fighter

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32/ Ibid.

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pilot could not leave the area without filing a flight plan, and could not file a flight plan if he was going to get practical "scramble" training, the whole mission was oftentimes of little value. To correct the matter, Headquarters Continental Air Command recommended to all its air forces that fighter base commanders establish two local flying areas, which was their privilege under the above regulation, a smaller one for use of local proficiency flying test hops, and miscellaneous training missions, and a larger one to be used for fighter-GCI intercept missions. The radius of the larger area was recommended to be made equal to the area covered by the Ground Control Intercept Stations.[33]

Late in the year, representatives of the air defense headquarters and the Headquarters Continental Air Command worked out reporting procedures, methods, and forms to be used in reports concerned with air defense training and operations. These revised procedures and reporting forms were utilized for those missions which were a part of joint operations between Strategic Air Command bomber strikes and air defense forces of the Continental Air Command.[34] A Continental Air Command Standard Operating Procedure covering these cooperative missions between the Strategic Air Command and the Air defense forces was published as a result of these meetings. Also, it was suggested at this time that in view of the arrangements with the Strategic Air Command and the publication of Continental Air Command General Order 122, which provided continuous operational control by the air defense headquarters over units assigned air defense, that

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33/ 1. Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Local Flying Areas for Fighter-GCI Training Missions," 17 Nov 49.
2. Ltr ConAC to All Numbered AF's, subj: "Local Flying Areas for Fighter-GCI Training Missions," 17 Nov 49.

34/ Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Interception Training Report," 28 Nov 49.

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the operation "Wednesday" missions be eliminated as being no longer required for coordinated or systems training.[35]

In the above agreement whereby Strategic Air Command guaranteed certain forces to be assigned air defense training, most of the fighter units of the Continental Air Command were "wedded" to units of the former organization for the purpose of scheduling this phase of the air defense program.[36] The 4th Fighter Group was not wedded but it was to be given concentrated gunnery training with the Strategic Air Command units equipped with B-36 units at a later date to accomplish high altitude camera gunnery training above thirty thousand feet. The 52nd and 33rd Fighter Groups also were not "wedded" but these two units were to be substitutes for the 20th and 31st Fighter Groups when the latter unit's comitments prevented the scheduling of concentrated air defense training. It was the plan that when sufficient gun camera interception training had been accomplished during the continuous training phase, the concentrated training could be eliminated at the discretion of the wing commanders. Training, under this program, was to be done in conjunction with the AC&W and Tactical Control Groups and be accomplished, insofar as possible, at the home bases of the units concerned.[37]

AIR DEFENSE TRAINING EXERCISES

Maneuvers simulating conditions as they will in all probability exist during wartime are the best and perhaps the only means the peacetime

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35/ SECRET 1st Ind. EADF to ConAC, 23 Nov 49, to SECRET "Report on Operations Wednesday", 16 Nov 49.

36/ Ltr ConAC to All Numbered AF's, subj: "Standard Operating Procedure for Combined SAC-ConAC Fighter Bomber Interception Training," Oct 49.

37/ Ibid.

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-- Air Force has of evaluating the combat potential of units and individuals engaged in air defense training; at the same time, they give impetus to training by emphasizing the importance of coordinated action between individuals, units and services in accomplishing a common objective. During 1949, the training value inherent in scheduling air defense exercises was given precedence over their worth as indicators of the capabilities of the air defense system.

Blackjack

There were three air defense training exercises held during 1949, two on the east coast, one on the west. The first was termed Blackjack and was conducted in the northwest area of the United States during May and June.[38] The primary purpose of Blackjack was made quite clear by Major General Saville, Commander of the Air Defense Command, who stated that he wanted it emphasized in news releases on the subject that aircraft control and warning and fighter unit personnel engaged in the maneuver were relatively inexperienced in air defense procedures and that training was their primary goal.[39] "Operation problems to test effectiveness of the Air Defense System, as a system", in other words, was still a matter of future concern at this time.[40] While this maneuver was primarily an Air Force training mission, the Navy contributed a few fighters, some shore-based radar and picket vessels,[41] and the Army sent officers to witness the operation and note any procedures which might assist the Army in executing its

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38/ TWX USAF to ConAC, 25 May 49.
39/ TWX ConAC to All Numbered AF's, 7 June 49.
40/ Ibid.
41/ SECRET Ltr DAD to CG ConAC, subj: Report of Air Defense Exercise "Blackjack". /July 49/

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ground defense mission.[42]

The actual exercise began on 1 June. Although it had been scheduled to commence a month previously, the time consumed in setting up and making operational the radars and the Strategic Air Command's inability to furnish strike force aircraft during that month prevented the exercise from getting off on time.[43] Originally, it had been planned to conduct Blackjack as a joint exercise with Strategic Air Command, but when, after that command had flown only six missions against the defended area, Strategic Air Command was directed by higher headquarters to stop operations in favor of other commitments, the Continental Air Command had to improvise strike forces from within its own resources.[44] The feasibility of using Air National Guard units for strike forces was investigated, but the subject had to be dropped because the Air National Guard units had completed the one field training period they were allotted for the year and there were no funds available for further active duty periods.[45] And since Blackjack missions were run Monday through Friday, exclusive of weekends, it was impossible for the "citizen airmen" to participate at all. The substitution of Continental Air Command B-26's for Strategic Air Command bombers deprived the maneuver of much of its realism. B-26's could not reach the operational altitudes of the Strategic Air Command aircraft and

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42/ Ltrs ConAC to 1st, 2nd, 4th & 5th Armies and replies.
43/ SECRET Ltr DAD to CG ConAC, op. cit., /July 49/.
44/ 1. Ibid.
2. TWX, SAC to ConAC, 22 Apr 49.
3. TWX, ConAC to USAF, /Apr 49/.
45/ Ltr SAF to ConAC, subj: Exercise "Blackjack", 12 May 49, and 1st Ind., ConAC to SAF, 31 May 49.

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could not stay aloft as long. Consequently, the fighter pilots did not have the opportunity to practice operating through and above weather in the defended area.[46]

The area in which Blackjack was conducted was divided among five provisional air defense divisions, and each division commander was made responsible to the commanding general of an organization labled the Eastern Air Defenses, a headquarters established just for the period of the exercise. To carry out his responsibilities, each division commander was given operational control of several warning units allocated him from within the eighteen radar units deployed throughout the area and manned by the 503rd AC&W Group.[47] Fighters were obtained from the combat wings under the jurisdiction of the Ninth, Tenth and First Air Forces.[48] The performance of these radar units varied considerably, some barely operative, and others picking up aircraft and tracking them in from surprisingly distant ranges. Radar capability at the Twin Lights station, for example, was practically zero, while the radar at Selfridge, after some experimentation, "painted" aircraft solid out to 210 miles. As the exercise progressed and personnel gained in experience, however, there was a general improvement in radar performance.[49]

One concept of air defense operation that it had been hoped could be tested on this maneuver was that of decentralizing control over intercept missions from the Control Centers down to the individual radars.

46/ SECRET Ltr DAD to CG ConAC, op. cit., July 49.
47/ Ibid.
48/ Ltr ConAC to IAF, subj: "Exercise Blackjack," 25 Apr 49.
49/ SECRET Ltr DAD to CG ConAC, op. cit., July 49.

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Reason for favoring this method of operation was that it would reduce communications requirements, reduce the time actually required to intercept an enemy, and provide a more flexible defense over a greater area.[50] While lack of height finding equipment and a dearth of fully trained air control and warning personnel prevented this concept from being given an adequate test, those who favored this type of operation claimed they had obtained enough data to prove that the concept was basically sound.[51] Brigadier General Herbert B. Thatcher, Continental Air Command's Deputy for Operations, however, disagreed, stating:

> "The Defense Centers must retain operational control, certainly in the initial stages of any scramble action, to prevent the misuse of fighters to conserve our effort and to have the appropriate number of fighters available against the proper targets. I believe decentralization is good as a training feature only." [52]

The insufficient test of the concept during Blackjack and the difference of opinion that appeared to exist concerning the efficacy of this method of operation warranted continued experimentation of the various means of sending fighters aloft on an interception mission in subsequent training maneuvers.[53]

In spite of the many unanticipated difficulties which sprang up to plague those units engaged in training, Blackjack was considered a success as a training exercise by the officers who evaluated the results of the maneuver. It afforded the participants the equivalent of many months

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50/ SECRET IRS, subj: "Exercise Blackjack," O&T to P&O, 30 Sep 49.
51/ SECRET Ltr DAD to CG ConAC, op. cit., [July 49].
52/ Ibid. DO to O&T.
53/ Ibid. O&T to P&O

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normal training and assisted in the preparations for getting the air defense system into actual operation. Also, it brought the three services together, arousing their interest and giving them an appreciation of the magnitude of the air defense task and clarifying the role each would play in the air defense system.[54]

Lookout

The second air defense training exercise held on the northeastern seaboard was Lookout, conducted during the period 10-16 September by Continental Air Command in conjunction with the Office of Civilian Defense.[55] The area included within this exercise extended roughly from Maine to New Jersey, from New York to Pennsylvania.[56] Types of units participating in the exercise were fighter and strike force aircraft from Continental Air Command, Strategic Air Command and the Navy, and radar units and civilian ground observers.[57] The exercise was intended to measure the efficiency of a combination of ground observers and radar stations in operating an aircraft detection and warning system.[58] The major objectives of the maneuver were to test the techniques and deployment of the proposed

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54/ SECRET Ltr DAD to CG ConAC, op. cit., July 49.

55/ TWX USAF to ConAC, 21 June 49.

56/ SECRET Report of Air Defense Exercise Lookout. Oct 49

57/ 1. Ibid.
2. Ltr ConAC to CC Atlantic Fleet, subj: "Naval Participation in Exercise Lookout," 3 Aug 49.
3. Ltr ConAC to Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, subj: "IFF during Exercise Lookout," 2 Sept 49.

58/ 1. Ltr ConAC to CAA, subj: "Exercise Lookout," 4 Aug 49.
2. News release, Office of Public Information, NME, subj: "Civilians in Ten States Will Participate in Aircraft Detection and Warning Test," 4 June 49.
3. TWX ConAC to SAC, 4 Aug 49.

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Ground Observer System, to test the proposed Civil Air Raid Warning System,[59] and to further train the Air Force units in their air defense missions.[60]

The Ground Observer System functioned four hours daily for the first five days and twelve hours daily during the last two days of the exercise, during both daylight and hours of darkness. A total of thirty-two strike missions were flown by elements of the Air National Guard, the Strategic Air Command and the Continental Air Command, the size of the strike forces varying from two ship to twelve ship formations. Strike forces flew at altitudes between 500 and 20,000 feet, flying scheduled routes to give as many ground observers as possible an opportunity to call in a report to a filter center and, at the same time, provide Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force with data related to the capability of the air defense system when linked to the Ground Observer Corps.[61]

Strike forces were routed primarily to test ground observer reporting procedures and air defense standing operating procedures. The fighters were dispersed in accordance with a general defense pattern and the strike forces were routed in such a manner as to give the GCI stations and fighters all possible opportunities of performing interceptions. Strike missions

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59/ 1. SECRET Report of Air Defense Exercise Lookout, op. cit., Oct 49.
2. Outline Plan for an Air Defense Exercise September 1949 - "Operation Lookout".

60/ Ibid.

61/ 1. SECRET Report of Air Defense Exercise Lookout, op cit., Oct 49
2. Participation of the RCAF in this maneuver and the steps taken thus far to effect close cooperation of Canadian and U.S. air defense forces is related in SECRET Ltr, ConAC to C/S USAF, subj: "Coordination with Canada on Ground Observer System," 15 Dec 49.

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were usually routed on irregular courses running lengthwise through the area for distances of approximately 350 miles. The usual time required by the strike aircraft to cover this distance was about one hour and twenty minutes. High altitude strikes were intercepted on an average of five times while on their way through the area. Because the strike forces did not use IFF until they entered the area, all interceptions were made well within the area.[62] The GCI stations did not fully exercise overlap-tolling, which in many cases would have instigated earlier scrambles and more effective interceptions. However, once identified and intercepted, a strike generally was subjected to a succession of attacks.[64]

The low altitude strike missions were not effectively intercepted during the maneuver. The majority of them were flown below the coverage patterns of the GCI stations and reliance on detecting them at these times was placed on the Ground Observer System. Because of its stage of organization, the Ground Observer System was neither capable nor expected to be capable of furnishing the air defense system reliable processed reports that could be used to vector fighters to effective interceptions. However, five interceptions were made against strike forces flying between altitudes of 1000 and 5000 feet. The areas in which these interceptions were made were other than those areas covered by GCI radars and the interceptions were based primarily on reports from the Ground Observer System. Overlap-tolling of reports received from the Ground Observer System and radars did in some cases assist in effecting these interceptions.

62/ Ibid.

63/ 1. Ibid.
2. Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Operations Analysis, Air Defense," page 3.

64/ Ibid.

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Interceptions made on low altitude strike missions were based on sketchy radar station reports and ground observer reports whereas interceptions made against high altitude strikes were based solely on radar information. A sequence of interceptions was usually made against a single high altitude strike, whereas a low altitude strike was seldom subjected to more than one interception.[65]

Thirteen radar stations were employed as combined early warning and ground-controlled interception stations in the Lookout area. Another four stations deployed adjacent to the area furnished early warning information. The identification concept used during the maneuver was different from that employed for Blackjack. During Lookout, for example, all instrument flights and military VFR flights were reported to the air defense system by CAA Air Traffic Control Centers and Military Flight Service Centers. During Blackjack, only those flights entering the area from the North and East were reported to the system by these agencies. The change was made, of course, because of the addition of the ground observers who could report tracks to the system from over the entire area. For the correlation believed necessary in identifying flights, each GCI station received flight plans on all flights entering its area of responsibility. During the operation, steady improvement was made by the GCI stations in their control over the fighters. Initially, flight leader's response to controller's directions was slow and caused more radio conversation than necessary. This condition improved greatly during the period. Also in

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65/ SECRET Report of Air Defense Exercise Lookout, op. cit., Oct 49.

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the first phases of the exercise, the fighters were poorly positioned for their attacks on the bombers, but as the controllers became better acquainted with the capabilities of the fighters and the relative speeds of the opposing forces at various altitudes, stationing became better. In some cases, interceptions could have been performed much quicker if the controllers had scrambled their fighters on track information that was passed to them from an adjacent station instead of waiting until they detected the target on their own scopes.[66]

It was concluded upon the completion of Lookout, that the techniques employed for handling the ground observer's information were basically correct. A few changes were incorporated in future planning to further reduce time delays between sighting and interception. Also, it was concluded that the density of the observation posts during this maneuver was too great. A new spacing principle was recommended, placing the observation posts approximately eight miles instead of five and one-half apart. In spite of many irregularities, therefore, it was concluded that the Ground Observer Corps would supply considerable aircraft detection data not otherwise obtainable. With further training and perfection, the information would be more accurate and timely and would materially aid the GCI controllers in supplementing the radar surveillance data.[67]

Toward the close of the year, General Myers, Vice Commander of the Continental Air Command, informed higher headquarters that the formation of the Ground Observer Corps - Aircraft Warning Service was necessary as a means of augmenting the existing and proposed radar surveillance system

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66/ Ibid.
67/ Ibid.

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in the Continental United States. However, he stated, the Continental Air Command had never been granted permission, in directive form, to organize the Ground Observer Corps-Aircraft Warning Service. He requeste d this be done and that also the necessary action to cause the enactment of federal legislation required to give the civilian detecting agencies an official status as an auxiliary to the U.S. Air Force be taken. At that time, Headquarters Continental Air Command prepared an estimate of the funds required to implement the Ground Observer Corps-Aircraft Warning Service and sent it to higher headquarters.[68]

This request was promptly granted by Headquarters U.S. Air Force and information was provided that funds for the project would be soon forthcoming. Higher headquarters further stated that the Ground Observer Corps would be composed of civilians who volunteered their services and that it would be operated on a permanent basis as an adjunct to the Aircraft Control and Warning services for the air defense of the United States. Its purpose would be to report, plot and furnish tracks for low-flying aircraft, thus compensating for the inability of the radar screens to pick-up aircraft approaching at low altitudes.[69]

Drummerboy

The third and last air defense training exercise conducted during the year was held in the Pacific Northwest from 4 through 14 November and was dubbed "Drummerboy". It was conducted under the supervision of the Western Air Defense Force with operational control of defensive fighters

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68/ SECRET Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Implementation of Ground Observer Corps - Aircraft Warning Service," 15 Dec 49.
69/ Ibid., SECRET 1st Ind., USAF to ConAC, 3 Feb 50.

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and AC&W units being exercised by the Commanding General of the 25th Air Division (Defense). The area included in this exercise extended from the Canadian border south to California and from the Pacific Ocean to the eastern border of Montana. The AC&W units participating consisted of radar stations manned and operated by the 505th AC&W Group, supplemented by one Canadian station of the 12th Group RCAF. A striking force was provided by the Strategic Air Command's 15th Air Force and the defense fighter forces were from Continental Air Command fighter squadrons in the area, the 60th Fighter Wing of the Air National Guard and the 442nd Fighter Squadron of the RCAF.[70] Once again it was emphasized, this time by Headquarters U. S. Air Force, that this air defense maneuver was a training exercise only, and was in no way to be construed as a test either of the Northwest Air Defense System or of the ability of the Strategic

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70/ 1. SECRET Ltr Col. Joseph A. Bulgar, IG Second Region, USAF to USAF, subj: "Special Report of Observation on Exercise Drummerboy," 2 Dec 49.
2. Ltr ConAC to WADF, subj: "Air Defense Exercise".
3. Ltr WADF to ConAC, subj: " Northwest Air Defense Maneuvers," 4-14 November 1949.
4. American Observer Groups attended Canadian and United Kingdom maneuvers during the period. Canada, as indicated, participated in U. S. air defense maneuvers and sent RCAF officers to inspect American air defense installations. For information on these exchanges see:
   a. SECRET Ltr 503rd AC&W Gp to USAF, subj: "Observations of Exercise Foil," 19 July 49.
   b. SECRET Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Report of RAF Air Defense Exercise Foil", 1 Nov 49.
   c. SECRET (Extract Copy) Ltr EADF to ConAC, subj: "Report on Exercise Bulldog," 13 Oct 49.
   d. SECRET Report of Staff Visit to Dir of Comm and Elect, Hq ConAC, 17 Dec 48. (RCAF visit to ConAC warning installations)

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Air Command units to penetrate that system.[71]

Representatives of the Inspector General, Second Region USAF, who witnessed this maneuver, were of the opinion that while the air defense exercise was well planned and implemented the air defense establishment, organization, system and procedures "appeared to be in a nebulous transition from the remnants of the World War II set-up toward some ultimate but vague future objective."[72] These officers were especially disturbed, it seemed, by their impression that the command structure with divided responsibilities would prevent a rapid reallocation or redeployment of forces to meet a surprise attack, particularly if communications were disrupted. Air defense, these officers stated, had to be prearranged with forces deployed in the best operational facilities and under a single commander with complete jurisdiction over administration, training, operations and logistics. In conclusion, this investigative board recommended that Headquarters United States Air Force appoint a board of officers to review the entire structure of the air defense System to "insure a maximum return from the forces and funds available."[73]

While the Commander of the 25th Air Division (Defense), Colonel Clinton D. Vincent, agreed in large part with the above analysis of the air defense system as a ready force, he cautioned that it should be kept clear that the air defense system in the northwest was only an interim

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71/ 1. TWX USAF to ConAC and SAC, 24 Oct 49.
2. RESTRICTED Operations Plan, Exercise "Over Greasy" /Drummerboy/, 6 Oct 49.

72/ SECRET Ltr Col. Bulgar to USAF, op. cit., 2 Dec 49.

73/ Ibid.

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system and that everyone concerned was well aware of its limitations and shortcomings.[74] Headquarters Western Air Defense Command agreed that the temporary air defense system in the northwest did not represent the desirable degree of air defense in being but stated that the ultimate objectives of the air defense system in that area were well defined and understood. It was felt that the only major alteration required in these objectives for the completion of the permanent system was a speed-up in the phasing and final completion date.[75]

In its report to higher headquarters, Headquarters Continental Air Command emphasized the fact that Drummerboy was conceived, planned and conducted for the primary purpose of training air defense field force personnel throughout the northwest area of the United States. That headquarter's final observation was that excellent training results were obtained from the exercise.[76]

In a preliminary report on the operation, General Whitehead called to the attention of higher headquarters certain observations he had made during the operation. Intercept aircraft, in his opinion, had to be equipped with responder beacons to enable the ground control to read the fighter with the same facility as they did the bombers so that fighters could be vectored to the optimum positions for intercept purposes.

74/ Ibid., 1st Ind, 25th Air Division (Def) to WADF, 12 Dec 49.

75/ 1. Ibid., 2nd Ind, WADF to ConAC, 22 Dec 49.
2. SECRET Ltr WADF to ConAC, subj: "25th Air Division (Def) Report on Exercise Drummerboy," 7 Dec 49.

76/ 1. Ibid. SECRET 3rd Ind, ConAC to the IG, USAF, 14 Jan 50.
2. SECRET 1st Ind, ConAC to USAF, to Ltr WADF to ConAC, subj: "25th Air Division (Def) Report on Exercise Drummerboy," 7 Dec 49.

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Against the B-29 and B-50 aircraft flying at 25,000 feet the F-82 All Weather Fighter had proved ineffective and certain radar equipment functioned poorly while other types proved very satisfactory. As far as training was concerned, the AC&W and fighter personnel were better trained than General Whitehead had expected: "Their morale was high and they were operating as a smooth team from the outset of the maneuver." He also had high praise for the performance of the Strategic Air Command units, stating: "missionswere executed in a business-like manner and were carried out as planned." His final observation was that it was most important for the fighter and warning units to continue to train together continuously, operate under the same command structure and live and work together.[77]

77/ 1. Ltr Gen Whitehead to C/S USAF, subj: "Preliminary Report on Operations Drummerboy," 16 Nov 49. (SECRET)
2. Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Preliminary Report on Operation Drummerboy", 27 Dec 49. (SECRET)
3. TWX ConAC to USAF, 15 Dec 49.

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VI. TRAINING IN TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

During World War II, the Tactical Air Force-Army-Amphibious team was developed. The concept of the employment of tactical air power during 1949 was that tactical air, ground and naval forces will again be employed as a team if there is another war. 1/

The mission of the present Tactical Air Command, placed under Continental Air Command in December 1948, is to act as the operational, planning and requirements agency for carrying out Continental Air Command's responsibilities for air cooperation with land and amphibious forces of the United States in the defense of the nation. 2/ The commander of the Tactical Air Command is the Air Force and Continental Air Command's representative of tactical air operations with whom the commanders of the Naval Fleets and the Chief of the Army Field Forces can directly communicate with and confer in determining the schedules, requirements and other joint aspects of ground and amphibious training. 3/ To carry out these requirements, the Tactical Air Command was given continuous operational control of certain regular air force units. 4/

1/ 3d Ind, 9AF to ConAC, 6 July 49, to Ltr Capt Francis J. Dillion, Jr., to ConAC (thru CO 363d Tac Recon Gp), subj: "Report on Conference on Selection of Future Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft," 17 June 49.

2/ ConAC Reg 26-1, 3 Nov 49. (Implementing AF Reg 23-1)

3/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Amphibious Training of Air Force Units," 17 Jan 49.
2. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr ConAC to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, subj: "Amphibious Training of Air Force Units, Fiscal Year 1950," 4 Feb 49.
3. RESTRICTED Ltr ConAC to 14AF, subj: "Amphibious Training of Air Force Units," 21 Mar 49.

4/ 1. ConAC G.O. 122, 10 Nov 49.
2. IRS, Lt Col E. B. Rasmussen, P&O to DTAO, subj: "Operational Control of 161st Tac Rcn Sq," 13 Oct 49.

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Responsibility for the training of these units in the conduct of routine tactical operations, such as "pay Jumps" of paratroopers, routine airlift and other continuous requirement operations remained with the numbered air forces.[5]

Shortly after the establishment of the Tactical Air Command under the Continental Air Command, certain organizational defects in the Tactical Air Command became apparent which impaired its ability to perform its duties. A staff study, drawn up by that organization, and forwarded to Headquarters Continental Air Command in February, proposed that the two tactical air divisions be combined to form one headquarters to handle the operational echelon for the Tactical Air Command in field exercises, route routine training activities requests to the numbered air forces, and function as a detailed planning agency.[6] Approval was granted on this proposal and Headquarters U. S. Air Force published orders which activated the Tactical Air Force Headquarters in June. This gave the Tactical Air Command a field agency to cooperate with the corresponding Army organization, the Office of the Chief of the Army Field Forces, in field exercises and other joint maneuvers.[7] This operational headquarters was located at

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5/ 1st Ind, ConAC to TAC, 7 Mar 49, to Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Request for Operational Control of 314th Troop Carrier and 316th Troop Carrier Wings," 28 Feb 49. (See Sup. Doc. #167, Chapter I).

6/ SECRET Memo CG TAC to CG ConAC, subj: "Current Activities of the Tactical Air Command", 12May 49. (See Sup Doc # 167, Chapter I)

7/ 1. ConAC Reg 26-2, 16 July 49.
2. Ltr TAC to TAF, subj: "Responsibilities for Airborne Developments," 1 Dec 49.

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Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina with a Joint Operations Center, Tactical Control Group and necessary ancillary units. In essence, the Tactical Air Command now had an operational organization similar to the type employed in the European Theater during the last war.[8]

Planning for Tactical Air Support

The requirements for training of Tactical Air Force units, the normal demands of United States Air Force and requests for tactical air support from the other services, particularly the Army, had taxed the facilities of the Tactical Air Command to the point where careful screening of all requests had become necessary just prior to the organization of the Continental Air Command.[9] Consequently, even closer coordination with the other services for tactical air support became necessary after the realignment of the tactical units to enable the Tactical Air Command to continue to meet its commitments. A conference was called late in December 1948 between representatives of the Tactical Air Command and the Army Field Forces in order for the former organization to get a better understanding of the latter's needs for tactical air support. Discussed at this time were Army requirements for airborne training, school and demonstrations and maneuvers and field exercises. Also discussed were the capabilities of tactical aircraft, particularly the jet planes, for tactical air operations. Those in attendance at this conference agreed that more intimate training had to be realized in order for each of the services to fully examine and determine the capability

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8/ SECRET Memo CG TAC to CG ConAC, op. cit., 12 May 49.
9/ Ltr OCAFF to Armies, subj: "Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army units and Schools," 23 Sept 48.

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of new equipment to perform the functions each of the services expected from one another.[10]

At a later conference between the same agencies, in March, several additional changes were made in Army instructions to its units governing the latter's requests for air support of exercises and demonstrations. To enable the Tactical Air Command to better plan and meet its commitments, the Army units were informed that they would have to forward their requests for air support to the Air Force at least six months prior to the date they planned to hold them. At this time, Headquarters Continental Air Command was requested, by the Tactical Air Command, to confirm all Army Field Force training commitments that had been submitted to date, and approve the changes to be made in the Army Field Forces letter directive to its units.[11] Later, the deadline for requests for air support from the Army units was placed on a quarterly basis, submitted by the tenth of the seventh month previous to the quarter for which the requests were made.[12] This gave Tactical Air Command and higher headquarters sufficient time, or at least additional time, in which to properly evaluate the reports, assign priorities to them, and make preparations for providing the support.

10/ Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Resume of Conference Conducted with Army Field Forces," 4 Jan 49.

11/ 1. Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Report of Joint Tactical Air Command/ Army Field Forces Conference," 28 Mar 49.
2. Proposed Change to Letter of Instructions to OCAFF Letter as Result of March Conference Agreements.
3. Ltr Hqs Infantry School to OCAFF, subj: "Tactical Air Support," 15 July 49. (Example of request from Army unit for tactical air support.

12/ Ltr OCAFF to Armies, subj: "Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army Units and Schools," 2 Aug 49.

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Troop Carrier Training

Tactical Air Command is authorized direct communication with the numbered air forces for preparing plans for and monitoring troop carrier operations in conjunction with the training of airborne troops.[13] Throughout the year, the workload of the troop carrier units was heavy, influenced by a shortage of cargo-type aircraft,[14] by the large number of requests for their services by the ground units for transport, and by the assignment of new equipment and aircraft and the normal malfunctions incident to conversion.[15] In spite of these difficulties, the troop carrier units made every effort to adhere to scheduled commitments.[16] An interim Standard Operating Procedure, based on a former Ninth Air Force troop carrier publication was issued pending publication of the Joint Action Armed Forces Study "Joint Principles and Doctrines for Airborne Operations" to facilitate this coordinated troop carrier and airborne unit training.[17]

Toward the end of the year, higher headquarters emphasized the importance of close coordination between the Tactical Air Force Headquarters and the Army to "provide and facilitate adequate training within the limits of available resources and to cooperate in the development of doctrines, tactics and techniques in airborne operations."[18] The latest development

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13/ TWX ConAC to TAC, 14 Feb 49.
14/ 1st Ind, USAF to ConAC, 3 May 49, to Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Commitment of Troop Carrier Units," 19 April 49.
15/ Ltr ConAC to 14AF, subj: "Troop Carrier Aircraft Requirements for Army Field Forces 1 Jan through 30 June 50," 23 Nov 49.
16/ 1. Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Commitment of Troop Carrier Units," 19 Apr 49.
2. Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Troop Carrier Aircraft Requirements for Army Field Forces 1 Jan through 30 June 50," 28 Oct 49.
17/ Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Standard Operating Procedure for Troop Carrier/Airborne Operations," 6 Sep 49.
18/ Ltr USAF to ConAC, subj: "Airborne Operations by Headquarters, Tactical Air Force (PROV)," 25 Oct 49.

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in the establishing of closer air-ground cooperation in airborne operations was a proposal of the Chief of the Army Field Forces to the Department of the Army that an agency, to be called the Army-Airborne Advisory Group, be established at Fort Bragg to collaborate with Headquarters Tactical Air Force.[19] As of the first of December 1949, a tentative T/O&E had been developed for this organization calling for the assignment of six to eight experienced Army officers. In addition, studies were underway for the appropriate personnel augmentation for Headquarters Tactical Air Force.[20] Joint exercises and maneuvers scheduled to be held during the remainder of Fiscal Year 1950 and those in the preliminary planning stages for the future will, in most cases, involve both of these agencies and should afford them ample opportunity to test the new doctrines and techniques of airborne operations they evolve.

Requirements for Development of Field Exercise Plans

In March, Tactical Air Command informed Continental Air Command Headquarters that it was in the "unsatisfactory position" of having to make detailed plans for field exercises with the Army Field Forces without the benefit of a firm program approved by Continental Air Command and higher headquarters. There was no established procedure, in other words, for the development of field exercises for the planning echelons within the Tactical Air Command to base their arrangements with the other services on. To have such a plan that would permit knowledge of the yearly requirements for tactical aviation sufficiently far in advance was desirable for several

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19/ Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Airborne Operations of Tactical Air Force," 1 Dec 49.

20/ Ltr TAF to TAC, subj: "Testing of Doctrine for Joint Operations Center," 12 Dec 49 and 1st and 2nd Indorsements thereto.

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reasons, the most cogent being: for Air Materiel Command to provide efficient logistical support for the field exercises; and for the Continental Air Command to have ample time in which to obtain the necessary funds for conducting the exercises.[21]

To correct this situation, Tactical Air Command proposed that it submit a schedule of field exercises, obtained through planning sessions with the Army Field Forces as cited earlier, for the oncoming year. The schedule would be accompanied by brief outline plans of the proposed exercises, including sufficient detail necessary for the preparation of budget estimates, and the exercises would each carry a priority number. At the time the Tactical Air Command submitted its plans, the Air Defense Command would also indicate the number and type of field exercises it plannned to conduct during the same period. Headquarters Continental Air Command could then make the necessary adjustments and consolidate the schedules, prepare budget estimates and send the plans to higher headquarters for approval and confirmation. Headquarters U. S. Air Force could approve the plans within budget allotment and issued broad directives covering major field exercises, particularly those involving joint command or cooperation, in order that the major commands, particularly the Air Material Command, would be coordinated in their planning from the outset. Continental Air Command could then coordinate the efforts of the Tactical Air and the Air Defense Commands,

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21/ 1. Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Procedure for the Development of Field Exercises Plans," 15 Mar 49.
2. IRS, subj: "Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans," 16 Mar 49.

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direct them to submit general plans for the approved exercises, allocate specific units for participation in each exercise, and issued the necessary directives to the regional air forces for administrative and logistical support. Finally, Tactical Air Command and the Air Defense Command could prepare detailed plans and conduct the approved exercises. If there were not enough funds provided for conducting all the exercises, those bearing the lowest priority numbers could be deleted from the schedule.[22]

This seemed like a logical method of facilitating the great task of planning and coordinating tactical training exercises and the suggestion was endorsed by most of the Continental Air Command Headquarters' Staff; however, there was no action taken on the proposal for several months.[23] Finally, toward the end of the year, Major General Robert M. Lee, Commander of the Tactical Air Command, broached the subject once again. Stating that "the passage of time has not altered Tactical Air Command's view on the importance of establishing a directive on the procedures to be followed in developing Field Exercise Plans," General Lee asked that his headquarters be apprised of the status of the project for drawing up a standard procedure for developing such plans.[24] He was told by General Myers that a publication was drafted in Headquarters Continental Air Command in April which established a standard procedure for the submission of plans for the conduct of air exercises, but that inasmuch as the air exercises involved not only the Tactical Air Command but the Air Defense Command as well that it

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22/ Ibid., Ltr TAC to ConAC, 15 Mar 49.
23/ Ibid., IRS, 16 Mar 49.
24/ IRS, DTAO to DO, subj: "Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans," 31 Oct 49.

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had been necessary to withhold publication of the draft pending the establishment of a firm air defense organization.[25]

TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT TRAINING MANEUVERS

As we pass further and further from World War II, tactical air tactics, equipment and conditions are changing so significantly that reliance on World War II experience becomes somewhat tenuous. Accordingly, as an alternate source for obtaining combat experience, frequent maneuvers must be held in conjunction with the other services which try to simulate combat conditions. In the preparation and conduct of these field training exercises and indoctrination courses, the Tactical Air Command, in the opinion of at least one commentator, has "probably more concrete results to show for its endeavor" than most of the other elements within the Air Force.[26]

Tarheel

Exercise Tarheel was a continuation of exercise "Assembly" which was conducted in the Camp Campbell area in May of 1948. Held during April and May in the Fort Bragg area, Tarheel represented a considerable effort of the Tactical Air Command, being the largest airborne operation conducted during the year, involving 26,000 Army and Air Force personnel and one-

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25/ 1. Ltr Maj Gen Myers to TAC, subj: "Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plan," 9 Nov 49.
2. Ltrs ConAC to TAC, EADF and WADF, subj: "Air Combat Maneuvers Program for FY 1952," 23 Nov 49.

26/ SECRET Memo CG TAC to CG ConAC, op. cit., 12 May 49.

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hundred jet and fifty cargo type aircraft plus considerable Army equipment.[27] It provided field training in airborne operations, training in air-ground support of paradrop operation and training in the conventional means of supporting a fieldArmy.[28]

All told, Exercise Tarheel was an excellent example of close cooperation between the Air Force and Army Field Forces.[29] Lieutenant General Hodge, V Corps Commander and Head of Task Force "Victor" during the maneuver and Major General Barcus who acted as Commander of Air Task Force "Eagle" found the results of the exercise, "extremely gratifying", stating that much valuable training was obtained and many lessons learned during the maneuver.[30] General Hodge went on to state: "It is the best exercise I have had the pleasure to see since the war."[31]

It was observed during the exercise that the Continental Air Command tactic of requiring the numbered air forces to furnish logistics and administrative support to the units under the operational command of the Tactical Air Command worked very well. This was due, it was noted, to the concentrated effort made by the geographical air forces to provide this support.

27/ CONFIDENTIAL Ltr TAC to AMC, subj: "Kiel Reconnaissance Missions Over Tarheel Maneuver Area," 25 Apr 49.

28/ Ltr ConAC to TAC, subj: "Units and Commanders for Exercise Tarheel," 16 Mar 49.

29/ 1. Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Air Outline Plan for Exercise Tarheel," 9 Mar 49.
2. Air General Plan for Exercise Tarheel.

30/ 1. "Comments on Air Task Force Eagle", contained in Final Report Air Task Force Eagle, Exercise Tarheel, 29 Jul 49, in the files of the Directorate of Historical Services, Hq Continental Air Command.
2. Extract, Final Report Air Task Force Eagle.

31/ "Comments on Air Task Force Eagle," op. cit., 29 July 49.

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However, it was pointed out, operational demands were neither geared to a definite plan nor to known capabilities of the supporting agencies, and missionswere scheduled without knowing whether the participating units were fully utilized or over extended. Therefore, it was cautioned, it was not to be concluded prima facie, purely on the basis of this one exercise, that separating operational responsibility from logistics responsibility has proved a sound principle of organization.[32]

Perhaps the most important lessons learned during this exercise were that Tactical Control agencies could effectively control jet aircraft during interception and interdiction missions without too great difficulty and that p-84's, limited to about one hour's flight, worked well on pre-planned missions but were somewhat limited for close support missions.[33]

Air Indoctrination Course II

> "Each Air Force was requested to furnish a pro-rata share of personnel to assist the Tactical Air Command in putting on Air Indoctrination Course II. The skits in which these men participated were an integral part of the show we put on for the Ground Forces people and our own people and while they may not be the best possible mechanics of getting over the Air Force thinking, at least they constitute the best mechanics we have been able to develop to date."[34]

The Air Force's annual AirIndoctrination Course evolved gradually into its present form after a series of trial and error experiments.[35]

32/ Historical Compendium, Deputy for Logistics, Hq Air Task Force Eagle, 17 May 49.
33/ "Comments on Air Task Force Eagle," op. cit., 29 July 49.
34/ Ltr Maj Gen Charles T. Myers to Brig Gen Hugo P. Rush, 22 Aug 49. (See Sup. Doc. #1, Section IV)
35/ Ltr TAF to TAC, subj: "Revision of AIC II Curriculum," 25 Nov 49.

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Originally conducted as a joint exercise known as "Operation Combine", it has, after three years, come to be primarily an air operation, as evidenced by its present title.

Air Indoctrination Course II (AIC II) was a series of demonstrations conducted in cooperation with the Army and Navy five one and one-half day courses between 6 and 28 October.[36]

36/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr Hq TAC to Hq ConAC, subj: "Amphibious Training of Air Force Units," Fiscal Year 1950," 15 Feb 49 states: "Review of the actual conduct of Combine III, study of the general background situation to be presented in the next demonstration, estimate of the forces to be available for the exercise under contemplated budgetary limitations and evaluation of the scope of the instruction to be presented to the students in Combine IV (AIC II) during the fiscal year 1950 has revealed that the inclusion of an amphibious operation would be inappropriate. It is felt that the primary objective can best and most economically be accomplished by confining the scope of the actual operations to the minimum consistent with requirements for portraying the air-ground team in operation. Any Navy participation desired will be on the basis of an air-surface campaign in which Navy units are allocated to the TAC Commander for operational control for a given period of time."

2. Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Invitation for Army Participation in Air Indoctrination Course II," 9 June 49.

3. Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Invitation for Navy Participation in Air Indoctrination Course II," 9 June 49.

4. Ltr ConAC to 14AF, subj: "Air Indoctrination Course," 9 June 49.

5. Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Staff Composition and Organization for Headquarters Tactical Air Force, Operational (Prov) for Air Indoctrination Course II," 8 July 49.

6. Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Air Indoctrination Course II," 11 Jul 49.

7. Ltr DTAO to CG ConAC, subj: "ConAC Support for the Academic Phase of AIC II," 22 June 49.

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Courses presented included: Theatre skits depicting the various phases of joint planning for air-ground operations; displays of ordnance, aircraft and equipment, operation and functions of the tactical air control system; and air demonstrations in which missions planned in the previous day's theatre skits were executed.[37] The purposes of the exercise were to demonstrate to students of the Armed forces service schools the fundamental principles, tactics and techniques of air-ground operations and to permit field training of the tactical units.[38]

The course, according to reviewing officials, accomplished the mission for which it was designed: the tactical units accomplished a good deal of valuable training in the field, including joint missions which required close timing and careful air planning to develop accuracy during the actual air demonstrations; also, the units acquired further training in the use of live ordnance. Personnel taking part in the various operational and support problems and the staffs of the planning headquarters gained a considerable amount of valuable experience. To all appearances, the participants were firmly impressed with the importance of cooperation among components of the air-ground team.[39]

One interesting sidelight to this exercise was the familiarization flights given important Army personnel in jet aircraft. Earlier in the

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37/ RESTRICTED Brief Summary of Air Indoctrination Course II, Oct 49. Published by the Tactical Air Command.

38/ 1. Ltr TAF to ConAC, Subj: "Final Report of Training for AIC II," 2 Dec 49.
2. Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Air Indoctrination Course," 9 June 49.

39/ 1. RESTRICTED Brief Summary of Air Indoctrination Course II op. cit., Oct 49.
2. Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "VIP Attendance at AIC II," 14 Oct 49.

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year, certain senior officers of the Army had indicated to the Tactical Air Command their skepticism of the capability of the jet fighter to perform third phase tactical air operations. To alleviate this "fear" and to enhance Army-Air Force relations, a project had been initiated to give key Army officers a flight in a TF-51 type aircraft followed by a flight in a TF-80. Thus, certain Army officers had had an opportunity to form their own opinion as to the relative capability of conventional and jet propelled fighters. The flights at this time consisted of a pre-mission briefing, takeoff and flight familiarization with the aircraft and a cruise to a target area.[40/] Since the facilities available had not permitted the use of live ammunition and explosives in the above demonstrations, and since the Army officers had expressed a desire at that time to participate in flights where live ammunition was actually fired on targets, Tactical Air Command recommended that a similar demonstration be conducted during Air Indoctrination Course II, using TF-80's, and that selected Army Officers be permitted to participate in flights where guns, rockets and bombs would be used. Higher headquarters approved the plan, stating: "it is believed that such demonstrations can prove to be invaluable in promoting interservice understanding and Tactical Air Command is to be commended for initiation of an unusual and worthwhile project." Consequently, orientation flights were given during AIC II in two armed T-33 aircraft for the "furtherance of inter-service understanding of air-ground operations in general and evaluation of the capabilities of jet aircraft in the tactical air cooperation role in particular." In all, sixty persons received familiarization flights, including Secretary of

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40/ Ltr TAC to ComAC, subj: "Flight Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to key Officers of the Army," 5 May 49, and six indorsements.

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the Army Gordon Gray and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Harold Stuart. All of the persons who made these flights seemed to be "sold" on the jet fighter as a tactical air support weapon.[41]

Camid IV

In the Spring of 1949, the Tactical Air Command trained, planned and supervised the training of certain Continental Air Command units in participation with the Navy in amphibious exercises at Little Creek, Virginia.[42] The participation of Continental Air Command units in the exercise was extremely light, consisting of one fighter squadron, the 502nd Tactical Control Group and the 934th Signal Battalion. The exercise was in no sense a joint exercise and did not involve an organization command relationship and participation by the Tactical Air Command was primarily that of limited training. However, for purposes of realism, live ammunition was used during certain phases of the two-day amphibious problem that was held on 28-29 July in conjunction with an exercise by the 16th Infantry Battalion of the Marine Corps Reserve. The 502nd Tactical Control Group debarked a tactical aircontrol party, a light-weight radar unit, a medium tactical air direction center and a tactical air control center. The elements, assisted by the 934th Signal Battalion, established necessary communications channels as rapidly as possible after debarkation and assumed control of close air support of the fighter squadron from the 4th Fighter Group. The value of the exercise was that

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41/ 1st Ind, TAC to ConAC, 1 Dec 49, to Ltr TAF to TAC, subj: "Familiarization Jet Flight Program," 23 Nov 49.

42/ SECRET Memo TAC to CG ConAC, op. cit., 12 May 49. (See Sup. Doc. #1, Section IV).

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the Tactical Control elements of the Tactical Air Command were given an opportunity to exercise air force control of the air units in the objective area when the transition of command from ship to shore had occurred.[43]

Little Combine

This exercise was conducted at Greenville Air Force Base and Fort Bragg on 15-16 April 1949 for the purpose of presenting an abbreviated course to the students of the Armed Forces Staff College and students of the Air Command and Staff School of the Air University. While not a major exercise, it was indicative of the type of activities conducted by the Tactical Air Command in continuing to display and maintain current the art of tactical air operations.[44]

PLANNING FOR AIR COMBAT MANEUVERS (Including Both Air Defense and Tactical)

Representatives of Continental Air Command were told, when they appeared before the Budget Advisory Committee, that the allocation of funds for Air Combat Maneuvers for Fiscal Year 1950 would be a "minor fraction of the amount" estimated by Continental Air Command as necessary to conduct scheduled operations with the ground forces during the period 1 June 1949 - 30 May 1950. To plan for maneuvers and to avoid unnecessary work, Headquarters Continental Air Command asked higher headquarters just what specific Air Combat Maneuvers were planned or

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43/ CONFIDENTIAL Ltr TAC to ConAC, subj: "Amphibious Training of Air Force Units," Fiscal Year 1950," 5 May 49.

44/ SECRET Memo CG TAC to CG ConAC, op. cit., 12 May 49.

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approved by USAF for ConAC during FY 1950.[45] The reply stated that the program for Continental Air Command for air maneuvers was as follows:[46]

Lookout	Blackjack Conference
S. W. Air Defense	Air Indoctrination Course II
Drummerboy	Tarheel II
Armored School (Demonstration	Air Force Gunnery Meet II
Cadet Indoctrination Tour	Aircraft Controllers Course
Sweetbriar	Fortrex
Amphibious Training, Little Creek, Virginia	Alamo

To conduct this program, ConAC was to be given $716,315.

ConAC replied that in addition to those maneuvers that it had scheduled, and had received approval from USAF, the following maneuvers: 1) A Tactical Air Support Demonstration at Fort Knox, Kentucky; 2) An Armored School Demonstration; 3) An Air School Demonstration; 4) The sending of observers to RAF maneuver "Bulldog"; and 5) Camid IV. ConAC also stated that it would like to schedule the following maneuvers which had not been previously included in the original program for conduct during the last half of Fiscal Year 1950: 1) Two Armored School Demonstrations (12 and 26 April 1950) in support of the Army Field Forces Armored School; and 2) Spring Combine, a maneuver designed to demonstrate tactical air support to members and students of the National War College and the Armed Forces Staff College. ConAC stated it thought the funding program established by paragraph 4, basic, was sufficient to meet the requirements of the

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45/ Ltr, Hq ConAC to DCS/O, Hq USAF, subj: "Air Combat Maneuvers," 7 Jul 49.
46/ 1. Ltr ConAC to USAF, subj: "Air Combat Maneuvers for FY 1950," 10 Nov 49.
2. Ltr Hq USAF to Hq ConAC, subj: "Air Combat Maneuvers Program, Project 488, Fiscal Year 1950," 20 Dec 49.

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Air Combat Maneuver Program for Continental Air Command.[47]

USAF added three of the additional requests to the original list: Tactical AirSupport Demonstration; Air Drop Demonstration; and Camid IV. Per diem costs for participation in observer capacity in exercise Bulldog, USAF stated, came within the scope of ConAC Air Combat Maneuver Funds, Project 488, but exercise Bulldog as a United Kingdom exercise was not an integral part of the ConAC Maneuver Program. The increased scope of support of the Army Field Forces Armored School Demonstration was not considered an additional maneuver, and because Spring Combine had never been listed in requests for Air Combat Maneuvers submitted to USAF by ConAC, USAF asked that the scope, units involved, maneuver area, duration, time and cost estimate of exercise, etc., be submitted for review and for ultimate inclusion in the approved program.[48]

Finally, all was settled and the approved Air Combat Maneuver Program for Fiscal Year 1950 for ConAC was as follows:[49]

Blackjack Conference	Air Drop Demonstration
Air Indoctrination Tour	Drummerboy
Armored School Demonstration	Sweetbriar
Amphibious Training, Little Creek, Va.	Portrex
Camid IV	Air Force Gunnery Meet II
Air Indoctrination Course II	Swarmer
Lookout	Air Defense SW
Aircraft Controllers Course	Spring Combine
Tactical Air Support Demonstration	Alamo

47/ Ibid., 1st Ind, 20 Dec 49.
48/ Ibid., 2nd Ind, 18 Jan 50
49/ Ibid., 4th Ind, 31 Jan 50

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SUMMARY

We see from the above account that a goodly amount of the Tactical Air Command's time was spent on organizing its forces so that it could handle its missions, in effecting arrangements with the Army and Amphibious Forces for scheduling joint operations. While at the end of the period there were still many problems confronting it, the Tactical Air Command, deprived of much of its former strength, appeared to have built an agency which is still capable of carrying out the Air Force's responsibilities to the other services for tactical air support.

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APPENDIX

(Section II)

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

12 Aug 48

SUBJECT: Unit Training Period

TO: Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

1. A study of personnel statistics of this command indicates that we will be faced with a critical shortage of trained personnel in the next few months. Positive remedial action is necessary in order that we will be able to continue to fulfill the mission of the Tactical Air Command.

2. During the period from the present to 31 Dec 48, this command projects a loss of 7,880 trained enlisted personnel. This number includes 2,100 miscellaneous losses such as retirements, deaths, personal hardships, etc, 2,899 losses to overseas commitments, and 2,801 losses through termination of enlistments. The 2,801 loss through termination of enlistement is based on the assumption that 50% of the total terminations will re-enlist. The majority of the personnel mentioned will be trained personnel and will be replaced by basic soldiers who are recent graduates of Lackland Air Force Base and will require extensive training before being capable of replacing the losses incurred.

3. To cope with this situation, this command is taking the following action:

a. On 4 August, a personal letter was initiated to the Commanding Generals of Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces and to separate bases assigned to this headquarters outlining a complete re-enlistment program pointed specifically to the individual and directing that special emphasis be placed on this program. It is realized that the assumption made above on the percentage of re-enlistments may be considered low; however, it is believed that unless positive measures are taken, this percentage does present a true picture. A "Squadron Level Handfile for Re-enlistement", a copy of which is attached (see Incl 1) was also published by this headquarters and distribution made to all squadron commanding officers. This program is over and above the normal recruiting programs conducted by the stations in accordance with directives from your headquarters. It is believed that if the interviews are carried out with the proper initiative and spirit, a good number of re-enlistments may be brought about and losses to the command reduced.

b. The above information has been brought to the attention of Chief, Army Field Forces, with a request that consideration be given to this situation prior to submission of desired air commitments.

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Hq, TAC, Langley AFB, Langley Fld, Va.
Subj: Unit tng Period

c. To meet the problem of raising the status of unit training to the optimum desired by pertinent Air Force and Tactical Air Command Standards, it is planned to institute a three month full scale unit training program for all units of this command during period 16 November 1948 to 18 February 1949.

4. Although this program must of necessity be of continuous nature, it is believed that training must be given a priority over all operational commitments during a definite period of time in order that concentrated effort may be expended. This concentrated program will extend for a three month period following Operation Combine III. Operational flying within this command will be held to a minimum commensurate with training and requirements.

5. In order that the above program may meet with the desired success, it is urgently requested that operational commitments assigned to this headquarters be held to an absolute minimum during the period 15 Nov 1948 through 15 Feb 1949.

1st Ind 1 Sep 48

Dept of the Air Force, Hq, USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Va.

1. This headquarters agrees that the loss of large numbers of enlisted personnel will seriously impair the capability of your command to fulfill its mission. The emphasis placed on the re-enlistment program and the unit training program will be of great assistance in overcoming the problems created by large losses of personnel.

2. To assist your headquarters in accomplishing the scheduled unit training program, this headquarters will make every effort to reduce operational commitments to a minimum during the period outlined in the basic communication.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl
n/c

s/ A. S. Fisher
For S. S. ANDERSON
Major General, USAF
Dir, Plans and Operations

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Va.

T 353

5 Nov 1948

SUBJECT: UNIT Training Period

TO: Commanding Officer
Sherman Air Force Base
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
(sent to all TAC units)

1. Due to the loss suffered by the Tactical Air Command of a great number of trained personnel during the past few months, the status of unit and individual training is at a low ebb. In order to rectify this situation it has been determined that a three month unit and individual training period will be instituted. Information recently received indicates that for the period 15 Nov 1948 through 15 Feb 1949, Hq, USAF will hold the assignment of operational missions to Tactical Air Command to a minimum.

2. To facilitate this priority training period, this headquarters will hold operational commitments to a minimum and it is directed that:

a. The numbered air forces and separate bases restrict operational commitments to those which are absolutely necessary.

b. All flying accomplished during this period be so coordinated and scheduled as to directly support the fulfillment of both unit and individual flight proficiency requirements as contained in pertinent training standards and directives.

3. Also, it is desired that your headquarters direct all unit commanders, under your command, to utilize the period 15 Nov 1948 through 15 Feb 1949 to accomplish all possible training requirements, applicable to their particular units, as contained in existing USAF and TAC training standards and directives. Further, it is desired that during this period every possible effort be expended to accomplish the following:

a. The training and qualifying of all assigned personnel in the duties and functions of their assigned position (Guide - TAC Training Standard 80-1).

b. The training and qualifying, if possible, of all basic airmen in a usable SSN (Guide, TAC Reg 50-44).

c. The raising of the status of unit training to the optimum required by pertinent USAF and TAC training standards.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL QUESADA:

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

24 Dec 1948

OS 353

SUBJECT: Unit Training Period

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Field, Florida

1. Former Tactical Air Command units which are now under your command are presently undergoing a concentrated unit and individual training program which will continue until 15 Feb 49.

2. It is requested that your headquarters give consideration to this situation and hold to a minimum during this period, operational commitments which would impede this program.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

1 Incl
TAC Ltr, subj: Unit Trng
Period, 12 Aug 48

s/t/ JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt., USAF
Actg Asst Adj Gen

OS 353/446 1st Ind

Hq, Fourteenth Air Force, OAFB, Orlando, Fla

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Field, N. Y.

1. All units transferred to this headquarters from Tactical Air Command have been instructed to continue all training, operations, and activities in effect at time of transfer.

2. Every effort will be made to continue all training programs to completion.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl: n/c

s/st/ R H THOM
Lt Col, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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ConAC REGULATION)
24-1)

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y., 21 July 1949

ORGANIZATION - AIR BASES AND AIR UNITS
MISSION OF SPECIFIC UNITS

Paragraph

Purpose 1

Mission Assignment 2

Administrative Mission 3

Applicability 4

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Regulation is to announce the mission of a specific units of Continental Air Command

2. Mission Assignment. Combat wings, Continental Air Command, will be trained under Continental Air Command training standards pertinent to the following primary and secondary missions:

	PRIMARY MISSION	SECONDARY MISSION
14th Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
33d Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
78th Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
56th Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
4th Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
81st Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
52nd Fighter Wing	All Weather	Penetration
325th Fighter Wing	All Weather	Penetration
20th Fighter Wing	Fighter Bomber	Interceptor
31st Fighter Wing	Fighter Bomber	Interceptor
47th Bomber Wing (L)	Bombardment (L)	None
62d Troop Carrier Wing	Troop Carrier (M)	None
316th Troop Carrier Wing	Troop Carrier (M)	None
314th Troop Carrier Wing	Troop Carrier (M)	None
363d Tactical Reconnaissance	Tactical Reconnaissance	None

3. Administrative Mission. Each of the above units will be assigned additional specific administrative missions by the air force to which it is assigned when such missions are required to be performed.

4. Applicability. This publication is applicable to Regular USAF. (DO 322)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF

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CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, USAF

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Fort Slocum, New York

OI 353

4 Jan 1949

SUBJECT: Aircraft Recognation Training

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York. ATTN: Director of Intelligence

1. Currently available aircraft recognition training aids and material are insufficient in quality and quantity to inaugurate and maintain an adequate training program on a standard and continuing basis.

2. Information is requested as to plans by higher headquarters for an effective aircraft recognition training program.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/st/ R. J. ERICKSON
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

Aircraft Recognition Training
OI 353 (4 Jan 49)

3rd Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 24 March 1949

TO: Commanding General, First Air Force, Fort Slocum, New York

1. Attention is invited to preceding indorsements.

2. This headquarters does not propose a comprehensive recognition training program at this time. However, a special project for drafting training standards and directives for all component forces of the Continental Air Command is in progress in this headquarters. Recognition training is being included in the directives being prepared, with special emphasis being placed on training the rated personnel of the Fighter Forces in aircraft recognition.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

st/ JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE
Orlando, Florida

OT 461/663

12 September 1949

SUBJECT: Implementation of Training Standards

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Officer personnel of the 20th Fighter Wing were placed on TDY at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, in the early part of this calendar year for the purpose of drafting Training Standards and Training Directives for F-84 penetration and interceptor units. This headquarters has received ConAC Training Standards 10-1 and 10-3, and has directed the 20th and 31st Fighter Wings to conduct training in accordance with these standards, placing emphasis on Training Standard 10-3, in accordance with information contained in ConAC Regulation 24-1, 17 August 1949, announcing the primary and secondary missions of Continental Air Command units.

2. Request information be furnished as to whether Continental Air Command contemplates publishing Training Directives to implement the training outlined in Training Standards 10-1 and 10-3 in the near future. Indications were that Training Directives would be published to implement Training Standards in order to assure standardization of training throughout the command. For this reason, this headquarters has withheld publication of Training Directives that would implement your Training Standards.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ CORTLAND S. JOHNSON
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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Implementation of Training Standards
O&T 353 (12Sep49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 20 Sept 1949

TO: Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida.

The training directives to implement Training Standards 10-1 and 10-3 are being written in this headquarters at the present time. However, due to the large volume of high priority printing projects which have been assigned to the 2220th Extension Group at Fort Benjamin Harrison, it is anticipated that it will be some time before these implementing directives will be distributed to the operational units. It is therefore recommended that the Fourteenth Air Force publish interim training directives for use by Fighter Units of your command until the Continental Air Command training directives are published.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WEBSTER:

/s/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

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(EXTRACT)

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

Subj: "A/C&W Training Standards".

4. 31 Mar (From) INT (to) O/T
Comm
Thru: DO

1. The attached training standard, when considered in the light of the current project underway in this office, is inadequate by virtue of its general nature. It does not measure in terms of time and space factors, those proficiencies that are measurable. For example, in paragraph 4a, the standard states that an ADDC "must be capable of installing, operating and maintaining all authorized equipment in accordance with prescribed procedures". The questions arise as to: (1) How quickly must they install certain specific equipment? (2) To what specific degree must they be able to operate certain specific equipment? (3) What maintenance inspections are required on certain equipment, and how rapidly must these inspections be accomplished?

2. Although the form of the attached training standard parallels that of AF Training Standard No. 10-3 for AC&W units, it does not follow the form being utilized in the new standards being prepared in this office; however, this is not to be considered a serious objection. It is suggested, nevertheless, that two (2) additional paragraphs be incorporated in this standard and numbered as follows:

Paragraph 1 - Unit Mission

Paragraph 2 - Applicability

3. This office feels that many of the subjects included in Par. 7 could be deleted from the standard. The consensus of opinion of personnel from other types of Regular air force units who have assisted this office in the preparation of training standards has been, that too much emphasis and time has been devoted to the training of personnel in general military subjects, with a resulting detrimental effect on the accomplishment of the primary mission of the unit. Consequently, it is recommended that the following sub-paragraphs of Par. 7 be deleted: c, d, f, h, i, k, m, and n.

4. This office has been informed, that the panel of USAF officers who prepared the AC&W training standard, are functioning as a committee at Orlando Air Force Base. It is recommended that this panel of officers be instructed to rewrite the attached training standard, with a view toward converting the present generalities into specific measurable standards of proficiencies. To aid this panel of officers in this recommended action, I am attaching draft copies of training standards for other types of Regular air force units which were prepared in the officer. These attached standards should serve to point out to this panel of officers, the type of specifil information that is desired in the training standard.

R.H. SMITH
Colonel, USAF
Project Officer

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3.

DO 452.01 18 May 1949

SUBJECT: Aircraft Assignment and Utilization.

TO : Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

This letter was sent to the 1st, 4th, 9th, 12th and 14th Air Forces, and 10th Air Force

1. In the near future, a ConAC Regulation will be issued which will establish minimum annual flying requirements considerably higher than are now prescribed by AF Regulation 60-2. The purpose of this letter is to require action designed to enable commanders to meet these higher requirements.

2. Additional flying hours can be realized by longer duty hours, more efficient utilization of aircraft, better maintenance, and an increased flow of spare parts and other supplies.

3. The availability of spare parts and supplies are in general beyond the control of this command. We propose to meet this contingency by:

a. Utilizing, where practicable, the simplest available type of aircraft.

b. Utilizing a minimum number of types of aircraft at each base.

c. Eliminating, where possible, aircraft which are difficult to maintain and those for which spare parts are scarce, and those which for any reason provide little return in flying hours for resources expended. The following roughly illustrates the relative cost in resources of operating various types of aircraft:

(1) Operating a T-6 for one hour X dollars (i.e. man-hours)
(2) " " C-45 " " " 2X "
(3) " " C-47 " " " 3X "
(4) " " B-25 " " " 4X "
(5) " " B-26 " " " 5X "
(6) " " F-80 " " " 8X "

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Ltr to CG, 9th AF, Subject: "Aircraft Assignment and Utilization," para 3 continued.

Obviously, it is necessary that we utilize training type aircraft for maintenance of individual flying proficiency for personnel not assigned to tactical units.

4. Efficient utilization of available aircraft results from good management. Factors affecting aircraft utilization are manifold and are frequently peculiar to a particular base. It is the responsibility of local commanders to prescribe management procedures for aircraft utilization. This headquarters will inquire into the degree which aircraft are utilized, and the management practices which effect aircraft utilization. Generally, however, this headquarters will judge a subordinate unit's proficiency by the results produced.

5. Similarly, the duty hours for military personnel must be determined by unit commanders. The Commanding General, Continental Air Command, will concern himself with the results obtained, leaving to subordinate commanders, the determination of how satisfactory results are obtained. Where subordinate units fail to produce satisfactory results, it is the Commanding General's expressed intent to prescribe not only what is required, but how it will be accomplished.

6. Foremost among the tasks of this command is maintaining its combat units at the highest possible state of combat readiness. Toward this end, decision has been made to assign to each combat unit aircraft additional to T/O&E allowances as shown below:

a. Ftr Gp Equipped with F-84 type aircraft:	Four (4) TF-51's for target towing. (F-47 type aircraft may be substituted if it is more practicable)
	Six (6) T-6's primarily for instrument flying.
	Two (2) C-47's for administrative purposes.
b. Ftr Gp Equipped with F-80 type aircraft:	Six (6) T-6's.
	Two (2) C-47's.

NOTE: Towing can be done by the F-80, therefore, TF-51's are not assigned F-80 equipped units.

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Ltr to CG, 9th AF, Subject "Aircraft Assignment and Utilization," para 6 continued.

c. All Weather Ops Equipped with F-82's:	Two (2) T-6's per Squadron
	Two (2) C-47's per Group
	One (1) F-82E per Squadron (Authorization not yet received from Hq USAF)
d. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons:	Two (2) T-6's per Squadron.
	One (1) C-47 for each Photo Recon Squadron.
	One (1) C-47 for each Night Photo Squadron.
e. Light Bomb Group:	Six (6) T-6's.
	Three (3) C-47's.
f. Troop Carrier Wing (Medium or Heavy):	Four (4) T-6's.

When available, TF-80's will replace in whole or in part the T-6's, assigned to the Jet Fighter Group.

7. Air Force Commanders will take action to effect the prescribed assignment of aircraft from resources within their commands. When this is not possible, request for aircraft not available to them will be made to this headquarters. (NOTE: The TF-51's are made available for target towing on the basis of four (4) per Group. Decision as to whether these aircraft are assigned to each Group, or assigned to a base more accessible to gunnery ranges rests with Air Force Commanders.)

8. The emphasis being placed on attaining and maintaining the highest possible degree of combat effectiveness in the tactical units necessitates the utilization of a large proportion of the resources available to this command for accomplishing this objective. The allocation of additional resources to tactical units in turn reduces the resources available for other flying activities, particularly, administrative flying; and the maintenance of individual flying proficiency of members of other than combat units. Since

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Ltr to CG 9th AF, Subject "Aircraft Assignment and Utilization," para 8 continued.

administrative flights cannot and should not be reduced, and flights incident to maintaining individual proficiency will be increased rather than decreased, it becomes necessary to accomplish non-tactical flying in the simplest type of aircraft that can be used to accomplish these tasks.

9. Administrative flights, since they require a degree of punctuality and certainty of accomplishment, must be made in aircraft suited for weather flying. This means that C-47, B-25, and B-26 type aircraft must be available to various headquarters. C-45 type aircraft can to a lesser degree be utilized for administrative flights.

10. In order to simplify supply and maintenance actions, the number of types of aircraft at each base will be kept to a minimum consistent with missions that must be performed at that base. The following general rules will govern:

a. B-25's and B-26's will not be assigned to one (1) base. A base will have only one (1) of these types.

b. Fighter type aircraft will not be assigned as UIT aircraft. Air Force Commanders will take action to dispose of all such aircraft that are not assigned as unit equipment or as prescribed above.

c. Administrative flights of several days duration, which normally result in aircraft remaining unused while business is being conducted, will be so planned as to permit utilization of the aircraft during those periods its passengers are engaged on the ground, when such utilization is practicable.

d. Administrative aircraft initially will not be assigned to AFRTC's. The aircraft assigned for Reserve activities will be utilized by Regular personnel assigned to the AFRTC in the conduct of business and for maintaining individual proficiency. USAF personnel attached for flying only will utilize aircraft assigned for Reserve activity insofar as no curtailment of Reserve training results therefrom.

e. In determining the number and types of aircraft required at each base, the following minimum utilization factors will govern:

(1) C-47 type aircraft will be flown a minimum of 150 hours per quarter.

(2) B-25 type aircraft will be flown a minimum of 150 hours per quarter.

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Ltr to CG, 9th AF, Subject: "Aircraft Assignment and Utilization," para 10 continued.

(3) B-26 type aircraft will be flown a minimum of 90 hours per quarter.

(4) C-45 type aircraft will be flown a minimum of 150 hours per quarter.

(5) TF-51 aircraft assigned to F-84 units will be flown a minimum of 90 hours per quarter.

(6) T-6 type aircraft will be flown a minimum of 200 hours per quarter.

f. MIT aircraft assigned any one (1) base will not exceed .2 aircraft per assigned or attached pilot. There will be no aircraft assigned for the personal use of any individual. Air Force Commanders will take action to reassign and utilize MIT aircraft in accordance with the provisions of this letter. Where the required type aircraft is not available within an Air Force a request for the type required will be sent to this headquarters. Aircraft in excess of requirements will be reported to this headquarters for disposition.

11. Actions directed herein will be completed as early as practicable. Requests for additional aircraft and a report of aircraft in excess of requirements will reach this headquarters not later than 15 June 1949.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt., USAF
Asst Adj. Gen.

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APPENDIX

(Section III)

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

15 August 1949
O&T/HGL/326/5142

O&T 353

SUBJECT: Technical Training Courses

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Slocum Air Force Base, New Rochelle, New York

(Identical Ltrs sent to 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th Air Forces)

1. In accordance with the assigned mission of Air Training Command, technical courses are established and conducted in accordance with directives from Headquarters USAF. The sole purpose of these courses is to produce certain technically qualified specialists to satisfy world-wide USAF requirements.

2. Information reaching this headquarters indicates that improper selection of officer and airmen personnel for attendance to these courses and the lack of knowledge of the technical requirements of the using agencies has created a situation requiring immediate corrective action.

3. The selection of personnel who do not satisfy the mandatory course pre-requisites as outlined in the "Training Prospectus for USAF Personnel" has necessitated the screening of personnel to determine those who may reasonably be expected to successfully complete a given course. Those not qualified must be classified as untrainable and returned to their unit. The resultant non-utilization of available class quotas creates an additional expense in the cost of training, as well as a loss of usable manpower to the units. The training load of Air Training Command is geared to satisfy the USAF trained personnel shortages by a pre-determined target date, and class quotas must be filled with qualified personnel if these requirements are to be met.

4. The changing technical requirements of the using agencies for specialists trained by the Air Training Command are, in many instances, unknown to that command. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that all ConAC Air Forces continually scrutinize graduates to insure that technical courses satisfy their needs. In the event a graduate does not satisfy the need, it is requested that this headquarters be advised of the name, rank, serial number of the graduate, course pursued, and specific reason for not satisfying the technical requirements. This procedure will insure that the technical courses are kept current and that graduates will be technically qualified to perform efficiently in their assigned duties.

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Technical Training Courses (cont'd)
O&T 353

5. It is further requested that commanders of all echelons give their personal attention to the selection of personnel for attendance of all technical training courses in order that fullest utilization of training facilities will be assured.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/st/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFOTG 9 August 1949

SUBJECT: Technical Training Courses

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, New York

1. Commensurate with the assigned mission of Air Training Command, technical training courses are established and conducted by that command in accordance with directives from this headquarters. The sole purpose of these courses is to produce certain technically qualified specialists to satsify the requirements of the USAF, world-wide.

2. Recent information reaching this headquarters indicates that improper selection of officer and enlisted personnel for attendance to these courses, and lack of knowledge of the technical requirements of the using agencies, has created a situation requiring corrective action.

3. The selection of personnel who do not satisfy the mandatory course prerequisites as outlined in the "Training Prospectus for USAF Personnel" has necessitated the screening of personnel to determine those who may reasonably be expected to successfully complete a given course. Those not qualified must be classified as untrainable and returned to their unit. The resultant non-utilization of available class quotas creates an additional expense in the cost of training, as well as a loss of usable manpower to the units. The training load of Air Training Command is geared to dissipate the USAF trained personnel shortages by a predetermined target date, and class quotas must be filled with qualified personnel if these requirements are to be met.

4. The changing technical requirements of the using agencies for specialists trained by the Air Training Command are, in many instances, unknown to that command. It is of paramount importance that the major air commands continually scrutinize graduates to ensure that technical courses satisfy their needs. In the event a graduate does not satisfy the need, it is requested that this headquarters be advised of the name, rank, and serial number of the graduate, course pursued, and specific reason for not satisfying the technical requirements. This procedure will ensure that the technical courses are kept current, and that graduates will be technically qualified to perform efficiently in their assigned duties.

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Subject: Technical Training Courses

5. It is further requested that the personal attention of all commanders be given to the selection of personnel for attendance to all technical training courses to assure the best utilization of training facilities.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ KENNETH P. McNAUGHTON
Major General, USAF
Director of Training and Requirements

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Mil Pers-F-3353

9 December 1949

SUBJECT: Training of Assigned Personnel

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia

1. Reference is made to ConAC Letter 53-5, 22 September 1949.

2. The monthly report submitted by the air forces of this command have, in some instances, reflected duplicate requests for quotas, i.e., the report due this headquarters on the 15th working day of one month reflects the same quotas requested for the previous month. The report for one month does not cancel the quotas requested the previous month.

3. Your command is advised, approximately forty-five (45) days after submission of your report, as to the status of requests for quotas. In this connection your attention is invited to our letter, Mil Pers-F-3352, 30 November 1949, "Training of Assigned Personnel." Action should not be taken to resubmit requests for training, until status of quotas are known.

4. It is requested that the contents of this letter be disseminated to all units of your command.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/ BRUCE H. GIMMEL
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Hq USAF Wash DC

COMGENCONAC, Mitchel AFB, NY 16 Dec 49

From AFPMP-2B-3 Reutt AFCONAC MIL PERS-F-S 42256 dd 13 Dec 49.

Non volunteers may be selected for tng in AF schools when such action is fully justified by the rqmts of the Air Force and when individual qualifications are such that ample assurance of ability to successfully complete instruction is evident. Individual desire is an important factor in any asgmt, and care must be taken to avoid selection of pers showing strong aversion to tng, in order to prevent excessive and costly elimination rates at the schools. Responsibility for decision in individual cases must be charged, to a great extent, with officers responsible for selection. In all cases where non-volunteers are detailed to tng, the action should be explained thoroughly to the individual. It is becoming increasingly apparent that airmen in surplus SSNs must be trained in critical or acute specialties in order that the rqmts of the Air Force may be met.

AFCONAC MIL PERS-F-s 42256 is AF IN 10993

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPMP-2B-3

22 December 1949

SUBJECT: Training of Assigned Personnel

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York, New York

* * * *

4. In the past it has been customary for this Headquarters to disapprove requests for formal training from personnel already classified, following on-the-job training, in specialties for which training is requested. This policy was necessary because training facilities were not adequate to meet the trained personnel requirements of the Air Force and, in addition, to provide proficiency training. During the next few months, at least, it is anticipated that considerable difficulty will be experienced in meeting the established input requirements for many courses. In such a situation, it is desirable that airmen who require formal training regardless of present classification. Requests for training from such personnel will be approved on a space avialable basis. Decision as to whether the expense of formal training is justified in the best interests of the Air Force should be determined by unit commanders.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ M. D. MANNION
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Mil Pers-3352

14 July 1949

SUBJECT: Cross Training of Critical and Acutely Short Specialists

TO : Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. Information received from Headquarters USAF states that the following policy regarding cross training of critical and acutely short specialists will be included in the forthcoming revision of AFR 35-34.

a. Officers and airmen who possess a critical MOS will not be trained into an acutely short or non-critical MOS.

b. Officers and airmen who possess an acutely short MOS will not be trained into an MOS which is neither critical nor acutely short.

c. Training of officers and airmen from a currently held critical MOS into another critical MOS, or from a currently held acutely short MOS into another acutely short MOS will be limited to related MOS in the same field of skill. Such cross training may be approved by major command headquarters concerned, and indicated in special orders detailing personnel to training.

2. Selection of students for training will be governed by the foregoing. Students improperly selected for non-critical courses in violation of paragraph 1a and 1b above will be screened at the Air Force Training Command School for entry into courses leading to critical MOS in consonance with paragraph 1c. Improperly selected students will be returned to proper stations only when additional training in a critical field is not available at the training station receiving such students.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

st/ FREDERICK W. GERHARD, JR.
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CHANUTE AIR FORCE BASE
and
3345th TECHNICAL TRAINING WING
Chanute Field, Illinois

5/ED/e

(T) [illegible]

18 JUL 1949

SUBJECT: Technical Instruction Analysis and Evaluation Visits

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchell Air Force Base
Mitchell Field, New York

1. Authority has been granted this Headquarters by Headquarters, Technical Division, Air Training Command, Scott Air Force Base, to visit bases of your Command for the purpose of analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness of training given at this Base.

2. This analysis and evaluation is designed to provide a basis for improvement in the current training programs which will improve the quality of graduates. The study will include the following topics:

a. Scope of jobs performed within an MOS compared to scope of training given in that MOS.

b. Proficiency of graduates of Chanute Air Force Base technical schools in their specialty, as reflected in their job efficiency ratings.

c. Correlation between student course grades and their job proficiency.

d. Training omissions and/or training needs on new or modified equipment and aircraft systems.

3. For completion of this project, a team of five (5) representatives of this Base will be detached on the following proposed schedule. All dates will be adhered to as closely as weather and other flying contingencies will permit.

BASE TO BE VISITED	DATE OF VISIT
McChord AFB, Tacoma, Washington	15 - 23 August 1949
Mitchell AFB, Farmingdale, L.I.	6 - 16 September 1949
Dow AFB, Bangor, Maine	6 - 16 September 1949

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(T) 353.02 5/ED/e

SUBJECT: Technical Instruction Analysis and Evaluation Visits

BASE TO BE VISITED	DATE OF VISIT
March AFB, Riverside, California	26 Sept. - 4 Oct. 1949
Hamilton AFB, San Rafael, California	26 Sept. - 4 Oct. 1949
Brooks AFB, San Antonio, Texas	17 - 25 October 1949
Bergstrom AFB, Austin, Texas	17 - 25 October 1949
Turner AFB, Albany, Georgia	7 - 15 November 1949
Shaw AFB, Sumter, South Carolina	7 - 15 November 1949

4. Personnel at the bases to be visited involved in the study will be graduates of the following courses:

SSN	MOS	COURSE NO.
4823	Aircraft Maintenance Officer	48230
4821	Flight Test Maintenance Officer	48230
4903	Aircraft Inspections Officer	48230
737	Flight Engineer	73700
528	Airplane Hydraulic Mechanic	52800
687	Airplane Propeller	68700
684B	Airplane Power Plant Mechanic	68405(V-1650)
684B	Airplane Power Plant Mechanic	68406(V-1710)
684A	Airplane Power Plant Mechanic	68410(R-3350)
684A	Airplane Power Plant Mechanic	68413(R-2000)
684A	Airplane Power Plant Mechanic	68414(R-2800)
684A	Airplane Power Plant Mechanic	68416(R-4360)
684C	Airplane Power Plant Mechanic	68421(Jet Engines)
685	Airplane Electrical Mechanic	68500 & 68512
958	Airplane & Engine Electrical Accessories Repairman	68500
1685	Airplane Electrical Mechanic - Gunner	68500
686	Airplane Instrument Mechanic	68600
957	Airplane Electrical Instrument Mechanic	68600
959	Airplane Mechanical Instrument Mechanic	68600
961	Airplane Gyro Instrument Repairman	68600
962	Optical Instrument Repairman	68600

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(B) 355 ea— 5/ED/e

SUBJECT: Technical Instruction Analysis and Evaluation Visits

S&N	MOS	COURSE NO.
964	Airplane Turbo-supercharger Repairman	96401
114	Machinist	11400
548	Fabric and Dope	54800
550	Airplane Woodworker	55000
555	Airplane Sheet Metal Worker	55500
665	Rubber Products Repairman	55500
573	Aircraft Welder	57300
594	Personal Equipment Technician	59400
200	Sewing Machine Operator	59400
609	Leather and Canvas Worker	59400
620	Parachute Rigger and Repairman	59400
969C	Synthetic Trainer Mechanic	96906(ANT-18 and C-8)
784	Weather Observer	78400
787	Weather Forecaster	78700
790	Weather Equipment Technician	79002
942	Rawinsonde Operator	94200
782	Rawinsonde Technician	78202
8205	Weather Engineering and Survey Officer	82053
8219	Weather Officer	82191
8219	High Altitude Forecaster	82197

5. Interviews and questionnaires will be limited to the extent necessary to accomplish the mission and every effort will be made to cause as little interference as possible with operation activities at the bases visited.

6. Request concurrence and confirmation of the proposed visits.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

A. P. [illegible]
Lt Colonel, [illegible]
Adjutant

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21 July 1949
Ont/vwn/5142/361

Subject: Technical Instruction Analysis and Evaluation Visits

Ref: AGO (21 July 1949) AFF 352.

Headquarters, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

Commanding General, 3345th Technical Training Wing, Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois.

1. This headquarters concurs with the proposed visits. Each Air Force concerned in this command has been fully informed.

2. Reference is made to Paragraph #3. March Air Force Base has been recently reassigned to Strategic Air Command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

ALLEN [illegible]
Captain [illegible] A.F.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

22 JUL 1949

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AFPMP-2-3-S

20 October 1949

SUBJECT: Training of Assigned Personnel

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. Reference is made to Letter, your Headquarters, 30 September 1949, subject as above.

2. Airman quotas for courses conducted by the Air Training Command, as well as for courses conducted by the Department of the Army, have been approved with the exceptions noted below:

Course Title	SSN of Personnel to be Trained	Remarks
AF Policeman	Unknown	Resubmit indicating SSN's of applicants.
Tabulating Machine Operater	Unknown	Resubmit indicating SSN's of applicants.
Intelligence Specialist	502, 275	Utilize quotas available to your Command.
Radio Repairman, Ground Equipment	Unknown	Resubmit indicating SSN of applicant.
Airplane Power Plant Mechanic, Spec V-1710		Resubmit indicating SSN of applicant.
Airplane Power Plant Mechanic, Spec R-2000		Resubmit indicating SSN of applicant.
Airplane Power Plant Mechanic, Jet Engines		Resubmit indicating SSN of applicant.

To AG For Info
Action Taken By Separate
Correspondence. Tenth & Jan 50

Lt Colonel 3208

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Ltr to CG, CONAC Mitchel AFB, NY., dd 20 Oct 49, Subj: "Trg of Aagd Pers."

Course Title	AFSN of Personnel to be Trained	Remarks
Electrical Mechanic	Unknown	Resubmit indicating AFSN of applicant.
Airplane Instrument Mechanic	Unknown	Resubmit indicating AFSN of applicant.
Airplane Propeller Mechanic	Unknown	Resubmit indicating AFSN of applicant.
Radar Mechanic, Airborne Equipment	Unknown	Resubmit indicating AFSN of applicant.
Meat Cutting	Unknown	Resubmit indicating AFSN of applicant.
Motion Picture Camera Opn	055	Known training requirements for this course have been filled.
Classification of Enlisted Personnel	055, 405	Army training is no longer considered appropriate to Air Force requirements. Training is expected to be available at Lowry AFB in the near future.
Finance Administration (Army)	623	Request utilization of Air Force Course, No. 62300.
Criminal Investigation	677, 368	No available class capacity.
Medical Equipment Repairman (JAN)	861	Resubmit as individual application upon notification of starting date for the next course.
Troop I and E Public Information	All AFSN's	Resubmit indicating the number of quotas desired in the Troop I and E Course and the Public Information Course.
Plumber	066	Course discontinued. Suggest on-the-job training if local requirement exists.
Parachute Rigger and Repairman	345	Training now contained in the Personal Equipment Technician Course (No. 59400). Request approved for this course.

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Ltr to CG, CONAC, Mitchel AFB, NY., dd 20 Oct 49, Subj: "Tng of Aggd Pers."

Course Title	SSN of Personnel to be Trained	Remarks
Cooking	821	Additional quotas not available until January 1950. Resubmit in December.
Recruiting	055	Training open only to personnel assigned to the Army-Air Force Recruiting Service.

3. Quotas approved for courses conducted by Air Training Command have been forwarded for scheduling or allocated directly by this Headquarters. Quotas requested and approved for Army schools are being obtained and will be forwarded under separate cover where training space can be made available by Army training agencies.

4. The Army food service training program for the first half of Calendar Year 1950 will be announced shortly by a joint Army-Air Force publication. Because of demands which have been made upon all Continental Air Force Commanders for personnel qualified to attend Air Force technical schools, it is not considered feasible to allocate food service quotas on the basis of command shortages during the period 1 January 1950 through 30 June 1950. It is requested that your requirements for this training be submitted on a monthly basis starting with the training requirement report due in this Headquarters on 1 December 1949. Training will commence in January 1950 and will be available in all courses available during 1949 with the exception that the Baking and Pastry Baking courses will be combined in one 12-week course. All requests for training should indicate the station assignments of applicants in order that quotas may be allotted for the nearest appropriate area school.

5. Air Force shortages exist in three (3) SSN's for which additional training probably can be obtained from the Department of the Army. These SSN's and the appropriate Army courses are as follows:

SSN	Appropriate Army Courses
282	Office Machine Repair (No. 10-3-8)
381	Watchmaker (No. 9-3-8)
204	Shoe Repair (No. 10-3-4)

6. The Department of the Army has announced that the next class in the Enlisted Postal Operations Course will convene on 28 November 1949.

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Ltr to CG, CONAC, Mitchel AFB, NY., dd 20 Oct 49, Subj: "Tng of Aegd Pers."

Requests for this training should be made by 8 November 1949.

7. Support of the accelerated training program by major continental air commanders thus far has, in the main, been remarkable. As the result, virtually 100 per cent of all Air Force training facilities from 1 April 1949 through 31 August 1949 were utilized, the only serious exception being in the Cryptographic Technician Course (No. 80500), requiring a cryptographic clearance as a prerequisite for entry.

8. Short entries in the Radar Mechanic, Ground Equipment, and the Radar Equipment, Airborne Mechanic, Courses occurred during September as the supply of basic airmen, backlogged at Air Force training stations since 1 April 1949, was reduced. Projected shortages during November 1949 forced the allocation of mandatory quotas contained in Letter, this Headquarters, 13 October 1949, subject, "Selection of Airmen Qualified for Technical Training." The importance of supporting these quotas fully cannot be overemphasized. The issuance of mandatory quotas for airman technical schools is not in accord with the normal policy of this Headquarters and will be avoided except when absolutely necessary. The Air Force can ill afford, however, to waste established training facilities when shortages exist in specialties critical to Air Force requirements while at the same time overages exist in many less essential SSN's.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

M. D. MANNION
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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O&T 352.11 March 1950

SUBJECT: Request for Lesson Outlines

TO: Commanding General, Air Training Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

* * * * * * * * * * *

1. This headquarters has recently directed all Continental Air Command Air Force commanders to intensify their on-the-job training programs to further supplement the formalized training conducted by your headquarters. This command will continue to utilize to the maximum extent practicable the formalized courses of instruction available. At the present time, specialties that are critical short, and therefore adversely affecting the missions of this command, are receiving particular emphasis. While this intensified on-the-job training program has been in effect less that three months, some headway has been made in alleviating critically short specialties through effective personnel management and on-the-job training.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

a/t V.E. MURPHY
Lt Col, USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D.C.

SECRET
Auth CS, USAF
28 Dec 49

AFPTI

28 Dec 49

D/O

SUBJECT: Tactical Training for Pilot Graduates

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. This headquarters is currently reviewing the capability of the Air Force to provide tactical training and experience for graduates of the Flying Training Program. Current policy requires that all newly graduated pilot officers receive at least one year of flying experience as a duty pilot in tactical or transport units (AFR 36-25). Since gunnery, tactical, and unit flying training are not made a part of the undergraduate flying training curriculum, it is important that the capability of the present 48-Group Air Force to give this type training and experience within the units be accurately assessed.

2. In order to do this, it is requested your headquarters scrutinize closely the capability of your units to provide tactical training for new pilots while retaining unit operational capability. A report is desired giving the maximum number of new pilots per year which can be accommodated by your command under the following assumptions:

a. That each new pilot be given one year's assignment in a duty pilot position in a tactical or transport unit before being rotated from that position or retained for further tactical flying.

b. That units remain at 100% authorized strength in pilots. This will require that new pilots be accommodated within a rotation system rather than as a student overload in the units.

c. That flying hours allocated for tactical units be the same as for fiscal year 1950, except where fiscal year 1950 allocations have been abnormally low due to conversion to unfamiliar equipment. Where a deviation from fiscal year 1950 flying hour allocations is required, indicate what estimate of flying time per aircraft is being made.

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SUBJ: Tactical Tng for Pilot Graduates. (Con'td)

d. That the peacetime and M-Day mission of each unit remain as at present.

3. It is presumed that most pilots will be rotated to other duties within your command or in another command after completion of one year of tactical flying. In assessing your capability to absorb new pilots, do not regard yourself as limited by the capacity of your command to utilize these pilots after one year. You will, of course, desire to retain some in order to provide pilots of intermediate experience for eventual replacement of experienced pilots. Any factors pertaining to experience or length of tour of duty which you deisre to add may be added. It is requested, however, that you define these clearly. It is requested also that you define any other stipulations regarded as necessary in providing your estimate. The desired date for the receipt of this information is 30 January 1950.

4. An entirely separate estimate is desired covering the maximum yearly number of additional new pilots who can be accommodated in positions which are primarily flyingpositions but which are not tactical as covered in the first estimate. Administrative, instructor, test, ferry, and similar types of flying fall within this category. It does not include MIT flying but may include full time pilot positions connected with the support of MIT for various organizations. In providing the second estimate, it will be assumed that the absorption of these pilots will not jeopardize the experience level necessary for flying safety. In providing this estimate, the following assumptions will be made.

a. That new pilots remain one year in pilot positions before being rotated.

b. That total flying hours allocated for the command remain the same as for fiscal year 1950.

c. That yearly hours gained by such pilots be considerably above MIT minimums.

5. It is desired to re-emphasize that this second estimate is to be entirely separate from the estimate covering those to be accommodated in tactical positions. It is not intended that non-tactical flying be utilized for new pilots unless the number of available tactical unit positions proves insufficient. Desired date for the submission of the second estimate is likewise 30 January 1950.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/t/
G.P. DISOSWAY
Colonel, USAF,
Chief, Individual Training Div.
Directorate of Training

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To: USAF, AFPTI
Subj: Tactical Trng for Pilot Graduates

CAT 385 (28 Dec 49) 1st Ind 8 FEB 1950

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Director of Plans and Operations, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Any estimate involving the acceptance of sizeable numbers of newly graduated pilots into the Air Defense system of Continental Air Command must take full consideration of the impact on the accomplishment of the primary mission of this command, that of providing an "M" hour "D" Day, Air Defense force in being. Any requirements increasing training for new pilots will automatically result in a corresponding decrease in combat capability.

2. The efforts of Continental Air Command tactical units to provide adequate tactical training for pilot graduates has been restricted the past year as the result of the following:

a. Conversion to new type high performance aircraft and the associated problems inherent to the initial stages of tactical testing.

b. Restrictions of flying hours which were based on assigned aircraft and not assigned pilots in each tactical unit. This discrepancy has restricted flying in the jet fighter units to approximately (10) hours per pilot per month.

c. As of 1 January 1950, Continental Air Command tactical units reported 1,868 pilots assigned as against an authorization of [illegible]. Of the assigned pilots, 877 are pilot graduates with less than twelve (12) months service.

3. In determining the maximum number of pilot graduates that this command can receive yearly, all tactical units of this command were considered and the following established:

a. Pilot graduates received by the Continental Air Command for tactical training would be absorbed within the units listed below:

(1) Twenty-one (21) Fighter Squadrons (Jet)

(2) Five (5) Troop Carrier Squadrons (M)

(3) Three (3) Troop Carrier Squadrons (H)

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ConAC Form 69-A 8
14 December 1948

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ConAC Form No-AG 9
10 August 1948

...USAF, AFPTI
...Subj: Tactical Trng for Pilot Graduates
...T 353 (28 Dec 49) 1st Ind (Cont'd)

(4) Two (2) Reconnaissance Squadrons

(5) One (1) Assault Transport Squadron.

b. Pilot graduates are not recommended for assignment to the following:

(1) All-Weather Fighter Squadrons. It is recommended that only pilots having over 500 hours flying time be assigned to this type units. This is based on the mission assigned these units, experience in instrument flying required, and flying safety factors associated with the normal training requirements.

(2) Bombardment Squadrons (L). It is recommended that pilots have at least 500 hours prior to assignment to multi-jet bombardment units. The present jet bomber is large, complex, and too expensive to permit rapid transition of recent pilot graduates. The B-45, with existing equipment, allows no margin for error. The instructor pilot is limited in his assistance by the tandem seating and the incomplete controls available in the rear seat. The lack of basic flying experience of the pilot graduate would require an excessive amount of co-pilot time at a point in his career that he should be gaining experience of his own.

c. Reference paragraph 2a, basic. It is within the capability of the Continental Air Command to accommodate 200 pilot graduates yearly as follows:

(1) Fighter Squadrons. To maintain a high degree of combat efficiency and optimum tactical integrity, the percentage of pilot graduates to experienced pilots (over twelve (12) months experience) must never exceed thirty percent (30%). This will permit the assignment of eight (8) pilot graduates per year per fighter squadron. Therefore, it is within the capability of Continental Air Command to accommodate 200 pilot graduates yearly within the twenty-one (21) fighter squadrons (pilots to be received in two (2) equal increments).

b. Troop Carrier and Reconnaissance Squadrons. The ratio of pilot graduates to experienced personnel may be increased in these units

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USAF, AFFTC

Subj: Tactical Trng for Pilot Graduates

AFF 355 (20 Dec 48) 1st Ind (Cont'd)

...h a lessening effect upon the combat efficiency and tactical integrity. ...within these units. All pilots may be accumulated yearly (pilots to be ...received in two (2) equal increments).

e. The present allocation of flying time permits each tactical ...t to transition and maintain tactical proficiency for only the authorized ...mber of pilots. This limitation of flying hours requires twelve (12) ...nths to bring the average pilot graduate to the tactical proficiency ...quired by existing training standards.

f. In order that our combat units may absorb the number of pilots ...itted and attain maximum operational capability, the following ...ulation is considered necessary to overcome the time factor listed in ...graph 4e above: The establishment of an accelerated training program ...permit pilot graduates to be brought to tactical proficiency within ... (6) months time. The required number of aircraft hours for this ...celerated program over the present allocation is estimated to be 18,000. ...e increased hours required for this proposal are within the capabilities ...the authorized aircraft.

g. Reference paragraph 8, basic, the following factors pertaining ...minimum experience for assignment and length of tour are:

a. Squadron Commanders. Four (4) years experience
Three (3) year tours.

b. Squadron Operations Officer. Three (3) years experience
Three (3) year tours.

c. Flight Commanders. Two (2) years experience.
Three (3) year tours.

d. Ass't Flight Commanders. One (1) to two (2) years experience
Three (3) year tours.

e. Pilots (SQ/C). One-half (½) to one (1) years experience
Two (2) year tours.

f. Pilots (SQ/C). Zero (0) to one-half (½) years experience
One and one-half (1½) year tours.

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15 August 1949

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Hq USAF, AFPPE
Subj: Tactical Trng for Pilot Graduates

CMF 3688 (28 Dec 48) 1st Ind (Gen's)

7. Reference paragraph 4, basis: It is estimated that twenty-three (23) pilot graduates can be accommodated yearly in other than tactical units under the assumptions proposed by your Headquarters. Pilot graduates would be utilized by the Tow Target Squadron, Radar Calibration Units and Liaison Flights. Other primary flying positions within the Continental Air Command require pilot experience not possessed by the new pilot graduate.

8. In summary the acceptance of pilot graduates must be accompanied by:

a. Controlled flow of replacements to permit accurate planning and training.

b. Increased flying hours, as indicated in par 6a above, to permit accelerated training.

c. Corresponding control of input to pilot training centers predicated on these estimates.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

W. E. MURPHY
Lt Col USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

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14 December 1948

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Basic: Ltr Hq ConAC DO 353, 11 May 49, Subj: GCA Training

DO 353 2nd Ind 6 June 1949

HEADQUARTERS 56TH FIGHTER WING, Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan

TO: Commanding General, 10AF, Ft Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

1. The SOP referred to in para. 2 of the 1st Indorsement is now in effect at this station.

2. The Selfridge AFB GCA unit completed 201 approaches during April 1949 and 255 approaches during May 1949. The factors that resulted in the low number of approaches during the previous months prior to April 1949 are listed for information:

a. Committments of the 56th Ftr Group during previous months have contributed to the low number of runs previously experienced at this station.

b. Maintenance of GCA unit resulted in extended "out of commission" status during months that desired number of GCA runs were not made.

c. High wind conditions experienced during previous months have resulted in numerous temporary groundings of T-6 and C-45 type aircraft which normally make the greater percentage of GCA runs at this station.

d. DIR committments of C-47 type aircraft assigned this command, major repair of one C-47 damaged during Operation Haylift and heavy administrative committments of remaining C-47 type aircraft of this command have resulted in almost total unavailability of this type aircraft for local GCA practice.

3. The plan now in effect is considered adequate and will continue to be monitored very closely to insure its adequacy. This plan consists of the local SOP referred to in para. 1, with additional provisions of one T-6 aircraft on GCA flying duty five days each week from 1300 to 1700 each day. In addition, regular status reports are submitted to this office on the 10th and 20th of each month reflecting the number of approaches completed for the previous days. This insures the constant maximum number of approaches are being made. Corrective action can be instituted without delay if the maximum number of approaches are not being made.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

s/t/ WILLIAM A. SHOMO
Major, USAF
Actg Deputy for Operations

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HEADQUARTERS 31ST FIGHTER WING
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

16 AUG 1949

SUBJECT: GCA Unit

TO: Commanding General
Fourteenth Air Force
Orlando, Florida

COPY

1. In order to facilitate training and to meet the high standards of 60-4 requirements as set forth by ConAC Regulation 60-4, dated 12 July 1949, it is requested that a GCA unit be assigned this field.

2. The Fighter Group alone has to accomplish a minimum of two hundred (200) GCA approaches per month (two per pilot) in order to fulfill the training standards set forth in ConAC Regulation 60-4. The above number is in addition to the regular instrument checks, and to the number of GCA's required by the remainder of Turner AFB pilots.

3. Presently the Fighter Group pilots are accomplishing GCA's in T-6's and C-47's because of limited cursing time in the F-84 and the long waiting periods at other AF bases. It is felt that personnel flying F-84 aircraft should accomplish all 60-4 requirements in that type. With the winter months approaching and accompanying poor weather conditions, it is stressed that all facilities available should be utilized and it is strongly felt that a GCA unit would be a great asset and a definite safety factor.

4. In the past, extreme difficulty has been encountered in obtaining the requisite of GCA's for instrument cards and consequently, the majority of the 31st Fighter Wing pilots are not proficient in the techniques of the GCA methods. Inasmuch as the secondary mission of the 31st Fighter Wing is interception, and consequently all-weather flying, it is believed that the use of a GCA unit would improve the proficiency of the average pilot to where he will be able to make the transition to all-weather flying in a minimum period of time.

5. With the curtailment of "Operations Vittles", it is likely that there will be more GCA units available in the near future, and it is the opinion of this headquarters that Turner Air Force Base could utilize one to a definite advantage.

/s/t/EUGENE H. SNAVELY
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

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OS 322/129 1st Ind 19 AUG 1949
SUBJECT: GCA Unit

Hq Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando, Florida

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, New York

1. This headquarters heartily concurs in the comments contained in paragraphs 3 and 4, basic communication.

2. The latest GCA priority list on file at this headquarters does not include Turner Air Force Base. (Reference letter, your Headquarters, OC 360.3, subject, "GCA Priority, Zone of Interior," 3 May 1949, with one (1) inclosure: Copy of letter, Headquarters United States Air Force, AFOAE/M 360.31/2, subject: "GCA Priority List, Zone of Interior," 6 Apr 1949, with one (1) inclosure.).

3. Forwarded for your consideration and comment.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/t/CORTLANDT S. JOHNSON
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

17 AUG 1949

CCAM 676.3

SUBJECT: Revision of CCA Priority List

TO : Director of Communications, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D.C.

1. It is requested that the present CCA Priority List for Zone of Interior, outlined in letter your Headquarters, AFOAK/M 360.31/2, subject: "CCA Priority List, Zone of Interior", 6 April 1949, with one inclosure, be amended insofar as it pertains to Continental Air Command bases as follows:

Priority	Station	Priority	Station
1	Moses Lake Air Force Base	13	Stewart Air Force Base
2	Otis Air Force Base	14	Pope Air Force Base
3	Mitchel Air Force Base	15	Atterbury AFB
4	McChord Air Force Base	16	Godman Air Force Base
5	Shaw Air Force Base	17	Hemsley Air Force Base
6	Smyrna Air Force Base	18	Lawson Air Force Base
7	Hamilton Air Force Base	19	Sherman Air Force Base
8	Langley Air Force Base	20	Marshall Air Force Base
9	Selfridge Air Force Base	21	Orlando Air Force Base
10	Turner Air Force Base	22	Lockbourne AFB
11	Kirtland Air Force Base	23	Moody Air Force Base
12	Brooks Air Force Base		

2. It is highly desirable that a CCA unit be installed at Shaw Air Force Base at an early date. Shaw Air Force Base is the first number on the revised priority list which doesn't have a CCA unit already installed.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/W.R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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GCA Units
OCM 522 (16 Aug 49) 2nd Ind DAR/ds

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida

1. Attached hereto is copy of letter this Headquarters, CCM 676.3, subject: Revision of GCA Priority List, 17 Aug 1949, requesting Hq United States Air Force to revise the GCA priority list insofar as it pertains to Continental Air Command bases.

2. It is pointed out that although Turner Air Force base is number [illegible] on the requested revision, it is actually number 4 insofar as installation of GCA units concerned since of the first ten listed bases all have GCA units installed except Shaw AFB, Smyrna AFB and Hamilton AFB.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

Incl:
1tr Hq ComAC,
Rev of GCA Priority
17 Aug 49

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B/ltr from CAC dtd 15 Dec 48, subject: Waiver of AF Reg 60-4, 1 Nov 48.

1st Ind

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 10 Jan 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, New York.

1. Reference basic letter, requests contained in paragraphs 6, 6a and 6b are approved, with the following exceptions:

a. Hooded low level approaches may be made only during daylight hours, and VFR conditions.

b. These approaches will be made at sufficient altitude to clear all obstacles to flight by a minimum altitude of 500 feet.

2. It is recommended that in the interest of flying safety all pilots perform three practice low level approaches in F-82 aircraft with a pilot observer before practicing with a radar observer. If, at the termination of 3 practice missions the pilot is not considered to be proficient, additional flights should be performed until a satisfactory standard is met.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/ C. N. BAGSTAD
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive, Operations Division

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Fort Slocum, New York

23 September 1948

03 360.1

SUBJECT: Recomaended Revision of Air Force Regulation 60-4A

THRU : Commanding General
Air Defense Command
Mitchel Air Forde Base
Mitchel Field, New York

TO : Chief of Staff
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

1. It is recommended that par 4a (1) (f), Air Force Regulation 60-4A be revised to read as follows:

"Five GCA low approaches during the preceding six months, under actual weather or hooded conditions, or in an instrument trainer, or simulated by an instrument flight examiner."

2. The above recommendation is made since many USAF bases do not have GCA units or instrument trainer operators qualified in GCA fundamentals. Further it is believed that an instrument flight examiner would be qualified through experience and training to simulate the functions of a GCA operator by giving headings, altitudes and rates of descent, and supervise the let-down.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ W. T. COLEMAN
Lt Col., USAC
Asst Adj Gen

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Recommended Revision of AF Regulation 60-4A.
OS 360.1 (23 Sept 48) 1st Ind. 4 October 1948

HQ AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, New York

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Pilots within this command have experienced severe difficulties in obtaining the minimum number of GCA approaches required by AF Regulation 60-4A. This headquarters has not been able to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem under existing regulations.

2. It is realized that while recommendations submitted in basic correspondence would not be totally adequate, it does offer a partial solution to the problem of obtaining adequate GCA approaches. It would still be necessary for pilots to demonstrate their proficiency in flying GCA during the instrument flight check.

3. While the matter is of definite concern to the regular Air Force, it assumes major proportions for Reservists and Air National Guard Units that are stationed in sections of the Zone of Interior that do not have GCA Units readily available. In addition, the lack of GCA spare parts usually results in a GCA Unit being inoperative for a large percentage of the time.

4. Recommend request contained in Paragraph 1, basic correspondence be approved.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ R. B. TRAVIS
Lt. Col., USAF
Actg Asst Adj Gen

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Basic ltr fm, Hq First Air Force, subject: "Recommended Revision of Air Force Regulation 60-4A" dated 23 Sep 48.

2nd Ind.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 12 Octo 1948

TO: Commanding General, Air Defense Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Reference is made to paragraph 2, basic communication. It is the opinion of this Headquarters that the procedure outlined therein for simulated GCA approaches would be of little training value. Furthermore, the problem of qualifying instrument trainer operators in the fundamentals of GCA operation is relatively simple, provided the content of AF Regulation 60-9 "Standard Radio Telephone Procedure for GCA" is used as a guide.

2. In view of the above, the recommendation contained in paragraph 1, basic communication, is not favorably considered.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

st/ C. W. BAGSTAD
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive, Operations Division

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HEADQUARTERS 21
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

27 AUG 1949

CCAM 676.3

SUBJECT: Revision of CGA Priority List

TO : Director of Communications, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D.C.

COPY

1. It is requested that the present CGA Priority List for Zone of Interior, outlined in letter your Headquarters, AFOAN/E 360.31/2, subject: "CGA Priority List, Zone of Interior", 6 April 1949, with one inclosure, be amended insofar as it pertains to Continental Air Command bases as follows:

Priority	Station	Priority	Station
1	Moses Lake Air Force Base	13	Stewart Air Force Base
2	Otis Air Force Base	14	Pope Air Force Base
3	Mitchel Air Force Base	15	Atterbury AFB
4	McChord Air Force Base	16	Godman Air Force Base
5	Shaw Air Force Base	17	Hensley Air Force Base
6	Smyrna Air Force Base	18	Lawson Air Force Base
7	Hamilton Air Force Base	19	Sherman Air Force Base
8	Langley Air Force Base	20	Marshall Air Force Base
9	Selfridge Air Force Base	21	Orlando Air Force Base
10	Turner Air Force Base	22	Lockbourne AFB
11	Kirtland Air Force Base	23	Moody Air Force Base
12	Brooks Air Force Base		

2. It is highly desirable that a CGA unit be installed at Shaw Air Force Base at an early date. Shaw Air Force Base is the first number on the revised priority list which doesn't have a CGA unit already installed.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ W.R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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

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(16 Aug 49) 2nd Ind

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida

1. Attached hereto is copy of letter this Headquarters, OCOM 676.3, subject: Revision of OCA Priority List, 17 Aug 1949, requesting Hq United States Air Force to revise the OCA priority list insofar as it pertains to Continental Air Command bases.

2. It is pointed out that although Turner Air Force base is number [illegible] on the requested revision, it is actually number 4 insofar as installation concerned since of the first ten listed bases all have OCA units installed except Shaw AFB, Smyrna AFB and Hamilton AFB.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1st Ltr Hq ComAC,
Subj: Rev of OCA Priority
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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DO 353 11 May 1949

SUBJECT: GCA Team Training

TO : Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. At each installation of this command equipped with GCA, a procedure will be established locally to insure continuous training of the GCA team on duty. During all periods of operation of the GCA unit, the control tower operator will request inbound aircraft, which are of the proper type and are adequately equipped, both local and transient, to make a GCA approach. Such requests will be made only when GCA can accept the aircraft without delay for an approach.

2. All control tower operators at stations having GCA facilities should be provided with a list of types of aircraft which are authorized to make practice GCA approaches. Lists should include thereon any restrictive conditions imposed on any type.

3. Pilots of aircraft who fail to avail themselves of this opportunity on the request of the tower operator will be reported to this headquarters by name, rank, ASN, home station, and organization.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

a/t/ JACOB E. SMART
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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353Gen/105 OT-3 1st Ind
Subject: GCA Team Training

Headquarters Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California, 27 May 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

The only GCA Unit in this Air Force is located at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, under the control of the 62nd Troop Carrier Wing. Commanding General of that Wing has been directed to establish the procedure to insure continuous training of GCA teams on duty.

BOR THIS COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ R. H. SUMMERS
NOJG, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEAD QUARTERS
AIRWAYS AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
Washington 25, D. C.

AACS 353

13 October 1948

SUBJECT: Acceleration of GCA Training

TO: Commanding General
Air Defense Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, L.I., New York

1. References:

a. AF Letter 60-10, subject, "Flying Support to the GCA Program," dated 8 June 1948.

b. Message from Headquarters USAF, DTG 012255Z August 1948.

2. A study of the current GCA program within the Zone of Interior indicates a considerable improvement in the number of training approaches and support of the GCA training program as a whole; however, there are several installations falling short of the necessary minimum training runs. This organization is appreciative of the interest demonstrated by Base Commanders in assigning aircraft and scheduling flights to make the GCA program a success. In spite of the commendable efforts of all concerned, there is a marked depreciation in the ranks of trained personnel.

3. The major contributing factors to this situation are the necessity for providing several additional fully trained GCA teams to Europe for Operations "Vittles" and to normal attrition within the GCA field. A total of 150 GCA approaches, 50 of which must be as Final Controller are the minimum runs necessary for training a GCA Operator. Although it is possible to train both GCA Trackers and Final Controllers simultaneously, it is evident that the length of time involved in the complete training of a GCA Final Controller is primarily dependent upon the number of practice approaches provided. Paragraph 2, AF Letter 60-10, dated 8 June 1948, states that a minimum of 200 approaches per month are necessary to maintain the operating skill of a qualified GCA team and that at least 300 approaches per month are required in the training of a GCA team.

4. Being cognizant of the service responsibility of the AACS and realizing that all commands will be affected by any adverse

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AACS
SUBJECT: Acceleration of GCA Training

flucuations in the competent control of instrument traffic, this organization wishes to insure that all Commanders concerned are advised of this problem and the action which will be necessary to alleviate same within the minimum period of time. In view of the rapid approach of Winter flying weather, time is of the essence.

5. A statistical report of GCA training approaches being provided within the Zone of Interior indicates that a need exists for immediate acceleration of the number of training approaches in order to meet minimum requirements. This headquarters earnestly solicits your support in providing maximum GCA training approaches.

/t/ K. O. SMITH
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

28 September 1948

OS 353

SUBJECT: Air Force Fighter Gunnery Meet

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Fort Slocum, New York
(Identical ltr sent to CG Fourth Air Force)

1. Headquarters, USAF, is formulating plans for an Air Force Fighter Gennery Meet of all tactical fighter units within the "ZI". It is proposed to hold this event on or about 1 May 1949, and if successful, to be made an annual event.

2. The meet will consist of two classes, the Jet Fighter Class and the Conventional Fighter Class. Each Class will include air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery, dive and skip bombing and rocketry. It is anticipated establishing a rotating trophy for the victorious group in each class and an award to the high scoring pilot in each class. Each group's team will consist of three pilots exclusive of spares.

3. It is, therefore, requested that your command inform all groups concerned of this event and that a concentrated effort be made to increase each indivdual pilot's gunnery proficiency. All gunnery training shall be reviewed and any obstacles hampering an efficient program which you cannot correct will be reported to this headquarters for action.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

st/ HARRY R. BEAMER
Major, Air Corps
Actg Asst Adj Gen.

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Hq, Air Training Command, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
452.3
SUBJECT: Requirement for Bomb Scoring Device 30 Sep 1949

TT 413.44 (30 Sep 49) 2d Ind

Hq, Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Virginia, 16 Nov 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Analysis of the functions of an adequate bomb scoring system, advantages obtained from its utilization by tactical units, and the types of bomb scoring systems presently in use has been made by staff personnel of this headquarters.

2. Consideration was given to, and a review made of the tactics and techniques of bombing, and the practicability of present bomb scoring systems to each.

a. Bombing tactics and techniques considered were those associated with:

(1) High altitude bombing.

(2) Medium altitude bombing.

(3) Low level bombing.

(4) Skip-bombing.

(5) Dive-bombing.

(6) Glide-bombing.

b. The bomb plotting and spotting systems reviewed follow:

(1) A sonic bomb scoring system which employs four (4) microphones and eight (8) geophones on an oscillagraphic reporting system. This system can be used to effect measurements which express 1.1 feet errors in a comparatively short time, dependent upon the ability of the operators to read the recording instruments.

(2) A manual bomb scoring system which employs three (3) triangulation towers, each equipped with a gunsight alidade to provide for sensing from each tower at the time of each bomb burst. This system has been utilized more often than any of the other systems employed and is accurate to approximately twenty (20) feet.

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Hq, Air Training Command, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
452.3 30 Sep 1949
SUBJECT: Requirement for Bomb Scoring Device

(3) A system employing the use of a gunsight which establishes the general direction from a point on the range to the bomb impact point and which utilizes a 1/4 ton 4 x 4 vehicle to make an actual reconnaissance of the line of sight in locating the crater and establishing an identifying marker at each crater between bomb drops. This system is the most accurate, naturally; however, it is the most time-consuming requiring a prohibitive lapse of time between bomb runs.

3. It is concluded:

a. That there is a definite requirement for an adequate bomb scoring system.

b. That, of the three systems in use and under consideration, the most costly system to develop and maintain is the sonic bomb scoring system. However, it is believed that the accuracy of the system, which is within prescribed minimums, and inherent capabilities to provide frequent and rapid scheduling of bombing missions outweigh the added costs of procurement and maintenance.

4. In view of the above, this headquarters recommends the development and use of a portable sonic scoring system capable of 1.1 feet accuracy at ranges of 1500 feet from the point of impact of a bomb. Further, it is recommended that Air Training Command secure comments and recommendations from other Air Force activities prior to initiation of a project to develop a sonic scoring system.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ [redacted] L. PETTUS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen.

1 Incl:
n/c

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Arbtration Committee Report on Air Force Fighter Gunnery Meet, 18 May 1949.

* * * *

8. The Arbtration Committee's recommendations are as follows:

a. That the gunnery meet be an annual event and that each overseas command enter one team to be determined by a command competition. They will be attached to a ZI group having same type of aircraft.

b. That the annual gunnery meet be given the highest priority over all other commitments.

c. That Headquarters, USAF place the highest priority on the procurement of range facilities in order that all fighter units may conduct a continued gunnery program.

d. That a continuing competition be encouraged between and among groups of the major and overseas commands.

e. That the Las Vegas AFB be used for future Air Force Fighter Gunnery Meets.

f. That the meet be so scheduled for the fall season of the year to allow cooler temperatures to facilitate jet fighter take-offs.

g. That the Group Commander and where possible the Wing Commander be present for all preliminary conferences and the entire meet.

h. That the teams arrive at Las Vegas AFB one week prior to the beginning of the meet to become familiar with the ranges, procedures, and rules governing the meet.

i. That the proposed rules and regulations for next year's meet be compiled by the Research and Development unit and sent directly to all Fighter Wing Commanders for comment. That the fighter wings be given a short suspense in which to submit their comments to the Fighter Gunnery Research and Development unit as Las Vegas AFB so that they may be compiled without delay. That following the compilation of the Wing Commanders' comments to the proposed rules for the 1950 Air Force Fighter Gunnery Meet, a conference of all Group Commanders be held at Las Vegas AFB to ascertain the rules for the 1950 meet in order that standardization of training and gunnery procedures may be effected throughout all the fighter units of the Air Forces.

j. That an Arbitration Committee of three qualified officers be established to rule on any protests. That the committee be granted the authority to modify the rules and regulations as may be required by unforeseen operational circumstances.

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k. That a malfunction committee be established to assist the arbitration committee in making dedisions on protests. That the malfunction committee be comprised of the necessary qualified technical personnel.

l. That immediate steps be taken by Headquarters, USAF to provide for adequate range facilities for all tactical groups.

m. That an insignia be authorized by Headquarters, USAF to enable the winner's team to paint the insignia on their aircraft. That Headquarters, USAF authorize permission for the winning team, both in jet and conventional aircraft, to paint the insignia on their aircraft. The winning team will be authorized to carry this insignia on their aircraft for the period that they are the winning team. This insignia will be painted on the left side of the fuselage centered on the cockpit.

n. That the Air Force Reserve and National Guard be invited to send one team each to participate in this gunnery meet.

o. That per diem be authorized for all participating officers and airmen during their absence from their home station.

p. That a standard length of tow cable be established at 750 feet on all aerial targets.

q. That a foul line be established for skip bombing and ground gunnery phases.

r. That scoring on dive bombing and rocket phases be accomplished by the utilization of circular error method.

s. That gun camera be utilized on all phases.

t. That disqualification of individual contestant on air-to-air gunnery phases be based on the length of the hole in the target and verified by the assessment of the film for any protest.

* * * * *

s/ DAVID C. SCHILLING
Colonel, USAF

ARTHUR G. SALISBURY
Colonel, USAF

ALBERT K. SCHINZ
Lt Colonel, USAF

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FM 12th AF

TO 1st Tow Target Sq Biggs AFB Tex PRIORITY

INFO CG 14th AF, Air Proving Ground, ConAC

O&T 105. Fol TWX from 14AF (14AFOS 147) quoted for your info and necessary action. "Extensive bombing and gunnery tng will be carried on by 20th Ftr, 31st Ftr and Tenth TAC Recon Wings at Eglin Aux #2 during period 13 Feb to 1 Oct current. Request acft detachment sufficient to maintain 2 tow target acft in commission during firing activities. Targets to be used are type A6A, 30 feet by 6 feet. Tow acft will be staged at Eglin main. Request this Hq be notified of action taken on this request". Desire you dispatch representative your Hq to arrive 14 AF nlt 7 Feb 49 to arrange details this commitment. If deemed necessary, instruct your representative to return via Eglin main to coordinate arrival and opr of detachment thereat. Further desire you furnish this Hq with detailed report of plans and agreements worked out with both 14 AF and Air Proving Ground Comd.

5 Feb 49 COPY

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HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia

MS 333

21 NOV 1949

SUBJECT: Monthly Letter of Armament Operations

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

353 Gunnery Rpt.

1. Operations:

a. The 20th and 31st Fighter Wings are undergoing extensive gunnery training at Eglin Auxiliary Field #2.

b. The 31st Fighter Wing participated in the Fort Benning demonstration, firing caliber 50 ammunition, 5.0" HVAR's and dropping bombs.

c. The 20th Fighter Wing will participate in the O-5 demonstration at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

d. During a recent staff visit to all the regular units within this command by the Armament Officer, this headquarters, it was noted that considerable trouble is being encountered by the pilots of the two fighter wings in the use of the AlB Sight for gunnery. The pilots contacted stated that the pipper in the sight is very erratic and the reticle very dim. They are all dissatisfied with the AlB Sight in gunnery; but like the sight for rocket firing.

2. Maintenance:

a. A Sperry Technical representative has been assigned to the 20th and 31st Fighter Wings to aid the Armament personnel on maintenance of the AlB Sight. This might eliminate some of the maintenance problems that the two fighter wings have been experiencing.

b. Very few malfunctions are being encountered by the two fighter wings so far in their gunnery or rocket firing.

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MS 333
SUBJECT: Monthly Letter of Armament Operations

3. Supply:

a. The 20,000 rds of caliber 22 ammunition which was reported excess at the University of North Carolina is now pending transfer to The Citadel; as they have requested that amount.

b. Orlando and Greenville Air Force Bases have reported their Ordnance equipment to the nearest depot for disposition instructions with the exception of SNL's A, B and C which was reported to the 831st Specialized Depot, Shelby, Ohio. All ammunition at these two installations have been reported through appropriate channels to Headquarters, Air Materiel Command.

4. Inspections:

a. Annual Armament and Ammunition inspections have been temporarily cancelled due to AIC II and shortage of Armament personnel in the Armament Division (DM). Since AIC II is now completed, it is felt that inspections of the units within this command will start in the near future.

5. Personnel:

a. No comment.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Thomas J. Barnhart
THOMAS J. BARNHART
Lt. Col. USAF
Ass't Adj. Gen.

1 July 50 - Fortieth Report

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FM CG Ninth AF Greenville So Carolina

TO CG ConAC

9AFOOT 788. Reutt AFConACOT 829, 17 Jan 49. A continuous gunnery program starting 15 Feb 49. through 15 Aug 49 in the Eglin Fld area for all tactical units of this command. To expedite aerial gunnery, desire sufficient number of TB-26 acft that two remain operational at all times, be placed on TDY from 1 Tow Target Sq, Biggs AFB, Tex for entire gunnery period.

19 Jan 49

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

Maj J Fleming 1249/bjm

CMT 385

SUBJECT: Air Chemical Warfare Training

TO : Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. Reference is made to the Monthly Report on Special Weapons Training, RCS-CHC-CT-78, submitted by your headquarters for November 1949.

2. The request for clarification contained in paragraph 1d(2) of subject report is assumed to pertain to the ComAC Diary item in which it was stated that fire bomb requirements had been submitted to Air Materiel Command only for the 20th and 31st Fighter Groups. It was also stated that no requirements existed for other fighter groups, even though they have a secondary mission of "penetration".

3. The statement "no requirements existed for other fighter groups" meant that no active requirement exists for other fighter groups, due to limiting factors such as the lack of suitable ranges and aircraft armament. The tactical units have also been exempt from the pilot and crew flight training phases in accordance with paragraph 3a(2)(c), Appendix A, ComAC Regulation 50-1, 22 June 1949. In addition, tactical units assigned the primary mission of interceptor have not as yet established any requirement for training in their secondary mission of penetration. This requirement may be established, however, at a later date, depending on training priorities and the suitability of the aircraft for penetration missions.

4. Tactical fighter units assigned to this command are not exempt from the provisions of paragraph 3a(1), Appendix A, ComAC Regulation 50-1, inasmuch as this is a ground training program applicable to any tactical unit assigned the primary or secondary mission of penetration.

5. In the event your command has a requirement for pilot and crew flight training in air chemical warfare, it is requested that these requirements be forwarded to this headquarters for evaluation and appropriate action.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITTENHEAD:

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ComAC Form 44G 5
Revised 22 November 1949

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Air Chemical Warfare Training
OTW-353 Gen (27 Dec 49) 1st Ind 10 Jan 1950

Headquarters Fourth Air Force, Hamilton AFB, Hamilton, California

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, New York

1. Request clarification of information contained in basic letter when considered in the light of the directives and information cited below.

2. ConAC Reg 24-1, 17 Aug 49, prescribes that both fighter wings (78th and 326th) of this command have primary missions of interception, with secondary of penetration, and will be accordingly trained under pertinent ConAC training standards. ConAC Training Standard 10-5, 7 Jul 49, and AF Unit Training Standard 10-8, 1 Dec 48, applicable in these instances to the secondary mission, outline the unit and aircrew capabilities to be attained. These capabilities include those of offensive chemical operations.

3. This headquarters is unaware of any directive or policy allowing this command or its tactical units to determine or establish the extent of requirements for training in their secondary mission of penetration. It is the view of this headquarters that secondary mission training requirements are not established by the tactical units but rather by the assigned mission itself and appropriate training standards published by your headquarters or Headquarters USAF.

4. In this command, the emphasis in training is being placed on the attainment of proficiency in primary mission, but concurrently there is an endeavor to include as much secondary mission training as possible (familiarization at least) and to plan to engage in the balance when such primary proficiency is attained. Problems and occasions arise which may slow primary mission training, affording an economical opportunity for secondary mission training. Bombing and air-to-ground gunnery, part of the secondary mission training, have been engaged in by tactical units of this command. Preparations have been underway for the conduct of the other phases of air-ground operations (with smoke, spray, fire-bombs, and rockets).

5. This command has a range which is adequate for air-to-ground work at Moses Lake AFB. There exists suitable armament for F-82 aircraft, and recently a letter, your headquarters, subject: Use of Fire Bombs and Smoke Tanks, file MSAS 471.6, dated 28 Nov 49, provided information permitting the use of air chemical armament on F-84 aircraft.

6. There remains the problem of allowances of smoke tanks, fuel tanks, and gasoline, the establishment of which (consistent with quantities of FS, MR, thickner, and igniters authorized in AR 775-10) was

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ROUTING	COORDINATION	STAFF ACTIVITY
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Air Chemical Warfare Training
OTW-355 Gen

10 Jan 1950

recommended by letter, this headquarters, subject: Monthly Report of Armament Operations, file M37-319.1, dated 18 Nov 49, and letter, file and subject same, dated 20 Sep 49. It has been noted in par 1e, Sec II, ConAC M&S digest, Oct 49 that a similar recommendation has been made to Headquarters USAF. This headquarters has not transmitted to your headquarters any special requirements of supply with which to meet secondary mission training primarily because there was no urgency. The establishment of permanent annual allowances which could be drawn on as the tactical units desired was considered more appropriate and was recommended as indicated above. The substance of this paragraph was communicated to your headquarters by letter, subject: Use of Fire Bombs and Smoke Tanks, file OTW 471.6, dated 14 Dec 49.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

S/T H. L. FULLER
Lt Col, USAF
Air Adj Gen

OAT 385 (27 Dec 49) 2nd Ind Maj Fleming 1249/bjm

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. Fighter units assigned to your command were not included in the requirement for 1,325 fire bombs submitted by this headquarters to Headquarters Air Materiel Command, inasmuch as Part B of message, 4AFMB 1134, 3 November 1949, indicated a negative requirement.

2. Training of the combat units of this command in the performance of their secondary mission is to be encouraged, however, such training logically must be subordinate to the attainment of proficiency in the primary mission. Unit commanders should have no difficulty in determining where the emphasis is to be placed.

3. In conformance with the policy set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, requirements of your command for chemical ammunition should be submitted to Headquarters AMC in accordance with message, AFCom&CSMS 15836, 20 June 1949. Allowances are set forth in paragraph 61, AR 775-10. In the event a requirement exists for fuel tanks and gasoline, it may be fulfilled in

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Revised 22 November 1949

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Hq ConAC, OAT 353
Subject: Air Chemical Warfare Training

OAT 353 (27 Dec 49) 2nd Ind (Cont)

accordance with letter, OAT 471.6, this headquarters, 13 October 1949, subject, "Authorization and Funds for Fire Bomb Items", and 1st Indorsement thereto (Inclosure 1). Requisitions for airplane smoke tanks, MIO, will be submitted to Headquarters AMC through channels.

4. Fire bomb and chemical spray missions will be accomplished in accordance with paragraph 1, letter, MSAS 471.6, this headquarters, 28 November 1949, subject, "Use of Fire Bombs and Smoke Tanks", and paragraph 3, Appendix A, ConAC Regulation 52-1, 22 June 1946.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Encl
Ltr Hq ConAC, 13 Oct 49,
w/1 Ind

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ConAC Form 440 A
Revised 23 November 1948

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 353

3 October 1949

SUBJECT: Air Force Fighter Gunnery Meet II

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Slocum Air Force Base, New Rochelle, New York

(Identical ltrs sent to CGs, 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th & 14th AFs)

1. Your attention is invited to letter, Headquarters, United States Air Force, subject as above, 26 September 1949 (Inclosure No. 1).

2. Request that you inform all fighter groups in your command of the plan for holding the annual Air Force Gunnery Meet at Las Vegas Air Force Base, Nevada, or or about 13 March 1950, and that a concerted effort be made to increase the individual pilot's gunnery proficiency. It is anticipated that teams representing the Continental Air Command fighter groups will excel the results obtained in last year's gunnery meet.

3. Representatives from each of the Regular fighter groups (preferably the Group Commanders) will attend a preliminary conference at Headquarters, United States Air Force, Pentagon Building, Room 4C1039, Washington, D.C., at 1000 hours EST, 9 November 1949, to discuss the rules and regulations and the overall plans of the meet. In order that representatives to this conference may be prepared to discuss amendments to the rules and regulations which governed the 1949 Gunnery Meet, seven (7) copies of the rules and regulations are forwarded herewith.

4. Teams from the Air National Guard will be selected at a later date. If the selection is made prior to 9 November 1949, a representative from the selected unit will also be invited to attend the preliminary conference.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WEBSTER:

2 Incls:
#1: Cy ltr, Hq, USAF, subj as above, 26 Sep
#2: Rules and Regs/1949 Gun Meet (7 cys)

st/ BRUCE H. GEMMEL
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

19 December 1949

AFOOP-C 353.41

SUBJECT: Air Force Fighter Gunnery Meet II

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel AFB, N. Y.

1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters dated 2 Dec 1949, subject, "Minutes of AF Fighter Gunnery Meet Conference."

2. AF Gunnery Meet II to be held at Las Vegas AFB, Nevada, beginning 28 March 1950 will have 19 fighter teams participating. A requirement for 12 B-26 tow aircraft has been established for this meet.

3. This headquarters is cognizant of the commitment of the 2602 Tow Target Squadron, however, it is planned to use 6 B-26 tow aircraft and crews of the 2602 Tow Target Squadron at Las Vegas AFB to insure smooth operation and a successful meet. It is also planned to make use of the two B-26 tow aircraft located at Shaw AFB, S. C., and the one located at Moses Lake AFB, Wash. Three additional B-26 tow aircraft will be obtained from Hqs Training Command.

4. The above aircraft should be in place at Las Vegas AFB not later than 20 Mar 50 and remain for approximately 20 days' duration.

5. Your comments and/or recommendations are requested.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ W. B. McDONALD
Colonel, USAF
Ass't Chief, Operations Div.
Directorate, Plans & Operations

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Hq USAF, AFOOP-C 353.41
SUBJECT: Air Force Fighter Gunnery Meet II

O&T 353 (19 Dec 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 30 Dec 1949

TO: Director of Plans and Operations, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The following comments are made relative to the use of B-26 tow aircraft of this command at the Air Force Gunnery Meet II:

a. The two B-26 aircraft at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina are committed to the test of the A-1 Gunsight. This test has been given an A-1 priority by Headquarters, United States Air Force.

b. The one B-26 aircraft at Moses Lake Air Force Base, Washington has been declared excess by this command and is presently on assignment orders for transfer to Air Material Command.

c. Present commitments to the Army Ground Forces require the entire effort of the 2602nd Tow Target Squadron, Biggs Air Force Base, At present the 2602nd is able to meet only forty-one percent of the Army requirements. Further, the reduction in number of B-26 aircraft assigned this unit from eighteen to fourteen has already begun.

d. This command has no other B-26 type aircraft which could be utilized for this purpose.

2. It is recommended that:

a. No B-26 aircraft from the 2602nd be committed to Gunnery Meet II.

b. Other arrangements be made for securing tow aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

27 June 1949

O&T 353

SUBJECT: Training Requirements

TO : Director of Training and Requirements, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Due to the increasing complexity of armament equipment, a requirement exists within this command for trained armament inspectors.

2. As stated in AF Letter 53-14, "Schools", 11 January 1949, "aircraft Armament" is within the scope of the General Air Inspectors' Course USAF Special Staff School. However, it is felt that the number of hours allotted to the aircraft armament phase of air inspection is insufficient to cope with the aforementioned complexity of present and planned armament equipment.

3. It is recommended therefore that additional emphasis and time be placed on inspector's procedures relative to armament equipment, including the Cal. 50 M3 machine gun, the K-14B and A-1B sighting instruments as well as the S-1 and S-2 racks.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ L. J. [illegible]
Captain, USAF
Asst Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEAD UARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFOTG-3 5 August 1949

SUBJECT: Increased Training for Aircraft and Armament Inspectors

TO: Commanding General
Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base
Alabama

The attached letter from ConAC is forwarded for your comments concerning the recommendation contained therein.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl
Ltr fr ConAC, Subj:
Trng Rqmts, dtd 27 Jun 49

s/ TOM J CUNNINGHAM
t/ G. P. DISOSWAY
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Training Division
Directorate of Training & Requirements

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B/ltr fr Hq USAF, Wash D.C. dtd 5 August 49, subj: Increased Training for Aircraft and Armament Inspectors

353 1st Ind

Headquarters, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 23 Aug 1949

TO: Headquarters USAF, Director of Training and Requirements, Washington 25, D. C. ATTN: APOTG-3

1. The present curriculum of the General Air Inspection Course at the Special Staff School consists of eight (8) hours of instruction with a one hour examination covering the field of Armament Inspection. In detail, this consists of a one hour orientation lecture, three hours of demonstration on Armament Inspection, two hour lecture on Bombardment Aircraft Armament, one hour lecture on Fighter Aircraft Armament, one hour Fire Arms and Misc, and one hour Armament Examination. This includes inspection instruction for caliber 50 M-3 machine gun, the K-14B sighting instrument, and S-1 and S-2 bomb racks. The A-1B gun sight, which is primarily a radar device and a highly complex piece of equipment, is not covered due to lack of qualified instructor personnel.

2. It is believed that the instruction, as indicated above, provides adequate coverage of Armament Inspection for a General Air Inspection Course. It is felt that if there is a requirement for a specialist school in Armament Inspection, it is a matter of consideration apart from a General Air Inspection Course.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
n/c

s/t/ F. E. LANKSTON
Major, USAF
Adjutant General

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2nd Ind.

AFFTI

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 16 Sep 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, New York

1. Your attention is invited to the comments contained in 1st Indorsement of Headquarters, The Air University.

2. Recommendation contained in basic correspondence is not favorably considered at this time. Introductions of A-1B Gun Bomb Rocket Sight, A-1 fire control equipment, APQ 24 bombsight and K-1 bombing system should change future subject matter of the course.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ LOUIS S. COIRA
Colonel, USAF
Deputy, Training Division
Directorate of Training

1 Incl:
Corresp. re abv subj.

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Auth CS, USAF
12 NOV 49

AFPTT

18 NOV 1949

SUBJECT: Special Training, AN/APG-5C and AN/APG-30

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, New York

1. The following program data on the AN/APG-5C and AN/APG-30 is furnished for planning purposes.

2. The AN/APG-5C is a gun laying radar which is incorporated into the A1-B gun bomb rocket system installed in F-86A airplanes. Two hundred and twenty (220) AN/APG-5C kits will be available on or about 1 January 1950. However, no installation schedule has been established. One complete system is presently installed in an F-86A airplane at North American Aircraft Company.

a. The number of personnel required per installation predicated on the job specifications contained in the new armament system carrier field is as follows:

(1) On the basis of twelve flights per aircraft per month, organizational maintenance will require approximately fifty man hours per aircraft per month. This total per aircraft may be divided into preflight and postflight inspection--thirty hours; trouble shooting--fourteen hours; and repair--six hours. Daily servicing, harmonization, and simple adjustment would be accomplished during the thirty-hour inspection time allotment. Repair and replacement of components will be accomplished in the six-hour maintenance time allotment, after the isolation and analysis of the malfunction has been accomplished in the fourteen-hour trouble shooting time allotment.

(2) This should afford a requirement for one trained individual per each two aircraft, after leave and time for other duty details are deducted from potential productive time of the individual.

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(3) One Gun-Bomb-Rocket Systems supervisor will be required for the resolution of major problems and final check for each eight aircraft, resulting in a total requirement for fifteen systems trained personnel per squadron having twenty-five aircraft. In this estimation the weapons maintenance and installation or ammunition loading functions are not considered part of the systems maintenance mechanic's responsibility.

(4) Field maintenance requirements based on seventy-five operational aircraft per fighter group result in a requirement for ten Systems Mechanics and Technicians to be assigned to the Maintenance Squadron of the Maintenance Group at the Wing Base level.

(5) Depot maintenance activities, predicated on the assumption that separate component overhaul will be accomplished which will not be considered complete systems maintenance, present a different requirement. Component repairmen found in several career occupational areas, i.e., intricate equipment maintenance and radio and radar maintenance, should constitute the depot overhaul and repair of systems components as determined by Air Material Command.

b. Qualifications of personnel requiring training:

(1) A well-grounded knowledge of gun sights, computers, and electronics application in radar maintenance is required.

(2) Armament type personnel, presently assigned to fighter type squadrons, who have the required knowledge of electronic theory and application to radar, are the best qualified to receive this training. Present electronics maintenance personnel who have knowledge of gun-laying systems are the next best qualified, with the present Aircraft Armorers having experience in maintaining fighter type gun and rocket sights, computers, and release mechanisms are the third best source of material for the required training, after a preparatory phase of radar maintenance training is accomplished.

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c. Scope of training to be given:

(1) Organization maintenance should include systems trouble shooting, calibration and harmonization, alignment of components, installation of components and cables, preflight and postflight inspection procedures, isolation and analysis of malfunction with replacement of components and component parts, i.e., tubes, cables, etc.

(2) Field maintenance should include all of the above functions with increased authorized equipment and facilities enabling a more comprehensive coverage to the systems maintenance.

(3) Depot maintenance to include component overhaul and not to require an operational knowledge of the integrated components forming the complete system in order to repair the separate component. When systems component installation and alignment is required at the depot the systems mechanics and technicians will be utilized.

3. The AN/APG-30 is incorporated into the A-1B Gun Bomb Rocket System for installation in F-84E airplanes. The same type of personnel requirement breakdown may be applied to the maintenance of this installation since the AN/APG-30 and AN/APG-5C maintenance requirements are of similar complexity.

4. The AN/APG-33 is used with the A-1B Gun Bomb Rocket Sight to form the E-1 Fire Control System. This system is to be installed in F-94 and F-89 airplanes. A factory training program will commence early in Calendar Year 1950. It is also planned to establish training on this system in the Air Training Command as soon as instructors and equipment are available, probably in July or August, 1950. Maintenance personnel requirements for the AN/APG-33 will be similar to those for the AN/APG-5C and AN/APG-30.

5. The F-84D airplane will incorporate the A-1B Gun Bomb Rocket Sight with a manual ranging device without the radar component. Consequently, personnel of units equipped with this airplane will require training on the A-1B Sight only.

6. In summation, it is planned to establish separate special courses in the Air Training Command on the AN/APG-5C, AN/APG-30, and AN/APG-33 radar equipments. Students detailed to these courses will be given a short maintenance training course on the A-1B sight. Personnel from units equipped with F-84D airplanes will be trained on the A-1B Sight only. Personnel entering the combined radar and A-1B courses

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Subject: Special Training, AN/APG-50 and AN/APG-30

must possess an electronics background or enter a basic electronics course, as a prerequisite. The course on the A-1B Sight only will include a short basic electronics course in order that armament personnel with no electronics background may be entered.

7. Information is requested as to your numerical requirements for trained personnel on each of the above radar equipments and on the A-1B Sight, under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 50-9. These requirements should be time phased according to your personnel resources.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

LOUIS E. COIRA
Colonel, USAF
Deputy, Individual Training Div.
Directorate of Training

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AFFTC, 18 November 1949
Subject: Special Training, AN/APG-5C and AN/APG-30

CMT 353 (18 Nov 49) 1st Ind Lt Col L.R.Branstetter/5142/mfn

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Director of Training, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Individual Training Division

1. Present planning indicates this command will have seven (7) fighter groups equipped with radar and A-1B equipped aircraft by July 1950. Since the gun laying radar will be a new equipment to all units concerned, the personnel required for maintenance of this equipment will be in addition to present T/O&E authorizations.

2. Personnel with the qualifications listed in paragraph 2b of basic letter are not available within this command. It is recommended that students presently undergoing training in Air Training Command Course #66753 be trained in the maintenance of the radar and A-1B gun laying system and earmarked for assignment to this command. In addition an advanced course for training qualified 955's as Air-Bomb-Rocket System Supervisors should be established.

3. It is considered desirable to train two (2) armament technicians (911) per fighter squadron on maintenance of the A-1B gunsight. This A-1B course should include a short basic electronics course. Armament technicians (911) presently assigned to units of this command will be made available for this special training. It is desired that two (2) classes be conducted with a quota of twenty-one (21) for each class.

4. A "Request for Special Training (AF-AP-P174B)" is attached in accordance with the provisions of Air Force Regulation 50-9. It is recommended that sufficient priority be placed on these programs to assure qualified personnel will be made available as soon as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

V. E. MURPHY
LT. COL., USAF
ASST. ADJ. GEN.

NO Incls
AG-C mailer

1 Incl:
Request for Special Training
(AF-AP-P174B) (dup)

Prepared by
Lt. Col. L. Branstetter
5142

Permanent File AG Chronicler

NOTE: The handling of classified correspondence in this headquarters is governed by ConAC Staff Memo 203-5 and AF Regulation 205-1.

ConAC Form 89-AG 9
14 December 1948

Adjutant General's Classified File Copy

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 353

SUBJECT: Special Weapons Training

TO : Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. Reference is made to letter, O&T 353, your headquarters, 9 November 1949, subject: "Special Weapons Training". This headquarters is aware of the acute shortage for Armament Officers, Staff, SSN 4590, and Special Munitions Officers, SSN 4591, within your command as a result of the recent transfers of subject officers to a classified project. An emergency requisition was forwarded by message to Headquarters United States Air Force, 21 October 1949, for one (1) SSN 4590 and two (2) SSN's 4591 to fill authorized position vacancies caused by the reassignment of these officers.

2. Until such time as qualified officers are assigned to your command to fill the position vacancies listed in paragraph 1 above, it is desired that each unit of your command appoint a training officer to act in this capacity, as an additional duty, to insure compliance with ConAC Regulation 52-1. Unit Chemical Warfare Training will be conducted in accordance with paragraph 2, Appendix A, ConAC Regulation 52-1, utilizing the course outline for unit chemical warfare training referred to therein. With the aid of this course outline, the Unit Gas Officer, Unit Gas Non-commissioned Officers or any officer or non-commissioned officer will be able to fulfill the minimum requirements for the monthly unit special weapons training program.

3. In addition to the action taken as outlined above, this headquarters is forwarding the letter referred to in paragraph 1 above, to Headquarters United States Air Force emphasizing the necessity for close scrutiny in the selection and reassignment of Special Munitions Officers due to the acute shortage for this type personnel within this command and recommending that in the future this headquarters be permitted to select and nominate officers in this category to insure that the Special Weapons Training Program can be continuous and progressive at all times.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

28 November 1949

O&T 353

SUBJECT: Training of Radiological Specialist.

TO : Director of Training, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to AF Letter 35-700A, 29 September 1949, which authorizes the MOS Radiological Specialist, 9870.

2. To aid in planning an adequate radiological defense training program for this command, it is requested that this headquarters be advised as soon as possible of the current plans for the training of this type personnel including location of schools, length of course, starting dates, quotas, career field and the source of personnel to be trained.

3. Information is also requested pertaining to the organization and authorized T/O&E vacancies proposed for the utilization of this specialty.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ BRUCE H. GERMEL
Capt., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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B/L fm Hq, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, N. Y., subject: Training of Radiological Specialist, dtd 28 Nov 49.

AFPTT) 1st Ind.

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 14 Dec 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

1. Current USAF personnel authorizations do not provide for Radiological Specialists (SSN 9870) in TO&E's on a primary duty basis. Hence, no plans are firm for the establishment of an Air Training Command course to produce this specialty. For your information, the final report of the Joint Radiological Safety Training Committee recommends that this type personnel be qualified in a course of three (3) weeks' duration.

2. It is anticipated that when personnel authorizations permit, one (1) Radiological Specialist, SSN 9870, will be allotted per wing base as assistant to the base radiological officer.

3. Until such time as a career field is developed for radiological specialties, the incorporation of radiological specialists in the special activities career field, as defined in paragraph 6, Air Force Letter 35-370, is contemplated.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/st/ S. H. McKINNON
Lt. Col., USAF
Executive, Individual Training Div.
Directorate of Training

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CEM/116

Fire and Crash Rescue Training Program
1nstl 353 (21 Jun 49) 1st Ind

29 JUN 1949

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding Generals, First, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth and Fourteenth Air Forces

1. It is desired that all fire and crash rescue protection activities under your command be advised of the information contained in inclosure 1.

2. The contents of Continental Air Command Letter 92-1, 22 March 1949, provides a standard training program for use by fire department officials in conducting the training of personnel assigned to installation fire departments.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl
Item, Training fire fighting personnel

COORDINATION	STAFF ACTIVITY
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FIRE AND CRASH RESCUE TRAINING PROGRAM

1. The necessity for a continuing training program of firefighting and crash rescue personnel has become self-evident to this headquarters. The increased efficiency of fire and crash rescue organizations at installations where a well-planned program has been in progress demonstrates the desirability of such training as an integral part of the functions of all fire departments.

2. Training for the fire or aircraft crash to come must be made part of the pattern for every day's work. It must include a comprehensive study in:

a. The control and extinguishment of all fires through coordination of applicable unit tactics or techniques in the application of various recognized extinguishing agents; and special operational techniques for protecting, removing, and rescuing entrapped personnel from crashed or burning aircraft, buildings and similar structures, motor vehicles, forest fires, or other disasters.

b. Fire and/or aircraft crash alarm communication facilities and procedures. Fixed and movable fire protection systems and devices in aircraft, structures, and processes, including sprinklers, stand pipes, alarm facilities, extinguishers, etc.

c. Fire prevention practices and inspection methods for detection of potential fire hazards and the correction, minimizing, or elimination thereof.

d. Base water systems, including source of supply, normal and emergency pumping capacity, distribution, shut-off valves, hydrant sizes, locations, and availability of emergency water supply source and limitations.

e. Effective utilization of various extinguishing agents in control and extinguishment of fires in aircraft, special processing and manufacturing methods, and individual hazards areas.

f. Hazards of combatting fires in crashed and grounded aircraft, structures and storage areas involving pyrotechnics and Ordnance materials, oxygen, hydraulic, fuel, gas, and oil pressure systems; inflammable liquids, solids, and oxidizing materials; corrosive liquids, compressed gases, toxic chemicals or materials.

g. Operational efficiency and limitations of crash and structural fire apparatus, individually or in groups. Limitation of protective clothing, gas masks, and other breathing apparatus or devices.

3. It must be emphasized that effective fire and crash rescue fire fighting service cannot be achieved simply by an intensive training of the recruit and the actual experience gained at fires or crash rescue incidents. Considerable time may elapse before a fire department will be called upon to use its ladders for rescue work or to make forcible entry into burning aircraft for rescue purposes. There must be a continuous and detailed study of the special conditions which apply to each installation. Carrying out a set of evolutions

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during training or the study of hydraulic formulas or lectures on rescue procedures from burning aircraft and building ventilation are of value, but without being supplemented by physical practice their value diminishes to a negligible point. Special attention will be devoted to the training of any personnel previously inexperienced or inadequately experienced in aircraft crash rescue and fire fighting. Cooperative assistance of appropriate training, operations, maintenance, chemical, ordnance, and medical authorities will be obtained in the accomplishment of such training. Responsible major air commands will assist in the initial development and conduct of such training programs insofar as possible.

4. In all aircraft accidents the rescue of personnel is of the foremost importance, with secondary efforts being extinguishment of fire resulting from crash. It is, therefore, essential that all personnel be drilled and schooled in evolutions to familiarize them in mechanical operation of crash rescue vehicles, coordination of various types of extinguishing equipment, aircraft recognition, location and operation of doors, hatches, canopies, essential controls, fuel tanks, master control switches, and fire fighting phases of aircraft design, etc.

5. Fire prevention technicians, during their course of technical supervisory visits to installations under the jurisdiction of their command, will be instructed to determine what plans have been made or are in effect to cope with unusual emergencies that may arise, in case of blizzard or hurricane or where traffic congestion ties up an important road. Action will also be taken to determine plans in effect for manning of reserve apparatus, calling of the offshift, and action to be taken in case two or more fires break out simultaneously in addition to expected response of outside aid. The training program should include all of these possibilities and this does not merely call for paper plans.

6. Compliance with the provisions of AF Manual 50-6, "AF Individual Training Standards No. 1343," will be strictly adhered to. Reference will also be made to AN Manual 00-80-C-1, "Procedure for Aircraft Crash Rescue," AFM-61-25, TM's 5-687, 692, 693, 695, 696. WD Field Manual 21-7 lists a series of available film training aids that are appropriate for use in conjunction with training of personnel assigned to fire and crash rescue activities. Particular reference is made to TF 1-3496 "Crash Rescue," and TF 1-3496 "Management of Aircraft Casualties," scheduled for release in the near future.

7. Every effort will be exerted by all concerned to achieve maximum training effectiveness with minimum expenditures. Every care and precaution will be taken to prevent unnecessary use and waste of CO , foam, fuel, and other required training material.

INSPECTORS GENERAL IN ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE THIS SUBJECT A MATTER OF SPECIAL ATTENTION.

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Hq ConAC, Mitchel AFB, New York

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Multiple Address:
CG: First AF, Slocum AFB, New Rochelle, New York
Fourth AF, Hamilton AFB, Hamilton, California
Ninth AF, Langley AFB, Virginia
Tenth AF, Benjamin Harrison AFB, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana
Twelfth AF, Brooks AFB, Texas
Fourteenth AF, Orlando AFB, Orlando, Fla.

Routine

AFPMP-2-B-3 42525, 25Aug49 NC

AFConAC Mil Pers-S 22865. Info recvd fr Hq USAF states that in view of limited facilities for tng am firefighters and crash rescuemen (SSN 1383) at Lowry AFB, Col, proposal is under cons to place the present crse on standby status and to train approximately two hundred (200) instrs in the SSN 1383 at the rate of forty (40) every ten (10) wks who will be capable of conducting standardized, comprehensive on-the-job tng programs to eliminate anticipated critical shortages in the SSN 1383. Minimum requirements for entry into instr tng will include at least one years' experience in a firefighter unit six (6) months of which have been spent in a supervisory capacity above individual fire trucks unit responsibility. Aptitude for leadership and a definite desire to instr will be imperative. In addition, trainees must weight at least one hundred and sixty (160) lbs, be at least five (5) feet eight (8) inches in height, have a GCT score of one hundred (100) or better, and possess general qualifications for entry of pers into tech crses. To assist Hq USAF in determining allocations

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Hq ConAC, Mitchel AFB, New York

Unclassified

Routine

of training quotas and the asgmt of grads to AF Bases, it is req that the foll info be furn this hq nlt 21 Sep 49:

a. Total estimated requirements, yr comd, for instrs under this plan, based upon a minimum requirement of one qualified instr per air base auth mil pers for firefighter duties.

b. The estimated number of potential instrs yr comd will be able to provide for tng against the needs of yr comd.

c. The estimated number of potential instrs qualified for overseas dy, yr comd will be able to furn for subsequent asgmt to fill overseas requirements.

CG: CONAC

Official Business

Unclassified

Lt. S. Guido/47
Mil Pers-3 Ext 5134

st/ EDMUND LAUDER
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS 31ST FIGHTER WING
Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia

3 December 1948

SUBJECT: Fire Protection and Aircraft Crash Rescue Training Program

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Greenville Air Force Base
Greenville, South Carolina

1. Under the provisions of TAC Letter 50-13, dated 16 February 1948, crash rescue teams at this base must participate in training in crash and rescue functions, which simulate as closely as possible an actual crash of an aircraft. To simulate such crashes, salvaged aircraft are used, however no provisions have been made to authorize fuel necessary in field instruction in situations involving fire. Contaminated fuels and oils presently authorized for such use are insufficient in quantity needed to accomplish the required training.

2. It is the opinion of this headquarters that only continuing practice in crash and rescue procedures will obtain the efficient results desired. The majority of crashes at this base resulting in fatalities have included a fire hazard. As a crash fire presents the most difficult crash rescue problem, training in this phase must be thorough. The instability of personnel has presented a major problem in maintaining the degree of proficiency required of crash crew teams which can only be resolved by a vigorous and constant training program.

3. In order to further the training of crash and rescue personnel, it is requested that authority be granted under the provisions of AF M&S Directive No. 67-3/a, dated 18 August 1948, to use 400 gallons of jet fuel, 100 gallons of gasoline, and 50 gallons of reclaimed oil per week for crash crew training purposes. The amount of fuel requested is based on present and futre training requirements for this base.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

t/ B. M. THOMPSON
Major, USAF
Adjutant

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Hq, 31st Ftr Wg, Turner AFB, Albany, Georgia
Subject: Fire Protection and Aeft Crash Rescue Tng Program 3 Dec 48

9AF 353 (3 Dec 48) 1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Greenville, South Carolina, 9 Dec 1948

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, New York

1. This headquarters concurs with paragraph 1 and 2, basic communication.

2. Reference paragraph3; recommend approval of 200 gallons jet fuel, 50 gallons gasoline, 50 gallons reclained oil per week for crash crew training purposes.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ W. L. BAXTER
Major, USAF
Asst Adj General

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 31 Dec 1948

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Greenville Air Force Base, Greenville, South Carolina

1. The present supply situation for both aviation and ground fuels and oils does not warrant their used for fire fighting training unless these products have become contaminated.

2. There are no provisions in the aircraft or ground fuels budgets for the procurement of uncontaminated fuels for fire fighting purposes.

3. Headquarters, Air Materiel Command can authorize exceptions to present restrictions only where complete justification for the use of uncontaminated fuel can be shown. Quantities must be kept to the absolute minimum required to accomplish training.

4. It is requested that action be taken to collect contaminated fuel from the segregators of fuel servicing trucks and allother sources of contamination in an effort to meet your requirements at Turner Air Force Base, In the event the quantities collected are insufficient it is requested that this headquarters be furnished with additional information as to the amount of training conducted, quantities of contaminated fuels accumulated monthly and minimum quantity of fuels required for this training.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

s/ JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt, USAF
Actg Asst Adj Gen

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

ROUTING | COORDINATION | STAFF ACTIVITY

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FOR DIRECTORATE USE

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EVALUATION

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ConAC Form No. 1G 5

Dear John,

I have your letter of 29 April and regret that time did not permit talking to you before your departure for Alaska.

I will make a few general remarks about the overall problems raised in your letter and then answer the more specific questions posed.

United States Air Force participation in domestic emergencies (including disaster relief) is governed by the Domestic Emergency Plan (ADC-DEP, Basic 1948) published by this headquarters. Each Continental Air Command Air Force has prepared a more detailed plan in accordance with AF Regulation 23-1 and the directives, assigned responsibilities, and authority contained in ADC-DEP. Further, each air force base in the continental United States is required by AF Regulation to prepare plans for and be prepared to conduct operations in domestic emergencies under the operational control of a Continental Air Command Air Force Commander. This control holds irrespective of the major command to which the base is assigned. The regulation and plan provide that Continental Air Command Air Force Commanders are authorized direct communication with other services, agencies, and air force bases within their geographic areas of responsibility for domestic emergency purposes.

This Plan, with its command arrangements and inter-command relationships, was severely tested during the disaster relief operations in the western states this past winter. Coordination with the units of the five Air Force commands participating under the direction of two Continental Air Command Air Forces (and Armies) was accomplished smoothly and without confusion. While this operation concerned disaster relief, the same plan of action would have prevailed in coping with domestic emergencies.

This headquarters dispatched a letter on 19 April 1949, to the Air Force Commanders further elucidating their duties established by AF Regulation 23-1 as the single Air Force representative for contact with Army Commanders, Naval District Commandants, Sea Frontier Commands and civilian agencies situated within their geographic areas of responsibility. In this connection, the Air Force

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Ltr from Gen. Whitehead to Gen Barker, continued.

Commanders are aware that should a request be made for their assistance which requires resources beyond their ability to provide, or is outside their purview of authority or responsibility, they will direct that request to the air force agency having adequate resources, authority or responsibility to meet the request.

As for the specific questions in your letter:

a. Question: How does an Army or Navy Commander get immediate air support in time of emergency - peace and war?

Answer: By contacting the Continental Air Command Air Force Commander in whose geographic area of responsibility the Army or Navy Command is situated. In the case of Naval Districts extending into two Air Force areas, the Naval Commander can contact the Air Force Commander in whose area the assistance is required.

b. Question: Where does a domestic emergency end and a tactical air operation begin?

Answer: Air Force participation in domestic emergency operations would be directed by the Air Force Commander in whose area the emergency arises. The Tactical Air Command would not enter into the picture until the emergency obtained the magnitude of open hostilities requiring tactical air operations acting in concert with land forces employed to counteract the hostile action.

c. Question: What happens in case of riot, disorder, or disaster in time of war?

Answer: The tenets of ADC-DNP are applicable during war as well as peace.

d. Question: Is there a Continental Air Command War Plan and is there such a thing as a War Plan for any of the Continental Air Command Air Forces?

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17 May '49
DO/TNW/202

ROUTING	COORDINATION	STAFF ACTIVITY
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tr from Gen. Whitehead to Gen. Barker, continued.

Answer: Since discussion of this point involves top secret matters, I would prefer to discuss this with you in person.

Your discussions in connection with possible solutions to the various problems discussed were appreciated; however, as discussed above, the recommendations are currently in effect in the ABC-DEP, Basic 1948.

Your letter was most welcome and I hope this information will be of assistance to you in the furtherance of your mission.

Sincerely,

CURTIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Commanding.

Major General John DeF. Barker
Deputy Director
Continental U. S. Defense
Planning Group
Washington 25, D. C.

Copy furnished:
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FM HQ USAF Wash D.C.

TO All major air commands in Zone of Interior

From AFOOP 4585

The President has designated the snowbound western states a disaster area and has authorized the use of such resources of the National Military Establishment as are appropriate to the relief of this area, based on the request of the Federal Works Administrator who is coordinating all Federal relief activities in the disaster area. This authority provides for the expenditure of any funds now available to the Departments of the National Military Establishment. The Secretary of Defense has designated the Secretary of the Army as his representative for all National Military Establishment relief activities in the disaster area and has directed the Secretaries of Navy and Air to extend to the Secretary of Army full support as appropriate. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Army Commanders to take such action as they deem appropriate to provide relief for snowbound families and livestock within their respective Army Areas based upon requests of the Federal Works Administration representatives designated for each state of the affected area. Further, he has authorized the Army Commanders to call upon the appropriate Air Force Commanders in their Army Areas for such assistance as deemed necessary. Accordingly, you are authorized and directed to utilize such resources of your command as are appropriate to assist in the relief of this area. Morever, you are authorized to expend such funds as are required to accomplish this task without regard to funds presently available to you. Promptly notify budget operations division, this Hq of expenditures in excess of present funds available to you. The expenditure of such funds will be in accordance with TM 14/700. Careful and accurate accounting of all funds expended will be made and reported periodically to the Budget Operations Division this Hq as a separate entry in the Monthly Report of Status of Funds. The provisions of A of AR 500-60 will be used as a guide for the expenditure of these funds and supplies. The Commanding General Continental Air Command will establish liaison with the Army Area Commanders and will be responsible for coordination with the activities of the Air Force within the area under the jurisdiction of the Army Commanders concerned. All other addressees will furnish assistance as requested by Com Gen ConAir Comd. Direct communication between addressees is authorized. To insure maximum effect of the combined effort of the three services, the present relief coordination by Army Commanders. Com Gen ConAir Comd will provide this hq, Attention AFOOP, a Daily Activity Report on all Air Force participation in relief activities.

30/0405Z JAN

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
Hamilton Field, California

2 March 194

Lt. General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF
Commanding, Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Dear General Stratemeyer:

Inclosed is an inspection request and an inspection report, with supporting documents, concerning Operation "HAYRIDE" in the Fourth Air Force area of responsibility, which is forwarded for your information. Briefly, this inclosure concerns rumors which reached the Air Force Air Inspector of uneconomical and misuse of aircraft, and of discrimination in distribution of air drop during Operation "HAYRIDE". It is pointed out in the inspection report that if such misuse of aircraft or discrimination in distribution was true, it was beyond the power of this headquarters to correct it to any appreciable degree. The inspection report further recommends that the matter be dropped. However, it is felt that your headquarters should be advised of the matter.

From the point of view of this headquarters, Operation "HAYRIDE" was very successfully accomplished in this area. Prior to the commitment of the Fourth Air Force on Operation "HAYRIDE", some air drop had been going on in Idaho, Utah, and Arizona by Air National Guard aircraft and aircraft of other commands. Complete records of that phase are not available in this headquarters and cannot be evaluated with reference to the inclosed inspection report. The initial call upon the Fourth Air Force in Operation "HAYRIDE" was to give all out support to the State of Nevada. The main effort of the Fourth Air Force throughout "HAYRIDE" was expended in that state, and the result was a great satisfaction to the State of Nevada and to this headquarters. The control exercised by the State of Nevada and this headquarters (as explained in the inspection report) was positive throughout the operation, and in the opinion of this headquarters there was no misuse of aircraft or discrimination or distribution. This is borne out by the fact that after the Sixth Army had finally gotten a Quartermaster trucking company into the Ely, Nevada area, its effectiveness was practically nil due to snow-blocked roads until the very last days of the operation. In most instances, the trucks were unable to get more than 20 miles from Ely.

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In each of the States of Idaho, Utah, and Arizona, the Fourth Air Force appointed a representative, whose job was to cooperate with the Sixth Army and the Federal Works Administration in giving all possible aid to snowbound areas. Aircraft to these states were furnished at the request of the Commanding General, Sixth Army, both as to numbers and extent of time. In each case, the Fourth Air Force liaison officer in the state and in this headquarters acted in an advisory capacity, and all operations were monitored closely.

In summation, no large scale relief effort such as Operation "HAYRIDE" could be executed without some individuals, or groups of individuals, feeling that misuse of equipment or discrimination in distribution had been practiced. However, this headquarters is of the opinion that Operation "HAYRIDE" in the Fourth Air Force area was conducted for the best interests of all, and that any criticism of the operation is unfounded.

Sincerely,

JOHN E. UPSTON
Major General, USAF
Commanding

2 Incls.
(#1-Ltr.to IG,2d Reg.fr. Hq.USAF,10/2/49)
(#2-Report of IG,2d Reg. to Hq.USAF,18/2/49)

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Operations Haylift

10 February 1949

Inspector General, Second Region, San Bernardino AFB
San Bernardino, California. Attn: Air Inspector

COMMENT NO. 1

1. Operations Haylift is being conducted over certain areas of the Western States under supervision of the 4th Air Force at San Francisco. As usual, when an activity of an emergency nature is initiated, certain questions arise and rumors are founded as to the efficiency and economy thereof. This Office has received unofficial information pertaining to the following specific questions which it is desired that you have investigated and a report rendered to this Office.

a. Uneconomical and Misuse of Aircraft: Rumors received here indicate that there has been poor coordination and direction of ground transportation facilities with result that aircraft have been used to move hay from areas far removed from the disaster area, wherein rail or other ground transportation should have been used.

b. Discrimination of Distribution: Additional rumors reaching this Office indicate that thorough political pressure or other methods, drops have not necessarily been made with consideration for equal distribution or with consideration to the areas most urgently in need of relief.

2. It is suggested that your representative first visit the Commanding General, 4th Air Force, and then broaden his inquiry in order to give this question the necessary coverage. An informal report may be submitted direct to this Office and should reach this Office at the earliest practicable date.

t/ B. A. BRIDGET,
Colonel, USAF,
Deputy, The Air Inspector.

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Operations Haylift

The Inspector General, USAF
Attention: The Air Inspector

18 February 1949

Inspector General, Second Region
San Bernardino AFB, California

1. Operation Hayride was initiated by the Fourth Air Force approximately 27 January 1949 in accordance with telephonic instructions from General O. S. Picher, Operations Division, Headquarters USAF.

2. The rumors of poor coordination and direction of ground transportation are probably based on the following situation. The grazing lands in the Ely, Nevada area had become sparse due to the droughts of recent years and it was estimated 3,000 tons of hay would be required to carry the cattle through the winter, regardless of weather conditions. The Fallon-Reno area is hay country. The storms hit the Ely area before any hay had been shipped in by land transportation, consequently, there was no stock pile at Ely. When orders were issued to airlift hay into the Ely area, housing, messing and servicing facilities necessitated basing the aircraft at Fallon. Ely has very limited operational facilities and was used only as an advance distribution and navigational control point. Aircraft based at Fallon were loaded at Fallon, proceeded to Ely where they circled and picked up a navigation lead plane and thence proceeded on a time-vector system to dropping areas. As of 16 February, 1,642 tons of hay had been airlifted from the Fallon area to the Ely area and over 90% was on direct drop with less than ten per cent being off loaded at Ely for local pickup or various other reasons. From the air operational viewpoint, the long (210) miles) haul of hay from Fallon to Ely area cannot be considered as uneconomical since operational facilities required basing aircraft at Fallon, the source of hay supply.

3. The distribution and navigation control point at Ely was operated in the following manner. A group of civilians headed by a Mr. George W. Swallows, Secretary of the United Stockman's Association, who was in daily contact with Governor Pittman and Senator McCarran, determined the locations, quantities and priorities for the drop. These were plotted on a map from which a troop carrier navigation officer directed the drops by the time-vector system, or spotting of herds by local guides. A local banker kept accounts for billing recipients.

4. With the issuance of Presidential Proclamation of 28 January, the Federal Works Administration became responsible for relief of disaster areas, with the Department of the Army in support, and the Department of the Air Force in support of the Army, Inclosure No. 1. The Fourth Air Force is in full coordination and cooperation with the Sixth Army which has gradually taken over the Ely operation with ground transportation, so that the airlift in that area is scheduled to terminate 18 February. Hayride operations are continuing in Utah, Idaho, and Arizona under FWA and Army control with the Fourth Air Force in a supporting role. Inclosure No. 2 indicates the method of operation under the President's proclamation. Inclosure No. 3 indicates the scope of operations as of 16 February.

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Operations Haylift

18 Feb 49

The Inspector General, USAF
Attention: The Air Inspector

2 contd

Inspector General, Second Region

5. The above information was furnished by General Ned Schramm, Deputy Commander, Fourth Air Force who had personally visited the Fallon-Ely area.

6. In view of the fact that distribution of hay has been under civilian control, it is not considered advisable to extend a confidential investigation of rumored discrimination of distribution into civilian agencies. It is believed beyond the purview of this office to assemble sufficient facts to prove or disprove that political pressure or other methods have resulted in unfair distribution. The Air Force through its speed and mobility bridged the gap from the initial emergency in the Ely area to the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation placing the disaster area under FCA and Army control, and filled the requests of civilian agencies within its capabilities. It received invaluable training in field operations under Arctic conditions which extended the experience of even the crews with previous Alaskan training.

7. The local Air Depot dropped 65,000 pounds of supplies under RAA direction on a distribution furnished by the local sheriff. This was not coordinated with Fourth Air Force. Ogden Air Materiel Area participated in hay operations, without initial coordination with the Fourth Air Force. It is believed possible that Headquarters USAF instructed AMC and other commands to participate in the haylift without providing for coordination with the Fourth Air Force. If such is the case, necessary action should be taken now to effect centralized control under the Fourth Air Force and consolidate reports so that costs and final reports will reflect the total operation.

8. Discussion with twelve pilots from March Air Force Base who had recently returned from various haylift operations revealed the following information:

a. Hay was hauled by air from Fort Riley, Kansas to Casper, Wyoming for distribution by ground forces. Roads and railroads into the Casper-Laramie area were so badly blocked that only three trains reached Casper during a ten day period one of which carried hay.

b. Utah apparently questioned the Nevada emergency. Army personnel were not permitted to act as aircraft guides on flights over Utah because such flights were considered not in line of duty. It was stated by the pilots that 2½ million head of cattle were located in the Ely area.

C. C-82 aircraft from Greenville, North Carolina, operated out of McClellan Field to the Ely area, and picked up hay enroute.

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Operations Haylift

The Inspector General, USAF
Attention: The Air Inspector 18 Feb 49

Inspector General, Second Region 2 contd

d. One pilot stated that he had read a Nebraska newspaper in which the Governor of Nebraska accused the Air Force of "grandstanding" and stated that he needed more bulldozers and less airplanes.

e. One of the guides who flew many missions estimated that less than 1% of the hay dropped was lost.

f. Davis-Monthan had aircraft operating in the Phoenix area.

9. In the absence of further instructions, this investigation is considered closed. If it is desired to extend the investigation beyond this report, it is requested that copies of USAF directives and reports covering the operation, more specific information as to areas of rumored long hauls and discrimination and the extent it is desired to extend the investigation into civilian and political channels, be furnished this office.

t/ JOSEPH A. BULGER
Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

3 Incls:
1 - Cpy TT #CL40145.
2 - Cpy TT to CG, 4th AF
3 - Cpy TT to C/S USAF, Attn: BG Picher.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

14 April 1949

General Muir S. Fairchild
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sandy:

I am attaching hereto two copies of Continental Air Command's report on "Operation Hayride" which I am sure will be of interest to you. This first real test of our Domestic Emergency Plan was, judging from my personal observations and reports reaching this headquarters, highly successful.

The lessons learned during the operation are being incorporated in a revised edition of the plan which should be ready for publication shortly. The changes are minor but desirable for future action. I believe that Ennis will find a satisfactory plan proven to be operationally feasible, when he arrives.

Sincerely,

t/ GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

2 Incls
ConAC Report of Operation
Hayride

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 381

7 October 1949

SUBJECT: Domestic Emergencies

TO : Director of Plans and Operations, DCS/O, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The following recommendations are made concerning domestic emergency relief operations and activities.

a. Recommend Air Force Letter 55-12 be rescinded and a directive be issued by Headquarters United States Air Force requiring Continental Air Command to amend present Domestic Emergency reports to include items listed in Air Force Letter 55-12. This recommendation is made in order that:

(1) Headquarters Continental Air Command may properly implement domestic emergency relief operations as directed in paragraph 3a(3)(h) Air Force Regulation 23-1, 11 January 1949, thus eliminating paragraph 11 of Air Force Letter 55-12.

(2) A single report will cover civil relief operations to give both this headquarters and Headquarters United States Air Force the required information.

(3) Directives concerning civil relief operations will be issued through the command assigned the mission of coordinating the efforts of all Air Force commands and activities and directing Air Force operations connected therewith.

b. Recommend the contents of Army Regulation 500-50, Army Regulation 500-60, and War Department Memorandum 500-50-2, as amended, be covered in a single document and published as a joint regulation in order that:

(1) Instructions at Department level may be current and applicable to the three (3) services for ease of planning and operation when joint civil relief operations are undertaken.

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Domestic Emergencies (Continued)

(2) Each service will have specific responsibilities to eliminate overlapping coordination, planning, and operations.

c. Recommend Air Force Regulation 76-6 be amended in order that civilian employees of other Government agencies may ride as passengers in military aircraft when participating in domestic emergency relief activities without having to sign release from claim for injury or death. Compensation funds are available to civil employees of other government agencies when participating in emergency activities, and the signing of release from claim for injury or death has led these employees to believe they are not eligible for compensation from the Federal Government.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/st/ V. E. MURRAY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen.

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Ltr fr Hq ConAC, 7 Oct 49, Subj: Domestic Emergencies

AFOCE-C 300.3 1st Ind

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 2 Dec 1949

To: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, N. Y.

1. Recommendation contained in paragraph 1a, basic communication, has been approved and appropriate action taken. (Message AFACC-6 2352, 18 October 1949.)

2. Action recommended in paragraph 1b has been under study by the Army, Navy, and this Headquarters. Upon arrival at a common agreement, your Command will be requested to furnish advice in preparing a joint regulation.

3. Reference is made to paragraph 1c, basic communication, AFR 75-6, 23 August 1949, is interpreted by this Headquarters as permitting those civilian employees participating in domestic emergency relief activities to ride in military aircraft without signing a release from claim for injury or death. Such employees are covered by paragraph 4i of subject regulation.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/st/ FRANK E. JOHNSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Executive, Operations Division
Directorate, Plans and Operations

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APPENDIX

(Section IV)

IV

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

16 November 1949

Brigadier General Harry A. Johnson
Vice Commander, Hq Tenth Air Force
Benjamin Harrison AFB, Indiana

Dear Harry:

In answer to your letter of 8 November enclosing Colonel Ralph Fisher's letter on the situation at Sherman AFB, I am sorry to have to tell you that we cannot afford the resources necessary to continue to maintain the C-47 at Sherman.

Our tactical units have been consistently short of maintenance personnel while our maintenance workload, particularly with the new types of aircraft, has tremendously increased in these units. It is the policy to man the Tactical Units to their TO&E strength in so far as personnel is available and to put in training the additional personnel needed to fully man the tactical units. With the transition from one type of aircraft to another taking place in most of our units and with the greatly increased requirements for aircraft maintenance personnel brought about by the change-over to C-54s in our Troop Carrier Units, we are making every effort throughout the command to reduce the maintenance workload on all non-tactical activities in order to provide manpower for the tactical units.

We are sympathetic with the problem at Sherman and feel you have taken proper action in giving them additional AT-6s and it is desired that they have not more than five of this aircraft assigned. The next personnel authorizations for the station will reflect a reduction in presently assigned aircraft maintenance personnel to the absolute minimum necessary to maintain not more than five AT-6 aircraft.

Please write Fisher and tell him the story so he will not feel that we are reducing his people and the others at Leavenworth without a real cogent reason.

As you know the SAM was established primarily to take care of requirements laid on the Air Force by non-Air Force activities. The decision on allotments of aircraft of that unit are made at Hq USAF and we had nothing to do with the C-47 allotted to the CG, C&GSC at Fort Leavenworth.

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Brigadier General Harry A. Johnson 16 November 1949

I am having the Air Installations people look into the picture on the Fire Department at Sherman and you will probably hear from them direct on this matter in the near future.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 354.2

28 July 1949

SUBJECT: Airfield Requirements for Jet Fighter Aircraft in Support of Army Field Forces

TO : Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Desire your headquarters submit recommendations for lengthening runways adjacent to Army Installations from which routine Jet Fighter-Bomber support operations may be conducted.

2. Since this command is no longer equipped with conventional type fighter aircraft, the problem is evident that longer runways will be required than now exist at airfields adjoining Army Installations.

3. Desire a priority, by airfield, for subject runway extension be given.

4. Above information to be used for planning purposes in this headquarters.

5. Subject recommendations to reach this headquarters by 15 August, 1949.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/at/ V. R. FURIUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Hq ConAC, Mitchel AFB, N.Y.
O&T 554.2
Subj: Airfld Reqmts for Jet Ftr Acft in Support of AFF 28 Jul 49

TR 686(28 Jul 49) 1st Ind

Hq Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AF Base, N.Y.

1. With reference to basic communication, it is believed by personnel of this headquarters that priority should be given to runway extensions of the following air bases in the order listed:

a. Pope Air Force Base
b. Godman Air Force Base
c. Lawson Air Force Base
d. Post Field

2. This priority was determined after consideration of the data listed below which is included for your information.

Pope Air Force Base

a. A ConAC base.

b. To be used by aggressor jet aircraft on exercises in the Ft. Bragg area, such as "Tarheel."

c. To be utilized for staging aircraft for participation in exercises similar to Ninth Air Force Operation 200 (operation with 502d Tactical Control Group).

d. It is desirable to use as a staging base for exercises in conjunction with Ft. Bragg such as West Point demonstrations, in order to alleviate the possibility of weather interfering when units are staged from Shaw, etc.

e. For safety reasons.

(1) Use of Pope AF Base by jet aircraft would eliminate carrying bombs and live ammunition over civilian-owned property for demonstrations and exercises conducted in Ft. Bragg area.

(2) Provide an emergency landing field for jet aircraft operating in the Ft. Bragg area.

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f. With the exception of Eglin area, it is believed the Pope AF Base area will be the location for the majority of jet operations within ConAC.

g. Housing and messing facilities at Pope AF Base are suitable for staging jet aircraft and crews during large scale maneuvers and exercises.

Godman Air Force Base

a. A ConAC station.

b. Jet aircraft will participate in close tactical air support missions with The Armored School on the average of ten times each year.

c. A centrally located refueling station for ferrying jet aircraft across the continent.

d. There is no other ConAC station capable of staging jet aircraft for The Armored School demonstrations. (Aircraft would be staged at Campbell AF Base which is a SAC station.)

e. For safety reasons.

(1) Use of Godman AF Base by jet aircraft would eliminate carrying bombs and live ammunition over civilian-owned property for demonstrations and exercises conducted in Ft. Knox area.

(2) Provide an emergency landing field for jet aircraft operating in Ft. Knox area.

f. Weather interference would be reduced for The Armored School demonstrations if Godman could be utilized instead of staging from another location.

Lawson AF Base

a. A ConAC station.

b. Jet aircraft will participate in close tactical air support missions with the Infantry School an average of six times each year.

c. For safety reasons.

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(1) Use of Lawson AF Base by jet aircraft would eliminate carrying bombs and live ammunition over civilian-owned property for demonstrations and exercises conducted in Ft. Benning area.

(2) Provide an emergency landing field for jet aircraft operating in Ft. Benning area.

d. Weather interference would be slightly reduced for Infantry School demonstrations if Lawson AF Base could be utilized instead of staging from Turner AF Base.

Post Field

a. Jet aircraft participate in artillery adjustment training in conjunction with Ft. Sill.

b. Alleviate necessity of staging aircraft from Tinker AF Base, an AMC station.

c. More missions could be accomplished daily if aircraft could operate from Post Field.

d. Perform joint exercises with the Field Artillery School.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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FILE:

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

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SUBJECT: Reqmts for Jet Fighter Acft in Support of AFF

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
1	7 Nov	O&T	DO DM	1. For information and remarks. 2. For information and advisability of requesting necessary funds for extending subject runways. 3. This command has been continuously confronted with problem of jet fighter operations in support of the Army. All fields outlined in 1st Ind are not suitable for the only fighters assigned this command. This necessitates operation from bases some distance from the support areas and carrying live ammo, bombs etc over private property and semi populated areas. J. M. HUNTSMAN Major, USAF Ext. 5256 DONALD N. YOUNGBLESEN Colonel, USAF Director, Operations & Training
2	7 Nov	DO	DM	Subject this matter should be referred to the CONAC Master Planning Board for its consideration and incorporation in CONAC program. F. S. Brown
3	22 Nov	MAT	Instal	1. For info. 2 Coraun w/TAC 3. Construction at Pope very important. Suggested we do something to get to Mtn Home there, at least. LEFT DM This is in reply to [illegible] which was suspended [illegible]

CONAC FORM 82-AS 1
10 December 1962

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

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SUBJECT: Reqmts for Jet Fighter Acft in Support of AFF

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
4	31Aug	Instl	MatP DM DO O&T	1. Reference paragraph 1 of attached 1st Indorsement, the following comments are furnished: a. Pope Air Force Base Runways at Pope AFB can be extended, but only at high cost. The 5,200' N/S (18/36) runway is the instrument runway and could be extended 1,300' to the north and 1,000' to the south. This will provide a take-off length of 7,500' and a landing length of 6,500'. The extension to the north would require the acquisition of approximately 55 acres of privately owned property and the relocation of a main internal road. The extension to the south would require the filling of ditches and valley. In order to obtain a 1:50 glide angle and eliminate hazards in the approach zone, 50 buildings in the division area, a power pole and a number of trees, all Army Field Forces property, would require removal. The north end of the 5,200' NE-SW runway could be extended approximately 3,000', but would require considerable filling, relocation of a main internal road, elimination of a railroad spur to maintenance area, placing of power lines underground, acquisition of approximately 29 acres of privately owned property, rechanneling of drainage ditches and installation of culverts. Neither end of the E-W runway nor the south end of the NW-SW runway can be extended without flying extremely low over rifle and artillery ranges and Fort Bragg main cantonment area. b. Godman Air Force Base A review of information available in this Directorate discloses a possibility of extending the north end of the 5,000' NW-SE runway by 1,900'. Due to the lack of adequate topographical maps, this possibility should be checked in the

AC/AC Form No. 10 1
10 December 1948

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SUBJECT: Reqmts for Jet Fighter Acft in Support of AFF

	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
31Aug	Instl	~~[illegible]~~ DO DAT	(continued) field. c. Lawson Air Force Base Engineer reports made in October 1948 indicate that the 5,740' NW-SE (14/32) runway is expandable to approximately 8,730' to the southeast. However, this runway is only rated at 18,000 pounds and is in very poor condition. Any extension would require the complete rebuilding of this runway and the installation of adequate drainage facilities. d. Post Field No information or maps available in this Directorate for this station. 2. The extension of a runway to sufficient length to permit efficient jet fighter operations in support of the Army from any of the above bases would require a project of such cost (above $20,000.00) as to place it in the new construction category under the provisions of AFR 85-4. It would be necessary for each such project to be programmed and justified by headquarters USAF before the Bureau of the Budget and subsequently submitted to the Congress for authorization and appropriation of funds. 3. Note No. 2 is not concurred in. Instead, it is recommended that this program be reviewed and developed by ~~DAS&Mobd~~ staff ~~A.A.F.~~. Lt.Col.Rutral/332 Ext 4144 W. T. [illegible] Colonel, USAF Dir. of Installations
	MATP	DAT D&T	In view of prior reclama: & BuDOM do you desire further action?

CONAC FORM RD-46 1
10 December 1948

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Classification changed from Conf. to Restricted 6 Oct 49

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 August 1949

SUBJECT: Allocation of Flying Hours

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Attached hereto is a tentative allocation by model aircraft, by utilization, of aircraft flying hours for your command for Fiscal Year 1950.

2. This allocation, which is being made to each command, is extracted from 90% of the USAF flying hours in the Budget program for Fiscal Year 1950. Ten per cent of the hours for each command have been withheld by this Headquarters as a cushion to permit adjustment of maladjustments which may be indicated by actual experience in the first quarter of this fiscal year and/or as a result of a forthcoming detailed recomputation of projected flying hours based on the latest detailed availability of aircraft. This initial allocation may, therefore, be considered as a service test. Pending the receipt of revisions or changes from this Headquarters, however, this present allocation should be treated as an indication of both the upper and lower limits of the flying activities of your command for this fiscal year. The flying to be accomplished by each command should be planned so as to meet this allocation with a minimum of variation.

3. The projection of USAF flying hours on which this allocation is based assumes that Operation "Vittles" has been discontinued. A further assumption has been made that the average pilot flying MIT (Minimum Individual Proficiency Training) aircraft will receive 80 first pilot hours per year. In line with this assumption, which each command must attempt to match by actual performance, is the necessity for the imposition of an absolute ceiling for the year of 250 total pilot and co-pilot hours for any individual in the MIT category. This ceiling must be adhered to except that it will not apply to instructor pilot time recorded in strict compliance with Air Force Regulation 60-7 dated 1 October 1945.

4. The comments of all commands on this initial allocation of flying hours are invited. Comments should be addressed to the Assistant for Programming, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

t/ F. H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Assistant for Programming

1 Incl
Allocation of Flying Hours

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Confidential

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

PRELIMINARY ALLOCATION OF FLYING HOURS

FISCAL YEAR 1950

BY AIRCRAFT MODEL AND UTILIZATION

Model	Total	Unit Training	Minimum Individual Training	Radar Calibration and Administration
Grand Total	460,700	265,935	170,079	24,486
B-29	1,700	-	-	1,700
B-17	970	-	-	970
B-25	37,800	-	37,800	-
B-26	43,[illegible]	6,145	37,080	-
AB-26	5,865	5,865	-	-
B-45	16,935	16,935	-	-
RB-45	995	995	-	-
F-47	3,240	-	3,240	-
F-51	7,200	-	7,200	-
F-82	18,685	18,685	-	-
F-80	63,440	63,440	-	-
TF-80	5,[illegible]	5,[illegible]	-	-
QF-80	5,8[illegible]	5,835	-	-
F-84	5,185	5,185	-	-
F-84	34,055	34,055	-	-
C-45	40,71[illegible]	-	40,715	-
C-46	36[illegible]	-	360	-
C-47	57,78[illegible]	3,245	32,724	21,816
C-54	38,880	38,880	-	-
C-82	18,25[illegible]	18,255	-	-
C-119	14,64[illegible]	14,645	-	-
C-121	560	560	-	-
C-124	2,790	2,790	-	-
T-6	28,635	17,475	11,160	-
L-13	7,025	7,025	-	-
H-5	415	415	-	-

NOTE: Air Force Reserve Training Centers are excluded from this allocation.

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Allocation of Flying Hours
O&T 452.1 (19 August 1949) 1st Ind

HQ. CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 27 Sep 1949

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

ATTENTION: Assistant for Programming

1. The flying hours allocation for this command for FY 1950 has been reviewed in light of past experiences, planning factors cited in AF Letter 150-10 and present aircraft allocation figures. This Headquarters in general concurs with allocation cited in inclosure to basic correspondence except that:

a. Allocation for B-29 aircraft should be increased to 10,800 hours in order to accommodate eight (8) B-29 aircraft utilized for radar calibration.

b. Allocation for B-26 aircraft can be reduced. Present plans in this Headquarters call for a total assignment of forty-four (44) B-26 aircraft for tactical and MIT flying. This would reduce the flying hours to 20,360 hours (9,280 Tactical - 10,080 MIT).

c

c. This command has no requirement for C-46 flying hours in the regular establishment.

d. The command no longer has any requirement for allocation of flying hours for F-47 aircraft.

2. This command will take all action possible to match allocated flying hours with actual performance. It is requested that this Headquarters be informed of any changes in planning factors in order to facilitate concurrent planning commensurate with directives from Headquarters, United States Air Force.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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

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O&T 452.1

JC AUG 1949

SUBJECT: Flying Hour Requirements

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Slocum Air Force Base, New Rochelle, New York.
(SAME LETTER TO: FOURTH, NINTH, TENTH, TWELFTH, FOURTEENTH AF'S)

1. Headquarters, United States Air Force has directed that a study be made of flying hour requirements for all Continental Air Command units. Sufficient priority should be given this report to insure receipt of necessary information in this headquarters not later than 10 September 1949. Present planning dictates that no extension of this suspense date can be authorized.

2. The following information and factors are forwarded for the purpose of assisting in the completion of requested reports:

a. Statement of the minimum number of flying hours per year by type aircraft required to permit each flying unit to perform its mission. This will include and will show separately, by unit to group or separate squadron level, the minimum number of flying hours required for all phases of unit training, administrative flying, UIT (Minimum individual proficiency training) flying, corollary reserve flying, mobilization reserve flying, and any other activity in the unit involving the utilization of aircraft.

b. Each headquarters in the echelon of command should attach separately its own flying hour requirement so that the final report submitted will contain a detailed statement of the total flying hour requirements for his command.

c. Assume the organization of the Air Force as at present with full peace time T/O&E or T/D authorizations of personnel and equipment and/or current authorizations based on latest revision.

d. Organizational flying is defined as that flying done by an organization in furtherance of its primary mission, i.e., unit flying training by tactical units, flying training by training command, test flying by Air Material Command or Air Proving Ground Command, scheduled operations by Military Air Transport Service, etc.

e. Administrative flying is defined as that performed on second line aircraft assigned for that purpose under Table 17, AAF 100-10, 31 May 1949, and letter, this headquarters, subject: "Aircraft [illegible]

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Subj: Flying Hour Requirements
2e (Continued)

ment and Utilization", dated 18 May 1949, and amendment letter thereto dated 9 August 1949. This will include all flying hours allied with any non-Military Air Transport Service transport, depot lift, or test support requirements.

f. MIT flying is defined as that flying, by pilots who cannot reasonably obtain their minimum requirements on unit equipment or administrative aircraft, performed on second line aircraft assigned for that purpose in accordance with eighty (80) percent of pilot to aircraft ratios furnished individually to your command, in paragraph 8 of above referenced amendment letter, and to personnel attending aircraft requirements conference, 20 July 1949, at Headquarters Continental Air Command.

g. Assume that each United States Air Force pilot requiring MIT flying will receive eighty (80) first pilot, repeat, first pilot hours per year. This assumption will in no way operate to waive or reduce the requirements imposed by AF Regulation 60-8.

h. Assume that corollary reserve unit pilots and mobilization assignee reserve pilots flying with United States Air Force units will receive a total (Pilot plus co-pilot) of 100 hours per year in accordance with AF Regulation 60-8. The number of such Reserve pilots flying with any unit must be determined by latest information available to the unit commander and should be stated.

i. All reserve flying (corollary unit and mobilization assignee) will be on unit equipment so far as possible.

j. All flying hours will be shown as requirements for one years activity in preparation for the performance of the assigned mission. If the mission of the unit is such that, due to its state of training, or for some other reason such as special non-recurring missions, differing annual flying hour requirements will exist. Requirements for both a year in which such special conditions exist and a normal year will be shown with the differences identified and explained.

k. Assume for the purpose of this report that number of United States Air Force pilots in your command will remain constant as of 30 June 1949.

l. Statements of flying hour requirements desired by this message will be based on best objective judgement of preparing unit and must not be influenced by any existing flying hour factors published by this headquarters or by any allocation of flying hours which may be made in the near future except as specified in this letter.

m. Indicate command, unit, location, and number of applicable T/O&E or T/D and show reports control symbol AF-CR-SP 149.

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

Subj: Flying Hour Requirements
2 (Continued)

n. List individually the activities of the unit under each of the following headings: Organizational flying, Administrative flying, ATT flying, corollary reserve flying, mobilization reserve flying, and other flying. Describe each activity by means of a general statement, and after such description give the number of aircraft hours per year required for performance of that activity on each necessary aircraft type (T Bomb, Day Fighter, All-Weather Fighter, Transport L, Transport M, Transport L, Trainer 2 Engine, Trainer 1 Engine, Liaison, Helicopter), identifying the hours with the aircraft type. List first the hours in a normal year, and second where applicable, the hours in a year of special conditions, identifying those special conditions by suitable description. When listing the activity under organizational flying, show separately the phases of flight training and the hours and aircraft type associated therewith. Under organizational flying also list the activity "Non-Air Crew Training" when applicable, and show the aircraft type and number of hours per year to be flown by non-air crew personnel (excluding mobilization and corollary unit reserves) on unit equipment aircraft. Under administrative flying also show the number of aircraft of each type. Under ATT flying, also show the number of pilots associated with each aircraft type. Under corollary reserve and under mobilization reserve flying, show and identify separately the number of hours to be flown on unit equipment aircraft and on other than unit equipment aircraft, by aircraft type, and also list the number of pilots associated with each aircraft type. Identify suitably other flying, giving the aircraft hours per year on each aircraft type required.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SMITH:

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 452.1 5 October 1949

SUBJECT: Flying Hour Requirements

TO : Director, Plans and Operations, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Transmitted herewith is the Report of Flying Hour Requirements as requested in your message AFOOP 57672.

2. A study of flying hour requirements from Continental Air Command field units discloses that the planning for future budgets on a flying hour basis is not practical insofar as regular units of this command are concerned. Any attempt to forecast MIT and tactical flying on the basis of eighty (80) hours per pilot per year is purely an estimate and it is felt that by using past experience and controlled administrative scheduling a more accurate and worth while report could be compiled. As an example, the attached report for Continental Air Command Headquarters indicates the basic requirement for MIT flying under 30 July pilot loads; however, there is a definite additional requirement for Administrative flying as indicated based on required Inspector General trips, scheduled conferences at United States Air Force, necessary Continental Air Command scheduled conferences, and routine inspection trips that in most cases cannot be accomplished concurrently with proficiency flying.

3. This headquarters also feels that the present 100 hours per year as set forth by AF Reg. 66-2 is in the best interests of flying safety and proficiency and any reduction of these factors would be detrimental to the Air Force. In connection with this, Continental Air Command proposes to solve the problem by increasing maintenance and operational efficiency to a point where desired aircraft utilization figures are exceeded. The aircraft required are to be determined on basis of past experience as to the number of aircraft to perform the mission of each unit.

4. This command has and will continue to reduce operating costs in connection with administrative and MIT flying, to the extent that it does not interfere with the performance of the mission of Continental Air Command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

6 Incls
Cys of Flying Hour Requirements

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 October 1949

SUBJECT: Allocation of Flying Hours

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Attached hereto is an allocation by model aircraft, by utilization of flying hours for Fiscal Year 1950 which supersedes that furnished you under letter, above, subject, dated 19 August 1949. It is anticipated that subsequent allocations will be published each quarter year to reflect all program changes.

2. Stringent economies in the operation of the Air Force already imposed for the current fiscal year and definitely foreseeable limitations for future fiscal years have dictated the inauguration of a system of allocation of flying hours as a measure of control over the expenditure of funds allied therewith. Restrictions more drastic than embodied in this allocation may have to be imposed if funds expected to be available for the operation of the Air Force are further curtailed. You should, therefore, establish a system of sub-allocation of flying hours which will permit the imposition of controls upon the individual operating unit and will insure that the allocated hours are not exceeded.

3. The Air Force flying hour program for Fiscal Year 1950 has been fixed by budgetary limitations. The allocation herewith presents in detail that portion of the Air Force total flying hours which must be flown by your command with a minimum of variance. Should it be apparent that this allocation is in excess of your requirements and/or capabilities in any area, this headquarters must be notified immediately and in detail. Should any addition to this allocation be required, it must necessarily be made at the expense of some other activity of the Air Force. Any request for additional flying hours must be accompanied by full justification. No hours are being withheld on this allocation to serve as a cushion for future adjustments.

4. The total number of hours allocated herewith is 419,276. This allocation reflects to the extent possible the recommendations of your 1st Indorsement, dated 27 September 1949, to basic letter from this Headquarters, dated 19 August 1949, subject: "Allocation of Flying Hours".

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5. Minimum individual training flying (MIT flying) has been defined as that flying performed, on aircraft specifically allocated for that purpose, by those pilots who cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the minimum flying requirements of Air Force Regulation 60-2 in aircraft assigned for other purposes. Under this definition the maximum possible utilization of required administrative flights should be made in order to provide minimum flying requirements of your Command. For those pilots whose flying must, of necessity, fall in the MIT category, a very close measure of control should be exercised in order to insure the closest adherence to the 80 first pilot hours peryear budgeted for individuals in this group. Continuing supervision in the MIT area is most important since it is here that any further restrictions on flying activities of the Air Force will first be imposed.

6. It must be emphasized that since the necessity for stringent economies in the operation of the Air Force has required the imposition of controls over all types of flying, the resultant allocation of flying hours must be adhered to in detail both as a performance goal and as a limitation on total flying.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl.
1 Oct 49 Allocation
of Flying Hours

t/ F. H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USAF
Assistant for Programming, DCS/O

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(No file) (24 Oct 49)
SUBJECT: Allocation of Flying Hours

OT 360.1 (24 Oct 49) 1st Ind.

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 2 Nov 1949

TO: Assistant for Programming, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. A thorough analysis of the flying hours allocated this command has been conducted. The problem was considered in two parts. First, to provide the minimum MIT and ADM aircraft hours necessary to enable assigned and attached pilots to meet Air Force Regulation 60-2 requirements and to accomplish minimum administrative missions. Second, to provide the minimum hours required to carry out Continental Air Command's Tactical mission, including Training, Maneuvers, AFF Committments, Air Shows, etc.

2. The MIT and ADM hours were computed on the basis of 8.3 hours (4 1st pilot and 4 co-pilot) per month per each assigned and attached pilot, not including pilots assigned to combat groups and separate squadrons, nor reserve individuals flying with regular units (corollary and mobilization assignees). This figure produces a total of fifty (50) first pilot hours as opposed to the eighty (80) first pilot hours per pilot budgeted for this group. In addition to the hours provided above, an admistrative buffer of 2800 hours per month was added to accomplish minimum administrative missions. These included OMT's, IG Inspections, Unit Inspection, Ferry Missions, etc, conducted by this headquarters and the headquarters of the numbered Air Forces. As of 1 November 1949 a total of 177,883 hours have been flown by all types assigned to Continental Air Command. This figure plus a total of 109,984 hours (MIT and ADM requirements for remaining eight months) produced a basic total of 287,867 hours.

3. Tactical hour requirements were then analyzed under three considerations; the remaining hours over and above the basic total (indicated in paragraph 2 above), standards set forth in Air Force Letter 150-10, and minimum Training Standards per individual per type unit (USAF and ConAC).

a. The first consideration did not provide sufficient hours to accomplish the mission:

419,276 (Total current allocations)

Less 287,867 (Basic requirement other than Tactical)
131,409 Total remaining for Tactical aircraft types for remaining eight months. This figure, when broken down by monthly averages (See Incl 2) was unacceptably low.

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Inds, Hq ConAC, OT 360.1, Subject: "Allocation of Flying Hours" (continued)

b. Under the second consideration (utilizing factors as set forth in Air Force Letter 150-10 for the Tactical aircraft types) the total Continental Air Command figure was 514,734.

c. Under the third consideration (minimum Training Standards for assigned Tactical pilots) the total Continental Air Command figure was 501,940 hours.

4. A final analysis was then prepared which took into consideration the factors discussed above, making reductions by specific aircraft types based on current operating experience and estimated performance for the remainder of this fiscal year. After applying these cuts, a new total of 483,921 hours was obtained. This total has been computed by aircraft type, by quarter. No weather factor was considered in allocations between quarters (see Incl 3).

5. Request approval of allocation of aircraft hours in accordance with Inclosure 3, attached, for an additional 84,645 aircraft hours. Based on a full consideration of the requirements of this command, a reduction below the indicated allocation of 483,921 hours will prevent Continental Air Command from accomplishing minimum flying committments.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ V. S. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

3 Incls
1- n/c
Added - 2 Incls
2- Average Aircraft Hrs Per Month by Type (dup)
3-ConAC Alloc of Flying Hrs (dup)

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CG 14th PRIORITY

(Similar TWX sent to each numbered AF

39671 . It is the responsibility of the Air Force commander to Sub-allocate a proportionate share of hours allocated among units assigned. Sufficient accounting will be established at each Air Force Hq to insure that the quota per type aircraft is not repeat not exceeded. Shifting of hours allocated, between types is not permitted. Par 3. All maneuvers, air shows, demonstrations, etc must be accomplished within the allocation furnished. There is no additional time available for this purpose. Par 4. In addition to the allocation in par 1 an administrative cushion is authorized as follows: C-47-880; B-25-400. This time is to be utilized at the discretion of the Air Force Commander in the performance of his mission. Par 5. 14th Air Force will absorb flying requirements of mobilization assignees, and corollary pilots within totals allocated, however, where these pilots have exceeded a proportionate share of their 70% requirements under 60-2 (ref AFConAC DT 39109) their flying may be limited to 4 hours per month total during Nov and Dec. Par 6. For your information and planning purposes, the allocation of hours for MTT and adm aircraft was based on providing each assigned and attached pilot, other than tactical pilots, with an average of 4 pilot hours and 4 co-pilot hours per month for FY 1950. Par 7. So much of the provisions of AFConAC 39131 in conflict with the foregoing are rescinded.

CG ConAC

5 Nov 49

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

18 November 1949

SUBJECT: Allocation of Flying Hours

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Reference is made to the allocation of flying hours which was furnished you under letter, above subject, dated 24 October 1949.

2. The total of the hours distributed to the various Air Force activities under above referenced letter represents the entire amount of funds available for direct support of flying operations during FY 1950. It is necessary, therefore, that this dollar ceiling not be exceeded within any utilization category.

3. While it is most desirable that the allocated flying hour program be followed in detail, it is nevertheless recognized that it may not be possible for all commands to adhere to the allocation of flying hours within detail by model aircraft and, at the same time, continue to perform essential portions of their mission. In order that allocated hours may be transferred from one model aircraft to the other whenever such is deemed necessary for the performance of this mission, the attached conversion table has been prepared and may be used subject to the following conditions:

a. No transfer of flying hours will be made between allocated utilization categories. For example, no unit training (UN) hours may be transferred to or from MIT (MT), administrative (MA) or any other utilization category.

b. All desired transference of flying hours between models of aircraft, in accordance with factors in the attached table, for Fiscal Year 1950 must be made prior to 1 January 1950. In no case will transference of flying hours be undertaken after 1 January 1950. It is anticipated that coincident with the next allocation of flying hours (estimated 31 January 1950), authority to transfer hours within utilization categories will be reaffirmed.

c. All actions taken under the authority of this letter and all flying hours redistributed must be reported in detail to this

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Headquarters. This report should be made as of 1 January 1950 and should reach this Headquarters no later than 15 January 1950. This date must be met in order that the next allocation of flying hours will reflect necessary adjustments.

4. It is emphasized that the authority herein granted is not intended in any way to authorize an abandonment of the flying hour program. This is simply a means of effecting certain changes now found to be required.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ F. H. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Assistant for Programming,
DCS/O

1 Incl
Flying Hour
Conversion Table

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

OT 360.1 2 December 1949

SUBJECT: Allocation of Flying Hours

TO : Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

1. Attached hereto is an allocation of flying hours by type aircraft, for the period 1 November 1949 to 30 June 1950 which supersedes that allocation furnished your headquarters in message AFConAOC 39669, above subject, dated 5 November 1949.

2. Stringent economies in the operation of the Air Force imposed for the current fiscal year has dictated the inauguration of a system of allocation of flying hours as a measure of control over the expenditure of funds allied therewith. A system should be established within your headquarters for the sub-allocation of flying hours imposing rigid controls upon the individual operating unit to insure that the total allocated hours attached herein are not exceeded. A breakdown by quarters is provided as a planning factor only and need not be adhered to in sub-allocation. Flying hours allocated to a specific type aircraft may be exchanged between quarters but under no circumstances will flying time be exchanged between aircraft types. For example, B-25 time will not be used by B-26 aircraft.

3. The Continental Air Command flying hour program for Fiscal Year 1950 has been fixed by budgetary limitations. The allocation herewith represents in detail that portion of the command total flying hours which must be flown by your command. Should it be apparent that this allocation is in excess of your requirements and/or capabilities in any area, this Headquarters must be notified immediately and in detail. Should any addition to this allocation be required, it must necessarily be made at the expense of some other activity of this command. Any request for additional flying hours must be accompanied by full justification. Hq USAF has stated that no changes in this allocation will be made subsequent to 1 January 1950.

4. Minimum individual training flying (MIT flying) has been defined as that flying performed, on aircraft specifically allocated for that purpose, by those pilots who cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the minimum flying requirements of Air Force Regulation 60-2 in tactical

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aircraft. Under this definition, the maximum possible utilization of MIT time allocation should be made in conjunction with administrative flights. For those pilots whose flying must, of necessity, fall in the MIT category, a very rigid measure of control should be exercised in order to insure the closest adherence to eight (8) flying hours per month (four (4) pilot and four (4) copilot in dual controlled aircraft) allocated for personnel in this category. Continued supervision in the MIT category is most important since it is here that any further restrictions on flying activities of the command will first be imposed.

5. It must be emphasized that since the necessity for stringent economies in the operation of the Continental Air Command has required the imposition of controls over all types of flying, the resultant allocation of flying hours must be adhered to in detail both as a performance goal and as a limitation on total flying.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl:
Allocation Chart
(in trip)

s/ V. S. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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CARGO FLIGHT SECTION

TYPE A/C	NOV DEC	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	TOTAL
		MTT		
C-45	136	208	208	772
C-47	688	907	907	2688
R-25	328	408	408	1232
L-5	84	-	-	84
TOTAL	1500	1767	1767	7000
		ASR SUPPLY		
R-17	66	180	180	346
C-47	800	780	780	2000
R-25	234	320	320	814
TOTAL	1100	1200	1200	3200
GRAND TOTAL	2600	2976	2976	8000

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2.

FIRST AIR FORCE

TYPE A/C	NOV DEC	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	TOTAL
TACTICAL				
T-33	126	189	189	504
F-47	45	-	-	45
F-82	1008	1512	1512	4032
F-84	3180	4725	4725	12600
F-86	-	-	F-84	F-84
F-51	196	294	294	784
L-13	31	46	46	124
T-6	924	1386	1386	3696
TOTAL	5480	8151	8154	21785
MIT				
C-45	1665	2377	2370	6340
C-47	844	1266	1266	3376
B-25	670	1008	1009	2687
T-6	504	756	757	2017
TOTAL	3683	5417	5430	14430
ADM SUPPORT				
C-47	400	600	600	1600
B-25	400	600	600	1600
TOTAL	800	1200	1200	3200
GRAND TOTAL	9963	14768	14784	39428

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FOURTH AIR FORCE

TYPE A/C	NOV DEC	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	TOTAL
TACTICAL				
T-33	65	189	189	441
F-82	1512	2268	2268	6048
F-84	2418	3628	3628	9674
F-51	392	588	588	1568
B-29	270	405	405	1080
C-54	2880	4320	4320	11520
C-82	500	-	-	500
L-13	62	93	93	248
T-6	924	1386	1386	3696
TOTAL	9021	13877	13877	34775
MIT				
C-45	844	1266	1266	3376
C-47	2144	3217	3217	8578
B-25	470	703	703	1876
T-6	822	1234	1234	3290
TOTAL	4280	6420	6420	17120
AIR BUFFER				
B-17	86	130	130	346
C-47	500	750	750	2000
B-25	214	320	320	854
TOTAL	800	1200	1200	3200
GRAND TOTAL	14101	20497	20497	55095

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1.

NINTH AIR FORCE

TYPE A/C	NOV DEC	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	TOTAL
TACTICAL				
T-33	65	189	189	441
P-38	2801	4000	4000	10691
P-51	196	294	294	784
B-25	-	675	675	1350
B-26	1140	1710	1710	4560
B-45	1008	1506	1506	4020
RB-26	-	720	720	720
AB-45	125	187	187	499
L-13	468	695	695	1848
T-6	5803	11696	11696	25815
TOTAL				
MIT				
C-45	352	526	526	1408
C-47	1615	2422	2422	6459
B-26	652	951	951	2554
T-6	475	714	714	1903
TOTAL	3094	4613	4613	12304
ADM BUFFER				
C-47 Pth	400	600	600	1600
TAC	200	300	300	800
B-26 Pth	300	450	450	1200
TAC	200	300	300	800
TOTAL	1100	1650	1650	4400
GRAND TOTAL	9789	15819	16239	41817

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TENTH AIR FORCE

TYPE A/C	NOV DEC	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	TOTAL
TACTICAL				
T-33	30	189	189	408
F-80	5150	4725	4725	12600
F-51	196	294	294	784
T-6	462	693	693	1848
TOTAL	5838	5901	5901	15640
MIT				
C-45	675	1011	1011	2698
C-47	701	1171	1171	3123
T-6	1360	2039	2039	5438
TOTAL	2814	4221	4221	11258
AIR BUTTER				
C-47	400	1200	1200	2800
B-25	400	-	-	400
TOTAL	800	1200	1200	3200
GRAND TOTAL	7452	11322	11322	30098

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TWELFTH AIR FORCE

TYPE A/C	NOV DEC	3RD QTR	4th QTR	TOTAL
TACTICAL				
T-33	30	189	189	408
P-39	252	378	378	1008
P-38	2080	4431	4431	11822
P-51	196	294	294	784
P-40	1400	2100	2100	5600
P-47	90	135	135	360
P-45	--	213	214	427
RC-45	180	270	270	720
L-5	125	187	187	499
L-6	462	693	693	1848
TOTAL	6858	8890	8891	24439
MIT				
C-45	286	432	432	1150
C-47	377	564	564	1505
B-25	14	22	22	58
L-5	309	453	453	1215
TOTAL	986	1471	1471	3928
AIR BUFFER				
C-47	800	600	600	1700
B-25	100	300	300	700
TOTAL	900	900	900	2400
GRAND TOTAL	7980	11261	11262	29763

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FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE

TYPE A/C	NOV DEC	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	TOTAL
TACTICAL				
T-33	60	578	578	1216
RF-80	784	1095	1095	2974
F-84	6300	9480	9480	25260
F-51	398	807	807	2012
B-26	280	420	420	1120
C-82	7661	7661	-	15322
C-119	-	5940	9600	15540
L-15	280	374	374	928
H-5	120	180	180	480
TC-123	-	-	920	920
T-6	924	1536	1536	3996
TOTAL	16781	28591	26590	72962
MIT				
C-45	1139	1704	1704	4547
C-47	1134	1695	1695	4524
B-26	285	381	381	1017
B-25	384	576	576	1536
T-6	204	396	396	1056
TOTAL	3176	4752	4752	12680
AIR BUFFER				
C-47 14th	400	600	600	1700
TAF	200	300	300	700
B-25	300	450	450	1200
B-26 TAF	200	300	300	800
TOTAL	1100	1650	1650	4400
GRAND TOTAL	21017	31793	30792	83602

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OT 360.1

2nd Ind

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 2 Dec 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. As was indicated by members of this headquarters in a meeting at your headquarters on 21 November 1949, the flying hours allocated to your command represent a portion of the total USAF flying hour program for Fiscal Year 1950 which is limited by a dollar ceiling. In order to satisfy the deficiencies presented in your 1st Indorsement any increase in your allocation of hours, or in dollar cost related thereto, must necessarily be at the expense of another command. Obviously such an adjustment cannot and should not be made arbitrarily.

2. Your headquarters has been furnished a table of factors for use in converting hours of one type aircraft to another. It is believed that use of this conversion table will at least partially satisfy your requirements for additional hours.

3. It is requested that you recompute the flying hour deficiencies of your command after implementation of the changes which can be effected with the conversion table, and submit a revised table of deficiencies. It is hoped that by that time this headquarters will have been able to have ascertained overages in other commands with which to permit further alleviation of your deficiencies.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ R. W. PURYEAR
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Aircraft Division
Assistant for Programming, DCS/O

3 Incls
1. n/c
2. w/d
3. w/d

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8.

LT. F.A.LEE/7126/mtb

ROUTING | COORDINATION | STAFF ACTIVITY

CG
VC
DAD
DTAO
LOTAO
IG
A Insp
PM
PIO
AG
Comp
Aud
Budg
Fis
Prog
Stat
IM
Chap
JA
Pers
Surg
MAP
Serv
TC
Pat
Cmd
Inel
Wat P
Wat M
Legal
DAP
POL
Proc
Mil

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ConAC Form No. AG 5
25 March 1948

HQ USAF (ac file)

SUBJECT: Allocation of Flying Hours

23 DEC 1949

AFT 360.1 (24 Oct 49) 3d Ind.

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Assistant for Programing, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

Answer requested in paragraph three of the 2nd Indorsement is forthcoming in the answer to letter, Headquarters, United States Air Force, 30 November 1949, Subject: "Allocation of Flying Hours", due your headquarters 15 January 1950.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Incl
2 n/c

Adjutant General's Central File Copy

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AVERAGE AIRCRAFT HOURS PER MONTH BY TYPE

Type A/C	For 419,276 Allocation	For 485,921 Allocation
B-17	50	50
B-25	36	35
B-26	43.5	30 (MIT) 45 (TACT)
C-45	28.6	27
C-47	36	35
T-6	28.3	28
DC-45	26.3	30
H-5	8.8	15
L-13	15.3	20
B-45	30.2	20
RB-26	23.6	35
RF-80	20.2	26
F-51	15.2	20
F-80	18.3	25
F-82	13.2	25
F-84	15.4	25
F-86	11.4	25
C-54	25.9	50
C-82	23.6	50
C-119	20.4	50
B-29	47.3	45
T-33	25	25

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CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
ALLOCATION OF FLYING HOURS

	1ST QTR	2ND QTR	3RD QTR	4TH QTR	TOTAL
MIT					
B-26	9,200	6,444	5,061	5,061	25,766
B-25	3,300	1,964	1,311	1,311	7,886
C-45	8,700	6,170	4,910	4,910	24,690
C-47	22,200	15,762	12,543	12,543	63,048
F-51	3,567	2,276	1,620	1,620	9,103
TF-51	-	-	-	-	-
T-6	12,132	7,345	9,820	9,820	39,117
SMA					
B-17	96	160	150	150	556
TB-17	97	160	150	150	557
B-26	6,727	4,986	4,104	4,104	19,921
B-29	151	860	1,215	1,215	3,441
B-45	-	-	360	360	720
DC-45	308	283	270	270	1,131
C-47	2,430	1,724	1,373	1,373	6,900
L-13	86	80	80	80	216
UE					
RB-26	1,584	1,708	1,890	1,890	7,152
B-45	447	1,590	2,160	2,160	6,357
RB-45	-	-	-	-	-
C-45	157	133	115	115	520
C-47	3,341	2,362	1,864	1,864	9,431
C-54	-	2,000	9,000	9,000	20,000
C-82	15,853	10,800	3,000	-	29,653
C-119	-	800	4,000	7,200	12,500
YC-122	-	-	-	-	-
YC-125	-	-	-	1,440	1,440
F-47	119	-	-	-	119
F-80	8,071	6,440	5,625	5,625	25,761
RF-80	1,229	1,846	1,404	1,404	5,383
F-82	3,242	4,500	4,500	4,500	16,742
F-84	22,776	22,593	22,500	22,500	90,371
F-86	1,359	8,753	12,450	12,450	35,011
H-5	191	184	180	180	735
L-13	462	350	350	350	1,512
T-6	4,860	4,860	1,080	1,080	11,880
T-33	-	-	3,150	3,150	6,300
TOTAL	132,688	116,383	117,005	117,845	483,921

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 360.1

14 January 1950

SUBJECT: Allocation of Flying Hours

TO : Assistant for Programming, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. References:

a. Letter, 24 October 1949, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Subject: "Allocation of Flying Hours."

b. Letter, 18 November 1949, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Subject: "Allocation of Flying Hours."

c. Second Indorsement, OT 360.1, 2 December 1949, Headquarters, United States Air Force, to letter, 24 October 1949, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Subject: "Allocation of Flying Hours."

2. This headquarters has reviewed the flying hour allocation provided by Headquarters, United States Air Force, in the light of accomplishing the essential portions of the assigned mission. Under the present allocation by aircraft type established by reference 1a, this command would fall short of a necessary required minimum of performance in adhering to type allocations. In order to accomplish a reasonable proportion of tactical flying time and a minimum amount of MIT and Administrative flying the conversion authorized in paragraph 3 of reference 1b was applied to the original allocation. There has been of necessity some divergence from the provisions of paragraph 3a, in view of the lack of sufficient flying hours allotted to cover the MIT - Administrative block in the original allocation. The conversion of flying hours between categories was kept to the essential minimum.

3. The study represented in Inclosure No. 1 (Flying Hour Allocation Breakdown by Quarters) and Inclosure No. 2 (Conversions) has been evolved to indicate the desired utilization of flying hours for Continental Air Command under the restrictions of the flying hour ceiling of 419,276 hours established in reference 1a.

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4. This headquarters concurs with the necessity for stringent budgetary limitations, however, the present allocation of 419,276 hours (converted by this headquarters to 450,263) fails to meet minimum training standards desired of combat units and does not include sufficient flying hours to perform additional missions assigned such as air shows, maneuvers, ferrying, tests and miscellaneous flights necessary to support the operations of this command.

5. Attached hereto as Inclosure No. 3 is the Continental Air Command requirement for flying hours based on maintaining an acceptable standard of operational efficiency in tactical units plus essential command support. This study has been revised from original requirement submitted in 1st Indorsement to letter reference 1a, and is submitted in compliance with request contained in paragraph 3c of reference 1b and 2nd Indorsement, Headquarters, United States Air Force, reference 1c. This requirement is the result of a thorough analysis of past actual performance figures, normal desired utilization of aircraft, training standard requirements of total assigned tactical pilots, mission requirements, command support and MIT requirements. Any allocation of flying hours less than this requirement will necessarily be reflected in a lowering of the training standards of the tactical units.

6. It must be noted that allocating hours to t actical units on an aircraft basis is not entirely acceptable due tothe current overage of pilots assigned as compared to the number of aircraft assigned. This relative assignment, in most cases, limits the tactical pilots (particularly fighter pilots) to approximately ten (10) hours per month. If budget limitations preclude the allocation of sufficient tactical time, an increased allocation of time to cover the MIT category will be mandatory in order to insure compliance with Air Force Regulation 60-2 for tactical pilots who cannot obtain their minimum training on tactical aircraft. The flying hours required based on the presently assigned pilot load are indicated in Inclosure No. 4.

7. Reference is made to paragraph 3b, reference 1b. Practical considerations make it mandatory that the authority to transfer hours between aircraft types be continued subsequent to 15 January 1950. It is not possible to predict accurately the hours required for a six months period under conditions involving receipt of new types, changes in delivery schedules, grounding of aircraft, variation in numbers of rated Reserve Mobilization corollary personnal and similar factors. This authority to convert under a table such as that now in effect provides needed flexibility to the system.

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Ltr Hq ConAC, C&T 360.1, subject: Allocation of Flying Hours (Continued)

8. Request approval of the following:

a. Flying hours outlined in paragraph 5.

b. Additional flying hours as indicated in paragraph 6 until such time as existing pilot overage is eliminiated.

c. Conversion authority as indicated in paragraph 7.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

4 Incls
1- ConAC Conversion of 419,276 Hours (trip)
2- ConAC Conversions (trip)
3- ConAC Acceptable Hours (trip)
4- ConAC Training Standard Hours (trip)

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TOTAL REGULAR ACTIVITY AIRCRAFT
IN CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
(By Month)

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
B	B-17	2	1										
O	B-25	85	13	2	5			1	5	1	1		
M	B-26	159	125	95	93	87	75	83	69	49	38	26	23
B	B-29	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	8	10	9
E	B-45			2	8	12	15	27	22	26	25	33	33
R	B-50		1	1									
S													
	TOTAL	258	141	101	107	100	91	109	97	77	72	69	65
F	F-47	86	82	62	59	46	46	7	4	4	3		
I	F-51	63	48	41	28	20	21	22	105	106	52	21	22
G	F-61	10	7										
H	F-80	206	194	225	194	145	144	136	139	131	122	101	100
T	F-82	64	63	63	58	72	71	68	69	66	66	65	63
S	F-84	313	317	334	384	361	345	337	315	273	269	296	259
R	F-86			34	59		22	48	77	92	105	125	142
I													
	TOTAL	742	711	759	782	644	649	618	709	672	617	608	586
	T-6	127	118	120	120	100	155	155	162	172	176	147	130
	T-7	1	1										
T	T-11								1	1	2	2	3
R	T-13	1					7	4	1	1	1		
A	T-33												
I	TB-17											4	10
N	TB-25		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E	TB-26		72	43	55	54	45	50	54	69	75	74	70
R	TC-46		72	69	72	63	61	63	54	51	43	43	41
S	TC-47								1	1	1	1	
	TF-47				1				1				
	TF-51		1	1									
	TF-80		15	15	11	12	12	11	12	12	13	12	10
	TJF-51								1	1			
	TOTAL	129	289	249	260	237	281	285	288	309	312	284	267
L	L-4	24	23	23	30	16	15	15	17	15	5	3	
I	L-5	36	31	17	35	32	30	27	26	21	14	7	5
A	L-13	39	54	54	52	36	37	35	35	28	37	33	20
I	L-17		1										
S	R-5	12	12	10	11	9	6	7	6	6	5	1	2
O													
N													
	TOTAL	111	121	104	128	93	88	84	84	80	61	46	27
	C-45	81	79	71	61	57	76	58	68	71	77	79	80
C	C-47	185	179	184	153	124	114	134	142	133	124	125	137
A	C-54										11	36	27
R	C-82	149	141	132	118	108	103	110	116	125	116	114	101
G	C-119												14
O	CE-25			23	9	9	8	9	11	10	9	9	4
	CE-26			1	1	1							
	TOTAL	415	399	411	342	299	301	311	337	339	337	363	363

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		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
A	RB-17	1					1	1	1				
B	RB-26	37	37	35	38	18	18	18	18	19	18	18	17
C	RC-45						1						
O	RB-80												
N	RF-51	37	36	28	24	17	19	2				17	
	UF-80	49	52	51	33	29	25	25	24	22	5	17	10
TOTAL		124	125	114	95	64	64	46	43	41	23	52	27
T	DB-26						1						
I	DC-45			3	3	1	3	3	2	3	3	3	3
S	DF-51			1	1		1	1	1				
C	DF-51					1							
E	DC-46						1						
L	DF-47					1		1	1	1	1		
L	DB-25											1	1
A	G-15	121	133	84	85	72	32	50	49	49	52	51	51
N	G-18	2	1										
E	PT-13		1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
O	O-14	25	23	17	14	14	12	12	11	11	11	10	10
U	AA-10			1	1						1		
S	SB-17						1	1	1	2	1	1	
	VB-17			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1
	VB-25			1				2		3	3	4	4
	VB-26			2	6	5	7	6		7	7	7	7
	VB-47										10		
	VC-47			7	9	10	10	12		9		11	12
	VH-5					1							
	VG-5												
	VR-18			2	2	1	3	1	2	2	2	3	4
	VR-5			1	1				1	1	2	4	
	ZSC-46					1							
	ZL-4											2	1
TOTAL		148	158	121	123	111	73	93	70	90	95	98	77

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COIY
(377.5),

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington D. C.

28 November 1949

SUBJECT: Mission of 33d Fighter Wing

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York, New York

1. The 33d Fighter Wing is designated as an interceptor unit and will convert to F-86A aircraft beginning February 1950. Due to the difficulty in obtaining a range for air-to-ground operations in the Otis AFB area, and the undetermined suitability of the F-86A aircraft for air-to-ground gunnery, bombing and rocketry, you are authorized to discontinue such training for this Wing until the suitability of the F-86A aircraft for air-to-ground gunnery has been determined. In the interim, Headquarters, USAF will continue to seek a solution to the problem of providing suitable and safe ground gunnery ranges for this and similar units.

2. The mission of the 33d Fighter Wing should be revised accordingly.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ WILLIAM F. McKEE
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

(28 Nov 49)
Subject: Mission of 33d Fighter Wing

C&T 377.5 (28 Nov 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 30 Dec 1949

TO: The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The mission of the 33d Fighter Wing has been revised.

2. The 4th Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and the 81st Fighter Wing, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, are designated as interceiptor units and are equippped with F-86A aircraft.

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Subject: Mission of 33d Fighter Wing
1st Ind (Continued)

3. In view of the "undetermined suitability of the F-86 aircraft for air-to-ground gunnery, bombing and rocketry" it is requested that authority be granted this Headquarters to also revise the missions of the 4th Fighter Wing and the 81st Fighter Wing, accordingly.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Vice Commander

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*ConACR 24-1
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ConAC REGULATION)
24-1)

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, N.Y., 17 February 1950

ORGANIZATION - AIR BASES AND AIR UNITS

Mission of Specific Units

	Paragraph
Mission Assignment	1
Training Objectives	2
Administrative Mission	3

1. Mission Assignment. Regular Air Force combat units are assigned primary and secondary missions as follows:

	Primary Mission	Secondary Mission
4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Interceptor	None
33d Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Interceptor	None
56th Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Interceptor	Fighter-Bomber
78th Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Interceptor	Fighter-Bomber
81st Fighter-Interceptor Wing	Interceptor	None
52d Fighter-All Weather Wing	All Weather	None
325th Fighter-All Weather Wing	All Weather	None
20th Fighter-Bomber Wing	Fighter-Bomber	Interceptor
31st Fighter-Bomber Wing	Fighter-Bomber	Long Range Escort
62d Troop Carrier Wing (H)	Troop Carrier	None
314th Troop Carrier Wing (M)	Troop Carrier	None
316th Troop Carrier Group (M)	Troop Carrier	None
2601st Assault Squadron (L)	Troop Carrier	None
84th Bombardment Squadron (L)	Bombardment	None
85th Bombardment Squadron (L)	Bombardment	None
363d Tactical Reconnaissance Group	Tactical Reconnaissance	None
161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron	Tactical Reconnaissance	None

2. Training Objectives. Training will be conducted to attain the standards of proficiency established in the appropriate USAF and Continental Air Command training standards.

*This Regulation supersedes ConAC Regulation 24-1, 17 August 1949.

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ConAC REGULATION)
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ConAC 24-1
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HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y., 17 August 1949

ORGANIZATION - AIR BASES AND AIR UNITS
Mission of Specific Units

	Paragraph
Purpose	1
Mission Assignment	2
Administrative Mission	3

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Regulation is to announce the mission of specific units of Continental Air Command.

2. Mission Assignment. Combat wings, Continental Air Command, will be trained under Continental Air Command training standards pertinent to the following primary and secondary missions:

	PRIMARY MISSION	SECONDARY MISSION
14th Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
33d Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
78th Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
56th Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
4th Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
81st Fighter Wing	Interceptor	Penetration
52d Fighter Wing	All Weather	Penetration
325th Fighter Wing	All Weather	Penetration
20th Fighter Wing	Penetration	Interceptor
31st Fighter Wing	Penetration	Interceptor
47th Bombardment Wing (L)	Bombardment (L)	None
62d Troop Carrier Wing	Troop Carrier (M)	None
315th Troop Carrier Wing	Troop Carrier (M)	None
314th Troop Carrier Wing	Troop Carrier (M)	None
363d Tactical Reconnaissance Group	Tactical Reconn	None

3. Administrative Mission. Each of the above units will be assigned additional specific administrative missions by the air force to which it is assigned when such missions are required to be performed.
(DO 322)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, USAF
Vice Commander

OFFICIAL:
s/t/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
C,N,R
*This Regulation supersedes ConAC Regulation 24-1, 21 July 1949.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

4 May 1949

OT 353

SUBJECT: Check-out and Maintenance of Proficiency in New Types of Tactical Aircraft.

TO : Commanding General, Air Defense Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Past experience have born out the fact that it is desirable to have certain selected key staff officers of command headquarters checked out in new type aircraft in order that they be better able to perform their planning and operational duties.

2. You are hereby authorized to select key staff officers of your headquarters for purposes of checking out in new type aircraft within this command. It is not intended that check outs of this nature be a burden to the tactical groups.

3. Direct communication between your headquarters and the air forces involved is authorized on matters pertaining to operational routine and scheduling.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl
cy ltr to
ConAC AF's

s/ JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 353

SUBJECT: Transition Program for C-119B Aircraft

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida

1. This letter supersedes Continental Air Command letter, subject: "Transition Program for C-119B Aircraft," 2 July 1949.

2. The 314th Troop Carrier Wing, Smyrna Air Force Base will receive the initial increment of C-119B aircraft. Latest information available indicates that fourteen (14) C-119's will be delivered to the 314th Troop Carrier Wing in October 1949. It is anticipated that mechanical difficulties will be encountered which can only be discovered and corrected by an intensive flying program. Intensive training operations will, therefore, be conducted in order that the 314th will be capable of conducting primary mission operations at the earliest possible date.

3. The 314th Troop Carrier Wing will be manned to full authorized strength. Personnel rendered surplus from inactivated bases will be utilized insofar as possible.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WEBSTER:

s/ V. S. MURTHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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OTT 353, Troop Carrier Training Standards

OAT 353 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y., 24 Dec 1949

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. It is requested that your headquarters review the recommendations contained in the basic letter and submit to this headquarters a revised AF Training Standard 120-2 which would be applicable to Troop Carrier Units (Heavy).

2. The revised standard should not be based solely on the capabilities of presently assigned aircraft, but should take into consideration the Army and Air Force's contemplated requirements of Troop Carrier Units (Heavy).

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/ BRUCE H. GUNN
Captain, USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

TT 353(10 Dec 49) 2nd Ind

Hq Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va., 18 Jan 1950

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AF Base, N. Y.

1. Considering the Army and Air Force contemplated requirements for heavy troop carrier units, it is believed that Training Standard 120-2 is applicable to all troop carrier units and that a separate training standard for heavy troop carrier is not necessary.

2. The recommendations contained in basic letter have been reviewed and the following comments are made:

a. Wartime employment of heavy troop carrier units will require day and night minimum altitude navigation.

b. Formation flying at all operating altitudes and speeds is a training requirement necessary for proficiency in flying various troop carrier missions.

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Hq 4th AF, Hamilton AFB, Calif.
OTT 353 Gen 2nd Ind
Subject: Troop Carrier Training Standards

c. Dropping of supplies, both free and parachuted, although impractical in the present interim type aircraft, will remain a requirement.

d. Proficiency of three crews per squadron in pathfinder operations is necessary to permit flexibility in airborne operations.

e. Dropping paratroopers, day or night, will continue to be a part of the troop carrier mission.

3. Since the C-54 type aircraft is not suited to the above operations, training must necessarily be limited; however, as soon as aircraft limitations are eliminated, the capability of airborne operations will be a requirement. Therefore, the standards set forth in Training Standard 120-2 should be fulfilled to the maximum extent.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

t/ W. H. TUCK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Air Adjutant General

C&T 353 (100ec49) 3rd Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 2 Feb 1950

TO: Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California.

1. Your attention is invited to thepreceding indorsement.

2. This Headquarters has forwarded a letter to Headquarters USAF requesting that units equipped with C-54 type aircraft be exempt from meeting the following requirements of USAF Training Standard 120-2, 1 December 1948:

a. The dropping of supplies, both free and parachuted.

b. The dropping of paratroopers, day and night.

3. The remaining training requirements of AF Training Standard 120-2 can and should be met by units equipped with C-54 type aircraft as it is contemplated that C-54 aircraft will be replaced by other aircraft whose operational capabilities will allow for the complete accomplishment of the Troop Carrier mission. In view of this contemplated replacement of aircraft it is deemed advisable to give Troop Carrier crews the maximum training possible, in Troop Carrier tactics and techniques, that presently assigned equipment will allow.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

st/ JAMES M. STRISLING
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Air Air Gen

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IRS

1. 3 May 49 O&T to DO

1. Reference is made to message received from Hq., USAF.

2. The apparent policy of USAF is to participate in all air demonstrations when such demonstrations do not seriously hamper established training commitments or exercises, keeping in mind the value of public interest and support.

3. This division will effect same policy unless the provisions of attached message are reversed.

s/t/ DOLF S. MUEHLEISEN
Colonel, USAF
Dir., Ops. & Trng.

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Hq ConAC

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25 D C

Routine

9273. Request this comd be relieved from participating in any additional air shows until 30 June. Commitments such as Blackjack, Tarheel, USAF Gunnery Meet, ORT Schedules during may and June, Rotation of Squadrons to Alaska, demonstration for West Point Cadet during June and July, etc make it impossible for this comd to comply with any further request without seriously curtailing the assigned missions of the combat groups.

CG ConAC

26 Apr 49

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FM HQ USAF Wash DC 292114Z

TO CG ConAC

/ R E S T R I C T E D / From AFCOP-C 54087 Reur T?X AFCONACOT 9273, 27 Apr 49 request for relief from participating in additional Air Shows until 30 June 1949 cannot be granted due to demand by the public for opportunities to view the latest Air Force equipment. This Hq is cognizant of your difficulties and will do everything possible to keep demands on your command to a minimum during this period. / R E S T R I C T E D /

30/0445Z Apr

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HEADQUARTERS
NINTH AIR FORCE
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

I 373.4 30 March 1949

SUBJECT: Authorization for Aircraft Flights for Ceremonies and Special Events

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. This headquarters receives numerous requests each year from military organizations, veteran organizations and civilian agencies requesting flights of aircraft for parades, ceremonies, dedications and other special events.

2. With the arrival of spring and better weather conditions, it is only natural that these requests will increase.

3. In many cases, a fly-by of aircraft can be performed in normal training flights at no additional expense to the government, and no interference to the normal training program.

4. Often request for flights do not arrive in this headquarters with sufficient time for processinf and approval in accordance with USAF Letter 190-10, dated 16 April 1947 or USAF Regulation 190-5, dated 29 April 1946.

5. In view of the above, it is requested that consideration be given to revising the above listed regulation and letter, to speed up the answering of these requests, and that this headquarters be granted the authority to evaluate the benefit to be derived from these requests. It is felt that authority at Air Force level to route aircraft scheduled on routine training flights, over towns in the Ninth Air Force area, would greatly facilitate the handling of these requests and promote better civilian - military relations.

6. This headquarters interprets AAF Regulation 190-5, dated 26 April 1946 as meaning that the $50,000 liability -- $500,000 personal injury and the $250,000 property damage bond is not required when aircraft fly-by are scheduled at demonstrations over other than government property, even though a charge for the event is made. Your interpretation of this regulation would be appreciated by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ ERLATH W. ZUEHL
Lt. Col., USAF
Adjutant General

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Authorization for Aircraft Flights for Ceremonies and Special Events
OT 373.5 (30 Mar 49) 1st Ind 18 Apr 49

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Correspondence has been initiated to the DeputyChief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters USAF requesting revision of Air Force Regulation 190-5, 29 April 1946, and Air Force Letter 190-10, 16 April 1947, to delegate authority to Air Force Commanders to approve or disapprove requests for Air Force participation in fly-by in conjunction with local civic-sponsored events. Until such time as these changes are received this command will be governed by the above mentioned directives.

2. The bond referred to in par 6, basic communications is not required when aircraft fly-by are scheduled at demon trations over other than government property, even though a charge is made for the event.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

s/t JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Request for Aircraft for Air Show
C&T 373.5 (2 Aug 49) 1st Ind

HQ, CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 11 Aug 1949

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas

1. The use of jet aircraft to accomplish the mission requested is not favorably considered by this headquarters due to the time, travel, and payment of per diem which it necessitates.

2. Request your headquarters notify Major Jack A. Gaygan that this command is unable to furnish a fly by of jet aircraft for the above reasons. Suggest your command offer a fly by of aircraft at your disposal.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl
n/c

/s/ T. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
4TH FIGHTER GROUP
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

LFFA 373.3

23 June 1949

SUBJECT: Air Shows and Aerial Demonstrations

TO: Commanding Officer
4th Fighter Wing
Langley Air Force Base
Virginia

1. In accordance with letter, Department of the Air Force, dated 17 February 1949, subject "F-80 Aerobatic Team, Fourth Fighter Group", and the four (4) indorsements thereto (See Incl 1), the Fourth Fighter Group maintains an aerobatic team. This aerobatic team (and others similar to it within the Group) are on various occasions directed by higher headquarters to perform aerobatic and/or demonstration flights.

2. In addition to the flights performed by the 4th Fighter Group aerobatic team, higher headquarters frequently directs "fly-bys", aerial demonstrations or airshows to be performed by pilots assigned to the Group. The total aerobatic flights, aerial demonstrations and airshows executed by this Group between 4 January 1949 and 12 June 1949 was thirty-two (32) (See Incl 6).

3. Comments of observers (civilian as well as military) and letters of praise received by this headquarters are ample proof that the airshows do much to add to the prestige of the Air Force. Because of this good will fostered by Air Force participation in public ceremonies, it is believed that such participation is in the best interest of the service and should be continued. However, the frequency of participation on the part of the Fourth Fighter Group (approximately 30 times in a six month period) has created a grave problem within the Group. Some of the airshows and demonstrations require no more than a flight off the home station and return without landing - essentially, no more than a routine training flight. That type of demonstration presents no problem. Many flights on the other hand require periods of TDY which, under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 190-5 and Army Regulation 35-4420, are not covered by per diem. The TDY is necessary in many cases because:

a. The location of the demonstration is at such distance from the home station that the flight cannot be made non-stop.

b. The location of the demonstration is at such distance from the home station, and the time of the demonstration is so set that the aircraft cannot meet the staging requirements on the given day and must make certain preparations the day before and possibly the day after

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L/tr, Hq 4th Ftr Gp, Langley AFB, Va., subj "Air Shows and Aerial Demonstrations," dated 23 June 1949

the demonstration.

c. Members of the acrobatic team may not be together at the same station. Therefore, orders must be issued to bring the members together to practice for a few days prior to the demonstration.

4. The necessary TDY periods invariably bring expense to the participants yet per diem in most cases is unauthorized. The problem of meeting these additional expenses has become so grave that the individuals concerned now feel they can no longer afford to participate. To the individuals, an airshow directed by higher headquarters is a military duty and therefore public business as specified in paragraph 1, AR 35-4820. In no way can airshows conceivably be construed as being for the individuals convenience.

5. It is believed that the Air Force policy governing participation in airshows is not intended to work a hardship on those individuals who take part. Such is presently true in the Fourth Fighter Group in all cases except aerial demonstrations originated and sponsored solely by the military, and those very rare cases in which the agency requesting the demonstration defrays participants' expenses.

6. Because the situation as cited above has become serious enough to cause a grave morale problem within the Fourth Fighter Group, it is requested that action be taken in accordance with the following recommendations.

a. That, if the aerial demonstration is actually for the good of the service or in the interest of the government (and not for the convenience of the personnel concerned) as specified in paragraph 1, AR 35-4820, the personnel directed to participate be paid per diem for the entire period of any TDY which may be necessary in the performance of the mission.

b. That, if per diem is not to be authorized for participating members, the 4th Fighter Group should not be directed to take part in any demonstration requiring TDY unless the requesting agency defrays all personal expenses of the members as provided in paragraph 2e(5) (b), Air Force Regulation 190-5.

c. That, if the aerial demonstration is not actually for the good of the service or in the interest of the government, and is not government business as specified in paragraph 1, AR 35-4820, the Fourth Fighter Group should not be directed to participate.

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Ltr, Hq 4th Ftr Gp, Langley AFB, Va., subj "Air Shows and Aerial Demonstrations", dated 23 June 1949

d. That, in all cases the directive ordering participation in an air show, aerial demonstration of acrobatic show state:

(1) "This aerial (show) (demonstration) is sponsored solely by the military as defined in paragraph 3a, Air Force Regulation 190-5 and is public business as specified by paragraph 1, Army Regulation 35-4820" or

(2) "This aerial (show) (demonstration) is sponsored solely by the following civilian agency (or agencies):_____

Name of Agency

(a) All personal expenses incurred by USAF participants incident to this aerial (demonstration) (show) will be paid in advance or upon arrival by the above agency. In this connection the demonstration leader should contact _____ at _____.

s/v ALBERT L. EVANS, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

3 Incls:
1. Ltr, Hq USAF, subj "F-80 Acrobatic Team, 4th Ftr Gp
   w/1 indorsements thereto
2. Atlantic City Air Show
   w/atchmts thereto
3. Andrews AFB Air Show
   w/atchmts thereto
4. Buffalo Air Show
5. Elmira, Sturgis and Johnsonburg Air Shows
6. List of airshows performed by 4th Ftr Gp
7. Ltr, [illegible] 4th Ftr Gp Unit, subj "Participation in Aerial Demon", 21 Jun 49

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LFFA 373.3 25 June 1949
Subject: Air Shows and Aerial Demonstrations, Hq 14th Fighter Gp, Langley AF Base, Va.

LFA 373.3 1st Ind FE/bgh

Hq 14th Fighter Wing, Langley AF Base, Virginia, 11 July 1949

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley AF Base, Va.

The undersigned concurs heartily in the proposals contained in the basic communication.

7 Incls:
n/c

HENRY B. FISHER
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

9AF 373.3 (25 Jun 49) 2d Ind

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 25 JUL 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Concur.

2. Military participants have suffered unusual personal expenses in support of aerial and ground demonstrations.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

W. L. BAXTER
MAJOR, USAF
ASST. ADJ. GENERAL

7 Incls
n/c

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Prepared by

Coordinated With

EVALUATION

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Until

O&T/JEM/261

Air Shows and Aerial Demonstrations
AAF 370.5 (25 June 1948) 3rd Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Director of Plans and Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Concur.

2. Recommend that arrangements be made to authorize and pay per diem to individuals participating in aerial shows or demonstrations, in cases where personal expense is incurred.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Major [illegible]
Asst Adj Gen

Incls:
N/C

Not necessary to file inclosures.

Adjutant General's Central File Copy

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3 of 3.

HEADQUARTERS
4TH FIGHTER GROUP
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

FOT 22 September 1949

SUBJECT: Reduction of Air Show Participation.

THRU: Channels

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

3737 Quiet Dem.

1. It is urgently requested that this group be relieved from further participation in air shows until such time as the numerous difficulties presently being encountered are remedied.

2. Due to the overexpenditure of funds allocated to Headquarters Ninth Air Force for Per Diem purposes, each airman and officer required to participate must do so at his own expense. At times when RON's are necessary to accomplish the mission, a financial burden is placed upon the personnel. When aircraft go out of commission, the pilot must remain until such time as arrangements can be made to return him to home base. His time away from home base is totally at his own expense without hope of reimbursement.

3. The majority of commitments this headquarters has received necessitated furnishing APU starter units from unit equipment utilizing only the means available to this organization. In each case a C-47 aircraft must be dispatched with a C-22 starter unit weighing 1250 pounds, or 2 C-116 units wieghing 1225 pounds each. This necessitates sending a minimum of two airmen to operate the unit, one airman to crew the C-47, and two pilots to fly the C-47. As no per diem is authorized, these personnel are strictly on their own for expenses, which in most cases cannot be afforded or should not be directed.

4. Due to the fact that the F-86 is a relatively new aircraft, the experience level of maintenance personnel as well as pilots is not at its peak. This, together with the difficulties normally expected with new equipment cause aircraft to go out of commission while away from the home base. In such cases, maintenance personnel must be flown in to repair the aircraft, a starter unit must be flown in, necessary spare parts

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must be furnished, and finally a pilot must be flown in to ferry the plane home. Delays extending from one week to one month result, and all must be accomplished with personnel and equipment from the group without per diem. In as much as the F-86 aircraft is in use by only two Fighter Groups, widely spread geographically, little aid is received from AMA depots when maintenance is necessary. This results in directing the efforts of this group toward accomplishing missions which would normally be accomplished by a depot.

5. Occassions frequently arise when planes and equipment are sent out on a Friday and do not return until Monday, thus adversly affecting the training program so necessary to accomplish the primary mission of the group.

6. The absence of per diem authorization is causing a serious morale problem among the pilots and airmen in the group. The operational efficiency will reflect the decrease in morale. Further, the absence of men and equipment from the group as a result of aircraft having to be left at outlying fields out of commission will seriously effect the operational efforts of the group in the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

7. In view of above it is recommended:

a. That this group be relieved of participation in airshows until such time as these difficulties are overcome.

b. That at least 1 C-22 starter unit be placed at all fields which could support F-86 operation.

c. That the use of a C-82 or other suitable type aircraft with crew be made available to this organization for transporting engines and other equipment and personnel which may be required to place aircraft in commission which have gone out of commission while operating away from the home station.

d. That when future commitments are deligated to this organization:

(1) Only those be accomplished at or from bases where the C-22 starter unit is available for staging.

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FCT

Subject, Reduction of Air Show Participation, Hq 4th Ftr Group, LAFB, Va. 22 Sep 49

(2) The agency requesting the participation will meet all normal living expenses incurred by the participating personnel.

(3) A suitable staging area with all necessary facilities such as JP-1 fuel, starter units, etc., be available within a 100 mile radius from the location at which the air show will be conducted. Experience has shown that 100 miles is the maximum safe distance that should be flown to participate in order to fly three speed run passes and return with the desired safety margin of fuel remaining. With additional F-86 experience in cruise control, and at such time as external fuel tanks may be used with safety this maximum distance of 100 miles may be extended.

ALBERT L. EVANS, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

OF 360 1st End

Headquarters 4th Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Va. 29 SEP 1949

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley AFB, Va.

1. Concur with recommendations contained in basic letter with the exception of paragraph 7.e. This mission can be accomplished with currently assigned C-47 aircraft.

2. Conditions beyond the control of this command have reduced the immission status of the F-80's to approximately 50%. Remedial action, although expedited, will take approximately 45 days.

3. The problem of per diem for personnel participating in air demonstrations, as well as other matters of an official nature, has been critical for

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FOR 22 Sep 48
Subj: Reduction of Air Show Participation, Hq 4th Fwr Op, LAFB, Va.

the past few months. It is requested that this headquarters not be directed to order personnel out on official business when, for any reason, perdiem will not be payable unless quarters and rations are otherwise available.

NELA A. HANCOS
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

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ConAC Form Hq-AG 5
28 March 1949

O&T/RV McH/eem
21 Oct 49

Reduction of Air Show Participation

O&T 373.6 (22 Sep 49) 2nd Ind

HQ, CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

1. Through administrative error, this correspondence was routed direct to this headquarters instead of through your headquarters.

2. Prior to the receipt of basic communication, this headquarters had initiated action to Headquarters, USAF regarding relief of 4th Ftr Gp from participation in aerial demonstrations requiring the use of P-80 type aircraft.

3. Your attention is invited to inclosure #1.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

BRUCE H. DENNIS
Col, AGD
Adjutant General

1 Incl:
cy ltr, ConAC, 4 Oct 49
with 1st Ind, Hq, USAF,
17 Oct 49

Adjutant General's Central File Copy

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE
HAMILTON, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:
I 373.5

28 SEP 1949

SUBJECT: Lack of Coordination within the USAF while participating in a Civic Event with an Aerial Demonstration at Concord, California, 14 August 1949.

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. The inclosed chronological record with reference to a request for participation in the Third Annual Celebration of Buchanan Field at Concord, California, is self explanatory and is being submitted for whatever action your Headquarters considers appropriate. Instructions to implement the information contained in the letter to Honorable George F. Miller from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force were never received by this Command.

2. The lack of coordination in this instance caused considerable confusion, as well as hurried last minute action in order to prevent what might have resulted in embarrassment to the Air Force.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

W. L. FUL
Colonel
Adjutant

1 Incl:
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FOR DIRECTORATE USF

Prepared by: Maj J. McDuffee

Coordinated with:

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I 373.3 28 September 1949
Subject: Lack of Coordination within the USAF while participating in a Civic Event with an Aerial Demonstration at Concord, California, 14 August 1949, Hq Fourth AF, Hamilton, Calif.

COMM 373.5 (28 Sept 49) 1st Ind COM/CM, ljk

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York 25 OCT 1949

TO: Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. Investigation of the handling of the message involved in subject correspondence, reveals that the message was received by the Continental Air Command Communication Center and was not delivered.

2. Records used in handling messages were the standard War Department relay log which did not contain sufficient space for pertinent information concerning the handling of messages. Therefore, the individual who received this message can not be identified.

3. Corrective action has been taken by this headquarters which should prevent any recurrence of such an instance.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl.
w/d

2

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE
HAMILTON, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:

18 August 1949

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF INCIDENTS RELATIVE TO A REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION BY THE FOURTH AIR FORCE IN THE THIRD ANNUAL CELEBRATION OF BUCHANAN FIELD AT CONCORD, CALIFORNIA, ON 14 AUGUST 1949.

8 July 1949
Friday

The Commanding Officer, Hamilton Air Force Base, received a letter from Mr. Noble Newsom Jr., Buchanan Field, Concord, California, requesting Air Force participation in ceremonies to be held at Buchanan Field, 14 August 1949. (Incl #1).

18 July 1949
Monday

The Public Information Officer, Fourth Air Force, wrote to Mr. Newsom advising him that the Fourth Air Force would be unable to participate due to prior civic and military commitments. (Incl #2).

NOTE: The 78th Fighter Group was engaged in the training of Reservists on the date of the coming celebration. The 2346th AFRTC had been previously committed for a fly-by at Chico, California, for that same day.

9 Aug. 1949

A telephone call from Mr. Newsom was received by the Asst. Public Information Officer, Fourth Air Force, who explained to Mr. Newsom that a fly-by of jet aircraft would interfere with the training program of the Reservists. Mr. Newsom replied that any Air Force participation would be deeply appreciated. The Asst Public Information Officer said that it might be possible to have conventional aircraft (C-46s) perform a fly-by. Arrangements were then made with the Deputy of Operations, Flight Operation Services, Hq. Fourth Air Force, for a fly-by of C-46 type aircraft of the 2346th AFRTC, Hamilton AF Base, at 1200 hours on the 14th of August. These aircraft were also performing a fly-by at Chico, California, at 1100 hours on that date and would thus accomplish two missions in one.

[illegible] Aug. 1949

Orders were sent to the 2346th AFRTC by the Deputy of Operations, Fourth Air Force, to perform the above fly-by.

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Buchanan Field, Concord, Calif. 14 Aug 49
18 August 1949

13 Aug. 1949 — At 2000 hours, the Director of Operations, 78th Fighter Wing, Hamilton AFB, called the Asst. Public Information Officer, Fourth Air Force, and informed him that a Mr. Newsom, Buchanan Field, called and informed him that they were in receipt of a letter from The Secretary of the Air Force Office, which stated that arrangements had been made for a fly-by of two flights of F-84 aircraft on 14 August 1949 at Buchanan Field; and that the details would be worked out with Mr. Newsom. The Asst. PIO checked with Hq. 4th Air Force Duty Officer, but no confirmation of the letter from the Office of the Secretary of Air Force had been received. The Hq. Duty Officer was alerted to inform the Asst PIO immediately upon receipt of confirmation of this fly-by.

14 Aug. 1949 — At 1000 hours, the Executive Officer, 78th Fighter Group, called the Asst. PIO and notified him that permission had not yet been received to perform the fly-by at Concord, California; he further stated that unless they were instructed to fly the mission immediately there would be insufficient time to prepare the pilots and to make all the necessary arrangements to carry it out. He asked the Asst. PIO to call Mr. Newsom and inform him so. At 1200 hours, the Asst PIO again checked Hq. Fourth Air Force and the permission had not been received.

At 1300 hours, the Asst. PIO placed a call to Mr. Newsom and was informed that U.S. Representative Miller, California, had contacted Mr. Symington relative to this fly-by, and that the Secretary of the Air Force Office had written Representative Miller a letter in which it was stated that two flights of F-84s would perform the mission. This letter was dated 8 August 1949. The Asst PIO asked to talk to Mrs. Iona M. Booth, Contra Costa County Development Association, who had possession of the above-mentioned letter. She substantiated Mr. Newsom's statements. (Incls 3 and 4).

Mr. Newsom was further informed that it would be almost an impossibility to arrange for a jet fly-by on such short notice, in that other than instructors, only Reserve pilots were flying jet aircraft on that date. Mr. Newsom replied that upon receipt of the letter from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, they had publicized the fact that jet aircraft would fly over; and that they now had a crowd of approximately 5,000 persons waiting to see the jets perform. The Asst PIO told Mr. Newsom that he would do everything he possibly could to have jet aircraft fly-by over Buchanan Field.

At approximately 1400 hours the Fourth Air Force Public Information Officer, prior to that time having been informed

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Buchanan Field, Concord, Calif. 14 August 1949
14 August 1949

of the situation by the Asst PIO, instructed the Asst PIO to contact the 78th Fighter Group and have them perform a fly-by over Buchanan Field with whatever aircraft they would have available. The Executive Officer, 78th Fighter Group, upon receiving this order, stated that they had 3 aircraft in the air which could perform the mission. However, they were Reservists in training and as such, were restricted as to type of show which they could perform.

SUMMARY

The following fly-bys were performed over Buchanan Field, Concord, California, on 14 August 1949:

1200 hours -- 6 C-46 type aircraft from 2346th AFRTC at Hamilton Air Force Base.

1500 hours -- 3 F-84 type aircraft from 83rd Fighter Squadron, 78th Fighter Group, from Hamilton Air Force Base, flown by Reservists of the 52nd Fighter Squadron, a corollary unit.

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Hq ConAC
Info to: SAC and all numbered ConAC Air Forces Priority except the 1st AF

The following message has been received by this Hq from Hq USAF:
"From AFOOP-C 24464 the USAF will participate in an aerial review for the Presidential Inaugural Parade January 20 1949, Washington DC. Your command is charged with the responsibility of conducting the Air Force participation in this event. Commands will contribute to the Air Force effort as follows: CG CAC, one group F-80 aircraft; all C-82 aircraft available up to 36 aircraft; CG SAC, Two groups B-29 aircraft, 6 B-36 aircraft, one group F-82 aircraft. You are authorized direct communication with commands concerned for purposes of arranging demonstration. A senior officer will be appointed as project officer and will be placed on TDY Hq USAF 3 January 1949 and as required until completion of event. This officer will report to Room 4D138, The Pentagon Washington DC." Commanding General First Air Force has been charged with the responsibility to conduct this review and for the assignment of the above mentioned project officer. Commanding General First Air Force will establish requirement for specific units at a later date. Direct communications with other major commands has been authorized First Air Force.

3Jan48

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373.5 Aerial Reviews 314.7

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

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19-0119

FILE:

SUBJECT: Briefing of USAF Participation in Aerial Review for Presidential Inauguration

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
1	19Jan	DO	CG	

1. Mission:

Plan and direct the USAF participation in the aerial review for the Presidential Inauguration on 20 January 1949.

2. Responsibilities:

a. Hq USAF gave the responsibility for this mission to ConAC by message (AFOOP-C-24464) on 30 December 1948. This responsibility was further delegated to the Commanding General, First Air Force. Lt. Col. Dean Davenport was appointed First Air Force Project Officer, and as such reported to Hq USAF on 3 January 1949.

b. ConAC responsibility is only for USAF units and does not include responsibility for participation by US Navy and Air National Guard Units. Hq USAF retains the responsibility for coordination of the three (3) aerial elements participating.

3. Planning:

Much of the planning for the aerial review had been accomplished by personnel in Hq USAF at the time Colonel Davenport reported for duty. Initial planning by Hq USAF included selection of units and aircraft to participate, staging areas, coordination with CAA, establishment of necessary communication facilities, and notification of other major commands of their responsibilities insofar as furnishing units is concerned. Colonel Davenport continued this planning, and in addition, completed all details regarding routes, timing, rescue facilities, order of aerial review, weather, and emergency procedures. In addition to the plans for the aerial review, it was necessary to transport 400 air cadets from Randolph and 208 airmen from Lockbourne, Ohio, to Washington and return. This transportation was arranged through the facilities of the Troop Carrier Units assigned to the Ninth Air Force. As a result of this planning, Operations Order #2-49 was compiled and is attached hereto as Inclosure #1.

1.

This is in reply to correspondence bearing AG Register No. _____ which was suspended to (date) _____

ConAC FORM HQ-AG 1
10 December 1942

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FILE:

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

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SUBJECT: Briefing of USAF Participation in Aerial Review for Presidential Inauguration.

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.

4. USAF Units Participating and Type Aircraft

Unit	Type A/C	Staging Area
7th Bomb Group	6 - B-36's	Home Station
307th Bomb Group	27 - B-29's	" "
93rd Bomb Group	27 - B-29's	" "
314th Trp Cr Gp	24 - C-82's	Andrews AFB
27th Ftr Gp	48 - F-82's	Langley AFB
4th Ftr Gp	48 - F-80's	Andrews AFB
56th Ftr Gp	48 - F-80's	Andrews AFB
9th Air Force	1 - Helicopter	Bolling AFB

5. Order of Review, Time, and Routes:

Order of the review will be a column of groups at one (1) minute intervals down Pennsylvania Avenue from SE to NW as follows: B-36's, B-29's, C-82's, F-82's and F-80's. The minimum altitude is 1,500 feet. Upon completion of the review, the B-36 and B-29 aircraft will head directly out for their home station. The C-82's will hold approximately fifteen (15) miles north of Washington until the F-80's have completed their review and landed at Andrews AFB, and then the C-82's will be cleared into Andrews for landing. The F-82's will land at Langley after passing in review. There will be a time interval of twenty (20) minutes between the Air Force, Navy, and Air National Guard. The lead group is scheduled to start up Pennsylvania Avenue at 1315 followed by the remainder of the Air Force Group.

6. Control:

Control of all aircraft will be by VHF radio. Colonel Schilling, Hq USAF, has been designated as the Controller, and as such, has complete control of the review as the aircraft leave the initial point.

7. Weather:

Weather minimums set up are that the review will be conducted if the ceiling is not less than 2,500 feet and visibility not less than three (3) miles. Authority for making the decision as to whether the review will be conducted or not

ConAC FORM NO-AG 1
10 December 1948

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CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
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SUBJECT: Briefing of USAF Participation in Aerial Review for Presidential Inauguration

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1	19 Jan	DO	CG

Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.

is vested in the Controller, Colonel Schilling. Colonel Melville, Hq First Air Force, and Colonel Davenport conducted a briefing at Washington on 12 and 13 January 1949 for all USAF Group Leaders. The plan was discussed thoroughly with them, minor changes made, and all Group Leaders agreed that the mission as now established in the Operations Order was clear, logical, and could be carried out as planned. Group Leaders were afforded an opportunity to fly routes, check timing, and generally familiarize themselves with route on 14 January.

8. Officers from the Office of the Deputy for Operations, this headquarters, have been in daily contact with Colonels Davenport and Schilling concerning the progress of these plans. In addition, we have sent out necessary messages to other major commands and when necessary, sent out orders as requested by either Colonel Schilling or Colonel Davenport. Colonel Melville DO, First Air Force, was directed to report to this headquarters on 14 January to brief interested personnel on this mission and after a briefing and review of the Operations Order, it appears that all plans have been completed and are satisfactory. This is also borne out by the fact that Colonel Melville briefed Generals Pilcher and Anderson in Hq USAF and they indicated that plans were satisfactory. General Anderson was to brief General Vandenberg on 14 January on the plan.

9. Alternate Plan:

An alternate plan has been prepared which will be placed in effect by Colonel Schilling in event that weather conditions present a ragged ceiling or scattered rain storms at the time of review. In general, the only alteration of this plan would require from the original plan is a slightly different formation by the Bombardment Groups. The Troop Carrier and Fighter Units would not be affected in event Plan "B" is necessary.

2 Incls:
1. Ops Order #2-49
2. Route Map

J. E. SMART, Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations
Ext 1220

ConAC FORM NO-46 1
10 December 1948

3.

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LTS
1. 29 Sept C&T to DO

USAF has directed that this command provide 1 F-84 with rockets and bombs for static display at Scott AFB. The longest runway at Scott AFB is 5400 feet, and therefore, operation from Scott AFB by F-84 aircraft is against the policy established by Gen. Whitehead that F-84s will not be operated from runways of 5500 feet or less. USAF was advised of Gen. Whitehead's policy and they stated that due to the importance of the demonstration a substitution of aircraft could not be made.

s/t/ DOLF E. MUEHLSIEN
Colonel, USAF
Director, Ops. & Trng.

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28 Sept 49

CG Continental Air Command — Unclassified

CG First AF

Routine

CG Tenth AF Benj Harrison AFB
Fort Benj Harrison Indiana
Hqs USAF Wash DC - Dir Plans and Operations — Multiple Address

2635A . Hqs USAF has directed participation in the following aerial demonstrations: a. Scott AFB, Mo., 15 Oct 49. b. Two F-84s. c. Static display. d. Edward B Meisener, President, St Louis Post American Ordinance Association, 8000 N. Broadway, St. Louis, Mo. e. Your Hq auth to obligate necessary M&O F442 funds to cover all travel expenses in connection with this program. These funds must be absorbed within the annual program to be given your Hq under M&O F442. f. One F-84 is to be fully loaded with rockets and bombs for static display. Contact Mr. Meisener ASAP for details and final instructions. Direct communication auth between First AF and Tenth AF. Runway at Scott AFB 5400 ft. Extreme caution must be exercised. No landing or take-off with bombs and rockets will be made at Scott. Request confirmation not later than 5 Oct.

CG ConAC

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

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APPENDIX

(Section V)

V

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DA 381

25 January 1949

SUBJECT: Planning for Emergencies

TO : Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, 90 Church Street, New York New York

1. Reference your letter of 12 January 1949, above subject, it is agreed that there should be a specifically designated representative or agency of the Army and the Air Force on joint local defense and emergency planning for the eastern seaboard area.

2. As you know, we have recently organized the Continental Air Command, with the Air Defense Command as a subsidiary thereof charged with all matters of air defense. Presently we are in a transition period of transferring air defense responsibilities from our numbered Air Forces to this newly formed Air Defense Command. The progress is a little slow, however, because the Air Defense Command does not yet have sufficient personnel who are oriented and geographically located to assume these responsibilities. We hope to have this transition completed by about 1 March 1949, at which time the Air Defense Command will have a specifically designated eastern joint planning agency.

3. Your attention is invited to a meeting held at Mitchel Air Force Base on 14 December 1948 between members of your command, Atlantic Fleet, Eastern Area of the Coast Guard, First Army, Second Army, and Air Defense Command on the matter of joint defense planning with specific emphasis on the collateral aspects of air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and utilization of antiaircraft artillery. Your senior representative was Captain A. G. Quynn. It was agreed at this meeting to hold another similar meeting as soon as the Air Defense Command was better established and as soon as an official position is established on joint doctrine procedures of air defense. A joint board is working on this matter at present, and it is hoped that its work will be completed shortly.

4. I believe that we will therefore be in a position shortly to establish joint defense planning groups on a firm basis in all local areas with USAF representation being vested in appropriate echelons of the Air Defense Command. I agree that this is necessary and desirable, and will keep you informed of progress made in matters pertinent to this subject as discussed above.

t/ GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Fort Slocum, New York

DO 381

29 April 1949

SUBJECT: Initial Tactical Operations in Air Defense.

TO : Commanding General, 67th Wing, Massachusetts National Guard, Commonwealth Armory, Boston 15, Mass.

* * * * *

2. The current concept of air defense involves the conduct of air defense operations on a national, rather than a local scale. Accordingly, numbered Air Force commanders of the Continental Air Command were relieved of air defense responsibilities on 1 March 1949. Those responsibilities were placed under the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, on that date. The Eastern and Western Air Defense Liaison Groups of the Air Defense Command are responsible for the conduct of joint planning and operations involving air defense. (Those Groups are cadres for the Eastern and Western Air Defense Commands, and will be absorbed by those commands when the latter are activated on 1 December 1949.) Operational control of all forces allocated to the air defense of the United States will be exercised by the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, and his subordinate commanders on M-day.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ R. J. ERICKSON
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

P&O 353

9 November 1949

SUBJECT: Operational Control in the Conduct of Air Defense and Air Defense Systems Training

TO : Commanding General, EADF, WADF, 1st, 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 14th AFs

1. In view of the increased emphasis being placed on the air defense responsibilities of the United States Air Force, it is considered appropriate to clarify the organization which exists within the Continental Air Command for the conduct of the air defense of the United States.

2. Two Air Defense Forces, the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces, have been organized to conduct the air defense of the United States and the air defense systems training required to discharge this task. The Eastern Air Defense Force will be responsible for the area east of 100° west longitude and the Western Air Defense Force will be responsible for that part of the United States west of that line.

3. It is essential that there be air defense systems in being for immediate utilization on the first indication of hostile attack. The development of the systems and the integration of available fighter units and AC&W units into the systems are responsibilities of the commanding generals of the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces. As soon as these systems can be utilized, aircraft will be placed on an alert status in conformance with paragraph 4d, ConAC SOP No1. Experience in the use of the various air defense systems can then be gained through the utilization of these aircraft in "scramble" training.

4. In order for the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces to conduct the air defense systems training required to reach the desired stage of preparedness, it is considered necessary to allocate certain Regular Air Force fighter units and AC&W units to the continuous operational control of the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces. Responsibility for the individual and unit training of these units, as distinguished from "systems" training, will remain with the Continental Air Command air forces to which these units are assigned. However, the

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P&O 353 Operational Control in the Conduct of Air Defense and Air Defense Systems Training

Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces may recommend direct to the parent Continental Air Command air force any suggestions for improvements in unit or individual training or other matters which they deem necessary to improve the overall air defense picture.

5. Command of the Regular Air Force units will remain with the Commanding General of the Continental Air Command air force to which the units are assigned. This separation of command relationship from operational control and the resultant division of authority and interest must not cause any loss in efficiency. Close coordination between the Air Defense Forces and the respective Continental Air Command Air Forces as well as the sincere cooperation of all commanders is essential to the establishment of an effective air defense for the United States.

t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

EADF 381 21 October 1949

SUBJECT: ConAC Fighter Forces Committed to Eastern Air Defense Force for Emergency Air Defense Operations

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. The rapidity with which air defense combatant forces can be brought into action at a progressive rate, from H-hour to at least H-hour plus three, will have extraordinary influence upon the ability of an air defense system to function effectively, and upon the outcome of the initial conflict. An Air Defense Force Commander must have continuous operational control over such elements as can be committed exclusively to air defense operations beginning H-hour. The minimum force that will be available for the first operations in air defense must be committed now. Regular Air Force minimum commitments should be established by ConAC. Air National Guard commitments should be established by agreement between the Air Defense Force Headquarters (in coordination with the numbered Air Force concerned) and State military authorities. Eastern and Western Air Defense Force Commanders should exercise continuous operational control over the above forces at their discretion.

2. Submitted herewith is a proposed ConAC SOP designed to achieve the operational considerations outlined above for Regular US AF fighter units. It is realized that in the event of any emergency resulting from enemy attack all forces capable of air defense functions would be made available, at least initially, to the Air Defense Commander. This consideration does not, however, insure the immediate readiness of a specific force capable of air defense operations. Anything less than a committed "ready" force must of necessity include a time interval to achieve combat readiness and will not permit immediate employment of air defense forces.

3. It is believed that continuing first-priority commitment of certain interceptor forces from the total effort available is both logical and mandatory if adequate and practical air defense

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ConAC Fighter Forces Committed to Eastern Air Defense Force for Emergency Air Defense Operations.

in being is to be acheived. The provision of a "ready" counter-strike force, and the determination of its strength, must of course be made with due consideration given to other priorities, commitments and requirements affecting the units concerned. The commitment of a ready strike force should, to justify the effort which will be demanded on the part of all concerned, be as substantial as other requirements, commitments, and demands will permit.

4. The attached sample SOP and commitment outline form is submitted only as an example of one of the means by which such forces could be committed. No attempt has been made to determine relative strengths to be allocated or to establish force requirements. This form, or one of similar nature, could be re-issued by ConAC at periodic intervals so that committed forces could be synchronized with requirements other than air defense.

5. At present, in some instances and under certain circumstances, it is not possible for all component parts of the air defense system to acheive a readiness status and capability consistent with that being requested as a commitment for fighter forces. This circumstance results in part from the shortage of trained personnel in AC&W units. The achievement of 24-hour complete readiness for all components of the system is now EADF's prime objective but the attainment of this objective will require time. Realizing that maintenance of H-hour readiness for fighters is not logical when circumstances force a lesser capability on supporting system components, it is planned to release fighters from any readiness commitment that is not consistent with the readiness capability of supporting components. For the present this would mean that the fighters would normally be released from H-hour readiness during periods other than duty hours except in special circumstances, but would still be required to meet the next higher readiness conditions. Forces allocated under such a system as this would be released from any state or degree of readiness by Hq EADF at any time other essential elements of its air defense system are incapable of operation under a corresponding state or degree of readiness.

6. It is requested that this matter of allocating a guaranteed minimum interceptor force for emergency air defense be given early consideration.

1 Incl:
Sample SOP No. 2

t/ ROBERT M. WEBSTER
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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ConAC Fighter Forces Committed to Eastern Air Defense Force for Emergency Air Defense Operations

DO 381 Air Defense (21 Oct 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 5 Dec 1949

TO: Commanding General, Eastern Air Defense Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Recognition by this Headquarters of the conditions described in basic letter led to the issuance of ConAC General Order 122, 10 November 1949. Under the provisions of this order and ConAC Regulation 25-1 you may define and prescribe any conditions of readiness which you consider advisable and necessary and may commit to actual air defense operations or systems training, any size interceptor-fighter force you desire, from within that available.

2. Recognizing the workload resulting from the current operations of the ConAC Air Forces, particularly the First, Ninth and Tenth Air Forces, it is necessary to limit, during the current period, the size of the interceptor-fighter force to be employed continuously by your Headquarters. Therefore, until amended by this Headquarters, you may employ (effective 12 December 1949), the following maximum commitment continuously: the total availability of one fighter squadron per day from the 4th, 33rd, and 56th Fighter Wings, plus four aircraft and crews per day from the 52nd Fighter Wing.

3. If at any time you are in a position to employ effectively on a continuous systems training basis, a larger interceptor-fighter force than that herein made available, you will so advise this Headquarters. You will, of course, release from Air Defense commitments any fighters which you do not require.

4. It is desired that you keep this Headquarters informed of your operations by including it on the distribution of all EADF SOP's, operating instructions, et cetera.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl:
w/d

t/ HERBERT B. THATCHER
Brig. General, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PO&R 381 29 December 1949

SUBJECT: Continental Air Command Fighter Forces Committed to the Western Air Defense Force for Emergency Air Defense Operations

TO : Commanding General, Wester Air Defense Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. The rapidity with which air defense combatant forces can be brought into action at a progressive rate commencing at H-hour will have extraordinary influence upon the ability of an air defense system to function effectively. Recognition of this fact lead to the issuance of Continental Air Command General Orders No. 122, 10 November 1949. Under the provisions of this order and Continental Air Command Regulation 25-2, you may define and prescribe any conditions of readiness which you consider advisable and necessary and may commit to actual air defense operations or systems training any size interceptor-fighter force you desire, from within that available.

2. In consideration of the workload resulting from the current operations of the Continental Air Command Air Forces, it is necessary to limit, during the current period, the size of the interceptor-fighter force to be employed continuously by your headquarters. Therefore, until amended by this headquarters, you may employ (effective 29 December 1949) the following maximum commitment continuously: The total availability of one (1) fighter squadron per day each from the 78th and 81st Fighter Wings, plus six (6) aircraft and crews per day from the 325th Fighter Wing.

3. If at any time you are in a position to employ effectively on a continuous systems training basis, a larger interceptor-fighter force that that herein made available, you will so advise this headquarters. You will, of course, release from air defense commitments any fighters which you do not require or which cannot be utilized due to a lesser capability of the supporting components within the air defense system.

4. It is desired that you keep this headquarters informed of your operations by including it on the distribution of all Western Air Defense Force Standing Operations Procedures as well as operating instructions.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

Info cy to:
CG, Fourth Air Force
CG, Twelfth Air Force

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

29 December 1949

PO&R

SUBJECT: Commitment of Interceptor-Fighter Forces to Western Air Defense Force

TO : Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California
(Same ltr to Twelfth AF)

1. ConAC General Orders No. 122, 10 November 1949, allocates the 78th, 81st and 325th Fighter Wings to the Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force for continuous operational control for the conduct of actual air defense and air defense systems training within his area of responsibility. Under the provisions of this order and ConAC Regulation 25-2, the Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force may define and prescribe the conditions of readiness which he considers advisable and may commit to actual air defense operations or systems training any size interceptor-fighter force he may desire, from within that available.

2. The workload imposed upon the ConAC air forces as a result of current operations and the state of unit and individual training is severe. It is therefore necessary, during the current period, to limit the size of the interceptor-fighter force which may be continuously employed by the Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force. Effective 29 December 1949, it is desired that one fighter squadron from each of the 78th and 81st Fighter Wings, plus six aircraft and crews of the 325th Fighter Wing be made available continuously to the Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force. The limitation outlined above will remain in effect as a maximum fighter force commitment to the Western Air Defense Force until amended by this headquarters. The rotation of squadrons to meet this commitment is encouraged.

3. The aircraft and crews made available to the Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force will be operated as he may direct in the air defense of his area and in the systems training for that defense. The Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force will prescribe and define the stages of readiness to be maintained by this fighter force and may commit from within this force any number of fighters under the various stages of readiness which he may prescribe.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

Info cy to:
CG, WADF

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t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DO 381 Air Defense 1 December 1949

SUBJECT: Commitments of Interceptor-Fighter Forces to EADF

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base New York
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base Virginia
Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base, Indiana

1. It is desired that effective 12 December 1949, one fighter squadron of the 4th, 33rd, and 56th Fighter Wings, plus four aircraft and crews of the 52nd Fighter Wing, be made available continuously to the Commanding General, Eastern Air Defense Force, to be operated as he directs in the air defense of the Eastern United States and in the systems training for that defense. The rotation of squadrons to meet this commitment, of course, is to be encouraged.

2. This limitation is imposed due to the workload incident to the mission of your Air Force and will remain in effect as a maximum fighter force commitment to Eastern Air Defense Force until amended by this Headquarters.

3. The Commanding General, Eastern Air Defense Force, will prescribe and define the stages of readiness to be maintained by this fighter force and may commit from within this force any number of fighters under the various stages of readiness which he prescribes.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

Info cy furnished:
CG, EADF

t/ HERBERT B. THATCHER
Brig. General, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

OT 353

1 March 1949

SUBJECT: Aircraft Control and Warning Seminar

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida

1. In accordance with classified letter, this headquarters, subject: Aircraft Control and Warning Training Activities in the Continental Air Command, 19 January 1949, a panel of officers convened at Mitchel Air Force Base, 31 January 1949 through 10 February 1949, under the supervision of the Director of Operations and Training, for the purpose of preparing detailed training standards, standing operating procedures, training schedules, course outlines and curricula for each MOS and team utilized by all type aircraft control and warning organizations. Due to the limitation of time and the lack of reference material, it was possible only to prepare training standards for the individual MOS's listed in paragraph 3 of Inclosure 1.

2. In order to accomplish the original objectives, it was recommended that a seminar of qualified officers be convened at Orlando Air Force Base on 10 March 1949 for a period of thirty (30) days. This recommendation has been approved. Therefore, it is requested that necessary arrangements be made to provide suitable office space and clerical assistance for this seminar of fifteen (15) officers.

3. Instructions have been issued to appropriate Air Force commanders directing that orders be published placing certain of their personnel on thirty (30) days TDY with Headquarters, Continental Air Command, with TDY station at Orlando Air Force Base to act as members of the aforementioned seminar. Accordingly, it is desired that orders be issued placing the following named officers of your command on TDY as described above:

Colonel MILLER, Cleo	(Hq, 14th Air Force)
Lt. Col. KONKEL, Ardie A.	(Hq, 14th Air Force)
Lt. Col. COOK, Carl L. Jr.	(539th AC & W Gp)
Captain HOSSLER, John	(502d Tac Con Gp)

4. Colonel Cleo Miller is appointed seminar chairman and during the period of TDY will operate under the supervision of the Director of Operations, and Training, this headquarters. Seminar members of other organizations have been instructed to report to Colonel Miller not later than 9 March 1949 for further information and detailed instructions.

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Aircraft Control and Warning Seminar.

5. It is requested that this letter and inclosures hereto be forwarded to Colonel Miller for his information and guidance.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

st/ CHARLES N. STEWART
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

2 Incls:
Incl 1-Report of Board of O.
AC & W Trng Stand.
Incl 2-IRS to Col Miller,
re: AC&W Seminar

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1 March 1949

SUBJECT: Aircraft Control and Warning Training Panel

TO : Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

IDENTICAL LETTER SENT TO 1ST, 4TH, 10TH, 12TH AND 14TH AFS

1. A seminar will be convened at Orlando Air Force Base on 10 March 1949. The mission of the seminar is to write detailed training directives, schedules, course outlines and curricula for each MOS and team utilized in all types Aircraft Control and Warning organizations. In addition, the seminar will write Standard Operating Procedures to be used in all Aircraft Control and Warning organizations of this command for the types of installations and equipments listed below. These Standard Operating Procedures will include: Radar Reporting, Air Rescue, Movement and Identification, and Weather Reporting Procedures.

a. The types of installations are:

Air Defense Control Center
Tactical Air Control Center
Air Defense Direction Center
Tactical Air Direction Center
Early Warning Stations
Forward Direction Stations
Tactical Air Direction Posts
Tactical Air Control Party

b. The types of equipments are:

AN/TTC-1
AN/CPS-1
AN/CPS-5
AN/TPS-1B
AN/CPS-4
AN/TPS-10
AN/MPQ-2

2. In furtherance of the above, it is desired that necessary orders be published placing one (1) representative of your command on TDY with Headquarters, Continental Air Command with duty station at Orlando Air Force Base for a period of thirty (30) days beginning on or about 9 March 1949.

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Aircraft Control and Warning Training Panel.

3. Representative will be diredted to report to Colonel Cleo Miller, seminar chairman, not later than 9 March 1949 for further information and instructions.

4. In the interests of accomplishing the objectives outlined in paragraph 1, above, representative should take with him copies of any pertinent publications that may be of assistance.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

s/ CHARLES N. STEWART
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

7 13 May Col CS O&T
Miller

1. Forwarded herewith for your approval and publication are copies of proposed ConAC Training Standard for Aircraft Control and Warning Units in Air Defense, (T/O&E 1-600, 24 July 1945)

2. The proposed training standard has been revised in accordance with instructions outlined above. Aircraft Control and Warning systems consist of various types of organizations made up of many different combinations of teams, detachments, and squadrons depending on the situation and mission to be performed. The various types of teams, detachments, and squadrons utilized in such a system have been included in the revised training standard. To eliminate considerable duplication, general information applicable to all the various teams, detachments and squadrons has been included in a general section of the proposed training standard.

3. The proposed training standard has been so written as to facilitate breakdown into separate training standards for the various teams, detachments, and squadrons, in the event it is desired. This breakdown would necessitate that the general information be included in each separate training standard and would therefore involve considerable duplication.

11 Incls:
Incl 1 - N/C
Incl 2 - 10 w/d
Incl 11 - added: Revised Trng Std AC&W Units in Air Defense (T/O&E 1-600 24 Jul 45)

/t/ CARROLL S. MILLER
Colonel, USAF
Chairman
ConAC Aircraft Control and Warning Planning Seminar

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
MITCHEL FIELD, NEW YORK

OT 353

27 JAN 1949

SUBJECT: Aircraft Control and Warning Training Center at Orlando Air Force Base

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida.

1. Confirming previous written and oral directives, it is directed that an Aircraft Control and Warning Training Center be established at Orlando Air Force Base on or about 16 February 1949.

2. The 539th AC&W Group, recently activated at Orlando in accordance with GO #114, Headquarters Air Defense Command, 17 November 1948, will constitute the administrative and training overhead for the Training Center. It is believed that sufficient personnel authorizations exist within the 539th Group to permit establishment and operation of the training herein contemplated.

3. The mission of this Training Center is:

a. Reception of trained technicians from the Training Centers and basics from other sources within the United States Air Force, and screening of such personnel and organization of appropriate teams in accordance with schedules issued by this headquarters.

b. The training of such teams to the highest degree of proficiency possible consistent with the requirements of the system as dictated by the rate installations are completed and become operational.

4. It is planned to deploy radar teams and control squadrons on a precise schedule geared to the expected production rate of equipment and to the rate of construction of the radar sites in the permanent Air Defense System. When a radar site is made operational, teams to man that installation must be made available despite the state of their training. This points out an immediate requirement that the Training Program be flexible in nature, capable of turning out either partially trained or fully trained teams as dictated by the development of the system.

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OT 353 Subj: Aerft Control & Warning Trng Center at Orlando AFB

5. It is contemplated that the bulk of the Aircraft Control and Warning units which will be required in the expanded Air Defense structure of the Continental Air Command will be those units required in Air Defense tactical operations. This task will involve ultimate processing and training of about 5,000 personnel according to present plans. The specific team structure and composition of the additional Aircraft Control and Warning Groups will be determined at the conference outlined later in this correspondence.

6. In the expansion of the Aircraft Control and Warning establishment, it is not contemplated that complete groups and squadrons will be formed at Orlando but rather that requisite complete teams for operation at any particular site will be formed and trained. Accordingly, the bulk of the training which must be given will be systems and team training.

7. This headquarters recently advised Headquarters, USAF of AC&W expected individual personnel requirements for the expanded Aircraft Control and Warning Program for the Continental United States. Subsequent conferences with Training Command representatives indicate that the Training Command will be capable of providing approximately 50% of our required specialists. Therefore, it now appears probable that some individual training of specialists, particularly in the basic radio and radar fields, must be undertaken at Orlando in conjunction with the team training activities.

8. In support of the above, this headquarters has taken the following action:

a. Arranged for the shipment to Orlando of the following controlled items of equipment:

(1) 1 ea. AN/CPS-6 (with associated IFF).

(2) 1 ea. AN/TTQ-1 plus additional plotting equipment.

(3) Miscellaneous radio equipment required in air-ground and some point to point communications.

b. Assigned a small cadre of officers and airmen technically trained in radar skills to the 539th AC&W Group.

9. Action will be continued by this headquarters to obtain additional personnel and equipment required for the Training Center.

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OT 353 Subj: ACrft Control & Warning Trng Center at Orlando AFB

10. It is requested that representatives of your headquarters attend a conference at this headquarters, 1000 hours, 31 January 1949. The purpose of the conference is to:

a. Brief representatives on the Air Defense System for the Continental United States.

b. Brief representatives in detail on the mission and concept of the Training Center.

11. Your representatives should be prepared:

a. To discuss a general plan for the conduct of the training which will be required to accomplish the broad objectives outlined herein.

b. To present a proposed equipment modification list for the 539th AC&W Group which will be required to undertake the training outlined above.

c. To discuss budgetary requirements.

12. It is believed the representatives of your headquarters named in your TWX 14AFOE-721 are qualified to discuss the above unless you desire additional representation.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

NEAL J. O'[illegible]
Colonel, [illegible]
Adjutant General

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27 JAN 1949

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OCP-353/36-B, 21 November 1949 7 Dec 1949
Subject: Training of AC&W Personnel

O&T 322 (21 Nov 49) 1st Ind Lt Col LKBranstetter/5142/mfn

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. Fifty-two (52) airmen were earmarked for assignment to the 505th AC&W Group upon deactivation of the Aircraft Control and Warning School at Orlando Air Force Base, Florida. Numbers of personnel by SSN are as follows: 014 three, 239 three, 274 one, 283 one, 510 and 514 ten, 521 three, 637 one, 648 two, 776 and 766 fourteen, 759 nine, 768 three, 951 one, and 953 one. The exact reporting date of the above personnel is unknown.

2. The accelerated Air Training Command program for training of AC&W SSN's is designed to eliminate USAF shortages in approximately twelve (12) months. An increasing number of graduates of these courses are becoming available for assignment. A peak flow of gaduates to the field should be reached about March 1950. These graduates will require both on-the-job and unit training before their full capabilities can be utilized in the AC&W organizations.

3. An Air Training Command Course status chart is inclosed for your information.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/t JAMES W. SMITH
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Added - 1 Incl
ATC Courses - Quantitative
Status as of 25 Oct 49

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
Interoffice Routing
Slip

SUBJECT: Staff Study, AC&W Training Center (cont'd)

7 Sep 49

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1. Reference the attached letters, the following comments are made:

a. The responsibility for further training of personnel assigned to AC&W activities will still remain with the operational AC&W organizations after Air Training Command starts to furnish trained personnel. The reason is that during the period when the AC&W organization is expanding, it will be necessary for the active AC&W organization to provide team training so that complete teams can be sent out to man the radar as they become available.

s/ F. H. ROGIER
Wg Comdr, RAF
Ext 5244

s/ E. F. HECTOR
Colonel, USAF
Asst Dep/Operations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

15 December 1948

SUBJECT: Rotation of Fighter Squadrons at Tyndall Air Force Base for Cooperative GCI Training Missions with the Controllers Course.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Hempstead, New York.

1. The Controllers course at the Air Tactical School, Tyndall Air Force Base is experiencing considerable difficulty in scheduling sufficient aircraft and pilots to conduct their necessary GCI training missions. This difficulty will be increased commencing with the next class, starting 10 January 1949, as this and subsequent classes will be increased from 20 to 30 students. To accommodate this increased student load, additional GCI synthetic trainers will be supplied, however the problem of scheduling actual flying missions will remain a requirement.

2. It is the opinion of this Headquarters that until such time as the Air Defense Command and the Tactical Air Command Aircraft and Warning organizations are fully operational much valuable training in operational procedures and techniques could be accomplished for both the Controllers Course and the Fighter Squadrons, if a program were developed whereby certain fighter squadrons could be rotated for short periods of temporary duty at Tyndall Air Force Base for the express purpose of cooperating in GCI training missions. Concurrently, such a program would also provide training for the units in squadron mobility and in operation away from their home bases.

3. It is therefore recommended that a representative of your Command contact the Air University to establish the above program.

4. Direct communication is authorized between your Command and the Commanding General, Air University for this project. It is desired that this Headquarters be advised of the action taken.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ C. Y. BAGSTAD
Lt Colonel, USAF
Executive, Operations Division

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Rotation of Fighter Squadrons at Tyndall Air Force Base for Cooperative GCI Training Missions with Controllers Course.

OT 353 (25 Feb 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 28 Feb 1949

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Coordination has been effected with Air University, Air Proving Ground, and Tyndall Air Force Base for aircraft support of the Air Controller Course.

2. Present plans provide for one (1) Jet Squadron to be located at Eglin auxiliary #2 which will provide sixteen (16) sorties per day in support of Controllers Class 49A through 1 April 1949.

3. It is contemplated that Aircraft Controller Classes for the remainder of this calendar year will be supported by two (2) Jet squadrons located at Tyndall Air Force Base or alternately at Eglin Auxiliary No. 2.

4. Every effort to meet the requirements of the Aircraft Controllers Course will be made within the capabilities of this command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ HAMES M. HACKETT
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

7 Jan 1949

OS 353

6 Jan '49
GSB/202

SUBJECT: Coordinating Interception and Allied Training

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Fort Slocum, New York

1. Recent Operational Readiness Tests which have been conducted of the 503rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group and the 52nd Fighter Wing, and staff visits by officers from this headquarters indicate the need for the initiation of an aggressive, coordinated training program.

2. It is accordingly desired that you take such action as is necessary to institute a program which will increase the operational proficiency of these units. This program will include daily interception problems utilizing airplanes of the 52nd Group and the Aircraft Control and Warning facilities of the 503rd with emphasis on night and actual instrument flying.

3. The practice area agreed upon at the conference held in the CAA building at La Guardia Field on 29 December 1948 may be utilized in furtherance of this program. The representative of your headquarters who attended this conference is familiar with the details thereof and was furnished with the geographical coordinates of the practice area. Further details concerning the use of this area will be furnished as soon as formal approval is received from CAA.

4. It is not intended that action initiated as a result of this directive will interfere with the accelerated training program of the 503rd AC&W Group during the period of 15 January-15 February 1949. On the contrary, it is expected that missions will be planned and scheduled to support those phases of that training program which require this support and will not disrupt other phases such as maintenance team training.

5. It is desired that information as to the action taken to implement this program be furnished this headquarters by indorsement hereon.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

s/ H. M. TURNER
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Vice Commander

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CS 353 (7 Jan 49) 1st Ind
Subject: Coordinating Interception and Allied Training 18 JAN 1949
HEADQUARTERS FIRST AIR FORCE, Fort Slocum, New York

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, New York

1. In accordance with instructions contained above the following course of action has been taken in the implementation of this program. A conference was held at Hq. 503rd AC&W Group on 14 Jan 1949. A representative of First Air Force, 503rd AC&W Group, and 52nd Fighter Wing (AW), were present. The program outlined above was discussed at this conference and steps necessary for the implementation of this program were formulated.

2. These steps are:

a. First Air Force has initiated a letter directive which will integrate the training of the 52nd Fighter Wing and the 503rd AC&W Group during the accelerated training period, copy of directive attached as inclosure #1.

b. Due to the scope of training to be conducted by the 503rd AC&W Group, no actual interception problems can be conducted until the final phase of this training period. The scope of training planned by the 503rd AC&W Group is at that level which will introduce the basic soldier to the radar scope and the fundamental principles of plotting and telling. Approximately 90% of the personnel to be trained as scope operators, plotters and tellers are basic soldiers, therefore the training must of necessity take the form of an orientation course. However, missions will be conducted to support the training of the 503rd AC&W Group by the following methods:

(1) 52nd Fighter Wing will perform its airborne radar interception and other training missions within an area mutually agreed upon by both units.

(2) Camp Kilmer and Twin Lights Training sites will request flights by the 52nd Fighter Wing at specific times and altitudes to coincide with instruction classes.

(3) The 52nd Fighter Group will perform the requested missions and will in turn notify the training sites of all flights not requested, which will be conducted within this area.

(4) Night flights will be requested and conducted during this period.

c. Actual instrument flights cannot be performed until formal approval by CAA of practice area, cited in paragraph 3 basic letter, is received.

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OS 353 (7 Jan 49)
Subj: Coordinating Interception and Allied Training

3. Immediately following the completion of this accelerated training period and as soon as the 503rd AC&W Group has completed its troop movements to permanent installations and is operational, daily ground control interception problems will be planned and scheduled with emphasis on night and actual instrument conditions. All Tactical Wings under jurisdiction of this headquarters will be required to participate in these coordinated training problems.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl.
Cy ltr to CO - 52 Ftr Wg
503 AC&W Gp

R. J. ERICKSON
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Fort Slocum, New York

26 August 1949

OT 353

SUBJECT: Training for Ground Control Intercept Facilities

THRU : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO : Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. A continuous requirement exists in the First Air Force for the training of control teams at the various radar sites under the Juriadiction of the 503d AC&W Group in ground control intercept. Some of these sites are located near flying units which are under your Juriadiction. Request authority for direct communication between Commanding Officers of First Air Force radar sites and Commanding Officers of flying units under your command, in order to furnish aircraft for training flights under GCI control.

2. If this request is favorably considered, the radar site commanders will contact tactical units, Air National Guard units and Reserve units and furnish them with available flying periods for the scheduling of missions. At this time the frequencies and call words to be used for the accomplishment of the specific GCI mission will also be furnished. This information will be furnished the flying unit commanders sufficiently in advance to allow proper scheduling and briefing of the airplaine crews and confirmation of the schedule to the GCI unit 24 hours in advance of the mission.

3. It is further requested that concurrently with favorable consideration of the program outlined in paragraph 2, Regular, Air National Guard and reserve flying units under your command be notified of the above requirement.

4. Training of both the flying unit and AC&W unit will be greatly enhanced through this type of coordination.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ Wm. T. Coleman
Lt. Col. AGD.
Asst Adj General

Info cy to CO, 503rd AC&W Gp

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Training for Ground Control Intercept Facilities
O&T 353 (26 Aug 1949) 1st Ind 8 Sept 1949

HEADQUARTERS, CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Approved.

2. Such coordinated training will definitely improve the operational efficiency of the units concerned, however, continuous supervision must be exercised at Air Force level to insure that the program is effectively carried out.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/s/ W. R. FURIUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Hq Continental Air Command

CG: First, Ninth, Fourteenth AF's Routine

4031. The First Air Force in order to carry out their mission as assigned by this headquarters must deploy squadrons and detachments of the 503 Aircraft Control and Warning Group in your areas of responsibility. It will be necessary that the First Air Force retain direct control of these units through their parent organization the 503 Aircraft Control and Warning Group. The 503 AC&W Group will administer said squadrons and detachments. AF Regulation 11-4, 6 October 48, will govern the support that is required by these squadrons and detachments from your command.

CG ConAC

Official Business

25 Feb 49

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FM HQ FAF Slocum AFB New Rochelle NY

TO CO 26th Air Division Roslyn NY

INFO CG ConAC Mitchel AFB NY

PRIORITY

AFLAFOT 484. Refur msg ADA-DB 20 units First Air Force pass to your control for air defense operations for 1 day 14 Sep 49. If weather prevents operation, 14 Sep 49 units will be under your control for 15 Sept 49. Direct communication has been authorized between units and your Hq. Request copies of mission reports for First Air Force units be forwarded this Hq Attention: Dir Opns and Trng. Units available as follows: 503d AC&W Gp, 14th, 33d and 82d Fighter Wings, 52d Fighter Gp All Wea. Directive being published for continuing operations each Wednesday with the following units: 503d AC&W Gp, 33d Ftr Wg, 52d Ftr Wg All Wea. Info copy will be forwarded to your Hq.

13/1541Z Sept

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HEADQUARTERS
26TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
ROSLYN, NEW YORK

EHR/jf

3 October 1949

SUBJECT : Air Defense Training Operation " Wednesday"

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Attention : Deputy For Operations, Operations and Training

1. Reference letter your headquarters, " Air Defense Training" dated 1 September 1949. This headquarters will submit a weekly summary of these operations to describe accomplishments and progress as well as difficulties encountered. Training operations conducted under referenced letter will have as their objective the overall proficiency of the air defense system embracing all elements that can progressively be brought into the scope of activity. The immediate objective in the initial stages shall be to develope further the confidence of fighter pilots in radar control capability and to heighten the team spirit between fighter pilot and controller. Interceptions of simulated strikes will be conducted whenever possible. Lack of strike aircraft will not be considered reason to limit activity, however. Trailer aircraft operations, the techniques of Broadcast Control, pilot use of the Air Defense Grid System, and internal procedures as well as normal GCI control will all be practiced and corrected methods instituted wherever necessary. A delayed start of these operations was occasioned by the preparation for and conduct of operation " Lookout ".

2. The Roslyn, Grenier and Washington nets were occupied with " Lookout " Wednesday, 14 September. This Division therefore conducted Wednesday training operations with the Selfridge net only. The Selfridge Control Center controlled F-80's of the 56th Fighter Group. A scheduled strike through that area which had been set up locally with SAC B-29's failed to materialize.

3. On Wednesday, 21 September the following training operations were accomplished : Selfridge Control Center and net tracked F-80's of the 56th Fighter Group and vectored them around that area passing control from station to station. No simulated strike force was available. Inclement weather forced the early release of these fighters and internal procedures were practiced the remainder of the day. Roslyn net also controlled F-82's out of the 52nd Fighter Group. Again a strike force was lacking and operation consisted of tracking the fighters as

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Basic Ltr: Subj: Air Defense Training Operation " Wednesday" dtd 3 Oct 49
Hq 26th Air Division(Defense) Roslyn, N.Y.

4. On Wednesday 28 September weather forced postponement of all operations until 29 September and on that date weather forced cancellation of all operations except in the Selfridge Area. The Selfridge Control Center again conducted tracking practice and passing of control from Station to Station with F-80's.

5. It will be noted from the summaries above, which cover a three week period, that the start was poor. Quantity and quality has progressed, however, and preparations are complete for operations in the spirit of referenced letter. This Division has assigned Captain Warren J. Lane, Ext 287 as Project Officer to monitor these operations in all phases. To date many deficiencies have become apparent. Upon receipt of referenced letter it was not clear whether numbered Air Forces involved were also addressees of the same similar directive from your headquarters. Telephone conversation with Lt Col. Hillery of your headquarters indicated that the letter was sent to the Air Forces. This headquarters then communicated with the Air Forces by teletype on 12 September. Information requested of the Air Forces was slow in arriving at this headquarters and no reply at all was received from Headquarters, Ninth Air Force. On 27 Sept. a check was made to verify informal information that Ninth Air Force had not received any appropriate directive from Continental Air Command. On that date Col. Dempster, your headquarters, communicated by telephone with Col. Daniels, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force and was informed by Col. Daniels that the letter had not been seen in his headquarters and that no fighter or strike aircraft could be furnished the 26th Division on Wednesday, 28 September. In the case of the First and Tenth Air Forces liaison was established and a working arrangement evolved. Cooperation by the First Air Force has been excellent in that both the 33rd Fighter Group and the 82nd Fighter Group as well as the 503rd AC & W Group have been made available as units for Division control on Wednesdays. Replies to our messages by the Tenth Air Force have not been prompt or complete although no time was lost in making available the F-80's at Selfridge. Further liaison with Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, now in progress, will undoubtedly refine the arrangements.

6. Inasmuch as certain difficulties arise which are believed to be beyond corrective action by this headquarters and which will, if not corrected, seriously hamper attainment of the objectives, it is desired to point out the following :

A. Only loose Division control can be exercised over the Control Centers other than that at Roslyn because of distances and lack of direct communication facilities. Control in these cases must be exercised through the Chief Controllers to a greater than normal extent.

B. The lack of strike aircraft tends to lessen the effectiveness of the training. Results are being obtained through requesting Air Forces cooperation in providing strike aircraft. Support from your headquarters would undoubtedly assist greatly.

C. The distance of any fighter base from the area of the Pine Camp net have so far made it impracticable to allocate fighter aircraft to the Pine Camp Control Center. Nor, is any solution to this deficiency apparent to this headquarters.

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D. The inability to date of the Ninth Air Force to make fighter aircraft available also leaves the Washington Control Center and net without fighters to control. It has been possible, however, to provide strike missions through both the Washington and Pine Camp areas.

E. The Grenier Control Center reports that cooperation with and by the Navy fighter unit at Quonset Point is excellent and that the naval unit is eager to work continuously with the radar control net. The fact that scramble lines were removed upon completion of " Lookout " leaves commercial long distance as the only means for direct communication. This condition may force discontinuance of efforts to work with the Navy at that base. Grenier Control Center has submitted a request for installation of direct land lines from Station 6 and Station 7 to Quonset Point Naval Air Station.

F. Selfridge Control Center reports that the blanket clearance to clear fighters out of local area by GCI Station terminated at the end of " Blackjack " and that the 56th Fighter Group now is reluctant to leave local area without executing Form 23. Since a strike may appear at any point no accurate flight plan can be given by fighters for Form 23 purposes. There exists a requirement that this blanket clearance authority be renewed in order that the fighters may be vectored out of the local area to cover geographically the entire net as well as to intercept strikes.

ERNEST H. BEVERLY
Colonel., USAF
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS
26TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
ROSLYN, NEW YORK

11 October 1949

353
SUBJECT: Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday"

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

ATTENTION: Deputy for Operations, Operations and Training

1. Air Defense training operations scheduled for Wednesday, 5 October were postponed until Thursday due to interference by adverse weather.

2. Three B-26 aircraft were furnished by the 106th Bomb Wing, NYNG, from Floyd Bennett. Excellent geographic spread was obtained by routing these simulated strikes through the division area as individual aircraft showing Iff code 4. However, delayed take-offs were experienced by all three of the flights for the morning mission and marginal weather prevented their flying the afternoon mission.

3. The 52nd Fighter Group provided ten F-82's from McGuire AFB. These were controlled in five flights by stations of the Roslyn net. Santani GCI effected an interception on a C-47 showing IFF code 4. Unfavorable weather in the afternoon forced early release of the McGuire fighters. Delayed appearance of scheduled strikes prevented interception attempts on B-26's by these F-82's.

4. One flight of three F-84's was furnished in the morning by 33rd Fighter Group, Otis AFB. Failure of fuel transfer system shortened the airborne time of this flight, but control was passed among three GCE Stations and interception was made on two targets of opportunity. In the afternoon one flight of four F-84's was furnished. Control was again passed from station to station and one target of opportunity was intercepted. This headquarters has taken action to assure that this group will furnish more F-84's for future training operations than were made available this week.

5. The Selfridge Control Center was without strike aircraft but controlled a total of twenty F-80's breaking these into flights to pass control from station to station and to effect two interceptions of one flight by another.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

s/t/ [illegible]
1st Lt, USAF
Adjutant General

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"Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday"

C&T 353 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 18 Oct 1949

TO: Commanding General, Eastern Air Defense Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. It is suggested that these reports to be of value should give at least the following facts for each "Target" on which an interception is attempted:

a. Information re target:

(1) Time and place picked up on screen and altitude.
(2) Course and changes of course, speed and height and the times at which these take place.
(3) Ground stations picking up target and times.

b. Information re fighter(s):

(1) State of alert.
(2) Time airborne.
(3) Changes of vector and heights.

c. This type of information can best be shown on a skelton map. The "Target" track can usually be compared with actual track by comparison with the attacking aircraft navigation log.

2. Your comments are requested.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

EADF 353 (11 Oct 49) 2nd Ind.

HQ EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 26 Oct 49

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

1. A study is being made to determine the type and amount of information that should be gathered from operational units to enable this headquarters to properly evaluate the degree of operational proficiency of the air defense system. This study includes the design of an operational and training mission report form to be used by the Air Divisions and Operational Units.

2. Factors listed in par 1, 1st Ind. will be used in this study and preparation of referenced report forms.

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HEADQUARTERS
26TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
ROSLYN, NEW YORK

17 October 1949

353

SUBJECT: Report on Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday"

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

ATTENTION: Deputy for Operations, Operations and Training.

1. Air Defense Training Operations conducted by the 26th Air Division (Defense) on Wednesday, 12 October 1949 were as follows:

a. The Roslyn Control Center had nine F-82's available from the 52nd Fighter Group throughout the morning. The GCI station at Cantini was assigned four of the aircraft and split them into two flights to work against each other. Three interceptions were made below ten thousand feet. The GCI Station at Twin Lights was assigned four F-82's and further split these into two flights. Four interceptions were made below fifteen thousand feet. The Controller at Twin Lights reported that pilot response to vectors given was very slow, intermittent interference appeared on the radar scopes, and VHF performance was generally poor. During the afternoon the above stations followed the same procedures with eight F-82's and performed six interceptions. The GCI Stations at Montauk and Palmero did not participate in GCI training as they were calibrating and performing maintenance respectively.

b. The Selfridge Control Center allocated fourteen F-80's to the GCI Station at Selfridge. These aircraft were split into two flights and made four interceptions against each other during the morning. In the afternoon the above mentioned station split seven F-80's into two flights and made three interceptions against each other. Radar performance was very good out to seventy-five miles distance. Eight additional F-80's were allocated to the GCI Station at Ravenna during the morning. These aircraft were split into two flights and made two interceptions against each other. Four of these F-80's were later passed to the control of the GCI Station at Buffalo for local tracking. In the afternoon eleven F-80's were allocated to the GCI Station at Ravenna. These aircraft were split into two flights and made three interceptions against each other. Radar performance at both Ravenna and Buffalo was reported as very good. Although a sufficient number of fighter aircraft were made available to these Air Defense

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Basic Ltr: Subj: Report on Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday" Hq 26th Air Division (Def) Roslyn, New York, dtd 17 October 1949

Operations, the lack of strike aircraft seriously hindered training accomplishments. The GCI Station at Connellsville did not participate in these exercises as there was no aircraft available which possessed sufficient range to remain in the vicinity of the GCI station any length of time.

c. The Grenier Control Center was unable to perform any control in the morning due to adverse weather. In the afternoon one flight of four F-84's was made available by the 33rd Fighter Group. This flight was passed from station to station up to the GCI Station at Dow and return. No strike aircraft were available, buth the GCI Station at Otis did control an interception on a transient C-54.

d. The Washington Control Center, and it's net did not accomplish anything in this week's operation due to the non-availability of either fighters or strike aircraft.

e. The Pine Camp Control Center contribute to the training operation only through the initiative of it's own officers, two of whom obtained two F-51's from Griffiss Air Force Base to fly in the event a strike was sent into the area. No strike was available, but the two officers flew throughout the area to provide plotting and tracking practice. The GCI Station at Schenectady did not participate in this exercise as it was calibrating.

2. As can be seen from the above the greatest deficiency in these operations is the lack of strike aircraft. The New York Air National Guard observed Columbus Day as a holiday therefore did not provide the B-26's that otherwise might have been available. An attempt to obtain administrative aircraft from Headquarters, First Air Force resulted in Major Freidman of that headquarters stating by telephone that, although the installation of IFF in these aircraft has been requested, none has been installed. Major Freidman also indicated that a delay in the installation of IFF was anticipated. Prior attempts to utilize administrative aircraft without IFF emphasized the futility of these efforts. Your headquarters has been informed previously of the Ninth Air Force's teletype message that neither fighters nor strike aircraft can be provided for Wednesday operations. Tenth Air Force was unable to provide strike aircraft for this Wednesdays training operations.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Distribution:
1. CG, EADF (1 cy)
2. CO, 503rd AC&W Gp (1 cy)

t/ EMMETT W. HUGHES
1st Lt., USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
26TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
ROSLYN, NEW YORK

21 October 1949

353
SUBJECT: Report on Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday".

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

ATTENTION: Deputy for Operations, Operations and Training.

1. Air Defense Training Operations conducted by the 26th Air Division (Defense) on Wednesday, 19 October 1949, were as follows:

a. The Roslyn Control Center had six F-82's available from the 52nd Fighter Group and four Corsairs from Squadron VC-4 at Atlantic City. The GCI Station at Twin Lights was assigned two F-82's in the morning to intercept a hostile strike simulated by two other F-82's under the control of the GCI Station at Montauk. Three interceptions were made by the Twin Lights Station. In the afternoon these stations had the same aircraft and the Twin Lights station made one interception. In addition to the interception practice the flights of fighters were passed back and forth between Twin Lights and Montauk with the GCI Station at Santini assisting. The GCI Station at Palermo was assigned two F-82's and four Corsairs in both the morning and afternoon. These flights were controlled to effect six interceptions of one by the other. The entire Roslyn net was exercised.

b. Twenty-one F-80's from the 56th Fighter Group were available to the Selfridge Control Center in the morning and twenty-two in the afternoon. These were assigned to the GCI Stations at Selfridge, Ravenna, and Buffalo. Selfridge made a total of eigh interceptions during the day by splitting it's flights and intercepting one with the other. Buffalo practiced tracking in the morning with good results for one hour and twenty minutes of control time and in the afternoon split it's flights and made five interceptions of one flight by the other. Radar pickup by ravenna was only fair in the morning and attempts to intercept one flight by the other were not successful. In the afternoon five interceptions were controlled by Ravenna. It was discovered that radar plots by Buffalo were some ten miles in error of actual position, which indicates a need for further calibration of this station. The entire Selfridge net was exercised.

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Basic Ltr: Subj: Report on Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday" Hq 26th Air Division (Def), Roslyn, New York, dtd 21 October 1949

c. The Grenier Control Center had one flight of F-84's available from the 33rd Fighter Group. This flight was passed from station to station and all stations except Dow received tracking practice. The latter did not obtain any training during the day's operations.

d. The Washington Control Center and it's net did not receive any training during these operations because of lack of both strike and fighters.

e. The Pine Camp Control Center again was able to contribute something to the day's operation only because two of it's officers personally flew two F-51's obtained from Griffiss Air Force Base. These fighters were obtained to be available against any strike sent into the area. When no strike was available the officers flew throughout the area to provide tracking practice for all stations.

2. It was again emphasized that the critical need in the Wednesday training program is aircraft to simulate strikes for the nets of all five Control Centers. To date very helpful assistance has been provided by the 106th Bomb Group of the New York National Guard at Floyd Bennett Field. On this date lack of available pilots prevented their participation and demonstrated that it is not sound to rely entirely on the National Guard in this respect. Ninth Air Force informed this Headquarters again that neither fighrer aircraft nor simulated hostiles were available to Division Control for an indefinite time. Major P. C. Sprawls of this Headquarters has made a direct inquiry into the existence of IFF in the administrative aircraft of Headquarters, First Air Force and your Headquarters. It was determined that several of these airplanes are equipped with IFF at the present time, and it is believed that it can be arranged for two or three of these to be utilized in Operation "Wednesday". For proper planning and complete utilization of any aircraft which are to be made available it would be advantageous for the Division to have a firm committment from these Headquarters as early as Monday of each week.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

s/t/ EMMETT T. HUGHES
1st Lt., USAF
Adjutant General

Cys to Commanding General, EADF
Commanding Officer, 503rd AC&W Gp

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HEADQUARTERS
26TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
ROSLYN, NEW YORK

353. 1 November 1949

SUBJECT: Report on Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday"

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

ATTENTION: Deputy for Operations, Operations and Training

1. Air Defense Training Operations conducted by the 26th Air Division (Defense) on Wednesday, 26 October or Thursday 27 October, were as follows:

a. Weather prevented operations by the Roslyn net on Wednesday. On Thursday two B-26's were obtained from the 106th Bomb Group of the New York Air National Guard for both morning and afternoon strike missions. In the morning one of these flew the route from Floyd Bennett Field to Cape May to Philadelphia to Martha's Vineyard to Floyd Bennett while the other flew the reverse of this. In the afternoon each flew the reverse of the morning route. Two F-82's from McGuire Air Force Base also were used to simulate a hostile strike. In the morning these flew from McGuire to Reading to Harrisburg to Wilmington to Atlantic City to Block Island to McGuire and reversed that route in the afternoon. The Roslyn Control Center had four other F-82's available from the 52nd Fighter Group and two Hellcats from Squadron VC-4 at Atlantic City. The latter were obtained as a part of the continuing cooperative program arranged between that Squadron and the GCI Station at Palermo. The GCI Station at Twin Lights was assigned two F-82's which were controlled by that station to effect a total of eight interceptions on simulated hostiles and transient aircraft. The GCI Station at Montauk was also assigned two F-82's and made two interceptions on simulated hostiles. The two U.S. Navy fighters were controlled by Palermo and five interceptions were made on simulated hostiles. The GCI Station at Santini was not assigned any aircraft because of calibration committments.

b. Twenty-two F-80's were made available to the Selfridge Control Center on Wednesday by the 56th Fighter Group. The GCI Station at Selfridge used three F-80's to simulate a hostile strike and accomplished six interceiptions with two other flights during the morning. In the afternoon this station experienced considerable difficulty in both radar and VHF performance. Although three interceptions were accomplished, neither four-ship nor eight-ship flights could be painted with dependability.

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Basic Ltr, File No. 353, Subj: "Report on Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday", Hq. 26th Air Division (Defense), Roslyn, N. Y. dtd 1 November 1949

Further scope difficulty was experienced in that the fifty mile range marker skipped about between ranges of forty and sixty miles. CPS-4 interference occurred on "F" channel. In the morning a flight of twelve F-80's was assigned to the GCI Station at Ravenna. Radar pickup by this station was so poor that control efforts had to be given up. In the afternoon this station was again assigned twelve F-80's. Radar performance was excellent, with the same Controller on the scope as in the morning, and four interceptions were controlled by splitting the flight of twelve into two flights and using one against the other. It is worthy to note that the above described characteristics of radar also have been evident in past operations. The GCI Station at Buffalo did not participate in the training.

c. The Grenier Control Center had one flight of four F-84's available from the 31st Fighter Group on Thursday, weather having been unfavorable on Wednesday. In the morning this flight was passed from Otis to Grenier to Portland GCI Stations. Portland was unable to paint the flight, and the Control Center returned the flight to Otis Air Force Base. In the afternoon control of the flight was passed from Otis to Grenier to Portland to Otis. The short endurance of these fighters has repeatedly denied training to the GCI Station at Dow, and the division has been unable to provide a simulated strike through this area in any of the operations.

d. The Washington Control Center postponed operations from Wednesday to Thursday due to weather but was again compelled to submit a negative report. The Chief Controller had obtained a B-26 from Langley Air Force Base with the intention of providing his net with tracking practice. However, no pilot could be obtained to fly this mission in view of the directive by Headquarters, Ninth Air Force restricting pilots to four hours per month.

e. For the third consecutive week two officers of the Pine Camp Control Center provided their own strike by flying aircraft from Griffiss Air Force Base. A B-25 was obtained late in the morning on Wednesday and two F-51's in the afternoon. These were flown to the Pine Camp GCI Station but VHF difficulties prevented that station from exercising any control or passing the flight to another station. As a result the entire net was unable to accomplish any training.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

s/t/ [illegible]
1st Lt., USAF
Adjutant General

Info copies to:

CG EADF

CO 503rd AC&W Group

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 353

1 September 1949

SUBJECT: Air Defense Training

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force
Slocum Air Force Base, New Rochelle, New York
(Identical ltrs to CGs, 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th AFs and CO, 26th Air Division)

1. Exercise "Blackjack" has afforded much-needed training to all elements of the Aircraft Control and Warning System in the northeast United States. It has also done much to improve the standards of training of certain fighter units in their primary roles of air defense. However, an efficient air defense system cannot be achieved if the training of the elements of this system is conducted only during major air defense exercises.

2. To achieve this continuity of training, the following measures will be instituted forthwith:

a. Air Forces will direct such fighter units as are situated within operational distances of GCI stations to give routine training to Aircraft Control and Warning section. Such training should be continuous and should not only include practice interceptions, but should aim at making fighter pilots confident of GCI control. Air Forces will arrange for the necessary coordination to be effected between air defense divisions (if activated) and Aircraft Control and Warning units.

b. Air Forces will arrange for Air National Guard and Reserve units having an air defense mission and being within or adjacent to GCI coverage to commence training in air defense in conjunction with the Aircraft Control and Warning system.

c. The 26th Air Division will assume operational control over each element of the air defense system as can be made available, having regard to prior commitments, on Wednesday of each week. In the event of bad weather, this may be postponed for one (1) day only. For the time being, units affected will be elements of the 503d Aircraft Control and Warning Group and fighter units in the First, Ninth and Tenth Air Forces.

3. The adoption of measures as outlined above is considered of

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Subj: Air Defense Tng
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paramount importance, not only to increase the efficiency of our air defenses, but to insure that future systems developments for the air defense of the United States will not be based on false promises arising from inadequate training of the basic air defense elements.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/s/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Air Defense Training

EADF 353 (1 Sep 49) 3rd Ind

HQ EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 4 Oct 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, N.Y.

1. With regard to request of first indorsement for additional information pertaining to the 26th Air Division (defense), the following is furnished:

a. At the present time the 26th Air Division (Defense) together with its corollary, the 503rd AC&W Group, is assigned air defense area responsibility composed essentially of that territory of northeastern United States east of 103° W. longitude.

b. Present plans call for the activation of two additional air divisions and two additional supporting AC&W Groups. When this action has been taken, the northwest area will then be divided among the proposed three air divisions.

c. Request has been submitted to USAF for activation of the 30th Air Division and the 541st AC&W Group. If activation request for these units is approved, they will be assigned an air defense area of responsibility which will include the area assigned Tenth Air Force. The 30th Air Division (Defense) upon activation will then be directly concerned, and actively work with the Tenth Air Force and its subordinate tactical units.

* * * * *

3. With the conclusion of the bulk of maneuver and special problem workloads, the 26th Air Division is now emphasizing publication of SOP's and related operational material based on experiences gained during recent exercises.

4. Representatives of the 26th Air Division will visit Hq Tenth Air Force prior to 15 October to coordinate directly on matters affected by basic communication and related operational problems common to 26th Air Division and Tenth Air Force. Instructions have been issued to 26th Air Division to maintain close liaison with Hq Tenth Air Force on Air Defense Systems problems pending activation of the 30th Air Division (Defense).

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/t/ HARRY R. BEAMER
Major, USAF
Adjutant General

CC: CO 26th AD

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

17 November 1949

C&T 373.5

SUBJECT: Local Flying Areas for Fighter - GCI Training Missions

TO : 1 Director of Plans and Operations, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. This command has been experiencing difficulty in fighter - GCI interceptor training missions due to the fact that wing commanders of fighter bases have not been exercising the authority that this headquarters interprets is given to them by paragraph 4, AF Regulation 55-19, 14 February 1946.

2. The difficulty experienced has been the lack of a sufficient area to complete successful GCI interceptions utilizing jet aircraft without running out of the local flying areas. These areas are at present confined to approximately one hundred (100) miles. Jet type aircraft flying at altitude require only about twelve (12) minutes to fly from the center of the local area, or over the base, to the perimeter of the area.

3. It can be seen that a bomber at high altitude acting as target for a GCI training mission could very easily fly through a section of the local flying area before a successful interception could be made. To leave the area and complete the interception, in accordance with existing regulations, the fighter pilot would be required to file and obtain approval of a flight plan. This, of course, is not practicable.

4. In order to alleviate this situation, this headquarters has sent a letter (copy attached) to all air forces within this command recommending that fighter base commanders establish two local flying areas. One area, the smaller, to be used for local proficiency flying, test hops, and miscellaneous training flights. The second, or larger area, is to be used for fighter - GCI interceptor missions. It was further recommended to the air forces that the radius of the larger area be equal to the radius of action of the fighter aircraft participating in the GCI training or equal to the area covered by the GCI stations participating, whichever is smaller.

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Basic Ltr - Local Flying Areas for Fighter - CCI Training Missions
(continued)

5. The concurrence of your headquarters is requested in the interpretation this headquarters has made of paragraph 4, AF Regulation 55-19, 14 February 1946, and the action taken as stated in paragraph 4, above.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl:
cy ltr this Hq to
ConAC AF's

s/st/ J. H. BIGGS
Lt. Col., ACD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

AFCOP-R 373.5 1st Ind

Department of the Air Force, Hq, USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 25 Nov 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, New York

This Headquarters approves the interpretation your Headquarters has made of paragraph 4 of AFR 55-19, dated 14 February 1946, and the letter to all numbered Air Forces within your command, recommending that fighter base commanders establish two local flying areas.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl
n/c

s/st/ FRANK S. JOHNSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Executive, Operations Div
Directorate, Plans and Operations

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

17 November 1949

C&T 373.5

SUBJECT: Local Flying Areas for Fighter - GCI Training Missions

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
(Identical ltrs to 4th, 9th, 12th and 14th AF's - 1st Ind - 10th AF)

1. It has come to the attention of this headquarters that fighter aircraft performing intercept missions in conjunction with GCI stations are being hampered by the present restricted size of the local flying areas at fighter bases within this command. AF Regulation 55-19, 14 February 1946, authorizes the Commanding Officers of AF Bases to establish local flying areas, and par. 4 of that regulation gives authority to Wing or higher Commanders to extend local flying areas when cogent reasons for doing so exist.

2. The presence of high speed jet fighter aircraft in the Air Force today, and the training missions required and performed in conjunction with GCI stations make it impracticable to limit the size of the local flying area to a radius of approximately one hundred (100) miles.

3. It is recommended that the base commanders of bases from which fighter aircraft operate establish two local flying areas. One local flying area should be used for local proficiency flying, test hops, and miscellaneous training flights, and the second area should be used in accomplishing realistic fighter interceptor training in conjunction with GCI stations. It is further recommended that the radius of the larger area be equal to the radius of action of the fighter aircraft participating in the GCI training or equal to the area covered by the GCI stations participating, whichever is smaller.

4. A letter is being sent to Headquarters, USAF advising them of the action this command is taking under the provisions of AF Regulation 55-19 to alleviate the current are restriction which is presently hindering the joint fighter - GCI interceptor training missions. Pending an alternate solution from Headquarters USAF, this letter is your authority to proceed with the action recommended in paragraph 3, above.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/s/ J. H. BIGGS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

Info cy to:
Dir. Plans & Opns, Hq USAF;
NADC: NADC: TAC

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

28 November 1949

C&T 353

SUBJECT: Interception Training Report

TO : Commanding General, Eastern Air Defense Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
Identical Ltr sent to CG, Western Air Defense Force, Hamilton AFB, Calif

1. In order to monitor the progress of the training being accomplished in the Air Defense system and to evaluate the Joint ConAC-SAC Gun Camera Interception Training Program, a weekly report will be initiated effective 1 December 1949.

2. The Interception Training Report will be prepared, in letter form, as of 1700 hours, local time, each Friday and two (2) copies forwarded so as to reach this Headquarters, attention Director of Operations and Training, by Thursday following the preparation date. A negative report will be submitted when applicable.

3. Subject report will indicate the following:

a. Number of days in which joint exercises were scheduled with SAC aircraft.

b. Number of penetrations of the defense area by SAC aircraft.

c. Interception of SAC aircraft:

(1) Number attempted

(2) Number successful

d. Number of ConAC fighters under operational control of Air Defense Force Headquarters during each exercise.

e. General comments:

(1) Evaluation of each exercise.

(2) Recommendations.

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Interception Training Report (cont'd)
O&T 353

4. Examples:

a. Four (4) days

b. Twenty (20)

c. (1) Twenty-seven (27)

(2) Sixteen (16)

d. (1) 4th Fighter Group

(a) 5

(b) 8

(c) 16

(d) 8

(2) 55th Fighter Group

(a) 4

(b) 8

(c) 16

(d) 8

e. (1) Unsuccessful interceiptions due to equipment failure in four (4) cases, personnel error in three (3) cases, communications in three (3) cases, unknown in one (1) case.

(2) Following recommendations are forwarded:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

5. Reports Control symbol RCS CMC-DO-US is assigned to this report

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/ EDMUND LAUDER
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Report on Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday"
EADF 353 (16 Nov 49) 1st Ind 23 Nov 1949

HQ EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Forwarded herewith for your information is the 26th Air Division (Defense), Report on Air Defense Training Operation "Wednesday".

2. Reference paragraph 1, basic letter, instructions relative to submission channels of this report were issued so that reports of an operational nature would flow up through the operational chain. This action was taken subsequent to and in consonance with the publication of ConAC General Order No. 122, which placed the 26th Air Division (Defense) and other units under the continuous operational control of the Eastern Air Defense Force.

3. Reference paragraph 2, basic letter: "G/Comdr Rosier, of this headquarters, has been working with Lt Colonel Dempster, of Hq ConAC, on the preparation of reporting procedures, methods, and forms to be used in reports concerned with air defense operations. This revised procedure and reporting form will be utilized for those missions which are a part of the joint operations between the Strategic Air Command bomber strikes and Air Defense Forces of ConAC". Information available to this headquarters indicates that the ConAC SOP covering the cooperative missions between the Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Forces is now in publication and will be ready for distribution within the next few days. Future reports concerning air defense operations will be rendered weekly as referred to in subject SOP and in the form that is now jointly being worked out between this headquarters and Hq ConAC.

4. It is the opinion of this headquarters that the publication of the SOP concerning the joint participation of Strategic Air Command bomber strike aircraft and ConAC Air Defense Forces interceptor aircraft in air defense training will render obsolete the directive letter published by Hq ConAC, subject: "Air Defense Training", dated 1 September 1949. The agreement by Strategic Air Command to provide guaranteed strike forces and the publication by Hq ConAC of General Order No. 122 provides both the strike forces desired and the operational control necessary to accomplish the air defense training which was the basis for the "Wednesday" Operation directive letter. It is, therefore, recommended that since Eastern Air Defense Force now exercises continuous operational control over the Air Divisions and the Fighter Wings concerned with air defense training that the "Operation Wednesday" directive letter be rescinded.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ Harry R. Beamer
t/ HARRY R. BEAMER
Major, USAF
Adjutant General

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Fm Hq USAF Wash D. C.

To CG, Mitchel AFB,
ConAC
CG; AMC; Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
CG, SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebr

/ R E S T R I C T E D /

From: AFOOP-C 54967

1. "Blackjack" Exercise has been broken down into 2 phases with the first phase (Training) conducted by ConAC during 1 May to 27 June 1949.

2. The second phase (Maneuvers) during September 1949 will be during FY 1950 and is to be re-named "Operation Lookout" and will consist of Strategic Air attacks by SAC on the Northeast industrial defense system of the United States, to be defended by ConAC with radar detection and fighter intercept.

3. Press announcements pertaining to "Blackjack" Exercise will be released by ConAC with press announcements on "Operation Lookout", to be released by this headquarters

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Hq ConAC

TO: CG's All numbered ConAC Air Forces and CG TAC Langley AFB (ATTN: PIO)

13482. For your info and release in whole or in part at your discretion according to local needs. Operation Blackjack is an exercise to test procedures and train personnel in Air Defense. The Deputy for Air Defense, this Hq, desires to make clear that training of personnel means exactly what it says. Aircraft control and Warning personnel and Fighter Aircraft Crews within Air Defense Command are relatively inexperienced. The current exercise, therefore, is intended to instruct them in basic procedures of operating an Air Defense System. These include: A. Plotting enemy positions on a control board. B. Telephonic communication as it relates to the Air Defense System. C. Procedures for scrambling fighter aircraft. D. Filtering and identification procedures. Simultaneously, exercise is designed to train fighter aircraft crews in air defense operations. All aircraft and facilities involved in operation Blackjack are part of or are controlled by Air Defense Command. Operational problems to test effectiveness of Air Defense System as a system remain for the future. Basic ground work, procedures and training of all elements involved in air defense must be accomplished before system can be put to final test. Operation Blackjack is an orderly, organized step toward the final goal. Nothing in the exercise is to be construed as involving bomber interception by fighter aircraft.

CG ConAC

Official Business

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DAD 311

SUBJECT: Exercise "BLACKJACK"

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base

1. There is attached hereto five (5) copies of final "Report of Air Defense Exercise "BLACKJACK", conducted in northeast United States during period 1 - 30 June 1949.

2. Attention is invited to paragraph 11, "Recommendation".

3. Copies of this report have been distributed as follows:

First AF (6 cys)
Fourth AF (3 cys)
Ninth AF (3 cys)
Tenth AF (1 cy)
Twelfth AF (1 cy)
Fourteenth AF (4 cys)
25th Air Divn (Def) (1 cy)
26th Air Divn (Def) (1 cy)
Chief of Naval Operations (2 cys)
ComAir Lant (2 cys)
First Army (2 cys)
Second Army (2 cys)
RCAF (4 cys)
CAA (3 cys)
Hq USAF (5 cys)
Air University (2 cys)
Dept of the Air Force Library (2 cys)

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ Harry R. Beamer
t/ HARRY R. BEAMER
Major, USAF
Adjutant General

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REPORT OF AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE "BLACKJACK"

1. AIMS OF EXERCISE:

Exercise BLACKJACK was conceived and conducted in order to determine generally the following:

a. To train fighter and Aircraft Control and Warning units in air defense operations.

b. To test and evaluate the overall effectiveness of the planned air defense system, organization and procedures.

c. To test the effectiveness of plans for the control for identification purposes of military and civil air traffic in specified NB areas.

d. To test the suitability of greater decentralization of control from control centers to GCI stations.

e. To evaluate fighter deployment.

f. To test the tactical suitability of the various types of fighter equipment in air defense operations.

g. To test reserviceability of fighter aircraft.

h. To evaluate radar deployment.

i. To test performance of radar equipment.

j. To test communication network.

k. To evaluate the effect of ECM on the operations of the air defense system.

l. To test air defense SOP's.

m. To integrate air defense capability of the U. S. Navy with the USAF air defense system.

n. To evaluate Naval picket vessel employment.

o. To evaluate airborne early warning employment.

p. To evaluate procedures for furnishing appropriate Army Commands with required information for the conduct of passive defense measures and ground defense.

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "BLACKLOCK". (Cont'd)

2. GENERAL:

As originally planned the exercise was to be of two months duration (1 May through 30 June) but due to delays in getting radars in place and operational, coupled with Strategic Air Command's inability to provide strike aircraft during the month of May (due to other commitments), this period was utilized in making the air defense system operational, checking communications and calibrating the radars. The exercise as such, started 1 June, with S.A.C committed to a minimum of four strikes per week, one of which was to be at night. S.A.C had flown only six missions against the defended area when they were directed by H.Q. U.S.A.F to suspend participation in BLACKLOCK due to other commitments and the Berlin strike. The six missions flown were on the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th (Night), 10th and 13th of June. Thereafter strikes were provided by Con.A.C on an improvised basis, utilizing B-26 aircraft of the Third Air Photo Reconnaissance Squadron located at Langley AFB, Virginia, and Con.A.C Fighter Section, Mitchel AFB, N.Y. The exercise lost a great deal of realism and training value when B-26's were substituted for S.A.C bombers. This was due to the inability of the B-26 aircraft to reach the operational altitudes of S.A.C bombers; their inability to traverse and criss-cross the defended area without landing and refueling, and the inability of strike force pilots to operate through and above weather in the defended area.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

In evaluating 1b and c, above, it was believed that the air defense function could be simplified by decentralizing control from control centers down to the individual radars; this decentralization to include authority to scramble fighters allocated to its control and responsibility for identification within its area of search. Compared with the accepted theory and practice of control and responsibility in air defense (i.e., vesting complete and final authority and control in the Control Center itself) such decentralization of control would appreciably reduce the communications requirements in an air defense system as well as provide a more flexible defense. Accordingly, the air defense system for this exercise was so organized.

4. COMMAND:

The defended region was divided into five air defense division areas, each with a provisional air defense division commander. Each division commander was responsible to the Commanding General, Eastern Air Defense (a provisional headquarters for the period of the exercise) for the air defense of his area. To carry out these responsibilities each division commander had operational control of fighter and aircraft control and warning forces allocated to him. These forces were administered and logistically supported by their parent organizations, however, division commanders were responsible for coordination with adjacent division commanders in effecting an integrated air defense.

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5. USAF PARTICIPATION:

The major effort in this exercise was provided from USAF forces and resources. Participation by other services and agencies will be treated separately.

a. Air Divisions: Air division commanders were keen, resourceful and showed ingenuity in the employment of forces assigned their areas, considering their inexperience in actual air defense operations. All division commanders were thoroughly familiar with the new concept of air defense (decentralization of control) being tested but for several reasons were unable to give it a fair test. Outstanding among these were poor performance of key radars; lack of height finding equipment; and lack of trained AC&W personnel to adequately man the air defense system as planned for this exercise. In order to realize some degree of training and experience from the exercise, commanders were forced to resort to such practices as trailer aircraft, air patrols and modified broadcast control to overcome the above-mentioned deficiencies. One notable exception was the Pine Camp Division area where radar performance and personnel capability permitted the highest degree of system test as originally planned. The division commander allocated fighter forces daily to individual radars and never once during the maneuver countermanded a scramble order by an individual radar. In most instances, division commanders kept each other informed of activities in adjacent division areas.

b. Radars: Eighteen USAF radars were deployed in the system and manned entirely by the 503rd AC&W Group. This unit consisted of a Group Headquarters and five AC&W Squadrons, one for each division area. Equipment consisted of CPS-5's, TPS-1B's, 1 CPS-1 and 1 CPS-6. Height finders consisted of TPS-10's and CPS-4's, a total of five in number. Radar capability varied from practically nil for the CPS-6 at Twin Lights to phenomenal performance by the CPS-5 at Selfridge. The former was practically useless during the maneuver, despite attempts by technical representatives and maintenance personnel of the 503rd Group and Watson Laboratories' engineers to make it operational. The CPS-5 at Selfridge, after much experimentation by the Chief Controller, was consistently painting a flight of four jet aircraft solid out to 207-210 miles. As the exercise progressed and personnel gained in experience, a very definite increase in radar performance was observed, this despite the fact that several radars were undesirably located terrainwise.

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "BRICKJACK". (Cont'd)

c. Fighters: USAF fighter types employed were F-80's, F-84's, F-51's and F-82's. Toward the end of the exercise, F-80's and F-51's were limited in operational hours which necessitated their replacement in the exercise by units equipped with the latest F-84 series (D's). Operationally the F-80 was superior to the early model F-84's in maintenance, serviceability, turn-around time and runway requirements. In F-84D's, however, serviceability and turn-around time were equal to the F-80, with ease of maintenance almost on a par. F-84 top speed and rate of climb are superior on all models to the F-80 although runway requirements are longer. F-82's participation as an all-weather fighter was limited due to maintenance difficulties of the aircraft and poor performance of the AI equipment.

6. NAVY PARTICIPATION:

Navy participation consisted of fighters and limited shore-based radar for the full period of the exercise; and picket vessels and [illegible] aircraft for a limited period during the exercise.

a. Fighters: A minimum of four Navy fighters were available daily at Norfolk N.S., Atlantic City N.S. and Quonset Point N.S. The type of fighters employed were F-6's, F-8F's and F-4U's. Navy pilots were eager, well disciplined and exhibited a high degree of training in RT and communications procedures. Their VHF chatter was exactly one-half that of USAF pilots on any one mission. Their best fighter at altitude is the F-4U. The F-8F has a phenomenal rate of climb and very high speed in level flight but its operational ceiling is not high enough to make it an effective interceptor.

b. Picket Vessels: During the week 13-17 June inclusive, four picket vessels participated in the exercise. Three were deployed off-shore at designated locations to form an integral seaward extension of the air defense system. The fourth performed in a roving gap-filler capacity and replaced picket vessels at designated locations when directed by division commanders to do so.

Participation by picket vessels as a whole was unsatisfactory. Communications with shore-based radars and control centers was of necessity by HF radio. Frequencies initially allocated were too close to commercial frequencies, consequently valuable time was lost assigning new ones and monitoring to insure they were relatively free of interference. Thunderstorms during this period further complicated the communications problem. Radar equipment aboard the picket vessels was of early World War II type and maximum effectiveness was 70-80 miles. Normally, it was much less than that. Despite relatively poor performance as a whole, several interceptions were carried out by the pickets. The above is not to infer that picket

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "Big Coal". (Cont'd)

vessels do not have a definite place and function in the air defense system. Future employment of picket vessels in exercises will require a longer training and testing period communications-wise prior to actual operations.

c. [redacted] aircraft: Navy [redacted] aircraft, in conjunction with one picket vessel, operated on a limited basis during week of 20-24 June. The limited participation during this period did not permit a true and realistic evaluation of [redacted] capabilities in an air defense system. The inability to provide strike aircraft of suitable range to go beyond the radar range of the [redacted] aircraft-picket vessel necessitated positioning the picket vessel fairly close inshore and within the coverage of shore-based radar. Nevertheless, this was accomplished in order to check the communications, intelligence and telling aspects between [redacted] aircraft, picket vessels and land radar.

[redacted] equipment demonstrated a capability of performing E.W. and G.C.I. functions up to 18-20,000 feet under conditions of moderate seas. Communications were satisfactory.

[redacted] performance indicates this equipment is very desirable to provide surveillance for low approaches from seaward and to serve as gap-fillers for land and ship-based radar.

d. Radar: One Navy land-based training radar at Norfolk was incorporated in the air defense system but proved totally ineffective in adding any capability to the system.

7. ARMY PARTICIPATION:

First Army participated for the purpose of determining the value of Army air information collected through the medium of the air defense system as an aid to the Army in execution of its ground defense missions; and to effect a method of evaluating this information and disseminating it to appropriate Army units. Fifteen officers of the G-2 and G-3 Sections and from Civilian Component [redacted] units were apportioned among several Air Defense Command installations (HQ EAD and Grenier and Roslyn Air Defense Control Centers) as liaison officers, to secure air activity information for Army Headquarters and Army installations, and to pass pertinent ground information to the air defense commander. Operations centers were established at First Army Headquarters, at Forts Devens, Dix and Hancock and at Camp Edwards to receive and evaluate air raid information passed on by the liaison officers.

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Headquarters, Air Defense Command furnished commercial telephone circuits from liaison officers at air defense installations to Army Headquarters and installations. Approximately five hundred telephone messages were received during the exercise, principally plots of hostile bombers and friendly fighters. This system of communications was excellent as no time delays were incurred. To test time delays on T.T. messages, eight messages were dispatched from Mitchel AFB to First Army over the military teletype system. The average time delay for these messages was three hours and thirty-six minutes. Telephone communications were excellent and proved to be the optimum system for the discharge of this responsibility. First Army recommends that in the future direct communications be afforded Army installations direct to the nearest air defense installation capable of providing the desired information and that the circuits between Air Defense Control Centers and Army Headquarters be eliminated. Air raid information required at Army Headquarters level will be obtained from Headquarters, Eastern Air Defense and relayed by telephone or teletype.

8. CAA PARTICIPATION:

CAA participation in this exercise was based on a jointly approved "Plan for the Security Control of Civil Air Traffic", dated 1 April 1949, and consisted generally of providing flight plan data on IFR and over-water flights in or near the defended area. During this exercise, two systems of transmitting this flight plan data to air defense agencies were tested:

a. In the area covered by the Boston CAA Air Route Traffic Control Center, flight plan information was passed directly to the radar stations concerned.

b. In the area covered by the New York CAA Air Route Traffic Control Center, flight plan information was passed to the air defense control center only. Here the data was plotted by Air Defense Command personnel and passed at the proper time to the radar stations concerned.

It was determined that the system utilized at Boston was the more satisfactory of the two as it was proved that any method which permits direct communications between the CAA ARTCC and the ADC radar stations affords a more expeditious means of communications.

It was anticipated that CAA Security Controllers in both Boston and New York Control Centers would be communicating with ADC personnel who were unfamiliar with CAA interphone procedures, phraseology and techniques. Accordingly simplified procedures were set up by CAA for the period of the exercise. These procedures did much to assure smooth operations, although it was evident throughout the exercise that a need existed for the development of a training course which would emphasize uniform methods, standard procedures, techniques, phraseology, good communications habits and circuit discipline.

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "SKY C J CK". (Cont'd)

9. RCAF PARTICIPATION:

a. The RCAF participated throughout the maneuver with both fighters and radar. Fighters (Vampires) were stationed near Ottawa, approximately ninety miles southwest of Ottawa at Uplands Field and a limited number near Toronto. Fighters performed very well, effecting interceptions on every sortie except one when mechanical difficulties forced a return to base. Fighters were passed from Canadian to U. S. control on several occasions when interceptions were made.

b. Three AMES-11 radars were deployed at approximately the same locations as fighters and formed an integral part of the air defense system, being linked to adjacent USAF radars and the Control Center at Pine Camp by land-lines and radio communication. One USAF TPS-10 height finder was utilized to good advantage at Ottawa. Radars performed well, although indications were that AMES-11 radars do not have the range of comparable USAF sets.

10. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The air defense system concept of decentralization of control was not given a fair or adequate test for reasons enumerated in 5 a, above. Enough data and experience was gained however, to prove that this concept is basically sound and desirable.

b. As a training exercise, SKY CJ CK was outstandingly successful. By arousing a degree of initiative and enthusiasm on the part of operating personnel, this exercise was the equivalent of many months training under normal conditions. The increased capability of men and equipment at the conclusion of the exercise was readily apparent.

c. The defended area was too large for the forces charged with its defense.

d. Picket vessels and [illegible] aircraft must inevitably be employed in key localities in the ultimate air defense system for the U.S. despite inconclusiveness of their employment in this exercise.

e. This exercise served as a basis for getting a model air defense system operational and the RCAF personnel out to operational sites.

f. This exercise served admirably in getting the three services together and arousing an interest and appreciation in the air defense task, and the role each can play in it.

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Report of the Air Defense Exercise "BLACKJACK". (Cont'd)

11. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That in order to add realism and test our capabilities an air defense maneuver be scheduled in the northeast during the winter months. Invariably maneuvers are scheduled for the summer months in order to lessen the problem.

b. That future maneuvers be conducted on a size and scale commensurate with the size and capability of unit(s) charged with carrying out the exercise.

c. That the importance of the proposed exercises for FY 1950 and FY 1951 in the northeast, northwest and Albuquerque areas be impressed upon higher headquarters in order that sufficient funds and units may be allocated for their successful conduct.

d. That every effort be made to have Strategic Air Command participate in future exercises by providing the necessary high altitude bomber strikes. Much of the realism and value of BLACKJACK was lost when S.C no longer provided the strike aircraft.

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DA 354.2

23 March 1949

SUBJECT: Army Participation in "Exercise Blackjack"

TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, 1660 East Hyde Park Boulevard, Chicago, Ill.

1. A field exercise under the code name "Blackjack" is to be conducted by the Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command during the months of May and June 1949.

2. The purpose of this exercise is to test the air defense system of the northeastern United States. As this system incorporates new air defense techniques based upon experience gained in World War II, and new tactical and materiel developments since then, it is considered primarily an Air Force exercise.

3. It is thought, however, that your command may be interested in participating on a Command Post Exercise and/or observer bases. If this proposal receives your favorable consideration, details and the degree of participation can be worked out with representatives of this command. In view of the time element, it is suggested that this conference be arranged at the earliest possible date.

4. Letters have also been forwarded to the Commanding Generals of the First and Second Armies relative to the above.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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AHFEC(6) 354 (23 Mar 49) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Army Participation in "Exercise Blackjack"

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY, Governors Island, New York 4, N.Y., 5 April 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

1. This Headquarters is interested in participating in "Exercise Blackjack" on an observer basis. It is assumed that this exercise will be carried on concurrently at several Air Force Bases within the First Army Area. It is proposed to have selected officers from all components of the Army, observe the new air defense equipment and techniques at Air Force installations nearest to their permanent stations.

2. Confirming telephone conversation of 4 April 1949, between Colonel Biever, Continental Air Command, and Lt Col. Feindel, G-3 Section, this Headquarters, representatives of the G-3 and Artillery Sections, Headquarters First Army will attend a conference at Headquarters Continental Air Command, on Wednesday, 6 April 1949. Additional information on "Exercise Blackjack", together with appropriate locations and dates for observation, scope of activity or demonstrations, and number of observers that can be accomodated, may be determined on that date.

FOR THE ARMY COMMANDER:

s/t/ E. P. CRANDELL
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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Army Participation in "Exercise Blackjack".
DA 354.2 (5 Apr 1949) 1st Ind.

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 25 Apr 1949

TO: Commanding General, Second Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

1. This headquarters is presently preparing a plan for "Exercise Blackjack" which will include boundaries of the area over which this exercise is to be conducted and the locations of the operational control centers taking part in "Blackjack".

2. The 672nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Washington National Airport, Washington D. C. has been designated as the Air Defense Control Center in your Army area and its commanding officer will be directed to receive personnel of your headquarters who are to participate in the exercise on an observer basis. Direct contact with this commander is suggested, informing him of the names of observers, dates of arrival, and their length of stay.

3. Due to the security classification established for Control Centers, all observers are required to hold a secret clearance. It is requested that a statement be included in your correspondence that observers listed hold a secret clearance.

4. In view of the Secret classification of Air Defense Control Centers, observer participation by members of the civilian components is precluded.

5. As it is planned to utilize the control period (1 May to 15 May 1949) to test electronics surveillance communications equipments for the purpose of eliminating any irregularities, it is suggested that observers delay their visit until after this period.

6. Strikes will be run in the Washington Air Defense Control area during May 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26 and 27; those of 18 and 23 May will be made at night. Future dates of strikes will be forwarded your headquarters.

7. With reference to para 3 of basic letter, this headquarters has extended an invitation to Commanding General, Fourth Army to include interested personnel of Antiaircraft Artillery Training Center, Fort Bliss, Texas.

FOR THE C OMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
1660 East Hyde Park Boulevard
Chicago 15, Illinois

AG 354.2 (ALPGG) 8 April 1949

SUBJECT: Army Participation in "Exercise Blackjack."

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Reference is made to your letter, DA 354.2, 23 March 1949, subject same as above.

2. This headquarters desires particularly to participate in "Exercise Blackjack" on an observer basis.

3. Had more time been available, participation in a joint CPX would have been welcome.

4. Pending receipt of more detailed information concerning number and duration of observer periods, location of exercise, a tentative commitment of two observers from this headquarters is made.

5. A conference on the exercise, time and place to be designated by you, is favorably considered.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ H. S. THATCHER
Lt Col., AGD
Asst Adjutant General

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Army Participation in "Exercise Blackjack".
DA 354.2 (6 Apr 1949) 1st Ind.

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 25 Apr 1949

TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, 1660 East Hyde Park Boulevard, Chicago 15, Illinois.

1. The 645th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Selfridge AFB, Detroit, Michigan has been designated as the Air Defense Control Center in your Army area and its commanding officer will be directed to receive personnel of your headquarters who are to participate in the exercise on an observer basis. Direct contact with this commander is suggested informing him of the names of observers, dates of arrival and their length of stay.

2. Due to the security classification established for Control Centers, all observers are required to hold a secret clearance. It is requested that a statement be included in your correspondence that observers listed hold a secret clearance.

3. In view of the Secret classification of Air Defense Control Centers, observer participation by members of the civilian components is precluded.

4. As it is planned to utilize the control period (1 May to 15 May 1949) to test electronics surveillance communications equipments for the purpose of eliminating any irregularities, it is suggested that observers delay their visit until after this period.

5. Strikes will be run in the Selfridge Air Defense Control area during May 17, 18, 23, 26 and 27; those of 18 and 23 May will be made at night. Future dates of strikes will be forwarded your headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/st/ [illegible]. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

26 April 1949

DA 354.2

SUBJECT: Army Participation in "Exercise Blackjack".

TO : Commanding General, First Army, Governors Island, New York 4, N. Y.

1. Reference is letter this headquarters DA 354.2 dated 28 March 1949 subject as above with 1st Ind. your headquarters, dated 5 April 1947 and conference held at this headquarters 6 April 1949, with representatives of your Command concerning "Exercise Blackjack".

2. The following Air Defense Control Centers will be located within your Army area:

646th Aircraft Control and Warning Sq., Roslyn, L. I., N. Y.
647th Aircraft Control and Warning Sq., Grenier AFB, Manchester, N. H.
648th Aircraft Control and Warning Sq., Pine Camp, Watertown, N. Y.

Commanding Officers of these Air Defense Control Centers will be directed to receive personnel of your headquarters who are to participate in the exercise on an observer bais. Direct contact with these commanders is suggested informing them of the names of observers, dates of arrival, and their length of stay.

3. Due to the security classification established for Control Centers, all observers are required to hold a secret clearance. It is requested that a statement be included in your correspondence that observers listed hold a secret clearance.

4. Because a classification of Secret has been established for Air Defense Control Centers, representation by members of the civilian components is precluded.

5. Since it is planned toutilize the control period 1 May to 15 May 1949) to test electronics surveillance communications equipments for the purpose of eliminating any irregularities, it is suggested that observers delay their visit until after this period.

6. Strikes will be run in the Air Defense Control Center areas listed in para. 3 above during May 17, 18, 20, 23 and 27, those of 18 and 23 May will be made at night. Future dates of strikes will be forwarded your headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF

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Army Participation In "Exercise Blackjack"
DA 354.2 (14 April 1949) 2d Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 2 May 1949

TO: Commanding General, Fourth Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

1. With reference to paragraph 1 of basic communication, the Strategic Air Command will not participate in "Exercise Blackjack" as originally planned due to subsequent commitments. The exercise will be conducted with units of the Continental Air Command comprising the striking forces.

2. The following units, at locations indicated, have been designated as Air Defense Control Centers during "Exercise Blackjack" and are those that will be located nearest to your headquarters.

a. 645th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Selfridge Air Force Base, Mt. Clemens, Michigan.

b. 672d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Washington National Airport, Washington, D.C.

3. Commanding Officers of above listed Air Defense Control Centers have been directed to receive personnel of your command who are to participate in the exercise on an observer basis. Direct contact with these commanders is suggested informing them of the names of observers, dates of arrival and their length of stay.

4. Due to the classification established for Control Centers, all observers are required to hold a SECRET clearance. It is requested that a statement be included in your correspondence indicating that observers hold a SECRET clearance.

5. In view of the SECRET classification of Air Defense Control Centers, observer participation by members of the Civilian Components is precluded.

6. Since it is planned to utilize the period 1 May to 15 May 1949 to test electronics surveillance communications equipments for the purpose of eliminating any irregularities, it is suggested that observers visit during the period 15 May to 30 June 1949 as operations will take place on a daily basis during this period.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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FM CG SAC Offutt AFB Omaha Nebr

TO CG ConAC Mitchel AFB, NY

Info CS USAF Wash DC

/ R E S T R I C T E D / DO2A 5471. This command is prepared to participate in Operation Blackjack during the period of 2 May 1949 through 24 June 1949 as agreed between ConAC and SAC during the period 2 May 1949 and 28 May 1949, SAC aircraft will overfly your radar net stations for the sole purpose of providing Plotting, Searching, and Interception practice for your units. No effort to escape evade detection and interception or jam search radar will be made

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Hq Continental Air Command

routine

Chief of Staff USAF Wash 25, D.C.

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Ref.AFOOP-C50443

SAC Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebr

3107 . Pursuant AFOOP-C50443 staff officer of ADC visited SAC on 27 January. Preliminary factors reference Blackjack discussed and basis for planning purposes established. SAC will simulate combat missions over defended area in conjunction with SAC Res training during May-June Blackjack Exercises and on continuing basis thereafter. SAC will issue Field Orders in advance so that type formations routes, timing etc can be coordinated with ADC. ADC presently plans use of all continental fighter units for limited period at some time during exercises. SAC concurs in use of 27 and 82 Fighter Wings defensively during portion of exercises. Representatives of ADC will proceed Hq USAF within 10 days to discuss present plans for Blackjack. ADC and SAC propose conference at Headquarters USAF about the 10th of March to coordinate final plans for Exercises and sfe fund requirements.

CG ConAC

Official Business

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Headquarters Ninth Air Force
Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia

9AF 354.2

SUBJECT: Exercise "Blackjack" OT

12 May 1949

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. It is requested that consideration be given to utilizing the following Air National Guard Squadrons during certain phase of Operation "Blackjack":

104th Fighter Squadron, Baltimore, Maryland
121st Fighter Squadron, Washington, D.C.
142nd Fighter Squadron, Wilmington, Delaware
149th Fighter Squadron, Richmond, Virginia

2. It is believed these units will welcome an opportunity to participate in this Exercise on Weekends as a medium for excellent training in air defense tactics.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

t/ F. L. BAXTER
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Exercise "BLACKJACK"
RG 354.2 (12 May 49)

1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 31 May 1949

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. The feasibility of utilizing Air National Guard organizations during operation "Blackjack" was previously examined by representatives of this headquarters and Headquarters USAF. It was determined that Air National Guard participation would not be possible during the months of May and June, primarily because Air National Guard units have completed their field training for fiscal year 1949 and there are no National Guard funds available for further active duty periods during this fiscal year. Secondly, "Blackjack" missions are being run Monday through Friday exclusive of week ends.

2. Air Defense Command is preparing missions for specialized air defense training for the fighter group to which squadrons listed in basic are assigned. This specialized training is to be conducted as part of the Operational Readiness Test to be given this group during its period of summer field training. Similar missions for specialized training are being prepared for certain other Air National Guard squadrons which will be in field training in the northeast area during the summer.

3. Although Exercise "Blackjack" terminates 30 June 1949, the air defense system will remain in operation. It is planned to continue missions similar to the missions presently being conducted in Exercise "Blackjack" and to utilize Air National Guard squadrons in field training to the extent possible as part of the air defense force. These units will be operated from their training bases, in coordination with regular fighter units, under the control of the Aircraft Control and Warning net as presently established.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/s/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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

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SUBJECT: Exercise "Blackjack".

TO: Commanding General, Headquarters First Air Force, Fort Slocum New York.

Same ltr to 4th, 14th & 14th AF's

1. Enclosed is "Exercise Plan 'Blackjack'" as approved by this Headquarters. It is desired that action required of you as indicated in the body of the Plan and its Annexes be accomplished in accordance with the provisions therein.

2. Operational control of the following elements will pass to the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, for the period of time indicated:

503d Aircraft Control and Warning Group

In place from 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

4th Fighter Wing

One (1) squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 15 May 1949.

One (1) squadron at Langley Air Force Base, 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949 to 2359, 30 June 1949.

Note: a. The 4th Fighter Wing will provide pilots to ferry four (4) F-80 aircraft to England in May.

b. The entire Wing will move to Langley Air Force Base prior to 1 June 1949.

c. Approximately six (6) aircraft and crews have been committed for gunnery meet during the period 1-15 May 1949.

14th Fighter Wing

One (1) squadron at Dow Air Force Base, 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

One (1) squadron at Stewart Field, 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949, to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

354 v Maneuvers

AGO Form No. AG 5 March 1948

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Note: a. Approximately five (5) aircraft and crews have been committed for a gunnery meet during the period 1-15 May 1949.

b. An Operational Readiness Test is scheduled during the period 18-22 May 1949, to be accomplished in conjunction with or so as not to conflict with Exercise "Blackjack".

33d Fighter Wing

One (1) squadron at Otis Air Force Base, 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

Note: a. Approximately six (6) aircraft and crews have been committed for a gunnery meet during the period 1-15 May 1949.

b. An Operational Readiness Test is scheduled during the period 3-7 May 1949, to be accomplished in conjunction with or so as not to conflict with Exercise "Blackjack".

c. One (1) Squadron is committed to Operation "Tarheel" during the period 1-21 May 1949.

20th Fighter Wing

One (1) squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, 0001 EDST, 1 June 1949 to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

Note: a. One (1) squadron is committed to Operation "Tarheel" until 21 May 1949.

b. Approximately five (5) aircraft and crews have been committed for a gunnery meet during the period 1-15 May 1949.

c. An Operational Readiness Test is scheduled during the period 1-7 June 1949, to be accomplished in conjunction with or so as not to conflict with Exercise "Blackjack".

52d Fighter Wing (All Weather)

One squadron at Mitchel Air Force Base, 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 15 May 1949.

Four (4) F-82F aircraft and crews at Mitchel AFB, 2359 EDST, 15 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

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Four (4) F-82F aircraft and crews at Andrews AFB, 2359 EDST, 16 May 1949 to 2359, 30 June 1949.

Four (4) F-82F aircraft and crews at Selfridge AFB, 2359 EDST, 16 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

Four (4) F-82F aircraft and crews at Grenier AFB, 2359 EDST, 16 May 1949 to 2359, 30 June 1949.

Note: a. Approximately six (6) aircraft and crews have been committed for a gunnery meet for the period 1-15 May 1949.

b. An Operational Readiness Test has been scheduled during the period 10-14 May 1949, to be accomplished in conjunction with or so as not to conflict with Exercise "Blackjack."

56th Fighter Wing

One (1) squadron at Selfridge AFB, 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

Note: a. Approximately five (5) aircraft and crews have been committed for a gunnery meet during the period 1-15 May 1949.

b. The 56th Fighter Wing will provide pilots to ferry approximately nine (9) F-80 aircraft to England in May.

c. One (1) squadron is committed during the period 23 May-1 July 1949, to support from Tyndall AFB, the Aircraft Control and Warning Controllers Course.

d. The wing is committed to support the making of a training film during the entire period of Exercise "Blackjack," however, this commitment will not be permitted to interfere with commitments to "Blackjack".

82d Fighter Wing

One (1) squadron at Grenier AFB, 0001 EDST, 1 May 1949 to 2359 EDST, 30 June 1949.

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Ltr to CG, 1st AF, subject: "Exercise 'Blackjack'", continued.

DO/TNW/87/lp
22Apr'49

Note: a. Approximately six (6) aircraft and crews are committed to a gunnery meet during the period 1-15 May 1949.

b. One (1) squadron is committed to "Tarheel" during the period 1-21 May 1949.

3. At such time as any of your elements listed in paragraph 2 above, are not required in the accomplishment of any phase of Exercise "Blackjack," the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, will temporarily return operational control of those elements to you in order that routine organizational training can be continued. Unless otherwise directed by the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, elements temporarily returned to your control will remain at their exercise locations indicated in Annex "B" of the plan.

4. Your Element Commanders are authorized to make local arrangements for joint training with elements of the 503d Aircraft Control and Warning Group during the period they (both the elements of the Tactical Unit and the element of the Control Group) have been released from your operational control.

5. It is desired that you submit to this headquarters a request for funds required to accomplish this exercise at the earliest practicable date.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

JACOB E. SMART
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations.

1 Incl:
"Exercise 'Blackjack'". (10 cys)

Identical ltr sent to 9th, 19th and 14th Air Forces

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
CLASSIFIED INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Exercise "BLACKJACK"

1 30Sep DO 067

1. I believe decentralization of control from Control Centers down to individual radars is only applicable to a routine situation. The Defense Centers must retain operational control, certainly in the initial stages of any scramble action to prevent the misuse of fighters, to conserve our effort and to have the appropriate number of fighters available against the proper targets. I believe decentralization is good as a training feature only.

2. Re the recommendations on page 8 of the report, I believe that:

a. We do not need specific maneuvers in order to make these tests. There are sufficient aircraft now in the air to continue this training on a 365-day basis.

b. As in a. above.

c. Concur

d. Concur

s/ HST
t/ HERBERT B. THATCHER, Brig Gen
USAF - Deputy for Operations

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
CLASSIFIED INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Exercise "BLACKJACK"

2 O&T P&O (Col Lee) DCS DO

1. The decentralization of control was believed essential in order to:

a. Reduce the communications requirements.

b. Reduce the time actually required to intercept an enemy.

c. Provide a more flexible defense over a greater area.

2. The Division Commander at the Control Center is still the Master Controller and can take over complete control any time he sees such action is warranted. The GCI's keep the Control Center informed of every decision made and the Control Center can override any or all of these decisions. Control of aircraft scrambled by a certain GCI can be transferred to another GCI by the Control Center as the situation dictates. Time lost by filtering information to the Control Center, and then scrambling interceptors, has prevented interceptions being made before "hostile" aircraft reach the "bomb release" point. It is believed that this undesirable situation will eventually be overcome when Controllers and interceptor pilots become more experienced and adapted to the modified decentralized control.

3. The directorate will make very effort, in

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
CLASSIFIED INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Exercise "BLACKJACK"

(continued - Page 2)

2	10 Oct	O&T	P&O (Col Lee) DCE DO	coordination with other interested staff agencies, to further evaluate the decentralized control during the Air Defense Maneuvers in the MM area (Operations Overgreasy).

s/ Cox
t/ RALPH L. COX
Major, USAF
Ext 6256

s/ DEM
t/ DOLF E. MUEHLEISEN
Colonel, USAF
Director, Ops & Trng

3	12 Oct	P&O Req	DCE	1. Concur in O&T comments. 2. Believe this matter should be discussed further with Gen. Thatcher at his convenience. 3. Believe certain maneuver tests must be held as commercial A/C do not simulate enemy E/A sufficiently for all tests. Much vluable training can be gained using general traffic.

s/ I.D.Lee
Col. Ext 1147

st/ JAMES H. PRICE
Col., USAF
Dir, P&O Ex 7244

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
CLASSIFIED INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Exercise "BLACKJACK"

3	25Oct	P&O	DO	1. Concur in O&T comments. 2. The Division Controller must remain in command of operations. He should be able to assign, reassign or cancel one or more fighters that are on alert status to their normal GCI controller for scrambling. Approximately 20 minutes elapses between scramble and the actual interception during which time the Division Controller can order the GCI controller to call off, divert or land the scrambled fighters. The GCI controller gets no more fighters for scrambling until the Division Controller assigns them to him. 3. I believe the practice of assigning fighters to GCI control for scrambling is a wise and useful practice.

s/ M. J. McK
t/ M. J. McKINNEY
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Plans Div
Ext 2143

s/ P
t/ JAMES H. PRICE
Colonel, USAF
Dir Plans & Orgn
Ext 7244

DO	O&T	Your [redacted] 2 comment 2 and my note express same thought believe it must be made very clear. s/ H.B.T.

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FM Hq USAF Wash D C 21/2150Z Priority

TO CG ConAC Mitchel AFB, CG, SAC Offutt AFB Omaha Nebr

INFO CG AMC Wright-Patterson AFB Dayton Ohio

/ R E S T R I C T E D / From AFOOP-C 55766 REDUR AFOOP-C 54967 referenced message is hereby rescinded. Exercise Lookout will be the one-sided aircraft warning and air raid defense exercises presented this Hq by ADC during conferences 17 June 1949. Exercise will be conducted by ConAC conjunction with OCD during Sept 49. A few SAC Bombardment Aircraft, under conditions specified by ConAC, will be made available for use on predetermined routes and altitudes for high altitude tests. Low altitude test of ground observer net will be made by ConAC aircraft augmented by 82/D Fighter Group of AMC. Due to limitation of object classification 99, aircombat maneuver funds, FY 1950, only $18,625.00 can be made available to ConAC from funds reserved in this Hq. This amount is ½ of total requirement ($37,250) agreed to during conference; the remaining ½ will come from $100,000 classification 99 funds presently programmed for ConAC for FY 1950.

Direct communication between SAC and ConAC for working out of details is authorized

/ R E S T R I C T E D /

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REPORT OF AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE "LOOKOUT"

1. GENERAL:

Exercise LOOKOUT was held during the period 10-16 September 1949, in the area of the northeastern seaboard containing the Air Defense Control Areas of the Grenier Air Division and the 26th Air Division. This area comprised a whole or part of the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware. (See Appendix 1.) This report is a general resume of operations conducted, results obtained, conclusions and recommendations. Dunlap and Associates, Inc., a civilian study and analysis firm, is preparing a detailed report on the Exercise, utilizing the mass of data and reports obtained during the Exercise period. This report will be available in mid-January 1950.

2. PURPOSE:

The purpose of Exercise LOOKOUT was to test the organization, procedures and techniques of the northeast air defense system. Specific objectives of the Eastern Air Defense Force during this Exercise were:

a. To test the techniques and deployment of the proposed Ground Observer System.

b. To test the proposed Civil Air Raid Warning System.

c. To train fighter and aircraft control and warning units in air defense operations.

d. To test the effectiveness of plans for the control for identification purposes of military and civil air traffic in specified areas.

e. To test the performance of radar equipment.

f. To test the communications network.

g. To test air defense SOP's.

h. To integrate the air defense capability of the United States Navy with the United States Air Force air defense system.

i. To evaluate procedures for furnishing appropriate Army commands with required information for the conduct of active and passive defense measures.

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "LOOKOUT"

3. PARTICIPATING UNITS:

a. The area of Exercise LOOKOUT was divided into three Air Division Areas, two of which incorporated the Ground Observer Corps - Aircraft Warning Service organization, and ground control of interceptors. The third divisional area furnished early warning information only.

b. The participating forces in Exercise LOOKOUT were as follows:

(1) Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force.

(2) The Ground Observer Corps - Aircraft Warning Service (Provisional) (U. S. Coast Guard facilities were incorporated in the Ground Observer Corps).

(3) Civil Air Raid Warning Key Point Personnel.

(4) Strike forces provided by:

(a) Strategic Air Command

(b) Air National Guard

(c) Continental Air Command

(5) Fighter interceptors provided by:

(a) Continental Air Command fighter units

(b) United States Navy fighter units

(6) 26th Air Division

(7) Grenier Air Division (Provisional)

(8) Pine Camp Air Division (Provisional)

(9) 503rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group

(10) Two CAA Air Traffic Control Centers

(11) Olmsted Military Flight Service Center

(12) Headquarters First Army by:

(a) G-3, First Army and Fort Jay, N.Y.

(b) AACR Boston, Massachusetts

(c) AACR Bronx, New York

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "LOOKOUT"

4. OPERATIONS CONDUCTED:

a. Strike Forces: The Ground Observer System operated four hours daily for the first five days and twelve hours daily during the last two days of the Exercise. These periods included both hours of daylight and darkness. A total of 32 strike missions were flown by units of the Air National Guard, the Strategic Air Command and the Continental Air Command in the LOOKOUT area during this period. The size of these strike forces varied from two-ship B-26 and B-29 formations to 12-ship F-47 and B-26 formations. Strikes were flown at altitudes between 500 and 30,000 feet. The routes flown were scheduled in a manner to give as many ground observers as possible an opportunity to call in a report to a filter center and at the same time provide Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force with data related to the capability of the air defense system when linked to the Ground Observer Corps. Skies were overcast during approximately 60% of the time that the Ground Observer System was operating, thus limiting visual observation by the ground observers.

b. Radars: Thirteen radar stations were employed as combined early warning and ground-controlled interception stations in the LOOKOUT area. Another four stations deployed adjacent to the area furnished early warning information. During the Exercise these radars averaged a range of 86 miles for targets above 10,000 feet, and 71 miles for targets below 10,000 feet. This low average was in the main caused by the very poor performance of three particular stations, however.

c. Identification Procedures:

(1) The identification concept used during LOOKOUT deviated from the concept employed for Exercise BLACKJACK and overloaded the communications circuits and personnel. During LOOKOUT, all instrument flights and military VFR flights were reported to the air defense system by CAA Air Traffic Control Centers, and Military Flight Service Centers, respectively. During BLACKJACK, only those flights entering the area from the North and East were reported to the system by these agencies. The original concept was changed because of the addition of the ground observers who reported tracks to the system from over the entire area. For the correlation believed necessary in identifying flights, each GCI station received flight plans on all flights entering its area of responsibility.

(2) The system used in distributing CAA flight plans directly to the GCI stations proved to be sound. Much extraneous conversation was carried on, however, by the GCI identification clerks who were inexperienced

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in their duties. Flight plans from Military Flight Service were sent to the Roslyn Control Center where they were sorted and sent to the GCI stations concerned. Inexperienced personnel caused delays in handling these flight plans and in many cases flight plans were not received at the GCI stations in time to be of value to their controllers. Had each station been connected to Military Flight Service on a direct circuit, as they were to the CAA Air Traffic Control Centers, the delays would have been reduced due to the fact that the relay by the Roslyn Control Center would have been omitted. However, the added expense of such circuits prohibited their installation for this exercise.

(3) Code words for strike forces, to be used to distinguish strike forces from friendly traffic, were not always used by the agencies responsible. The improper use of these code words placed an additional burden on the communications circuits and personnel that were assigned for processing flight plan information.

(4) To assist the stations in identifying hostile and controlling fighters, IFF Codes 4 and 3, respectively, were used. Performance of IFF was excellent and in many cases surpassed the range of its associated radar.

d. Ground Observer Corps - Aircraft Warning Service (Provisional):

The Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning Service (Provisional) was organized during the period 20 April 1949 to 10 September 1949, in the areas of the Cronier Air Division and the 26th Air Division. Initial calculations required the manning of 1208 aircraft observation posts for the complete coverage of the area, based on 32 square miles coverage per observation post.

(1) Recruiting: The recruiting of personnel for the Ground Observer Corps was delegated to the Office of the Assistant of Civil Defense Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This office delegated recruiting responsibilities to states through governors of the ten states involved, who in turn appointed temporary civil defense state agencies to handle the job for that particular state. Each state used forces or organizations available to effect recruiting of the Corps. No two states utilized the same type of recruiting system.

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(2) Results of Recruiting: The following table indicates results achieved in forming observation posts by 10 September 1949:

State & Coast Guard	Number of O.P.s Required	O.P.s Actually Organized	% of O.P.s Organized
Maine	20	7	35.1
New Hampshire	163	70	43
Vermont	83	24	45.3
Massachusetts	240	59	24.6
Rhode Island	43	21	48.8
Connecticut	150	144	96.9
New York	149	72	48.4
Pennsylvania	140	59	42.2
Delaware	5	4	80
New Jersey	304	61	30
Coast Guard	45	45	100
TOTAL	1208	566	46.8

(3) Filter Centers: Filter centers were necessary to receive the calls from the Ground Observer Corps—Aircraft Warning Service and were constructed in temporary locations in the following cities: Manchester, New Hampshire; New Haven, Connecticut; Providence, Rhode Island; Trenton, New Jersey; White Plains, New York.

(4) Filter Center Personnel: Personnel required to operate each filter center were recruited through local civil defense agencies, there being a minimum requirement of 100 people per filter center required to operate the filter center during the test period. The personnel recruited for each filter center and the average hours of participation per person are enumerated below:

Filter Center	Personnel Recruited	Average Man Hours Per F.C. Personnel During LOOKOUT
Manchester	132	11 hrs. 9 min.
New Haven	209	8 " 21 "
Providence	108	10 " 11 "
Trenton (N & S)	188	15 " 6 "
White Plains	83	23 " 42 "
TOTAL	720	MEAN AVER 13 " 30 "

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(5) Ground Observer Corps Communications: The communications system used for the transmission of the Ground Observer Aircraft FLASH reports to the filter centers and the passing of the filtered track to the GCI station were commercial land-lines. During Exercise LOOKOUT the following communication factors were achieved:

(a) Total number of FLASH message calls during the 44-hour period - 29,473.

(b) Average time achieved from spotting of aircraft by the observer to plotting the aircraft at the GCI station - 116.8 seconds.

(c) Communication equipment at the filter boards were sufficient to receive all aircraft FLASH calls without overloading either the filter board or the commercial telephone system.

(6) Training of Plotters and Effectiveness of Plotting Equipment:

(a) The plotting equipment utilized in Exercise LOOKOUT was simple, and was designed primarily to eliminate every possible second in plotting procedure. The equipment and procedures were proven as adequate. Had there been complete coverage of Aircraft Observation Posts and with more training on the part of both the Observer Corps and the filter center plotters, a greater number of complete tracks could have been achieved. The spotty coverage of the Observer Corps prohibited complete aircraft tracks.

e. CIVIL AIR RAID WARNING SYSTEM:

(1) A Civil Air Raid Warning System involving the formation of 34 Key Point Air Raid Warning Centers and areas was formed in the Exercise LOOKOUT area. Special air raid warning telephone equipment was designed, manufactured, and installed at the Air Defense Control Centers at Cronier and Roslyn and at the 34 Key Point Air Raid Warning Centers enumerated below:

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PENNSYLVANIA,	Hazelton	NEW JERSEY,	Trenton
	Reading		Newark
	Philadelphia		Atlantic City
	Allentown		
	Stroudsburg	RHODE ISLAND,	Providence
	Scranton		Newport
NEW YORK,	New York	MAINE,	Portland
	Mineola		
	Riverhead	VERMONT,	Montpelier
	Poughkeepsie		
	White Plains	DELAWARE,	Wilmington
	Newburgh		
MASSACHUSETTS,	Boston	CONNECTICUT,	New Haven
	Fall River		Hartford
	Hyannis		New London
	Lawrence		Bridgeport
	Lowell		Stamford
	New Bedford		
	Springfield	NEW HAMPSHIRE,	Manchester
	Worcester		

(2) Personnel: Two mobilization assignees were trained and placed on duty during Exercise LOOKOUT to act as Civil Air Raid Warning Controllers at Grenier and Roslyn ADCC. The states selected personnel to operate the 34 Key Point Air Raid Warning Centers.

(a) During the Exercise, test calls were made to each of the 34 Key Point Air Raid Warning Centers. Progressive air raid warning test calls in the degree of Yellow, Blue, Red and White were sent to the Key Point Air Raid Warning Centers based on strike force missions over the LOOKOUT area. The average time achieved from placing the "warning call" to its acknowledgment by the Key Point Air Raid Warning Center chief was one minute and fifteen seconds. The above system was operated by utilizing existing Bell Telephone System toll circuits.

(b) During Exercise LOOKOUT, in conjunction with the Assistant for Civil Defense Liaison and the Radio Corporation of America, a sub-audible radio alarm system was tested. The sub-audible system utilizes existing commercial broadcast stations by superimposing upon their normal carrier a sub-audible note between 30 to 40 cycles that can only be picked up by specially designed receivers.

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "LOOKOUT"

This experiment was conducted to determine the feasibility of using radio broadcast stations as a secondary means of Civil Air Raid Warning in the defended zone and as an inexpensive means of dissemination of Civil AirRaid Warning to areas outside of a defended area. This test in principle was most successful, pointing the way to improving this radio equipment for more selective signalling of each type of warning signal.

f. Ground-Controlled Interception GCI - Fighter Team:

(1) A marked improvement in the quality of control of fighters by the GCI stations was evident during Exercise LOOKOUT. Initially flight leaders' response to controllers' directions was slow and caused much more radio conversation than would ordinarily be necessary. This condition improved greatly throughout the LOOKOUT period. In the initial phases of the Exercise, the fighters were poorly positioned for their attacks on the bombers, but improved as the controllers became better acquainted with the capabilities of the fighters and the relative speeds of the opposing forces at various altitudes. In some cases, interceptions could have been performed much quicker if the controllers had scrambled their fighters on track information that was passed to them from an adjacent station instead of waiting until they detected the target on their own scopes.

(a) Controller and Fighter Pilot Relations: Visits to GCI stations and talks with controllers proved worthwhile as those pilots had a better understanding of controller problems and achieved better overall interception results.

(2) Conditions of Alert: The F-84 aircraft had difficulty meeting the conditions of alert when they were ordered in the normal sequence, i.e., 15 minutes "Available" to 5 minutes "readiness" to 2 1/2 minutes "standby". The difficulty arises when the aircraft is moved under its own power to be in a position to meet the 5 minute and 2 1/2 minute conditions. Once the engine in the F-84 has operated, a re-start cannot be made until the excess fuel has drained from the engine, which normally requires 20 minutes. There were occasions

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during LOCKOUT when F-84 fighters were put on a "standby" condition, which required they be in position to become airborne in 2½ minutes. This condition required that the F-84's be placed adjacent to the downwind end of the active runway. The aircraft were taxied to that position rather than towed or parked there initially. Because of the time factor mentioned, it was not possible for these aircraft to assume these more advanced stages of alert within the required time limits.

(3) Scrambles:

(a) With exception of the F-84's, all fighters were scrambled within the time specified for the condition of alert existing at that time.

(b) There were occasions when controllers held fighters on a 2½ or 5 minute alert on the basis of ground observer reported tracks. Such tracks generally were short in length and not consistent in succession, which did not give the controller a track comparable to those usually received from his radar sources. Thus the controllers were hesitant to scramble fighters which they had placed in a high state of readiness, and frequently they reverted them to a less advanced condition of alert. Such alerting lowered the morale and confidence of the pilots because they felt that if the controller had made a sound evaluation of the information available to him, before he had placed them on such advanced states of alert, there should have been more scrambles subsequent to such alerts. However, such conditions will always exist to some degree in an alert air defense system.

(4) Communications:

(a) Each fighter unit was connected by a direct telephone line to the nearest GCI station capable of exercising initial ground control of the unit after a scramble. It was necessary in some instances to redesignate the GCI station which would exercise initial control because of radar operating deficiencies. The landline communication circuits provided proved to be adequate to care for such changes.

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(b) Each fighter squadron was assigned a common primary tactical frequency and seven of the eight squadrons were assigned a common secondary tactical frequency. In addition to these tactical frequencies, each squadron of the United States Navy and each group of the United States Air Force had its own unit frequency. The aircraft control and warning stations monitored the primary and secondary air force tactical frequencies, United States Navy squadron frequencies, the emergency frequency and the Navy common frequency. No trouble was experienced in air-to-ground communications by the Navy fighters. However, on many occasions the Air Force fighters had difficulty contacting their respective controllers on the primary tactical frequency because other Air Force fighters were transmitting simultaneously to other controllers. Greater use of the secondary tactical frequency would have alleviated to some degree the crowded condition on the primary tactical frequencies. Radio discipline was improved over Exercise BLACKJACK, but still left room for improvement.

6. Army Liaison:

(1) The First Army provided a liaison officer at Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force and liaison officers at Cronier Air Division and the 26th Air Division. The duty of these officers was to inform Headquarters First Army and Antiaircraft Operations Rooms in Boston, Massachusetts, and New York City respectively, of aerial activity that was of value or interest to those organizations.

(2) Communications provided for these liaison activities were one direct telephone circuit and one direct teletype circuit from Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force to Headquarters First Army; and a direct telephone circuit from 26th Air Division and Cronier Air Division to the AACRs at New York City and Boston, respectively. In addition to these circuits, a high frequency radio back-up was provided between the 26th Air Division and the AACR at New York City. These communications were adequate for the Army liaison conducted during the Exercise.

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "LOOKOUT"

h. Summary of Ground-Controlled Interceptions:

(1) For the purpose of LOOKOUT, a defense zone was established which covered approximately the area bounded by a line from Springfield, Massachusetts around Greater Philadelphia to Mitchel Air Force Base to New Bedford, Massachusetts, around Greater Boston to Springfield, Massachusetts. Strike forces were routed primarily to test ground observer reporting procedures and air defense standing operating procedures. The fighters were dispersed in conformance with a general defense pattern, and strike forces were routed to give GCI stations and fighters all possible opportunities of performing interceptions. Strike missions were usually routed on irregular courses running lengthwise through the LOOKOUT area. These routes were approximately 350 miles in length and the average time required by the strike forces to cover these routes was approximately one hour and twenty minutes.

(2) High altitude strikes were intercepted on an average of five times while on their routes through the area. These strikes did not use IFF until they entered the LOOKOUT area; consequently no strike was intercepted until it was well within the area. The GCI stations did not fully exercise overlap-tolling, which in many cases would have instigated earlier scrambles and more effective interceptions. However, once identified and intercepted, a strike generally was subjected to a succession of attacks. Adverse weather grounded all assigned fighters for fifty percent of the Exercise and the lack of operational all-weather fighters allowed many strikes to pass through the area unmolested.

(3) The low altitude strike missions were not effectively intercepted during this Exercise. The majority of them were flown below the coverage patterns of the GCI stations and much reliance was necessarily placed on the Ground Observer System. The Ground Observer System, because of its stage of organization, was neither capable nor expected to be capable of furnishing the air defense system reliable processed reports that could be used to vector fighters to effective interceptions. However, five interceptions were made

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against strikes flying between altitudes of 1000 and 5000 feet. The areas in which these interceptions were made were other than those areas covered by GCI radars, and the interceptions were based primarily on reports from the Ground Observer System. Overlapping telling of reports received from the Ground Observer System and radars did in some cases assist in effecting these interceptions. Interceptions made against low altitude strike missions were based on sketchy radar station reports and ground observer reports whereas interceptions made against high altitude strikes were based solely on radar information. A sequence of interceptions was usually made against a single high altitude strike, whereas a low altitude strike was seldom subjected to more than one interception.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The techniques evolved for the handling of the Ground Observer information were basically correct and adequate. A few changes are being incorporated in future planning to further reduce time delays. It has been determined that the density of the Observation Posts based on a spacing of 5.6 miles is too great. By mathematical analysis, a new spacing principle has been determined as 7.9 miles average. This principle is being used for future planning and reorganization. In spite of many apparent irregularities, it is concluded that the Ground Observer Corps will supply considerable aircraft detection data not otherwise available. With further training and perfection, the information will be more accurate and timely and will materially aid the GCI controllers in supplementing the radar surveillance data.

b. The Civil Air Raid Warning System equipments and techniques were completely adequate. Of the two methods tested, the telephone method met all requirements while the sub-audible radio method fell short in one respect, i.e., that an acknowledgment was not possible as designed.

(1) By the telephone method an overall average passing time achieved was 2.1 minutes from instant of origin by Civil Air Raid Warning officer to acknowledgment by Key Point Air Raid Warning Center. By additional training, it is concluded that this time interval can be reduced to the order of one minute. The time required for passing alerts via sub-audible radio is, for all practical purposes, instantaneous.

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c. GOI controllers and fighters greatly improved their operations during the Exercise period. The level of experience of the participating personnel has been more thoroughly appreciated and future exercises should reflect the related evaluations made during Exercise LOOKOUT.

d. The communications circuits and procedures used throughout the system were not adequate for efficient processing of identification information during this Exercise. The identification of flights in the New York City area was a tremendous task for the GOI stations concerned and was, at times, impossible to perform because of the prevailing high density of air traffic. The use of IFF, by both strike forces and fighters, greatly assisted controllers in directing interceptions; and for training maneuvers its use must be continued until a plan for the identification of all traffic is effected.

e. Radar performance was below the equipments' maximum capability due to location of equipment and state of training of operating personnel.

f. The communications network was inadequate because of the added load of identification messages, which were sent over circuits not specifically installed for that purpose. The amount of flight plan information relayed to GOI stations and the low capability of identification clerk personnel pointed out a requirement for additional telephone circuits to be used solely for identification messages during peacetime operations in congested areas.

g. With present facilities, F-84 aircraft are unable to meet all of the conditions of alert specified in ConAC Air Defense SOP No. 1.

h. The integration of the Navy squadrons into the air defense system created no problems and they participated effectively throughout the Exercise.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

As a result of the evaluation made of Exercise LOOKOUT, it is recommended that:

a. The Ground Observer Corps be extended in accordance with the new concept outlined herein and that the area tested during Exercise LOOKOUT be redesigned and reorganized. The filter center sites should be surveyed and secured and mobilization assignments should be given to reservists selected for the cadre of these centers. This cadre should be drawn from reservists living in the town or city selected as the filter center site.

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Report of Air Defense Exercise "LOOKOUT"

b. The Civil Air Raid Warning system be extended by phases to include the entire United States in accordance with current defense plans.

c. Greater priority be given to air defense training to allow the personnel of the air defense system more frequent and realistic practice by participating in a continuous air defense training program.

d. A study be made of the identification procedure to be used by the system when ground observers are included in exercises.

e. Emphasis be placed on the radar maintenance sections of the GCI stations to raise the low operational efficiency of radars that was predominant during LOOKOUT.

f. Additional communication circuits be added for use in processing identification messages when an identification concept such as that used in LOOKOUT is followed.

g. Facilities be provided to units equipped with F-84 aircraft to enable them to assume advanced states of readiness in accordance with ConAC SOP No. 1.

h. The procedures and communicative media used in scrambling fighters be further standardized throughout the air defense system.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

354.2 3 August 1949

SUBJECT: Naval Participation in Exercise LOOKOUT

TO : Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, U. S. Naval Base, Norfolk, 11, Virginia

1. Air Defense Command is presently planning an air defense exercise known as LOOKOUT which is to conducted in the northeast during the period 10 through 16 September. The major objective of this exercise are to test the techniques and deployment of the proposed Ground Observer System and to test the proposed Civil Air Raid Warning System. At the same time the exercise will furnish additional training for fighter and AC &W personnel.

2. The defended area will be roughly a 50-mile wide strip between Boston and Philadelphia. In the defense of this area the majority of the radars employed in Exercise BLACKJACK will be operational and it is presently anticipated that seven jet fighter squadrons, one conventional fighter squadron, and one all weather fighter squadron will be made available from regular USAF units.

3. This Headquarters and Headquarters, Air Defense Command are extremely desirous of Navy participation in this forth-coming exercise. It is requested that naval units provide one squadron of fighter aircraft at each of Quonset Point NAS and Atlantic City NAS, under the operational control of Air Defense Command and operating in a similar manner as did naval fighter units participating in Exercise BLACKJACK. In the event an entire squadron cannot be made available at the above-named locations, participation at these stations on a scale commensurate with availability of units is desirable and acceptable.

4. If you concur in the above, a conference will be scheduled at this Headquarters not later than 12 August for attendance by representatives of the headquarters and units concerned.

5. A copy of this letter is being sent for information to CNO, ComAirLant and Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DAD 354.2

2 September 1949

SUBJECT: IFF during Exercise "LOCKOUT".

TO : Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, 90 Church Street, New York, N. Y.

1. This headquarters is conducting air defense Exercise LOCKOUT from 10 September through 16 September 1949.

2. This exercise will include strikes by bomber aircraft against simulated targets, which lie between Cape May and Portland, Maine; and interceptions performed by Navy and Air Force fighters under the operational control of the Aircraft Control and Warning net. The bomber aircraft while performing strikes in the area will employ Code 4 on IFF Mark III and the defending fighters will use Code 3, IFF Mark III.

3. It is requested that Headquarters, Eastern Sea Frontier, take necessary action to insure that U.S. Navy units in this area refrain from using these IFF bands during the period of this exercise.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CC: Commander In Chief
Atlantic Fleet
Commander, Air Atlantic Fleet

s/ [illegible] R. RUFUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

4 August 1949

354.2

SUBJECT: Exercise LOOKOUT

TO : Administrator, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Washington 25, D. C.

ATTN : T-41

1. Air Defense Command is presently planning an air defense exercise under the code name LOOKOUT which will be conducted in the eastern part of the northeast defense area during the period 10 - 16 September. The major objectives of this exercise are to test the techniques and deployment of the proposed Ground Observer System and to test the proposed Civil Air Raid Warning System.

2. This Headquarters and Headquarters, Air Defense Command are extremely desirous of CAA participation in this exercise in a similar capacity and on a similar scale as that of CAA participation in Exercise BLACKJACK.

3. To fulfill the objectives of the exercise as stated above, the major portion of the exercise must necessarily be conducted during the hours of operation of the Ground Observer System. The tentative schedule of operation of this system calls for four hours of operation per day 10 - 14 September, each period being at a different time of day starting at 0800 on 10 September and ending at 0400 on 14 September. The last 24 hours of operation ending at 12 noon on 16 September is to be continuous.

4. Dependent upon your approval of CAA participation in LOOKOUT, it is requested that CAA representative (s) attend a meeting at Air Defense Command at 1000 on 12 August to discuss this matter in detail.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ T. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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FURTHER RELEASE PLEASE NOTE DATE

NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
Washington 25, D. C.

HOLD FOR RELEASE -
UNTIL 7:00 P.M. (EDST)
SATURDAY, JUNE 4, 1949

NO. 59-49A

RE 6700 EXT. 3201 - 3202

CIVILIANS IN 10 STATES WILL PARTICIPATE IN AIRCRAFT DETECTION AND WARNING TEST

Thousand of American citizens will take part in a 10-state aircraft detection exercise in September under the sponsorship of the Air Defense Command assisted by the Office of Civil Defense Planning, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson announced today.

The exercise, known as "Operation Lookout," will utilize both radar and ground observers in a test of long-range emergency air-raid defense plans.

"Operation Lookout" will use the services, on a volunteer basis, of enough civilians to man 1300 ground observation posts, as well as hundreds of supervisors to select observer personnel and posts. Duty periods at each post will be divided among approximately 20 people.

The region covered will comprise northern Delaware, eastern Pennsylvania, all of New Jersey, southeastern New York, all of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, eastern Vermont, southern New Hampshire, and southern Maine. Roughly the area lies between Portland, Maine, and Wilmington, Delaware.

The exercise, extending over a six-day period, will measure the efficiency of a combination of ground observers and radar stations in operating an aircraft detection and warning system.

Aircraft simulating enemy attackers will be tracked and information provided for the issuance of ample warnings to the civilian population and for Air Force interception purposes. No public alarms or warnings will actually be issued.

Recruiting of observers is a Civil Defense responsibility. In a meeting held recently in Washington by Aubrey H. Mellinger, Director of the Office of Civil Defense Planning, representatives of the 10 states included in the exercise expressed the willingness of their governors to cooperate with the OCDP in recruiting observers and assumed responsibility for organizing and manning the observation posts (OPs).

Under the present schedule, sectional supervisors throughout the test area will be recruited and organized by June 30. Supervisors will select chief observers who in turn will pick the personnel to man the OPs.

Areas involved have been mapped in one-mile grids, and the availability of telephone service within each grid is a factor in determining the exact location

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of each OP. The posts will be about 5.7 miles apart, or the equivalent in coverage of 32 square miles.

Between June 30 and September 1, posts will be organized and personnel trained to stand by for the test.

The Air Defense Command, under Major General Gordon P. Saville, with headquarters at Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, will undertake the training of personnel through direct correspondence with chief observers at the posts. It will also exercise operational supervision of the test.

Fighter and bomber aircraft will participate in "Operation Lookout", now scheduled for early September. Numerous types of planes will be used, flying at various altitudes and from different directions.

At previously announced intervals during hours of daylight and darkness, mockraids will be made to explore the efficacy of sight as well as hearing in detecting the approach of aircraft and in determing their types, altitudes, and directions. Posts will be manned only specified times, and then by rotated personnel.

Observer personnel, after being called to their posts, will report what they see or hear through a telephone network into filter centers. Reports will be evaluated at the filter centers and then relayed to Air Defense Control Centers (ADCC's) in the test area. Telephone companies will cooperate by tabbing OP phones and giving priority to their calls during test hours. Calls will be without expense to observers or to subscribers making their telephones available.

Radar stations will include only those already in existence, located mostly at temporary installations on military establishments such as air bases and ordnance depots.

Existing radar detectors, or even the much more extensive screen contemplated by recent legislation, do not provide complete surveillance of approaching aircraft. Hence the need for ground observers to supplement the radar detection.

Since radar is limited in its discrimination of aerial targets at low altitudes, it is frequently possible for airplanes to approach radar stations at altitudes below the lowest horizontal vision of the detectors.

The curvature of the earth permits airplanes to fly relatively close to a station before entering the straight-line scope of the detector. This limitation would be present even though radar stations were located at close intervals with overlapping fields of vision. Furthermore, the expense of placing stations close enough to furnish overlapping lateral coverage would be prohibitive.

In the event of an emergency, ground observers would be invaluable in spotting aircraft flying below the vision of each radar sight. Also, it is pointed out, radar detection gives only a silhouette picture, whereas observers can read insignia and distinguish other identifying markings.

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Thus, ground observers will offset the limitation of radar inherent in its line-of-sight characteristics.

The Ground Observer Corps, Aircraft Warning Service, performed an important service during World War II in assuring ample coverage over critical areas. The possibility of air attacks in another war has greatly increased since then; volunteer observers would have an even more valuable function in the event of any future emergency, Civil Defense officials stated.

Individuals volunteering and selected as observers for "Operation Lookout" will be asked to man their posts in all future times of need. Many are expected to be men and women who acted in a similar capacity in World War II. Personnel selected will necessarily have to be those who are generally ineligible for military service.

State civil defense heads who are participating in "Operation Lookout" are: Connecticut, Edward J. Hickey, Coordinator of Civil Defense Plans, 100 Washington Street, Hartford; Delaware, Colonel George Sylvester, Jr., Dover; Maine, Colonel Francis Farnum, Augusta; Massachusetts, Major General W. H. Harrison, Jr., the Adjutant General, Boston; New Hampshire, Brigadier General Charles F. Bowen, the Adjutant General, Concord; New Jersey, Leonard Dreyfuss, State House, Trenton; New York, Major General Karl F. Hausauer, Commanding General, New York State National Guard, 112 State Street, Albany 7; Pennsylvania, Colonel J. F. Kuhns, Harrisburg; Rhode Island, Brigadier General James A. Murphy, 1051 North Main Street, Providence; Vermont, Major General Merritt Edson, Montepelier.

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Hq Continental Air Command

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CG, Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB,
Omaha, Nebr

Priority

AFOOP-C 55766 Restricted

12065. Re AFOOP-C 55766. Present planning for Exercise Lookout indicates requirement for simulated bomber strikes against the Eastern part of the northeastern defense area as follows: 10 Sept during period 0800 to 1200 two strikes at 5,000 feet and two strikes at 10,000 to 20,000 feet; 11 Sept similar strikes during period 1200 to 1600; on 12 Sept similar strikes during period 1600 to 2000; on 13 Sept during period 2000 to 2400 two strikes at 5,000 feet and two strikes at 20,000 feet; on 14 Sept during period 2400 to 0400 strikes similar to those on 13 Sept; on 15 Sept two strikes at 5,000 feet during period 1200 to 1800 and two strikes at 5,000 feet during period 1800 to 2400; on 16 Sept two strikes at 5,000 feet during period 2400 to 0600 and two strikes at 5,000 feet during period 0600 to 1200. In addition there will be a requirement for a minimum of one high altitude strike per day during other than 4 and 6 hour periods listed above. Request your indications as to what portion of these requirements can be met by SAC bombers.

CG ConAC

Official Business

Restricted

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

15 December 1949

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SUBJECT: Coordination with Canada on Ground Observer System

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Complete low altitude coverage of the radar systems to be implemented by this Headquarters requires that the Ground Observer System should be augmented by coverage in Canada north of Lake Ontario, Lake Erie, and Lake Huron by the Canadian Ground Observer System. This Canadian system, in addition to effecting low coverage for the Canadian radar system, should implement early warning north of the Great Lake region. Without this coverage, there is no low altitude protection (warning) for such key cities as Detroit, Michigan; Toledo, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Erie, Pennsylvania; Buffalo, New York; and Rochester, New York.

2. The following action has been taken regarding the Canadian Ground Observer System. A representative of the RCAF Air Defense Group visited the U. S. Air Defense Command Headquarters during June 1949, and discussed the Ground Observer System as contemplated by the U. S. Air Defense Command. At this time arrangements were made to have responsible officials of the Bell Telephone Company of Canada visit the Air Defense Command to learn the technical implications of forming a Ground Observer Corps and implementing this corps into a workable Ground Observer System. In September 1949, three officials of the Bell Telephone Company of Canada visited the U. S. Air Defense Command (Eastern Air Defense Force) and were fully acquainted with the ground observer system, civil air raid warning system and construction and operation of air defense control centers and filter centers. During Exercise LOOKOUT, another RCAF representative was assigned to Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force to observe Exercise LOOKOUT. He was given all material, fully instructed as to organizational procedures, and was escorted to air defense control centers and filter centers while they were in operation.

3. There are no known plans, documents, or directives at ConAC regarding the Canadian Observer System. It is, therefore, necessary that knowledge of Canadian plans for the establishment of a Ground Observer Corps should be obtained and made available to the Continental Air Command for augmentation of ConAC 1-49, and that coordination and necessary communications be established between ConAC and Canadian authorities.

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Coordination with Canada on Ground Observer System. (Cont'd)

4. It is requested that this Headquarters be advised of Canadian plans as presently known and that authority be granted for communication direct with the proper Canadian authorities from ConAC for future planning and coordination.

s/t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

1st Ind

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 16 Jan 1950

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

1. The Canada-U. S. Emergency Defense Plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designates the Royal Canadian Air Force headquarters at Ottawa, Canada and the U. S. Air Defense Command as planning agents for the Air Defense ofCanada and the United States. It authorizes direct communication between planning agents and such coordinated planning as is necessary for air defense. The authority and responsibility provided for in this plan now rests with the Commanding General, Continental Air Command as the Air Defense Commander.

2. The information requested in the basic communication is not available in this headquarters. It should be obtained directly from Headquarters Royal Canadian Air Force, Ottawa, Canada.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/st/ S. E. ANDERSON
Major General, USAF
Director, Plans & Operations

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

SUBJECT: Operations Analysis, Air Defense

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff - Operations, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C., ATTN: Assistant for Operations Analysis

1. Attached herewith are two copies of Operations Analysis, Air Defense, Summary Report to Deputy for Operations, Continental Air Command.

2. The Operations Analysis Unit, formerly attached to the Office of the Commanding General, Air Defense Command, is now attached to the Deputy for Operations, Continental Air Command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl:
As listed in
para 1 above.

t/ HERBERT B. THATCHER
Brig. General, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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OPERATIONS ANALYSIS, AIR DEFENSE

Summary Report to DO, Continental Air Command

INTRODUCTION

1. This summary covers the period from 1 July 1949 when the Operations Analysis unit at ConAC was established, to 1 October. The unit consists to date, of one man, myself.

GENERAL

2. The bulk of the period I have used in obtaining a picture of the air defense problem as a whole, of air defense philosophies, and of the approaches now being taken and being planned for air defense. I have been looking especially for those key parts of the problem that are the most critical and that appear somewhat amenable, with the thought that attack on these parts first of all will pay off most heavily. The equipment, personnel, organization, and training problems and the operational, tactical, and strategic problems are all closely interdependent, and each must be scrutinized in relation to the others. I have attempted not to overemphasize any one with respect to the others.

3. It has worked out well to intersperse observation of the operation of various parts of the Eastern Air Defense system (Control Centers, GCI stations, Ground Observer Corps, and fighter units) with discussions at Hq, ConAC, and Hq, EADF, together with study of an assortment of papers on air defense, together with intermittent work on specific projects with members of the commands.

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REPORTING SYSTEM

4. In connection with looking at the performance of the air defense system in regard to its present capabilities, its potentialities and the areas in it where improvement is most needed, I spent some weeks with Hq, EADF in devising an improved reporting system for use during tactical operations. This system was designed to obtain quantitative and factual information from the GCI stations, Ground Observer Corps, and fighter units on their operational performance, both individually and collectively. It was used with some success in Operation Lookout and, with improvement and expansion to include the performance of Control Centers, will be valuable in future operations. With members of EADF, I am now in process of working over the reporting system and expect to have ready an improved system suitable for use in the Northwest Air Defense Maneuver in November under EADF.

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF LOOKOUT

5. Analysis of the reports from Lookout is now going on under a three-man stop-gap analysis team of two-week mobilization assignees assembled for the purpose, a group of reserve officer-scientists from Watson Laboratories. The main results of this analysis should be available during the week of 10 October. I have taken the position that this analysis must yield its main results by this early date to be of maximum value and that lesser results can follow in due course.

6. Though the analysis is hampered by incompleteness of reports, this is in itself indicative of improvements that must be made both

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In the air defense system and in the reporting system itself. It is, in fact, somewhat unexpectedly bringing to light information that will help appreciably in the planning and managing of future exercises. This information will, at least as to essential points, be put into presentable form in time for use in connection with the November maneuver. It is already apparent that clear provision must be made for obtaining vital information such as actual flight paths of strike forces, and for proper briefing of participants including the GCI stations in regard to both the purposes of an exercise and the purposes and functioning of the reporting system.

7. The analysis team, a relatively impartial outside group, may itself be regarded as something of a guinea pig, from the composition, performance and success of which the job of analysis of future air defense maneuvers can be estimated.

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

8. It begins to appear that the combination of the operations reporting system and the analysis technique will serve as a tool of unexpected value for locating those parts of our air defenses that most need improved organization or training or both. An example is the matter of overlap tolling of bomber tracks between GCI stations and from Ground Observer Filter Centers to GCI stations. Infrequency of overlap tolling stood out in the record of LOOKOUT as a weak element. Reliable and effective overlap tolling is of course vital to the success of the air defense system since the coverage of any individual radar is so limited.

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AIR SURVEILLANCE

9. I have been discussing and considering a series of questions to do with air surveillance among them the following:

a. Can reliable and at the same time economical twenty-four hour surveillance of the air space be achieved in the immediate future through a combination of the ground observer system, a passive detection system involving D/Fing on any enemy R/T (navigational radar, bombing radar, air-to-air communications, jamming), and radar net, each compensating for the deficiencies or actual local inoperativeness of the other?

b. What is the degree of reliability inherent in the passive detection (D/Fing) system (1) for positive identification and (2) for tracking of enemy bombers, and is this reliability plus the low cost of a D/Fing net sufficient to warrant immediate setting up of this system to augment and support the radar net especially along our borders?

c. Can a detection aid be provided the Ground Observer that will increase his reliability of detection and his altitude coverage profitably, but that will cost so little as not to increase beyond the point of diminishing returns the expense of the Ground Observer System as a whole. (As based on peak loads in operation the Ground Observer System without any special detection aids will cost less than $2,000,000 for the entire United States for construction, installation, and operation for one year.

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d. Is there inherent in the combination of three or more air surveillance system real hope of detecting and of identifying even the first enemy onslaught, in peacetime, in time to diminish its violence either by actual interception or by providing civil air raid warning?

t/ Frederick M. Varney
Operations Analyst
Deputy for Operations, ConAC

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SUBJECT: Implementation of Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning Service

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. It is generally agreed that the formation of the Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning Service is necessary as a means of augmenting the existing and proposed radar surveillance system in the Continental United States.

2. This Headquarters has, in the absence of any specific directives, been charged to establish the plans and requirements for such a system in accordance with verbal instructions received by the Air Defense Command.

3. The approved concepts, methods and principles for the Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning Service were tested during Exercise [illegible] and were later outlined in Memorandum for the Inspector General, [illegible], subject: "Special Survey of Air Defense of Continental United States", dated 28 October 1949 and letter Headquarters Continental Air Command, [illegible], subject: "Status of Air Defense", dated 28 October 1949.

4. In order that the Ground Observer Corps can be implemented as proposed, it is requested that Headquarters, United States Air Force:

a. Issue the necessary directives to Continental Air Command to form the Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning Service within the boundaries of the established areas to be defended.

b. Initiate the necessary action to cause the enactment of Federal legislation required to give the Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning Service an official status such as an auxiliary to the United States Air Force.

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Implementation of Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning Service. (Cont'd)

c. Furnish the necessary funds to the amount of $746,400.00 as outlined in detail on the attached Fund Study.

5. It is believed that the Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning Service can be completely organized, installed and tested within five (5) months from date of receipt of the funds and directives listed in paragraph 4 above.

CHARLES T. MYERS,
Major General, USAF,
Vice Commander.

2 Incl:
Fund Study

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FUNDS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT
GROUND OBSERVER CORPS--AIRCRAFT WARNING [illegible] ICE
WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF AREAS TO INCLUDE RADAR SURVEILLANCE OUTLINED
IN CONAC 1-49

NOTE: These Total Cost figures are based on the following factors:

a.	Total Number of Filter Centers	26	
b.	Total Number of Observation Posts (Est.).	9,112	
c.	Total Volunteer Personnel (Estimated)....	186,000	
d.	Area Covered - Eastern Air Defense Force.	433,754	sq. mi.
	Western Air Defense Force.	271,271	sq. mi.
	TOTAL ConAC	705,025	sq. mi.

ITEM	NON-RECURRING COSTS	ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS
A. Filter Center; rental, 1600 sq. ft. per Center @ $2.50 per annum x 26 Filter Centers		$ 104,000
B. Filter Center; construction of Plotting Boards, Teller Platforms, Training Positions, etc. @ $2000 per Filter Center x 26 Filter Centers	$ 52,000	
C. Filter Center; procurement of Plotting Equipments (est.)	6,000	
Depreciation Replacement		1,200
D. Filter Center; Telephone Equipment and Circuit Costs:		
(a) Interior Telephone Equipment Installation Charges	20,800	
Annual Rental		39,000
(b) Exterior Circuits (All circuits installed ready to operate). Installation Charges	8,200	
Annual Rental		243,200
E. Ground Observer Corps; Estimated Costs for: Printing, Maps, Armbands, Badges (Awards), Misc. Supplies, Travel Funds		
Initial Organization	100,000	
Annual Replacements		25,000
F. TOTAL NON-RECURRING COSTS	$184,000	
G. TOTAL ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS		$512,400
H. TOTAL COST to Construct & Maintain First Year (F&G)(No FLASH Calls Incl)		$696,400
I. Estimated Req. for FLASH Calls for Test Exercises (All Centers--48 hrs)		50,000
J. Funds Required NOW (H&I)		$746,400

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Basic ltr fr Hq Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, subj: "Implementation of Ground Observer Corps--Aircraft Warning" 15 Dec 49

AFOFO 667 1st Ind

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C. 8 FEB 1950

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. You are hereby directed to provide the facilities and supervision necessary for the formation of a Ground Observer Corps, Aircraft Warning Service. Reprogramming is being accomplished as expeditiously as possible in order to make funds available to permit its implementation. In accordance with your initial cost submission, you are advised that $159,000 to cover non-recurring expenses will be made available as follows:

a. $26,000 for purposes outlined in Item D (a) and (b) of Inclosure 1. This money is now available at AMC.

b. $133,000 to be made available from FY 1950 P430 funds available in this Headquarters. Additional information is required covering the increase of $25,000 over your initial submission for equipment contained in Item E of Inclosure 1.

c. In order that action may be taken by this Headquarters relative to the provision of funds noted as Annual Recurring Costs in Inclosure 1, information will be required indicating that portion of such costs as will be required from FY 1950 funds and that portion which can be properly funded during FY 1951. In this respect, it is desired that you review your funding program for the remainder of FY 1950, with a view toward providing for the FY 1950 costs not provided for in the preceding subparagraphs and this Headquarters advised accordingly.

2. This Ground Observer Corps will be composed of civilians who volunteer their services. Recruiting of this personnel will be on a mutual cooperation basis between proper civil authorities of each State concerned and the Continental Air Command. Further, it will be coordinated directly with the Assistant for Civil Defense Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order that he may be fully informed on this Civil Defense matter.

3. The Ground Observer Corps will be operated on a permanent basis as an adjunct to the Aircraft Warning Service for the Air Defense of the U. S. Its purpose will be to report, plot and furnish tracks of low-flying aircraft.

4. Action has been initiated to obtain such legislation as may be desirable to assure an orderly continuance of the Ground Observer Corps

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as a permanent and integral part of the Air Defense of the U. S. Although this Headquarters is well aware of Ground Observer activities conducted, it cannot take final action toward appropriate legislation until it has a detailed plan describing the Ground Observer Corps, Aircraft Warning Service. It is desired that you furnish this Headquarters with such a plan. Among other pertinent data, it will include the purpose and organization of the Ground Observer Corps. The purpose should indicate its relationship to other civil defense activities as well as to the U.S.A.F. The organization should be shown both as to personnel, physical layout and the equipment associated therewith. The basis on which civilians are utilized, the job description of military personnel and the functions of each of the physical installations involved must be described. Finally, such rules and regulations as are necessary for the orderly supervision of the Ground Observer Corps must be included.

BY COMMAND OF [illegible]

1 Incl
n/c

MUIR S. FAIRCHILD
General, United States Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff

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Auth: G/S USAF
2 Dec 49

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

AFIG2-14
Inspector General, Second Region
San Bernardino Air Force Base
San Bernardino, California

2 December 1949

SUBJECT: Special Report of Observation on Exercise "Drummer Bay" (Former Title "Overgreasy")

THRU: Commanding General
25th Air Division (Defense)
P. O. Box 909
Everett, Washington

Commanding General
Western Defense Force
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

TO: The Inspector General
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

I. EXERCISE

1. A training Exercise designated as "Drummer Bay" was conducted in the Pacific Northwest during the period 4 - 14 November 1949. The Exercise was conducted at the direction of Continental Air Command, under the supervision of the Western Air Defense Force with operational control of defensive fighter and AC&W Units being exercised by the Commanding General, 25th Air Division (Defense). Representatives of the Inspector General, Second Region, USAF, observed the Exercise during the period 6 - 14 November 1949.

II. GENERAL SITUATION

2. An active air defense zone in the Pacific Northwest has been established by the Western Air Defense Force. This defense area generally extends from the Canadian border south to California and from the Pacific Ocean to the eastern border of Montana. This zone contains many priority targets.

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R/L to YIR,USAF, Subj: Spec Rpt of Obs on Exercise "Drummer Boy", 2 Dec 49.

3. The AOSW Units involved consisted of radar stations manned and operated by the 505th AOSW Group supplemented by one Canadian radar station of the 12th Group RCAF.

4. The defensive fighter forces involved in "Drummer Boy" consisted of the following:

a. 325th Fighter Wing (All Weather).

b. 71st Fighter Squadron (Jet).

c. 83rd Fighter Squadron (Jet).

d. 91st Fighter Squadron (Jet).

e. 60th Fighter Wing (AW), (4 Sqs).

f. 442nd Fighter Squadron (RCAF).

5. Bases utilized by defensive fighter forces were:

a. Moses Lake Air Force Base.

b. McChord Air Force Base.

c. Paine Field, Everett, Washington.

d. Portland Airport, Portland, Oregon.

e. Geiger Field, Spokane, Washington.

f. Vancouver, B. C.

6. A striking force consisted of B-29 and B-50 type aircraft of the Strategic Air Command's 15th Air Force.

7. Specific attack conditions, tasks for subordinate defense units and liaison involving other services and Government agencies are described in detail in Operations Order 2-49, attached as Inclosure No. 1.

III. MISSION

8. The mission of the Task Force is to provide an active air defense of the northwest area of the United States; to carry out the assigned tasks and within maximum capability of the assigned equipment; prevent hostile airborne aircraft, missions and/or weapons from penetrating the defended area.

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9. The specific objectives of the 25th Air Division (Defense) during the period of the Exercise "Drummer Boy" are as follows:

a. To train Fighter and Aircraft Control and Warning Units in air defense operations.

b. To test and evaluate the overall effectiveness of the planned air defense system, organization and procedures.

c. To test the effectiveness of plans for the control for identification purposes of military and civil air traffic in the Northwest Area.

d. To evaluate fighter deployment and determine the need for additional fighter bases west of the Cascade Mountain Range.

e. To test the tactical suitability of the various types of fighter units in air defense operations.

f. To evaluate the radar performance and deployment and the communications network.

g. To evaluate the effect of ECM on the operations of the air defense system.

h. To evaluate procedures for furnishing Sixth Army with required information for the conduct of active and passive defense measures.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

10. Exercise "Drummer Boy" should have been a normal routine operation for the 25th Air Division. However, the 25th Air Division normally has only four aircraft allocated to it for operational control in the Air Defense of the Northwest. The extent of reinforcements and changes in normal deployment are self-evident weaknesses in the normal air defense organization and deployment.

11. The results of the Exercise cannot be accurately determined until tracks flown, targets detected and targets intercepted, are analyzed and evaluated. Inasmuch as the foregoing will involve a period of many days before final critique can be held, the following is a report of general impressions gained from observation of this Exercise and from discussion with operating personnel.

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12. The exercise general mission of the Exercise Task Force is the normal mission of the 25th Air Division, except that it normally operates on the principle of operational control of four fighter aircraft rather than within the maximum capability of fighter aircraft assigned to the Fourth Air Force and deployed in the defended area.

13. Reference paragraph 9a above, Fighter and Aircraft Control and Warning units are normally assigned to the Fourth Air Force for training. Since the primary mission of these type units is air defense it appears inconsistent to have one chain of command responsible for training and another chain of command responsible for operations. It is believed that if the 25th Air Division is given complete training responsibilities during exercises, it should also have as a normal mission the supervision of training rather than monitoring responsibility.

14. a. Reference paragraph 9b above, the planned air defense system, organization and procedures are believed in need of a complete review, analysis and clarification of ultimate objectives. The Air Defense Control Center is a large installation, expensive in construction and manpower and provides for a multitude of functions of a liaison and passive nature for which the USAF is bearing the construction, communications and operating costs. The system was copied from the British system designed on a large scale to handle sustained mass raids. It is a cumbersome manual operation in which information is displayed on a large scale more for liaison intelligence purposes than actual command and intercept purposes. If Joint Operations Centers are to be established, transfer of such functions as Civil Air Raid Warning, Control of Radio Emissions, Army, Navy and Coast Guard Liaison from the ADC to the JOC would permit a reduction in the ADC to a purely command intercept operation and result in a considerable saving of USAF personnel and funds. The method of obtaining Y service should also be planned.

b. The organization of the Air Defense System is not clear cut with the present Western Air Defense Force, Fourth Air Force, 25th Air Division, 325th Fighter Wing and the 505th Aircraft Control and Warning Group having one command channel for operations and another for administration, training and logistics. In the Fourth Air Force area, it is believed a single command channel would result in a better coordinated balance of missions and increased efficiency in attaining overall objectives.

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B/L to TIG,USAF, Subj: Spec Rpt of Obs on Exercise "Drummer Boy", 2 Dec 49.

c. Very little change in operational procedures since World War II was noted. A re-evaluation of the functions and procedures of the Air Defense Center in the light of intelligence estimates is indicated in order to balance the operation with the probable scale of attack.

15. Reference paragraph 9c above, identification of aircraft is complicated by the number of agencies controlling aircraft such as CAA, Flight Service, Army, Navy, Marine, Coast Guard and private civil aircraft. It is considered impractical to attempt to identify all aircraft in peacetime. However, rigid control and timely identification of aircraft approaching from the sea, the north, and northwest is essential for an effective defense against surprise attack. Rigid enforcement supported by anti-aircraft fire is vitally necessary for the defense of the Hanford area against internal sabotage by private aircraft.

16. Reference paragraph 9d above, the permanent fighter deployment is not orientated for Air Defense. McChord Air Force Base is the key base and should be developed as the primary fighter base and supported by Moses Lake. The first two days of the Exercise were carried out under weather conditions consisting of dense ground fog throughout the entire area west of the Cascade Mountain Range. The only base that was open for operations during the period of fog was Paine Field, Everett, Washington. Even airlines and other types of aircraft could not land at their regular terminals and had to proceed to Paine Field for landing. Inasmuch as the Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and Vancouver areas have many periods of dense fog conditions during the year, it is considered advisable that a study be made to determine whether or not an active (or standby) fighter base should be provided in a reasonably fog-free area, such as Paine Field.

17. a. Reference paragraph 9e above, the permanent deployment of present equipment is not tactically suitable for air defense operations. Fighter equipment is exclusively F-82 aircraft which are relatively ineffective. Balanced day jet interceptor and all weather fighter units should be deployed at both Moses Lake and McChord with Paine Field developed into a suitable staging alternate base. The impression was gained, both through observation and discussions with operating personnel, that the Air Force cannot consider fighter aircraft available in the northwest today as being capable of tracking down and intercepting hostile aircraft under adverse weather conditions. From the 6th through the 13th of November, weather conditions throughout the entire area west of the Cascade Range was such that all aircraft except F-82's were grounded.

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R/L to TIB,USAF, Subj: Spec Rpt of Obs on Exercise "Drummer Boy", 2 Dec 49.

Discussions with F-82 fighter pilots and operating personnel indicated that the tracking radar equipment (AFG-28) used on the F-82 aircraft is unsatisfactory. Whether this unsatisfactory condition is due to design, maintenance, or operation under the violent vibration it received in the F-82 installation could not be determined during the relatively short period of observation of the Exercise. However, a spot check of fighter mission reports showed the following conditions:

b. 317th Squadron - out of ten missions flown on which the radar equipment was operational on take-off, seven failed during flights and only three remained operational.

c. 318th Squadron - 15 failed and eight remained operational.

d. 319th Squadron - nine failed and two remained operational.

e. Of those remaining operational, approximately 30% would not lock and could be used for search only.

Discussions with Squadron operating personnel disclosed the fact that special effort had been made to have all radar equipment operational during the period of this Exercise and that normal operating conditions show a much higher percentage of radar out of commission.

18. Reference paragraph 9f above, radar performance is limited by the training deployment in the interest of economy. Targets are lost in voids or fixed echoes and friendly fighters fade at high altitudes due to lack of beacon equipment. It is understood that permanent radar sites have been surveyed but not tested. There appears to be a question on the soundness of siting criteria. The Seattle District Engineer appears to be expediting permanent construction although funds have not yet been allocated. His principle concern is the excessive construction costs at several inaccessible sites which require an Air Force decision as to whether operations buildings can be remoted from radar towers. There are apparently two schools of thought on this subject which require firm resolution.

19. Reference paragraph 9g above, training in Electronic Counter Measures was negligible and operating personnel were unfamiliar with a confidential publication by ConAC which established procedures to minimize ground radar jamming.

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20. Reference paragraph 9h above, the Sixth Army, Navy and Coast Guard had liaison officers present in the Air Defense Control Center. There was no anti-aircraft, ground observer corps, civil air raid warning or control of radio emissions, participation in the Exercise. National Guard and Naval Reserve units were made available for specified periods but adverse weather limited their employment.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

21. The Air Defense Exercise was well planned and implemented. Adverse weather conditions curtailed operations. The present Air Defense establishment, organization, system and procedures appear to be in a nebulous transition from the remnants of the World War II set-up toward some ultimate but vague future objective. The temporary active air defense provided for the Northwest Area during the period of this exercise should not be construed as a measure of air defense in being. The command structure with divided responsibilities precludes a rapid reallocation or redeployment of forces to meet a surprise attack, particularly if communications were disrupted. Air Defense must be prearranged with forces deployed in the best operational facilities and under a single commander with complete jurisdiction over administration, training, operations and logistics.

V. RECOMMENDATION

22. It is recommended that Headquarters United States Air Force appoint a Board of Officers to review the entire structure of the Air Defense System to insure a maximum return from the forces and funds available.

VI. FORWARDING INSTRUCTIONS

23. This report will be forwarded by each Headquarters indicated as expeditiously as possible. Indorsements are not required to contain specific comments on each item of the basic report, however general comments are invited.

JOSEPH A. BULGER
Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

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AFIG2-1A 2 Dec 49
Subject: Special Report of Observation on Exercise "Drummer Boy"
(Former Title "Overgreasy)

A 381 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, 25th Air Division (Def), P.O. Box 909, Everett, Washington
12 Dec 1949

TO: Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California

1. Basic correspondence noted.

2. The following specific comments are submitted:

Reference Sec IV par 10: The 25th Air Division normally has operational control of seven (7) aircraft, including four F-84's and three F-82F's.

Par 13: Comments relative organization for Air Defense were made in Division report on the exercise. It was recommended that wherever possible an integrated single command be assigned the Air Defense responsibility. Comments regarding separate operational and administrative channels are concurred in.

Par 15: Contents heartily concurred in. It is strongly recommended that joint plans be made for the rigid control and identification of all aircraft.

Par 19: Contents of this paragraph are not quite factual. Prior to the exercise, all controllers (1014) and most of the radar operators (514) were brought into the control center and briefed, among other things, on procedures to minimize the effects of ECM. Also, full distribution was made of publication referred to as well as others on this subject. An attempt was made to secure an actual ECM training flight prior to the exercise but maintenance difficulties at Castle Air Force Base precluded consummation.

3. In general the conclusions and recommendations are concurred in. It should be borne in mind by further reviewing headquarters that the present Air Defense system in the northwest is the interim system and everyone concerned is well aware of its capabilities and limitations. Written recommendations have been submitted to improve the interim system and there are at present approved plans to be implemented to do this, including the addition of 3 sites in this area.

In my opinion the single item requiring attention and emphasis at this time is the strengthening of the processes for control and identification of aircraft.

CLINTON D. VINCENT
Colonel USAF
Commanding

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WAEF 384.2 2nd Ind
Subject: Special Report of Observation on Exercise "Drummer Boy" (Former Title "Overgreasy")

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE, Hamilton AFB, Hamilton, California

THRU: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, New York

TO: The Inspector General, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Concur generally in the comments by the Air Inspector, 2nd Region and the Commanding General, 20th Air Division (Defense).

2. Specific comments on the contents of the basic report are as follows:

Reference Section IV, Paragraph 12: Effective 10 November 1949, the Western Air Defense Force received operational control of all fighter and Aircraft Control and Warning units in its area and has in turn allocated to the Commanding General, 20th Air Division (Defense) all such forces in his area. Further action is being taken by this headquarters to place 1/3 of the available fighter strength on Air Defense operations at all times. The remainder of the forces available will participate in individual and unit training.

Reference Paragraph 13: It appears that the mission and responsibilities of the 20th Air Division (Defense) may not have been made clear to the Inspector. The 20th Air Division (Defense) is normally responsible for all air defense operations and air defense systems training. The numbered air forces have only individual and unit training responsibilities.

Reference Paragraph 14a: It is pointed out that the air defense systems, organizations and procedures, are constantly undergoing review and analysis. Formerly, this function was done principally under the direction of the Air Defense Command. At present, this function takes place throughout all echelons of the air defense system up to and including the Directorate of Requirements, Headquarters USAF. It is further pointed out that while the ADCC is somewhat similar to those used in the RAF, these functions are in no way similar inasmuch as the basic air defense problems of Great Britain and the United States are in no respect similar. Further, it is fallacy to assume that the United States air defense systems will not be called upon to cope with large scale or sustained mass raids. The present and future air defense systems have removed large portions of the air defense operation from the ADCC through decentralisation to the SCI. This headquarters does not consider it feasible to further remove such functions as Civil Air Raid Warning, Control of Electronic Emissions, Army, Navy, and CAA Liaison from the ADCC. The Joint Information Center, to be established on the West Coast, could not properly handle these functions and the time and space element would be wholly unacceptable from an air defense point of view.

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Subject: Special Report of Observation on Exercise "Drummer Boy"
(Former Title "Overgreasy")

Reference paragraph 14b: This headquarters concurs that a single chain of command would be highly desirable. It is considered, however, that this would require a major USAF-wide reorganization and reassignment of missions. As long as the present wing base structure is required to perform the many varied missions it now has assigned, a single chain of command is not possible.

Reference paragraph 15: This headquarters considers the problem of identification to be of the first magnitude. The principle shortcoming is the lack of proper authority over civil and military aircraft. It is strongly recommended that higher authority secure the necessary legislation which will permit rigid enforcement of identification procedures on all air traffic.

Reference paragraph 16: Concur in the recommendation that Paine Field be prepared as a satellite air defense base. This matter has been the subject of separate correspondence by this headquarters.

Reference paragraph 17: Information contained in this paragraph is not entirely correct. The 25th Air Division (Defense) is provided with a flight of F-84 or F-86 aircraft at Moses Lake Air Force Base. Realizing that this force was inadequate, this headquarters has requested a movement of a jet fighter squadron to the area at the earliest practicable date.

Reference paragraph 20: The liaison problem mentioned herein, has not been a real one to date inasmuch as there have been no anti-aircraft, ground observer corps, air raid warning system, or control of electronic emissions. These forces will, in part, be brought into the air defense system in the near future. The 31st AAA Brigade at Ft Lewis, Washington, is just becoming operational. The ground observer corps and the air raid warning system will be activated in the spring of 1950.

Reference paragraph 21: This headquarters considers that the ultimate objectives are well defined, and that the temporary air defense system in the Northwest does not represent the desirable degree of air defense in being. It is considered that the only major change in the objectives for the completion of the permanent system, will be a change in the phasing and final completion date, which must be changed in view of the recent indication that the USSR is now capable of atomic operations. The future system is designed to permit rapid reallocation and redeployment and a high degree of decentralization. Further, do not concur that air defense must be automatic any more so than any other military operation. The only portions of the system which should be permitted to become automatic are the individual highly technical pieces of equipment with which the system operates.

1 Incl: n/c

HUGO P. RUSH
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

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Subject: Special Rpt of Observation on Exercise "Drummer Boy" (Former Title "Overgreasy")

353.5 (2 Dec '49) 3rd Ind.

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

The Inspector General, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. In general, the comments of the Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force are concurred in by this headquarters. His comments with reference to paragraph 21 of basic report reflect this headquarters views the overall air defense program. Recognition of the conditions enumerated in the basic correspondence and the views of this Headquarters concerning remedial actions were adequately covered in the following correspondence to Headquarters, United States Air Forces:

a. Letter this Headquarters, POAR 452.1, subject, "Composition of certain Fighter Wings", dated 12 January 1950.

b. Letter this Headquarters, Comm 381, subject, "Outline Study Electronics Countermeasures in Air Defense", 11 January 1950.

c. Letter this Headquarters, O&T 381, subject "Police of Airspace Reservations Surrounding Atomic Energy Installations", 29 November 1949.

d. Letter this Headquarters, DO 381, subject "Survey of Air Defense", 28 October 1949, which accompanied a Memorandum to the Inspector General, United States Air Force, subject "Special Study of Air Defense of the Continental United States".

2. It is emphasized that Exercise DRUMMERBOY was conceived, planned, and conducted for the primary purpose of training air defense field force personnel throughout the northwest area of the United States. It is believed that excellent results were obtained from the exercise.

ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Commanding

1 Incl.
No (Not attached)

NOTE: The handling of classified correspondence in this headquarters is governed by ConAC Staff Memo 203-4 and AF Regulation 205-1.

Register No.
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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

WADF 354

No Date

SUBJECT: Northwest Air Defense Maneuvers 4-14 November 1949

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel AFB, New York

1. Forwarded by officer courier this date are tentative plans for Air Defense exercises in defense of the Puget Sound-Hanford Area 4-14 November 1949. These plans are based on your directive letter, file DAD 354.2, subject: "Air Defense Exercise", dated 3 September 1949, and subsequent letter, Headquarters, USAF, reference participation of the 1st Fighter Wing (One Squadron F-86 A/C). See Incl #1.

2. With reference to the participation of a squadron of the 81st Fighter Wing, Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, it is considered that they should participate to the maximum extent practicable but with due regard to the present circumstances of their transition to the F-86 airplane. In this light, it appears that a flight of six to eight F-86's would be the limit of their maneuver capability in November. The 81st Fighter Wing has agreed to furnish six (6) officers and nineteen (19) airmen from the 636th Aircraft Control & Warning Squadron to augment the 505th Aircraft Control and Warning Group if concurrence is received from Hq Continental Air Command.

3. With respect to the participation of the 78th Fighter Group, it is recommended that their participation in the maneuver be reduced to one F-84 Squadron of sixteen (16) aircraft, the balance of the group being employed on the transition training of 27th Fighter Group Pilots and in the attainment of a higher degree of combat readiness through intensified aerial gunnery training, their final requisite for such readiness.

4. Ault Field, NAS, Whidby Island, Washington, is not available for use by the USAF during the period of the maneuver because of concurrent Naval ASW exercises in the vicinity.

5. McChord Field is not suitable for Jet Fighter Operations due to inadequate length of runways and trees which constitute approach and take-off obstacles.

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Northwest Air Defense Maneuvers 4-14 Nov 49

6. Paine Field, Everett, Washington, is of limited utility because of restrictive runway length, limited availability of hangar and billeting space, and the shortage of jet fuel storage facilities other than rail tank car storage. However, steps are being taken to overcome these difficulties and tentative plans call for use of sixteen (16) F-84's to be stationed at Paine Field.

7. Of the eighteen (18) Controllers presently available for duty in the 25th Air Division Area, four (4) have been ordered to TDY elsewhere for the duration of the maneuvers. Four (4) Controllers are scheduled for loan from the 81st Fighter Wing for the exercise and two (2) can be supplied from Headquarters, Fourth Air Force. Thus, twenty (20) Controllers should be available from resources at our disposal. The overall requirement for the maneuvers is thirty-three (33) Controllers, or a shortage of thirteen (13). Request that not less than eight (8) Controllers be placed on 30 days temporary duty with the 505th AC&W Group, Everett, Washington, on or about 15 October 1949.

8. A major handicap to the deployment of jet aircraft has been the lack of available C-22 starting units and jet refueling units. The scrambling time and refueling time will be in direct proportion to the number of starting and refueling units obtainable for use at Moses Lake and Paine Field. Request that the squadron to be furnished by the 1st Fighter Wing be instructed to provide its full authorization of starter units, and that the delivery of C-22 starting units to the 78th Fighter Wing be expedited.

9. Included as Inclosure #2 to this letter is the budget estimate for the Air Defense Exercise in the Northwest. The budget was prepared on the basis of two (2) squadrons of the 78th Fighter Wing, one (1) squadron of the 1st Fighter Wing, one (1) squadron of the 81st Fighter Wing, and four (4) flights of the 325th Fighter Wing.

2 Incls:
1. Exercise Plan (4 cys)
~~2. Budget Estimate (4 cys)~~

JOHN E. UPSTON
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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Hq 503d AC&W Grp

Subj: Observations of Exercise FOIL 19 July 49

Thru: CG 1st AF

To: C/S USAF
Attn: Directorate of Plans and Operations

1. This report of observations of Royal AF "Exercise FOIL" for the period 25 June 1949 to 3 July 1949 is made in compliance with para. 6k, AF Reg 35-59.

2. Background information is contained in the attached pamphlet, subject "Exercise FOIL", classified Secret.

3. The American Observer Group consisting of representatives of the AF, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were housed at Swanton Morely, Royal AF, for the entire period. Swanton Morely is an airborne communications equipment trng base for RAF personnel and did not enter into the exercise. The American Observers were divided into three groups. Each group assigned to a bus and a RAF officer guide. Each day the group went by bus to different RAF bases to observe their function in the exercise. Usually two bases were visited each days.

The RAF Officers who acted as guides and officers contacted at the visited bases were very courteous, showed a willingness to show any equipment used, and answered all questions on equipment use and performance with marked frankness and honestly. Our original briefing emphasized that the American Observer Group would be given any information desired, but that observers from other nations would not be afforded the same freedoms (the French Observers were used as an example of those who would be shown only a limited amount). We were cautioned that should we meet observers from other nations we were not to disclose any information we had received.

4. Observations.

a. In the eastern sector in which my observations were conducted there was one master GCI station located at Langtoft, one sector operation center GCI located at Neatishead, and one low lever attack Chain Home Low device for low altitude reporting located on the channel coast. The exact location of this station is unknown. The above radar stations were forty to sixty miles apart.

b. Personnel for Langtoft, Neatishead, and the low altitude reporting station were drawn from all available sources in the RAF to fully man these stations. In talking to numerous officers it was learned that they had only been at these stations since the start of the exercise. For twenty-four hour operation one hundred thirty-five men were used at Langtoft and and Neatishead while only ninety were used for the low altitude reporting station.

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c. The RAF system of target plotting is the same as that used in World War II. At each GCI station four horizontal plotting boards are used. Approximately twenty personnel are used to place the information on the boards and to screen such information. The information arrives in the information center and is placed on the first board, called the "dirty" board. The information is then filtered and screened by a filter officer who takes important information from the "dirty" board and places it on a second board. The information on the second board is again screened and the resultant information is placed on a third board, known as the master target board. The fourth board is used exclusively to maintain the location and movements of the intercepting fighters. Unless you stand directly in front of the first three boards it is impossible to see the figures and information on the designations of the reported aircraft. Other information concerning equipment status, weather, available aircraft, etc. is located on large boards, scattered about the information center. The number of people involved in the information center and their constant movements about the boards leave one with the impression of utterpost confusion. It is difficult for an untrained or casual observer to interpret information from the information center and its attendent confusion. (The vertical boards now being used by USAF give clearer, more concise information while using fewer personnel and accomplishes the same end result with much less confusion. Opening off the information center are three blacked out control rooms. Each one is equiped with a heighth finder scope, PPI scopes, and VHF radio facilities. These three rooms are known as the green, red, and yellow rooms.

Each of the green, red, and yellow rooms has a controller and scope reading personnel assigned for duty. The chief controller is stationed in the information center and is in a position to see all four plotting boards. Thus he may follow the movements of both the attacking and intercepting forces. The chief controller does not control intercepts but desiganates targets and fighter interceptor forces to each of the control rooms, namely the green, red, and yellow rooms. The controllers in the blacked out control rooms control the intercepts for their assigned targets. This enables three separate problems to be run simultaneously. This system was used for all daylight missions observed.

d. I was very interested in the method of broadcast control used against mass raids at night. The particular mission I observed was a mass raid of bombers in two groups. The lead group was composed of four or five "Enemy" aircraft and the second group was composed of approximately twenty "Enemy" aircraft. Both groups were at eighteen thousand feet at all times throughout the strike. Three groups of fighters were scrambled. Each fighter group received a target designation. One fighter group was ordered to attack the lead "enemy" group, the second fighter group was ordered to attack the leading element of the large "enemy" group, and the third fighter group was ordered to attack the last element of the large "enemy" group. The chief controller then broadcasted on VHF the positions of the three elements of the target in consecutive order. The fighters were equiped with airborne radar. No effort was made to track the fighters. At one minute intervals the "enemy" positions were given. It was impossible to observe if any interceptions were made since radar and radio counter measures were being used which caused the fighters not to be seen clearly on the scopes. The broadcast method when used against mass raids at night should be effective in bringing the radar equipped fighters and the "enemy" forces together. It later developed that a considerable delay was occasioned in trying to return the fighters to their home bases at the termination of the attack.

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e. The site of the low altitude reporting station and the observations made there are considered by the RAF to be Top Secret. This site has three steel towers over three hundred feet high upon which are mounted Chain Homing Radar antennae. Three radar sets are located at this site. The antenna of one set, known as a CHel, was tilted to give extremely low altitude coverage. At the time of my visit no aircraft were in the air but ships in the channel could be seen up to approximately thirty miles. The officer in charge claimed that he could detect aircraft right on the water for a distance of thirty miles. The antenna of the second radar set was adjusted for medium altitude detection to cover approximately two to five thousand feet but no range was given. The third radar set covered altitudes from five thousand feet upward. It is interesting to note that while I was looking at the scope of the CHel (the low altitude radar set) the operator and the officer explained that no aircraft were visible, but just as we walked out of the door of the building a Spitfire came right over the station from the direction of the channel at a height of approximately seventy-five feet. The officer in charge could not account for this.

f. Fighter Aircraft.

The fighter aircraft used wereF-80's, Meteor-IV's, Spitfires, and Vampire III's for day work. For night fighters, radar equipped Mosquitoes and Spitfires were used. Four aircraft were used in each squadron as its full strength. I did not observe any actual scrables during any visit to a fighter station. I did observe fighter planes in readiness for a scramble. The aircraft were in the takeoff position, starting equipment was available for each plane, and the pilots were in the cockpits. There was one interesting observation. The leader of the formation had a scrable line attached to his helmet earphones which connected him direct with the controller so that he could get first hand information. This line could be instantly disconnected when the ship was ready to roll.

5. The summary of my observations is as follows:

a. That the RAF Radar equipment, communications system, and physical facilities were those used during World War II with very little improvement. The control center and adjacent buildings were built in 1937 and 1938.

b. That they are extremely short of trained personnel to handle their radar and warning equipment for defense of the entire Island. It is noted in this exercise that they defended only a very small portion and were required to use personnel from other locations to suitably man these few stations.

c. That shortage of fighter aircraft available required that they use only four aircraft per squadron.

d. That American Observers were given information that was not given to observers of other nations.

e. That some doubt exists as to the effectiveness of the extremely low level radar coverage. A remark by Fighter Group Operations Officer, Group Commander Donaldson verified this doubt when he stated that theRoyal Observer Corp usually gave information on low level attacks coming over the Channel before the CHel reported it to group.

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Par 5f subj: Observations of Exercise FOIL (cont'd)

g. That the system used for plotting information had too many boards and too many personnel with a resultant of confusion.

h. That the broadcast control for night interceptions has considerable merit and should be incorporated for test in our ADC exercises.

i. That connecting a scramble line to the earphones of the leader of a formation would facilitate securing the correct information and should speed up the scrable.

6. The American Observer Group did not have an opportunity to attend a general critique where they could have gotten a summary of events, results obtained, and lessons learned from exercise foil; therefore, by necessity the foregoing summary is spotty and without conclusive results. The information was received in a widely scattered, piece-meal fashion which makes it difficult to correlate all observations. At times the group would visit a station when nothing of interest was going on. At other times when some of the stations were visited, particularly sector control stations during a large mass raid, the personnel at the station were so busy that it was impossible to get anyone to give full time attention to the observers. When RAF personnel were thus engaged, observations made by the individual officers in our group were based on their technical and tactical background.

s/t/ CHARLES B. HARVIN
Col, USAF
Cmdg

1 Incl
Pamphlet (EXERCISE FOIL)

1st Ind
Subject: Observations of "Exercise FOIL"

30 July 49

Hq 1st AF

To: CG Gen AC

R. F. Nutman
1st Lt USAF
Asst Adj Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1 November 1949

PO 354.2

SUBJECT: Report of RAF Air Defense Exercise "FOIL"

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. The attached report is submitted in supplement to the previous report of this Headquarters prepared by Colonel C. B. Harvin on RAF air defense Exercise "FOIL".

2. An extract with comments by this Headquarters covering salient points of the report which are considered of special interest follows:

a. Para. 3. The reliance of the RAF upon Auxiliary Forces in air defense; and the use of direct communications between the air defense controller and flight leader sitting in the cockpit.

This direct communication is considered an excellent idea. Whether modification of aircraft is required to obtain same is doubtful. Facilities having handset on a long cord at the ready position which the pilot may give to the Crew Chief just before takeoff may accomplish the same purpose.

b. Para. 5. Automatic VHF D/F equipment.

This equipment appears to be similar to one or both of two (2) D/F equipments now being produced by USAF for service tests. These equipments are:

(1) MX-536

(2) AN/URD-2

c. Para 6. Reactions of bomber crews and bomber operations.

d. Paragraphs 8 through 12. Master OCI and Sector Control activities.

e. Para. 13. Control during jamming operations.

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Subj: Rpt of RAF Air Defense Exercise "FOIL"

f. Para. 11. Use of rated personnel (fighter pilots) as controllers throughout the RAF.

g. Para. 16. The use of broadcast control of fighters in jamming and mass raid conditions.

h. Paragraphs 21 through 25. Operation of USAF fighters in Exercise "FOIL".

i. Para. 23. Ground servicing possibilities of a Meteor IV fighter and gun charging equipment.

(1) One point refueling is highly advantageous. Man hours and equipment could be greatly reduced if we had this set-up. One point refueling plus a hydraulic valve system would speed up refueling operations even more.

(2) As long as machine guns are used in fighters, it is recommended some method of charging and clearing guns be made available to the pilot.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

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Report Exercise "FOIL"

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C O P Y (EXTRACT)
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HEADQUARTERS
EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

13 October 1949

Report on RAF Exercise BULLDOG

* * * * *

10. On returning to London, ConAC observers visited Hq Third Air Division (USAF) near London to try to ascertain overall results of the exercise. Members of the Third Air Division staff pointed out that it would be three or four months before the mass of data and reports of the maneuver were analyzed and concrete results published. However, conferences with personnel from the Director of Intelligence and Director of Operations revealed the following:

a. It is possible for B-50 bombers to penetrate the defenses of the UK at altitude during daylight hours without appreciable loss.

b. It is possible for B-50 bombers to penetrate the defense of the UK at high altitude at night with negligible losses.

c. 95% of the attacks made by fighter aircraft against B-29 and B-50 bombers misjudged the speed of the bombers and invariably resulted in stern chases and slow rate of closure, thereby leaving fighters extremely vulnerable to tail gunners' defensive fire.

d. Fighter aircraft had difficulty in establishing altitude for additional attacks and appeared sluggish at all times.

e. Night fighters (Mosquitoes) were totally ineffective at 25,000 feet and above as they could not keep up or close with bombers at that altitude.

General Observations

11. Manual DF triangulation methods are extensively used for fighter navigation aid and were used to DF on enemy jamming aircraft during the exercise. No interceptions were made from these plots, however, as the time lag in plotting the jammers in the SOC results in a lag of 5 to 40 miles. The SOC did not appear to be prepared to handle an interception from data thus obtained and plotted on the sector operations board.

12. Though every member of the SOC had a job to do, it appears that some simplification could be obtained by consolidation of duties and elimination of overlapping functions. Particularly it appeared that the staffs

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of the sector controller and the chief controller of the OCI located in the SOC performed many overlapping functions.

13. It was interesting to note that the controllers at the SOC preferred the 1.5 meter equipment for intercept control when they had centimetric equipment available (scopes stand side-by-side). Under questioning on this matter the controllers admitted their preference was due to the more solid overage obtained by the 1.5 meter set. They stated that they preferred a less accurate but continuous track to the high resolution with occasional skips that is obtained from the 10 centimeter equipment. The chief OCI controller and the radar officer agreed that this was possibly more a matter of training than actual preference and that with further experience the controllers would rely more heavily on the centimetric equipment. It was noted that the controllers would turn to the 10 centimetric scope for the closing of an interception in almost every instance.

14. The RAF is adopting a very efficient scramble circuit system. The controller's scramble ciruit is terminated in the tower VHF radio (tower VHF is remotely operated by the controller). With this system the pilot on stanby alert (in cockpit on end of runway with battery cart plugged in) listens to the VHF control frequency and can acknowledge scramble order or request further instructions, etc. The tower operator of course hears the transmission also andcan talk back to the controller. This procedure will be tested and evaluated in our air defense system for possible adoption.

15. Due to the general havoc created by the use of ECM during exercise "FOIL", only one limited ECM mission was flown during BULLDOG. During this mission ECM was used to spot-jam a few VHF controlled frequencies and specific radar frequencies. The ECM operation was carried out by the USAF Third Air Division. The results of ECM were successful in that identification and control were delayed 5 to 7 minutes, causing missed interceptions. Jamming of the radar was effected to the extent that the main raiding force was plotted on a ragged course 20 to 40 miles from their actual course.

16. During the morning's operation while observing at Trimley Heath, eight or ten fighter sorties were dispatched to investigate "bogies" or unknowns, that appeared on the scope. Late checks with pre-plot personnel indicated that they were civilian or RAF bombers on which pre-plot information had been dispatched, but was actually 30 minutes to an hour late.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

17. In the future it is recommended that observers reviewing exercise such as BULLDOG also be given the same return priority with MATS. Although this group had no difficulty getting return transportation, this lack of difficulty was due to the fact that there was no backlog of passengers at the time of our return.

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18. In submitting the names of ConAC observers to view this exercise, it was stipulated they desired to observe the air defense aspects of this maneuver. Obviously, the desired location for ConAC observers for the entire maneuver would have been at the SOC at Trimley Heath. Actually the group spent one morning there and observed no operations during that period due to inclement weather. The rest of the tour was informative and interesting, but the group realized little air defense value as no estimate can be made of the effectiveness or results of air defnese operations. In order to properly assess and evaluate such a maneuver, it is recommended that in the future observers be briefed on Bomber Command strikes, to include time, size, and altitude of bomber formations, so that when they appear on the board, the observing group is cognizant of their intentions. A commentator who is cognizant of both sides' intentions should brief observers as the action develops, pointing out what defensive action is being taken. After the day's operations, observers should be briefed on results of the day's operations, this briefing to include number of bomber sorties, number of fighter sorties, number of interceptions, etc. In this manner only will observers really profit by observing exercise of this sort.

t/ E. F. HECTOR
Colonel, USAF

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HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Field, New York
17 December 1948

SUBJECT: Report of Staff Visit

TO : Director of Communications and Electronics Leader

1. Officers making visit: Wing Commander Woodspith, R.R.B., RCAF.
Squadron Commander Upton, D., RCAF.
Squadron Commander Briese, C., RCAF.
Capt. Philip B. Anderson, AO-431717, USAF,
Office of the Dir of Comm & Elect.

Unit visited: Detachment 646th AC&W Sq of the 503rd AC&W Gp at Twin Lights, New Jersey.

Duration of visit: 16 December 1948.

2. General purpose of visit: To provide the RCAF with first hand information as to current operational procedures and policies of USAF AC&W operating unit.

3. Results of visit:

a. The RCAF officers were provided with the desired information and expressed satisfaction with the results of their visitation.

b. During the visitation the undersigned noted the following collateral information:

(1) The Detachment Commander, Capt. Elbert, stated that only one scheduled training mission had been conducted since 18 Nov 48. (The completion date of the ORT conducted on the 503rd AC&W Group).

(2) The NCOIC of Tech Supply, Sgt. Collier, stated that he is continuing to have difficulties in procurement of all classes of stock. In several cases replacement parts and supplies, unsuccessfully requisitioned, have been purchased thru both non-appropriated and personal funds. For example: a rocker-arm was thus procured for theemergency power unit.

(3) The intra-station telephone system is being re-wired under the supervision of a representative of Watson Laboratory to correct the present unsatisfactory

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Report of Staff Visit (cont'd)

condition wherein the original system had been patched and re-patched. When that project is completed, new wiring-diagrams will reflect the true picture of the telephone system.

(4) Upon arrival of the visiting party, operations were closed down because all available enlisted personnel were being used to make facilities at Fort Hancock ready for the arrival of the 646th AC&W Squadron.

(5) Radio logs indicate that since 1 Dec 48 HF contact has been maintained with Roslyn on an hourly basis during duty hours. Although no missions have been scheduled since 19 Nov 48 to check on air-ground communications, records of daily checks indicate such equipment is operative.

(6) As soon as facilities are available at Fort Hancock, the Detachment Commander contemplates setting up receiving antennas and positions there to correct present unsatisfactory conditions caused by the closeness of radio receiver antennas to radar antennas.

Philip B Anderson
PHILIP B ANDERSON
Captain, USAF

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FM HQ USAF Wash DC

TO CG SAC Offutt AFB Nebr

INFO CG ConAC

/ R E S T R I C T E D / From AFDCP 59964.

Publicity releases relating to ConAC's Northwest Maneuver during the period 1-10 November 1949 make it advisable to reiterate that this is a training exercise only, and is in no way a test either of the Northwest Air Defense System or of the ability of SAC units to penetrate that system

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

7 December 1949

WADF 319.1

SUBJECT: 25th Air Division (Defense) Report on Exercise "DRUMMERBOY"

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. This headquarters concurs, in general, with the observations, conclusions and recommendations of the 25th Air Division (Defense) contained in the report on Exercise "DRUMMERBOY", Inclosure 1 hereto. Specific comment thereon is set forth in the following paragraphs.

2. a. Reference Section III, paragraph A1a (Air Defense, General-Personnel and Administration). It is understood that this problem has been recognized by Hq Continental Air Command and necessary action is being taken with Hq U.S. Air Forces to rectify the deficiencies of the present TO&E's. This action should be expedited.

b. Reference paragraph A 1 b. The eventual elimination of "operational control" is recognized as being highly desirable and should be a final objective in organization for air defense.

c. Reference paragraph A 1 c. It appears highly desirable that the Aircraft Control and Warning Group headquarters be eliminated and the Air Divisions (Defense) headquarters augmented to provide for the administration of its own headquarters personnel and of the Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons.

d. Reference paragraph A 1 d. Stabilization of personnel is a fundamental requisite.

e. Reference paragraph A 2 a, (Air Defense, General - Operations). Concur. It is further recommended that the squadron organization of these all-weather interceptors should provide for the authorization of twenty-five (25) aircraft per squadron.

f. Reference paragraph A 2 b. Concur.

g. Reference paragraph A 2 c. Concur.

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Subj: 25th Air Division (Defense) Report on Exercise "DRUMMERBOY"
WADF 319.1

h. Reference paragraph A 2 d. Concur. Such facilities must be provided to minimize scramble time. Drawings for such facilities were prepared by Air Defense Command and are in the files of the Air Engineer in Hq Continental Air Command.

i. Reference paragraph A 2 e. This problem should be given priority consideration at inter-departmental level.

j. Reference paragraph A 2 f. Concur. Rules of Engagement should be promulgated at departmental level. It is requested that action in this matter be expedited.

k. Reference paragraph A 2 g. Concur. It is believed that the ConAC-SAC fighter-bomber camera gunnery program will accomplish much to this end. Additionally, action will be taken at this level to augment this training through direct contact with neighboring Strategic Air Command units.

l. Reference paragraph A 3 (Air Defense, General - Logistics). Concur.

m. Reference paragraph B 1 a (Air Defense, Northwestern USA-Personnel and Administration). Concur.

n. Reference paragraph B 2 a (Air Defense, Northwestern USA-Operations). Recommendation with respect to McChord Air Force Base is concurred in. In addition, strongly recommend the development of Paine Field, Washington, as an advanced all-weather jet fighter base to accomodate a minimum of one (1) squadron of twenty-five (25) aircraft.

o. Reference paragraph B 2 b. In lieu of the conventional VHF-DF nets, urgently request the allocation of five (5) AN/URD-2's for the Western Air Defense Force area as the installation and operation of the conventional net would present complications because of organization of the Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons, terrain, and climate. The automatic stations would result in considerable economy and greater reliability.

p. Reference paragraph B 2 c. This headquarters considers that one (1) jet fighter group is necessary for minimum air defense, in addition to the 325th All-Weather Group in the 25th Air Division (Defense) area. It is recommended that movement of the 81st Fighter Wing to the area be expedited, movement to be made by individual squadrons as they become available. The first squadron should be moved immediately.

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Subj: 25th Air Division(Defense) Report on Exercise "DRUMMERBOY"
WADF 319.1

q. Reference paragraph B 2 d. Action has been initiated by this headquarters to provide the 25th Air Division (Defense) with the indicated communications as well as other communications deemed essential by this headquarters.

r. Reference paragraph B 2 e. It is considered that this problem is being accorded adequate consideration in the radar program.

s. Reference paragraph B 2 f. Concur. Request that the installation of the authorized Class B weather station for the 25th Air Division (Defense) be expedited.

3. This headquarters considers the stabilization of personnel a primary requisite in the realization of an effective air defense system.

4. An ancillary of highest importance to an air defense system is "Y" service. Radio intercept intelligence of the enemy's movements, route, and objectives is considered to be of utmost importance to the over-all efficiency of an air defense system. This radio intelligence should be both strategic and tactical. Information acquired by it should be passed by the fastest means of transmission to the ADCC and GCI station. It is strongly recommended that priority action be initiated to establish this facility so as to make it available to the Eastern and Western Air Defense Forces and to all activated Air Divisions (Defense).

5. It is further recommended that the 325th All-Weather Fighter Group be equipped with F-94 aircraft as soon as feasible on the basis of twenty-five (25) aircraft per squadron. This recommendation is made in light of the well known deficiencies of the F-82, the proximity of the Northwest Sector to the Soviet air base system in the Far East Maritime Siberia, and of the priority of the defended installations in the Hanford-Puget Sound Area.

1 Incl - 25th Air Div (Def)
Rpt on Exercise
"DRUMMERBOY"

s/ Robert S. Israel, Jr.
t/ ROBERT S. ISRAEL, Jr.
Colonel, USAF
Vice Commander

cc: CG 25th Air Div (Def)

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

16 November 1949

DO 676.1

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report on Operations "DRUMMERBOY"

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. The following observations will, I believe, be of interest to you and your staff. These observations were made personally during the period 4 November to 7 November 1949 conclusively:

a. Our jets must be equipped with responder beacons or some device to enable the ground control to read the fighter with the same facility as the bombers. Unless this capability exists, fighters can not be vectored to the optimum positions for intercept purposes.

b. The F-82 all weather fighter lacks the performance to be effective at 25,000 feet or above against B-29 or B-50 type aircraft.

c. The CPS-5 ground radar performs less effectively above 25,000 feet than I had expected. I question its value as an early warning set. Current long range plan utilized twenty-three (23) CPS-5's as early warning stations. I feel this must be changed by either utilizing more power to get stronger returns or by multiple transmissions. Antenna tilt will reduce range to an unacceptable minimum.

d. The CPS-1 radar proved better than I had expected it to do at altitudes up to 32,000 feet, which is the highest altitude mission I observed.

e. The CPS-4 also performed better than I had expected at 32,000 feet and higher.

f. The electronic countermeasure utilized by the combers was not effective in that it provided positive identification and had such a narrow beam of effectiveness at ranges of over forty (40) miles from the ground radar, as to allow for good interception.

g. Both the AC&W troops and the fighter units were better trained than I had anticipated. Their morale was high, and they were operating as a smooth team from the outset of the maneuver.

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Ltr to C/S, Wash., file 676.1

h. The Strategic Air Command missions were executed in a business-like manner and were carried out as planned. The cooperation of the Strategic Air Command units is very much appreciated.

i. Much delay was caused at each early warning location due to the inability to quickly identify. The long range radar net work planned does not include OCI capability or identification capability at early warning sites. The use of height finders at early warning locations will greatly facilitate identification. I feel that a portion of the plan must be amended to include identification capability at all early warning sites.

2. A saving of personnel was effected by the incorporation into a headquarters of the Air Division (Defense), the AC&W Group headquarters. This arrangement proved satisfactory and allows for operational control by the defense forces and at the same time administrative control by the air forces. Thus there is no duplication of effort in the administrative details and the logistics, and allows for a smooth running team.

3. In conclusion, I desire to emphasize the necessity for the fighters and AC&W to operate and train together continuously, for fine and close teamwork is necessary. This can best be obtained by the same units, trained together continuously, by operating under the same command structure and by living and working together.

ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington, D. C.

27 December 1949

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report on Operation DRUMMERBOY

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Reference is made to your letter, subject as above, file DO676.1 dated 16 November 1949.

2. The information contained in your report has been received with interest by this Headquarters and copies have been distributed to the Staff for study and recommendations.

3. The following action has been instituted to correct some of the weaknesses mentioned in your letter:

a. A program has been initiated to provide responder equipment for jet fighters in the regular Air Force:

(1) Starting with the 9th article, the F-94A aircraft will be produced with such equipment (MARK X IFF) Installed at the factory.

(2) March 1951 has been set as the date of completion of a retrofit program on the following aircraft:

3 F-94
279 F-86 A and D
330 F-84 D and E
Any F-89 aircraft not equipped during production

(3) Jet Fighters not mentioned in (2) above will be retrofitted but have been given a lower priority.

b. Thirty (30) FPS-3 radar sets have been procured, twenty-four (24) of which are to be allotted your Command to augment the CPS-5 equipment now in use. Delivery of the FPS-3 will start in October 1950 and end approximately June 1951.

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Ltr to CG, ConAC, subj: Preliminary Report on Operation DRUMMERBOY

c. Twenty-four (24) height finders (AN/TPS-10B) have been procured and it is planned to increase this to approximately eighty (80). Of this number, sufficient height finders will then be available to provide one (1) for each early warning station in the system.

4. In connection with the unsuitability of the F-82 as an all weather fithter, consideration is being given to changing the all weather fither conversion program. Under the present schedule, the F-82 all weather units in your Command are not due to start converting until January 1951. To delete approximately fifty percent of the F-82's as soon as possible, it may be advantageous to divert the F-94A aircraft from the 78th Fighter Group in August 1950 to the two (2) squadrons of the 52nd Fighter Group at McGuire AFB and to the one (1) squadron of the 325th Fighter Group due to remain at Moses Lake AFB. Your comments and recommendations are desired.

5. It is the understanding of this Headquarters that a complete report on Operation DRUMMERBOY is being prepared by the 25th Air Defense Division. Final action regarding this matter is being held in abeyance pending receipt of this information together with your comments and recommendations.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ Muir S. Fairchild
t/ MUIR S. FAIRCHILD

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APPENDIX

(Section VI)

VI

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[redacted] TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE GROUP
[redacted] AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

17 June 1949

SUBJECT: Report on Conference on Selection of Future Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft

THRU: Commanding Officer
[redacted] Tactical Reconnaissance Group
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. On 9 and 10 June, 1949 the undersigned attended a conference at Air Material Command's Wright Aeronautical Laboratory to determine the feasibility of using fighter aircraft as photographic reconnaissance aircraft. The aircraft under consideration were the photographic reconnaissance versions of the F-80, F-84, and F-[illegible].

2. Part I [illegible] before us with a review of the latest [illegible] pointed out the [illegible] for tactical photographic reconnaissance aircraft [illegible].

3. It appeared evident from the beginning of the conference that a final decision [illegible] select the F-[illegible] as the desired model [illegible] that aircraft [illegible] production, [illegible] procurement.

[illegible] of future [illegible] follow[illegible]ous as [illegible]. This [illegible] AMC [illegible] to blue [illegible] Stal[illegible]ura in[illegible] the sque[illegible]ing [illegible] fighters.

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5. I would like to take this opportunity to discuss the requirements as stated in Materiel Requirements Directive Number 19-44. In addition, based solely on experience in this field of photo reconnaissance, as I have served over seven years in Observation Squadron, Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, and finally Tactical Reconnaissance as I envision it.

6. To be more specific I would like to first bring up the question of armament. Armament has had its pros and cons since early in the last war. It was doubtful if there was a need for it because the F-5 performed without guns while the F-6 had guns. The biggest argument against his primary mission. The conduct of the pilot or his air discipline is a cam and responsibility and the psychological factor of having guns on board drove F-6 pilots forward to accomplish more than just what was required. Therefore, I conclude this point by saying that armament is [illegible] future requirement, the amount of armament being consistent with the aircraft design and the ammunition being enough for a small amount of air to air combat.

7. Second, numerous camera requirements occupy space that could be used for armament. For example, the tri-nitrogen installation in the F-9J did hinder the possibility of installing guns or ammunition in that area. Is there a definite need for tri-nitrogen? Tactical reconnaissance? Is there a need for a stabilized mount for a camera? If there is, I doubt that need very much. If a camera is to be used in a reconnaissance with it is the Commander's duty to [illegible] the Command and Employment of Air Power is a factor to consider in this case. A Tac Recon Air Force may be responsible for an area and all the recon missions in that area, but not in a strategic function and I say let it remain with Strategic [illegible].

8. Third, future fighter aircraft are being designed so that the aircraft will eventually [illegible] large [illegible] and adjustment, visual reconnaissance and [illegible]. I doubt if this [illegible] could be accomplished now in an aircraft as large as the [illegible]. [illegible] reconnaissance is to operate where air superiority is [illegible], to get tactical [illegible] to support all reconnaissance flights [illegible] for some special missions it may be a good section.

9. Fourth, I would like to mention the manner in which representatives from this command are notified and prepared for each [illegible]. [illegible] notification of a forthcoming [illegible] requirements or however one subject may be [illegible] to our units or the way [illegible] the aircraft at the conference, and all other information regarding the [illegible] of what preparation should be made for a [illegible] should be included. The result [illegible] is the subject.

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

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17 June 1950

Subject: Report on Conference on Selection of Future Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft, Hq 363d Tac Recn Gp, Langley AF Base, Va.

LFA 337 2d Ind FR/ept

Hq 14th Fighter Wing, Langley AF Base, Va.

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley AF Base, Va.

The undersigned concurs in general with the contents of the basic letter and 1st Indorsement.

HENRY D. FISHER
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

9AF 337 3rd Ind A

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Concur in general with the contents of the basic communication. Attention is invited to Paragraphs 9 and 10.

2. Reference Paragraph 6, basic communication, it is believed that reconnaissance aircraft should be equipped with armament, primarily for defensive purposes. Flying a reconnaissance aircraft, equipped with guns, on a mission in an area where interception is possible, is an important factor bearing directly on the morale of the crews.

3. Reference Paragraph 7. During World War II, the Tactical Air Force-Army team was developed. Our present concept of the employment of Tactical Air Power in the future is that Tactical Air Forces and Armies will again be employed as a teams. Armies have many requirements for maps, particularly in a moving situation. The time element is usually an important factor. Since the Army Commander looks to the Tactical Air Force commander for all types of air cooperation, it is necessary for the Tactical Air Force commander to have under his control the equipment required to accomplish his missions. It is believed that there is a requirement in Tactical Air Forces for aerial mapping equipments.

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Hqs 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Langley AFB, Va., 17 June 49
Subject: Report on Conference on Selection of Future Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft

4. Reference Paragraph 8. Concur that large high speed aircraft are undesirable for Artillery Adjustment.

WILLIAM D. OLD
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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

...063d Tac Ron Gp, Langley AFB, Va. 17 Jun 49

...Report on Conference on Selection of Future Tac Recn Acft
...O 337 412 Jul 49) 4th Ind

...COMMANDING, ATR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

...Director of Research and Development, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. This headquarters is in agreement with the basic letter and subsequent indorsements, except as pointed out below.

2. Your attention is invited to paragraphs 4 and 7, of the basic letter.

a. Reference paragraph 4, the officer representing this headquarters at subject conference agrees that the lack of information on all models presented made any really judicious comparison difficult. However, except for the quarter scale model of the F-88, the lack of information was equitable in all models. In this officer's opinion, though the decision was not unanimous, the F-88 most certainly received an overwhelming majority. What little disagreement occurred was over the relative positions of the other three.

b. Reference paragraph 7, this headquarters does not agree with Captain Dillon's opinion that mapping is a strategic function only. The mission of tactical reconnaissance, night photo, must include the capability for daylight mapping, and, as the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force states in the 3rd indorsement, time is a definite factor in a mobile air-ground team. It could conceivably be impossible to obtain strategic support fast enough to benefit the tactical situation.

3. It is recommended that emphasis be placed on efforts to provide this and subordinate headquarters with advanced, detailed information and action concerning future conferences of this nature. Such information will make possible advance study and planning, which will result in more successful conferences.

CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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2.

Basic Ltr fm 363D Tactical Recon Group, dtd 17 June 49, subject: Report on Conference on Selection of Future Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft

5th Indorsement

SEP 29 1949

Department of the Air Force, Headquarters U. S. Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, New York

1. Reference paragraph 3 of the 4th Ind, this Headquarters has requested the Air Materiel Command to make every effort to provide adequate and timely information on scheduled conferences to allow for preparation and dissemination to all concerned.

2. The specific meeting mentioned in paragraph 1 of the basic letter was of an informational nature called to familiarize interested agencies of possible future tactical reconnaissance aircraft. All of the information, in this case, was at AMC which precluded any advanced planning. In addition, the procurement of a tactical reconnaissance aircraft is entirely dependent upon the selection of a Penetration Fighter.

3. In regards to the armament on a reconnaissance aircraft, it has been the policy of this Headquarters, dependent on the mission of the aircraft, to retain the armament in the aircraft if the photographic capability or performance was not compromised to a prohibitive degree.

4. This Headquarters concurs in the need for a mapping capability in tactical reconnaissance aircraft and also in the need for the smallest, lightest aircraft capable of performing the assigned mission.

5. Reference is made to paragraph 10 of basic letter concerning selection of representatives to attend conferences. The procedure in the past, relative to representation for mock-ups and conferences, has been to have representatives present, commensurate to their interest, to allow for the best evaluation and decisions possible. The selection of these representatives rests with the immediate commanding officer and should be the best qualified individuals available.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

CARL A. BRANDT
Major General, USAF
Deputy Director of Requirements

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DO 353

21 March 1949

SUBJECT: Amphibious Training of Air Force Units

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida

1. The Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, has been designated as the Air Force representative with whom the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets may confer in determining the schedules and other joint aspects of amphibious training and has been authorized direct communication with these Commanders.

2. It is understood that some unit commanders have been or are at present engaged in discussion of these matters with naval amphibious training school commanders. It is desired that until the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, has worked out with the appropriate naval commanders the broad aspects of these matters, no commitments be made by unit commanders concerning training requirements or scheduling.

3. You will be kept advised of the progress made by the Tactical Air Command in discharging this responsibility.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Info copies to:
CG, Tactical Air Command
CG's, 1st, 9th, 10th &
12th Air Forces

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Virginia

DF 373

1 December 1949

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Airborne Development

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Force
Pope Air Force Base
North Carolina

1. Reference is made to the functions and responsibilities of the Tactical Air Force (Provisional) as set forth in AF Regulation No 20-1; ConAC Regulation No 23-1; and in letter, Hq Tactical Air Command, subject: "Clarification of Responsibilities," file DF 322, dated 14 July 1949.

2. In the close relationship presently established between your headquarters and Headquarters V Corps, it is desired that special emphasis be placed on the development of doctrines, tactics, and techniques in airborne operations.

3. The Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, has recommended to the Department of the Army the establishment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, of a special agency directly under the supervision of V Corps for the above purpose. In maintaining this close relationship, you are directed to collaborate as closely as possible with that agency and with Headquarters V Corps in the following:

a. Review of current doctrines, tactics, and techniques in airborne operations and preparation of recommended revisions in JAAF as may be indicated.

b. Development of new and revised doctrines, tactics, and techniques, and preparation of appropriate recommendations.

c. Conduct of such joint unit training as is required.

d. Development of training aids.

e. Detailed planning of joint maneuvers and exercises in airborne operations.

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Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Va
DF
Subject: Responsibility for Airborne Development

f. Performance of service test of specialized weapons and equipment.

g. Preparation and submission, with recommendations, of evaluation reports on items tested.

4. It is recognized that this directive imposes an additional requirement for properly qualified officer personnel for full-time duty at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and the appropriate augmentation of your headquarters is currently under study.

5. Periodic progress reports concerning significant developments and recommendations in connection with the above considerations are desired. A preliminary progress report (copy inclosed) has been forwarded to the Commanding General, Continental Air Command.

/s/t/ ROBERT M. LEE
Major General, U. S. A. F.
Commanding

1 Incl
Cy ltr Hq TAC to ConAC
Subj: "Airborne Opns of TAF"

Copies furnished:
CG, ConAC
OCAFF

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2.

OFFICE, CHIEF, ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

AFFOP-GS 373.21/6(25 Sep 46) 25 September 1946

SUBJECT: Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army Units and Schools

TO: Commanding Generals
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Armies

1. Reference is made to:

a. Section I, AA-AF Bulletin No. 13, 13 May 1946, subject: "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

b. Training Circular No. 7, 26 July 1946, subject: "Army Training."

c. FM 31-35, FM 72-20, and TM 71-210.

d. Department of the Army Memorandum 95-15-8, 20 July 1946, subject: "Joint Army-Air Force Cooperation - Use of Aircraft."

e. War Department Pamphlet 1-1, April 1946, subject: "SOP for Air Force Units Cooperating with Antiaircraft Artillery."

f. Section IV, Department of the Army Circular 344, as.

2. The following letters are hereby rescinded:

a. Letter, Hq AGF, 373.21(2 Jul46)GNGCT-18, 2 July 1946, subject: "Air-Ground Operations," to Replacement and School Command.

b. Letter, Hq AGF, 373.21/213(31 Jul 46)GNGCT-18, 31 July 1946, subject: "Cooperation with Army Air Forces Commanders."

c. Letter, Hq AGF, 373.21/217(6 Sep 46)GNGCT-18, 6 September 1946, subject: "Air Participation in Air-Ground Training."

d. Letter, Hq AGF, 353/1434(21 Jan 47)GNGCT-37, 21 January 1947, subject: "Air Participation for Army Ground Forces Service Schools."

e. Letter, Hq AGF, 373.21/239(17 Jul 47)GNGCT-37, 17 July 1947, subject: "Air Participation in Demonstration at Service Schools and Unit Field Exercises 1947-1948."

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8. General:

a. The requirements for training of Tactical Air Force units, the normal demands of United States Air Force, and requests for Tactical Air Support by the Army have taxed the facilities of Tactical Air Command to the point where careful screening of all requests is necessary. To enable these requests to be properly evaluated the following procedure will be used in the future.

(1) All Army requests will be made to Office, Chief, Army Field Forces by the 10th of each month for the requirements of the fourth subsequent month. Office, Chief, Army Field Forces will coordinate and act on these requests without delay, subject to review the 15th day of the month preceding the month for which support has been requested, when all commitments will be confirmed for the ensuing month.

(2) Letters of requests will be submitted by the unit or school through the appropriate Army headquarters to Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, using the forms established in paragraph 8 below. Army commanders will:review requests for suitability and necessity and will establish the priorities for his area.

(3) Emergency requests, when approved by Army commanders, will be submitted at the earliest possible date, including information as required in paragraph 8. Emergency requests will frequently require the diversion of aircraft from a previously approved mission and should be made only under unusual circumstances.

(4) After requests have been approved by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces and accepted by Tactical Air Command, direct communication between interested Air Force and Army units will be authorized for coordination and planning.

b. Air Force Participation in large scale joint exercises or maneuvers planned by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces and approved by Director of Organization and Training Division, General Staff, United States Army, will continue to be coordinated by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces with Tactical Air Command.

c. The above procedure will not be utilized in obtaining aircraft for operational requirements of defense or emergency plans.

d. Except for missions already approved by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, requests covering the period between the date of publication and 1 January 1940 will be submitted under the provision of subparagraph 8f (3) above.

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ATTNG-AS 373.21/4(23 Sep48) 23 September 1948
Subj: Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army Units and Schools

4. Types of requests:

a. Airborne Training. Requests for aircraft for airborne training will be handled under provisions of special letters of instruction. Specifically, the 82d Airborne Division, The Infantry School and Army Field Forces Board No. 1, through the Commanding General, Third Army, will continue to operate under instructions contained in letter, OCAFF, [illegible]-47 353 (Abn), 23 June 1948, subject: "Airborne Training," to Commanding General, Third Army.

b. Air Transportability Training. All requests for air transportability training or demonstrations will be submitted in accordance with subparagraph 5b. Units making requests will have completed ground instruction and have suitable instruction teams or teams available during the dates for which aircraft are requested.

c. Air-Ground Participation.

(1) Exercise "Combine" presented annually will fulfill most requirements for air-ground indoctrination; however, air-ground participation in specific type unit demonstrations and field exercises will substitute to such exercises, and will show the mechanics of close air support to include air and ground communications.

(2) Requests for air participation in demonstrations or unit field exercises will be submitted in accordance with subparagraph 5b, and only under the following conditions:

(a) Army unit will be at least a battalion operating as a part of a larger unit or simulated unit.

(b) Simulated staffs of higher headquarters to include Army (JOC) will be represented or simulated.

(c) Communications are provided to show the exchange of tactical information (subparagraphs 22b and 22c (5), FM 31-35).

(d) Current recognition and identification aids will be utilized as far as practicable.

(e) A Tactical Air Control Party (AF) control or liaison [illegible] (paragraphs 12 and 13, FM 31-35) can be obtained.

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c. Air Reconnaissance Missions. Requests for air reconnaissance missions will be submitted in accordance with subparagraph 5a. This type request includes visual or photographic reconnaissance and artillery adjustment missions.

d. Antiaircraft Tow Target Missions. Instructions for securing Tow Target missions under provisions of TB Pamphlet 1-4 will continue in effect.

5. Forms: Letters of requests will include the information set forth below to enable each request to be properly evaluated and a priority to be established:

a. Air Transportability:

(1) Name and date or dates (with hour) of exercise.

(2) Unit or units to participate.

(a) Strength, officers and enlisted men.

(b) Equipment to be loaded.

(c) If "Type Loads" are to be employed, add information as inclosure.

(3) Purpose and scope.

(4) Observers (if any).

(5) Status of air transportability training.

(6) Airfield to be utilized and facilities available for billeting air crew personnel.

b. Air-Ground:

(1) Name and date or dates (with hour) of demonstration or exercise.

(2) Unit or units to participate (Army).

(3) Observers to witness demonstration or exercise.

(4) State the purpose and scope as pertains to air-ground participation.

(5) If an Air Liaison Officer is on duty with the agency submitting the basic request, the suggestions of this officer as regards numbers and types of aircraft, ordnance, safety features involved, and any other pertinent comments should be included.

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(d) Posting of abandoned plane of the demonstration to
[illegible]:

(a) Targets [illegible] Para 3d, FM 31-35,
[illegible] or simulated targets and methods to be
demonstrated for each target or terrain feature
for air training.

(b) Communications - Air and ground communications to
be utilized in demonstration, stating whether or
not the communications normally provided by a
Tactical Air Control Party can or cannot be
provided.

(c) Method of presentation - [If appropriate] commenta-
tor or broadcast over public address system, etc.

(7) Airfield available for use and facilities available for
billeting air crew personnel.

e. Air Reconnaissance:

(1) Purpose for which required - Reasons for requesting
missions which may aid in planning mission or interpre-
tation, such as artillery adjustment, tank assault,
direction of enemy installations, artillery barrage,
study of terrain, check of concerting disciplines, etc.
Also give brief description of Army Field Forces tacti-
cal plan or situation.

(2) Priority - Use one or more of the following terms:
MOST URGENT, URGENT, OPERATIONAL, or NONOPERATIONAL.
Examples, NONOPERATIONAL, or OPERATIONAL URGENT, may be
given relative priority, if two or more requests are
submitted.

(3) Date and time desired.

(4) Maps and coordinates of objective - The areas or targets
to be covered by the reconnaissance should be outlined
on the map submitted along with this request:

For oblique photos only:

Foreground line: _____(Coordinates).

Facing: _____(Direction of view, such as north
or 3300).

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(5) Type of reconnaissance: (See below) Desired method _____(if necessary).

Visual or photo indicated by following symbols:

A-Visual
Vertical: large (1:10,000 or less)
Vertical: medium (1:10,000 - 1:15,000)
Vertical: small (over 1:15,000)
Oblique: low (suitable for close study, occasional reconnaissance only)
Oblique: medium (suitable for normal reconnaissance)
Oblique: high (suitable for terrain study, survey)
Horizontal: panoramic (for artillery use only)

(6) Dissemination of report - How and where reports, visual or photo interpretation, will be sent.

(a) How - Telephone, radio, courier, report, or quickest means available.

(b) To whom - CG, First Infantry Division; G-2 Air, XX Corps, etc.

(c) Where - CP XXIV Corps; APOO, Ninth Army; or any special arrangements.

(7) Sets of prints required - Always consider economy of prints.

(a) Initially - State quantity of prints required initially, keep to minimum.

(b) Later - State quantity of prints required later; keep to minimum.

(c) Prints useless after - State last useful date.

(8) Delivery of prints - Tactical Air Forces delivers to Army Photo Interpretation Center. Thereafter distribution by Army Field Forces.

(a) To whom - State who gets prints and where, if necessary.

(b) How - Routine or other means, such as special messenger or aircraft.

(c) Date initial prints required.

(d) Date additional prints desired.

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AFTRS-AS 373.22/h(23 Sep h8) 23 September 19h8
Subj: Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army Units and Schools

(9) Remarks - Any special remarks pertinent to the fulfillment of this mission or an elaboration of Item H. Possible alternate requirement if weather precludes flying the entire mission, such as pin-point or short strip of specific spot.

(10) If mission cannot be accomplished by the desired date, notify the undersigned or _____.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY FIELD FORCES:

LEONARD S. CARROLL
2d Col., AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
5 - CG, Tactical Air Command
Langley Air Force Base
Hampton, Virginia

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Hampton, Virginia

In Reply Refer To: [illegible]

JAN 4 1949

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

SUBJECT: Minutes of Conference Conducted with Army Field Forces

1. A conference was conducted with representatives of the Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, 28 December 1948 for the purpose of determining the operational requirements of the Field Forces for the fiscal year 1950. It was also desired to determine the results expected from activities conducted with the Army in joint operations and to further information on the basis of this information what type of equipment and organization of the forces required to discharge these functions. The conference was held in order that a better understanding could be obtained of the requirements of the Field Forces when analyzing and preparing the Air requirements in the 1950 budget. A conference of this kind is now convening in Headquarters United States Air Force.

2. First topic of discussion presented by Army Field Forces was Airborne Training Requirements for the Fiscal Year 1950. Personnel of Army Field Forces indicated that there would be [illegible] airborne divisions [illegible] the event of [illegible] during the period under discussion. [illegible] requirements accumulated for this period of time [illegible] divisions operated in the Fort Bragg area, a regimental combat team operated in the Fort Benning area, a regimental combat team operated in the First Army area in New York (Governors Island) and [illegible] operations involving forces of the Army [illegible] Illinois area. The maximum airlift required for any one operation at any time was believed by an airborne regimental combat team of [illegible] Army Field Forces expressed a desire to [illegible] regimental combat team lifts. In their opinion, it would require [illegible] C-119, [illegible] C-82 aircraft to accomplish [illegible] Army Field Forces personnel also expressed the desire [illegible] 1950 to support an air transportability exercise [illegible] Army Air Forces. This latter exercise was expressed as [illegible] it was doubtful that it probably could not be achieved [illegible] the limited resources available with respect to troop carrier aircraft.

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JAN 4 1949

IX Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Langley Field, Va.
AFF
Subject: Result of Conference Conducted with Army Field Forces

3. Comments were requested from the Field Forces on the suitability of C-124 versus C-97 for airborne operations. It was indicated without the benefit of data available to them that C-124 was a more desirable aircraft than the C-97. The reason for this statement being that the C-124 is capable of carrying a heavier load, and is adaptable for bulky items of equipment that the cargo compartment of the C-97 is not able to accommodate. The Field Forces also expressed an opinion that the composition of the 10 troop carrier groups tentatively scheduled for the Air Force program should consist of 6 heavy troops and 4 mediums. They have also the opinion that the heavy transports did not provide the type of facilities desired for the dropping of paratroops. These aircraft are not considered suitable because of the higher drop speeds and lack of adequate access doors for personnel. An opinion was expressed that a 100 paratroopers could be dropped from the C-124 in 8 runs over the target. This was not considered the most satisfactory method because of the large spread in the parachute stick. Representatives of the Field Forces agreed to submit a more firm position with respect to the advantages or disadvantages of the C-124 versus the C-97.

4. A discussion ensued on the merit of the assault transport versus the assault glider. The types of aircraft under discussion were the C-124, C-128, CG-10 and CG-20 glider. They were of the opinion that the Air Force should not discard the procurement of the gliders in favor of the assault transport until such time as a thorough evaluation had been conducted on the suitability of the assault transport. I believe this opinion is concurred in by the Air Force also and that pending an evaluation of the C-128 and C-124, the gliders will be continued. However, it is the ultimate objective to replace the gliders with assault transports. There seems to be no technical difficulty that should preclude the attainment of this objective. There are obvious advantages of the assault transport over the glider. The most obvious advantage being that of the greater degree of versatility of employment in an airborne operation and the tremendous saving affected in the repeated usage of the assault transport versus limited secondary usage of the assault glider.

5. The 11th Airborne Division, which is now stationed in Japan, is scheduled to return to the Zone of Interior beginning in February. This Airborne Division will consist of two regimental combat teams with the Third Regimental Combat Team not being manned. As far as can be determined, it is scheduled to be located at Camp Campbell, Kentucky with a consequent movement of the Third Division from that installation to another selected area. The best estimates that were available indicated that the 11th Airborne Division will require troop carrier training beginning sometime the later part of the calendar year 1949.

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Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Langley Fld, Va. JAN 4 1949

Subject: Resume of Conference Conducted with Army Field Forces

6. The Army Field Forces was queried as to their requirements for tactical air support missions during Fiscal Year 1950. Their requirement indicated tactical support in three categories of operations:

a. School and demonstrations for purposes of instruction

b. Maneuvers and field exercises

c. A joint air-ground instructional exercise such as conducted at Eglin Field this past year familiarly known as "Exercise Combine."

In the estimation of these representatives, two fighter-bomber groups would be required to discharge these operational commitments during this period. In their opinion, during these exercise periods, it would require the effort of two missions per day per squadron. These concentrated activities to cover a period not to exceed two weeks which was considered the normal duration for one of the exercises discussed above.

7. A lengthy discussion ensued on the merits of fabricating a special type of aircraft for close-support operations. This question has been of paramount interest since there is some skepticism among the Army Field Forces as to the adaptability of the jet aircraft to engage in close support. Normally, close-support operations are classified as those attacks occuring from 100 to 1000 yards from the line of contact of two respective surface forces. The general consensus of opinion indicated that the Air Force should utilize F-47 to provide this close-support function for the interim and that continued deployment should be exerted to enable the jet aircraft to perform the multiplicity of functions that the fighter-bomber did during the last war. It was thus proposed that the characteristics now under consideration by the Headquarters United States Air Force for a tactical support aircraft be examined to determine if an aircraft delivered during the period specified by the characteristics would be suitable for all three phases of tactical air operations. It was agreed by all personnel in attendance that more intimate training must be realized in order that each of the services can fully examine and determine the capability of new equipment to perform the functions desired by each of the services. This was particularly true with respect to the jet aircraft.

8. Field Forces was queried with respect to their photographic requirements. These personnel envisaged no difficulties of visual reconnaissance from the means now allocated to this effort. From tests conducted to date, the evidence indicates that the jet aircraft is

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Hq Tactical Air Cmd, Langley AF Base, Langley Fld, Va. JAN 4 1949

AAF

Subject: Resume of Conference Conducted with Army Field Forces

capable of performing visual reconnaissance in an acceptable fashion as well as providing artillery adjustment. These tests were conducted at Fort Sill and all personnel associated with these tests are satisfied with the results obtained therefrom. Field Force representatives were of the opinion that one flight of night photo reconnaissance type of aircraft was required by combat theater commanders to accomplish those types of mission that have not been adequately pursued on other types of air-ground activities. This opinion was concurred in and an expression will be submitted on the details required to implement such a training activity. Field Forces also expressed a desire that the Air Forces continue to assist in the reproduction of prints since the engineer unit to perform this function has not been activated. Therefore, they requested that the Air Forces continue to utilize the Technical Photo Unit to assist in the reproduction of required photographic prints.

9. An expression of bomb-target requirements was submitted for the Fiscal Year 1950 which revealed a maximum effort that must be expended if this requirement is to be accomplished. There are 48 anti-aircraft battalions scheduled in the Army Program during the period under consideration. They estimate that 17,000 hours of tow-target missions will be required to provide the minimum training in tracking and firing of these units. Sixty percent of the missions to be conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas. The remaining forty percent to be conducted with field units throughout the United States. In addition to the training of Regular Army units, there is a requirement for training of civilian personnel involved approximately 2000 hours of tow-target missions. A directive was expressed from the Air Forces continue the development of a high speed target and that consideration be given to the assignment of more jet-propelled aircraft for training missions.

10. The above information is submitted for your information. Detailed action will be forthcoming from this headquarters to firm up these interceptive programs for the Fiscal Year 1950. These programs will be submitted in sufficient time to permit a thorough evaluation by your headquarters in order that the proper force requirements can be allocated.

ROBERT M. LEE
Major General, U. S. A. F.
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

JOC 337 28 March 1949

SUBJECT: Report of Joint Tactical Air Command/Army Field Forces Conference

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. A joint conference was held at this headquarters 8 March 1949 for the purpose of discussing Army Field Forces air support for the balance of the fiscal year 1949, and secondly, to evolve a uniform procedure to be followed by Army Units requesting air support in the future.

2. During the course of the conference representatives from Headquarters, Continental Air Command; Office, Chief, Army Field Forces; Headquarters Tactical Air Command; and Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force discussed the following subjects:

a. Routine training requirements for the 82nd and 11the Airborne Divisions to 30 June 1949.

b. Channels to be followed by Army Airborne units when requesting and implementing troop carrier support.

c. Army maneuver requirements to 30 June 1949.

d. Miscellaneous Army air support requirements to 30 June 1949.

e. Future channels and procedures to be used by Army units and schools requesting air support for joint training purposes.

3. The projected routine jump training requirements for the 82d and 11th Airborne Divisions to 30 June 1949 were presented by representatives from Office, Chief, Army Field Forces. Dates for accomplishment of these requirements were mutually established on the basis of availability and capability of troop carrier units assigned to Continental Air Command. Tentatively approved commitments have been outlined in graphic form for your information and concurrence. (See Incl 1)

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Hq Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Virginia
JGC 337
Subject: Report of Joint TAC/AFF Conference

4. In consonance with recommendations from this headquarters and with your approval, direct communication has been authorized between Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force and Army Airborne Units. Procedures to be followed by Army Airborne Units requesting routine troop carrier support are outlined in paragraph 4a, Inclosure 2. (Future copies of projected requirements for routine training will be forwarded to your headquarters for planning purposes as they become available from Office, Chief, Army Field Forces.)

5. Maneuver and miscellaneous Army requirements for air support to 30 June 1949 have also been charted for your information and planning. (See Inclosure 1)

6. In order that this headquarters could receive a planning estimate of all Army Field Forces air support requirements for a minimum period of at least six months in advance, several changes were proposed to Army Field Forces letter ATTNG-25 373.21/4 (23 Sep 48), Subject: "Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army Units and Schools." (See Inclosure 3) Proposed changes have been coordinated with Headquarters, Army Field Forces personnel and it is hoped that through the implementation of these changes, both Continental Air Command and this headquarters will be able to more accurately project Army training requirements in the future. Draft copy of proposed change is attached for your information as Inclosure 2.

7. To assist this headquarters in establishing a sound planning and operational relationship with Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, it is requested that the following action be taken by your headquarters:

a. Confirm all Army Field Force training commitments as indicated in Inclosure 1.

b. Approve draft change to Army Field Forces letter ATTNG-25 373.21/4 (23 Sep 48), Subject: "Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army Units and Schools." Subject change will be incorporated into above mentioned letter and published by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces upon receipt of your concurrence. (Inclosure 2)

8. To alleviate the misuse of limited troop carrier resources and other tactical air force units, it is suggested that Headquarters, United States Air Force be requested to formulate a system similar to that to be followed by Army units for the guidance of non-Army agencies

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Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Virginia
J@C 373
Subject: Report of Joint TAC/AFF Conference

requesting United States Air Force support in the future. The adoption of such a system would materially assist all planning agencies in projecting over-all yearly requirements and would tend to eliminate last minute rush requests for airlift or other air support.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

3 Incls
1. Commitment Chart
2. Draft of Proposed Changes to Incl 3
3. CCAFF Ltr, Subj, Tac Air Support for Joint Tng Missions of Army Units & Subs, dtd 23 Sep 48

Report of Joint Tactical Air Command/Army Field Forces Conference
CT 337 (28 Mar 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 18 Apr 1949

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. All Army Field Force training commitments as indicated in your inclosure 1 and the draft change to Army Field Forces letter ATTNG-25 373.21/4 (23 Sep 48) are approved by this headquarters.

2. Copies of the report and Commitment Chart are being forwarded to the Fourth and Fourteenth Air Forces for information and future plans. Likewise, Headquarters United States Air Force is being informed for any action deemed necessary reference the report and commitments with particular attention to paragraph 8, basic letter.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

3 Incls
n/c

s/t/ F. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen.

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Proposed Change to Letter of Instructions that will be Issued by CGAFF to All Army Units. (Enclosure Enclosure to CGAFF Letter (Incl 2)
As Result of Conference Agreements

3. General:

a. The requirements for training of Tactical Air Force units, the normal demands of United States Air Force, and requests for Tactical Air support by the Army have taxed the facilities of Tactical Air Command to the point where careful screening of all requests is necessary. To enable these requests to be properly evaluated the following procedure will be used in the future:

(1) All Army requests for United States Air Force support will be made to Office, Chief, Army Field Forces by the tenth of each month for the sixth subsequent month. Office, Chief, Army Field Forces will coordinate all requests with Commanding General, Tactical Air Command and will advise Army Commanders of all approved requests as soon as practicable.

(2) All requests for aircraft will be submitted in three categories:

(a) Routine airborne training estimates of aircraft required to meet minimum proficiency requirements. Requirements will be planned to use integral Air Force units of flights, squadrons or groups.

(b) Routine AAA tow target training missions (towing and tracking) for maintaining proficiency and tests.

(c) Maneuvers or special requirements to include all types of air cooperation for all Army units.

INCL 2

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(3) Letters of request will be submitted by the unit or echelon through the appropriate Army Headquarters to Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, using the forms outlined in paragraph 5 below. Army Commanders will screen requests for suitability and necessity and will establish the priorities for his area.

(4) Emergency requests, when approved by Army Commanders, will be submitted at the earliest possible date, including information as required in paragraph 5. Emergency requests will frequently require the diversion of aircraft from a previously approved mission and should be made only under unusual circumstances.

(5) After requests have been approved by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces and accepted by Tactical Air Command, direct communication between interested Air Force and Army units will be authorized for coordination and planning.

b. Large scale joint exercises, involving Army and Air Force participation, will be jointly planned by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces and Tactical Air Command.

c. The above procedure will not be utilized in obtaining aircraft for operational requirements of defense or emergency plans.

d. Except for missions already confirmed by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, aircraft requests between date of publication of this letter and 30 June 1949 will be submitted under provisions of subparagraph 3a (4) above.

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c. Initial estimated aircraft requirements for the six month period 1 July to 31 December 1943 will be prepared under the provisions of paragraph 4a (2) above and will be submitted to Office, Chief, Army Field Forces prior to 10 May 1943. Projected requirements thereafter will be furnished each month as outlined in subparagraph 4a (1) above.

d. Types of Requests.

(1) Troop Airborne Training. Copies of requests for aircraft will be submitted under the provisions of subparagraphs 4a (2) (a) and 5a above. Although requirements for airborne units will be furnished in advance to this headquarters for planning purposes, actual operational implementation of routine troop carrier training will be accomplished through direct liaison with Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division and Commanding General, 11th Airborne Division, with information copies of all correspondence exchanged between Fourteenth Air Force and Airborne Division forwarded to Commanding General, Third Army, and Commanding General, Second Army, respectively.

• • • • • • • •

e. Requests for Antiaircraft Artillery Training and Firing Missions.

(1) All requests for antiaircraft artillery towing and towing missions will be submitted as outlined in paragraph 4a (2) (a) (b) and 5b containing the information in paragraph 5d.

(2) All requests for antiaircraft artillery towing and towing missions which have been approved by this office and Tactical Air Command will be implemented through direct coordination with Commanding Officer

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Tow Target Squadron, Biggs Air Force Base, El Paso, Texas.

(3) In the event of necessary changes to previously approved mission requests, information copies of correspondence exchanges between Antiaircraft Artillery Unit and First Tow Target Squadron will be forwarded to CG,AFF, Tactical Air Command and Headquarters, Fourth Air Force.

6. Forms:

d. Information required: All requests for training and testing missions will contain the following information:

(1) PERIOD;

(2) AA UNIT(S) TO CONDUCT FIRING;

(3) LOCATION OF AA FIRING BASES;

(4) EQUIPMENT;

(5) PURPOSE OF FIRING;

(6) NUMBER OF MISSION(S) REQUIRED;

(a) Date(s);

(b) Type Mission (Training, Testing);

(c) Number of Missions;

(d) Mission Hours;

(e) Altitude and Air Speeds.

(7) TYPE OF AERIAL TARGET(S) TO BE USED

(8) LOCATION OF AERIAL TARGETS AND ASSEMBLING;

(9) COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AVAILABLE;

(10) AIRFIELDS AVAILABLE AND FACILITIES FOR AIR CREWS;

(11) REMARKS.

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1.

HEADQUARTERS THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

GNHEAD-A (O) 16 July 1949

SUBJECT: Tactical Air Support

THRU: Commanding General
Third Army
Fort McPherson, Georgia

TO: Chief
Army Field Forces
Fort Monroe, Virginia

1. Reference letter, OCAFF, file ATTNG-25, 360/52 (27 May 49), subject, "Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army Units and Schools."

2. Request sixteen (16) operational Fighter type aircraft be dispatched to The Infantry School for the following periods:

a. October 12, 1949, (Rehearsal) and 14 (Demonstration) for students of the Armed Forces Staff College.

b. October 26, 1949, (Rehearsal) and 28 (Demonstration) for students of the Command and General Staff College.

3. The following information is submitted in accordance with paragraph 5b, reference letter:

a. Problem No. 2421, "Battalion in Defense."

(1) 12 October (Rehearsal - 10-1600 hours) and
14 October (Demonstration - 1030 hours).

(2) 26 October (Rehearsal - 10-1600 hours) and
28 October (Demonstration - 1030 hours).

b. Army units to participate will be School Troops, Infantry School Detachment, plus Infantry and Artillery units of the Third Infantry Division.

c. Observers will be students of the Armed Forces Staff College (14 October) and the Command and General Staff College (28 Oct).

Annual Operations

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GNKEAD-A (O) 15 Jul 49
SUBJECT: Tactical Air Support

d. Purpose of the demonstration is Battle in Defense utilizing tactical air support. Scope covers the use of an air alert mission to destroy an enemy armored column expected to attack friendly troops. This information was obtained by aerial reconnaissance. (A copy of the Air Commentary is attached as Inclosure No. 1).

e. The Air Liaison Officer, The Infantry School, has recommended the use of 16 Fighter aircraft, eight (8) armed with 5-inch HVAR Rockets, and eight (8) loaded with 250 pound GP bombs-(250 pound GP bombs used for safety reasons)-to attack in elements of four. Rocket attack is first, followed by bombing attack. (Bombs should have instantaneous nose and tail fuses.) Safety limits at Fort Benning permit the use of strafing in the attack. Safety requirements listed in ConAC Regulation 55-1, dated 28 April 1949, will be complied with.

f. (1) Target for air attack is simulated armored column, marked by three (3) 50' panels of target cloth, enclosed in a circle of lime, with a six (6) foot upright panel at the head of the target. Smoke will also be used to mark the target.

(2) Two Tactical Air Control Parties are required, one for the jettison area and one for the target area. One Radio Jeep is required for the target area. Portable VHF radio sets in possession of The Infantry School can be utilized for the Jetison area controller.

(3) The Air Instructors' commentary will be broadcast over a Public Address System to the students. TACP will be picked up on PA while the mission is being controlled.

g. Lawson Air Force Base is available for use and facilities are available for billeting of air crew personnel.

h. Remarks:

(1) Request that live ammunition be furnished in sufficient quantity to permit two (2) rehearsals and one (1) presentation for each group to witness the demonstration.

FOR THE COMMANDANT:

/s/t/J. R. GROLLEMUND
Lt. Col. AGD
Asst. AG

1 Incl:
Air Commentary
2421 - Bn in Def

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AJROT 373 General (15 Jul 49) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY, Fort McPherson, Georgia 20 July 1949

TO: Chief, Army Field Forces, Dept of the Army, Ft Monroe, Va.

Request approval.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/t/F. N. LASKOWSKI
Major, AGD
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl: n/c

ATTNG-25 360 (15 Jul 49) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Tactical Air Support

Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia 27 July 1949

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Hampton, Virginia

1. It is requested that the tactical air support for The Infantry School as outlined in paragraph 3 of basic letter be approved.

2. This Office places these requests in first priority.

3. It is further requested that direct communications be authorized between the Air Force Unit providing the aircraft and the Commandant, The Infantry School to coordinate details.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY FIELD FORCES:

/s/t/LEONARD S. CARROLL
Lt Col. A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen

1 Incl
n/c

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Hq The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.
GNKRAD-A (O)
Subject: Tactical Air Support 15 July 1949

JOC 373 (15 Jul 49)

3rd Ind

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Va. 3 August 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AF Base, N. Y.

1. Recommend that the missions requested in basic letter be approved and that the 20th Fighter Wing be assigned the 12 and 14 October mission and the 33rd Fighter Wing be assigned the one for 26 and 28 October, since both the 20th and 31st Fighter Wings will be engaged in Air Indoctrination Course II on the latter dates. Recommend further that Turner Air Force Base, Ga. be used as staging base for both demonstrations.

2. Information received this date in telephone conversation between Col. McDonald, CO, 33rd Fighter Group, and Col French, TAC Operations, disclosed that the goup's aircraft are equipped to fire 5" HVAR rockets and drop bombs, but that no training has been conducted recently on dive-bombing and rocketry. If participation of the 33rd Group is approved it is recommended that refresher training be conducted in dive-bombing and rocketry to insure an accurate demonstration.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
n/c

/s/ R. M. THOM
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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ACTION	COORDINATE	STAFF ACTIVITY
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FOR DIRECTORATE USE

Prepared by

Coordinated With

RECORD EVALUATION

Non Record

Permanent ✓

Temporary

Destl

Tactical Air Support ... GLW/211
O&T 373.5 (15 July 1949) 4th Ind.
HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. It is desired that Tactical Air Command assume operational responsibility for the demonstrations at Fort Benning.

2. Every effort will be made to have the missions accomplished by the 20th and 31st Fighter Wings (Units are under operational control of Tactical Air Force during the period of the demonstrations). It is realized that during the latter dates, 26 and 28 October, the 20th Fighter Wing, and part of the 31st Fighter Wing will be utilized for Air Indoctrination Course II; however, it is believed that a satisfactory arrangement can be made with the Infantry School by utilizing the remaining capabilities of the 31st Fighter Wing. The 33rd Fighter Wing is not considered due to the expenditure of funds which would be required to commit that unit.

3. MAC P442-02 Regular Travel funds will be utilized for these demonstrations.

4. This headquarters will be notified as to unit committed, and of any difficulties encountered in accomplishing the above arrangement.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl.
n/c

NEAL J.
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

Info copy to:
CG, 14th AF

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FILE:

SUBJECT: Tactical Air Support

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

REGISTER NO				
SUSPENDED TO				
EXTENDED TO				
CLASS	ADM	MISC	HIST	PERS

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
4	[illegible]	O&T	BUD DO AG	1. Paragraph 3, letter Hq. USAF, 12 August 1949, subject, Air Force Combat Maneuvers, FY 1950 (mentioned in note 3, DO's Office) reads as follows: "Any changes to either the maneuver or budget programs established in paragraphs 1 and 2 above will be submitted to this Headquarters for approval". 2. The 4th Ind. has been rewritten to classify these particular demonstrations as routine training for the following reasons: a. Due to the directive mentioned in paragraph 1 above. b. Due to the limited time remaining for TAC to make proper plans in committing the units during AIC II. In view of the directive from USAF on Air Combat Maneuvers, additional time would be required to determine the funds required for the demonstrations. This would require 14t AF to prepare an estimate of the ACM funds needed prior to obtaining approval from Hq. USAF. 3. This office intends to request TAC to secure OCAFFs requirem for tactical support during such demonstrations for the remainder of FY 50 and to submit a one time request to USAF for approval. George L. Wells GEORGE L. WELLS Major, USAF Ext. 5256 [illegible] E. MUEHLEISEN Colonel, USAF Director, Operations & Training
5	22 Aug	Budget	DO	[illegible] Action Desired
6	[illegible]	DO	AG	Concur [illegible] Major, USAF

ConAC FORM RQ-AG 1
10 December 1948

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

FILE: Bud 373.5

SUBJECT: ~~Tactical Missions at Fort Benning~~, Georgia
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

REGISTER NO
SUSPENDED TO
EXTENDED TO
CLASS | ADM | MISC | HIST | PERS

NO.	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
				Mr R A Fasciani, Ex 7243/117
1	16 Aug	Bud	O&T	1. It is requested that paragraph 3 of the 4th Indorsement to CG TAC be changed to read substantially as follows: "Available M&O P488 Air Combat Maneuver funds are completely programmed and M&O P442-02 Regular Travel funds are extremely limited within this command. In this connection it is desired that these demonstrations be classified as Air Combat Maneuvers." 2. It is the opinion of this office that the determination of the category of these missions should not hinge on the availability of funds but on the type of training being performed. 3. This office concurs in the 4th Indorsement after the change in paragraph 1 above is completed. 1 Incl B/Ltr w/4 Inds to CG TAC R T BAYDALA Major, USAF Dir of Budget
2	17 Aug	O&T	AG	1. For dispatch. 2. Change has been made as recommended in Note #1, above. GEORGE L. WELLS Major, USAF Ext. 5256 DOLPH H. MUEHLEISEN Colonel, USAF Dir. Ops. & Trg.
3	17 Aug	DO	O&T	Returned for approval of NSAF as designation of demonstrations as "combat maneuvers" by the from NSAF stipulating this is proposed change in maneuver schedule. J. Fisher Lt Col. AUS

ConAC FORM NO-AG 1
10 December 1942

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OFFICE, CHIEF, ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-25 360/52 (2 Aug 49)

2 August 1949

SUBJECT: Tactical Air Support for Joint Training Missions of Army Units and Schools.

TO : Commanding Generals
ZI Armies

Reference is made to letter, OCAFF, ATTNG-25 360/52 (27 May 49), 27 May 1949, subject as above, in which the following changes are made:

a. Paragraph 3a(1) is deleted and the following substituted therefor:

All Armies requests for USAF support will be made quarterly and reach Office, Chief, Army Field Forces by the tenth of the seventh month previous to the quarter for which the aircraft are requested. For example: Request for estimated aircraft requirements for the quarter 1 July to 30 September 1950 should reach Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, not later than 10 December 1949. Requests will include actual mission time only and will NOT add days to allow for bad weather. U.S.A.F. will make every effort to carry out mission to include provision for inclement weather.

b. Paragraph 3e is deleted and the following substituted therefor:

Initial estimated aircraft requirement for the period 1 January to 30 June 1950 will be prepared under the provisions of this letter and submitted to Office, Chief, Army Field Forces prior to 10 September 1949. Projected requirements thereafter will be furnished each quarter as outlined in subparagraph 3a(1) above.

c. Paragraph 4a is deleted and the following substituted therefor:

Requests will be submitted including date or dates of training, type of mission, size of unit, and the type and number of aircraft desired. If the size of the unit to be lifted does not fully utilize the capacity of the aircraft, an explantion should accompany the

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minor changes in schedule, number of aircraft, etc., may be arranged by direct contact between the Commanding General of the Airborne Unit and the Commanding General of the Air Force furnishing the aircraft. Copies of all correspondence covering these minor changes will be furnished by the CGs of the Airborne Units to the CGs of the appropriate armies.

d. Paragraph 4c(1) is deleted and the following substituted therefor:

Air-ground participation in school demonstrations and field exercises is highly desirable. It adds realism to such exercises and shows the mechanics of close air support to include air and ground communications.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY FIELD FORCES:

t/ NEIL M. MATZGER
Lt Col, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

23 November 1949

O&T 373.5

SUBJECT: Troop Carrier Aircraft Requirements for Army Field Forces 1 January through 30 June 1950

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia

* * * * *

3. This headquarters is fully cognizant of problems that affect the troop carrier potential of your command during period 1 January through 30 June 1950; with the assignment of new equipment, expected malfunctions of new aircraft, and other possible changes. Every effort will be made to meet assigned commitments; however, at any time it appears that subject commitments to Field Forces cannot be met, this headquarters will be advised immediately with information copy to Tactical Air Command.

* * * * *

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHIDLAW:

s/ V. S. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl:
1. Trp Carr Sat Maneuver Rpts
1 Jan to 30 Jun 50

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Virginia

In Reply
Refer To

JOC 373

SUBJECT: Troop Carrier Aircraft Requirements for Army Field Forces
1 January through 30 June 1950

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel AF Base, N. Y.

1. In accordance with procedures established by Headquarters Tactical Air Command and Chief, Army Field Forces, troop carrier aircraft requirements for Army units and schools between the period 1 January 1950 and 30 June 1950 have been compiled and are submitted herewith for your approval.

2. The original letters prepared by each Army unit or school outlining their desired troop carrier support and subsequent indorsements thereto by the various numbered Armies and Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, are attached as Inclosure #1. A review of the Army requests disclosed that several changes would be necessary prior to being submitted to your headquarters for final approval, since some of the requirements were either in conflict with maneuver periods or in excess of estimated troop carrier capabilities for the period January through June 1950.

3. For planning purposes it was assumed by this headquarters that troop carrier aircraft assigned or projected for assignment to Continental Air Command between 1 January 1950 and 30 June 1950 could be made available for airborne and air transportability training of Army units on the following basis:

a. Continuous day to day operation - 30% of assigned aircraft

b. Maximum effort with a 2 or 3 day preparation period - 60% of assigned aircraft

c. Maximum effort for a large scale maneuver or field exercise provided 7 to 10 days were allowed for preparation, maintenance, and training. - 80% of assigned aircraft

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TAC, Langley AFB, Va.
JOC 373
Subject: TC Acft Requirements for AFF 1 Jan through 30 Jun 50

It is believed that the planning factors as set forth may, in some cases, be on the conservative side. However, taking into consideration that troop carrier units assigned to Continental Air Command during this period will be equipped with new types of aircraft (C-119 and C-54), it is the opinion of this headquarters that the planning factors used will, in all probability, approximate the actual number of troop carrier aircraft that can be made available for training of Army Units.

4. Using the planning factors outlined in paragraph 3, above, the individual requests submitted by Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, were reviewed during conference with Army Field Forces representative and were scaled down to within the estimated aircraft availability figures considered feasible using the 30-60-80% planning factor. The adjustments made have been concurred in by Office, Chief of Army Field Forces.

NOTE: Subsequent to adjusting Army Field Force aircraft requirements using the planning factors outlined above, it was learned by Tactical Air Command that it is Continental Air Command's desire to pro-rata available troop carrier aircraft to Army/Troop Carrier units for routine training on a 45% - 55% basis. The 30% planning factors used by this headquarters is 1.5% lower than the 45% support for Army units desired by Continental Air Command (based on 70% in commission rate).

5. The revised troop carrier aircraft requirements for January - June 1950 have been charted and are attached as inclosure #2. Attached to the chart is a breakdown of each individual unit or school request (revised) briefly outlining the number and type of aircraft required, dates, place and type of training to be accomplished. (Tab A to Inclosure #2.) It is desired to point out that the troop carrier aircraft requirements for maneuvers and special exercises Swetbriar, Portrex, and Tarheel are also included on the chart. The aircraft requirements for these exercises are based on planning estimates, and provision was made for time considered necessary for training and maintenance prior to each exercise.

6. In addition to the routine and maneuver requirements outlined in the attached inclosures, one classified Army request was received and processed. Aircraft requirements for this mission are indicated on the chart under Fourth Army 22-25 May 1950, however, the detailed request is being forwarded under separate cover.

7. A recapitulation of troop carrier support required by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, for the period 1 January through 30 June 1950

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Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va.
JCC 373
Subject: TC Acft Requirements for AFF 1 Jan through 30 Jun 50

has been prepared showing the number of "aircraft days" required to meet both routine and maneuver requirements. (See Inclosure #3) The breakdown indicates that the average monthly support required to meet the adjusted routine Army requirements, Army Field Forces Board No. 1, Infantry School and maneuver requirements is within the estimated 30% across the board availability of troop carrier units to meet Army Field Forces requirements. This conclusion was reached in the following manner:

a. Troop carrier unit authorization - 1950

3 Medium Troop Carrier Squadrons	48 aircraft	48
4 Heavy Troop Carrier Squadrons	48	60
1 Assault Squadron	16	
TOTAL	112	

b. Day to day continuous support of Army requirements - 30% of assigned aircraft. .30 x 112 = 33.6 aircraft available per day.

c. Assuming 25-work days per month - average monthly availability equals: 840 aircraft days.

d. Total availability January through June- 6 x 840 = 5240 aircraft days.

e. Total aircraft days committed January through June 1950 - 5143 aircraft days or 98% of estimated availability.

8. It is recommended that the adjusted routine Army requirements be approved and forwarded to appropriate Continental Air Command Air Forces for necessary action. It is further recommended that this headquarters be furnished copies of directives prepared by your headquarters in order that confirmation of approved requirements can be forwarded to Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, and necessary monitoring can be accomplished by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

3 Incls
1. Army requests for TC Spt
2. Chart of TC Acft Reqmts for Jan-Jun 50
3. Recapitulation of TC Spt required for OCAFF 1 Jan thru 30 Jun 50

3

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B/L fr Hq ConAC, dtd 19 Apr 49, subj: Commitment of Troop Carrier Units

1st Ind 3 May 1949

Department of the Air Force, Hq. USAF, Washington 25 D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, N.Y.

1. In view of the present shortage of cargo-type aircraft available in the ZI, there will be times when the troop carrier capabilities of your Command will be called upon to perform functions not included in their mission. However, these outside commitments will be kept to a minimum.

2. The chart referred to in paragraph one of basic correspondence has been withdrawn and every effort will be made to maintain those commitments made to the Army Field Forces.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

2 Incls withdrawn

O. S. PICHER
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief, Operations Division,
Directorate, Plans and Operations

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

6 September 1949

JOC 373

SUBJECT: Standing Operating Procedure for Troop Carrier/ Airborne Operations

TO: Commanding General
Continental air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter, your headquarters, subject: "Standing Operating Procedures for Troop Carrier Units," dated 7 June 1949, a draft SOP is submitted herewith for your approval.

2. The SOP as presented was evolved from a former Ninth Air Force Troop Carrier SOP. The procedures and instructions contained in this manual have been brought up to date through coordinations with Office, Chief, Army Field Forces and the 82d Airborne Division.

3. Representatives from OCAFF have informally concurred in the SOP and have stated that it is acceptable to that headquarters in its present form as an interim guide for Troop Carrier/Airborne operations pending final publication of the Joint Action Armed Forces Study, "Joint Principles and Doctrines for Airborne Operations." A copy of the draft SOP has been forwarded to OCAFF requesting official confirmation.

4. OCAFF has requested that subsequent to publication, ample copies of this SOP be forwarded to each Army headquarters for review and recommendations for future amendments or changes.

5. It is the opinion of personnel of this headquarters that the operating procedures outlined in this SOP will facilitate troop carrier units cooperating with airborne and/or like units. It is foreseeable that occasionally minor changes may become necessary during implementation of the procedures outlined due to local conditions or lack of homogeneous equipment; however, it is believed that in general the troop carrier procedures, as outlined, will meet the requirement for an operating guide at unit level.

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Hq, TAC, Langley AF Base, Va.
JOC 373
Subject: Standing Operating Procedures for Troop Carrier/Airborne Operations

6. Reference is made to paragraph 28. Drop Zones, b. (2) "Night Operations," and paragraph 29. Landing Zones, b. (2) "Night Operations" in the draft SOP. Detailed instructions concerning night parachute and glider DZ and LZ markings are not firm. Temporary marking patterns are outlined in Appendices X and XII; however, the markings as indicated are subject to revision at a later date.

7. This headquarters recommends that Tactical units be requested to employ the SOP whenever possible, for a period of at least six (6) months, to determine and submit recommendations for changes and additions considered necessary to bring it up to the highest possible standard.

8. It has been brought to the attention of this headquarters by the OCAFF that the Command and General Staff College "Airborne Operation Manual" is used as the primary guide for Army airborne operations. It is strongly recommended that copies of this document be obtained and furnished Reserve Troop Carrier units as an additional source of reference materiel when planning Joint Troop Carrier/Airborne Operations.

9. The 82d Airborne Division has furnished this headquarters copies of their latest SOP for Parachute Training - "Training Memo #68." It is desired to point out that the procedures and instructions outlined in this memorandum are construed to be applicable only to the 82d Airborne Division during local training. Therefore, the memorandum contains some instructions which are not in complete accord with the instructions outlined in the SOP prepared by this headquarters. However, during a joint maneuver or exercise, the instructions outlined in the draft will apply to all units participating.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

2 Incls.
1. Draft - SOP for Troop Carrier/Airborne Oprs.
2. 82nd Abn Memo # 68

st/ R. H. THOM
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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Standing Operating Procedure for Troop Carrier/Airborne Operations
O&T 373.5 (6 Sep 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 7 Oct 1949

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. "Standing Operating Procedure for Troop Carrier/Airborne Operations", is being revised and reproduced at this headquarters.

2. Distribution will be made of the tentative SOP for study and submission of recommended changes and/or additions, to the following:

Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, Ft Monroe, Virginia	15 cys
Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia	2 cys
Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, Calif.	2 cys
Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Florida	2 cys
Commanding Officer, Each Troop Carrier Wg	5 cys

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WEBSTER:

st/ EDMUND LAUDER
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

25 October 1949

SUBJECT: Airborne Operations by Headquarters, Tactical Air Force (TAFV)

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. It is desired that the closest coordination be established between Headquarters, Tactical Air Force, Operational (TAFV), and the Headquarters V Corps at Fort Bragg, N. C., to provide and facilitate adequate training within the limits of available resources, and to cooperate in the development of doctrines, tactics and techniques in airborne operations.

2. In maintaining this close cooperation, Headquarters, Tactical Air Force, (TAFV) should collaborate as closely as possible with the airborne elements of Headquarters, V Corps in the following:

a. Review of current doctrines, tactics and techniques in airborne operations and preparation of recommended revisions in JAAF as may be indicated.

b. Development of new and revised doctrines, tactics and techniques and preparation of appropriate recommendations.

c. Conduct of such joint unit training as is required.

d. Development of training aids.

e. Planning of joint maneuvers and exercises in airborne operations.

f. Performance of service test of specialized weapons and equipment.

g. Preparation and submission, with recommendations, of evaluation reports on items tested.

3. It is desired that a report be made to this Headquarters periodically on the operations and developments in airborne operations.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ F. F. EVEREST
Major General, USAF
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff

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25 Oct. 1949
Subject: Airborne Operations by Headquarters, Tactical Air Force (PROV)

OAT 373.5 25 Oct. 49 1st Ind.

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 7 Nov 1949

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.

1. Forwarded for necessary action.

2. Reference paragraph 3, basic communication, it is desired subject report be forwarded through this headquarters. Headquarters, United States Air Force is being requested to provide a Reports Control Symbol as well as the frequency of this report. Your headquarters will be advised upon receipt of this information.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOYSGARD:

s/ FREDERICK W. OSBURN, JR.
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

OF 373

1 December 1949

SUBJECT: Airborne Operations of Tactical Air Force

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. Reference is made to letter Headquarters TAC, Subject: "Airborne Operations by Headquarters, Tactical Air Force," dated 28 October 1949, and 1st Indorsement, Hq Continental Air Command, file CAF 373.5, 7 November 1949, thereto.

2. The following constitutes a preliminary report of action to date on joint airborne operations and developments. This report is directed by paragraph 3 of referenced letter.

3. a. The Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, has recommended to the Department of the Army the establishment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, of an agency to be called Army-Airborne Advisory Group. This special agency is to be under the direct supervision of V Corps and is to collaborate with Hq Tactical Air Force. It is to be specifically charged with the development of those aspects of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and new equipment of Army interest in airborne operations. A tentative T/O&E is being developed and current plans call for the manning of this structure with six (6) to eight (8) properly qualified officers.

b. Based on the above and in pursuance of the directive letter referred to in paragraph 1, above, preliminary discussions between the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, and Hq Tactical Air Command have been held. A supplementary directive (copy inclosed) has been dispatched to the Commanding General, Tactical Air Force, and the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, has been advised of this action. In addition, studies are underway which will culminate shortly in similar recommendations for the appropriate personnel augmentation for Hq Tactical Air Force to accomplish the above mission.

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Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Va.
OP 373
Subject: Airborne Operations of Tactical Air Force

c. Joint exercises and maneuvers scheduled to be held during the remainder of Fiscal Year 1950 and those in the preliminary planning stages for the future will, in most cases, involve Hq Tactical Air Force and will afford opportunities to test new doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment. Of interest among these maneuvers are Exercise [redacted] (the JCS sponsored amphibious - airborne maneuver for Fiscal Year 1950) and Operation [redacted], which will be a joint Army-Air Force free maneuver between opposing airborne forces.

3. Additional reports will be submitted periodically as directed.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/s/ [redacted]
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

1 Incl
Cy ltr Hq TAC to CG, TAF,
Subjt: Responsibility for
Airborne Development

Copy furnished:
CG, TAF

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HEADQUARTERS
TACTICAL AIR FORCES (PROVISIONAL)
POPE AIR FORCE BASE
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

TAF CG 333 — AR8/GRJ

12 DEC 1949

SUBJECT: Testing of Doctrine for Joint Operations Center

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Air Force Base
Virginia

1. Reference is made to the following letters and publications:

a. Letter, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, file DP 322, subject, Testing of Doctrine for Joint Operations Center, dated 21 October 1949, to the Commanding General, Tactical Air Force (Provisional)

b. Letter from Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia, File AFDTM-25 360, subject, Testing of Doctrine for Joint Operations Center, dated 27 October 1949, to the Commanding General, V Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

c. Copy, letter, Headquarters, V Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, File 353 CMWJF, subject, Testing of Doctrine for Joint Operations Center, dated 4 November 1949, to Brigadier General Willard W. Wolfinbarger, Commanding General, Tactical Air Force (Provisional), copy attached.

d. Letter, Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, United States Air Force, subject, Airborne Operations by Headquarters, Tactical Air Force (Provisional), dated 25 October 1949, to the Commanding General Tactical Air Command.

2. A careful review of the matter contained in letters cited above indicates that two separate and distinct requirements exist for the establishment of standing committees for the testing and development of doctrines and allied matters.

3. It is understood that your request to ConAC for additional officers to augment the Tactical Air Force (Provisional) covers only that requirement set forth in the letter from the Department of the Air Force to the Commanding General, ConAC, dated 25 October 1949, cited in paragraph 1d, above. These additional personnel are intended to

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TAF OG
Subject: Testing of Doctrine for Joint Operations Center

serve on Standing Committee, Airborne Operations in conjunction with V Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. At the present time V Corps has received no implementing directive to proceed with the organization of this committee.

4. In addition to the officers referred to in paragraph 3, above, it appears that a requirement exists for an experienced A-2 officer and an experienced A-3 officer to be assigned to this headquarters in order that they may be provided on a permanent basis to perform continuous study of air-ground operations in conjunction with Headquarters, V Corps, reference letter from General Hodge, dated 4 November 1949, copy herewith attached.

5. It is requested that necessary action be taken to provide to this headquarters three two (2) additional officers of the necessary rank and experience as indicated by the tenor of General Hodge's letter. If possible, these officers should have combat experience and be thoroughly familiar with the operation of a Joint Operations Center under combat conditions.

6. In view of the fact that General Hodge expects the personnel who will work as opposite number to the persons mentioned in paragraph 5, above, to become available on or about 1 January 1950, it is considered advisable that this request be processed as a matter of urgency.

W. R. WOLFINBARGER
Brig. Gen., USAF
Commanding

3 Incls
1. Ltr, Hq V Corps, Ft Bragg, N.C., file 383 GNWJF, dated 4 Nov 49
2. Ltr, Hq, DAF, Washington 25, D.C., dated 26 Oct 49
3. Ltr fr Office of Ch Army Fld Forces, file ATTNG-25 360, dated 7 Oct 49

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Hq Tactical Air Force (Prov), Pope AF Base, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
TAF CC 353 12 Dec 49
Subject: Testing of Doctrine for Joint Operations Center

DP 373 (13 Dec 49) 1st Ind 21 Dec 49

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. It is recognized that additional personnel with necessary rank and experience are needed to augment the present staff of the TAF. This is particularly true when the majority of the staff are in the field on various exercises leaving insufficient qualified personnel at Hq TAF to maintain continuity in such projects as the one indicated in Inclosure #3 to basic communication.

2. In view of Paragraph 4, Inclosure #1, and Letter from Hq USAF, dated 25 October 1949, attached as Inclosure #2, it is recommended that the Hq TAF (Prov) be expeditiously assigned the following number of officers:

No	Rank	SSN
1	Colonel	2162
2	Lt Colonels	2162
1	Lt Colonel	9301

3. It is considered imperative that the Colonel SSN 2162, possess substantial experience and knowledge of Tactical Air Operations. It is desired that the two (2) Lt Colonels (2162) possess intimate knowledge of troop carrier activities in order to properly fulfill the requirement outlined in Inclosure #2.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/t/ EMMETT L. PETTUS
Capt, USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

3 Incls: n/c

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Maj.R.A.Wray,Jr/8246/eab

TAF (Prov), TAF CC 353

bject: Testing of Doctrine for Joint Operations Center

1Pers-3-E 373.5 (12 Dec 49) 2nd Ind

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. The request contained in basic communication and 1st Indorsement approved. This headquarters is augmenting the T/D (by change #1) for 2600th Air Base Squadron, Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, by (1) colonel, and three (3) lieutenant colonels with SSN's as indicated 1st Indorsement.

2. Headquarters USAF has advised that Colonel James C. Averill, 1848A, l be assigned to the 2600th Air Base Squadron, Pope Air Force Base, th Carolina, for duty with Headquarters TAF (Prov) upon completion of d Forces Staff College.

3. Lieutenant Colonel William F. Brandt, 4715A, SSN 2162, Headquarters lfth Air Force, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, has been reassigned to the 00th Air Base Squadron, Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, for duty with dquarters TAF (Prov).

4. Requisition has been submitted to Headquarters USAF for one (1) utenant colonel, SSN 2162, and one (1) lieutenant colonel, SSN 9301.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

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cy of incls not required for AG files

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In Reply Refer To

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

DP 354

15 MAR 1949

SUBJECT: Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Within the past month, this headquarters has found itself in the unsatisfactory situation of making detailed plans for field exercises with the Army Field Forces without the benefit of a firm program for the fiscal year.

a. The Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, has already presented to this headquarters the Army outline plans for field exercises in fiscal year 1951.

b. At the recent Washington conference on the proposed Arctic/Canadian combined field exercise for fiscal year 1950, a representative of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Material, United States Air Force, stated that in order to provide efficient logistical support for field exercises Air Material Command should know the yearly programs of the major commands well in advance.

c. It appears that there is at this time within the Continental Air Command no procedure for the development of field exercises which is known and understood by the planning personnel of the various echelons.

2. Accordingly, in the absence of a clearly defined procedure for the development of plans for field exercises, the following steps are proposed:

a. The Tactical Air Command will submit a schedule of field exercises (joint, or unilateral with units normally concerned with tactical air operations) proposed for a given fiscal year. The schedule will be accompanied by brief outline plans of the proposed exercises to include, however, the detail necessary to the preparation of budget estimates. Further, each exercise will carry a priority number.

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Hq, Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va.
DP 334
Subject: Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans

b. Concurrently with the action proposed in a. above, the Air Defense Command will submit a schedule of field exercises related to air defense matters.

c. The Continental Air Command will consolidate the schedules (making adjustments where required), prepare the necessary budget estimates, and submit the proposed exercise plans to Headquarters, United States Air Force, for approval.

d. Headquarters, United States Air Force, will, within the limits of its proposed budget for field exercises, approve the plans submitted by the various major commands.

e. Additionally, Headquarters, United States Air Force, will issue broad directives covering major field exercises, particularly those involving joint command, or cooperation, in order that the major commands, particularly the Air Materiel Command, may be coordinated in their planning from the outset.

f. The Continental Air Command will then coordinate the efforts of the Tactical Air Command and Air Defense Command, direct them to submit general plans for the approved exercises, subsequently allocate specific units for participation in each exercise, issue the necessary directives to the regional Air Forces for administrative and logistical support of each exercise, and direct Tactical Air Command or Air Defense Command to conduct the appropriate exercises.

g. The Tactical Air Command and Air Defense Command will then prepare detailed plans for, and conduct, the approved exercises.

h. Provided the Air Force budget as approved by the President does not contain sufficient funds for the conduct of the previously approved exercises, the exercises carrying the lowest priority number will be deleted from the yearly program as directed by the Continental Air Command.

j. It is recommended that Headquarters, United States Air Force, promulgate a broad policy covering the matters outlined in subparagraphs

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Hq, Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va.
DP 384
Subject: Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans

2 c, d, e and h, above and that Headquarters, Continental Air Command, subsequently issue appropriate directives covering the proposals listed in subparagraphs 2 a, b, c, g and h.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

FILE: 354.2 Maneuvers

SUBJECT: Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans

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NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
1	16Mar	AG	DO	
2	16Mar	DO	DM COMP DAD DO	DO/202 This looks like a very sound approach. Your comments are requested. G. S. BROWN, Colonel, USAF Asst Deputy for Operations Ext. 1239
3	17Mar	Mat P	Comp	I believe this approach to the problem is absolutely essential. Furthermore, I believe that this paper illustrates that Tactical Air Command has properly assessed one of their chief responsibilities. ROBERT C. McBRIDE Colonel, USAF Director of Materiel Planning Ext. 7155
4	22Mar	COMP	DAD	Brig Gen Candee/3140/60 1. Attached letter seems to me to be an excellent and concise statement of the steps involved in the development of Field Exercise Plans. The concept of this procedure is not new or original. It is implied in the organization of the Continental Air Command as set forth in AFR 23-1 and is in accordance with normal and traditional staff procedure. 2. As a practical means of applying this procedure, I suggest that the word "Deputy for Tactical Air Operations" be substituted for "Tactical Air Command", that the Term "Deputy for Air Defense" be substituted for Air Defense Command", and the term "Deputy for Operations", "Deputy for Air Operations", and "Deputy for Tactical Air Operations" be substituted for COPY

ConAC FORM HQ-AG 1
10 December 1948

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SUBJECT:

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

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NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
4	22Mar	COMP	DAD	(Continued) "Continental Air Command" wherever possible in the letter. This will place the responsibility for staff action on some individual rather than on a headquarters, as a whole. 3. Reference paragraph 3 of the attached letter, I believe it unnecessary for U.S. Air Force to promulgate board policies as recommended in view of the fact that those policies are implicit in AFR 23-1 and in normal staff procedure. s/t/R. C. CANDEE Brigadier General, USAF Comptroller 1 Incl: n/c
5	25Mar	DAD	DO	Concur. I thought this was what we are doing? ! ? s/t/B. K. HOLLOWAY, Col, USAF, Asst. Dep. Air Defense, Ext. 1112
6	28Mar	DO	O&T	DO/202 1. Please prepare a staff memo establishing as SOP the procedure recommended by TAC in basic. Include in SOP exactly what information will be required, when and in what form. Provision should be specifically made for inclusion of ANG in these plans. Field exercise plans should be submitted to this office for approval and allocation of forces. 2. It may be necessary to check further with Colonel Russell, Hq TAC, on paragraph 2a, obviously something was omitted from this paragraph.

ConAC FORM RQ-AG 1
10 December 1942

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FILE:

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

SUBJECT: Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans

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1	DTAO Langley AFB, Va.	DO ConAC Mitchel AFB, NY 31 OCT 1949 VC	1. Attached is a copy of Tactical Air Command letter File Number DP 354, subject "Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans" dated 15 March 1949. Also attached is a copy of an Interoffice Routing Slip of the same subject. 2. The passage of time has not altered Tactical Air Command's view on the importance of establishing a directive on the procedures to be followed in developing Field Exercise Plans. It is noted that item 6 of the attached Interoffice Routing Slip directs that the action requested by Tactical Air Command (see attached TAC letter) be taken. 3. To date, Tactical Air Command has not received distribution on the subject publication. It is requested that Tactical Air Command be apprised of the current status of this project. ROBERT M. LEE Major General, USAF Deputy for Tactical Air Operations

2 Incls:
1. Cy TAC ltr, subj "Procedure for the Development of Fld Ex Plans"
2. Cy IRS, subj as above

ConAC FORM RO-AG 1
10 December 1948

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FILE:

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

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SUBJECT: Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plans

	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry. Show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly; show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
2.	4 Nov	DO	VC	The status of this project is as follows: a. A publication was drafted in this Headquarters in April 1949 which established a standard procedure for the submission of plans for the conduct of Air Exercises. Inasmuch as the Air Exercises involved not only the Tactical Air Command but also Air Defense, it was necessary to withhold publication of subject draft pending the establishment of a firm Air Defense organization. b. Now that the Air Defense organization is considered stable, a draft of the publication is being coordinated with the various staff agencies within this Headquarters. It is anticipated that this draft will reach your Headquarters prior to 15 November for necessary coordination before final publication. GEORGE S. BROWN Colonel, USAF Executive-DO 1239
3	5 NOV	VC	DO	Prepare letter to Gen Lee for my sig stating facts. 11 1010 7 Nov

Cont'd from HQ-AG 1
10 December 1949

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DO 354.2 9 November 1949

SUBJECT: Procedure for the Development of Field Exercise Plan

TO : Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Reference is made to letter, DF 354, your Headquarters, 15 March 1949, subject as above and Interoffice Routing Slip from DTAC, 31 October 1949, same subject.

2. Publication of the proposed standard procedure has been held in abeyance pending finalization of the air defense organization.

3. As of this date subject publication has been drafted and is being coordinated throughout the staff. It is anticipated that this draft will reach your Headquarters prior to 15 November 1949 for coordination before publication.

t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

Cy to:
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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 354.2

23 November 1949

SUBJECT: Air Combat Maneuver Program for Fiscal Year 1952

TO : Commanding General, Western Air Defense Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California.

(Identifical ltrs to CGs, TAC and Eastern Air Def Force)

1. Attention is invited to attached letter to HeadquartersUSAF, File No. O&T 373.4, subject as above.

2. It is requested that you formulate plans for Air Combat Maneuvers which you contemplate conducting during Fiscal Year 1952. Include a brief narrative statement explaining the scope and objective of each maneuver and its relationship to other tactical or air defense programs. Each maneuver will carry a priority number relative to its significance with other maneuvers contemplated by you.

3. In order for this command to prepare budget estimates for your maneuvers, it will be necessary to include the following items:

a. Area in which the maneuver is to be conducted.

b. Staging or operating base to be utilized.

c. Type and number of units to be employed in the maneuver:

(1) Number and type of aircraft.

(2) Give composition of special or non-T/O&E units.

d. Duration of maneuver in days.

e. Date maneuver is to be conducted.

f. Approximate number of personnel engaged in the maneuver, listed by staging or operating base.

g. Additional wire communications, teletype or telephone circuits required.

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Subj: ACM Prog/FY 50
Par. 3 (continued)

h. Movement of other than organizational equipment (type, number and method of movement), e.g., radar equipment.

i. Pre-maneuver training required, if applicable.

j. Any additional information which may be of assistance in preparing budget estimates.

4. In order for this headquarters to review and evaluate all the required maneuvers prior to submission to Headquarters USAF, it is requested that your reply arrive at this headquarters no later than 20 January 1950.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl:
Cy, ltr to
Hq, USAF,
subj as above.

s/t/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

OA 354 25 April 1949

SUBJECT: Kiel IV Reconnaissance Missions over Tarheel Maneuver Area

THRU : Commanding General Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO : Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
ATTENTION: Dr. Paul Overbo, Radiation Laboratory, Electronics Subdivision

* * * *

2. During the period 5 - 20 May, a joint Air-Ground Force training exercise, "Tarheel", will be carried out at Ft Bragg and Camp Mackall, N. C. Tarheel, the largest Air-Ground operation planned for this year involves approximately 26,000 men, 4,000 trucks, 2,000 trailers, 350 tanks, 70 heavy guns, 25 F-80s, 25 F-84s, 18 F-51s, 25 B-26s, 48 C-82s and miscellaneous equipment. Night air operations involve photo reconnaissance only, and will include a maximum of 6 RB-26 sorties per night for 8 nights out of the period 5 - 20 May. Altitudes flown by these reconnaissance aircraft will not exceed 15,000 feet. Continuance day and night operations will be carried out by the Ground Forces during the period 11 - 20 May. Prior to the Joint training exercise (2 - 4 May) there will be large troop and equipment concentrations in the Camp Mackall area. The large variety of items involved (troops and equipment) in various combinations and arrangements will provide a number of worthwhile targets for Kiel IV observations.

3. Training exercise Tarheel is not a "canned" operation. Hence, it will be necessary for the Kiel IV crew to contact the Air Operations Officer (Air Task Force Eagle) and the Ground Operations Officer (Task Force Victor) at the JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER, Camp Mackall, N. C., (1) to obtain the necessary correlation data on actual night-to-night operations, and (2) to obtain assignment of altitudes for night operations over the maneuver area. In order to maintain Air-Ground communication with the tactical air control system at Camp Mackall, it is recommended that one channel of the AN/ARC-3 aircraft VHF Radio (preferably Easy) be crystalized to operate on frequency 141.66 mc, which has been designated Task Force Eagle Common.

* * * *

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CONFIDENTIAL s/t/ J. K. BROCK
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

16 March 1949

SUBJECT: Units and Commanders for Exercise "Tarheel"

TO : Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. The following units are allocated for participation in Exercise "Tarheel":

316th Troop Carrier Group
4th Fighter Group
1 Squadron (B-26), 47th Bombardment Group, Light
2 Flights (1-PJ), 1-NP), 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Group
1 Squadron, 332nd Fighter Group
1 Liaison Flight
Detachment, 502nd Tactical Control Group
Detachment, 934th Signal Battalion

2. It was necessary to delete units requested from the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Group and the 72nd Liaison Squadron as these units are scheduled for inactivation on 1 April 1949. One squadron of the 332nd Fighter Group has been substituted for one squadron of the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Group to be employed as Aggressor Air Forces. The Liaison Flight may either be secured from the Army Field Forces or made up of suitable type aircraft (T-6, C-45) available in the Ninth or Fourteenth Air Forces.

3. Reference Paragraph VI B, 1e of Outline Plan. The 506th Tactical Control Group is scheduled for inactivation during the month of April 1949, however, a limited number of personnel may possible be available from the 505th Aircraft Control and Warning Group.

4. You are hereby authorized direct communication with appropriate Continental Air Command Air Forces for the purpose of preparing and implementing plans for this exercise. The Commanding Generals of the Ninth Fourteenth, Twelfth and Fourth Air Forces are being notified of this exercise and the fact that direct communication is authorized with your headquarters in connection herewith.

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Units and Commanders for Exercise "Tarheel"

5. Brigadier General Ralph Stearley, Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, is designated Commanding General, Tactical Air Force (simulated) for the exercise.

6. Brigadier General John P. Doyle, Headquarters Continental Air Command is designated the Air Exercise Director and Commanding General, Air Task Force.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

t/ JACOB E. SMART
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

In Reply
Refer To

DP 354

MAR 1949

SUBJECT: Air Outline Plan for Exercise "Tarheel"

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Submitted herewith for your approval is Air Outline Plan for Exercise "Tarheel" (Inclosure No. 1).

2. In connection with this exercise, it is requested that the following specific units be allocated for participation:

316th Troop Carrier Group
4th Fighter Group (to be based at Shaw AFB, S. C.)
1 Squadron, 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Group
1 Squadron (B-26), 47th Bombardment Group, Light
2 Flights (1-PJ, 1-NP), 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Group
1 Flight, 72d Liaison Squadron
Detachment, 502d Tactical Control Group
Detachment, 934th Signal Battalion

3. In addition to funds required for transportation and other purposes incident to this exercise, it is recommended that funds also be set aside for the leasing of commercial wire facilities between Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and the following bases:

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina
Greenville Air Force Base, South Carolina
Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana

4. Reference Annex I to the Air Outline Plan for Exercise "Tarheel", Organization Chart:

a. It is recommended that:

(1) Major General Robert M. Lee, Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, be designated as both the Air Exercise

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Hq, Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va.
DP 354
Subject: Air Outline Plan for Exercise "Tarheel"

Director and the Commanding General, Air Task Force. Lieutenant General John.R. Hodge, Commanding General, V Corps, has been designated as both the Exercise Director and the Commanding General, Task Force Victor.

(2) Major General William D. Old, Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, be designated as the Commanding General of the simulated Tactical Air Force in order that the Air Force chain of command will contain an echelon parallel to the Third Army, whose commander, Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., will command the entire ground operation.

b. The number of personnel composing the Air Umpire group will be small. Its composition and organization will be contained in an annex to the detailed plan for the exercise.

5. Inasmuch as the two Tactical Air Forces authorized the Tactical Air Command have not become active, the Air Task Force Headquarters for this exercise is constituted of personnel from Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Ninth Air Force, Twelfth Air Force and the Fourteenth Air Force. Personnel selected from Tactical Air Command Headquarters is, in each case, a key individual; as a consequence the use of these people in the exercise will seriously hamper the ability of this headquarters to discharge those functions enumerated in Air Force Regulation 23-1. It is realized that the Regional Air Forces (9th, 12th, 14th) have similar problems; therefore, if the positions to be filled from the indicated Regional Air Forces as recommended in Part II, Annex II to the Air Outline Plan is not deemed desirable, it is strongly urged that the personnel selected from other Regional Air Forces of the Continental Air Command possess an equal degree of competency and qualification.

6. Attached as Inclosure No. 2 is the draft of a letter for the signature of Commanding General, Continental Air Command, allocating specific units for participation in the exercise, authorizing this headquarters direct communication with those units and Air Forces involved, and designating by name the senior Air Force commanders.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

J. M. FITZMAURICE
Brig Gen, USAF
Vice Commanding General

2 Incls
1. Outline Plan "Tarheel"
2. Draft of ltr allocating units and designating commanders

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

AIR GENERAL PLAN

for

EXERCISE "TARHEEL"

I. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this exercise is to train Army andAir Force units in field operations and air-ground operations under simulated combat conditions, and to indoctrinate personnel of both services in the procedures and techniques incident to air-ground operations.

II. SITUATION.

A. Enemy.

Since the defeat of Aggressor guerrilla forces at Camp Campbell, Kentucky, in the Spring of 1948 by Task Force Lucky, Aggressor has redoubled its effort to expand its bases in the Caribbean area from which he can launch an airborne attack. Recent intelligence reports indicate that several guerrilla leaders escaped capture at Camp Campbell and are believed to be organizing forces in the vicinity of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to support and reinforce Aggressor in event of an airborne landing. Reconnaissance of the areas Southeast of Florida and of the Caribbean area indicate Aggressor plans to invade the Southeastern United States. Further, captured documents indicate that Aggressor has plans for the invasion of the Northeastern United States. (See Annex I - Intelligence)

B. Friendly.

1. Based on the above situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the formation of Task Force Victor at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, and of an Air Task Force ("Eagle") to support its operations. Task Force Victor, the nucleus of which is an airborne division, assembled at Fort Bragg by early April 1949. Headquarters of Task Force Eagle moved to Camp Mackall on 28 April and units of Task Force Eagle were deployed prior to 5 May 1949. On 20 April Army units began intensive unit training which culminated in a period of joint training with Air Force units from 5 - 11 May. Upon completion of the unit training, a critique was held the night of 11 May at Camp Mackall.

2. During the critique, word was received that Aggressor airborne troops had landed just north of Fort Bragg and were overrunning Pope Air Force Base. The Commanding General, Task Force Victor, took immediate security measures and notified the Commanding General, Third Army, of the situation; he was directed to attack as soon as possible to destroy the Aggressor Force and secure the Fort Bragg - Camp Mackall area against further Aggressor operations. At the same time the 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 31st Infantry Division, Fort

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Jackson, South Carolina, were released to him in place. The Commanding General, Task Force Eagle, having informed his higher headquarters of the invasion, was directed to support the operations of Task Force Victor.

III. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS.

A. Exercise "Tarheel" will consist of a period of intensive unit training for participating units in the Fort Bragg - Camp Mackall area, followed by a continuous field maneuver by the Task Forces against an Aggressor Force according to the following schedule:

1 - 20 April 1949	Arrival of participating Army units.
15 April - 21 May 1949	Operation of airdrome at Camp Mackall.
21 April - 4 May 1949	Army unit training to include battalion and regimental combat team exercises.
25 April - 4 May 1949	Deployment of Air Force units. (See Annex A - Movement Schedule.)
5 - 11 May 1949	Joint training of Army and Air Force units.
11 - 20 May 1949	Continuous operations against Aggressor.
21 - 31 May 1949	Return of troops to home stations.

B. The maneuver will portray a separate Army Task Force ("Victor") supported by an Air Task Force ("Eagle") attacking to destroy an Aggressor Force which has made a simulated airborne landing in the Fort Bragg - Pope Air Force Base area. It will include an actual airborne landing of a Task Force Victor battalion combat team (with one tactical air control party) combined with the ground maneuver on the Fort Bragg reservation of an airborne division (less 2 battalions) and of two infantry divisions (simulated) on the flanks.

C. Task Force Eagle will provide the required air participation for the exercise. (See Annex A1 - Scope of Employment.) This participation will consist of:

1. Phase I, II and III operations. Phase I, counter-air, operations will be simulated by two simulated fighter groups; Phase II, interdiction operations, will be conducted concurrently with Phase III operations because of the short time interval between the hostile attack and the counteroffensive; Phase III, close support operations, will be conducted in coordination with airborne landing and subsequent follow up operations.

2. Sufficient airlift furnished by a troop carrier group for a battalion combat team drop with elements of a fighter group providing necessary escort.

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3. Visual and photographic reconnaissance as required, to include night photography.

4. The operation of a joint operations center, tactical control center and subordinate control facilities for the command and direction of all air activities in the exercise.

D. The operations of the air aggressor will include visual and photo reconnaissance (simulated), escort (simulated) and first (simulated), second and third phase tactical air operations. Control of the air aggressor will be exercised through one tactical air control party only. Other control echelons will be simulated.

E. Even though there is an air task force and an army task force in this exercise, there will not be a joint task force headquarters. This exercise is conceived as an air-ground action as prescribed in FM 31-35. Coordination of the air-ground effort will be effected at the Task Force Eagle - Task Force Victor level of command. Coordination of air activities will be accomplished at the joint operations center which will be located adjacent to Task Force Eagle and Task Force Victor headquarters. (Normally the joint operations center would be established at the Army-Air Force level, but geographical limitations as well as maneuver limitations make it advisable to eliminate those headquarters from active participation in the exercise.) (See Annex II - Exercise Organization Chart.)

F. The phases of the maneuver will be controlled by the Army Exercise Director and the Air Exercise Director through Umpire and Air Umpire groups.

V. FORCES.

A. ARMY.

1. Task Force Victor.

One (1) Corps Headquarters.
One (1) Airborne Division (less two battalions)
Three (3) Armored Cavalry Heavy Tank Battalions (less one company)
One (1) Field Artillery Battalion
One (1) Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Company
Supporting Services

NOTE: Two (2) Infantry Divisions are simulated.

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2. Aggressor.

One (1) Armored Cavalry Regiment (less Jets)
One (1) Battalion, Airborne Division
Supporting Services

B. Air Force.

1. Task Force Eagle.
Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Air Task Force, Provisional
One (1) Troop Carrier Group (reinf)
One (1) Fighter Group (ANG)
One (1) Fighter Group, Jet (- 1 Sqdn)
One (1) Bombardment Squadron, Light
One (1) Tactical Reconnaissance Group
One (1) Liaison Flight, Provisional (4 - L-5 type aircraft and 2 Helicopters)
Detachment, Tactical Control Group
Detachment, Signal Battalion, Separate, Tac.
Detachment, Shoran Beacon Unit
NOTE: Two (2) additional fighter groups, Jet are simulated.

2. Aggressor.

One (1) Squadron, Fighter Group, SS
Detachment, Tactical Control Group (1-TACP)

V. TASKS

A. Army. The Third Army will:

1. Provide the Army Exercise Director.
2. Exercise over-all control of the entire ground operation.
3. Provide the air-ground operations section of the Joint operations center.

B. Air Force

1. Continental Air Command will:

a. Provide the Air Exercise Director.
b. Exercise over-all control of the entire air operation.

2. Tactical Air Command will:

a. Exercise immediate supervision of the tactical air operation.
b. Organize the Task Force Eagle Headquarters and subordinate control echelons.

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c. Train units allocated for participation in the exercise commencing 20 April 1949. (See Annex III -Troop List, and Annex IV - Training.)

d. Train personnel of the Air Umpire group to be employed under the Air Exercise Director. (See Annex V - Air Umpire Group.)

3. Fourteenth Air Force will:

a. Prepare assigned units for participation in the exercise. (See Annex III - Troop List.)
b. Provide weather service to Task Force Eagle Headquarters utilizing the facilities at Pope Air Force Base, N.C.

4. Ninth Air Force will:

a. Prepare assigned units for participation in the exercise. (See Annex III - Troop List.)
b. Organize a provisional liaison flight for participation in the exercise.

5. Twelfth Air Force will:

Prepare assigned units for participation in the exercise. (See Annex III - Troop List.)

6. First Air Force will:

Prepare assigned units for participation in the exercise. (See Annex III - Troop List.)

7. Fourth Air Force will:

Prepare assigned units for participation in the exercise. (See Annex III - Troop List.)

8. 54th Fighter Wing (ANG) will:

Prepare assigned units for participation in the exercise. (See Annex XII - Special Instruction for Air National Guard Units - to be issued separately)

VI. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. ARMY

1. Responsibilities.

a. The Commanding General, Fort Bragg, will:

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(1) Procure necessary maneuver rights in the Fort Bragg - Camp Mackall area.

(2) Settle all claims arising in the maneuver area as a result of this field exercise except those involving aircraft.

(3) Operate necessary facilities for an observer group, members of the press, and authorized visitors.

(4) Furnish logistical support to the Army Exercise Director Headquarters, including the Army Umpire groups and Army Aggressor troops, and to Task Force Victor (except during period 20 April - 20 May).

(5) Provide the Task Force Eagle Headquarters and Air Force control and signal units in the Camp Mackall area with Class I, III and V supplies.

(6) Provide 2d and 3d echelon vehicular maintenance support and evacuation to Air Force units in the Camp Mackall area.

b. Task Force Victor Commander will be responsible for:

(1) Administration and logistical support for the forces under his command during the period 20 April - 20 May, inclusive.

(2) Billeting, feeding, and transporting Army umpires and observers attached to units under his control.

2. Administrative Instructions: Omitted.

3. Logistics: Omitted

Air Force.

1. Responsibilities.

a. The Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, will be responsible for:

(1) Providing a limited number of commissioned and enlisted personnel for the composition of Task Force Eagle Headquarters.

(2) Supervising the organization and operation of the Air Section of the Exercise Joint Information Bureau. (See Annex VI - Public Information.)

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b. The Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, will be responsible for:

(1) Administration and logistical support of Air Force units participating in this exercise, and operating from bases within his area.

(2) Movement to and from the exercise area of assigned units participating in the exercise.

(3) Investigation, processing, and disposition of all claims arising in the maneuver area involving aircraft and of all claims arising outside the maneuver area as a result of this field exercise and involving Air Force units within his area.

(4) Operation of airdrome at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, during hours of daylight only from 15 April - 29 May 1949.

(5) Providing a limited number of commissioned and enlisted personnel for the organization of Task Force Eagle Headquarters and the Air Umpire group. (See Annex V - Air Umpire Group.)

(6) Equipping Task Force Eagle Headquarters to include transportation, messing and billeting equipment.

c. The Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, will be responsible for:

(1) Administration and logistical support of Air Force units participating in this exercise and operating from bases under his command.

(2) Movement to and from the exercise area of assigned units participating in the exercise.

(3) Providing a limited number of commissioned and enlisted personnel for the organization of the Task Force Eagle Headquarters and the Air Umpire Group. (See Annex V - Air Umpire Group.)

4. The Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, will be responsible for:

(1) Administration and logistical support of Air Force units participating in this exercise and operating from bases under his command.

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(2) Providing a limited number of commissioned personnel for the organization of Task Force Eagle Headquarters and the Air Umpire group. (See Annex V-Air Umpire Group.)

e. The Commanding General, First Air Force will be responsible for:

(1) Movement to and from the exercise area of assigned units participating in the exercise.

(2) Providing a limited number of commissioned personnel for the organization of Task Force Eagle Headquarters.

f. The Commanding General, Fourth Air Force will be responsible for:

(1) Movement to and from the exercise area of assigned units participating in the exercise.

(2) Providing a limited number of commissioned personnel for the organization of Task Force Eagle Headquarters.

g. The Commanding General, Tenth Air Force will be responsible for:

Providing a limited number of commissioned personnel for the organization of Task Force Eagle Headquarters.

h. Personnel requirements for Task Force Eagle Headquarters are being published separately.

2. Administrative Instructions: See Annex VII

3. Logistics: See Annex VIII.

VII. COMMAND

A. General.

The command and command relationships for this exercise will be prescribed in FM 31-35. The command control of all air units shall be vested in the Task Force Eagle Commander. Mutual differences that cannot be reconciled on the Task Force Eagle - Task Force Victor level will be submitted to the next higher echelon of Air Force and Army commands for reconciliation.

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B. Army.

1. The Commanding General, Third Army, Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., will command the entire ground operations.

2. The Army Exercise Director, Lieutenant General John B. Hodge, will be the representative of the Commanding General, Third Army, in the field and will command the Army Aggressor forces and the Army Umpire group.

3. The Commanding General, Task Force Victor, Lieutenant General John B. Hodge, will command all Task Force Victor units.

C. Air Force.

1. The Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Major General Robert M. Lee, will command the entire air operation.

2. Brigadier General Ralph P. Stearley will be Commanding General of the Tactical Air Force (simulated).

3. The Air Exercise Director, Brigadier General John P. Doyle, will be the representative of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, in the field and will command the Air Aggressor forces and the Air Umpire Group.

4. The Commanding General, Task Force Eagle, Brigadier General John P. Doyle, will command all Task Force Eagle units.

VIII. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. ARMY.

1. Responsibilities.

a. Commanding General, Fort Bragg, will:

(1) Provide the Army and Air Exercise Director Headquarters with radio, telephone, communications center, and motor messenger service to all major headquarters throughout the Field Exercise Training Area.

(2) Provide the Army Umpire Group with a voice radio fire marking net and a telephone net throughout the Field Exercise Training Area.

(3) Provide radio frequency and call sign allocations for all Army units participating in the maneuver.

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(4) Provide the PIO, upon request, with commercial facilities to meet the needs of the Press and Observer Groups.

b. Commanding General, Task Force Victor, will provide communications facilities from Headquarters, Task Force Victor to Headquarters, Task Force Eagle and to the Joint Operations Center.

2. Command Posts:

a. Army Exercise Director : Later
b. Task Force Victor: Camp Mackall

B. Air Force.

1. Responsibilities: (See Annex IX - Communications)
2. Command Posts:

a. Air Exercise Director: Later
b. Task Force Eagle: Camp Mackall

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ANNEX I
To
AIR GENERAL PLAN FOR EXERCISE "TARHEEL"

INTELLIGENCE

MAPS: US Sectional Charts, Scale 1:500,000, Code APC R-B
World Aeronautical Charts 1:1,000,000, Code WAC 410
AMS 1/25,000, 101877 to 101880; (4 sheets); 1/50,000, 100925

I. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION: (Simulated).

A. See IIa, Air Outline Plan, Exercise "Tarheel"

B. Air Order of Battle (Simulated)

1. Strength in Aircraft:

1st TC WG, BATISTA FIELD, CUBA, 150 Troop Carrier
36th TC Gp, SYLVANIA, PUERTO RICO, 75 Troop Carrier
92nd Ftr Gp Aboard Carriers, 75 Fighters
3rd Bomb Gp, SYLVANIA, PUERTO RICO, 75 Medium Bombers
2nd Bomb Wg, (H), ELDORADO, CUBA, 100 H Bombers
(Air Refueling Units for TC Aircraft)

2. Identification -- See FM 30-101

3. Replacement of Aircraft: The Aggressor replacement is by means of ferrying aircraft from Aggressor mainland to operational area.

4. Personnel Replacement: Aggressor potential manpower available for tactical air operations is approximately double that committed presently to the CARIBBEAN AREA.

C. Ground Order of Battle - (Simulated).

1. Units:

Headquarters, Fourth Army, CUBA
15th Airborne Division, CUBA
106th Infantry Division, CUBA
96th Motorized Division, CUBA
3rd Fuselier Division, CUBA
31st Armored Division, PUERTO RICO
2nd Mechanized Division, PUERTO RICO
12th Cavalry Division, PUERTO RICO
20th Field Artillery Brigade, PUERTO RICO
Guerrilla forces in area of Ft. Bragg

2. Identification -- See FM 30-101.

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3. Personnel and Materiel Replacement: Aggressor potential manpower available for Ground Forces is estimated to be double that currently committed to Caribbean area, and materiel replacements are from fast dwindling stocks of Lend-Lease supplies.

D. Naval Order of Battle -- (Simulated).

1. Naval Task Force, PUERTO PRINCESSA

a. 2- BB, Iowa Class
2- CV, Essex Class
1- CA, Baltimore Class
2- CL, Brooklyn Class
6- DD, Sumner Class
5- SS, Balao Class (2 with Snorkels)

b. Miscellaneous craft, including transports, tankers, etc., PUERTO PRINCESSA and Aggressor mainland.

2. Identification -- See FM 30-101

3. Personnel Replacement: Aggressor potential manpower for naval units is estimated to be double that currently committed to the Caribbean Area.

4. Replacement of Vessels: Nil.

II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION -- (Simulated)

What is the radius of action of Aggressor for airborne landings?

To what extent can Guerrilla forces in FORT BRAGG area support an Aggressor airborne invasion.

III. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.

A. Aerial Reconnaissance and Photography.

Visual and Photographic Reconnaissance will be accomplished (See Incl #4 to Appendix B and Annex XII).

B. Agents - FT BRAGG Area

IV. MAPS.

A. Maps will be distributed to using agencies by JOC, TAC.

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Annex I-Intelligence(Cont'd)

V. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS:

See Appendix B.

VI. SECURITY:

A. The provisions of AR 380-5 will govern the handling of classified material.

B. Restrictions on photography will be governed by existing Base Regulations.

C. Classification of aerial photography will be in accordance with AF Regulation 205-50.

D. Security violations will be brought to the attention of JOC Duty Intelligence Officer.

VII. CLIMATIC STUDY: For the Month of May, the following climatic conditions may be expected to exist in the Pope AFB - Ft Bragg Area:

Average daily temperature	69° F
Average daily maximum temperature	82° F
Average daily minimum temperature	57° F

CFR conditions may be expected to 93.1% of the time.

Favorable conditions for air-ground support will exist most frequently in the afternoon, when they occur on all but an average of one (1) day per month. They will be less frequent in the hours between 0600 and 0900 when unfavorable conditions exist on an average of 4 or 5 days per month.

Surface winds will occur most frequently from south or southwesterly direction with a speed between 4 and 12 mph, very rarely reaching a speed between 32 and 46 mph.

Weather conditions should be satisfactory for paratroop and glider operations during this period, since contact conditions (ceilings 950 feet or over with visibilities 3 miles or over) with surface winds equal to or less than 24 mph exist a mean average of 92.1% of the time.

Clear skies occur most frequently between hours of 2200 and 0500, and least frequently between hours of 1400 and 1700. Ceilings below 500 feet occur very infrequently, generally between hours of 0200 and 0700.

VIII. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES:

See Appendix "A".

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

ANNEX II
to
AIR GENERAL PLAN FOR EXERCISE "TARHEEL"

EXERCISE ORGANIZATION CHART



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EXTRACT

AIR TASK FORCE EAGLE

Exercise "TARHEEL"

4 April --- 28 May 1949

Key Personnel

	Name	Regular Asgmt	Task Force Eagle Asgmt
M/Gen	Glenn O. Barcus	CG 12 AF	Commanding General
Col	Ernest K. Warburton	TAC	Deputy CG, Deputy for Operations
Col	Howard F. Nichols	ConAC	Vice Deputy for Operations
Col	Blair E. Garland	TAC	Director of Communications
Col	Chester L. Sluder	14AF	Deputy for Administration
Col	Robert C. McBride	ConAC	Deputy for Logistics
Lt Col	George D. Hastings	14AF	Director of Operational Intelligence

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PARTICIPATING UNITS (Continental Air Command)

1. Friendly Forces

363d Tactical Reconnaissance Group

20th Fighter Group (Plus one squadron of 33d Fighter Group)

47th Bomb Group

316th Troop Carrier Group (reinforced by one squadron 62d Troop Carrier Group and one squadron 314th Troop Carrier Group)

157th Fighter Squadron (ANG)

156th Fighter Squadron (ANG)

502d Tactical Control Group (Det)

1st Shoran Beacon Unit (Det)

934th Signal Battalion (Sep) TAC (Det)

2060th Mobile Weather Squadron

1850th AACS (Det)

363d Liason Flight (Prov)

2. Aggressor Fighter Forces

82nd Fighter Group (One squadron)

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

Summary of the sorties accomplished during the Training Phase are as follows:

A. Friendly Forces:

Type Mission	Number Sorties
Armed Reconnaissance	99
Close Support	40
Escort	32
Bombing	27
Visual Reconnaissance	10
Photo Reconnaissance	33
On Call	12
Fighter Bomber	7
Area Cover	37
Interception	4
Total	301

B. Aggressor Forces:

Type Mission	Number Sorties
Air Patrol	10
Armed Reconnaissance	42
Dive Bombing	28
Interception	18
Night Patrol	12
Total	110

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

The advance echelon of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Task Force Eagle (Provisional), was formed at Pope Air Force Base, 4 April 1949, with the assignment of twenty-six (26) officers and fifty (50) airmen. Colonel Chester L. Sluder assumed Command.

Action was taken by Colonel Sluder and his staff to prepare the Mackall area for the arrival of personnel assigned to Headquarters, Task Force Eagle and participating units. Billeting, messing, transportation, and supply facilities were established. Assigned units moved into position on 25 April 1949.

Major General Glenn O. Barcus assumed Command of Task Force Eagle on 26 April 1949.

Exercise "Tarheel" was divided into three phases of operations: The Deployment Phase, The Training Phase, and the Maneuver Phase. During the Deployment Phase, 25 April to 4 May 1949, units were positioned and prepared for the succeeding operations.

The Training Phase consisted of joint training of Army and Air Force units. This period began on 5 May and terminated on 11 May 1949. Air units involved participated in counter air operations, interdiction operations, and support operations. All air missions were controlled by the Joint Operation Center.

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR TASK FORCE EAGLE
Camp Mackall, North Carolina

17 May 1949

SUBJECT: Historical Compendium

TO : Commanding General, Air Task Force Eagle

The following report is submitted in accordance with memorandum, Headquarters, ATFE, dated 10 May 1949, same subject as above.

1. Logistics

a. Mission: To provide for an even flow of supplies, adequate maintenance, transportation and facilities for units of Task Force Eagle.

b. Requirements: Task Force Eagle Logistics Staff consisted of two officers and one airman.

c. Operations: Minor matters were handled directly with Base Commanders, however, most of our requirements were established with the Commanding General, 14th AF, and the Commanding General, 9th AF.

d. Problems: The most striking single fact concerning Logistics during Exercise Tarheel, was that there were no critical problems during the maneuver. This was a result of sound pre-planning and first class execution, by Headquarters, 14th AF,F and its participating stations. Most of the requirements of Task Force Eagle were anticipated before the maneuver started. Full cooperation on the part of 14th AF stations, particularly Pope Air Force Base, was major factor in the

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success of the exercise. In addition, as minor problems arose during the maneuver, Headquarters, 14th AF quickly found solutions for them.

e. Recommendations and Conclusions:

(1) Every effort should be made to estimate more accurately operational requirements before the maneuver starts. During this exercise, the sortie rate was more than double the planned figure. This would normally result in a shortage of fuel, aircraft parts, personnel and funds.

(2) Units should be committed to the maneuver as far ahead as possible in order to give units time to properly equip themselves and procure supplies. For example, a photo unit was assigned Task Force Eagle after the exercise had started. It did not arrive fully prepared to accomplish its mission, because there was insufficient time for it to procure all the supplies needed.

(3) The system outlined in the ConAC Air General Plan for providing administrative aircraft proved to be excellent, and should be used in the future for similar provisional organizations.

(4) During this exercise, the established ConAC organization which requires geographical Air Forces to furnish logistics and administrative support to operational commands, worked well. During the exercise, a concen-

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trated effort was made by ConAC Air Forces to provide adequate support. As a result, the support met operational demands. But on the other hand, operational demands were neither geared to a definite plan nor to known capabilities of the supporting agencies. Missions were scheduled without knowing whether the participating units were fully utilized or over extended. Therefore, it should not be concluded that separating operational responsibility from logistics responsibility is a sound principle of organization.

2. Base Operations

a. Mission: To operate the airdrome during daylight hours including the following:

(1) Dispatcher's Section

(2) Personal Equipment Section

(3) Tower

(4) Base Flight Section

(5) Alert Section

(6) Crash Crew

(7) Liaison Flight

b. Requirements:

(1) Thirteen (13) officers

(2) Fifty (50) airmen

c. Operations: Normal Base Operations functions were conducted.

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d. Problems:

(1) Handling visiting delegations.

(2) Participating in long hours of duty.

e. Recommendations:

(1) A visitors' bureau should be established. This bureau should be charged with providing the maximum amount of service for visitors, and at the same time, with relieving the other sections of the Task Force of the responsibility of serving visitors. Base Operations sections should be manned so that duty hours will be no longer than sixty (60) hours per week, in order to maintain the efficiency of the organization.

3. Flight Scheduling:

a. Mission: To schedule and control administrative aircraft.

b. Requirements:

(1) Two (2) officers

(2) One (1) airman

c. Operations: Four (4) C-47's and two (2) B-26's were available for ATFE, which had fifty-three (53) pilots assigned.

d. Problems: None

e. Recommendations: This section would have done a better job if it had provided adequate means to check out more pilots on assigned aircraft. In order to procure forms, technical orders, handbooks and instructor pilots needed, the section should be completely organized before moving into the field.

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4. Weather Station

a. Mission: To provide weather reports and forecasts.

b. Requirements: One mobile weather unit and necessary communications connections.

c. Operations: This unit operated twenty-four (24) hours per day providing complete weather service.

d. Problems: On arriving this unit was below standard in the military appearance. However, the unit responded quickly and satisfactorily to instruction.

e. Recommendations: None. This unit accomplished its mission in an excellent manner.

ROBERT C. MCBRIDE
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Logistics

1. Incl: Functional Chart

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2.

HEADQUARTERS
TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
POPE AFB, NC

TAFPR 354 25 Nov 1949

SUBJECT: Revision of AIC II Curriculum

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Air Force Base
Hampton, Virginia

1. The annual Air Indoctrination Course conducted by the Air Force at Eglin Air Force Base has gradually evolved into its present form after a series of trial and error experiments conducted over a period of three years. This exercise was originally conducted as a joint exercise known as "Operation Combine", it has now evolved into what is primarily an air operation as evidenced by its current title. This evolution necessitates a revision of the curriculum if it is to be an outstanding course.

2. AIC II as conducted during the current year can, in general, be considered a success, in that it generally accomplished the objective for which it was organized. It must, however, be recognized that the current presentation was far from satisfactory and is well below the standard which should be considered as representing the best efforts of the Air Force in "selling" itself to the public, to distinguished guests and to the other services. In view of the fact that this annual event has grown immeasurably in importance and in the amount of comment and attention it has attracted, it deserves sufficient funds and talent in order to make it a really outstanding presentation.

3. Experience has given this organization and other contributing agencies the means of correcting many of the imperfections of the present course. There are, however, certain unsatisfactory aspects which will require the aid and cooperation of higher echelons in order that they may be improved. This letter will deal with revision of the scripts, which is considered to be that phase of AIC which most urgently requires early and skillful revision and editing. It is believed that by improvements in this phase, future Air Indoctrination Courses can attain that degree of perfection necessary to insure an outstanding presentation.

4. The present situation and supporting skits have been developed as a result of much loyal and diligent effort on the part of those who prepared them. They are perhaps as good as can be developed through the

354.2 - Indoctrination

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TAFPR
Subject: Revision of AIC II Curriculum

earnest efforts of amateurs, but they leave much to be desired from the dramatic and critical spectator standpoint. The conclusion is that professional playwrights or script writers must be provided if this phase is to be improved to any appreciable degree.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That funds be procured from USAF at an early date for the specific purpose of preparing for AIC III.

b. That TAC assign a full time project officer as soon as practicable, for the purpose of monitoring the script revisions and simultaneous preparation of necessary maps, charts and visual aids.

c. That professional playwrights or script writers be employed on this project.

d. That a firm decision be reached at the earliest possible date regarding the locale where future AIC courses are to be conducted, in order that the hypothethical situation portrayed in skits and commentaries may be fully adjusted to actual terrain.

/s/ Willard R. Wolfinbarger
WILLARD R. WOLFINBARGER
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

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Hq Tactical Air Force (Prov), Pope AFB, N.C.
TAFPR 354
Subject: Revision of AIC II Curriculum 25 November 1949

DP 354 (25 Nov 49) AIC II 1st Ind

Hq, Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va. 22 DEC 1949

TO: Commanding General, Headquarters Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

1. Reference is made to the recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of basic communication.

a. It is understood by Tactical Air Command that funds for Air Indoctrination Course III were requested by Headquarters Continental Air Command along with funds required for Field Exercises, Fiscal Year 1951. The Commanding General, Tactical Air Force, is being so informed.

b. A project officer will be assigned by Headquarters Tactical Air Command.

c. The Tactical Air Command concurs in the recommendation to secure the services of a professional writer, however, it is felt that the individual utilized to prepare the skits for Air Indoctrination Course III must, in addition to his writing skill, possess a knowledge of tactical air operations. It is requested that action be taken by Continental Air Command to fill this requirement. The individual selected should report to Headquarters Tactical Air Command in May 1950 and remain until completion of the demonstration.

d. Action is being taken by the Tactical Air Command to secure the Fort Bragg area for use in presenting Air Indoctrination Course III. Failing this, action will be taken to again secure the facilities at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

E. E. WARBURTON
Col, USAF
Vice Commander

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Major JMHuntsman/5256/mh

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HQ TAC, TAFPR 564
Subject: Revision of AIC II Curriculum

OAF 564.2 (25 November 1949) 2nd Ind 18 JAN 1950

TO: CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. In regard to 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1(a), Air Indoctrination course was included in 1951 budget.

2. Records pertaining to all Field Grade Officers' assignment to Continental Air Command have been screened with a view of locating an officer with knowledge of tactical air operations and a playwright and/or public relations background. Although no officer in this command possesses the above qualifications, a small number of officers possess qualifications which would enable them to assist in this accomplishment if selected. Attached are briefs of four (4) officers for your consideration.

3. Advise this headquarters of your desires to utilize any of the above officers.

4. It is believed that funds allocated in 1951 budget will necessitate the use of the Fort Bragg area, with units operating from home stations, for conduct of Air Indoctrination III.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITELAW:

Incls:
1. Brief of Off for Project Off for AIC II Curriculum - Lt Col Booth
2. Same - Lt Col Foster
3. Same - Major Zelliher
4. Same - Major Lawrence

Not necessary to keep copy of inclosures on file in AG.

JAMES M. HUNTSMAN
Major, USAF

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Hampton, Virginia

In Reply
Refer To

DF [redacted] (15 Feb 49)

15 FEB 1949

SUBJECT: Amphibious Training of Air Force Units, Fiscal Year 1950

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. Reference letter Headquarters, United States Air Force, subject as above, dated 13 January 1949, with 1st Indorsement Headquarters, Continental Air Command, dated 19 January 1949, and one(1) Inclosure, letter Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27 December 1948.

2. Correspondence with the Commanders-in-Chief, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets has been delayed to permit initial contact through letters forwarded in 2nd Indorsement to letter, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, subject, "Amphibious Training of Air Force Units," dated 7 January 1949; however, since paragraph 4 of inclosure to letter referred to in paragraph 1 above has authorized direct communication between the Commanders-in-Chief, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and the Air Force representatives, action will be taken immediately to establish contact with the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets to arrange the details of the amphibious training.

3. As constituted, the primary intent of "Combine" is to indoctrinate personnel of the other services, particularly the Army, in the principles and doctrine of joint Air-Ground operations rather than to constitute a field exercise with a joint task force. Inasmuch as the background situation of "Combine III" contained an amphibious assault on the beaches of a hypothetical country, it was felt last August, even before final plans for "Combine III" had been completed, that this stage of the overall operation might be realistically portrayed in future demonstrations by a small amphibious landing party. Subsequent review of the actual conduct of "Combine III", study of the general background situation to be presented in the next demonstration, estimate of the forces to be available for the exercise under contemplated budgetary limitations and evaluation of the scope of the instruction to be presented to the students in "Combine IV" during the fiscal year 1950 has revealed that the inclusion of an amphibious operation would be inappropriate. It is felt that the primary objective can best and most economically be accomplished by confining the scope of the actual operations to the minimum consistent with requirements for portraying the Air-Ground team in operation. Any

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Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Langley Fld, Va.
DP

Subject: Amphibious Training of Air Force Units, Fiscal Year 1950

Navy participation desired will be on the basis of an air-surface campaign in which Navy units are allocated to the Tactical Air Force Commander for operational control for a given period of time.

4. It is recommended that the letter, draft of which is inclosed, be forwarded to Headquarters United States Air Force, withdrawing the request previously made for a Naval Task Force participation in Exercise "Combine" in 1949.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

3 Incls:
1. Draft of Ltr to C/S USAF, subject as above.
2. Cy of Ltr fr TAC to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.
3. Cy of Ltr fr TAC to Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet.

[redacted]
Lt. Colonel, AGD (USAF)
Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

9 June 1949

OT 352.11

SUBJECT: Invitation for Army Participation in "Air Indoctrination Course II"

TO : Director of Plans and Operations, DCS/O, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. It is requested that a formal invitation be extended to the Department of the Army to participate in "Air Indoctrination Course II".

2. In informal conferences between authorized representatives of Tactical Air Command and the Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, the following Army support has been agreed to:

a. One Airborne Battalion Combat Team with supporting units for the air demonstration phase.

b. Twelve (12) reserve or regular Army officers to take part as actors and commentators in the academic phase.

(1) Based on superior performance in Combine III, the following Army Reserve Officers specifically are requested by name:

(a) J. D. Adams, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry Reserve, Tampa, Florida

(b) J. S. Mace, Major, Infantry Reserve, Charleston, South Carolina

(c) J. W. Lamberson, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry Reserve, Rocky Mount, North Carolina

(d) E. J. Fogarty, Major, Artillery Reserve, Pensacola, Florida.

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c. Technical supervisors to monitor and/or prepare scripts dealing with Army aspects of the theoretical situation.

3. Army support as indicated in the foregoing has been promised orally by Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, representatives to Tactical Air Command planners. Recently Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, reported to Tactical Air Command that a formal invitation from United States Air Force to Army would expedite firm commitment of Army support units and personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

at/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

Info cy to:
CG, TAC

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

OT 354.2

9 June 1949

SUBJECT: Invitation for Navy Participation in "Air Indoctrination Course II"

TO : Director of Plans and Operations, DCS/O, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. It is requested that an invitation be extended to the Navy to participate in field demonstrations of "Air Indoctrination Course II", the air indoctrination course for Service School Student Officers, to be staged at the Eglin Air Proving Ground.

2. The requirement is for one (1) fighter squadron.

3. The period of employment, including rehearsals, will be from 6 September to 9 November 1949.

4. It is contemplated that the squadron would operate from a home Naval Air Station in the western Florida (Pensacola) are to minimize administrative/logistical support requirements.

5. An early decision by the United States Navy will facilitate Continental Air Command planning.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

Info cy to:
CG TAC

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

9 June 1949

OT 352.11

SUBJECT: Air Indoctrination Course

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida

1. The Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, is currently engaged in plans and preparation for "Air Indoctrination Course II", the major annual air indoctrination presentation for service school student officers. Subject operation will be conducted at the Air Proving Ground, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida from 6 September through 15 November 1949.

2. "Air Indoctrination Course II" will involve more than two hundred fifty (250) aircraft and three thousand (3,000) Air Force personnel, in addition to an Airborne Battalion Combat Team of approximately fifteen hundred (1500) Army troops. The administrative and logistical support requirements for this operation are extensive and necessitate preparations and arrangements months in advance of the actual operational period.

3. Inasmuch as the Fourteenth Air Force will be charged with administrative and logistical support of subject operation, it is directed that the following personnel from your headquarters be placed on temporary duty, without delay, with Headquarters, Tactical Air Command:

a. A qualified officer representative of Deputy for Materiel (for the purpose of coordinating administrative and logistical support requirements and plans).

b. A qualified officer representative of Director of Communications (to coordinate communications requirements and plans).

4. Direct communication with the Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, is hereby authorized your headquarters for the purpose of establishing requisitioning priorities, joint logistical agreements and other long range support requirements incident to "Air Indoctrination Course II".

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

Info cy to:
CG, TAC

s/t/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Va.

EQ 354

8 July 1949

SUBJECT: Staff Composition and Organization for Headquarters, Tactical Air Force, Operational (Prov) for Air Indoctrination Course II

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. The attached staff study represents the recommendation of this headquarters for personnel, staff organization, and certain equipment deemed necessary in the execution of Air Indoctrination Course II.

2. The organization depicted in the attached study was determined from past experience gained in the conduct of Air Indoctrination Course I and Combines II and III in the years 1946, 1947, and 1948. Due consideration was given to current organization structure that provides for the division in responsibility for operational control and administrative and logistic support. Appropriate modifications in personnel and equipment requirements were made accordingly.

3. The requirements imposed on the operational staff charged with the presentation of this type exercise to student bodies of the various service schools remain generally constant. Therefore, this study is valid although operating units and scope of employment are not presently firm.

4. Requirements for actors and guides are not reflected in this study as those requirements are directly related to the detailed plan which has not been developed.

5. It is requested that the recommendations set forth in the attached study be approved and immediate action be taken to provide the personnel in order that the Tactical Air Force, Operational (Prov) may initiate the intensive briefing and training program necessary to insure the successful conduct of Air Indoctrination Course II.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/st/ R. H. THOM
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

1 Incl.
Staff Study

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

11 July 1949

DP 354

SUBJECT: Air Indoctrination Course II

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. Air Indoctrination Course II, the annual demonstration of tactical air operations, has been in the planning stage since March, 1949. The outline plan was forwarded to your Headquarters for approval on 21 May 1949. Concurrently with this initial planning, continuous liaison with your Headquarters has been maintained for the purpose of obtaining the necessary funding and for a statement of the availability of tactical units. This exercise, involving as it does the participation of both the Army and the Navy, imposes an abnormal requirement for thorough and timely planning.

2. The basic operational schedules for the various phases of this exercise have been established with sufficient firmness to be included in the curricula of the service schools whose student bodies normally attend these exercises. In addition, negotiations have been opened with other major commands. Preliminary deployment is scheduled to commence the first week in August with the movement of the Tactical Air Force (Prov) Headquarters into the exercise area.

3. The detailed planning necessary to assure the success of this exercise depends on the following major factors:

a. Approval by your Headquarters of the outline plan.

b. Assurances of the necessary funds to support the exercise as outlined in this plan.

c. Timely and definite allocation of the necessary units to perform the exercise.

To date, basic decisions have not been reached on any of the above vital aspects.

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Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
DP 354
Subject: Air Indoctrination Course II

4. The conflicting requirements for funds, tactical units, and facilities which face the Air Force today are recognized and the relative priority of this exercise must of course be the governing factor. The time remaining for the completion of the extensive and detailed planning on which the success of this exercise depends is alarmingly short. In addition, the Air Proving Ground Command must have funds in hand by 15 July 1949, in order to accomplish the necessary repairs to facilities required for the exercise.

5. It is, therefore, imperative that current uncertainties be resolved immediately if this exercise is to be held. If this is not possible only a prompt decision to cancel the exercise will prevent embarrassment to the Air Force.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/st/ R. H. THOM
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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DTAO

22 June 1949

SUBJECT: Continental Air Command Support for the Academic Phase of Air Indoctrination Course II

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Academic presentations through the media of skits have proved a superior method of teaching student officers. Through progressive experience in the post-war years, Tactical Air Command representatives familiar with skit presentations, present the following special requirements:

a. Preparation of skit manuscripts. The goal of manuscript preparation is to present lessons in vivid, dynamic form to gain and hold the attention of students. Doctrine, tactics and technique are more effectively impressed by dialogue and action than by the most accomplished lecturer. When specific points are matched by field demonstrations, the clarity of such a form of instruction is enhanced. We believe Tactical Air Command currently has the personnel to produce such manuscripts in collaboration with other services.

b. Staging.

The most important adjuncts to make dialogue lucid are maps. This requirement has two phases:

(1) Maps of sufficient size so that military symbols are readily discernible from the rear rows of a theater. Accuracy of detail and proper use of color are concurrent requirements.

(2) Mechanical means for rapid exchange of maps, as one map is needed to picture a general situation and other maps are needed to depict following special situations or vice versa.

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HQ, Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va.
DTAO
Subject: Continental Air Command Support for the Academic Phase of Air Indoctrination Course II

a. Actors.

The requirement for actors has several vital aspects:

(1) Voice timbre, command and enunciation of English.

(2) Poise, appearance, posture.

(3) Rehearsals must be continuous beyond the preparatory stage because of infrequency of performances. This requirement is based on full-time application. When personnel are assigned on a basis of "in addition to other duties" both primary job and rehearsal/performance suffer.

(4) The number required is stated in letter accompanying the outline plan.

d. Provisions for an adequate public address system with remote control installation in the rear of the theater.

e. Costuming and props to "dress" the stage and provide "eye appeal."

2. Current arrangements are satisfactory as regards subject of paragraphs a and c.

a. Need exists for an officer competent to prepare full screen sized maps, together with a mechanism to quickly substitute one map for another. This need is urgent and hardly can be expressed by an MOS. If Continental Air Command lacks an officer with such talents, it is believed Lieutenant Colonel Robert Nordstrom, Chief Graphic Presentations Section, Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force, may supply one. Maps must be completed, ready for use before 6 September.

b. Before selection, officers to be assigned as actors should have their records screened or be personally interviewed to determine previous theatrical or relative experience in radio or public speaking. This precaution is based on the fact that among officers assigned as actors in previous skit presentations, it has been necessary to eliminate

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Hq, Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Va.
DTAO
Subject: Continental Air Command Support for the Academic Phase of Air Indoctrination Course II

approximately one-half for inability to "read lines" in a convincing manner. Actors should be directed to report at Eglin Main Theater not later than 6 September.

c. Enlisted men are preferable for stagehands. About ten (10) are required. Reporting date should be 6 September.

d. Use of Master Sergeants as student guides should prove satisfactory. VIP parties require officer guides, however. The ratio of officers to sergeants should be at least one to four.

e. The theater used at Eglin Main is a conventional post movie-house. The movie sound projector is not adaptable to voice projection. Supplementary equipment at Eglin last year - when available - was antiquated and unsatisfactory. The need exists for special equipment as described in paragraph 1, d. This equipment should be installed, ready for use by 6 September.

3. It is requested that action be taken by Continental Air Command on requirements outlined in paragraphs 2 a, b, c, d, and e.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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Breakdown of sorties by type:

Actual Medium Altitude Bombing	5
Demonstration Rehearsals	13
Demonstration Missions	12
Miscellaneous	8

(b) Ground Training.

One (1) B-29 and one (1) B-26 with crews, were on loan from 3200th Group and were not required to perform ground training.

(2) 47th Bomb Group.

(a) Flight Training.

Total number sorties flown during training	42
Total number sorties flown during rehearsals	18
Total number sorties flown during demonstrations	12
Total number hours flown during training, rehearsals and demonstrations	295:30
Ordnance expended by type during training, rehearsals and demonstrations	
500# Bombs, GP	138
Breakdown of sorties flown by type:	
Medium altitude bombing	16
Fly-by's	14
Demonstration Rehearsals	18
Demonstration Actual	12
Simulated interdiction missions	8
Transition day check outs	3
Test Flights	4
Miscellaneous	25

(b) Ground Training.

Subject	Classroom Hours
Flying Safety	8
Flight Charts	1
Instrument Calibration	1
Code	4
Weather	6
Air Discipline	2
Command-Employment of Air Power	2
Daily Inspections	8
Troop Information	6
B-45 Emergency Procedure	7

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B-4b Radio Equipment	5
B-45 Weight and Balance	2
Cruise Control	4
Personal Equipment	2
Safeguarding Military Information	3
E6B Computer	4
Character Guidance	5
ADQ-24 Familiarization	5
Polar Navigation	2
Interior Guard	2
New Developments	4
Arctic, Desert and water survival	2
Navigation	3
MPQ-2	1
Arctic Equipment	1
Aircraft Identification	1
Air Ground Operations	2
Organization and Command Planning	1
Tactical Air Control Communications	1
Combat, Tactical	2
Organization of USAF, Army, Navy	4
Organization of ConAC	1
Organization of TAC	1
Organization of ADC	1
Organization of AMC	1
Organization of ATC	1
Articles of War	1

e. Liaison Training.

(1) Liaison Squadron.

During AIC II period the Liaison Squadron flew a total of ninety-five (95) hours in L-13 type aircraft and thirty-two (32) hours in H-5 helicopter.

The Liaison aircraft were used primarily for passenger and courier runs from Eglin #2, Fla. to each of the Auxiliary Fields in use by AIC II units. The helicopters were used during the rehearsals and demonstrations to check all roads leading in to the range area prior to rehearsals and demonstrations and as standby aircraft in event of emergency. They also flew two (2) pre-planned missions in the rehearsals and demonstrations. One (1) mission was to pick up a messenger in front of the spectator stands at H#31 and another was to deliver photos (taken by RF-80's in dicing run of stands) as soon after development as possible.

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No real difficulties were encountered by the Liaison Squadron during AIC II period and all assigned missions were flown successfully.

Note: Some missions were flown in conjunction with other missions, therefore, the breakdown of sorties by type and total flown will not ballance.

5. Discussion.

The first day of training commenced on 19 September 1949. During the period 19 September to 29 October 1949 a total of over 5,000 sorties were flown for training purposes (including missions flown during rehearsals and demonstrations). A total of over 5,000 hours were logged by units participating in AIC II, on training, rehearsals, demonstrations and miscellaneous missions. This total does not include hours flown by 316th Troop Carrier Group on Student Airlift missions. Maximum opportunity was afforded tactical units to participate in gunnery training missions, through the utilization of one (1) water range and three (3) ground gunnery ranges. During the course of AIC II, two (2) special interception and simulated strike missions were scheduled in order to provide realistic training in the type missions in which TAF would be normally involved.

During the planning stages of AIC II, seven (7) rehearsal missions were scheduled for participating units to be performed in preparation for the demonstrations. After completion of the seventh rehearsal, the general appearance of the rehearsals performed was not considered to be as good, from a spectator's point of view, as was desired. In order to correct this, two (2) more rehearsals were considered necessary before attempting to conduct the first demonstration.

The units were considered to be ready for the first demonstration on 7 October 1949. Due to the changes made in the chronological schedule of the demonstrations, caused by elimination of the parafrag missions, and having the dive-bomb missions performed by the 31st Fighter Group instead of the 20th Fighter Group, three (3) more rehearsal missions were performed between the remaining four (4) demonstrations.

Unit training, to include air-air, air-ground, dive-bombing, rocketry and ground training was conducted by each unit in accordance with training directives as far as facilities would allow.

Difficulty was encountered by all fighter units in the attempt to qualify pilots in all phases of gunnery. There were not adequate means for the scoring of rocket and dive-bomb hits. Another or a larger water range was badly needed because the fighter units could not perform air-air gunnery to the maximum.

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The water range used was approximately sixteen (16) miles wide with aircraft firing out to sea and parallel to shore. Only one (1) flight could fire on the range at a time. A range with a corridor thirty (30) miles wide and fifty (50) miles long, extending out into the Gulf, would have been more adequate in providing proper training in air-air gunnery. A range of the recommended size would allow more than one (1) flight to fire at a time.

Training for rocketry could not be conducted to the maximum due to nonavailability of rockets and rocket motors. Investigation revealed that the rockets and rocket motors, in sufficient quantities for training, rehearsal and demonstration missions had been ordered, but had not arrived at Eglin AFB, Florida. Until it was determined that sufficient rockets and rocket motors were available for the conduct of the actual demonstrations, it was directed that rocket training be suspended.

Listed below is a total list of ordnance by type expended during AIC II as acquired from Final Reports on Ordnance Expended from participating units:

5.0" Rockets	2426
Smoke	93
50 Cal	231,855
100 lb Frac Bombs	1205
250 lb GP	330
500 lb GP	332
4000 lb LC	14
20 MM	8659
Minature Bombs	592
SCAR	366
Napalm	72
Parafrags	396
JATO Units	34

6. Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. It is recommended that in future operations of similar type that:

(1) Ordnance items, sufficient to fulfill training requirements, be made available early enough and in adequate numbers for sufficient practice missions to be flown prior to rehearsals and demonstrations.

(2) Properly constructed ground ranges suitable for skip-bombing, dive-bombing and rocket firing be made available immediately upon arrival of units in exercise area.

(3) Maximum effort be made by units to qualify as many pilots as possible in various gunnery phases.

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(4) A Training Officer be appointed from unit conducting exercise to moniter each participating unit's training program and to make periodic reports to Commander of unit conducting the exercise.

(5) In the planning stages of future exercises of similar type, that more time be allotted for training of units before rehearsal missions are flown.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

William W. Berg
WILLIAM W. BERG
Major, USAF
Adjutant General

1 Incl:
AIC II Training Directives
1,2,3 and 4 (in dup)

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Hq Tactical Air Force (Prov), Pope AFB, N.C.
TAFJOC 319.1
Subject: Final Report of Training for AIC II 2 Dec 1949

TR 354(2 Dec 49) AIC II 1st Ind 14 DEC 1949

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Va.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AF Base, N.Y.

1. The final report of training for AIC II contained in basic letter has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. It is desired to point out that a minimum of training was received by the 316th Troop Carrier Group in those phases of training required by Air Force Training Standard 120-2. This was primarily due to the fact that the Group was heavily committed during the period in airlifting the students to and from Eglin Air Force Base, in addition to accomplishing the troop carrier portion of AIC II air demonstration.

3. The following comments are made concerning the conclusions and recommendations:

a. Reference par 6a(1). Armament items sufficient to fulfill training requirements were available early enough and in adequate numbers for sufficient practice missions for rehearsals and demonstrations with the exception of M-34 adapter kits for use with 5" HVAR's. This shortage was attributed to the fact that the M-34 kits had just been standardized and only recently placed in production.

b. Reference par 6a(2). Because of monetary restrictions, it was not possible to construct completely realistic targets for skip bombing, dive bombing, and rocket firing for use during rehearsals and demonstrations in AIC II. Every effort should be exerted to make these targets available for future exercises of this nature.

c. Reference par 6a(3). The requirement for qualifying as many pilots as possible in various yearly gunnery phases was included in the training directive, annex 2 to Air General Plan for AIC II. This requirement should be included in all future planning.

d. Reference par 6a(4). It is believed that appointment of a unit training officer is standing operating procedure.

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Hq Tactical Air Force (Prov), Pope AFB, N.C.
TAFJOC 319.1 1st Ind
Subject: Final Report of Training for AIC II 2 Dec 1949

e. Reference par 6a(5). It is felt that as much time as possible, consistent with budgetary limitations, should be allotted for training of units for exercises such as AIC II, especially when range facilities are available.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

R. H. THOM
Lt Col, USAF
Air Adjutant General

1 Incl
(dup cy w/d)

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App 2.

HEADQUARTERS
TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
POPE A F B, N.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO: TAFJOC 319.1

SUSPENSE DATE
2 DEC 1949

SUBJECT: Final Report of Training for AIC II

THRU : Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Air Force Base, Va.

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

1. Purpose.

a. This report is rendered in compliance with Section 5, Par. 3 Outline Plan for AIC II, Hq. ConAC, dated 10 July 1949, and is a report of the training accomplished by units participating in AIC II with recommendations for training in future operations of a similar nature.

2. Scope.

a. This report will cover:

(1) Training required of participating units by this headquarters during period 19 September to 29 October 1949.
(2) Training actually accomplished by each unit to include various phases of air and ground training.
(3) Discussion of training with difficulties encountered.
(4) Conclusions and Recommendations for training during future operations of similar type.

3. Training requirements.

a. Training to be accomplished during period 19 September to 29 October 1949, during which time participating units were under operational control of this headquarters, was set forth in Training Directives for each participating unit as indicated below:

(1) Fighter Unit Training, AIC II Training Directive No. 1, for 20th Fighter Group, 31st Fighter Group and VP 131 Navy Squadron.
(2) Tactical Reconnaissance Training, AIC II Training Directive No. 2, for 161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.

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Final Report of Training for AIC II - Cont'd.

(3) Troop Carrier Unit Training, AIC II Training Directive No. 3, for 316th Troop Carrier Group.

(4) Bomber Unit Training, AIC II Training Directive No. 4, for the 47th Bomb Group.

b. Above Training Directives are attached as enclosures to this report.

4. Training Accomplished.

a. Fighter Training.

(1) 20th Fighter Group.

(a) Flight Training.

Total number of sorties flown during training	1318
Total number of sorties flown during rehearsals	801
Total number of sorties flown during demonstrations	353
Total number of hours flown during training	1206:15
Total number of hours flown during rehearsals	593:30
Total number of hours flown during demonstrations	246:50
Ordnance expended by type during training:	
50 Cal Ball Ammo	45,795
5.0" Rockets, HVAR	200
100 lb Bombs, Practice	729
Smoke	15
Ordnance expended by type during rehearsals:	
500 lb Bombs, GP	38
250 lb Bombs, GP	172
5.0" Rockets, HVAR	340
Napalm	18
Smoke	42
50 Cal Ammo	54,189
Ordnance expended by type during demonstrations:	
50 Cal API Ammo	31,004
Parafrags	324
Smoke	36
Napalm	54
500 lb Bombs, GP	42
5.0" Rockets, HVAR	512
250 lb Bombs, GP	110
JATO Unit	16

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Final Report of Training for AIC II - Cont'd.

Breakdown of sorties flown by type:

Air-Air Gunnery	86
Ground Attack	8
Ground Target	305
Dive-Bombing	96
Skip-Bombing	114
Rocket Mission	36
Intercept	23
Interdiction Missions	0
Close Support Missions	0
Demonstration Rehearsals	801
Demonstration Missions	353
Test Flights	65
Miscellaneous	601

(b) Ground Training.

Subject	Pilot Hours
Unit Mission	40
TAF Memo 3 & 5	44
AIC II	98
Intelligence Briefing	97
JANAP 124	54
AF Regulation 60-16	42
ConAC 10-3	17
Air Power and Armies	34
History of Fighters	64
Offensive Tactics (Fighter)	36
Defensive Tactics (Fighter)	36
Combat Tactics	21
Air-Ground Operations	45
Flying Safety	163
Ground Safety	23
Radio Discipline	14
Take-off and Landing Techniques	14
Aircraft Identification	38
F-84 Engineering	272
Armament & Ordnance	145
A-1B Gunsight	131
Fighter Gunnery	269
Rocketry	91
Rockets (Tiny Tim)	22
Skip-Bombing	48
Dive-Bombing	142
Fire-Bombing	24
Armament-Napalm	22
Aircraft Maintenance	12
Climatic Hangar Tour	50
Arctic Survival	111
Desert Survival	46
Physical Training	73

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Final Report of Training for AIC II - Cont'd.

(2) 31st Fighter Group.

(a) Flight Training.

Total number of sorties flown during training	493
Total number of sorties flown during rehearsals	182
Total number of sorties flown during demonstrations	92
Total number of hours flown during training	431
Total number of hours flown during rehearsals	156:40
Total number of hours flown during demonstrations	83:35
Ordnance expended by type during training:	
50 Cal Ball Ammo	38,567
5.0" Rockets, HVAR	224
100 lb Bombs, Practice	464
Ordnance expended by type during rehearsals:	
50 Cal API Ammo	34,648
5.0" Rockets, HVAR	396
Ordnance expended by type during demonstrations:	
50 Cal API Ammo	22,969
50 Cal Blank Ammo	600
5.0" Rockets, HVAR	400
250 lb Bombs, GP	48
JATO Unit	16
Breakdown of sorties flown by type:	
Air-Air Gunnery	46
Ground Attack	8
Ground Target	118
Dive-bombing	149
Skip-Bombing	42
Rocket Missions	68
Intercept Missions	37
Interdiction Missions	0
Close Support Missions	0
Demonstration Rehearsal Missions	146
Demonstration Missions	89
Test Flights	16
Miscellaneous	206

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Final Report of Training for AIC II- Cont'd

(b) Ground Training.

Subject	Pilot Hours
Air Ground Operations.	172
F-84 Armament.	50
AIB Gunsight	75
Physical Training.	150
Small Arms Firing.	48 range hours

(3) VF-131 Navy Squadron.

(a) Flight Training.

Total number sorties flown during training, rehearsals and demonstrations.	663
Total number hours flown during training, rehearsals and demonstrations.	989.20
Ordnance expended by type during training:	
Minature Bombs	428
100# Bombs, Practice	12
SCARS.	253
5.0" Rockets, HVAR, Plaster Heads.	49
20MM Ball Ammo	683 rds
20MM H.E..	500 rds
Ordnance expended by type during rehearsals:	
Minature Bombs	164
SCARS.	113
5.0" Rockets, HVAR, Plaster Heads.	83
5.0" Rockets, HVAR, H.E.	55
20MM Ball Ammo	4,337
20MM H.E..	420
500# Bombs, GP	50
Ordnance expended by type during demonstrations:	
5.0" Rockets, HVAR, H.E.	142
20MM H.E. Ammo	2,719
500# Bombs, GP	64
Breakdown of sorties by type:	
Air-Air gunnery.	5
Ground target.	21
Ground attack.	51
Dive-bombing	105
Skip-bombing	0
Rocket missions.	84
Intercept missions	9
Interdiction missions.	0
Close support.	0
Demonstration rehearsal missions .	129
Demonstration missions	72

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Test flights	6
Miscellaneous (mainly instrument)	332

(b) Ground Training.

Subject	Classroom Hours
Athletics	12
Navigation	6
Maintenance	2:50
Military Law	1:00
AIC II Briefing	10:00
F9F Lecture	1:30
Intelligence	:30
Miscellaneous	:30
Tactics	1:00
Ordnance	2:00
Administration	1:00
Operations Briefing	7:20
Instrument	1:00
Safety	2:50
Aerology	2:20
Personnel	3:30

b. Reconnaissance Training.

(1) 161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.

(a) Flight Training.

Total number sorties flown during training	134
Total number sorties flown during rehearsals	54
Total number sorties flown during demonstrations	29
Total number hours flown during training	220:10
Total number hours flown during rehearsals	49:30
Total number hours flown during demonstrations	27:20

Breakdown of sorties flown by type:

Vertical	(Photo)	52
Obliques	(Photo)	103
Visual	(Recce)	35
Route	(Recce)	23
Weather	(Recce)	10
Navigation	(Hi Alt)	20
Navigation	(Med Alt)	7

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(b) Ground Training.

Subject	Pilot Hours
Tactical and Strategical Air Force Operations	6
Communism	8

c. Troop Carrier Training.

(1) 316th Troop Carrier Group.

(a) Flight Training.

Total number sorties flown during training	316
Total number sorties flown during rehearsals	78
Total number sorties flown during demonstrations	192
Total number hours flown during training	601:00
Total number hours flown during rehearsals	48:00
Total number hours flown during demonstrations	130:00
* Total number hours flown during AIC II	2210

* Note: Includes hours flown for airlift of students to Eglin Aux #2, Florida

Breakdown of sorties by type:

Pathfinder	13
Para-drop	94
Artillery	48
Glider	36
Wire-laying	13
Glider pick-up	36
Resupply	48
Test Flights	41
Miscellaneous (Includes student airlift missions)	788

(b) Ground Training.

Subject	Classroom Hours
Physical Training	46
Career Guidance	1
Discipline and Morale	2
Personal Affairs	4

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Air Intelligence	1
Armed Forces Lecture	1
Intelligence	1
Ground Safety	1
Mississippi River	2
Extinguishing in-flight fires	1
Driving Safety Lecture	2
Cruise Control	1
Chemical Warfare	1
Landing Gear Emergency Procedure	1
Venereal Disease	1
New Pay System	3
World Events	1
Air Force Extension Courses	2
Troop Movement	1
Current Events	1

d. Bomber Training.

(1) 3200th Proof Test Group.

(a) Flight Training.

Total number sorties flown during training	13
Total number sorties flown during rehearsals	13
Total number sorties flown during demonstrations	12
Total number hours flown during training	16:45
Total number hours flown during rehearsals	15:55
Total number hours flown during demonstrations	17:25
Ordnance expended by type during training:	
4000# Bomb, LC	2
50 Cal Ammo APIT	1439
Ordnance expended by type during rehearsals:	
5.0" Rockets, HVAR	6
50 Cal Ammo, APIT	380 rds
Ordnance expended by type during demonstrations:	
4000# Bombs, LC	12
5.0" Rockets, HVAR	74
50 Cal Ammo, APIT	3735 rds
Parafrags	72
Jato Units	2

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

9 June 1949

OT 354.2

SUBJECT: Air Indoctrination Course

TO : Director of Plans and Operations, DCS/O, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Continental Air Command is currently engaged in plans and preparations for the conduct of "Air Indoctrination Course II".

2. This headquarters is keenly interested in the success of subject operation from the standpoint of unification and the widespread air indoctrination dividends which will accrue to attending officer observers from all services. The highly successful presentation of last year's course, Operation "Combine III", was directly attributable to the splendid support provided by the Air Proving Ground, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, despite heavy Air Proving Ground primary mission commitments. It is desired that "Air Indoctrination Course II" meet with equal success.

3. It is requested that the above information be brought to the attention of Commanding General, Air Proving Ground and facilities such as those previously provided be made available during September and October 1949.

4. Continental Air Command agencies will contact Commanding General, Air Proving Command in the near future regarding specific Air Proving Ground support requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

Info cy to:
CG TAC

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

5 MAY 1949

SUBJECT: Flight Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to Key Officers of the Army

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Senior officers of the Army have repeatedly indicated to this headquarters their skepticism of the capability of the jet fighter to perform third phase tactical air operations. In order to alleviate this fear and to improve Army-Air Force relations, a project was recently initiated to give key Army officers a flight in a TF-80 followed immediately by a flight in a TF-80. Thus the Army officers would have an opportunity to form their own opinion as to the relative capability of conventional and jet propelled fighter type aircraft. This project was completed on 28 April 1949.

2. The following Army officers participated in the demonstrations:

General J. Lawton Collins, Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Army
General Jacob L. Devers, Chief, Army Field Forces
Major General K.B. Wolfe, Deputy Chief, Army Field Forces
Major General H.R. Bull, Director of Operations and Training, Department of the Army
Brigadier General R.M. Wicks, Chief, Training Section, Army Field Forces
Colonel P.W. Thompson, Intelligence Section, Army Field Forces
Colonel G. MS Lynch, Chief, Joint Training Maneuvers and Special Projects Division, Army Field Forces
Lt. Colonel C. Billingsley, Plans Section, Army Field Forces
Lt. Colonel C. L. Sheppard, Field Artillery Branch, Army Field Forces
Lt. Colonel D. Jensen, Joint Training, Maneuvers and Special Projects Division, Army Field Forces
Lt. Colonel R. K. Wissmann, Training Section, Army Field Forces
Lt. Colonel J. E. May, Jr, Training Section, Army Field Forces
Lt. Colonel S. S. Huff, Signal Section, Army Field Forces
Major Leo K. Schweitzer, Development Section, Army Field Forces
Captain C. C. George, Field Artillery Branch, Army Field Forces

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Hq TAC, Langley AFB, Va 5 MAY 1949
DO
Subj: Flt Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to Key Officers of the Army

3. The flights in each type aircraft were conducted in an identical manner and consisted in general of the followings

a. Pre-mission briefing included the followings

(1) Characteristics of subject aircraft.

(2) Location of the Forward Air Controller.

(3) Identification flares and marker panels in the target area.

(4) General location of simulated enemy targets.

(5) Army observers were requested to observe the ability of the jet aircraft to maneuver and to fly at varied speeds. Their attention was also invited to the fact that the jet fighter is a torqueless gun platform.

b. Takeoff and flight familiarization with the airplane. During this period, the pilot carried on a pre-planned inter-phone commentary on the speed and flight characteristics of the airplane.

c. Cruise to a target area at which time radio contact with a Forward Air Controller was established. The Forward Air Controller then directed such maneuvers as simulated strafing passes at relatively slow and fast speeds, visual observation from 10,000 feet down to about 500 feet at varied speeds and simulated glide bombing attacks.

d. After leaving the target area, the YP-80 rendezvoused with a standard P-81 and flew a loose formation with this aircraft for about ten minutes to illustrate the ability of the jet airplane to maneuver with conventional fighters besides having the greater speed range.

e. Return to Langley Air Force Base and land after which there was a discussion on the relative merits of the aircraft and other items of mutual interest.

4. Without exception, the Army observers expressed enthusiasm for the jet fighter. Time will provide a better evaluation of the Army reaction; however, it is believed that in the future the Army officers who participated in this demonstration will use their influence in the Department of the Army and Army Field Forces to indorse the Air Force jet program.

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Hq TAC, Langley AFB, Va

5 MAY 1949

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Subj: Fit Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to Key Officers of the Army

6. The facilities available did not permit the use of live ammunition and explosives in this demonstration. However, the Army officers expressed a desire to participate in flights where live ammunition is actually fired on targets. It is, therefore, recommended that at some future date, a similar demonstration be conducted using TF-80 type aircraft and that selected Army officers again be provided the opportunity to participate in a flight where guns, rockets, and bombs can actually be used.

ROBERT M. LEE
Major General, U. S. A. F.
Commanding

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ROUTING	COORDINATION	STAFF ACTIVITY
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		Pers
		Surg
		WAF
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Flight Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to Key Officers of the Army
OT 373.5 (9 May 49)
1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

1. Recommendation contained in paragraph 5, basic, approved. It is suggested that this demonstration be conducted in conjunction with Air Indoctrination II.

2. It is requested the following information be furnished this headquarters:

a. Number of TF-80 aircraft required.

b. Date(s) of demonstration.

c. The exact type of demonstration desired, including number and types of rounds of ammunition and/or bombs for each aircraft in the demonstration.

d. Any other information which you deem appropriate.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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Hq, National Air Cond, Langley AF Base, Va.
AC 475 6 May 1949
Subject: Flight Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to Key Officers of the Army

AF 475 (6 May 49) 1st Ind.

Hq, National Air Cond, Langley AF Base, Va. 14 JUN 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base New York

Reference is made to paragraph 2 of 1st Indorsement.

a. Four [illegible] aircraft are considered the optimum number. This would allow a realistic "flight" demonstration.

b. The [illegible] demonstrations would be most effective if executed after the final demonstration of "Air Interdiction Course II." As presently planned, this would fall on Wednesday afternoon each week from 5 October 1949 through 9 November 1949.

c. It is considered that two training flights would be flown each [illegible] afternoon during the Air Interdiction period. Each flight would consist of a flight briefing, a take off by elements, an assembly and climb to altitude (formation), followed by a short period by demonstration flying. This would be followed by a loose or "battle" formation, a [illegible] by elements of formation to "line astern" and a "breakaway" by [illegible] This type training would then be repeated, followed by a penetration and finally a "peel off" for the individual landings at the home station. Such a demonstration would require [illegible] rounds of [illegible] ammunition for each of two aircraft. It is expected that [illegible] will be available for the flight [illegible] with demonstration aircraft per series [illegible] rounds of ammo and 500 rounds of [illegible] ammunition for each of the two [illegible]

d. It is felt that this demonstration will create considerable interest and that the above mentioned planes may not satisfy the requirement. It is therefore [illegible] to allow continuation of the demonstrations as previously [illegible]

For the Commanding General:

[illegible]

[illegible] 5 CI

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24 June 49
CT/RHJ/180/5142

...ght Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to Any Officers on ... Army

CT 373 (5 May 49) 3d Ind.

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Director of Plans and Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. It is felt that the inclusion of TF-80 demonstrations in ...Indoctrination Course II" will create considerable interest on ...part of Army officers and improve Army-AirForce relations.

2. Authority is requested to include the flight demonstrations ...ir Indoctrination Course II" as indicated in basic and 2d Indorse-

3. If authority is granted to include the flight demonstrations, ... requested that the Commanding General, Air Training Command, be ...ed as to the possibility of furnishing the four (4) TF-80 type air- ... and pilots on the dates indicated in paragraph 1b, 2d Indorsement, ...is command does not have this type aircraft assigned at present.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

...HURPHY
...Col., USAF
...GRN

ROUTING | COORDINATION | STAFF ACTION
CG
VCHC
DAD
DPAE
LOTAC
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Basic LAr fr Hq TAC, 5 May 49, Subj: Flight Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fire to Key Officers of the Army.

4th Ind.

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C. 27 JUL 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

1. The request contained in basic communication and allied indorsements is approved by this Headquarters. It is believed that such demonstrations can prove to be invaluable in promoting inter-service understanding, and Tactical Air Command is to be commended for initiation of an unusual and worthwhile project.

2. Inasmuch as the TF-80C is limited to bombing and gunnery with two guns only, it is suggested that the TF-80C fly wing position on an F-80C during the rocketry phase. This will permit the passengers to actually witness all types of gunnery missions from a cockpit.

3. The Command or Commands which will furnish the aircraft will be selected at a later date, since this will depend upon production and distribution during the next two months. For obvious reasons, pilots selected will possess maximum proficiency in demonstrating the capabilities of the aircraft.

4. It is desired that a requirement for this demonstration be included in your plans for Air Indoctrination II when submitted to this Headquarters for review and approval.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

S. E. ANDERSON
Major General, USAF
Director, Plans & Operations

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EXT	COORDINATION	STAFF ACTIVITY
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		Prog
		Stat
		TP
		Chap
		JA
		Pers
		Surg
		WAP
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		DO
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		Comm
		O&T
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Flight Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to Key Officers of the Army

AAF 373.6 (5 May 1949) 8th Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. It is desired that a requirement for the demonstrations of jet propelled fighters to key officers of the Army be established as an amendment to the Air General Plan for "Air Indoctrination Course II," and published in the same manner as the Air General Plan. Further, request four copies of the amendment be returned with this correspondence for subsequent forwarding to Headquarters, United States Air Force.

2. Reference paragraph 4 of the 4th Indorsement, this headquarters is advising Headquarters, United States Air Force of the above action. In addition, four (4) copies of the Air General Plan are being forwarded to Headquarters, United States Air Force.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

O.R.W.

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Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Va.
DO-575
SUBJECT: Flight Demonstration of Jet Propelled Fighters to Key Officers of the Army — 5 May 1949

DO-575 (5 May 49) 6th Ind

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Va. 19 AUG 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. A requirement for demonstration of jet propelled fighters to key officers of the Army is being established in the form of Annex 8 to Air General Plan for "Air Indoctrination Courses XX." Copies of this Annex will be forwarded to your headquarters not later than 24 August.

2. This annex provides for use of four (4) operational YF-80's. In addition, a requirement is established for one (1) operational F-80C equipped for rocketry. The pilots selected to perform these missions should be well qualified to insure maximum success for the demonstration.

3. The above personnel and aircraft should be in place at Eglin Field not later than 15 September and remain there through 29 October.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

EMMETT L. PETTUS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adjutant General

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Hq, TAF, (PROV), Pope AFB, N. C.
TAFFR 319.1 23 Nov 49
Subject: Report on Familiarization Jet Flight Program

JOC 354(23 Nov 49)AJ c.II 1st Ind 1 DEC 1949

Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Virginia

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, N. Y.

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy of "Report on Familiarization Jet Flight Program." The second copy will be retained at this headquarters as a reference in planning future programs of this nature.

2. Comments, oral and written, by personnel who received jet familiarization rides expressed the success of the program. As a result it is felt that many uncertainties in the minds of key Army personnel pertaining to the role of jet aircraft in tactical operations, have been eliminated.

3. It is emphasized that proper logistical support for the four T-33 aircraft was lacking. Implementing the recommendation stated in paragraph 8b of the subject report should prevent recurrence of this problem.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

P. J. THOM
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV)
POPE A F B, N.C.

SUSPENSE DATE

IN REPLY REFER TO: TAFPR

SUBJECT: Report on Familiarization Jet Flight Program

TO: Commanding General
Tactical Air Force
Pope Air Force Base
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1. The Familiarization Jet Flight Program was set up in accordance with instructions as issued in Annex 8, Air General Plan for AIC II. The purpose of this program was to provide in-flight tactical air orientation demonstrations, in armed T-33 aircraft, for certain key Army and/or other observer personnel, for the furtherance of inter-service understanding of air-ground operations in general, and evaluation of the capabilities of jet propelled aircraft in the tactical air cooperation role in particular.

2. Two T-33 aircraft, two pilots and nine airmen arrived at Eglin Auxiliary #6 on 2 October 1949. These aircraft and personnel plus two other T-33's and two pilots which arrived at Eglin Auxiliary #6 on 6 October comprised the "Flight" which implemented the directives as set forth in the AIC II Familiarization Jet Flight Program. (See Annex I)

3. The 30 day level supply of parts which was requested of the Training Command by Continental Air Command never arrived and it was only during the last ten days of AIC II that a working agreement was made between 14th Air Force Advanced and Air Proving Ground whereby Air Proving Ground furnished parts and supplies for the four T-33 aircraft.

4. Due to the non-availability of parts for the T-33 aircraft the training program as set forth in Annex I, AIC II Familiarization Jet Flight Program, was dispensed with and training flights severly limited in order to keep all four aircraft in commission for each scheduled VIP familiarization flight.

5. A total of sixty (60) sorties were flown, fifty-seven (57) of which were actual demonstration flights, the remaining three being training flights. On 26 October one T-33 had

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a false start and was unable to become airborne on schedule for the only abortive mission of the entire program.

6. During the period 3 October through 28 October, the four T-33 aircraft flew a total of 61 hours 30 minutes, dropped twelve (12) 100 lb practice bombs, 48 250 lb GP bombs, 16 500 lb GP bombs and fired 12390 rounds of 50 cal ammunition. The accuracy of the four T-33 pilots was excellent, the contributing factor probably being that they had all just recently completed a gunnery and dive-bombing course at Oscoda, Michigan.

7. Sixty persons (see Annex II) received familiarization flights with the two most distinguished passengers being Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray and Ass't Secretary of the Air Force Harold Stuart. Air Proving Ground photographers took 35mm movie shots of all phases of the familiarization program both on the ground and in flight with the sequence of shots being centered around the Honorable Mr. Gray. All of the sixty persons who rode in the T-33 aircraft were "sold" on the jet fighter and expressed only favorable comments. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the Familiarization Jet Flight Program was highly successful in acquainting the Ground Force VIP's with the capabilities of the jet-fighter type aircraft and will prove of invaluable aid to the Air Forces.

8. It is recommended that:

a. This program be incorporated as an integral part of AIC III and that planning begin simultaneously with AIC III planning.

b. A firm commitment for T-33 parts and supplies be obtained at the same time the aircraft are obtained and that they arrive in the maneuver area simultaneously with if not before the aircraft.

c. Sufficient advance publicity be given this program in order that more Ground Force personnel might take advantage of the opportunity to take a familiarization jet flight thus enabling them to better evaluate the capabilities of the jet fighter-type aircraft and tactical air operations.

d. One officer be assigned full time duty for the implementing of any future program and that on the days of actual demonstration flights an additional officer be

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TAFPR
Subj: Report on Familiarization Jet Flt Program

utilized in order to insure success and proper handling of the VIP's. It is necessary that the officers chosen to present this program have a pleasing personality and neat appearance.

e. The Combat Operations section be charged with implementation of any future programs of this nature inasmuch as it entails operational control of aircraft and personnel as well as close coordination between the Range section and the Joint Operations Center.

2 Incls
1. Annex I
2. Annex II

WILLIAM I. WILLIAMS
Major, USAF
Asst Dir Opnl Plans

cc: CG, TAC, Langley AFB, Va, Attn: D/Opns

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Compr 373.5

7 July 1949

SUBJECT: Air Combat Maneuvers

TO : DCS/Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Representatives of this headquarters were informed, during their appearances before the Budget Advisory Committee meetings on Budget Estimates for FY 1950, that the allocation of funds for Air Combat Maneuvers under Project 488 would be a minor fraction of the amount estimated by Continental Air Command as necessary. We were also told that approval of Air Combat Maneuvers by Headquarters USAF would be accompanied or followed promptly by authority to obligate Project 488 funds in specific amounts.

2. In view of the prospective reduction of personnel and funds for FY 1950 and in order to avoid unnecessary work incident to planning, information is requested as to the following:

a. What specific Air Combat Maneuvers are planned or approved by Headquarters USAF for the Continental Air Command during FY 1950?

b. What funds are likely to be made available for each such Air Combat Maneuver?

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

Info cy to DAD
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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

O&T 373.4

10 November 1949

SUBJECT: Air Combat Maneuvers Program for Fiscal Year 1952

TO : Director of Plans and Operations, Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. This command is now formulating training programs including fund estimates for Air Combat Maneuvers contemplated for execution during Fiscal Year 1952. A predetermination of requirements is necessary to provide sufficient time for essential staff planning and to obviate the necessity of a request from your Headquarters similar to the one contained in your letter, subject: "Preparation of Estimates, Military Activities, Fiscal Year 1951", 20 April 1949.

2. The preparation of fund estimates for these Air Combat Maneuvers is of primary concern at this time. To prepare these estimates, this command must have information on these maneuvers that have been established and are required by your Headquarters, including any exercises directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When all Air Combat Maneuvers in which this command must participate are known, fund estimates will be prepared and forwarded your Headquarters for inclusion in "Department of the Air Force Fiscal Year 1952 Estimates".

3. To date, in this fiscal year, the Army Field Forces has requested this command to provide support in numerous maneuvers and demonstrations which had not been included in our budget program. This necessitated requests to your Headquarters for additional funds to cover the cost of participating in these unscheduled maneuvers. It is suggested that the Department of the Army be contacted for their requirements for Air Force participation in maneuvers and demonstrations during Fiscal Year 1952, thus assuring that our requirements are all-inclusive.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ J. H. BIGGS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

Info cy:
CG, TAC
CG, EADF
CG, SADF

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

[illegible]

[illegible] air Command maneuvers [illegible]

To: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, New York

[illegible]

3. The approved program for Continental Air Command is as follows:

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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2.

AFOOP-C 354.2, 20 Dec 49
Subj: Air Combat Maneuvers Program, Proj 488, FY 50

OAT 354.2 (20 Dec 49) 1st Ind.

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Director, Plans and Operations, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D.C.

1. In addition to those maneuvers listed in paragraph 3, basic, the following are included in the Air Combat Maneuver Program of this command for Fiscal Year 1950:

a. Tactical Air Support Demonstration. Approved by 1st Indorsement, your Headquarters, File No. AFAEF-B-1, 2 November 1949, to basic letter, 11 October 1949, subject: "Tactical Air Support Demonstration at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

b. Armored School Demonstration. Approved by 1st Indorsement, your Headquarters, File No. AFAEF-B-1, 2 November 1949 to basic letter, subject: "Additional M&O P488 Budget Requirements, Fiscal Year 1950 - Armored School Demonstration", 22 September 1949.

c. Air Drop Demonstration. Approved by 2d Indorsement, your Headquarters, File No. AFAEF-B-1, 27 October 1949, to basic letter, your Headquarters, subject: "Fiscal Year 1950 Estimated Expenditures of Air Combat Maneuvers", 30 September 1949.

d. Observers to RAF Maneuver "Bulldog". No reply received to date from your Headquarters, to letter, File No. Bud 121.2, 1 December 1949, subject: "Air Force Observers, RAF Maneuver "Bulldog".

e. Camid IV. This maneuver was included as one of the projects listed in letter, this headquarters, File No. Bud 121.2, subject: "Fiscal Year 1950 Appropriation M&O P488 Fund Requirements". This program was approved by letter, your Headquarters, subject: Air Force Air Combat Maneuvers, Fiscal Year 1950", 12 August 1949.

2. The following additional maneuvers in support of the activities indicated and not previously included in the original program are scheduled for conduct during the last half of Fiscal Year 1950:

a. Two (2) Armored School Demonstrations. These maneuvers are to be conducted on or about 12 and 26 April 1950 and are similar to the maneuver listed in paragraph 3, basic. These maneuvers are in support of the Army Field Forces Armored School.

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B/AFOOP-C 354.2, 20 Dec 49
Subj: ACM Prog, Proj 488, FY 50
Par 2 (Continued)

b. Spring Combine. This maneuver is designed to demonstrate tactical air support to members and students of the National War College and the Armed Forces Staff College.

3. The funding program established by paragraph 4, basic, is believed to be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Air Combat Maneuver Program for Continental Air Command as outlined in paragraph 3, basic, and paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Neal O'Brien

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B/L fr Hq USAF, dtd 20 Dec 49, subj: "Air Combat Maneuvers Program Proj 488, FY 50"

AFOOP-C 354.2 2nd Ind

Dept of the Air Force, Headquarters, USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Headquarters, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. The exercises listed below are being added to the approved program of Air Combat Maneuvers for Continental Air Command for Fiscal Year 1950.

a. Tactical Air Support Demonstration

b. Air Drop Demonstration

c. Camid IV

2. Reference paragraph 1d. of preceding indorsement, per diem costs for participation in observer capacity in exercise "Bulldog" comes within the scope of ConAC Air Combat Maneuver Funds, Project 488, however, exercise "Bulldog" as a United Kingdom exercise is not an integral part of the ConAC Maneuver Program.

3. Reference paragraph 2a. preceding indorsement, the increased scope of support of the Army Field Forces Armored School Demonstrations is not considered an additional maneuver.

4. Reference paragraph 2b. preceding indorsement, Spring Combine was not included in letter, your Headquarters, dated 13 July 1949, subject: "Air Combat Maneuvers" which listed the planned exercises for Fiscal Year 1950. It is desired that the scope, units involved, maneuver area, duration, time and cost estimate of exercise be submitted for ultimate inclusion in the approved program.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

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B/L fr Hq CONAC, dtd 31 Jan 50, subj: ACM Program, Proj 488, FY 50

4th Ind

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. The justification for Spring Combine Exercise as submitted by preceding indorsement with one inclosure, "estimated costs for Air Combat Maneuvers "Spring Combine" has been reviewed and approved by this Headquarters.

2. The approved Air Combat Maneuvers Program, Fiscal Year 1950 for Continental Air Command is as follows:

Maneuvers

- Blackjack Conference
- Air Indoctrination Tour
- Armored School Demonstration
- Amphibious Training, Little Creek, Virginia
- Camid IV
- Air Indoctrination Course II
- Lookout
- Aircraft Controllers Course
- Tactical Air Support Demonstration
- Air Drop Demonstration
- Drummerboy
- Sweetbriar
- Portrex
- AF Gunnery Meet II
- Swarmer
- Air Defense S M
- Spring Combine
- Alamo

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

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HISTORICAL DATA

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

1 DECEMBER 1948 – 30 DECEMBER 1949

VOLUME IV

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HISTORY

of the

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

1 December 1948 - 31 December 1949

IV PERSONNEL

Prepared by: Mr. Thomas A. Sturm
Directorate of Historical
Services

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CHAPTER ONE

PERSONNEL - SUPPLY AND DEMAND

"The personnel levies being made on this command are heavy indeed." 1/

- General Stratemeyer.

I

Shortages of certain personnel, skilled technicians and key staff officers in particular, decidedly contributed to the lowering of the Continental Air Command's performance of its several missions during 1949. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact role personnel shortages played in hampering operations in proportion to other maladies which afflicted the command during the period, a glance at the USAF-wide picture of personnel manning may afford some perspective. According to USAF sources, personnel shortages did not contribute greatly toward retardation of the Air Force's progress toward "preparedness". USAF inspectors traced only 10.6 per cent of the major causes for irregularities and deficiencies within the USAF during the first half of 1949 to manpower shortages. These reviewing officials placed (1) unsatisfactory operating practices, (2) failure of commanders and their assistants to afford adequate supervision over their men, (3) materiel shortages and (4) errors in planning ahead of personnel shortages on the list of inhibitors to the efficient functioning of the Air Force during this period. 2/ However, these same

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1/ Ltr, General Stratemeyer to General Old, 8 March 1949

2/ TIG Brief, Vol. 1, No. 61, 24 August 1949

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officials later inferred that there may have been room for error in their analyses when they noted that inspection reports were not distinguishing between actual shortages of personnel and shortages of trained personnel. When future shortages of personnel are reported, these USAF inspectors stated, "consideration should be given to the possibility of inadequate distribution of personnel throughout the various commands and a distinction should be made between the lack of bodies and lack of trained bodies."[3]

It was more the "lack of trained bodies" that plagued the Continental Air Command during the year than it was lack of manpower in general.[4] Personnel statistics of the Continental Air Command for 1949 reveal an overall shortage of personnel existent at the end of December 1948, the first month following activation.[5] During the year, these same figures depict a closing of the gap between authorized and assigned strength until, finally, in December of 1949, the

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3/ TIG Brief, Vol. 1, No. 62, 31 August 1949

4/ It must not be presumed from this that the command was fully satisfied with the number of persons authorized and assigned it to carry out its duties. For example, Col H. L. Halsey, Dir of Mil Pers, Hq ConAC, forwarded the following comment in an IRS to the DP on 23 Feb 49: " . . . ConAC has been charged constantly with increased missions and responsibilities without commensurate increases in the personnel authorizations and facilities necessary to insure proper accomplishment; . . . even these insufficient personnel authorizations have been filled to only 80%. In other words, our authorizations are insufficient, to begin with, and personnel allocations are 20% short of this inadequate basis." (Vid. sup. doc. #138(2), Section I, Organization and Mission of the Command)

5/ Personnel Strength Chart, Excerpted from ConAC Personnel Strength Report, RCS: FS-P17, Dec 48 - Dec 49

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command had assigned approximately 97 per cent of its authorized number of officers and was actually overmanned in enlisted personnel. Thus, from the viewpoint of "bodies on hand," the Continental Air Command was better off, and extremely so, at the end of 1949 than it was at the close of 1948. However, from the point of view of "trained bodies at hand," (i.e., having a qualified man in every position) the command suffered a serious personnel problem throughout the entire period.

Certain jobs went "unfilled" during 1949 for two major reasons: In the first place, actual position vacancies existed. These were caused by: (1) Non-effective personnel in hospitals, on leave enroute between assignments and enroute to and from oversees, and absent on temporary leave for schooling. Of course, shortages of this type are normal, existing whenever assigned and authorized strength are closely in balance; (2) Downward adjustment of strength in certain commands, in accordance with troop program reductions, which was in progress throughout the USAF during 1949. Until the completion of this process, most units, those of the Continental Air Command included, will continue to have shortages and position vacancies in addition to those due to the non-effectives; (3) Continuation of cross-training of personnel - reassigning men from military occupational specialties where overages exist into those where the Air Force is short. Until this cross-training is completed, vacancies in many critical specialties will continue to exist, according to information received from USAF Headquarters.[6] In the second place,

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6/ Ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Unauthorized Personnel Commitments, To: CG ConAC, 1 April 1949

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many persons struggled along in jobs for which they were neither sufficiently trained nor educated. In other words, there may have been a man in a certain job, but he might not have been qualified to handle that job. That it was possible for a unit to be reasonably well stocked with "bodies" yet, at the same time, remain drastically understrength from the standpoint of men being fitted for their tasks was, fortunately, fully comprehended by higher headquarters.

There was little USAF could do to alleviate the first problem. Throughout the period commanders continued to provide their own stopgap measures to fill position vacancies. However, as intimated above, USAF Headquarters did not take definite action to attempt to correct or alleviate the critical shortage of technicians. In an effort to forestall prolongation of these type shortages, higher headquarters, early in 1949, evolved the plan of expanding the Technical Training Division of the Air Training Command to intensify its formal program for training of men in technical skills. In its letter to the Continental Air Command telling of the new program, USAF Headquarters explained the reasons for these deficiencies and warned that further reductions in technical personnel would ensue before the crisis could be overcome through training. 7/

To effect the expansion of the Technical Training Division, USAF Headquarters pursued the following course: It assigned the majority of the overseas returnees during April, May and June 1949 to the

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7/ SECRET ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Effects of Accelerated Training Program, To: CG ConAC, 25 March 1949

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Technical Training Division, either as permanent party buildup or as students in the advanced technical courses. After June, higher headquarters estimated, about one half of the returnees would become available for reassignment to the major commands in the continental United States; the other half, presumably would continue to enter technical school training. Additionally, those graduates of the Indoctrination Divisions, the basics, who were suited for formal training were retained within the Air Training Command. As a final step, the effective manpower of the Zone of the Interior commands and overseas commands were reduced by increments in order to make additional manpower available to the Technical Training Division. The only organization and activity excluded from this requirement were the Strategic Air Command and the Berlin Airlift.[8]

To result from this program was a gradual reduction in strength of all commands until an accumulative 13 per cent reduction of assigned strength (as of March 1949) was reached in December 1949. Command strengths would be kept at this reduced level from December 1949 to April 1950 at which time an increased student output, if everything went according to schedule, would begin to take effect. From that time on, all commands would be gradually filled up to authorized strength until, by October 1950, all units would be fully manned. During this same period, the student population of the Technical Training Division would diminish from about 37,000 to approximately 25,000 and the cadre strength would be reduced proportionately. Headquarters USAF acknow-

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8/ Ibid.

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ledged the fact that this accelerated training program would aggravate the already acute personnel conditions existing in the various commands but stressed the point that, once the difficult period was over, the Air Force would have more and better trained personnel than at any time since the war. The end objective, in other words, would fully justify the cost - i.e., a period of deprivation of technical personnel even more stringent than that of previous years.[9]

For its role in the program, the Continental Air Command was called upon to send an increased number of officers and airmen to the technical schools. USAF Headquarters stressed the importance of the command sending the most qualified persons to the schools and filling all quotas. This advice, of course, was intended to prevent wastage of training facilities and lowering in quantity and caliber of student output.[10]

Largely as a result of this program, comparatively few military personnel skilled in the technical trades were assigned to the Continental Air Command during the year. At the same time, for reasons to be discussed subsequently, a steady flow of personnel departed the organization for schooling or for replacements within commands and projects having higher priority on personnel. In carrying out its assignment in regard to the program, Continental Air Command Headquarters pointed out to its units that it was cognizant of the personnel difficulties all commanders were having due to the "continuing demands" made upon them for personnel to maintain USAF commitments but that the need for

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9/ Ibid.

10/ Ibid.

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the accelerated training program was apparent and would be implemented throughout the command.[11]

For the record, then, the Continental Air Command was organized at a time when the personnel situation, USAF-wide, both quantitively and qualitatively, was critical. It was a period of "turmoil", quoting Major General Myers,[12] the logical aftermath of the war. And in the face of these difficulties the newly created Continental Air Command Headquarters had the task of staffing the several different types of aerial organizations assigned it whose commanders almost immediately began requesting, practically pleading, for augmentation of manning tables or placement of capable and qualified officers and men in already established positions. In short, personnel needs were varied and critical and the sources for procurement almost non-existent, but the demands were so intense that they had to be met in some way. Truly, General Arnold's description of an effective peacetime Air Force following World War II as one supplied and manned on a functional and not budgetary basis seemed especially valid during this period.[13] General Myers summed up the situation fairly well in letters to his numbered air force commanders in the early part of 1949 when the units were striving to place their people in the most effective positions when he stated: "Personnel skills available to the Air Force are not compatible with

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11/ Ibid., 1st Ind., Hq ConAC to CG 10th AF, 14 April 1949

12/ Ltr, General Myers to General Rush, 22 August 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #136(1) Section I Organization and Mission of the Command)

13/ Global Mission, pp 614-615

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the mission of the Air Force at the present time,"[14] and"...we have more missions and more requirements than we have personnel to fill same..."[15]. If we accept the above explanations as the principal reasons "why" a serious personnel crisis existed during 1949, we can now examine "what" effect these shortages had within the command.

II

The higher priority for personnel enjoyed by the Strategic Air Command and the overseas commands decreed that Continental Air Command be on call for refurbishing those organizations with rated, non-rated, and skilled men from its ranks and to suffer long waits for qualified replacements. These requisitions for personnel resulted in losses over and above those lost through normal attrition - discharges, transfers within the Zone of the Interior, and assignments to schools.[16]

14/ SECRET 1st Ind., VC ConAC to CG 10th AF, 14 April 1949 to SECRET ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Effects of Accelerated Training Program, To: CG ConAC, 25 March 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #7)

15/ Ltr, General Myers to General Rush, 22 August 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #126(1) Section I Organization and Mission of the Command)

16/ School assignments oftentimes rendered the "on-paper-strength" of the Continental Air Command meaningless, as was inferred by Colonel D. E. Muehleisen, Dir of O&T, Hq ConAC, in an IRS to the Dir of Mil Pers, on 19 July 49: Personnel selected for the Atomic Energy Training Course at Keesler AFB, Mississippi were eventually assigned to SAC. But attendance at this course was on a temporary duty status. Consequently, it was not possible for ConAC to obtain replacements for officers enrolled in the course until they completed the course of instruction. In a training course of this type, which did not benefit ConAC, the individual, in the opinion of the above officer, should have been transferred to the gaining organization concurrently with orders to proceed to the technical school. In this wise, perhaps the non-effective ratio of personnel, which sometimes become an unwarranted deterrent to efficient operation, could (Cont'd)

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The shortages of rated and skilled personnel within the Strategic Air Command resulted in a major "special drain" on Continental Air Command manpower. The need of that organization for navigators, radar observers, B-29 pilots and other rated personnel was, according to USAF Headquarters, too acute to "permit continuation of the situation with SAC units being tactically handicapped by lack of this type of ... personnel while the other continental commands had [them] on flying status occupying non-rated positions or observer positions of lower priority."[17] Consequently, Continental Air Command was directed, midway in the year, to give up many of its people who qualified for the position vacancies in SAC on permanent transfer.[18] USAF Headquarters made known that it was aware of the effect this requisition would have on the Continental Air Command's situation, implying that it sympathized with the commanders of units who had to lose rated men holding down key positions in their outfits as a result of this decision. But, higher headquarters stated, "the basic concepts of Air Force personnel, with respect to rated personnel, require that all other considerations be relegated to a secondary position when such personnel are urgently

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have been lessened. (See Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Reassignment of Officers on PCS Status, To: Dir of Mil Pers, Hq USAF, 27 July 1949 and 1st Ind., Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 1 August 1949)

17/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Reassignment of Navigators and Radar Observers (Bombardment) to Air Crew Positions in SAC, To: CG ConAC, 25 April 1949
2. TWX Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 21 February 1949

18/ TWX, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 13 May 1949

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needed for rated tactical duty."[19] By way of advice concerning future action that would be taken, USAF Headquarters suggested that the Continental Air Command units train replacements for the remaining rated personnel performing non-rated duties with a view toward freeing such officers when need be for rated duty.[20] Presumably, the same was to be done for the remainder of the personnel destined eventually to depart the Continental Air Command on priority shipment to insure that their places would be taken by at least reasonably competent if not fully qualified persons.[21]

Another major special requisition made on Continental Air Command was for the Berlin Airlift, or Operation "Vittles", as it was popularly termed. The airlift operation during 1948 had been vastly successful,

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19/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Reassignment of Navigators and radar Observers (Bombardment) to Air Crew Positions in SAC, To: CG ConAC, 25 April 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #17). Under the Troop Program in effect in April 1949, SAC units needed 2412 observers for duty in crew positions. Manning at that time was about 50% complete. Training output from Mather AFB and the new course at Ellington AFB could not fill the shortages in less than 18 months. Resources of overseas commands in navigators were already being fully applied to the SAC shortage by the policy of assigning all returnee navigators and bombardiers to Mather AFB for observer training and subsequent assignment to SAC. Strength ceilings would not permit accelerated recalls to active duty. Therefore, action taken seemed to be the only recourse, even if it meant sacrificing efficiency in the ConAC and other ZI commands.

20/ Ibid.

21/ 1. In addition to the levies imposed upon the other ZI commands for personnel to man SAC at top strength, a recall of reservists was initiated. See ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Recall of Navigators and Radar Observers (Bombardment) for SAC, To: CG ConAC, /April/ 1949

2. TWX, Hq ConAC to all ConAC AF's, 14 May 1949. Lists by category the number of enlisted personnel transferred to SAC.

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USAF Headquarters pointed out, only because the men who had participated in that emergency at that time on temporary duty had been highly experienced. Therefore, the replacement of those men in January and March 1949 with permanent personnel from the Zone of the Interior sources, including the Continental Air Command, had to be made with personnel equally as well qualified in order to avoid any serious lowering of the efficiency of the operation. Consequently, persons shipped out by the Continental Air Command on this duty, on permanent assignment, were of the highest type, able to perform their primary specialties with minimum supervision and without the necessity for on-the-job training.[22] By way of illustrating the affect these levies had on the commands, one commander summed it up very politely, following one assessment, when he stated: "When compared to the total number of qualified, eligible [men] of this command, these quotas are considered rather heavy."[23] At any rate, loss of men of the specialties and the caliber required for this operation sorely taxed the already critical manpower resources of the Continental Air Command.[24] Replacements for men lost to this duty were furnished from graduates of pilot schools and basic training and personnel

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22/ TWX, Hq USAF to CG's All ZI commands, 19 January 1949

23/ Ltr, Hq 9th AF, Subj: Selection of Officers for Assignment to Operation "Vittles", To: CG ConAC, 21 June 1949

24/ See TWX, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 13 May 1949, for list of airmen specialties and number transferred for Operation "Vittles". See also: Ltr, HqUSAF, Subj: "Operation Vittles," To: CG ConAC, 20 January 1949, for number and qualifications for officers shipped overseas for duty on the Berlin Airlift.

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returning from overseas commands.[25]

In the face of scarcities of personnel Air Force-wide, therefore, and exposed to constant demand for their best people for higher priority projects, the commanders of the several types of units within the Continental Air Command built their units up to efficient operating strength. To effect this, an equitable distribution of rank and specialties was made to the greatest extent possible throughout Continental Air Command, as we shall see in the next chapter. When commanders, sometimes in tired tones reminiscent of those uttered during wartime crises, brought their complaints concerning threats of and actual personnel losses to the attention of higher headquarters, the latter could only inform them that allocations of personnel and project and school quotas were made in proportion to the assigned strength of each unit or echelon of command and had to be carried out if the overburdening of any one unit was to be avoided and if the critical personnel situation world-wide was to be met.[26] Under these circumstances, if a commander let loose occasionally with a phrase such as, "this war is hell," in regard to his continuous and oft times unrequited hungering for personnel, he had to be excused. In face of the facts, the personnel "war" appeared indeed to be "hell" at times.[27]

III

Initial manning of certain of the numbered air force headquarters

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25/ Ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Operation Vittles, To: CG ConAC, 20 January 1949

26/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Officer Losses, To: CG 9th AF, 11 May 1949

27/ Ltr, General Johnson to General Myers, 22 September 1949

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was a difficult and perplexing problem. For example, General Old, Commander of the Ninth Air Force, shortly after the reorganization, strove "desperately" to set up his Headquarters for taking over and operating its new responsibilities, but he and his staff had to go about it "with their tongues in their cheeks." Guidance and approval was slow in coming from higher headquarters as far as organizing and manning these units were concerned.[28] Instead of being manned and organized for the job prior to assuming their responsibilities, the territorial air force commands first had to assume their responsibilities and then wait patiently for explicit ennumeration of these functions and the organization and numbers and types of personnel they would ultimately need to carry out these requirements. Continental Air Command Headquarters, General Turner stated, recognized the weakness of the role it played, of not being able to give the air force commanders a "specific statement" of the manpower authorizations they needed to properly organize their headquarters. However, the Vice Commander pointed out, until Headquarters Continental Air Command itself was given enough resources and information to enable it to sit down and work out the strength of its organizations and determine what people it could assign each of its units to accomplish its duties, the parent headquarters was limited in the amount of help it could give. Realizing the hardship this placed on the air force commanders, Headquarters Continental Air Command encouraged its unit officials to assist one another in their manning problems.[29]

28/ Ltr, General Old to General Turner, 20 December 1948

29/ Ltr, General Turner to General Old, 27 December 1948

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Especially, the other four air forces were requested to aid the Twelfth and Ninth Air Forces, for the latter outfits found themselves with a "pressing and critical problem" resulting from their newly acquired responsibilities in connection with the administration of civilian component activities.[30] They had had much experience in tactical aviation but little in management of reserve forces.

Because of the nature of its previous misions, the Ninth Air Force, its commander remarked, was almost "destitute" in personnel having experience in reserve matters. The Ninth carefully screened its "limited" resources for specialists in reserve affairs but it did not have them and, because of the overall crisis within the personnel picture, it was not able to procure them outside the command. A good part of the men required to handle reserve duties, General Old stated, could be trained locally, but the "imminence of deadlines", the short time the Ninth Air Force had to get its reserve program going, made it necessary that it be given certain key persons familiar with inspection and administration of the reserve forces. General Old's closing remarks, in one letter to higher headquarters, seemed to have been typical of the attitude adopted (or shall we say which they were forced to adopt) of the several air force commanders in connection with their personnel manning problems during the initial period of reorganization: "Your difficulties," General Old said, speaking to the Commander of the Continental Air Command, "in meeting quantitative personnel requirements are understood, and we shall

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30/ Ltr, General Old to General Stratemeyer, 21 February 1949

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insure maximum utilization of personnel within the limits of any manpower ceiling prescribed. Nevertheless, in order to discharge our new responsibilities in connection with civilian components affairs, it is essential [that this Air Force be provided the officers requested]".[31]

In response to these requests, General Stratemeyer reassigned officers versed in reserve forces affairs from the First and Fourteenth Air Forces to the Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces to assist them in becoming operative.[32] General Stearley, Commander of the Fourteenth Air Force, sanctioned reassignment of certain of his officers to the Twelfth and Ninth Air Forces for duty with the reserve forces program in spite of the fact that, as he stated, "to do this fairly and honestly [he] had to strip his headquarters to the bone".[33] Also, General Stearley further aided General Old by assigning Fourteenth Air Force officers experienced in administration of reserve records, civilian affairs, welfare, and classification and assignment to work with their counterparts on General Old's staff, in temporary duty status, to assist in solving the Ninth's reserve forces problems.[34]

The reductions of officer and airmen authorizations which were made during the year, consistent with the overall decrease in the strength of the Air Force, created sub-surface complications within the numbered air forces, in the opinion of one commander. The assignment of additional

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31/ Ibid.

32/ Ltr, General Stratemeyer to General Old, 8 March 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #1)

33/ Ltr, General Stearley to General Stratemeyer, 17 December 1948

34/ Ltr, General Stearley to General Turner, 4 January 1949

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responsibilities during the period - explicitly, the assignment of (1) maintenance of field personnel files and personnel administration of reserve personnel which were disseminated to the field early in 1949, (2) processing of pipeline records, and (3) implementation of the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Program - were, in effect, additional cuts in authorization. At least, no additional personnel was provided to implement the functions. The extensive reduction in force, in the opinion of this commander, necessitated a complete review of scheduled distribution of non-T/O&E authorizations to the numbered air forces.[35]

Another personnel difficulty the numbered air force headquarters had was that of meeting their quotas for Air National Guard and Air Reserve Officer Corps instructors. Headquarters Continental Air Command stated to USAF Headquarters that in its opinion, instructor personnel should be exempted from the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-34 which forbade the assignment of officers having an acute or critical MOS (in spite of the fact that the Continental Air Command had no need for them) to these positions. This suggestion was made both for the purpose of continuing instructors already engaged in the Air Guard and Air ROTC programs in that capacity and to permit the detailing of future volunteers possessing acute and critical skill specialties to the programs. USAF Headquarters refused to sanction this proposal, however, on the grounds that the difficulty encountered in meeting these quotas was not considered sufficiently acute to justify assignment of critically needed specialists to this duty. That organization believed

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35/ TWX, 1st AF to CG ConAC, 21 July 1949

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that instructory requirements could be met by detailing non-critical specialists to this duty rather than exempting volunteers from the provisions of the above regulation.[36]

The separation of the Air ROTC units from the Army ROTC units, which took place during 1949, and curricuim additions and improvements, led the Headquarters Continental Air Command to request an increase in its authorization for Air ROTC instructors. It was pointed out to USAF Headquarters that the "administration of the Air ROTC program [was] a major responsibility" of the Continental Air Command, and that "success of the program [was] dependent primarily upon the provision of an adequate number of qualified officer and enlisted personnel. Failure to establish an adequate space authorization [would] cripple the program without question."[37] USAF's response to this forceful plea for increased manning was that budgetary and program planning for the last half of 1949 and the first half of the following year limited the assignment of Air ROTC instructors to an average of four officers and four enlisted men to each unit. Since there were 139 such units in the educational institutions across the nation, this meant that the total personnel allocated to this function could not exceed 556 officers and 556 enlisted men. Restrictions on manpower resources, especially officers, USAF pointed out, made it impossible to authorize any more men than that to the program. If it

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36/ Ltr, Hq 1st AF, Subj: Report of Officers Possessing Critical MOS's, To: CG ConAC, 14 April 1949, and 1st Ind., Hq ConAC to DCS/P, Hq USAF, 5 May 1949, and 2nd Ind., Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 13 June 1949

37/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: AROTC Personnel, To: DCS/O, Hq USAF, 7 May 1949

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was impossible to operate on the above personnel authorization, Continental Air Command Headquarters was informed it should make known its maximum capability within the above authorizations and, presumably, some activities of this nature would be restricted or eliminated altogether if necessary.[38]

Ultimately, the number of instructors to man the program was elevated to 598 officers and 598 enlisted men. It was the belief of officers in charge of the program in Headquarters Continental Air Command that "with the proper assignment of personnel and by developing more efficient schedules at units, this quantity of personnel /would/ constitute the bare essentials for /Continental Air Command/ to fulfill /its/ mission."[39]

The manning problems of the Air Defense Commands and the Tactical Air Command have been discussed at considerable length previously in the history. The manning of the headquarters of the operational commands and their ancillary units was, of course, a matter of much concern to Continental Air Command Headquarters. The caliber of officers required for assignment to these activities was such that officers available to the command who were qualified to carry out these assignments were, for the most part, already occupying key positions in other organi-

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38/ Ibid., 1st Ind., Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 24 May 1949

39/ Historical Data Report, Directorate of AROTC, Hq ConAC, for the period 1 July 49 - 1 July 50. This report went on to state: "Personnel allocations are obviously related to the quantity and type of units in the program and the quantity of students to be trained. Up to and including FY 50, the mission of this command has been to graduate 12,500 students in the directed SSN's."

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zations. In spite of the fact that their loss seriously restricted the functioning of the organizations from which they were taken, a portion of the required number to staff the operational organizations were reassigned to these duties. However, the remaining key positions, logically, had to be filled from sources outside the command. There could be no compromise in the selection of outstanding officers to occupy the top positions, Continental Air Command Headquarters pointed out, and too much stress could not be placed on the necessity for USAF Headquarter's assignment of the officers needed for these spots.[40] For the most part, however, the Headquarters had little success in getting these officers from without its personal manpower resources.

Within the Tactical Air Command during the early period of the year, there was a "highly critical shortage" of personnel in the 502d Tactical Control Group. This fact, coupled with the inadequate supply of trained replacements that unit was receiving from the Air Training Command and the low reenlistment rate of radar specialists, gave that headquarters "grave" concern.[41] In fact, General Saville's statement appraising the condition of the nation's air warning defense system on 10 February 1949 - "Words would be impossible to describe how poor it is... dangerously inadequate...it is almost a blank" - applied equally to the status of the tactical control group at that time, in the opinion

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40/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Manning of The Tactical Air Command, To: DCS/P, Hq USAF, 15 April 1949

41/ SECRET 1st Ind., Hq TAC to CG ConAC, 28 February 1949 to Ltr, Hq 9th AF, Subj: Operational Effectiveness of the 502d Tactical Control Group, To: CG TAC, 31 January 1949

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of the Tactical Air Command's commander.[42] To this estimate of the personnel situation within this unit, Headquarters Continental Air Command replied that "the only foreseeable alleviation of /the/ critical shortage in the immediate future /would/ occur as a result of the inactivation of the 506th Tactical Control Group" and the reassignment of that Group's personnel "in accordance with priorities established by /Headquarters Continental Air Command/ based upon immediate requirements." However, it was further stated, because the 502d Tactical Control Group would receive only a limited number of this personnel, the operational effectiveness of the tactical control and aircraft control and warning groups would necessarily have to be curtailed as long as the scarcity of skilled personnel continued.[43]

Another of Tactical Air Command's personnel worries during the year concerned manning of the Troop Carrier Wings. In view of the

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42/ Ibid.

43/ 1. Ibid., 2d Ind., Hq ConAC thru CG TAC to CG 14th AF, 24 March 1949

2. In a SECRET IRS dated 18 March 1949, the Director of Communications, Hq ConAC (Colonel Hobart R. Yeager) explained the reasons why all the people from the inactivated 506th Tactical Control Group could not be reassigned to the 502d Tactical Control Group. There were approximately 761 airmen assigned to the 506th TCG who were available for reassignment. Of these, 30% were trained and they were part of the cadre of 85 trained airmen who were assigned to the 506th upon its activation on 1 July 1948. The remaining 70% were basic airmen who had received some on-the-job training. Of this 70%, practically all of these airmen were vulnerable for overseas shipments since they had few or no overseas credits.

3. SECRET Ltr, Hq 502d Tactical Control Group, Subj: Recent Personnel Losses of the 502d Tac Cont Group, 22 July 1949

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heavy commitments assigned these units, the Tactical Air Command believed that "manning of these units fully and giving them preferential status in ... personnel assignments /would/ lead to greatly improved capacity to complete the heavy requirements." According to the Tactical Air Command, the main problem within the troop carrier units was not with planes and equipment but with personnel to maintain the planes and equipment. In other words, the planes could be flown many more hours daily if the maintenance crews were of sufficient size to keep the aircraft in flyable condition.[44] While the Continental Air Command Headquarters agreed with the Tactical Air Command's contention that the troop carrier units should be manned sufficiently to permit them to perform their normal missions, it did not concur in the opinion of the former organization that these particular units should be built up "at the expense, if necessary", of all other units. The former headquarters remained aware that it still had a "very important Air Defense mission to perform" and fighter units to man and operate and that it had to balance its personnel efforts even if it meant cutting down on the requirements of the troop carrier units.[45] As they became available for assignment, specialists possessing skills required by the troop carrier units, the tactical control groups and other units, were allotted as equitably as possible in accordance with Continental Air Command-wide priorities. That was the best the Headquar-

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44/ 1. SECRET ltr, Hq TAC, Subj: Manning of Troop Carrier Wing, To: CG ConAC, 1 April 1949
2. SECRET ltr, Hq TAC, Subj: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings, To: CG ConAC, 11 April 1949

45/ 1. SECRET IRS, Dir O&T (Col Howard F. Nichols) to LOTAC, DO and DP, 4 April 1949
2. SECRET ltr, Hq ConAC to CG TAC, Subj: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings, 29 April 1949

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ters could do to alleviate these problems, as we shall see subsequently in the following chapter.

Priority assignment forestalled the occurence of any serious officer shortages in the fighter units. However, one problem existed in the three fighter wings assigned from the Strategic Air Command to the Continental Air Command on 1 December 1948 that deserves comment. These units had not been permitted to have non-rated officers within their membership while members of the Strategic Air Command. As a result, the rated officers had to be cross-trained in double specialties as pilots and also as administrative or technical officers. This made certain of these officers doubly valuable because they had two MOS's, one as combat pilots, the other as key administrators. By the same token, it made them doubly vulnerable for reassignment from Continental Air Command, where they were vitally valuable, to higher priority units where they were critically needed. When these officers departed, the numbered air forces, as pointed out previously, received few qualified replacements to take their places. In the words of one general officer, "everything tended to go out and nothing came in".[46] This practice could not help but affect the efficiency of these units. In an attempt to overcome this problem, one air force commander screened the reserve training centers in his command for non-rated replacements. His purpose in doing this was to relieve the rated officers in the fighter units of their administrative assignments so that when they came under the "axe"

46/ Ltr, General Johnson to General Stratemeyer, 2 March 1949

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(i.e., when they were pulled out and reassigned to another command), there would be trained rated officers to take their places on the flight line and the administrative duties, conducted by non-rated officers, would continue unaffected. However, he was unsuccessful in procuring qualified non-rated officers from these sources. Accordingly, he placed an emergency request to Headquarters Continental Air Command.[47] Although General Stratemeyer stated he was "cognizant of the problem and [would] lend every [aid possible] to alleviate this condition as early as practicable," the Continental Air Command commander was forced to state that he could not predict what the chances were of obtaining and assigning non-rated personnel to fill the administrative positions in the fighter units. Throughout the year, this serious shortage of officers, both rated and especially non-rated continued, "due [as mentioned previously] to the curtailment of the broad troop program."[48]

The effect of personnel shortages on keeping aircraft in flyable condition was, perhaps, one of the most serious results of shortages of technical personnel in the fighter units. Certain units were forced to place up to one-third of their aircraft in flyable storage in order to maintain some semblance of operational status.[49] This condition, naturally, lowered the aircraft in commission averages, at the same time raising the out of commission figures. The personnel shortage, also,

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47/ Ibid.

48/ Ltr, General Stratemeyer to General Johnson, 22March 1949

49/ SECRET TWX, Hq ConAC to C/S USAF, 17 February 1949

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had an adverse affect upon the units from the standpoint of field maintenance support. In many units, particularly within separate squadrons, groups, and jet groups, field maintenance "shops" fell considerably behind in their labors -- in their compliance with Technical Order instructions, repair of damaged aircraft and major aircraft components, removal of dangerous corrosive conditions, fabrication of parts not available in supply and other work. Keeping current, in other words, was simply beyond their capabilities. 50/

During the first quarter of the year, an approximate total of 813 aircraft maintenance personnel were lost to the Continental Air Command for "Vittles" and other overseas assignments. This figure was in addition to normal attrition. Replacements for these men for this same period totaled approximately 318 which were obtained from returnee and reenlistment sources. In all, it was estimated that the command was short approximately 1800 maintenance men at the end of the above period. On-the-job training failed to solve this problem because such personnel were lost as soon as, if not before, training was completed. This very high rate of personnel turnover of both enlisted men and officers - caused, as we have said, by overseas assignment policy, by school commitments, and by expiration of enlistments to a lesser degree - destroyed continuity of working management and kept all units "in a state of confusion" from Headquarters Continental Air Command's point of view. Unless these losses were sharply curtailed, Continental Air Command Head-

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quarters warned, and additional maintenance personnel assigned, the command would be fortunate to reduce or even maintain in succeeding months, the aircraft out of commission percentage which had already assumed alarming proportion.[51] Evidence that this critical situation was subsequently relieved, if not solved, is found in the following statement from USAF: " ... records this Headquarters indicate that as of 30 November 1949, your command will be 90.26% manned /with Airmen Aircraft Maintenance Personnel/."[52]

The seriousness of the shortages within aircraft control and warning units of the command is another topic that has already been discussed at some length previously in the history.[53] These shortages existed throughout the period primarily for the reasons mentioned in the opening pages of this chapter. Additional hardships wrought by the

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51/ Ibid.

52/ 1. SECRET 1st Ind., Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 22 November 1949, to SECRET ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Personnel Requirements for Certain Continental Air Command Units, To: DCS/P, Hq USAF, 8 September 1949

2. For additional information concerning the affect of personnel shortages on the in-commission status of aircraft in ConAC, see SECRET ltr, Hq 4th Fighter Wing, Subj: Aircraft Out of Commission, To: CG 9th AF, 16 May 1949. This special study may be found in its entirety in the section on Maintenance in the History.

53/ 1. Early in the period, General Stratemeyer had informed the Chief of Staff in USAF Headquarters of "the serious position of the entire command with regard to critical shortages in AC/W technical specialties, pointing out that continued drain would not only prevent accomplishment of /the ConAC's mission/ (Cont'd)

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continuous demands for persons with these capabilities was pointed out by General Upston, Commander of the Fourth Air Force, in calling to the attention of General Stratemeyer the effect withdrawals of technical officers (aircraft warning, ground reporting equipment and radio) in conformity with USAF requisitions had on warning groups under his jurisdiction. The mission of the warning groups, General Upston declared, necessitated the widespread deployment of detachments, thereby creating personnel problems not found in units normally based at one geographical location. Because of this, and due to the overall critical shortages of officer personnel in these units, technical officers in many instances were, of necessity, also assigned key administrative duties with isolated detachments. Consequently, when these men were taken from the units, "whose assigned primary mission [was] the installation, maintenance and operation of the Air Surveillance System in the United States", their loss had a marked effect on both the units' operational and administrative functioning.[54]

One reason for the increasing shortages of communications and electronics specialists observed by the Continental Air Command Headquarters during the year was that considerable numbers of highly qualified men in

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but would manifestly delay activation of programmed units." In spite of this and other pleas for release from required overseas shipments of such people, higher priority continued to exact its toll of these specialists. (Ltr, General Stratemeyer to General Upston, 16 December 1949).

2. See also: Ltr, General Stratemeyer to C/S USAF, Attn: General Edwards, Subj: Regular Air Force Officers in the Field of Aircraft Control and Warning, 16 March 1949

54/ Ltr, General Upston to General Stratemeyer, 3 December 1949 and ltr, General Stratemeyer to General Upston, 16 December 1949

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these fields were leaving the Air Force on expiration of their terms of enlistment or tour of active duty for higher paying civilian jobs. Training and experience acquired by these individuals at government expense through service schools and on-the-job training was thus totally lost to the Air Force. Although the several units in the Continental Air Command attempted to do everything possible to encourage these individuals to remain in the service, their efforts seemed to make little impression. The resultant losses, Continental Air Command explained, was depleting the already meager supply of such technically qualified men.[55] An economic recession, the Air Force career plan, permanent and better site housing and facilities for Aircraft Control and Warning personnel and other inducements which would make an Air Force career more attractive to these specialists and increase the reenlistment rates of skilled air force electronics personnel were the only problematical solutions higher headquarters could see for alleviating this problem.[56]

Toward the close of the year, the personnel picture seemed to glow with a little brighter lustre. General Myers, who had encouraged air force commanders and their deputies to bring their major personnel problems to him during the year, said optimistically, "we may expect more people to come in to us now".[57] The effect of this was felt in (1) the cancellation of a considerable overseas shipment of communications

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55/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Electronics Personnel, To: C/SUSAF, 5 January 1949

56/ SECRET ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Domestic Technical Representative Requirements through Fiscal Year 1951, To: CG AMC, 11 July 1949

57/ Ltr, General Myers to General Johnson, 31 October 1949

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specialists in October and (2) general higher airmen assignment priorities in the latter half of the year over what they had been in the earlier session.

IV

The shortage of qualified officers in various categories not only affected the functioning of the Continental Air Command during the year, but it prevented the Headquarters, on at least one occasion, from assisting in a project which, had it been carried out, would have tended to benefit the Air Force as a whole. In response to a suggestion made by General Wolfe, Director of Procurement and Industrial Planning of the Air Materiel Command, that qualified operations officers from Continental Air Command's procurement division be transferred permanently to the Air Materiel Command to assist that organization, General Stratemeyer first referred the text of the letter to the commanders of the operational commands for their comments. Both of these officers indicated that while the idea of an exchange of tactically experienced officers from the tactical commands was sound and that there was no question but that such an arrangement would produce better equipment not only for the Continental Air Command, but for the USAF as a whole, both stated they could not comply with the request.[58] General Stratemeyer then went on

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58/ General Saville's comment to the suggestion was: "My number one problem at present is personnel and I believe I am worse off on this respect than the AMC. However, I most heartily agree on principle to the idea of a flow of tactically experienced officers from the tactical commands to AMC. It is a sound and healthy idea and a year from now I hope to be able to support such a policy."

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to state that the Continental Air Command, at that time was undergoing reorganization, and that the resultant shifting about of the various air force headquarters, transfers of personnel, and assuming of additional responsibilities by the units made the personnel situation most acute and that he could not spare anyone for assignments of that nature. "The type of officers you desire," General Stratemeyer stated, "must be of the highest quality and extremely qualified along the lines you indicated, else the idea will not produce the desired results. The shortage of this type of officer is presently critical within my command and it appears very unlikely that the situation will improve for some time to come."[59]

Indeed, procurement of senior officers for staff duties remained a recurrent problem. As early as April 1948, General Stratemeyer told General Edwards, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in USAF Headquarters, that there was an "urgent need" for the assignment of additional general officers in his command. "In the light of current conditions and the accordingly increased significance of assuring effective air defense of the United States," General Stratemeyer said, "it was essential to the proper accomplishment of the air defense mission that these general officers be provided."[60] Presumably, General Stratemeyer's need for gen-

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59/ Ltr, General Stratemeyer to General Wolfe, 19 January 1949

60/ Ltr, General Stratemeyer, Subj: Request for Assignment of General Officers, To: C/S USAF, Attn: General Edwards, 24 April 1948

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eral and other senior officers increased upon the organization of the Continental Air Command and the establishment under the one roof of air defense, tactical aviation and reserve forces duties. In September 1949 we find General Webster, Commander of the First Air Force, calling to the attention of General Whitehead the "sharp contrast which /existed/ between the ability of the Army to apply directly personnel resources to /its/ problems and the relatively weak effort of the Air Force in the same direction."[61] In this particular instance, General Webster was looking at the ability of the Army to place higher ranking officers in charge of its civilian components program than the Air Force was able to match. "If the Air Force ... is considered to be in competitive position with the Armed Services," General Webster stated, "I would like to leave the impression with you that the results we achieve must be measured to a very great extent by the ability of the Air Force to support its programs with adequate personnel." General Edwards in USAF Headquarters, to whom the letter was forwarded, penned the following reply to General Webster's comments: "These /shortages/ are not the result of low interest in reserve activities but are attributable to limited resources. The price of an effective Air Force in being, with particular emphasis on vital strategic striking force units, has been the relatively lower precedence of the reserve forces."[62] In an analysis of requirements for the various senior officer grades which General

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61/ Ltr, General Webster to General Whitehead, 21 June 1949

62/ Ltr, General Edwards, Subj: Letter from Major General Robert M. Webster, To: CG ConAC, 21 September 1949

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Edwards provided at this time, he attempted to give the Continental Air Command Headquarters a picture of problems confronting USAF Headquarters in trying to meet world-wide demands for higher ranking officers.

The ceiling placed on the number of general officers within the Air Force during the last half of 1949 and the first half of 1950 was 228, based on the 48 Group Program. According to General Edwards, the full number had been tentatively allocated at the time he prepared his letter. And at that time, there were outstanding many requests for generals still to be considered. This necessitated a continuing review of overall general officer's requirements to determine those positions which could be filled within budgetary limitations. As a guide in the distribution of general officers, he stated, brigadier generals would be available only for assignment to positions which were responsible for the operation of two combat wings at below numbered air force level. Since the demand for general officers exceeded by far the supply, it was impossible to maintain in some instances a parity of rank with other services in positions of correlated responsibility. This observation answered the "why" of General Webster's observances, but did not, of course, rectify the discrepancies mentioned in the General's message.[63] In a subsequent letter, General Edwards had this to say on the topic of general officers:

> "The subject of general officers takes up a large percentage of my time. Despite the fact that there may be little difference between the pay of a colonel and a general, when any bill involving officer personnel is presented to Congress,

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63/ Ibid.

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> the number of general officers is the subject of much discussion. Our little group is easy to put the finger on. Right now there are well over 300 positions which appear to warrant the assignment of general officers. But should any attempt be made to secure such a number we would be the subject of much adverse criticism as well as being the instigator of further requests by both the Army and the Navy for an increase in their top rank. 64/

In view of the world-wide shortage of colonels in the Air Force, all commands operated under a reduced manning allotment of these officers during the year. 65/ Assigned officers of this grade totaled only 74% of the number required for authorized troop spaces. The strength of the Continental Air Command in September, according to General Edwards, was in excess of the percentage of colonels available for world-wide service. There were only 565 permanent colonels on the Air Force muster at this time; one hundred of them serving in a general officer grade, leaving only 465 permanent colonels for assignment world-wide. A full proportionate share of permanent colonels, the USAF Personnel Chief stated, had been assigned to the Continental Air Command. 66/

Of the total number of lieutenant colonels and majors assigned to the major Zone of the Interior Commands at the end of June 1949, the Continental Air Command had 21%, a greater proportion than any other command. 67/ Whether this was a sufficient amount for the Continental Air Command to carry out its duties in the most efficient manner was not

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64/ Ltr, General Edwards to General Stratemeyer, 24 November 1949

65/ ConAC Diary, 26 December 1948

66/ Ltr, General Edwards, Subj: Letter from Major General Robert M. Webster, To: CG ConAC, 21 September 1949

67/ Ibid.

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mentioned.[68]

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Just prior to the end of the year, USAF Headquarters informed the Headquarters of the Continental Air Command that the Air Force budget for fiscal year 1950 was undergoing close re-examination by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and that the effect of further reduction of

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68/ The difficulty of procuring qualified senior officers in addition to those already on hand to man the newly organized units of the ConAC is almost humorously illustrated in one exchange of correspondence which took place between ConAC and USAF Headquarters. In January, ConAC asked USAF for three officers, by name, for assignment to the Air Defense Command, giving as justification for the request the following: "The qualifications and experience of the above named officers are known to this headquarters. Due to reorganization of ConAC, qualified officers such as these ... are urgently needed and can be well utilized within this command". To this request, USAF's reply was: "AF Reg 36-3, 13 Dec 48, prohibits requests by name for officers to fill other than key positions." To this rather abrupt reply, ConAC stated: "Request every consideration be given to honoring this requisition since it is proposed to assign these officers to duties of primary importance within the ADC. The magnitude of the task of defense of ConAC and the complexities of the system make it essential that personnel with special qualifications and experience be obtained; hence, it is felt that reconsideration of preceding indorsement is warranted." Headquarters ConAC then indicated what key positions these men were slated to fill, adding: "There are no qualified officers available within this command for assignment to these duties." USAF's final verdict on the matter was as follows: "The present overage of officers in your command precludes assignment of additional officers at this time." A quick glance at the record revealed that of the 9,036 officers authorized the ConAC as of 31 March 1949, the approximate date of USAF's final reply, there were 8,427 assigned. In other words, ConAC Hq, at the time it received the denial to its requests for three officers to fill critical positions in the ADC on the grounds that the command was "over-strength on officers", was actually 609 officers below par. (Ltr, Hq ConAC to C/S USAF, Subj: Reassignment of Officers, 31 January 1949, file 210.3, and three indorsements)

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officer personnel in the Air Force had to be assessed, presumably to enable higher headquarters to lay up a stock of "ammo" to fire back against any "across-the-board" reductions.[69] Specifically, the Continental Air Command was asked to analyze the effect a 10 per cent cut of the number of officers authorized the command at the end of fiscal year 1949 would have on the command. The following factors were to govern the making of the analysis: (1) No reduction was to be made in the capability of the tactical units to carry out their combat missions, (2) no reduction was to be made in planned training loads, and (3) airmen authorizations could be substituted for officer authorizations when such substitution was more desirable than complete elimination of an activity or function.[70]

In making an appraisal of the effect such a cut would have on the functioning of the Continental Air Command, General Whitehead noted that under this program, if it came about, the command would lose 774 officer spaces.[71] Since he could not reduce the number of authorized officers in individual T/O&E units without lowering their capability to perform their missions, the General stated that his only other recourse if he applied any part of the cut to the tactical units would be to inactivate complete units. This, of course, he did not recommend. His only alternative, therefore, was to make the proposed

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69/ SECRET message, AFCVC 50776, C/S USAF, To: All major commands, 18 November 1949

70/ Ibid.

71/ SECRET ltr, General Whitehead, Subj: Reduction in officer Troop Space Authorizations for ConAC, To: C/S USAF, 1 December 1949

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slash from the ranks of the non-T/O&E units.[72]

In looking back over his personnel actions during the eight months he had acted as commander of the Continental Air Command, General Whitehead noted that through the constant review of personnel manning, he and his commanders had exercised within the command, officer requirements had already been reduced by approximately 186 spaces.[73] The only solution he could see to bringing about further reductions without seriously affecting functioning was (1) to cut down on the number of National Guard Instructors, (2) eliminate all of the liaison officers which the numbered air force commanders maintained at Army Headquarters, and (3) inactivate Marshall, Lawson and Sherman Air Force Bases, placing the latter two outfits on caretaker status. In response to USAF's additional request that Continental Air Command Headquarters "review the activities and functions [it was performing] ... and recommend in order of priority those which should be eliminated or reduced in order to effect the officer reduction ... with the least reduction of ... capability,"[74] General Whitehead stated: " ... all of the missions, tasks and functions currently assigned to my command I consider essential to the interests of the Department of the Air Force. Therefore, I cannot, from this level, recommend the elimination of any of them."[75]

72/ Ibid.

73/ Ibid., Inclosure #1, "Reductions in Officer Personnel Authorizations Which Have Already Been Effected Within ConAC".

74/ SECRET message AFCVC 50776, C/S USAF, To: All major commands, 18 November 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #67)

75/ SECRET ltr, General Whitehead to C/S USAF, 1 December 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #68)

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In his final recommendations concerning the personnel status of the Continental Air Command and the steps that should be taken if it became necessary to further reduce the officer strength of the organization, General Whitehead made clear what he considered prerequisites to such action. First, he stated, all of the activities and units of the command, both T/O&E and non-T/O&E had to be manned at 100 per cent authorized strength in officers before any cut was made. Finally, the annual turnover of officer personnel within the several units had to be reduced to a maximum of 30 per cent and a personnel pipe line established to accommodate for absentees on temporary duty attending service schools.[76] It will be noted that these "stipulations" pointed up conditions which had adversely affected the personnel picture, both "on-paper" and "in-actuality", within the Continental Air Command during 1949. Although it was not stated, it was nevertheless strongly inferred that unless these deficiencies were corrected, it would be improbable if not impossible for the Continental Air Command to reduce the number of officers available to it without seriously hurting the ability of the command to carry out its assigned duties.

76/ Ibid.

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CHAPTER TWO

PERSONNEL ADJUSTMENT

"We constantly strive to screen and readjust personnel within this command to level off the requirements of our Air Forces." 77/

- General Myers

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Personnel redistribution and reductions continued throughout the USAF during this period while missions remained constant and production requirements increased. 78/ "... the strains and stresses upon the

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77/ Ltr, General Myers to General Johnson, 30 September 1949

78/ Headquarters USAF's approach to the manpower shortage problem during 1948 was to study the directives and missions of the major commands and to ferret out and destroy, whenever possible, malpractices resulting in wasteful utilization of personnel. Through eliminating unessential or non-productive activities, that headquarters tried to steer clear of any straight percentage cuts. In their studies, USAF Headquarters personnel officials found these practices aggravating the manpower shortage problem: (1) Location of headquarters on separate bases instead of as tenants with a tactical unit; (2) operation of small isolated bases and failure to use larger bases to full capacity; (3) inter-station transfers, where expectancy of service was short; (4) diversion of troops from primary duties; (5) failure to understand, accept, and discharge command responsibilities in lower units; (6) lack of proper supervision by junior officers and non-commissioned officers; (7) handling of new problems as a special project, thereby creating new staff agencies instead of using the existing staff; (8) failure to combine and consolidate similar activities. In summation, Headquarters USAF had this to say: "It will be some time before we have sufficient trained survey teams, but in the meantime /It is felt/ that a great deal can be accomplished by closing small unprofitable stations, eliminating unnecessary headquarters, and consolidating similar activities with the considerable saving in

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national economy ... made it impossible for any service to get all that it /wanted/ whether in dollars, in manpower strength, or in materiel."[79] If the Continental Air Command was to obtain maximum usage of its available manpower resources, it had to apply every technique in its repertoire applicable to personnel utilization, management and control. In general, this entailed (1) priority manning of units; (2) close monitoring of personnel utilization through required reporting procedures and frequent manpower surveys, (3) investigation of suspected malassignments of personnel, and (4) elimination to the greatest possible extent of actual malassignments. The manner in which personnel was distributed and the adjustments taken to exact the utmost from each man commensurate with his talents and experience, then are the matters to be discussed in this chapter.

Let us look first at the broad policy of personnel allotment followed during the year. When the Tactical Air Command was merged with the old Air Defense Command to form the Continental Air Command, General Stratemeyer undertook immediately to balance the manning level

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overhead." If we assume that these were the buoys charting the ConAC's personnel course during the period, it will make for a clearer understanding of the broad picture of manning difficulties and the attempts made to resolve these difficulties throughout the Air Force. (Ltr, General Eubank, Chief, USAF Manpower Group, to General Stratemeyer, 31 December 1948. Vid. sup. doc. #134 (1), Section I, Organization and Mission of the Command)

79/ Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, 21 October 1949, in his statement to the House Armed Services Committee on unification problems and disputes (Vid. sup. doc. #139(1), Section I, Organization and Mission of the Command)

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over the entire organization.[80] All during the period, constant effort was made to distribute rank and skill specialties equitably amongst the several units.[81] Since it was mandatory that units be manned in consonance with the roles they played in the overall strategy of the Continental Air Command and the USAF, a priority system of allotment was adopted giving the fighter units (deployed for both ground support aviation and air defense) first call on personnel. The troop carrier units received second priority; the air reserve training units and other non-tactical units got third.[82] In short, the tactical units were "manned at highest possible strength" because of their greater value to the Continental Air Command in carrying out the operational duties assigned to the command by Headquarters USAF.[83] By the same token, levies on personnel for reasons of economy or higher priority reassignment to other commands or activities were made so as not to interfere any more than absolutely necessary with the manning of the tactical units. The above policy, of course, meant that the non-tactical units would have to suffer most from withdrawals and have to endure long waits for replacements.[84]

80/ Ltr, General Stratemeyer to General LeMay, 26 March 1949

81/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Officer Losses, To: CG 9th AF, 11 May 1949

82/ Ltr, General Stearley to General Myers, 1 August 1949; and ltr, General Myers to General Stearley, 10 August 1949

83/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Manning of 314th and 316th Troop Carrier Groups, To: CG 14th AF, 30 June 1949

84/ Procedures adopted to man the tactical units to 100% assigned strength were (1) reassignment and (2) on-the-job training. That there were limitations to the accomplishment of this goal entirely through these methods is revealed in the following document: Ltr, Hq 4th Fighter Wing, Subj: Assignment of Personnel, To: CG 9th AF, 30 September 1949 with two indorsements.

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The Air Force Reserve Training Centers were manned at the average manning level of all other non-tactical units.[85] In view of the important mission these units were assigned, that of training the Air Reservists over the nation, some numbered air force commanders felt their reserve training centers were insufficiently manned. While actually there was little the Headquarters Continental Air Command could do to assist the air forces in their manning problems in the reserve training centers, it did observe that too often these units were absorbing the brunt of the shortages and school quotas. Because of the workload within these units, care had to be taken to man them on at least equal basis with the other non-tactical units. To effect this, it was directed that school quotas be allocated to all non-tactical units in proportion to their assigned strength and in such a manner that when a man left for school, he would be replaced by a returning graduate. Of course, there would still remain an interval, in most cases, between the departure of a man for and the return of a man from school but the more even levying of quotas and the paying of closer attention to scheduling returns and departures, Headquarters Continental Air Command believed, would give the training centers a better chance of meeting their commitments in the face of their personnel shortages.[86]

86/ 1st Ind., General Candee, 24 May 1949, to ltr, General Webster, Subj: Shortage of Officer Personnel - Air Force Reserve Training Centers, To: CG ConAC, 12 April 1949. The Category "R" Program, through which certain positions in the Reserve Training Centers were manned with reservists on three year tours of active duty, was instituted during this year to provide the AFTRC's with experienced and qualified personnel. For details of this program, see Section Two of the History covering the Air Reserve mission of the Continental Air Command.

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As a result of priority assignment, all tactical units were maintained at full authorization before surplus in any skill specialties were permitted to accumulate elsewhere.[87] And, when the requirement existed, manning of the tactical units was made at the expense of the non-tactical units. The logic of this policy is illustrated in a review of the steps taken to alleviate the serious shortage of aircraft mechanics which existed in the tactical units throughout the year. Analysis of aircraft operation statistics proved that those combat squadrons which had the prescribed number of aircraft mechanics had the best record of aircraft in service. By the same token, the units which were undermanned in specialists of this type had the poorest aircraft operational status.[88] Officials were able, in this case, it appeared, to trace a direct relationship between personnel manning and operational effectiveness. Since there was little hope of obtaining persons for these jobs outside the command, the required number of aircraft mechanics to bring the tactical outfits up to authorized strength was taken from the non-tactical units.[89]

Radar specialists to man the aircraft control and warning units were assigned to the numbered air forces on a proportionate basis out

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87/ Ltr, General Myers, Subj: Apparent Assignment Discrepancies SSN 750 and 747, To: CG 10th AF, 10 November 1949

88/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Manning of Combat Squadrons, To: CG 14th AF, 10 November 1949 and 5 indorsements.

89/ Ltr, General Myers to General Johnson, 16 November 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #2, Chapter IV, Section III, Operations and Training) "To correct the resultant lack of maintenance personnel in the non-tactical units, they were relieved of any administrative aircraft which Headquarters Continental Air Command believed not essential for them to carry out their missions."

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of the slim supply made available to the Continental Air Command. The allocation of priorities for manning these units was left up to the air forces, air defense forces and air divisions as the various phases of setting up the Air Defense network developed.[90] In this wise, the several aircraft control and warning units in the Continental Air Command were manned to an equal percentage of authorized strength. The activation of new warning units, normally, did not disrupt the manning of units already in existence. Rather, newly activated units, after being given their initial cadre, were allotted their proportionate share of specialists as they became available. Thus, in general, the date of activation of a warning unit established the relative order of its completion of manning. As mentioned several times previously, the USAF resources of radio and radar maintenance personnel were extremely critical and, as a consequence, the Continental Air Command suffered continuous shortages of these technicians throughout the year.[91]

90/ Radar specialists were vital to the operation of troop carrier, all weather fighter and aircraft control and warning units, and Hq ConAC found it impossible to obtain sufficient quantity of them during the period. Typical of the methods applied to alleviating shortages of this type was that employed by Hq Fourth Air Force. That unit strove to correct its shortages of radar mechanics and radar technicians in its aircraft control and warning units by placing surplus radar repairmen in these positions and training them on-the-job. (See ltr, Hq 4th AF, Subj: Utilization of Airmen, SSN 935, To: Hq ConAC, 16 August 1949)

91/ 1st Ind., Hq ConAC to CG EADF, 5 January 1950, to ltr, Hq EADF, Subj: Request for Manning Schedules - Air Divisions and AC&W Groups, To: CG ConAC, 16 November 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #144(3), Section I, Organization and Mission of the Command)

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The loss of key staff officers oft times disrupted operating efficiency in the several units. In an effort to mitigate this problem, Headquarters Continental Air Command notified each air force commander that it was his responsibility to insure that officers subject to withdrawals had understudies working with them to assume their duties when they departed. In other words, due to the overall shortage of senior officers, replacements had to be readied from within the respective units themselves to compensate for their staff officer losses. Headquarters Continental Air Command, informing USAF Headquarters of the scheme it had evolved stated: "The establishment and maintenance [of this program will] be of material benefit" but "[If it is] placed into effect, it [will] be necessary to more freely waive [the rule requiring] an 18 month tour of duty at a station prior to reassignment to another station." The fact that this program would cause individual officers considerable personal hardship was also faced, but Headquarters Continental Air Command stated, "The policy [had to be placed into effect] to enable the command to fill mandatory requisitions for officer personnel."[92] While Headquarters USAF "strongly endorsed" this program of understudy, it considered that adoption of such a system did not in itself necessitate a blanket waiver of the regulation.[93]

92/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Replacement of Personnel, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 29 March 1949. The regulation at point was AF Reg 35-39.

93/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Replacement of Personnel, To: DCS/P, Hq USAF, 14 April 1949 and 1st Ind., Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 27 May 1949. The inability of the Continental Air Command to accede to AMC's request for certain type officers to assist the latter headquarters (Cont'd)

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On a similar subject (the filling of staff officer vacancies), the Eastern Air Defense Command found itself with the peculiar responsibility for setting up staff positions for which there were no Service Serial Numbers (SSN's) assigned. Consequently, that headquarters had to place officers in those duties whose primary qualifications were entirely different from the work on hand. This, of course, was contrary to normal rules of personnel assignment. The men were appointed Chiefs of the Ground Observer Section, Filter Center Section and Training Literature and Standard Procedures Section of the Civil Defense Branch and each of them performed duty as staff officers on an operational

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with important research was pointed out in Chapter I, p. 21. A similar request, in reverse, was made in May when General Whitehead contacted General Chidlaw of AMC on the feasibility of that headquarters assigning colonels experienced in materiel to each of the six numbered air forces to take over the Deputy of Materiel slots. "Underlying this proposal," General Whitehead stated, was his belief "that senior staff officers who supervise activities related to any one service should not only be extremely familiar with and expert in the functions and activities of that service but should be regarded by the service itself as one of its people." It was the General's belief that the Air Force could "return to the old principle of providing specialists for staff assignments which call for experience in respective staff jobs without returning to the undesirable feature of creating staff corps." Although nothing came of the General's proposal during the period, it is interesting to note the "feelers" which went out in an honest effort to procure and maintain more experienced persons in responsible staff positions in the Continental Air Command and other major commands. (See ltr, General Whitehead to General Chidlaw, 12 May 1949)

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sub-command level in the general project of organizing and operating the Ground Observer Corps and Civil Air Raid Warning System.[94] Because of the absence of SSN's to fit these positions, the duty specialty number of the Aircraft Warning Ground Observation Officer was given them for personnel reporting purposes. Each of the officers served an intensive training in that duty assignment for approximately six months and was trained by a retired officer recalled to active duty for three months for this specific task.[95] The training of these officers, "under stress of time elements, and without the blanket of historical precedents," Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Command pointed out, not at all modestly, was "unique, invaluable, and irreplaceable."[96] With another officer of that staff plus one officer with the Western Air Defense Command, these men comprised at the end of the period the entire cadre of officers experienced in the Ground Observer-Civilian Air Raid Warning field. To the request that these men be kept on this duty without regard to routine personnel dictates concerning assignment regulations, the Headquarters Continental Air Command gave its assent.[97] This is the only instance the historian observed whereby a unit found itself with a staff vacancy for which there was no one trained or for which there had never been created a duty number. It is an excellent

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94/ Ltr, General Acheson, Subj: Primary and Duty SSN's of Air Defense Officers, To: CG ConAC, 7 December 1949

95/ Ibid., Training of these officers was conducted by Colonel William M. Talbot, USAF - Ret.

96/ Ibid.

97/ Ibid., 1st Ind., Hq ConAC to CG EADF, 27 December 1949

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example of the extent of improvisation to which certain commanders had to go to meet their manpower requirements.

To assist commanders in surveying their manpower resources and take whatever action was necessary to correctly balance mission, workload and personnel availability, Manpower Evaluation Boards were established within Headquarters Continental Air Command and the headquarters of each numbered air force mid-way in the year. USAF Headquarter's Manpower Group, upon which the subordinate groups were patterned, was established earlier, in November 1948. While the latter group made a number of detailed manpower surveys, it considered the maintaining of regular and frequent manpower survey coverages of the many installations in the Air Force impracticable; hence, the creation of similar units within lower commands. Following this decision, the USAF Manpower Group limited its activities to assisting major commanders and their manpower experts in making supervisory and special surveys and to acting in an advisory capacity to the USAF Chief on overall matters of personnel availability, assignment and utilization.[98]

As pointed out by higher headquarters, Manpower Groups could, through continuing survey action, improve manpower utilization and assist commanders in effecting a balance between their mission requirements and their manpower resources. Since it was reasonably certain that additional personnel cuts would be levied against the United States Air Force,

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98/ Ltr, Department of the Air Force, Subj: Manpower Groups, To: CG ConAC, 12 December 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #134(3), Section I, Organization and Mission of the Command)

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it was especially essential that Headquarters Continental Air Command's Manpower Group be prepared to offer advice concerning the functions which could best be eliminated or modified in the event such cuts were announced.[99] All units, it was directed, were to be surveyed as often as possible and at least once each year and reports of surveys were to be sent to the Director of Manpower and Organization in USAF Headquarters. Where this system had been in effect, marked improvements in manpower utilization were apparent, USAF stated. In the Continental Air Command an important function of the survey teams, both of the parent headquarters and the numbered air forces, would be the development of "yardsticks" for the manning of units not governed by the wing-base organization structure, such as the Air Reserve Officers Training Corps units and the Air Reserve Training Centers.[100]

II

Having established the above policies for distributing its personnel and having set up special agencies for surveying personnel utilization, Headquarters Continental Air Command was prepared to attack the surplus-shortage problem which existed throughout its several organizations. The strategy evolved for solving this problem was the equalizing of shortage-surplus conditions through (1) appropriate assignment

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99/ Ibid.

100/ 1. Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: USAF Manpower Group Conference, 18 April 1949, To: USAF Manpower Group, 16 June 1949
2. Ltr, General Myers, Subj: Manpower Groups, To: Assistant Vice C/S USAF, 19 December 1949. In this letter, General Myers informed higher headquarters that the Hq ConAC's Manpower Evaluation Board would "initiate continuing specific action in an effort to most effectively utilize ConAC personnel resources."

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of personnel allocated by higher headquarters and (2) equitable distribution of quotas of personnel withdrawn from the command to meet drafts upon its manpower resources.[101]

In checking closely the use the numbered air forces were making of their personnel, Headquarters Continental Air Command concluded that many of the lower echelons were using their manpower resources improperly. It was noted that men with critically short specialties were being assigned to duties completely foreign to them and that in spite of the fact that overages existed in other specialties, men were being assigned to these duties for on-the-job training when they had the necessary qualifications to learn other jobs for which there was a critical shortage of applicants. "The utilization of [manpower] by unit commanders ... merits close scrutiny," was the solemn verdict of Colonel Landon, Deputy for Personnel, Headquarters Continental Air Command, after he had reviewed the several reports coming in from the units concerning their personnel management and control measures.[102] The shortage-surplus problem could never be resolved, this officer stated, unless each commander gave closer attention to the assignment and utilization of his personnel. Congress and Headquarters USAF were the only agencies holding the key to the ultimate resolution of manning problems, but no action by either of those agencies could resolve internal problems "compounded by mal-

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101/ TWX, Hq ConAC to CG 10th AF, 25 October 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #132(2), Section I, Organization and Mission of the Command)

102/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Utilization of Airmen, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 21 November 1949

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assignment and consequent poor utilization of personnel."[103] "Continuing Surveys," Headquarters Continental Air Command directed, "should be made ... to determine that personnel [were] being utilized to the fullest extent and ... surpluses [were being] reported for reassignment in accordance with existing directives."[104]

The formula Headquarters Continental Air Command advised its units to followto alleviate their manning problems was: (1) to assign men with secondary MOS's in critical vacancies to those duties; (2) to take full advantage of school quotas for educating additional men in the skills required to handle the critical vacancies;[105] (3) to give on-the-job training in a higher or allied MOS for which there was a need; and

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103/ Ibid.

104/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Assignment and Utilization of Personnel, To: CG 1st AF, 1 July 1949

105/ An officer completing formal school training in a technical specialty is not awarded an MOS in that skill upon graduation; it is only recommended that he be awarded that MOS after he has served in that capacity as a principal duty. Consequently, if an officer, having completed his formal training, is assigned other duties when he returns from school, no regulation is being violated in spite of the fact that such practice defeats the purpose of technical school training. In Hq ConAC's opinion, paragraph 2b of AF Ltr 35-45 had to be re-written to require assignment of officers to principal duty in the MOS for which they trained when they return from school. If that was not done, they would never obtain the MOS's and the USAF might never solve its problem of obtaining enough skilled technicians. (See ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: AF Ltr 35-45, To: C/S USAF, 14 January 1949 and 1st Ind., Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 29 June 1949) That this situation was corrected is indicated in : Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Classification of Officers, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 19 October 1949.

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(4) to apply appropriate and timely reclassification procedures.[106]

If the analysis of one numbered air force can be fully credited, the shortage-surplus problem in the lower echelons was aggravated by the following conditions: (1) The lack of stabilization of authorization due to changes in mission and budgetary allocations. Each change tended to produce a different situation and create new manning problems.[107] (2) The lack of control over discharges. The lenient policy followed throughout the Air Force of approving hardship discharges greatly accelerated discharges, in turn creating many shortages this

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106/ Ibid., During July, the Mission Progress Division, Hq ConAC, prepared, at the request of the Director of Personnel Planning and Management, a special study entitled "Utilization of ConAC Airmen by MOS and Family Group." The Director of Personnel Planning and Management consolidated the MOS's under study into family groups such as "Aircraft Maintenance", "Radar and Communications", "Chemical", "Armament and Gunnery","Supply", "Photographic", "Administrative", "Food Service", "Automotive Mechanics and Operators". The purpose of this study was: (1) To analyze the current utilization of airmen assigned ConAC by MOS; (2) To point out greatest discrepancies between authorized and assigned airmen, considering those training-in and training-out of MOS; and (3) To consider trends of these factors over the period 1 March through 31 May 1949. The study indicated that little or no control was being exercised over on-the-job training of assigned personnel. In one instance, it was discovered that 13% of the assigned personnel of the Aircraft Maintenance family were training out of primary MOS's while 21% over and above those authorized the Aircraft Maintenance family were training in MOS's peculiar to this family. The same trends to a lesser degree were evident in other family groupings. (ConAC Bulletin, No. 170-11, 29 August 1949)

107/ 1st Ind., Hq 10th AF to CG ConAC, 3 February 1950, to ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Utilization of Airmen, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 21 November 1949

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unit averred.[108] (3) The lack of unit control over assignments which resulted in many cases in the assignment of overages and further aggravation of the shortage-surplus problem.[109] (4) The demands on experienced personnel by special details (such as Operation Portrex, Air Indoctrination School, and others) which decreed that inexperienced people be assigned positions for which they were not fully competent or qualified.[110]

108/ TWX, Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 12 July 1949. Lists the requirements for discharging personnel or releasing them from active duty because of dependency or hardship reasons.

109/ True, Hq ConAC allocated pipeline personnel to the numbered AF's in specialties that were surplus to the requirements of those organizations in many instances. Naturally, the units wrote back, requesting that these persons be reassigned to other organizations where they might be possibly used since they had no need for them. Hq ConAC could not accede to these requests, however. Persons in surplus specialties as well as needed specialties, it was pointed out, had to be assigned by the fastest means possible to relieve the congestion at AF assembly and processing stations. In the majority of cases, surplus persons were allocated to the AF located nearest the assembly and processing stations from which those persons were located in order to reduce the travel involved and decrease the amount offunds expended in travel. This had to be the policy, Hq ConAC pointed out, and the parent headquarters requested its units not to ask to be relieved from assignment of a person on the grounds that he was surplus. If there had been an error, and a man who had a critically needed specialty which the receiving unit knew would be used in another unit, then, Hq ConAC stated, a request should, of course, be put through to reassign the man where he could be best used. (See TWX, Hq ConAC, 9 September 1949 to All numbered AF's)

110/ One commander was especially perturbed at the assignment of several of his officers to the Air Indoctrination Course II midway in the year. "One of the most frequent topics of discussion," he stated, "is stability of personnel. We get the same comments from every phase of our activities, whether it be unit commanders or civilian institutions. It is difficult to attack the problem. General statements are of little value, so I'm taking the liberty of inviting your attention to a specific case. The Wing Commander (Cont'd)

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(5) The mandatory school quotas for training men into specialties not authorized or already surplus to the command upon which the quotas were levied. (6) The option of re-enlistees to select stations of their choice.[111] These matters, of course, were beyond the ability of the Headquarters Continental Air Command to correct. The Headquarters could, however, keep close tab on its units, through inspections and reporting requirements, to make certain they were getting the most out of the people made available to them.

To effect this close supervision on unit personnel management, a Personnel Accounting Chart system was initiated midway in the year. By turning to this record, unit commanders and inspecting officials could get a reasonably accurate knowledge of the qualifications of the men in the units for the positions they were occupying. It was pointed out many times by Headquarters Continental Air Command that the Person-

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of the 78th stated he was losing two flight commanders (scarce individuals in his fighter group) to Eglin Field on TDY because they had theatrical experience. We must send eight officers ... to participate as actors in skits to be presented during air indoctrination course. The officers meeting the requirements in some cases were key officers in the organization. Our commanders lost officers for many causes, but losing them to "Participate as actors in Skits" to be presented at Eglin is a bit difficult for some of them to understand, and frankly I'm unable to explain it to them. Any help you can give us towards stability will be greatly appreciated." To this request for explanation as to why critical officers had to be taken out to be used as "actors in skits" General Myers replied that the AIC II was perhaps the only method the AF had of showing off its capabilities and that levies for this detail had been distributed as evenly as possible over the command. (See ltr, General Rush to General Myers, 10 August 1949)

111/ 1st Ind., Hq 10th AF to CG ConAC, 3 February 1950, to ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Utilization of Airmen, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 21 November 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #107)

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nel Accounting Chart totals and the numerical summary of the personnel utilization form forwarded to higher headquarters had to agree if the true manning picture was to be presented. "The Form 127 is the basic factor in the Air Force Personnel replacement system," Headquarters Continental Air Command pointed out, "and if the Personnel Accounting Chart presents an erroneous picture reflected by the Form 127, the entire Air Force training and replacement schedule might be unbalanced."[112] It is to be noted, however, that these reports did not always reveal the true status of personnel manning in a unit, even if compiled with the utmost care. If a man was received from an outside source, let us say, and was in a particular job and after serving for a period of time in that category, evidenced that he was not qualified for this task nor suited for further training, he was given a new assignment and recommended for reclassification. Until he was actually reclassified, however, he showed on the records as a misassignment.[113]

An actual case in point was as follows: When one unit reported an overage in clerk typists, Headquarters Continental Air Command requested reasons as to why there were overages of this type personnel in this one unit while there were shortages in the same specialty in other units. Why had this matter not been brought to the attention of higher headquarters so that action could have been taken to reassign these surplus individuals to the units where their services were in great demand?[114]

112/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Apparent Assignment Discrepancies SSN 750 and 747, To: CG 10th AF, 10 November 1949

113/ Ltr, Hq 12th AF, Subj: Utilization of Airmen, To: CG ConAC, 6 December 1949

114/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Personnel Assignment Analysis, Thru: CG 1st AF, To: CO 503 AC&W Group, 6 December 1949

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The reply was that the manning authorization for this organization was not adequate to its real needs and the positions had to be filled. This, of course, resulted in overages being reflected in the accounting reports. The commander of the unit admitted that he was aware that an apparent malassignment would be indicated but he had to carry out the unauthorized job requirements with whatever personnel possessing the necessary experience or training he had available regardless of the primary classification of the men holding down the positions if he was to meet his mission requirements. Consequently, he had to report such action in either of two ways: either that the men were working out of their primary classification or that they were working in their primary MOS. If the latter were recorded, it would be a false excuse, he pointed out.[115] He then went on to state that he was attempting to correct malassignments of this nature by assigning individuals "dual" responsibilities. "It /was/ believed that this action /would/ stay within the spirit of current classification directives as well as enable the units to perform their mission."[116] At least, this sort of an arrangement was an interim solution until such time as the manning allotments of units could be altered and sufficient specialists assigned to negate the "necessity of malassignments."[117] Instances of this sort failed to detract from the utility of the charting system, however; rather it served an additional

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115/ Ibid., 2nd Ind., 26th Air Division (Defense) to CG 1st AF, 13 January 1949

116/ Ibid.

117/ Ibid.

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invaluable purpose of bringing to light the sometimes ingenious methods employed by commanders to "shuffle" their people about in their attempts to accomplish their assignments with inadequate manning resources.

Personnel audit teams prosecuted a continuous program throughout the year for the proper classification and utilization of personnel by means of semi-annual surveys of the several units within the command. Personnel Accounting Charts were reviewed frequently and, when necessary, letters were sent to the units instructing them to correct what appeared to be misassignments of personnel or to justify such assignments. The major rules for the lower echelons to follow toward properly using their personnel were enumerated by one numbered air force commander as follows:[118/]

(1) Maintain records to accurately show the number of officers and airmen authorized, assigned and present for duty each day.

(2) Record on the proper form the shortages of personnel.

(3) Justify completely any request for personnel beyond personnel authorized.

(4) Assign each individual to a duty in which his skills are used to the best possible advantage.

(5) Assign each officer and airman to duty for which he has been trained or to a parallel or higher field of endeavor. (It was pointed out that it was important that no person possessing an MOS or SSN declared critical be utilized in any other field and that no person possessing an MOS or SSN declared acutely short be utilized in any other capacity than as a trainee on a parallel or higher field of endeavor.)

118/ 1. Ltr, General Johnson, Subj: Utilization of Personnel, To: CO 47th Bombardment Wing, 11 August 1949
2. (See also: 1st Ind., Hq 4th AF to CG ConAC, 19 December 1949, to ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Utilization of Airmen, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 21 November 1949)

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(6) Do not select rated officers to attend Service Schools where the course of instruction is purely administrative or not related to duties required of rated personnel.

(7) Declare as excess all unauthorized personnel who possess a critical MOS or SSN.

(8) Report overages in authorized strength to higher headquarters or completely justify their retention.

(9) Keep grade spreads in accordance with authorizations.

It was pointed out by this air force commander that "[these] points ... [were] not of such a nature as to be considered a one-time effort to improve utilization of personnel. Each matter [had to] be constantly reviewed and applied ... to daily procedures."[119] "

Albeit seemingly in agreement with the above action to correct the shortage-surplus problem within their units, certain air force commanders observed that the program brought about certain undesirable results. It was felt that the system had an adverse morale effect upon men well up the career ladder who found themselves reclassified because they were in surplus specialties. Such reclassification, it was feared, might cause these individuals to have to begin all over again in a career field in which they had no training and for which they had little interest or aptitude.[120] The SSN's in which surpluses existed were filled with airmen, for the most part, in the first three grades. For this reason, it was pointed out, they were not adaptable nor was it fair

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119/ Ibid.

120/ 1st Ind., Hq 10th AF to CG ConAC, 3 February 1950, to ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Utilization of Airmen, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 21 November 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #107)

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to them to train them in other specialties not commensurate with their present rank and in a different functional field. The above problem was aggravated by the assignment of technical school graduates for which no vacancies existed in the receiving unit. The only solution for this latter problem was to retrain these men into different specialties in allied fields in order that their school training would not be completely wasted.[121]

III

An extensive personnel study was conducted in Headquarters Continental Air Command during the latter months of 1949. The study revealed that there still existed many badpersonnel utilization practices over the command. Most important it showed that as of the close of this historical period little progress had been made to improve the overall situation as it existed before the initiation of the above program.[122]

Excessive surpluses in certain specialties and shortages in others stood out in sharp contrast. The situation was complicated by the loss of personnel in the critical specialties through expiration of term of service, fulfillment of oversees quotas and by the uneven distribution of shortages and surpluses among the various units within the command. Analysis of Personnel Accounting Charts continued to show many instances in which personnel possessing MOS's short in the units were being assigned

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121/ Ltr, Hq 12th AF, Subj: Utilization of Airmen, To: CG ConAC, 6 December 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #117)

122/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Reclassification and Utilization of Airmen, To: CG 1st AF, 13 January 1950

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duty in surplus specialties. Also, specialists in surplus skills were still being utilized in their primary specialties when greater need existed in the units for them in their secondary MOS's.[123]

Headquarters Continental Air Command warned its units that the continued loss of personnel in specialties which were short had to be anticipated and plans made accordingly. It had to be assumed that personnel in surplus specialties would continue to be assigned. If progress was to be made, the major portion of the problem had to be solved internally through judicious assignment to duty of assigned personnel and a more equitable distribution of this personnel among the units. Specifically, if the shortage-surplus problem was ever to be alleviated, each unit had to:[124]

(1) Thoroughly screen all personnel possessing primary MOS's which were surplus to Continental Air Command and the United States Air Force for the purpose of reclassifying those individuals not fully qualified and for reclassifying those men found qualified but for whom no authorized T/O&E or T/DA vacancy existed;

(2) Utilize all basic airmen in SSN's in which shortages existed in Continental Air Command and within the individual units; and

(3) Utilize all surplus personnel to the maximum extent possible in SSN's which were short both in Continental Air Command and within the individual units.

To accomplish the above objectives, the commanders of the units were directed to bring airmen who possessed certain surplus specialty

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123/ Ibid.

124/ Ibid.

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numbers both Continental Air Command and United States Air Force-wide, before a classification board and determine through study and interview the degree of qualification of each airman.[125] Those individuals found not fully qualified in their primary MOS were to be reclassified to another specialty in which they were fully qualified (including basic airmen 521) and used in accordance with the above directions. Such individuals who possessed one of the short MOS's as a secondary MOS were to be reclassified in their secondary MOS's as rapidly as possible and used in their secondary MOS. The old primary MOS of these individuals would then be removed from qualification records.[126] Those individuals found qualified in their primary MOS's were to be reassigned to duty in their primary MOS's only insofar as actual T/O&E, T/D or T/DA authorizations permitted. Inter-squadron transfers of these men, on the same station, would be made to the extent necessary to fill all authorized vacancies which existed on a station orwhich were created as a result of reclassification. The remainder of those individuals who possessed a critically short skill as a secondary MOS were to be reclassified in these secondary MOS's without delay and would be utilized in the secondary MOS. However, the old primary duty number of these individuals was to remain on their qualification records as a

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125/ Ibid., The Classification Board was to be convened in accordance with the provisions of ConAC Reg 14-1, 7 January 1949

126/ Ibid., A list of those shortages to, by SSN, is presented in the supporting documents.

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secondary MOS. The remaining airmen in the surplus SSN's who wanted formal school training in the aircraft and electronics maintenance fields and who possessed reasonable aptitude could, Headquarters Continental Air Command stated, be sent to an appropriate school, on temporary duty, and brought back to the same base. Even if the school required a permanent change of station assignment, approval of the return of the men to their home stations could be secured, it was believed. Remaining airmen in the surplus SSN's, not affected by the above action, were to be placed in on-the-job training in one of the short specialties.

No further awards of surplus MOS's were to be made to basic airmen, under this program. However, basic airmen were to be utilized to the maximum extent possible to fill shortages in the critical specialties. Selection of basics for on-the-job training in specific MOS's was to be made only after careful consideration of the overall personnel situation in the unit. Inter-squadron transfers of basics on the same station was to be made to the extent necessary to achieve their maximum effective utilization in the short SSN's. Finally, basics were to be given priority, after the NCO's were retrained from surplus specialties, in the fulfillment of quotas to technical schools not requiring prerequisite qualifications.[127]

To accomplish the third objective set by Headquarters Continental Air Command (the maximum usage of surplus personnel), commanders were to: (1) determine through continual analysis and review of squadron

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127/ Ibid.

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Personnel Accounting Charts that all surplus personnel were being utilized to the utmost in filling vacancies in short specialties within the units; (2) determine through continual analysis and review of all personnel reports that equitable distribution of both short and surplus specialists was being effected through inter-squadron transfers of surplus personnel on the same station; (3) perform a continual analysis and review of all T/O&E's, T/D's and T/DA's and take action to recommend changes where necessary; (4) conduct a program of continual analysis and study of the shortage-surplus pattern and take action to insure that training was conducted in consonance with air force needs; and (5) require Classification Audit Teams to devote specific attention during the course of regular personnel surveys to compliance with the above requirements.[128]

Headquarters Continental Air Command informed its units that United States Air Force and Continental Air Command records of shortages and surpluses in the field were only as good as the data received from the units in the field. Headquarters USAF, it was pointed out, established all training quotas from this data. Consequently, records from the field had to portray the personnel situation as it existed. Unnecessary delay in the reclassification, for example, of 502's to 275's would cause Headquarters USAF to establish school quotas for 275's when actually there were more than enough 502's available who, in a brief on-the-job training period, could be fully qualified as 275's.

128/ Ibid.

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In closing this vital personnel message General Whitehead stated: "I shall expect you, your general staff officers and wing and group commanders to be able to answer any of my questions on this subject when I next visit these activities."[129] "

"The purpose of [the above action was] , quoting the Director of Personnel Plans and Management in Headquarters Continental Air Command, "to divert airmen from fields in which significant surpluses (overages) [existed] and provide for their retraining and subsequent utilization in other fields in which shortages [existed]." This was a positive action designed to meet an immediate problem. The effects of the new program will be felt throughout the Continental Air Command, personnel officials believed, since it was an innovation in that the action proposed was specific and mandatory and not governed by local circumstances.[130] Certainly, the affect this project has on the alleviation, if not the elimination, of shortages in the command will be one of the major topics of discussion in the next volume of the history.

The shortage-surplus problem was put on a realistic basis when the cost caused by the lack of balance between authorized and assigned airmen was estimated. In the automotive, administrative, clerical and supply airmen fields, the Continental Air Command was, as of 30 November 1949, overstrength 5,948 airmen, which included an average of

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129/ Ibid.

130/ Historical Report, Directorate of Personnel Planning and Management, Jan-Feb 1950, prepared under the auspices of Lt Col Richard A. Yudkin, Dir PPM, Hq ConAC.

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1,423 basic soldiers. While some of these men were being used effectively, in allied specialties, at the time in which the Continental Air Command computed this estimate, most of these men could not be used at even fifty per cent efficiency in some other specialty. In view of these facts, General Whitehead estimated that at least forty to fifty per cent of this annual payroll rate of about $10,100,000 was a complete loss to the United States Air Force. The net shortage in the operations and maintenance fields of aircraft, communications, and radar (early warning and airborne both) was 2,944; an annual payroll rate of approximately $5,000,000 which, as of that time, was not being provided the Continental Air Command to carry out its mission. 131/

131/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Airmen Overage and Shortage Costs, To: DCS/P, Hq USAF, 22December 1949. Here are tabulated by number and quantity, the shortages and overages in airmen during the period in question.

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CHAPTER THREE

PERSONNEL VITALIZATION [132]

I

As any large agency striving for consistency and efficiency of production must remain continually alert to the hiring of potential executives, so must the Air Force establish an aggressive program for inducing promising young men to make air military service a career. From the colleges, reserve forces and officer candidate schools come these future regular Air Force officers - fledglings at the outset, but destined one day to slip into the traces and "carry on" when the contemporary leaders pass into retirement. [133]

The Continental Air Command is charged, among other responsibilities, with the procurement of men within the continental limits of the nation to staff the United States Air Force. This entails

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132/ For purposes of this chapter, the term "vitalization" is defined as procurement, separation, career progression and welfare and other special services activities within the USAF and, in turn, ConAC. The common goal of these affairs is to provide the Air Force with the most highly qualified persons obtainable and make their lives in the Air Force as vigorous and secure as possible. That it has a more limited meaning in the Air Force dictionary must be acknowledged, however. According to common military usage, the term means the elimination of unfit or unproductive officers through reclassification and dismissal by (1) court-martial action, and (2) through methods prescribed in AF Reg 36-2. For additional information on these subjects, See: Ltr, General Lyon to General Whitehead, 5 October 1949; and ltr, Department of the Air Force, Subj: Air Force Vitalization Program, To: CG ConAC, 21 March 1949.

133/ For information concerning General Stratemeyer's views on "the development of future leaders", see: Ltr, General Stratemeyer to General Vandenberg, 26 March 1949.

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normal recruiting activities and the organizing and dispatching of personnel procurement teams about the country to interview and enlist young men into the Air Cadet and Officer Candidate School programs.[134] Also, it entails the operating of the Air ROTC establishment,[135] and the selection from that program and from the reserve officers on inactive duty of certain qualified persons to enter or re-enter the air service on extended terms of active duty. While results of the first two programs, from the standpoint of numbers of persons recruited, and the number of Air ROTC graduates called to active duty can be handled

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134/ The number of college students processed for Air Cadet and Officer Candidate School was lower at the end of the year than at the beginning. One reason for this drop-off in enlistment, in the opinion of officials responsible for the conduct of this program in Hq ConAC, was the change in education requirements for Aviation Cadet (pilot-navigator) applicants. Beginning 1 October 1949, a college student interested in aviation cadet training was required to have a minimum of two years of college. Prior to that time, high school graduates could take the Air Force Education Examination which, if passed, measured the equivalent of two years of college. Wide-spread adverse publicity resulting from the relief from active duty of so many reserve officers was also believed to be a contributing factor in the decline of applicants. Aviation Cadet classes, at the end of the year, were being filled from a surplus of qualified applicants procured by traveling officer procurement teams and the recruiting service during 1949. Because this surplus of qualified applicants had just about been depleted, it appeared to procurement officers in Hq ConAC that there may be some future difficulty in filling classes because of the lack of applicants due to the above factors. (Staff Historical Report, Office of the Director of Military Personnel Procurement, 1 - 28 February 1950. Also, Interview, Major Raymond F. Sanford, Office of the Dir of Mil Pers Proc., Hq ConAC, 8 July 1950)

135/ 1. Ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Active Duty for Air ROTC Graduates, To: CG ConAC, 4 March 1949
2. Ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Procedure for Call to Active Duty of Air ROTC Graduates, To: CG ConAC, 14 April 1949

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statistically in this edition of the history, certain developments within the recall program during this period are considered of sufficient importance to warrant space in the narrative.[136]

The United States Air Force's long range plans are such that it has had to maintain a post-war strength considerably greater than that authorized for the regular establishment.[137] Consequently, capable persons holding reserve commissions who have evidenced their desire to enter into or re-enter the aerial service for terms of active duty and who met certain high standards have been accepted periodically for duty in numbers commensurate with funds available. Replacements to fill vacancies by the loss of regular officers through normal attrition or their elimination because of incompetence or unproductivity have been made to a large extent from this reserve "pool".

In contrast to previous years, the recall program was not designed during 1949 strictly as a process to meet current strength requirements. Rather, it was intended primarily to provide the Air Force with an input of reserve officers in an age range and of a quality that would constitute both a source for selection of officers for regular commissions and an addition to M-Day resources for replacements for the field.[138] Early in the year, troop program limitations, based on plans for a 48

136/ Statistical Data Charts:
1. Aviation Cadet-Officer Candidate Procurement
2. Continental Air Command Officer Procurement Program

137/ AF Ltr 35-74, 20 October 1947, relates the role the reserve officer occupies in the USAF and the privileges he enjoys within that status.

138/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 26 August 1949

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Group Program, restricted normal recalls to active duty to (1) a limited number of specially qualified individuals whom Headquarters USAF picked out, and (2) to legal officers. At that time, higher headquarters stated that if the troop program for Fiscal Year 1950 was established on a larger numerical basis, considerably more reserve officers could be called to active duty. If such became the case, procedures to be followed in effecting such recalls would be supplied at the opportune time.[139] Noteworthy in these directions was the role the recall program was expected to play in alleviating the critical shortage of legally and medically trained officers. The recall program, it was felt, was the principal source for obtaining these vitally needed specialists. In this connection, Headquarters USAF stated: "In order to meet [these needs], it is necessary to make extensive use of the resources represented by the reserve officers not currently on extended active duty. Applications for recall should be encouraged by all reasonable means ..."[140].

While the above policy remained in effect throughout the year, preferential treatment was accorded those reserve officers who were

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139/ Ltr, Department of the Air Force, Subj: Interim Procedure: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty, 14 March 1949. As an example of the procedure followed in recalling reserve officers at this time for explicit duties see: Ltr, Department of the AF, Subj: Recallto Active Duty of Navigators, To: CG ConAC, 15 April 1949.

140/ 1. Ibid., Inclosure #1, Subj: Procedure for Recall to Active Duty of Legal Officers
2. Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Procedure for Call or Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 14 September 1949. This document informed all unit commanders that applications for call or recall to active duty of medical officers were to be sent directly to the Surgeon General.

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college graduates, who had not reached the age of thirty prior to 1 July 1949, and who met the general eligibility criteria established for normal recall. Officers with these qualifications were assigned against recall quotas allocated to the numbered air forces by Headquarters Continental Air Command if there were openings for them in these organizations. If no vacancies were available within the processing unit at that time, the officers' applications were forwarded to Headquarters Continental Air Command with a request for station assignment.[141] This policy and procedure was adopted, higher headquarters stated, to provide the United States Air Force with an adequate supply of suitable officers from whom selection for commissions in the Regular Air Force could be made and to raise the level of education among officers currently on duty.[142]

Subsequently, qualifications for recall of reserve officers with college degrees was made stricter when it was decreed that they had to have an efficiency index of 40 for their previous active duty if they returned to active duty in company grade and one of 45 if they came back in field grade.[143] Also, their records had to be free of derogatory information.[144] The following procedures were followed in assigning

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141/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 1 June 1949

142/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Recall to Active Duty for Reserve Officers with College Degrees, To: CG's All Numbered AF's, 21 June 1949

143/ Ibid.

144/ Factors which were considered "derogatory" and disqualified applicants for recall to active duty are listed in ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 26 August 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #6)

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officers recalled under these circumstances: No grade restrictions were imposed for applicants for flying training provided they met the age requirements specified for such training.[145] Rated officers and non-rated officers who did not desire or who were not eligible for flying duty were assigned as follows: (1) Officers possessing skill specialties qualifying them for assignment against recall quotas allocated the numbered air forces were assigned directly against such quotas without action on Headquarters Continental Air Command's part. (2) Where no suitable assignment quota was available, applications were forwarded to higher headquarters with a request that station assignment instructions be provided. That was the policy followed through to the end of the year.[146]

In addition to preferential recall accorded reserve officers who were college graduates and under thirty years of age, an extremely limited number of older officers not elibile for commissioning in the Regular Air force but who possessed scarce skills required by the Air force were recalled to active duty on the same preferential basis.

145/ Requirements as to age of applicants for flying training are included in AF Ltr 51-6, 3 May 1949. These applicants were processed in accordance with the specifications of ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Recall of Officers To Extended Active Duty, To: CG ConAC, 20 May 1949. This letter revoked the limitation that officers recalled for flying training had to be in the grade of lieutenant.

146/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Recall to Active Duty for Reserve Officers with College Degrees, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 21 June 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #10). It is interesting to note that one numbered air force commander came to the conclusion that graduating men with prior service might well be considered for regular commissions at about the same moment Hq USAF formulated the policy that any reserve officer not on active duty who was a college graduate would be accepted for active duty if he met other normal requirements. (See ltr, General Stearley, Subj: Procurement of Regular Air Force Officers, To: CG ConAC, 16 May 1949 and 1st Ind., Hq ConAC to CG 14th AF, 2 June 1949)

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These officers had to have a minimum efficiency index of 38 for the last two years of their active duty if they applied for recall in company grade and 43 if in field grade.[147] This, also, became an established recall policy, holding true through the end of the year.[148]

One numbered air force commander noted that approximately half of the total officers with college degrees applying for active duty at his station met all the administrative requirements for recall except the one stipulating that they have an efficiency index of 40 or above. A study of the rejected cases indicated that the majority of these men were young rated officers with two to three years previous duty who had entered the service late in the war and who, after receiving their aeronautical ratings, had been assigned to technical schools, replacement training units or other advanced schools. It was pointed out that these assignments did not offer these officers opportunities to serve in a stabilized assignment where they could be tested in a

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147/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 26 August 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #8)

148/ It was brought to the attention of Hq ConAC that the numbered air forces were, in some instances, operating the recall program only on the basis of specific needs for highly specialized personnel even after receipt of the information to recall all reserve officers with college degrees who satisfied normal requirements. Hq ConAC directed correction of this policy. Also, to shorten the waiting period between receipt of information from Hq USAF and transmission of this information to the units, Hq ConAC commenced to condense this information and forward it by electrical means to the units. This served as advance notice on all matters pertinent to the recall program until it could be implemented by airmail message. (See ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: Recall of Reserve Officers to Extended Active Duty, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 21 July 1949)

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field that indicated their true capabilities. For the most part, they were interested in expeditious completion of an assigned task and not in demonstrating the qualities of leadership and professional proficiency necessary for an officer of the peacetime Air Force. Further, this commander noted, the standard rating awarded by rating officers of schools and training units was "Satisfactory" and "Very Satisfactory" due to the large number of personnel passing through these organizations and the inability of commanders to completely acquaint themselves with the conduct of the rated officers and their potentialities. After the war, however, many of these men had returned to college and, after reflection on the advantages of a military career, had decided to attempt to return to active duty. In some instances, their records revealed, they had even adopted a field of study that would equip them for a career in aeronautics. Taking these factors into consideration, this commander recommended that young college graduates be given special consideration for recall to extended active duty under the same efficiency index as other officers of equal rank.[149] Headquarters Continental Air Command concurred in this recommendation.[150] Headquarters USAF, however, refused to make any allowances for these officers whose efficiency records fell below the established criteria on the grounds that personnel planners in that headquarters intended to maintain the highest standards of selection on the "input of young

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149/ Ltr, Hq 4th AF, Subj: Recall to Extended Active Duty, To: CG ConAC, 15 July 1949

150/ Ibid., 1st Ind., Hq ConAC to Hq USAF, 29 July 1949

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America" to make certain that all applicants for regular commissions were of the highest caliber obtainable.[151] Strict adherence to this policy, Headquarters USAF admitted, would result inevitably in some injustices but the fact that a reservist with a low efficiency record for his previous active duty had attended college was not indication that his character had undergone drastic improvement. College education, in other words, was not to be assumed as the "panacea of low efficiency."[152]

II

The "blitz" that was on during the year (as one officer labeled it)[153] to eliminate all unproductive personnel was increased when budgetary decreases made it necessary to relieve additional reserve officers from active duty. In its directive providing the authority and outlining the procedure to be followed for effecting these reductions, Headquarters USAF stated: "This letter applies to all officers of the Reserve forces, male and female, rated and non-rated, on extended active duty, including Medical Service Corps officers but excluding all other Medical Service Officers."[154]

Under the terms of this mandate, officers were to be relieved from active duty (or converted to non-flying status) in such numbers and at such times as Head quarters USAF directed. The number of officers to

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151/ Ibid., 2d Ind., Hq USAF to CG ConAC, 11 August 1949

152/ Ibid., (See also: IRS, Colonel J. MCCurnin, Dir of Mil Pers, Hq ConAC, Subj: Recall of Officers to EAD, To: VC, 1 September 1949

153/ IRS, Colonel Landon, DP, Hq ConAC, to VC, 2 November 1949

154/ AF Ltr 36-26, Subj: Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty & Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status, 29 November 1949

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be relieved or converted was subsequently published in letter form and sent to each major command, specifying both separation and conversion quotas by grade for the command concerned.[155] Quotas were primarily based upon: (1) The number of Reserve Officers in each grade on duty in each command, and (2) the mission of the command and the number of rated reserve officers assigned to it.[156] It was stressed that relief of these officers was effected for the convenience of the Government without prejudice to the individuals concerned.[157]

Reserve pilots on extended active duty were the first type of personnel to be affected by the terms of this policy. As pointed out by Headquarters USAF: "The pilot strength of the Air Force must be reduced to a total of 24,000. The 24,000 ... on pilot status must, therefore, be the most fully or potentially qualified to perform pilot duties under combat conditions." In making these selections, it was warned, officials delegated the task had to take into consideration the availability of replacements for those officers relieved who possessed scarce skill specialties. The capabilities of graduates of certain specialized training courses, for example, had to be carefully considered before their names were forwarded on the list of officers for dismissal.[158]

155/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: PROJECT FEB - Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 30 November 1949

156/ AFL 36-26, 29 November 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #153)

157/ Ltr, Department of the Air Force, Subj: Officers Released under Air Force Letter 36-26, To: CG ConAC, 18 January 1950

158/ Ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Release of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces (Cont'd)

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Quotas for the number of officers to be separated from active duty and the number of reserve pilots to be converted to non-flying status within the Continental Air Command were sent down by higher headquarters just prior to the close of the period. The first officers to be separated under this policy were to get their dismissal notices in February 1950. Quotas, it was directed, would be strictly adhered to insofar as numbers were concerned; however, grades shown for conversion indicated the most desirable gradespread only, to be followed as closely as practicable.[159]

In a subsequent directive, Headquarters USAF stated that colonels and lieutenant colonels would be selected for separation and conversion through means of a central selection board in Washington. The Headquarters Continental Air Command was told to list all the reserve officers in these grades in its command according to the following categories: (1) The 25% whose retention on extended active duty would be most contributory to the best interests of the Air Force by virtue

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Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26, To: CG ConAC, 25 November 1949. The names of officers who had successfully completed the following courses of training within the past three years were forwarded to Hq USAF before final action toward separating or converting them was taken: (1) Atomic Energy Course; (2) Aircraft Warning Officer Course; (3) USAF Bombardment School; (4) Radiological Defense; (5) Factory Familiarization - Armament.

159/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: PROJECT FEB - Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 30 November 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #154)

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of their outstanding qualifications; (2) the 50% who had a relatively limited potential value for future utilization; (3) the 25% who could best be spared and whose loss would have the least disruptive effect upon the functioning of the Continental Air Command.[160]

These instructions Headquarters Continental Air Command transmitted to its units, at the same time calling to their attention the fact that they held a "grave responsibility" in selecting the officers who were to be released from active duty under the terms of this program. In most cases, Headquarters Continental Air Command warned, the judgement exercised by the numbered air forces as to which reserve officers it could best spare would be tantamount to separation of these men from the service.[161]

160/ 1. Ltr, Department of the Air Force, Subj: Release of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26, To: CG ConAC, 28 November 1949.

2. The release of officers in this category was to be effected 60 days after they were notified of the decision to dismiss them. However, there were certain alternatives to this time limit as noted in ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Separation of Reserve Forces Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels, To: CG ConAC, 30 January 1950. See also: Ltr, Department of the AF, Subj: Extension of Separation Date for Officers to be Released from Active Duty Under Provisions of AFL 36-26, To: CG ConAC, 1 February 1950; and TWX, Hq ConAC to CG's All numbered AF's, 31 January 1950.

161/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subj: PROJECT FEB - Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26, To: CG's All numbered AF's, 30 November 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #154)

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III

"During periods of economic prosperity such as the nation is experiencing today, the services are not in a position to compete with industry for personnel on a wage basis. Therefore, in our efforts to attract highly-qualified personnel we must capitalize on career opportunities and other long-range benefits ..." . 162/

Convincing the individual airman and officer that he has a career before him in the service, a definite goal to work toward, is one of Headquarters USAF's major concerns. Airmen and officers, it has been rightly assumed, have to feel that they are progressing within a chosen field of skill and that their jobs are as important and as provocative as any they might secure as civilians.

Toward fulfilling this requirement, higher headquarters initiated during this period, a "career program" for both enlisted men and officers. It was higher headquarters' belief that once this program was fully in effect it would "contribute materially to the desire of ... personnel to continue in the Air Force on a career basis." 163/ Under this program, definite career fields were to be formed, consisting of jobs grouped on a functional basis as opposed to the former organization grouping. Opportunities for advancement were to be based on appropriate qualifications and not influenced by organizational or administrative factors. And, promotions to higher grades were to be made on

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162/ 1st Ind., Department of the Air Force, to CG ConAC, 27 January 1949

163/ Ibid.

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a competitive basis within career fields, selection to be made with the aid of proficiency testing devices.[164] Prior to getting this program underway, Headquarters USAF had to re-evaluate each different type of job and assign to it a grade authorization commensurate with the degree of skill, knowledge and responsibility the incumbent of that job had to possess.[165]

In an attempt to find out what the attitude of enlisted men would be toward a program of this type, the Attitude Research Branch of the Armed Forces Information and Education Division, at the request of the Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, conducted the following survey early in 1949.[166] Six hundred and seventy-eight enlisted men from the airplane mechanics career field and 633 from the administrative career field filled out questionnaires in which were listed the various subjects that would go to make up a "career program".[167] The questions dealt primarily with promotion, placement,

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164/ New job descriptions, job codes and career progression charts were published in AF Letters of the 35-430 series. (Vid. sup. doc. #162)

165/ 1st Ind., Department of the Air Force to CG ConAC, 27 January 1949 (Vid. sup. doc. #162)

166/ Ltr, Hq USAF, "Research Study No. 93-328 - Airman's Attitude Toward a Career Plan, To: CG ConAC, File 220, 9 June 1949

167/ Ibid., Early portions of the questionnaire were devoted to determining how many career-minded enlisted men there were. The survey board, from the findings, listed the following as characteristics of "career-minded" airmen: (1) They have a long period of service behind them, being on their second or subsequent enlistment; (2) They are of relatively higher grade; (3) They are older; and (4) They are likely to be married. They also show greater liking for Air Force life, enjoy greater job satisfaction, and are more inclined to believe their officers are interested in their personal welfare and are less apt to be bothered by orders given them for which they do not perceive the reasons.

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and determination of job efficiency. In essence, the questionnaire asked: "What type of a career program would best suit you, as airmen of the USAF?"

Approximately two-thirds of the men indicated their preference of competitive testing over command selection as a basis for promotion. More than eighty per cent of them believed that such competition should be at squadron level; five to six per cent preferred Air Force-wide competition. Men in the upper grades, it was found, were the least in favor of command selection as a basis for promotion. Opinions were not markedly different whether the promotion in question was to private first class or to master sergeant.[168]

About ninety-seven per cent of the men stated they would apply for promotion tests if they were available, and most of them were confident they could pass them. The majority of them indicated willingness to devote free time to studying for promotion tests. Most of the men felt that the primary basis for promotion should be job efficiency.[169] Length of service, time in grade and "character" were less highly regarded.

There was some divergence in the opinions of airplane mechanics, when contrasted with administrative personnel, as to how job efficiency could best be determined. The mechanics thought that the supervisory non-coms could best certify their efficiency while lesser numbers favored "performance" tests and the opinion of the men who worked with

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168/ Ibid.

169/ Ibid.

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them as the best method. Little regard was shown for written tests, the opinion of the Commanding Officer, or of a board of officers, in this connection. By a small plurality, the administrative personnel also preferred the opinion of supervisory non-coms as a means of determining job efficiency. The opinion of a board of officers, once again, commanded little favor, but administrative personnel did favor to a greater extent than airplane mechanic specialists the opinions of their commanders and written tests. The question of who should make efficiency reports was answered so vaguely by both categories of personnel as to be inconclusive. The question of what should be done with men of low efficiency ratings was also answered so variously as to produce little that was conclusive.[170]

The possibility of securing more re-enlistments from non-career minded men through operation of a career plan was also investigated. Only two per cent were almost sure to re-enlist without this inducement; however, thirty-nine per cent professed their willingness to remain in the service if promotions were more fairly distributed and were awarded on the basis of testing. Twenty to thirty-five per cent stated they would almost certainly re-enlist if given their choice of overseas theaters, military jobs and service schools.[171]

170/ Ibid.

171/ Ibid., The re-enlistment rate, Hq USAF stated in June, was one of its most important planning factors under study. At that time, the re-enlistment rate for the USAF ran about 40%. There was a marked correlation between military grade and the re-enlistment quota; over 80% of the master sergeants re-enlisting and less than (Cont'd)

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Approximately two-thirds of the respondents believed that initial placement within a given career field should be as a result of aptitude tests, and that a man should specialize in this field throughout his Air Force career. One in four thought that a man should be tried out in several jobs before being permanently assigned to a specialized field. One in ten men preferred generalization rather than specialization in their careers.[172]

As to how much influence results of this survey had on Headquarters USAF when it sat down to devise the new career program this writer cannot say. It is true, however, that many of the points brought out in the survey had long been recognized by Air Force personnel specialists as "musts" in any management program which would attract the type of persons the United States Air Force requires.

Headquarters Continental Air Command had a few ideas of its own concerning the policies to be followed in the training and advancement of airmen in technical skills. From its experiences, the Continental Air Command found that it was practically a waste of time to send recruits from basic training directly to technical schools. "Classification methods and aptitude tests being what they are," Headquarters

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10% of the privates re-enlisting. There was also an interesting variation among the re-enlistment rates of the different military occupational specialty groups. Generally, the occupational skills which were in great demand in civilian life, such as electronic specialists, had below average re-enlistment rates, while specialists such as administrative, ordnance, and aircraft and engine mechanics, which were particularly suited to military uses, had above average re-enlistment rates. (Comptroller News, Department of the Air Force, Vol. I, No. II, 1 July 1949)

172/ Ibid.

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Continental Air Command stated: "this training is often wasted on individuals not suited to receive it." 173/ And since there was no established policy for down-grading a man who failed to maintain his technical qualifications, many airmen presumably because of incorrect training in the first place, were, in the peacetime Air Force, "coasting on an incomplete knowledge acquired during the early years of the war." To correct this matter, Headquarters Continental Air Command recommended:

> That newly enlisted airmen be sent from the indoctrination center to the various units of the Air Force where they will receive apprenticeship training in the field for which they are best suited and where an error of classification can be most readily discovered and corrected, and that students for the technical schools of the Air Force be drawn exclusively from the field from men who have earned the right to receive such training and who have proven their capacity and aptitude therefor.
>
> That an examination, either annual or semi-annual along the lines of the old air mechanic examination, be required of all enlisted technicians and the firm policy established that the first failure to pass such an examination be in itself sufficient grounds for reduction of the individual concerned, if in the opinion of the organization commander desirable, and that the second such failure result in mandatory reduction. 174/

Once again the writer is unable to trace the effect this proposal might have had in the formulation of the new career program. The important fact is, however, that both commanders and men had definite ideas as to how to improve career progression policies in the Air Force. There was a definite need for such improvement, in other words, and Headquarters USAF's response to this need was the new program. Whether it will

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173/ Ltr, General Turner, Subj: Airmen Career Program, To: C/S USAF, /January/ 1949

174/ Ibid.

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serve to correct the problems noted remains to be seen.

By mid-1949, conversion of warrant officers and airmen from the old jobs and job codes to the new job and job coding system commenced. The conversion was handled by classification boards set up within the various commands and sub-commands throughout the Air Force. At that time, however, the conversion action did not call for a change in the old specialty designation. The old system of reporting and transfer and assignment remained in effect.[175]

Later in the year, supplementary monthly reports were initiated to tabulate and inventory the Air Force skills based upon the conversions to the new job titles and job codes. The plans were to complete the bulk of the conversions before the end of Fiscal Year 1950. It was directed by higher headquarters, however, that classification boards would continue in effect until all hospital, pipeline and other personnel had been reclassified. Then, at a date to be announced at a later time, after all other phases of the personnel program had been completed, the new job coding system would be placed into effect.[176] Thus, as Headquarters USAF pointed out, and as reiterated by the Director of Personnel, Headquarters Continental Air Command, the career program would not be fully launched before the first months of 1950.[177] Since the development of career fields for officers was not

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175/ Ltr, Hq USAF, Subj: Retraining of Classification Personnel to Implement Certain Phases of the Airmen Career Program, To: CG ConAC, 25 April 1949

176/ Ibid.

177/ IRS, Colonel Halsey, Dir of Personnel to DPA, [January] 1949

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contemplated until the enlisted program was completed, it will be some time before the new program is fully in effect and before its results can be analyzed with any degree of accuracy.

IV

"The life of a member of the armed forces does not end with the sounding of Retreat at the close of normal duty hours. His mind and body continue to function in the same manner as any normal human. The fact that he wears a uniform does not mean that /he can be shut up/ in his barracks until it is time for him to resume his assigned duties. To the contrary, the way in which he spends his free time has a pointed bearing on his attitude toward his job, unit and will to serve. Idleness and boredom inevitably lead to demoralization. When off-duty time is enjoyable and meaningful, morale is high, operational production is at its zenith, and loss of time due to AWOL and VD is correspondingly low." 178/

The Director of Personnel Services, the Provost Marshal, the Air Chaplain, the Air Surgeon and the Chief of the Ground Safety Division 179/ all have one ambition in common: to safeguard the health and welfare of the individual officer and airman, both on and off duty. Organized

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178/ Quoted from History of Personnel Services for Past Six Months (October 1949 to March 1950) prepared by Mr. Thomas McCeney, Directorate of Personnel Services, Hq ConAC.

179/ 1. General Stratemeyer had this to say pertinent to implementing a strong Ground Safety campaign within ConAC: "A recent study of ground accident losses, compared with costs of the Ground Safety Program, reveals that we are spending less than six cents per dollar lost to eliminate the causes of ground accidents. This is inadequate insurance. Our coverage to protect the huge USAF investment in trained personnel, valuable material and equipment must be increased. I suggest that you review your Ground Safety personnel allocations to assure they are adequate for the job and that all allocations are filled with full time qualified personnel. (General Stratemeyer, Monthly Letter to Commanders, February 1949)
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recreational and educational programs, rehabilitation programs, character or spiritual guidance programs and safety campaigns all seek to better and protect the individual both for his own sake and for the sake of a stronger United States Air Force.

A good illustration of the cooperation between staff actions in the physical and spiritual betterment of Continental Air Command personnel is the record of these agencies' participation in the Character Guidance Program. Initiated late in 1948, this Program showed "marked progress" throughout the Continental Air Command during 1949.[180] Commanders of Continental Air Command units noted a sharpened increase among their men in unit activities and religious affairs. Whether or not the general decline in military offenses, unofficial absenteeism and venereal disease can be attributed to a definite cause is problematical.[181] However, if one was to be selected, this Program would appear to be the logical one.

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2. For an excellent account of Ground Safety activities during 1949 see: History of Ground Safety Division, Hq ConAC (Calendar Year 1949), prepared by Major E. J. Evans, Ground Safety Director, Hq ConAC.
3. In an address before the Air Force Ground Safety Conference and Institute at AMC Hq in February 1950, General Edwards, DCS/P outlined the major reasons why a vigorous ground safety program had to be maintained within the USAF.
4. ConAC Bulletin 32-5, Ground Safety, 30 January 1950 contains a statistical presentation of Ground Safety Experience in ConAC during 1949.

180/ PIO Release, Subj: ConAC's Character Guidance Program Deemed Success After Year's Trial.

181/ For information pertinent to discipline matters within ConAC during 1949 and other matters of general interest concerning Provost Marshal activities see the following: Provost Marshal Bulletin 125-19, 30 November 1949.

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The Character Guidance Program is officially defined as: "A command responsibility to promote that quality of leadership which exemplifies by precept and example the worth of disciplined moral character; ... a combination of responsibilities and cooperative efforts of all personnel to promote and encourage the development of morality, spiritual values, and self-discipline."[182] President Truman explained the purpose of the program when he stated: "It is the policy of the government to encourage and promote the religious, moral and recreational welfare and character guidance of persons in the Armed Forces and thereby to enhance the military preparedness and security of the nation."[183] Organized in the same mold as Headquarters USAF's Character Guidance Council in Washington, Continental Air Command Councils (there is one in the parent headquarters and in each of the numbered air force headquarters) carried out the broad objectives of the Character Guidance Program. During the year, the major goals of the Council were: the development of moral leadership; the creation of character building activities; the combating of corruptive influences which create moral delinquency; and the solving of servicemen's problems through private counseling. In addition, the Councils kept close tab on the moral trends of the personnel within their organizations and acted as advisory boards to commanding officers on standards expected in officer and airmen clubs, recreational activities and entertainments.

182/ Air Force Letter 35-31

183/ PIC Release (Vid. sup. doc. #180)

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Comprising the Character Guidance Council at Headquarters Continental Air Command were representatives from the offices of Military Personnel, Air Chaplain, Provost Marshal, Ground Safety, Air Surgeon, Personnel Services and Public Information. The Air Chaplain conducted citizenship and morality lectures, orientation talks, personal interviews with newly assigned personnel, religious retreats, youth forums and Bible Study courses and supported servicemen's membership in a number of religious organizations and activities.[184] The Provost Marshal, in addition to maintaining corrective discipline, sought to minimize servicemen's military and civil violations through unit program training in law observance.[185] In addition, this officer arranged lectures by local law enforcement agency officers. The Air Surgeon conducted periodic lectures on Social Hygiene and afforded professional counsel to personnel on social and personal problems. And the Military Personnel Director stressed character development through education, emphasizing in particular the United States Armed Forces Institute, through which the serviceman could earn credit toward high school and college diplomas.[186]

184/ ConAC Bulletin 165-2, Chaplain, 16 December 1949

185/ One ConAC air force commander had the following to say on the subject of punishment for men who absented themselves from duty illicitly: "We have gone to great lengths to impress upon the public at large, as well as all our own people, our belief that a career in the Air Force is a desirable career. It seems to me that any gesture we make toward restraining an individual who indicates a lack of desire for that career is a gesture in defeat of our position. We should expend all our efforts toward establishing such conditions that our airmen will want to remain on duty and we should take the attitude that any airman who absents himself hurts himself more than he hurts the Air Force. I presume that the primary purpose of apprehending an absentee is to

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185/ punish him and let other airmen know that such absence will bring about punishment. In other words, we are attempting to retain our airmen in the service on the basis of fear of reprisal if they fail to do so. I maintain that an Air Force established on this plan will never be an Air Force consistent with our ideals." (Ltr, General Stearley to General Stratemeyer, 8 March 1949, Vid. sup. doc. #102 (2b), Section I, Organization and Mission of the Command)

186/ PIO Release (Vid. sup. doc. #180)

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

8 March 1949

Major General William D. Old
Commanding General, Ninth Air Force
Langley Air Force Base
Virginia

Dear Don:

Reference your letter of 21 February concerning the shortage in your headquarters of personnel qualified in civilian component affairs, we in this headquarters are aware of the critical problem resulting from lack of experienced personnel in the administration of your new responsibilities. I am indeed sympathetic, as all our Air Forces, perhaps not to the same degree, face essentially the same problem.

As a result of your assumption of the civilian components program, four (4) officers from the Fourteenth Air Force and two (2) officers from the First Air Force, experienced in civilian component affairs, have already been reassigned to your headquarters. The two officers from the Fourteenth Air Force that you mentioned in your letter as being immediately vulnerable for overseas service with project "Vittles," should be retained until June, which will give you an opportunity to train replacements. In addition, there is a Major Richard B. James, AO-381608, in the First Air Force, earmarked for Air ROTC instructor duty, who can be made available for thirty days temporary duty, if you so desire. He has had experience at Air Force level, in civilian component affairs.

Due to a shortage of this type personnel in the First Air Force, Captain Coons cannot be made available at this time. While no doubt you have already done this, I suggest you screen your Reserve Training Centers with a view to assigning potentially qualified officers to your headquarters. In addition, the forthcoming rotation of both Air National Guard and Air ROTC instructors within your area, should likewise be exploited. Well qualified individuals should be secured from this source.

I have directed that our Air Forces be screened in order to select a qualified technical inspector, experienced in Air National Guard and reserve inspection procedures, for assignment to your

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headquarters. You can expect this officer in the near future. A screening has likewise been undertaken to locate qualified administrative and tactical inspectors and if any can be made available, action will be taken to have them assigned to your headquarters at the earliest possible date.

While the above actions are not entirely satisfactory ones, I know you appreciate the difficulties this command is experiencing in maintaining an efficient operation with limited personnel. The personnel levies being made on this command are heavy indeed.

Sincerely,

t/ GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	Officers			Enlisted			Civilian			Total		
	Auth	Asgd	(Over) Short	Auth	Asgd	(Over) Short	Auth	Asgd	(Over) Short	Auth	Asgd	(Over) Short
Dec '48	9812	8244	1568	56457	54804	1683	12620	11567	1053	78889	74615	4274
Jan '49	9427	8457	970	55907	54765	1142	12654	11869	785	77988	75091	2897
Feb	9477	8401	1076	56218	54442	1776	12654	11976	678	78349	74819	3530
Mar	9036	8427	609	53216	53951	(735)	12266	11975	291	74518	74353	165
Apr	8611	8275	326	50240	52587	(2347)	12406	12132	274	71257	72994	(1737)
May	9024	7925	1099	53068	48988	4080	12406	11450	956	74498	68363	6135
Jun	8339	7492	847	48813	48555	258	10660	10556	104	67812	66603	1209
Jul	7759	7503	256	46079	48740	(2661)	11053	10338	715	64891	66581	(1690)
Aug	8953	8338	615	50583	51755	(1172)	10785	10134	651	70322	70227	95
Sep	8524	7408	1116	50688	45296	5392	10785	8962	1823	69997	61666	8331
Oct	8078	7663	415	46240	46148	92	8838	7862	976	63156	61673	1483
Nov	8023	7663	360	46054	46404	(350)	8877	7762	1115	62954	61829	1125
Dec	8080	7837	243	46095	46462	(367)	8680	7728	952	62855	62027	828

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
(Monthly Strength Report)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

1 April 1949

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Personnel Commitments.

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

1. The world-wide officer strength of the U. S. Air Force has reached the total officers authorized under our present program. As a result of this, the recall of additional officers to extended active duty has necessarily been severely restricted.

2. The existence of position vacancies in the various commands does not modify the general picture. These vacancies exist for the following reasons:

a. A portion of officer strength is always non-effective due to hospitalization, leave enroute between assignments, enroute to and from overseas or in process of training. Shortages of this type are normal and may be expected to continue to exist whenever assigned and authorized strength are closely in balance.

b. Downward adjustment of strength in certain commands in accordance with troop program reductions is still in process. Until this action is accomplished certain other commads will continue to show shortages and position vacancies in addition to those due to the non-effectives.

c. Cross training of officers and reassignment from military occupational specialties where overages exist into those where we are short is necessarily a time-consuming process. During this process, vacancies in many specialties will continue to exist despite our having full officer authorizations on hand.

3. It is essential that all officers under your control bear in mind the over-all officer strength situation when engaging in conversation or correspondence with inactive officers seeking recall (or their representatives) or with active officers seeking transfers.

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Ltr to CG, ConAC, Subject: "Unauthorized Personnel Commitments."

4. Certain individuals seeking transfer or recall are prone to "shop around" in the various commands and Staff Agencies for the purpose of locating an apparent vacancy and obtaining a sponsor. The present restriction on recalls may be expected to increase this practice and to add to the number of individual appeals for exceptional treatment. Any downward trend in economic conditions can be expected to provide a further acceleration in these tendencies.

5. Too often in the past these requests for special handling have resulted in unauthorized commitments being made to individuals by responsible officers in the major commands or at individual stations. In the current situation such commitments will invariably result in embarrassment to the U. S. Air Force since over-all strength and skill requirements will not permit their being honored.

6. It should be understood that this Headquarters and specifically the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel is the only agency in a position to accurately appraise these situations in their relationship with the over-all Air Force position. Further, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, in this Headquarters, is the only agency authorized to commit the Air Force with respect to recalls or intra-command reassignments.

7. Now, more than ever, this Headquarters must fully evaluate each personnel action with respect to over-all Air Force requirements.

8. It is requested that you issue appropriate instructions to all officers under your jurisdiction in order to be certain that, with regard to recalls, no such officer:

a. Makes any statement or dispatches correspondence which could possibly be interpreted as a personnel commitment to an individual, or

b. Engages in any transaction which could result in embarrassing or compromising U. S. Air Force personnel policies and decisions.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

st/ B. L. BOATNER
Major General, USAF
Asst Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

25 March 1949

SUBJECT: Effects of Accelerated Training Program

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, New York

1. It has been decided that the Technical Training Division of the Air Training Command will be expanded immediately to accomodate a training load appropriate to the current skill shortage of the Air Force.

2. In order to implement this decision it will be necessary to: first, increase the permanent party strength of the Technical Training Division and; second, increase the student population of the Technical Training Division.

3. Personnel actions necessary to carry out this program include:

a. Assignments of the majority of the overseas returnees flow during April, May and June to the Technical Training Division, either as permanent party build-up or as students population in the advanced courses. After June, about half of this flow will be available for general reassignment within the Zone of Interior.

b. Retention within the Air Training Command of the entire Indoctrination Division output who are found suited for formal technical training. This will reduce the flow of new enlistees into other commands to a total of approximately 1500 per month, part of this flow resulting from re-enlistment of prior service personnel who have been out of the service more than ninety (90) days.

c. Reducing the effective manpower of the Zone of Interior commands and overseas commands by increments in order to make the additional manpower available to the Technical Training Division. The Strategic Air Command and the Berlin Airlift are excluded from this reduction.

4. The above personnel actions will begin to take effect immediately and with the exceptions of Strategic Air Command and the Berlin

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SUBJECT: Effects of Accelerated Training Program

Airlift will produce the following results:

a. A gradual reduction in strength of all commands until an accumulative 13 per cent reduction of current assigned strength (as of 1 March 1949) is reached in December 1949.

b. Command strengths will be maintained at this reduced level from December 1949 to April 1950.

c. In April 1950 the increased student output from the Technical Training Division will begin to take effect and all commands will be gradually filled up to authorized strength. By October 1950 it is anticipated that all units will be fully manned. During this same period the student population of the Technical Training Division will diminish from about thirty-seven thousand (37,000) to approximately twenty-five thousand (25,000) and the permanent party strength will reduce proportionately.

5. It is realized that this accelerated training program will aggravate the acute personnel conditions now existing in all commands, until the benefits of the program materialize. However, once this difficult period is over, the Air Force will have more and better trained personnel than at any time since the war. It is believed that this end objective justifies the means.

6. To secure the people for the increased permanent party, activation of certain units will be delayed. (See Tab A).

7. Your command will be called upon for increased quotas of officers and airmen for the technical schools. It is important that you send qualified people in the numbers allotted to make this plan successful. Unqualified entries or unfilled quotas will merely cause a waste of training facilities and a proportionate reduction in student output.

8. The plan will be presented in its entirety at the commanders' meeting to be held in this headquarters on 12 April 1949.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/t/ F. F. EVEREST
Major General, USAF
Asst. Deputy Chief of
Staff, Operations

1 Incl
Tab "A"

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Effects of Accelerated Training Program
PT-F 353 (25 Mar 49) 1st Ind 14 Apr 49

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

1. This headquarters is cognizant of the difficulties experienced by all commanders at the present time, due to the continuing demands made upon them for personnel to maintain USAF commitments. However, the need for the accelerated training program outlined in basic communication should be apparent. The personnel skills available to the Air Force are not at all compatible with the mission of the Air Force at this time.

2. This plan contemplates the assignment of comparatively few military personnel to the Continental Air Command while, at the same time, a steady flow of personnel will leave the command. Therefore, until the results of this program become effective, the personnel difficulties encountered will be considerably increased.

3. As indicated in paragraph 7 of basic communication, qualified individuals must be made available for technical schools, or the objective of this plan will not be achieved. It is evident therefore, that under existing circumstances, all commanders must examine their organizational and functional structure, and eliminate unnecessary steps and duplicating effort so as to secure the maximum efficiency with minimum personnel. Proper and effective utilization of manpower is mandatory.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

1 Incl
n/c

/s/t/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

27 July 1949

SUBJECT: Reassignment of Officers on PCS Status

TO : Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Officers of this command are continually being placed on fifteen (15) weeks TDY to attend Atomic Energy Training Course No. 73144, Basic Course at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, and subsequent to graduation from this course are reassigned PCS to Sandia Base, New Mexico.

2. While on a TDY status these officers are of no benefit to this command and it is impossible to obtain a replacement until such time as PCS orders are published.

3. All officers selected for this training are eventually assigned to the Atomic Energy Program and are lost to this command.

4. In view of the above, request consideration be given to the reassignment on PCS status of officers to the gaining organization concurrently with orders to proceed to the Atomic Energy Training Course.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Mil Pers-S 210.3 1st Ind

Dept. of The Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 1 August 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, N.Y.

1. It is contrary to the policy of this Headquarters to reassign personnel on PCS status for schools of less than five months duration. Budget estimates submitted to Congress were based on this assumption.

2. Eliminees from Course No. 73144 are returned to home stations. Most of the graduates from this training are returned to stations of assignment to await granting of necessary clearances before proceeding to Sandia Base for classified training.

3. The other Zone of Interior commands share in this responsibility of furnishing personnel on a TDY basis for the Atomic Energy Training Course.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF: s/t/ A. W. TINGS
Major, USAF
Office, Director of Mil Pers

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

25 April 1949

SUBJECT: Reassignment of Navigators and Radar Observer (Bombardment) to Air Crew Positions in Strategic Air Command

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. The immediate need of Strategic Air Command striking force units for navigators and radar observers, bombardment, remains acute and must be met in part by reassignment of such officers from other continental commands. The needs of the United States Air Force will not permit continuance of the present situation with Strategic Air Command units being tactically handicapped by lack of this type of air crew personnel while the other continental commands have observers on flying status occupying non-rated positions or observer positions of lower priority. This Headquarters is fully aware of the circumstances producing this situation and its existence does not imply criticism of the personnel policies of any of the major commands nor of the officers assigned outside of thier air crew specialties. In addition, it is known that many of these observers are performing non-observer duties that are of considerable importance to thier commands. Nevertheless, basic concepts of Air Force personnel policy, with respect to rated personnel, require that all other considerations be relegated to a secondary position, when such personnel are urgently needed for rated tactical duty.

2. Under the present Troop Program, Strategic Air Command units require 2412 observers for duty in crew positions. Current manning of these positions is about 50%. Training output from Mather Air Force Base and the new course at Ellington Air Force Base can not fill the shortage in less than eighteen (18) months. Resources of overseas commands in navigators are already being fully applied to the Strategic Air Command shortage by the policy of assigning all returnee navigators and bombardiers to Mather Air Force Base for observer training and subsequent assignment to Strategic Air Command. Strength ceilings will not permit accelerated recalls to active duty.

3. Request you select seventy-five (75) navigators or radar observers, bombardment, (SSNs 1037, 0142, 1034, 1036 acceptable. SSN 1035 not acceptable) for reassignment from your command to the Strategic Air Command stations indicated below with reporting dates not later than 15 June 1949. Administrative action is to be completed not later

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than 20 May 1949 and copies of orders will be furnished this Headquarters, Attention: AFPMP-1.

20 - 7th Bomb Wing, Carswell AFB, Texas
4 - 97th Bomb Wing, Biggs AFB, Texas
47 - 11th Bomb Group, Carswell AFB, Texas
4 - Air Refueling Squadron, Chatham AFB, Georgia

4. As an aid in selecting subject officers, a roster of navigators and radar observers, bombardment, assigned to your command, as reflected in Statistical Control Reports as of 28 February 1949, is attached as Inclousre # 1. This listing is in no sense intended to be restrictive or to limit the personnel who may be reassigned.

5. It is suggested that subsequent to effecting the reassignments specified in paragraph 4, your command should take steps to train replacements for the remaining observers who are performing non-rated duties with a view toward eventually freeing such officers for observer duty.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl:
Roster of Navs and
Radar Obs-Bomb.

/s/t/ I. H. EDWARDS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel

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FM Hq USAF Wash D C

TO CG ConAC

From AFPMP-1 8269 ReTelecon 18 Feb 1949, Colonel Sutterlin this headquarters, with Colonel Dash your headquarters, and letter this headquarters, dated 14 February 1949, subject: Utilization of Pilots with B-29 Experience. Reiterate high priority SAC mission and necessity reassigning all possible B-29 pilots that command. Request expeditious action and maximum possible compliance with quota set forth reference letter. "Vittles" quota must also be filled, but pilots with B-29 experience should not be assigned thereto, unless impossible repeat impossible to otherwise meet "Vittles" requirements.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPMP-1-L

April 1949

SUBJECT: Recall of Navigators and Radar Observers Bombardment for Strategic Air Command

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

1. Reference is made to letter, this Headquarters, dated 14 March 1949, Subject: "Interim Procedure, Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty".

2. Requirements of Strategic Air Command for observers are in excess of the number that can be procured by 31 December 1949 by reassignments from other commands and utilization of training output.

3. Therefore, you are requested to initiate the recall of 130 navigators (1034 or 1036) or radar observers, bombardment (0142) to report for duty in equal increments during the months of July and August 1949. Assignment to Strategic Air Command stations will be as indicated in Inclosure 1. Recall orders should incorporate citation to the SAC requisitions specified in the Inclosure.

4. Officers recalled must meet the general criteria established in Inclosure 2 to letter from this Headquarters cited in paragraph 1, above. No field grade officers will be recalled for this particular requirement and captains will be limited to 25% of the total. Preference should be given, where possible, to officers with at least two (3) years college education and those with at least twelve (12) months overseas service although neither of these factors is established as an absolute requirement.

5. For your information, there is a strong probability that the recall of observers for SAC will continue past August. Definite advice concerning this will be forwarded to you on or about 1 July 1949.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ ANNE W. TINGES
Major, USAF
Office, Director of Military Pers

1 Incl:
Asgmt Instrs for Obs recalled for asgmt to SAC.

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CG Continental Air Command

Unclassified

All ConAC Air Forces

11148. In order to bring the Strategic Air Command up to authorized strength by 30 June 1949, in accordance with operation manning authorities in effect at the present time, it is necessary to make immediate withdrawals from Air Forces of this command for transfer on PCS to units of the Strategic Air Command. The following quotas indicating white male USAF and white and negro AAFAF personnel are allocated to your command. It is requested that immediate screening of your command be started and personnel frozen pending receipt of station assignments from the Strategic Air Command which will be forwarded to you immediately upon receipt. Personnel may be transferred in primary SSN, secondary SSN or allied SSN's:

A. USAF Enlisted White Male Personnel

Briefed from above TWX

SSN	Total
004 (Photogrammetrist)	18
033 (Train Crewman)	4
039 (Cable Splicer Telephone)	3
060 (Cook)	183
063 (Crane Operator)	8
072 (Physical Therapy Technician)	6
076 (Draftsman Topographic)	3
110 (Locomotive Engineer)	1
117 (Heating Specialist)	4
120 (Meat or Dairy Inspector)	12
136 (Model Maker)	7
144 (Painter)	40
166 (Powerman)	40
167 (Lithographic Pressman)	1
188 (Construction Worker)	22
196 (Sanitary Technician)	7

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A. USAF Enlisted White Male Personnel

SSN	Total
212 (Statistical Clerk)	7
227 (Surveyor)	3
230 (Surveyor Topographic)	2
237 (Teletype Operator)	14
242 (Toolroom Keeper)	13
243 (Geodetric Computer)	1
264 (Radiology Technician)	13
268 (Accountant)	10
275 (Classification Specialist)	67
279 (Legal Clerk)	10
282 (Office Machine Serviceman)	6
345 (Automotive Equipment Operator)	8
348 (Parts Clerk Automotive)	23
381 (Watchmaker)	2
409 (Medical Technician)	40
432 (Bandsman Clarinet)	19
438 (Bandsman French Horn)	10
439 (Bandsman Saxophone)	7
441 (Bandsman Tuba)	3
485 (Petroleum Storage Technician)	10
528 (Airplane Hydraulic Mechanic)	16
548 (Fabric Dope Mechanic)	11
555 (Airplane Sheet Metal Worker)	95
574 (Bombsight Automatic Pilot Repairman)	2
580 (Remote Control Turret Mechanic)	2
581 (Communications Technician)	22

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A. USAF Enlisted White Male Personnel

SSN	Total
583 (Engineer Supply Technician)	5
609 (Leather Canvas Worker)	6
612 (Airplane Armorer Gunner)	20
631 (Intelligence Specialist)	11
646 (Telephone Telegraph Equipment Technician)	1
647 (Radio Repairman Aircraft Equipment)	12
648 (Radio Repairman)	76
650 (Telephone Switchboard Operator)	13
657 (Medical Corpsman)	20
673 (Medical Administrative Specialist)	29
683 (Bombsight Mechanic)	17
685 (Airplane Electrical Mechanic)	40
(686 (Airplane Instrument Mechanic)	61
687 (Airplane Propeller Mechanic)	27
737 (Flight Engineer)	17
750V (Airplane Maintenance Technician)	6
756 (Radio Operator AAF)	1
786 (Toxic Gas Handler)	15
792 (Radio Repairman Single Channel Teletype)	3
805 (Cryptographic Technician)	6
809 (Decontaminating Equipment Operator)	3
815 (Ordnance Supply Technician)	7
825 (Medical Supply Technician)	8
848 (Parts Clerk Armament)	5
852 (Radar Mechanic RCM)	3
853 (Radar Mechanic Navigation)	8

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A. USAF Enlisted White Male Personnel

SSN	Total
855 (Dental Assistant)	5
858 (Medical Laboratory Technician)	9
862 (Radar Mechanic IFF)	6
867 (Radar Mechanic Bombardment)	52
870 (Chemical Technician)	10
901 (Munitions Worker)	10
903 (Armament Repairman)	8
911 (Armament Mechanic)	143
941 (Camera Technician)	25
945 (Photographic Laboratory Technician)	43
955 (Radar Repairman Airborne Equipment)	20
957 (Airplane Electrical Instrument Mechanic)	6
958 (Airplane Engine Electrical Accessories Repairman)	10
960 (Remote Control Turret Mechanic)	10
969E (Synthetic Trainer Mechanic)	1
995 (Rotary Wing Mechanic Helicopter)	2
1383 (Fire Fighter Crash Rescueman)	3
1685 (Airplane Elec Mech-Gunner)	1
2274 (Information Education Specialist)	3
2756 (Radio Operator Mechanic)	99
9014 (AF Motor Transportation Technician)	2
	Total 1664

B. ARNAF Enlisted White Male Personnel — Total 122

C. ARNAF Enlisted Negro Male Personnel — Total 52

Medical SSN's required on this requisition may be filled from Department of Army or USAF personnel. A minimum of 10% of the personnel selected for transfer from your command will be in the first three grades.

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It is desired that maximum utilization be made of enlisted personnel in the grade of M/Sgt in filling this requisition. All personnel transferred will have at least six months remaining service in current enlistment. Personnel will be transferred in sufficient time so as to be at new station on or before 15 June 1949. Delay enroute is authorized provided it does not interfere with reporting date of 15 June 1949. The provisions of paragraph 2d, and 3, AF Reg 35-59, 22 Apr 47, as amended, are waived to effect the transfer of this personnel. However, the maximum possible notice will be given all enlisted personnel prior to commencement of travel. Personnel presently assigned to the following listed units will not repeat not be utilized in filling this shipment:

Assigned to Fourth Air Force
817th Engineer Aviation Battalion (H of R)

Assigned to Ninth Air Force
9th AF Hqs

Assigned to Tenth Air Force
56th Fighter Wing

161st Tac Recon Sq Photo-Jet
Assigned to Fourteenth Air Force
502d Tact Cont Group
2nd Armament Sq Chemical
934th Sig Bat (Sep)
30th Motor Transp Sq (Avn) (Negro)
12th Photo Tech Unit
256th Med Disp Unit (Avn) (D of A)
1st Vet Det (Avn) (D of A)

This hq is cognizant of the fact that the withdrawal of the above personnel will in some cases seriously effect the operating efficiency of your command, and in some cases withdraw personnel below the authorized level. However, this is a mandatory shipment and the immediate manning of the Strategic Air Command is of primary concern. It is requested that an all out effort be made by your Hq to fulfill the quota allotted your command. In the event of any short shipment request this Hq be immediately advised by priority message the number and SSN which your Hq is unable to furnish. Request this Hq be advised the number of enlisted personnel transferred by grade, primary SSN and shipping SSN as soon as practicable, and in no case later than 15 June 1949.

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

9AF 210.3

21 June 1949

SUBJECT: Selection of Officers for Assignment to Operation "Vittles"

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. This command recently received an Operation "Vittles" quota of eleven officers for July and eleven for August 1949. When compared to the total number of qualified, eligible officers of this command, these quotas are considered rather heavy. Therefore, it is desired to submit the following comments and recommendation for your consideration.

2. The qualifications established for this project are such that neither the number of rated officers assigned a given unit, nor the number of rated officers with low Foreign Service Credits, reflect to any close degree the number of officers who are actually qualified and eligible for assignment to the project. Factors such as qualification as a jet pilot, application for under-graduate or graduate training, application for assignment as AROTC and ANG instructors, compassionate cases, current valid instrument cards, and recent graduates of flying training schools all serve to dissociate the relationship of assigned rated personnel to qualified and eligible personnel for any given month.

3. As a result of difficulty experienced in correctly allocating quotas so as to insure the assignment of qualified officers in exact relationship to their overseas service, this command now receives a monthly roster from each major unit listing eligible officers in order of priority up to and including a given number of Foreign Service Credits. The number of such credits is based on the anticipated quota for the forthcoming month. Present indications are that qualified and eligible officers with nineteen Foreign Service Credits will be included in the August shipment. It is the opinion of this headquarters that only by the use of such a roster can quotas be allocated so as to maintain exact balance between the unit quotas and the number of qualified officers in order of Foreign Service Credits. The inclosed roster which includes all Ninth Air Force officers qualified for this project is a typical example of the intangible factors which enter into the selection of personnel to fill each quota. Without obtaining such

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9AF 210.3
Subject: Selection of Officers for Assignment to Operation "Vittles"

a current roster, this headquarters would have no dependable information on which to allocate quotas.

4. In view of the several factors affecting qualifications for this particular quota, some of which vary from month to month, and the desirability of assigning all qualified officers to this project in the exact order of their overseas service, it is recommended that each air force be required to submit to your headquarters a monthly roster listing the total number of officers qualified for duty with Operation "Vittles", with Foreign Service Credits indicated up to and including a prescribed number of such credits. The number of Foreign Service Credits should be determined in relation to the total ConAC quota for the given month.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
Roster of Offs qualified
for Operation "Vittles"

st/ ERLATH W. ZUSHL
Lt. Col., USAF
Adjutant General

Mil Pers-D 210.3 (21 Jun 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 1 Jul 1949

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

This headquarters has been cognizant of the situation which is outlined in basic communication. Attention is invited to message, this headquarters, AFCONAC MIL PERS-D 15674, 27 June 1949, which requires a report of the number of officers qualified and available for assignment to Operation Vittles as of 1 July 1949. Periodic reports of this nature will be required in order that requisitions for personnel for Operation Vittles can be fairly apportioned within this command.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl
n/c

st/ J. B. O'ROURKE
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPMP-1-T

20 January 1949

SUBJECT: Operation Vittles

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel AFB, Mitchel Field, N. Y.

1. Issue orders assigning the following number of officers to the 1701st Replacement Squadron, Great Falls AFB, Great Falls, Montana, on dates as indicated. Quotas levied on your command have been based on the total number of pilots assigned and eligible for overseas service. Replacements insofar as possible will be furnished your command from recent graduates of pilot schools and officers returning from overseas commands:

Reporting date at Great Falls AFB	Number
2 March 1949	58
30 March 1949	58
27 April 1949	58
15 May 1949	58
15 June 1949	7
22 June 1949	58

2. Qualifications for the selection of officers are as follows:

a. Officers selected will have a minimum of 200 hours in any four engine or two engine aircraft.

b. At least 50% of officers selected will have a minimum of 1500 hours total pilot time. The remainder must have a minimum of 900 hours total pilot time. No jet pilots will be assigned.

c. Have a minimum of 50 hours instrument time (hood or actual instrument).

d. Hold a current valid instrument card.

3. Officers selected will be assigned to the 1701st Replacement Squadron, Great Falls AFB, Great Falls, Montana, for a three week C-54 Transition Course and then reassigned overseas to USAFE. Each individual will be advised prior to departure from home station that dependents or automobiles will not accompany to Great Falls AFB.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

t/ CHARLES D. SONNKALB
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PP-E210.3 11 May 1949

SUBJECT: Officer Losses

TO : Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

* * * * *

2. The situation outlined in cited message is prevalent throughout Continental Air Command and early relief is not expected since its causes are numerous and beyond the control of this command. An equitable distribution of rank and SSN's throughout Continental Air Command Air Forces is being made to the greatest extent possible, consistent with USAF policy on stabilization of personnel. The allocation of personnel and project and school quotas in proportion to assigned strength must be carried out to extent possible by each echelon of command, as a means to partially alleviate the present situation and to avoid overburdening any one unit.

* * * * *

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/s/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col. AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS TENTH AIR FORCE
Benjamin Harrison AFB, Indiana

22 September 1949

Major General Charles T. Myers
Vice Commander
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Dear Charlie:

Next month our quartermaster, Colonel Pease, retires for age. We have had a requisition in your headquarters for some time for a quartermaster, and we were informed that Colonel Cloud would be sent up here. He objected stremuously and put out so many alibis that I am glad we did not get him.

We have had a requisition in for some time for a man with quartermaster training, and I would appreciate any action that you would take to get us an officer with this training for our DM Section. He is needed to handle commissary, quartermaster and subsistence stuff, which requires that type of background.

Sometime ago your Commanding General stated, if we needed personnel, to ask for them and see that the word got to the Command Office. I have noticed that requisitions are filled when and if available, but I think it is time some screening was done to see if somebody with the qualifications that we need cannot be made available.

This war is hell!

Sincerely your,

s/t/ HARRY A. JOHNSON
Brigadier General, USAF
Vice Commander

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To V.C.
Have reply
Prepared.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

21 February 1949

Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer
Headquarters Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Dear General Stratemeyer:

The purpose of this letter is to acquaint you with a pressing and critical personnel problem resulting from our newly acquired responsibilities in connection with the administration of civilian component activities in this area.

Because of the nature of previously prescribed missions, this Air Force is almost destitute in personnel with any experience in civilian component matters. Our limited resources have been carefully screened for the few specialists urgently needed. We do not have them and have not been able to get them in the usual manner. The majority of personnel to be assigned to civilian component duties will be trained locally, but the imminence of deadlines to be met makes procurement of the following essential:

a. 1 - Administrative Inspector (2121))
b. 1 - Tactical Inspector (2166)) for Inspector General
c. 1 - Technical Inspector (7536))

d. 1 - Officer familiar with the USAF Reserve Program (for Deputy for Civilian Components)
e. 1 - Officer familiar with Reserve Records Administration (for Deputy for Personnel)

Reference requirements a, b, and c, this Headquarters will be severely handicapped in the inspection phase without the immediate assignment of an Administrative Inspector (2121), Tactical Inspector (2166), and a Technical Inspector (7536), experienced in Air National Guard and Reserve inspection procedures. In its inspection activities, this Headquarters is faced with a peak load between now and the end of this fiscal year. With the beginning of the new fiscal year we will have reached the "leveling off" point, and all personnel in the Inspection Section will have gained sufficient experience in Air National Guard and Reserve inspection. The remaining inspections to be accomplished in the area recently reassigned this Headquarters, during the remaining months of this fiscal year, will require the energetic performance of duty by a sufficient number of properly experienced

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personnel which are not available in this Headquarters at this time. The personnel to fill vacancies in the Air Inspection Section, other than those three mentioned, will be requested through regular channels.

Inspections required of this Headquarters prior to the end of this fiscal year include inspection of nineteen (19) ROTC units which must be inspected prior to the closing of schools about 31 May; annual Air Inspections of Langley Air Force Base and 4th Fighter Wing; and inspections of Air National Guard and Reserve Units in the District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, and Ohio. In addition to the inspections mentioned, beginning 1 June, Operation Readiness Tests of all Air National Guard units in this area must be accomplished during the period of the unit summer camp.

Reference requirement d, there is no officer in Headquarters Ninth Air Force presently acquainted with the details of the USAF Reserve Program. An officer qualified in USAF Reserve matters is urgently needed in the Office of the Director for Civilian Components. Other personnel can be trained on the job. Captain R. L. Coons, AO 56038, now in First Air Force Director of Reserve Office, is well qualified and is particularly well briefed on Reserve matters in the new Ninth Air Force Area.

Reference e, Reserve Records Section under the Deputy for Personnel is authorized five officers. We have received one Major from the First Air Force. The Fourteenth Air Force transferred to this Headquarters three officers qualified in this specialty. Two of these, however, are immediately vulnerable to overseas service with Vittles. Our net gain, therefore, is two officers to handle more than 100,000 records in a new and important activity.

Your difficulties in meeting quantitative personnel requirements are understood, and we shall insure maximum utilization of personnel within the limits of any manpower ceiling prescribed. Nevertheless, in order to discharge our new responsibilities in connection with civilian component affairs, it is essential that the five officers, as indicated above, be procured for this Headquarters. In this connection, it is suggested that those former Eleventh Air Force officers now assigned to the First Air Force, who are already familiar with the problems and details of our new area, be considered for assignment to this Headquarters.

Sincerely,

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WILLIAM D. OLD
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Fort Slocum, New York

PCL 210.01 14 April 1949

SUBJECT: Report of Officers Possessing Critical MOS's

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. In compliance with Par 4c, AFR 35-34, dated 16 March 1949, the following officers of this headquarters possess critical MOS's as indicated, for which no vanancies exist in this command.

a. Lt Colonel Tarleton H. Watkins, AO 32 623 - MOS 7050 - presently assigned as ANG Instructor with Rhode Island Air National Guard.

b. Major John S. Szymkowicz, AO 434 359 - MOS 7050 - presently assigned as Ass't PMS&T for Air at Boston University.

c. Major John Reid, AO 42 260 - MOS 7050 - presently assigned as Ass't PMS&T adr Air at University of Connecticut.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ R. G. SHERIDAN
Capt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Report of Officers Possessing Critical MOS's
PP-E210.3 (14 Apr 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 5 May 1949

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton H. Watkins, AO-32623, USAF, was reported for reassignment to your headquarters by letter, this headquarters, file PP-E210.65, subject: "Reassignment of ANG Instructors", 14 April 1949; however, inasmuch as no vacancies exist within this command in SSN 7050, officer is surplus to the needs of Continental Air Command. It is requested that officer not be assigned to Headquarters First Air Force as requested by cited letter.

2. Major John S. Szmkowicz, AO-43459 and Major John Reid, AO-42260 are not scheduled for relief from ANG and AROTC duty respectively during the current year.

3. Due to the difficulty encountered in meeting quotas for ANG and AROTC instructors, a definite need exists to exempt such personnel from the provisions of AF Regulation 35-34 both for the purpose of continuing personnel presently engaged in the ANG and AROTC program in their present capacities, and to permit detailing of future volunteers possessing acute and critical MOS's to the program. Amendment of AF Regulation 35-34 is strongly recommended to preclude disapproval by other commands of applications for ANG and AROTC duty on the basis of the provisions of that directive.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ RICHARD W. GEUSS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

2d Ind

Dept of Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 13 June 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Necessary action has been taken to effect the reassignment of Lt Colonel Tarleton H. Watkins, A)-32623.

2. Reassignment of Major John S. Szymkowicz, AO-43459, and Major John Reid, AO-42260, to duties in MOS 7050 will be deferred until June 1950, since other sources are believed to be adequate to satisfy urgent current requirements.

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Report of Officers Possessing Critical MOS's

2d Ind (Cont'd)

3. The difficulty encountered in meeting quotas for ANG and AROTC instructors is not considered sufficiently acute to justify assignment of critically needed specialists to this duty. It is believed that instructor requirements can be met by detailing non-critical specialists to this duty rather than exempt volunteers from the provisions of AF Regulation 35-34.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ WILLIAM. L. TUDOR
Major, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
MITCHEL AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK

IN REPLY
REFER TO: PP-R 320.4

7 MAY 1949

320.4 Manning

SUBJECT: AROTC Personnel

TO : Director of Training and Requirements, DCS/O, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The present personnel space authorization for AROTC military personnel includes 444 officer instructors and 416 airmen for the school year 1948-1949 for 110 units. The separation of the Air ROTC units from the Army ROTC units, as well as curriculum additions and improvements, renders it essential that the Air units receive an increased authorization to enable them to carry out an effective program. Your particular attention is invited to the fact that the University of Maryland has advised the Department of the Army that it desires to drop its Army ROTC program and give its entire support to the Air Force ROTC unit. Consequently, the AROTC requirement at this institution alone is increased from six to nineteen officers with a proportionate increase of enlisted personnel to a total of sixteen.

2. Twenty-nine or thirty additional institutions are entering the AROTC program in September 1949. Each of the new units requires a minimum authorization of four officers and four airmen, resulting in a total increased requirement of 120 officers and 120 airmen.

3. In substance the present space requirement for military personnel for the AROTC program 1949-1950 school year is for 744 officers and 757 airmen. This requirement is broken down (with the exception of the thirty new units) in the attached tables by Air Force, Unit, and SSN for officers and airmen. The requirement is based on a careful study of the curriculum to be offered at each institution and the anticipated student load. It is not possible at this time to identify by name the thirty new units to be activated this year. The estimated minimum space requirement for officer instructors by SSN and grade for the new units is as follows:

New Units	No. of Officers	SSN	Grade
30	6	0200	Major or Captain
	2	0600	" " "
	66	2120	Col. or Lt. Col. (30) Major or Captain (36)
	30	4000	Major or Captain

REV. THE CIVIL
DIVISION
HQ USAF

OTR

No Further action necessary Kittredge (P)

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Ltr, Hqs ConAC, SUBJECT: AROTC Personnel

7 MAY 1949

(Cont'd) New Units	No. of Officers	SSN	Grade
	3	4822	Major or Captain
	9	4823	" " "
	2	6305	" " "
	2	7025	" " "
Total Number	120 Officers		

4. It is regretted that it has been impossible to draft and forward a firm AROTC space requirement prior to this date. Administration of the AROTC program is a major responsibility of this command. The success of the program is dependent primarily upon the provision of an adequate number of qualified officer and enlisted personnel. Failure to establish an adequate space authorization will cripple the program without question. Consequently, an urgent request is made that the personnel space authorization for the AROTC program be increased immediately to 744 officers and 757 airmen. It is important that this command be notified of the status of this request with the least delay.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

R B Travis

R B TRAVIS
Colonel, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl
List of Requirements

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Basic Ltr fm Hq, ConAC, Mitchel AFB, NY, dated 7 May 49, subj: AROTC Personnel

AFOOR 1st Ind MAY 24 1949

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

1. Budgetary and program planning for FY 1950 contemplated the assignment of an average of 4 officers and 4 enlisted men for each Air ROTC unit. With 139 units planned for FY 1950 the total strength allowed for this function amounted to 556 officers and 556 enlisted men. Current restrictions on manpower resources, especially officers, makes it impossible to authorize additional troop spaces.

2. It is suggested that if it is impossible to operate 139 ROTC units on the above personnel authorization that you submit your maximum capability within the authorization and recommendations as to future action.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Allen R. Springer

1 Incl
n/c

ALLEN R. SPRINGER
Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief, Organization Division
Directorate of Training and Requirements

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PP-E210.3

15 April 1949

SUBJECT: Manning of Tactical Air Command

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The manning of the Tactical Air Command and its Tactical Air Forces is a matter of grave concern to this headquarters since the caliber of officer required for assignment to these activities is such that those officers available to this command who are qualified are occupying key positions precluding reassignment to other duties. A few of these officers are earmarked for assignment to Tactical Air Command activities despite the fact that their positions are such as to justify retention in their present capacities. However, the remaining key positions must of necessity be filled from sources outside this command.

* * * * * *

4. The mission of the Tactical Air Command and its component parts permits no compromise in the selection of outstanding officers to occupy not only the top positions but all positions and, therefore, too much stress cannot be placed on the necessity for making the officers requested available for this purpose.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIRFORCE
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

31 January 1949

9AF 322

SUBJECT: Operational Effectiveness of the 502d Tactical Control Group

THRU: Commanding General
Tactical Air Command
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. A study of the personnel situation in the 502d Tactical Control Group has revealed a startling shortage, resulting in a definite lowering of operational efficiency. This loss of personnel has occurred in the last half of 1948, and the reported strength figures do not reflect the true picture.

2. Comparisons of authorized and assigned figures with additional facts follow:

a.	Total authorized strength:	1076 (Officers & Airmen)
b.	Total assigned strength:	835 or 22% short
c.	Total personnel present:	557 or 52% of the authorized strength
d.	Total on TDY:	278 or 30% of the assigned strength

3. Communication and radar specialties which are vital to operations, are about 49% of the authorized strength in those specialties and since many of these personnel are semi-skilled and in training, the true skilled strength of these specialties is well below the above percentage. This brings the operational effectiveness of the unit down to approximately 40%.

4. It is recommended that the above information be considered when commiting the 502d Tactical Control Group.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

t/ H.M. BOWMAN
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

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Hq 9th AF, Greenville AF Base, Greenville, SC
9AF 322
Subj: "Operational Effectiveness of the 502d TCG" 31 January 1949

DC 320.3 (31 Jan 49) T/O 1st Ind

Hq, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Langley Fld, Va., 28 Feb 49,

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AF Base, Mitchel F ield, N. Y.

1. The operational effectiveness of the 502d Tactical Control Group is not only of grave concern to this Command but it must be of grave concern to the Department of the Air Force as well. It has long been realized that the inadequate supply of trained replacements being received from the Air Training Command together with the low reenlistment rate of radar specialists would result in the situation outlined in the basic correspondence.

2. This organization is committed to the plan "Blackstrap" and its low operational effectiveness would definitely compromise the successful implementation of this plan.

3. In view of the long standing critical shortage of trained specialists in this field, it is quite apparent that the minimum training requirements and proficiency standards that USAF has set forth in AF Training Standard No. 10-3, 7 October 1947 for Aircraft Control and Warning Units cannot be achieved until this highly critical shortage has been alleviated.

4. Reference to paragraph 3, of letter Headquarters Continental Air Command, 19 January 1949, subject, "Aircraft Control and Warning Training Activities in the Continental Air Command," the following sentence is quoted. "Personnel-wise, the magnitude of this task can be measured by the fact that the present Aircraft Control and Warning population of some 4500 personnel (a large percentage of whom are basic Airmen) must be expanded to a total population of approximately 12,000 in the next 18 months. Not only must this expansion succeed in the face of a high attrition rate among higher skills, but we must expect to furnish, in growing numbers, the bulk of overseas requirements."

5. Reference is made to a statement by Major General Gordon Saville, Commanding General of the Air Defense Command, and repeated over the national radio chains on 10 February 1949, to the effedt that the Nation's air warning defense system is so inadequate that "words would be impossible to describe how poor it is ..... dangerously inadequate ..... it is almost a blank." General Saville's statement is equally applicable to the tactical air control system.

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Operational Effectiveness of the 502d
Tactical Control Group
OT 320.3 (31 Jan 49) 2nd Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 24 Mar 49

THRU: Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

TO : Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida.

1. The serious shortage of radar specialist set forth in basic and 1st Indorsement was anticipated by this headquarters more than a year ago and, during the subsequent period, the problem has been presented to Headquarters, United States Air Force by formal correspondence and has been the subject of numerous conferences with representatives of that headquarters and Headquarters, Air Training Command.

2. Since the maximum estimated capability of the Training Command will provide not more than 50% of the required trained specialists, the responsibility has been placed upon this command to establish a Training Center to fulfill the remaining requirement. This action was and is considered an undesirable but mandatory expedient. Although the decision to establish this Training Center was made in July 1948, the necessary funds were not available at that time to implement the decision.

3. It now appears that funds will be made available in the near future and it is planned to commence training individual radar and communication specialists and aircraft control and warning teams at Orlando Air Force Base on 1 July 1949. The Aircraft Control and Warning and Tactical Control Groups will not realize any benefits in the way of graduates of this Training Center until 1 January 1950, and then only in small increments.

4. The only foreseeable alleviation of this critical shortage in the immediate future will occur as a result of the inactivation of the 506th Tactical Control Group. Personnel of this Group will be reassigned in accordance with priorities established by this headquarters based upon immediate requirements. The 502nd Tactical Control Group will receive a limited number of this personnel.

5. The proposal, to turn this training over to civilian institutions, enunciated in paragraph 3, 1st indorsement is not considered feasible as:

a. Funds are not available.

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OT 320.3 Ops Effectiveness of the 502d Tac Con Gp (cont'd)

b. Critical items of shipment necessary to conduct this training are not available to allocate to such institutions.

6. It is realized that the operational effectiveness of Tactical Control and Aircraft Control and Warning Groups will be considerably curtailed during this interim period, however, it is believed that all possible action within the means available is being taken to correct this unsatisfactory condition.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Subject: 1st Ind fr Hqs TAC, 28 Feb 49 on b/ltr fr Hq 9th AF, dtd 31 Jan 49, subj: Oper Effect of the 502d TCG

No. 3 18 Mar 49 Comm to DAD
DP
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AG

Concur with 2nd Ind; however, the 506th Tactical Control Group, upon deactivation, cannot be depended upon to supply all of the requirements. There are approximately 761 airmen presently assigned to the units who are available for reassignment. Of these, 30% are trained and they are part of the cadre of 85 trained airmen who were assigned to the 506th upon its activation on 1 July 1948. The remaining 70% are basic airmen who have been receiving on-the-job training. Of this 70%, practically all of these airmen are vulnerable for overseas shipments since they have few or no overseas credits.

/t/s/ HOBART R YEAGER
Colonel, USAF
Dir of Comm & Elect

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Hq 502d Tactical Control Grp

22 July 1949

Subj: Recent Personnel Losses of the 502d Tactical Control Group

To: CG Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB

1. Reference is made to the verbal request of the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, for information concerning personnel losses of this organization (Air Indoctrination Course 2, conference at Pope AFB on 20 July 1949).

2. Personnel losses of this organization since 1 July 1949, for reasons other than discharges, have amounted to twenty-four (24) officers and airmen. Of this number sixteen (16) airmen and two (2) officers were technical Specialists badly needed for operation.

3. A Comparison of authorized strength with assigned strength is included as inclosure 1.

4. The most critical personnel shortage of this organization is in Radar Officers, Ground Reporting Equipment, (SSN 0110). Twenty-one (21) of these officers are authorized and four (4) are present for duty. Two radar officers have been transferred from this group since 1 July 1949.

5. It is felt that additional losses of technical losses will seriously effect participation of this organization in Air Indoctrination Course 2.

s/t/ ARTHUR L. LOGAN
Lt. Col., USAF
Commanding

1 Incl:
Personnel Status of the
502d Tactical Control Gp

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Hq, 502d Tactical Control Gp, Pope AFB, Ft. Bragg, N. C.

22 Jul 49

Subject: Recent Personnel Losses of the 502d Tac Con Gp

SYS 320.3 (22 Jul 49) 1st Ind

Hq, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, 2 Aug 1949

To: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Attention is invited to basic communication.

2. The shortage of communication and electronic personnel in the 502d Tactical Control Group has been the subject of previous discussions, conferences and correspondence with Headquarters, Continental Air Command, with the results that the Deputy for Plans, by 6th Comment, to Continental Air Command Routing Slip, dated 27 May 1949, subject, "Routing Slip from Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, 25 May 1949, w/1 Indorsement, subject, "Operational Effectiveness of the 502d Tactical Control Group," stated that a high manning priority had been established by Headquarters, United States Air Force, for the 502d Tactical Control Group. This high manning priority is yet to be reflected in the strength of the 502d Tactical Control Group.

3. Reference paragraph 4, a minimum of one (1) Aircraft Warning Officer is required for the operation of each ground radar set. It has proven unsatisfactory in the past to try and operate ground radar stations without a certain minimum of qualified electronics and communications personnel. Spreading the critical personnel too thinly has resulted in the unsatisfactory operation of the whole Tactical Control Group. In order to effectively operate the radar stations, it has been necessary to reduce the number of stations to less than half required for minimum tactical coverage.

4. In accordance with doctrines set forth in FM 31-35, the Tactical Control Group is the heart of tactical air operations. The 502d Tactical Control Group is at the present time the only such group organized and consequently, the only such Air Force organization capable of furnishing tactical air operations for the Army Field Forces. Further reductions in skilled technical personnel in the organization will preclude the 502d Tactical Control Group from meeting its requirements for tactical air support of the Army Field Forces. If the USAF is to meet its responsibility for furnishing tactical air support to the Army Field Forces, the 502d Tactical Control Group must be maintained at a reasonable

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Hq, 502d Tactical Control Gp, Pope AFB, Ft. Bragg, N.C.
1st Ind
Subject: Recent Personnel Losses of the 502d Tac ConGp

operating effectiveness, otherwise, the Army will be justified in a request for its organic Air Force.

5. It is requested that action be taken to man the 502d Tactical Control Group in accordance with the high manning priority established by Headquarters, United States Air Force.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ E. K. WARBURTON
Colonel, USAF
Actg Vice Commander

1 Incl
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Information to:
CG, 4th Air Force
Orlando AFB, Fla.

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Recent Personnel Losses of the 502nd Tactical Control Group.
Mil Pers-X 352.11 2nd Ind.
(22 Jul 49)
HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base,, New York, 15 Aug 1949

THRU: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

TO : Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

" 1. Letter, this headquarters, file Mil Pers-A, subject: "Precedence List of USAF Functional Activities", 21 July 1949, clarifies the manning priority of the 502nd Tactical Control Group and certain other units.

2. As they become available for assignment, specialists possessing skills required by the unit will be allotted as equitably as possible in accordance with ConAC-wide priorities.

3. A conference is presently being conducted at Orlando Air Force Base for the purpose of determining reallocation of personnel of the 539th AC&W Group. It is expected that a limited number of such personnel will be available for reassignment to the 502nd AC&W Group within the very near future.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

st/ N. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen.

1 Incl:
n/c

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Hampton, Virginia

1 April 1949

AC 320.3 (1 Apr 49)

SUBJECT: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, New York

1. It is recommended that prompt action be taken to build and maintain all of Continental Air Command's Troop Carrier Wings up to authorized strength. This request is made after study of past and expected Troop Carrier commitments and the ability of the wings to fulfill them. It is believed that manning these units fully and giving them preferential status in future personnel assignment will do much to further efficient operation and will lead to greatly improved capacity to complete the heavy requirements.

2. Troop Carrier Wings have been given heavy commitments continuously for as long as Tactical Air Command has knowledge of their activities. These commitments have been constantly heavy and very often of such a nature tha no time for preparation, maintenance stand down, and supplying has been available. Examples of this are the movement of elements of the 802d Tactical Control Group to Alaska last spring and Operation "Hayride". Commitments such as "Assembly," "Combine," "Tarheel," "Yukon," and lifts of airborne units on their routine requirements give more time for preparation but keep the units working constantly under pressure. This is a problem that exists only in Troop Carrier Units and which must be surmounted continously. The peacetime missions of Fighter, Reconnaissance, and Bomber ings call for unit training and participation in maneuvers whereas Troop Carrier's mission calls for training its own organizations, aiding in training of airborne and air transportable Army Units, providing transportation for itself and other air units to and from maneuvers, participation in emergency plans such as Operation "Hayride," Texas City disaster, Operation "Casey Jones," (which was to support United States transportation during the threatened railroad strikes), furnishing transportation to other agencies (present freight hauls to Brazil, airlift of students to "Combine," air indoctrination of United States Military Academy students, etc.), and other miscellaneous work. Because of Troop Carrier's constant commitment the units never have opportunity for essential unit training.

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Hq, Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Langley Fld, Va.
AC
Subject: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings

3. School requirements, TDY problems, leave and sickness losses, and overseas shipments combine to aggravate the limited personnel authorizations existing in tables of organization and equipment. A Troop Carrier Wing is designed to operate on a mission basis (authorizations are made to give men and material to do a forecast job) but tasks are assigned more nearly on an aircraft utilization basis. The main problem encountered is not with planes and equipment but with personnel to maintain and operate the planes and equipment so the job can be done. The planes could be flown many more hours daily if the maintenance crews were of sufficient size to keep them in flying condition a greater percentage of the time.

4. With the assignment of the 11th Airborne Division to Camp Campbell, Kentucky, the overall increase in Army strength and the Army's plan to have all ground units air transportable there will be a continuing increase in the Army's requests for Troop Carrier support. At present these requests and Air Force commitments are keeping Troop Carrier Units over committed; as they increase we are reaching a point where we will be unable to fill them. The United States Air Force has a commitment to give the Army its necessary Troop Carrier support and if we should fail in this support the Army would have an argument for further organic air units.

5. The capability of Troop Carrier Wings has lessened appreciably in the past year. The 62nd Wing's case can be cited as an example. From October 1947, until March 1948, this Wing was engaged in Exercise "Yukon." One squadron with 16 aircraft was stationed in Alaska and supported the Ground Forces during the winter. The remaining two squadrons were able to maintain and fly 30 of their 31 assigned planes on monthly round trips to Alaska via Great Falls. Five of these movements were successfully made with 2nd Infantry Division troops and one additional trip was flown to return a Fighter Squadron from Alaska to March Air Force Base. Between February 1 and March 5, two round trips were flown with the 2nd Division Troops and one with the Fighter Squadron. In contrast with this, the 62nd is now hard pressed to maintain one squadron in Alaska and fill such other commitments as it may be assigned.

6. For these reasons, it is strongly recommended that Troop Carrier Wings be given preference in personnel assignment at the expense, if necessary, of other type Wings.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ R. H. THOM
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIRCOMMAND
Langley Air Force Base
Langley Field, Virginia

AC 320.3 (1 Apr 49) 11 April 1949

SUBJECT: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

1. It is recommended that prompt action be taken to build and maintain all of Continental Air Command's Troop Carrier Wings up to authorized strength. This request is made after study of past and expected Troop Carrier commitments and the ability of the wings to fulfill them. It is believed that manning these units fully and giving them preferential status in future personnel assignment will do much to further efficient operation and will lead to greatly improved capacity to complete the heavy requirements.

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Hq, Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Langley Fld, Va.
AC
Subject: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings

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Hq Tactical Air Comd, Langley AF Base, Langley Fld, Va.
AC
Subject: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings

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6. For these reasons, it is strongly recommended that Troop Carrier Wings, be given preference in personnel assignment at the expense, if necessary, of other type Wings.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ R. H. THOM
Lt. Col., USAF
Adjutant General

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IRS

Subject: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings
(Hq TAC, 1 Apr 49)

No. 2 4 Apr 49 O&T to LOTAO
DO
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1. Troop Carrier units are being built up from personnel available from de-activated units.

2. It is not believed that Troop Carrier units should be built up at the expense of all other units. They should be given enough personnel so that they can perform their normal mission. However, we also have a very important Air Defense mission to perform and the fighter units have to be able to operate. We must balance our effort and if Troop Carrier cannot perform all the missions that we are called on to do we must cut down on their requirements.

s/ HOWARD F. NICHOLS
Colonel, USAF
Dep Dir O&T

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

29 April 1949

OT 320.3

SUBJECT: Manning of Troop Carrier Wings

TO : Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Reference is made to the following communication concerning Manning of Troop Carrier Units: letter, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, file number 320.3, dated 1 April 1949, subject: "Manning of Troop Carrier Wings".

2. Latest strength figures available in this headquarters (28 February 1949) reflect the following:

a. 62nd Troop Carrier Wing.

	Authorized	Assigned	% Manned
Officers	279	278	99%
Airmen	1679	1651	98%

b. 314th Troop Carrier Wing.

	Authorized	Assigned	% Manned
Officers	281	208	74%
Airmen	1322	923	70%

c. 316th Troop Carrier Wing.

	Authorized	Assigned	% Manned
Officers	351	326	93%
Airmen	1854	1514	82%

3. On 28 March 1949, this headquarters issued instructions to Commanding General, Fourth Air Force and Commanding General, Fourteenth

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Air Force to give priority to the troop carrier wings in re-distribution of personnel from the inactivated Reconnaissance Wings. It is believed that when the strength figures for 31 March 1949 are available, great improvement will be shown in the strength of Troop Carrier Wings of this command. In fact, it is believed that they will be as well or better manned than any other type of unit in Continental Air Command.

4. The conditions which exist in Troop Carrier Wings of Continental Air Command are well known in this headquarters. However, a similar condition exists in all tactical units in this command. Troop carrier units cannot be built up at the expense of other tactical units or emphasis placed on any one major mission of this command.

5. This hea dquarters will continue to offer assistance through severe efforts to hold operational commitments to a minimum and to provide troop carrier units, through Fourteenth Air Force and Fourth Air Force, with opportunity for unit training.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TENTH AIR FORCE
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

Office of the Commanding General 2 March 1949

Lt. General George E. Stratemeyer
Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Dear Strat:

General Williams is still absent in Washington, and consequently I am trying to hold down his seat.

I had a long conference with Colonel Hudnell, Commander of the 56th Fighter Wing at Selfridge, and I am very worried about this organization. It seems that, when this unit was under SAC, they were not allowed to have any non-rated officers, as a result of which the rated officers had to be cross-trained in double specialties as pilots and also as administrative or technical officers. This has placed these officers in double jeopardy because they have two MOS's.

This Air Force has received very few replacements during the past two months, as a result of which everything has been going out and nothing coming in. This has placed the 56th Wing at a state where its efficiency rating is 5. We are screening our training centers to see what assistance we can get for this unit so that especially flight commanders can be relieved from another job and placed on training to train the new officers who are reporting in periodically.

I noticed on the ConAC Diary of February 23 where two squadrons of this wing are to be ordered to Tyndall Field for five weeks beginning the 23d of May. I do not see how this unit can make these commitments unless they are reinforced immediately, and I have directed our DPA to place an emergency requisit on for personnel with specialties, such that experienced pilots on other than pilot assignments can be released to the fighter group and bring it back up to the efficiency which I know you desire. Any assistance that you can give this will be greatly appreciated, for apparently somebody used an old efficiency rating of 9 on this wing.

We have unconfirmed reports that all returnees from foreign service are being put on the pipe line for SAC which, of course, will not help us any, as everything is going out to the top which is experienced, and all we are getting in are trainees from the training centers.

Sincerely yours,

/s/t/ HARRY A. JOHNSON (Brig. Gen USAF comdg)

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SUBJECT:

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
INTEROFFICE ROUTING SLIP

NO	DATE	FROM	TO	Number and date each entry - show date of dispatch. Show staff division or office in FROM-TO columns. Sign each entry legibly - show actual signer. Draw a line across the page under each entry. Use full width of page for long entries.
				* * * * * * *
2	16 Mar	Pers	DAD	1. As of 31 January 1949 the 56th Ftr Wg was 96% manned and the 10AF's personnel shortages were not as critical as some of our other Air Forces. 2. The 56th Ftr Wg requisitons are undoubtedly all shortages which will exist after completion of the overseas shipments. Consideration of the command-wide officer situation does not justify 100% manning of this unit at the expense of other units; however, every effort will be made to allocate the maximum number of officers to the 56th Ftr Wg, consistent with the overall needs. 3. In addition, a survey of the AFRTC's in 10AF indicates that in a number of the AFRTC's, officer overages exist and further that officers possessing SSN's appearing on emergency requisitions are being utilized in non-critical specialties. Follow-up action is being taken to determine to what extent 10AF can help itself. For signature. 1st Lt. Mario Fortunati /s/t/ 5235
				* * * * * * *

HQ ConAC FORM 1-1
22 April 1950

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22 March 1949

Brigadier General Harry A. Johnson, USAF
Headquarters Tenth Air Force
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

Dear Harry:

Reference is made to your letter of 2 March 1949 pertaining to the personnel situation within the 56th Fighter Wing. I am cognizant of the problem and will lend every support I can to alleviate this condition as early as practicable. I cannot predict at this time what your chances are of obtaining non-rated personnel to fill certain administrative positions as you requested. Further, I know that you realize that due to the curtailment of the broad troop program of the United States Air Force, a serious shortage of officers, both rated and non-rated, is developing.

As of 31 January 1949, the Tenth Air Force was thrid highest amongst all the Continental Air Command Air Forces in personnel manning, with a percentage of ninety one (91.) As of the same date, the 56th Fighter Wing was 98% manned.

By comparison, other Air Forces are presently suffering more serious personnel shortages. However, in view of the imminent inactivation of certain units of this command, some assistance will be given your command by virtue of the availability of many of these officers for reassignment to other units. A survey of your units, which records of this headquarters indicate are carrying officer overages, should be undertaken to determine what readjustments can be made to alleviate shortages in other organizations. As of 31 January 1949, numerous AFRTC's had considerable officer overages. In view of the curtailment in the flow of officer replacements to this command, it behooves us, in the interests of good personnel management and economy, to continuously study the personnel problem and make necessary readjustments to the best interests of all concerned.

In closing, I wish to assure you that every effort will be made to obtain additional and replacement officers for assignment to your command and that the problem set forth in the above letter has been given due consideration.

By best personal regards.

Sincerely,

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

8 September 1949

Mil Pers-X 200.3

SUBJECT: Personnel Requirements for certain Continental Air Command Units

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. References: Letter AFPMP-1-E4, Subject: "Disposition of Officer quotas requested in 1 August 1949 Air Force Letter 150-2 Report", 18 August 1949.

2. Shortage within this command of certain key specialists has prevented or will prevent the following units from being able to perform their assigned or anticipated missions:

47th Bomb Wing, Light, Barksdale AFB, La.
162nd TACT Recon Sq, Night Photo, Langley AFB, Va.
62nd Troop Carrier Wing, Heavy, McChord AFB, Wash.
316th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium, Greenville AFB, S. C.
(Scheduled to move to Smyrna AFB, Tenn.)

3. Stated missions of these units are attached as Inclosure 1. Information received from your Headquarters indicates that Navigator-Bombardiers, SSN 1037, will not be available to this command in the foreseeable future due to higher priorities of the Strategic Air Command.

4. Letter, AFPMP-1-E4, Subject: "Disposition of Officer quotas requested in 1 August 1949 Air Force Letter 150-2 Report", dated 18 August 1949, is quoted in part as follows:

"a. Navigation Training. Currently, consideration is being given to the training of Regular Air Force pilots of permanent company grade who have not reached their 30th birthday. It is contemplated that the first group of officers will be entered into the 1 November 1949 Navigation class at Ellington Air Force Base, Texas. Careers for these officers will be planned leading to duty assignment, in many cases, with Strategic Air Command. Your Headquarters is advised that mandatory quotas for the above course will soon be allocated your command."

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Personnel Requirements for Certain Continental Air Command Units

a. Personnel of this command attending the Bombardment School at Mather Air Force Base have been detailed in a PCS status and in all cases have been reassigned to the Strategic Air Command, representing a total loss to the Continental Air Command. In the event personnel from this command continue to attend this school, we will, in the very near future, be depleted of all navigators and bombardiers without any source of replacement.

b. Considering the especially small number of navigators and bombardiers now remaining within this command, and the critical need for this personnel, it is becoming almost impossible to fill mandatory school quotas.

c. Due to the requirements of the units listed, and future requirements for training Radar Observers all Weather (SSN 0520) it is essential that:

(1) This command receive a trained replacement for each navigator and bombardier detailed to the Bombardment School at Mather Air Force Base in the future.

(2) This command receive a proportionate share of the graduates of the Navigation Course conducted at Ellington Air Force Base.

5. Outstanding requisitions of this command include the personnel requirements for the 47th Bomb Wing, Light, and the 162d Tact Recon Sq, Night Photo, but do not as yet reflect the new requirements resulting from announced C-54 conversion of the 62d TC Wing, Medium, and the proposed conversion of 2 squadrons of the 316th TC Wing, Medium, or the scheduled movement of the 316th TC Group to Smyrna Air Force Base.

6. Present requirements for the 47th Bomb Group are specified in Inclosure 2.

a. As of 1 August 1949, the following personnel situation existed in the Wing:

Job Description	SSN	Auth	Assigned
Radar Mechanic Bomb	867	28	5 (2 fully qualified)
Radar Repairman, Airborne	955	14	6
Navigator-Bombardier	1037	49	1 (DS Air Tac School)
Pilots	1069	104	71

b. Obviously the wing is capable of manning only one (1) B-45 aircraft in performing its assigned missions. Minimum acceptable substitutions of allied SSN's in this organization for the purpose of formulating

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Personnel Requirements for certain Continental Air Command Units

partially trained crews by OJT is considered to be as follows, based on FY 1950-51 Troop Basis of a Group Headquarters and two squadrons:

Five (5)	1037
Four (4)	0142 (or 0520)
Twenty-Four (24)	1034 (or 1035)

c. Nine complete sets of AN/APQ-24 equipment are on hand in this organization and 19 Shoran equipped B-26 aircraft are still assigned, which equipment requires a weekly detailed check. Furthermore, each B-45 to be received hereafter is to be equipped with AN/APQ-24, equipment. Qualified Radar Maintenance personnel must be made available to maintain and repair this equipment.

d. In brief, the unit is being equipped with the latest tactical type aircraft and the latest Radar Bombing system, but due to personnel shortages, has no way of accomplishing its operational responsibilities.

e. On 23 April 1947, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, during a conference concerning equipment for the B-45 aircraft, representatives of Headquarters USAF brought out that:

(1) Since the AN/APQ-24 equipment was behind schedule, it was not desirable that a new first-line aircraft be assigned to a Tactical Unit with no means of delivering a bomb load.

(2) In view of this, it was decided (by USAF representatives) that the first B-45's would be equipped with Shoran until the desired equipment became available.

(a) The undesirable situation indicated above still exists today but in a slightly modified form; i.e. - we have a first-line aircra ft (B-45) and the latest radar bombing system (AN/APQ-24) but no qualified operators (1037's) and insufficient maintenance personnel.

(b) It is believed that the personnel problem as it exists today can be more readily solved than the equipment problems which existed in 1947. A minimum number of qualified graduates of the 1037 School should be immediately made available to this command to permit minimum essential testing and operational training.

7. Present requirements for the 162d Tact Recon Sq are stated in Inclosure 3.

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Personnel Requirements for certain Continental Air Command Units

a. Effort has been made by this unit to train sufficient individuals to meet the minimum requirements for Radar Observer, however, all such personnel have been lost to schools or by transfer to other commands.

b. The desirable combat crew for the RB-26 is one pilot and two Bombardier-Navigators 1037 as called for in the TO&E. An adequate substitute crew consists of one pilot, one navigator (1034) and one 1037. The minimum essential crew is considered to be one pilot, one other crew member (Navigator), Second Pilot, or Engineer) andd one Radar Observer 0142.

c. It is proposed to consider the following minimum acceptable substitution in this unit as a basis for on-the-job training of combat crews:

Three (3)	1037
Three (3)	0142 (or 0520)
Thirty (30)	1034 (or 1035)

8. Requirements for the 62d TC Wing are stated in Inclosure 4. The C-54 Crew members should be in place at McChord A ir Force Base not later than 1 October 1949. In view of the shortage of Navigator Bombardier, SSN 1037, substitution of Navigator SSN 1034 and Radar Observer 0142 is contemplated on the following basis:

Seven (7)	1037
Three (3)	0142 (or 0520)
Twenty-four (24)	1034

This is considered to be the minimum acceptable substitution for qualified 1037's.

9. Anticipated requirements for the two squadrons of the 316th TC Wing, scheduled to be re-equipped with C-54 aircraft are indicated in Inclosure 5. The crews should be in place at Smyrna coincident with the arrival of the C-54 aircraft during November 1949. Minimum acceptable substitutions in the crews of these two Squadrons is considered to be:

Four (4)	1037 (2 per Sq)
Two (2)	0142 (or 0520 - 1 per Sq)
Eighteen (18)	1034 (9 per Sq)

10. Thorough screening of the SSN's (and related SSN's) included in the attached requirements reveals that this command cannot furnish any additional technical specialists of the type required by these units

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without severe adverse effects on other missions and on other TO&E combat units. Such SSN's are being utilized in the electronics field, as ANG and AROTC instructors or advisors, in other priority units and in the ca se of the officers, as rated pilots. It is believed that all actions possible have been or are being taken at this and lower levels of command to alleviate this untenable situation.

11. This letter is to be considered as an emergency requisition to cover requirements not presently reflected in outstanding requisitions.

12. In the event that the minimum personnel requirements as stated cannot be furnished to this command, it is requested that your Headquarters take steps to re-ovaluate the mission of the units concerned, with a view toward amending those missions to the extent that the revised missions can be accomplished with personnel presently available or to be shortly made available to this command.

s/t/ ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

5 Incls:
1 - Missions of Certain ConAC Units
2 - Pers Rqmts: 47th Bomb Wg
3 - Pers Rqmts: 162d Tac Recon Sq
4 - Pers Rqmts: 62d TC Wg
5 - Pers Rqmts: 316th TC Gp

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1st Ind.

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 22 November 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Consistent with current and future foreseeable resources, the following action will be taken by this headquarters toward alleviating the observer shortage within the four units of your command indicated in paragraph 2, basic communication:

a. School graduates:

(1) Ten (10) graduates of the November 1949 USAF Bombardment School, Mather Air Force Base, California, will be assigned to the 84th Light Bomb Squadron, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;

(2) Ten (10) graduates of the January 1950 USAF Bombardment School, Mather A ir Force Base, California, will be assigned to the 85th Light Bomb Squadron, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;

(3) Ten (10) graduates of the February 1950 USAF Bombardment School, Mather Air Force Base, California, will be assigned to the 162nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Photo), Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and;

(4) Ten (10) graduates of the March 1950 USAF Bombardment School, Mather Air Force Base, California, will be assigned to the 84th and 85th Light Bomb Squadrons, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, on the basis of five (5) per squadron.

b. Overseas returnees:

(1) This headquarters will continue to assign all overseas returnees possessing MOS 0520, to units of your command.

(2) Additionally, it is anticipated that a proportionate share of officers returning from overseas possessing MOS 1034 will be assigned to your command as required. The original requirement for SSN 1037 as established by T/O&E 1-1314 (Troop Carrier Squadron, Heavy), has been deleted by T/O&E 1-0001-E, 1 July 1949, and, in lieu thereof, a requirement has been established for SSN 1034. Since quotas for the USAF Bombardment School ha ve been partially filled heretofore with overseas returnees, and now that Strategic Air Command is charged with filling subsequent quotas, more returnees should be available for assignment to ZI commands.

2. USAF resources with respect to radar maintenance personnel are

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extremely critical, and every major command will continue to feel this shortage until the output of the accelerated technical training program reaches its peak. World-wide trained personnel requirements indicate that, by continuing the present training rate, shortages in Radar (ground operation and maintenance of airborne equipment) will be largely met during the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1951. Any phase-down during 1950 to an attrition training rate in these courses will release a corresponding number of instructors to partially alleviate existing shortages. The Radar Mechanics Airborne Equipment Course No. 86753 is of forty-two (42) weeks duration, and an appreciable flow of school graduates is just starting. This flow will be about 65 students per month at the start and will gradually build up to a flow of approximately 230 per month by November 1950 and then gradually decrease to a point where the output is expected to take care of attritional losses. It must be realized that the personnel graduating from Course No. 86753 are potentially qualified in SSNs 849, 867, 850, 853, 854, and 862, and that this is the only resource for training out the world-wide shortages in these specialties.

3. It is contemplated that during 1950 a formalized course of instruction for the training of Rada r Repairmen, Airborne Equipment, SSN 955, will be established within the Air Training Command. Class capacities are estimated at ten (10) per week. Duration of the course will be approximately five and one-half (5½) months. Except for a few overseas returnees, this is and will be the only source for this personnel.

4. With reference to A irmen Aircraft Maintenance Personnel, records this Headquarters indicate that as of 30 November 1949, your command will be 90.26% manned. This compares very favorably with allother ZI commands. This Headquarters will continue to make allocations of this personnel to units of the Continental Air Command from daily pipe-line sources, including school graduates.

5. World-wide resources of airmen SSN 647 and 648 are still critical. Every consideration will be given the Continental Air Command in the allocation of these personnel from allavailable sources.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

5 Incls:
n/c

s/st/ E. H. UNDERHILL
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Dirdotor of Military Personnel
Office of DCS/P

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HEADQUARTERS 4TH FIGHTER WING
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

SUBJECT: Aircraft Out of Commission 16 May 1949

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Reference is made to paragraph 2, 1st indorsement by your headquarters to letter, Headquarters, Continental Air Command, MS 452.1, Subject as above, dated 25 February 1949, with inclosures, directing that a study be made to determine if any additional or aggravating factors are causing the high percentage of aircraft reported out of commission. To obtain general opinions of the units involved, the reference correspondence was forwarded to the following units of this organization for submission of separate reports:

363d Tactical Reconnaissance Group
4th Maintenance & Supply Group (formerly 363d)
4th Air Base Group (formerly 363d)

* * * * * *

3. The following staff study by this headquarters is submitted for your consideration. The first portion of the study is prepared in the same heading order as shown in inclosure 2 of the reference letter:

a. Personnel Shortages:

(1) Field Maintenance: It is believed that shortages of personnel in field maintenance was responsible for the following unsatisfactory conditions at the time the high out of commission reports were considered:

(a) A reduced amount of repairs of reparable items which increased the shipments to overhaul depots and resulted in retarded supply action.

(b) A tendency for organization maintenance personnel to add field maintenance work to squadron maintenance functions, because of the time required to process work through the field maintenance shops. They performed major sheet metal jobs, engine cylinder changes, replacement of large airfoils, repainting of aircraft and equipment, major repairs of auxiliary equipment, etc.

(c) The above conditions adversely affected the accomplishment of organizational maintenance to the extent that in many instances it produced requirements for field maintenance normally prevented by organizational maintenance. Example: Lack of

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preventative battery and generator control maintenance caused airframe corrosion damage requiring some two hundred (200) manhours of field maintenance to repair.

(d) Inability of base shops to readily accept and perform newly directed field maintenance responsibilities as required by regulation changes.

(2) Organizational Maintenance: As indicated above, organizational maintenance was adversely affected by personnel shortages in field maintenance.

(a) It is believed that the conditions outlined under this heading in the report of the 162d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron were applicable to all aircraft operating organizations on this base. (Re: par 1a (1), Incl #1, 363d Tac Rec Gp.)

(b) It is pertinent to note that the conclusion of Major Hamilton on the "quantity" of personnel required, ... are predicated on the inference that the unsatisfactory conditions relating to incentive, control and training, discussed later in his report, were corrected. It is further believed that the assumptions and conclusions pertaining to general personnel problems are basically sound. ...

(3) Supply: The shortage of qualified supply personnel is generally effecting both field and organization supply functions:

(a) The conditions related in the M&S Group report relating to base supply activities ... are concurred with. The breakdown of inventory teams, because of personnel losses, caused inventory backlogs. Attempts were made to catch up on inventories by use of key personnel from other supply functions, which aggravated backlogs in those sections. Any supply backlog multiplies the delay in supply action. Posting backlogs delays processing of requisitions, preparation of due outs and action to replenish stocks.

(b) A majority of unit and technical supplies are limited in qualified personnel assigned. Incorrect and incomplete requisitions, with little or no follow-up action produces delays. This condition still exists, even after assignment of personnel to authorized strength.

(4) General: The number of personnel required to perform a specified mission is governed by the levelof experience and training of the key airmen and officers. Personnel shortages cannot be based entirely on tables of authorization. The amount of experience and general know-how regulates the quantities of bodies required. The quality and amount of training that can be accomplished is governed by the availability of personnel with the above prerequisite.

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(a) The importance of training in the service functions, supply, maintenance, etc., is oftimes overshadowed by the operational readiness phase. Over emphasis on operational readiness produces retarding of technical training which in turn results in lowered operational readiness. Having a high in commission rate at the expense of training will result in a lowered rate when key personnel are lost.

(b) Many portions of T/O&E authorizations with reduced peace time figures, does not appear to consider the necessity for extensive training in supply and maintenance functions. Also there appears to be no consideration given to the greater amount of paper work and maintenance incidental to peace time operation. Reports are multiple, and care and preservation of unused T/O&E equipment high. Training of personnel required more than just sufficient personnel required to perform normal supply and maintenance missions.

(c) Reference is made to Major Hamilton's report relative to training. The assumptions and conclusions are believed to be basically sound.

b. Personnel Instability: A high percentage of the maintenance and supply problems has been caused by instability.

(1) Personnel Shortages: Instability has resulted in reenlistment for other bases, where airmen believe that they will be able to remain longer. Airmen have an opinion that other commands are more stable. Non-commissioned officers are retiring with twenty (20) to twenty four (24) years service, thereby reducing the much needed experience level.

(2) Operation Vittles: Personnelshortages creadted by Operation Vittles and other long time TDY assignments are not reflected in personnel reports. An organization cannot keep high efficiency with a large percentage of assigned personnel on TDY. Shipments on short notice and extensions of TDY periods have caused lowered morale.

(3) Experience levels: A majority of the losses by transfer and TDY assignments involve the experienced personnel. This condition affects organizations as outlined in paragraph 3a (4) above. Reference is made to the remarks contained in the report of the 162d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron ... pertaining to the instability of officers. Rapid transfers of maintenance and supply officers has resulted in poor maintenance and unsatisfactory supply responsibility. Large reports of survey are produced by rapid changes of responsible officers.

(a) It is suggested that it will require a minimum of one year for a staff officer or unit commander to become fully acquainted with a base of this size, so that he might effectively

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perform his duties. It is felt that transfers of officers of that level should be limited to a minimum of four (4) years to obtain the benefit of his acquired knowledge of the base and its functional peculiarities. Stability of officers of that class will provide more stable administration and clearer cut policies for the guidance of the inexperienced.

(b) It is believed that the expressed AF policy of assignment of non-rated officers, with extensive military and technical experience, to staff functions is of paramount importance. Such personnel, most of whom are approaching the twilight of their military careers, may be depended upon to perform these duties efficiently and expeditiously for the remainder of their active duty.

* * * * * *

i. Conclusions:

(1) It is felt that the following major problems already discussed have produced the unsatisfactory out of commission percentages and will in some extent continue to do so:

(a) Personnel instability.

(b) Incomplete planning in directives pertaining to: unit movements, priority operations or maneuvers and assignment of neatype aircraft.

(c) Provisions for training of maintenance and supply personnel.

(2) The present conditions of personnel instability, personnel shortages, insufficient experience in supervisory personnel and the appearence of poor planning has a direct bearing on the morale of the troops. It is felt that too little consideration is given to this phase of the morale problem and that special services activities, exchanges, clubs, etc., are given more consideration as basic causes for low morale. The morale effects the efficiency of the accomplishment of a mission and most certainly effects the maintenance record.

(a) There have been many instances where extensive reports have been required with insufficient suspense time. The reports produced an overload on already overburdened functions. This condition adversely effected the morale of airmen in the base supply working along side of civilians drawing premium pay for overtime.

(b) The slowness in establishing policies effecting the careers of airmen, which have been given general publicity in newspapers, along with other seemingly inconsistent information on career planning has detrimentally affected the morale.

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(3) It appears evident that the Air Force is experiencing growing pains which is reflected in reports of aircraft out of commission. It is suggested that many of the points brought out in this and inclosed reports should be brought to the attention of higher authority.

s/t/ ROBERT W. C. WIMSATT
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

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DA 210

16 March 1949

SUBJECT: Regular Air Force Officers in the Field of Aircraft Control and Warning

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards

1. The Aircraft Control and Warning System provides the basic framework for the coordinated employment of all air defense measures. The stability and efficiency of this system, of paramount importance to Air Defense, is completely dependent on the solid core of highly trained specialists required to man its complex electronic devices.

2. As you know, this command is going to great lengths in establishing a permanent continental Air Defense System. Enabling legislation and funds are being secured from the Congress, and millions of dollars worth of electronic equipment is being procured and installed. All these efforts are to no avail without career personnel properly trained, in sufficient numbers, at the right places. Our net shortages of officers and airmen and their deplorable state of training is another subject of which you are well aware. Still more serious, but fortunately subject to immediate improvement by administrative action, is the alarmingly low proportion of career officers in the system. A sampling of company grade officers assigned to three Aircraft Control and Warning Groups of this command reveals the following percentage of reserve officers in the four categories in which we are most critically short:

	% Reserve Officers	
	Capts.	Lts.
Communications Officers (0200)	88	87
Radar Officers (0140,0145, 0141)	96	88
Comptrollers (1014)	80	100
Radar Maintenance and Supply (0110 and 4400)	100	100

3. The Air Defense Command and the Tactical Air Command are not the sole users of these critical specialists in the Air Force. They are equally in demand for maintenance and operation of GCA, for airport surveillance radar, missile guidance, and for the atomic energy program. Because their skills are also immediately applicable to civilian life, indications are that many now assigned to Continental Air Command units

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SUBJECT: Regular Air Force Officers in the Field of Aircraft Control and Warning

will not renew their present service agreements.

4. It is recommended that an immediate and complete survey be made of the ratio of reserve and regular officers in these career fields to determine the Air Force position as a whole. If the situation prevailing in Continental Air Command is at all representative, it is urgently recommended that a program be formulated for offering a selected number of these officers regular Air Force commissions. Early announcement of such a program would greatly assist in reviving the morale of this group of officers, who due to lack of appropriate grade position vacancies in World War II are on the whole far behind their more fortunate colleagues who served in flying units.

EDGAR E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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Basic Ltr fr Hq Continental Air Comd, subj: "Reg Ap Offs in the Fld of Acft Control & Warning," 16 Mar 49.

1st Ind AFPMP-11

Dept. of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 27 Apr 49.

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. A survey of the ratio of Regular and Reserve Officers in the Aircraft Control and Warning Field, as recommended in basic letter, verifies the condition existing in your command as well as the overall Air Force position in regard to Regular Officers in these specialties. Grade distribution, as indicated in Tab A, is also comparable.

2. There is a definite necessity for stabilizing officers in the Aircraft Control and Warning Field, either by increasing the percentage of Regular Officers or by extending the active duty tours of qualified Reserve Officers or by extending the active duty tours of qualified Reserve Officers. Moreover, this problem of stabilization is common to other technical fields in which the percentage of Regular Officers is below average. The Regular Officer composition of specialized fields is presented in Tab B, which indicates that a special program to offer regular commissions to a selected number of Reserve Officers in the Aircraft Control and Warning Field is equally applicable to other critical fields.

3. A plan to emphasize selection of qualified specialists for regular commissions in critical fields is now in the process of being implemented. Its objectives are a more uniform distribution of Regular Officers throughout the Air Force and increased stability in those highly technical fields which are critically short of officers. The Regular Officer Selection Board has been advised of the shortages of Regular Officers in these critical fields and will be guided by this data in making future selections.

4. It is well known that Reserve Officers who are qualified in Communications and Electronics specialties are in great demand for technical jobs in civilian industry, and have not taken full advantage of the current program for appointing Lieutenants in the Regular Air Force. Be encouraging your Aircraft Control and Warning Reserve Officers to apply for regualr commissions, the Air Force-wide program for procuring regular officers will be greatly benefited. If these officers are otherwise qualified under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 36-5, their technical qualifications will assure favorable consideration.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

2 Incls:
Tab A
Tab B

H. K. MOONEY, COLONEL, USAF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MIL PERS

For & in Absence of D. C. STROTHER
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Military Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PP200 5 January 1949

SUBJECT: Electronics Personnel.

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. This command is confronted with the problem of a considerable number of highly qualified communications and electronics personnel leaving the Air Force on expiration of their current term of enlistment, or tour of/duty, for higher paying civilian jobs. The training and active experiance acquired by these individuals through service schools and on-the-job training is thus lost to the Department of the Air Force.

2. Although the various echelons of this command attempt to do everything possible to encourage these individuals to remain in the service, the effort appears to be of no avail, and the resultant losses are daily further depleting our almost non-existent resources of such technically qualified personnel.

3. Informal information indicates that a study of this problem has been or is being conducted at your headquarters with a view to proposing improvements in promotion possibilities and other career developments plans which would tend to alleviate the condition. Request any available information concerning the status of this study, proposals under consideration, or probable resultant action of policy. Such data would be of value to this headquarters in combating the reluctance to reenlist or to extend active duty tours displayed by these critical scarce technical specialists.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ FREDERICK W. GERHARD, JR.
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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Department of the Air Force, Hq, USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 27 Jan 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, New York

1. No study of the specific problem outlined is being made at this Headquarters. However, the Airmen Career Program currently being developed should, when implemented, contribute materially to the desire of enlisted personnel to continue in the Air Force on a career basis.

2. Definite career fields are being formed as a part of the program. These career fields will consist of jobs grouped on a functional basis as opposed to the present organizational grouping. Opportunities for advancement will be based on appropriate qualifications and will not be influenced by organizational or administrative factors. It is contemplated that the program will place promotions to the higher enlisted grades on a competitive basis within career fields. This method, with the aid of proficiency testing devices, will permit the most qualified to be selected for promotion.

3. In connection with the program, each different type of job in the Air Force is being reevaluated and will carry a grade authorization commensurate with the degree of skill, knowledge, and responsibility connected with the job. It is estimated that such action will result in the elevation of grades in many jobs.

4. The recent warrant officer integration is an example of the opportunity open to qualified airmen. Further, current plans envisage the adoption of four (4) distinct warrant grades into which airmen may progress. The plan, as now proposed, would provide for pay equivalent to that of major for the most senior warrant grade.

5. The development of career fields for officers is not contemplated until the enlisted program is completed. In the meantime, temporary promotions in all officer grades are being made affording opportunity for advancement to the best-qualified officers. Temporary promotions are expected to continue so long as budget limitations permit. This measure should serve as an additional incentive for non-regular officers to remain on active duty.

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6. During periods of economic prosperity, such as the nation is experiencing today, the services are not in a position to compete with industry for personnel on a wage basis. Therefore, in our efforts to attract highly-qualified personnel, we must capitalize on career opportunities and otherlong-range benefits offered by the Air Force.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/st/ ROBERT H. WARREN
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director, Personnel Planning

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

COMM 200.3 11 July 1949

SUBJECT: Domestic Technical Representative Requirements through Fiscal Year 1951

TO : Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio

1. Reference your message MCMXP-2-6-667, 8 June 1949 and message AF CONAC OC 9524, 29 April 1949. Since the requirement of one hundred thirty one (131) technical representatives through Fiscal Year 1951 was made in above message to your command, 29 April 1949, the Air Defense System Interim Aircraft Control and Warning plan site requirements, site priority, equipment availability have been revised and to adquately and realistically reflect the technical representative requirements, the previous estimate is revised accordingly. It is believed that the Air Defense planning at this stage on which this revised estima te is based has sufficiently stabilized to reasonably and accurately project our future needs. The computation for the revised technical representative requirements was based on the following:

a. Three (3) Heavy Ground Radar Specialists per AN/CPS-6B.

b. One (1) Communications Specialist per AN/CPS-6B.

c. One (1) Heavy Ground Radar Specialist per AN/CPS-5, AN/FPS-3 or AN/CPS-1.

d. One (1) Communications Specialist per Control Center.

e. Three (3) Heavy Ground Radar Specialists (instructors) at the 539th Aircraft Control and Warning Group Team Training School, Orlando, Florida.

f. Three (3) Communications Specialists (instructors) at the 539th Aircraft Control and Warning Group Team Training School, Orlando, Florida.

g. Six (6) Airborne Radar Specialists for All Weather Night Fighter Groups and other Continental Air Command airborne problems.

h. One (1) Communications Systems Technician, Headquarters, Continental Air Command.

i. One (1) Radar Systems Technician, Headquarters, Continental Air Command.

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Domestic Technical Representative Requirements through Fiscal Year 1951 (continued)

2. The site numbers, site priority, type of equipment, proposed geographical location, equipment availability date and the approximate date and the number of technical representatives that will be required are attached herewith as Inclosure #1.

3. The type of equipment, geographical location, air force organization, primary duties and specialities of the thirty (30) technical representatives currently assigned Continental Air Command are attached herewith as Inclosure #2.

4. The basis for the estimated requirement of technical representatives for each location was arrived at after a staff study and coordination within this command. This study revealed that the following electronic personnel problems and deficiencies will most likely exist in the implementation of the Interim Aircraft Control and Warning plan which it is believed can be most efficiently dealt with and probably ultimately corrected by utilizing the services of these technical representatives.

a. The complexity of the AN/CPS-6B, AN/FPS-3 and other radar sets that will be used in the Interim Aircraft Control and Warning plan with the many various and relatively new electronic systems, components and circuits employed such as moving target indication stalo and multiple tunable RF systems, projected PPI and many proposed types of remote presentation and micro wave link transmission, beacon and IFF equipment and other ancillary telephone radio and communication equipment demand that the operating and maintenance personnel be skilled mechanics and technicians.

b. Past experience dictates tha t it requires a minimum of three (3) years to formally train a basic MOS in electronic fundamentals and to train by apprenticeship (OJT) these semi-skilled 953's to a stage of proficiency that they would be able to perform the functions of a skilled mechanic as is required in the operation and maintenance of these equipments.

c. To train these semi-skilled mechanics by OJT methods it is necessary that skilled mechanics and technicians be made available to act as technical supervisors and instructors.

d. The reenlistment rate of the technical electronics personnel in the Aircraft Control and Warning Groups within this Command is approximately 10%, consequently precluding the use of air force personnel to conduct this training.

e. The proposed expansion of the Air Defense System, the current low reenlistment rate, the comparatively low personnel priority of this command, the almost negligible rate that the semi-skilled personnel are being received from the A ir Training Command, makes it imperative to

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Domestic Technical Representative Requirements through Fiscal Year 1951
(continued)

implement the Interim Aircraft Control and Warning plan that skilled civilian electronic technicians be procured to augment the limited air force personnel available to this command in the training of these unskilled and semi-skilled personnel.

5. An economic recession, the air force career plan, permanent site housing and facilities for Aircraft Control and Warning personnel and other factors may modify and increase the reenlistement rate of the skilled air force electronic personnel and consequently decrease the requirement for civilian technical representatives. It will be necessary to periodically review these requirements but for the present time it is believed that Inclosure #1 presents a realistic estimate of the number of technical representatives that will be needed to implement the Interim Air craft Control and Warning plan and properly and adequately support the mission of the Air Defense Command through Fiscal Year 1951.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

2 Incls:
1. - TechReps required for Implementation of Interim AC&W Plan.
2. - Utilization of Tech Reps currently assigned ConAC.

Info cy:
Dir. Comm, Hq, USAF

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
MITCHEL AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

31 October 1949

Brig General Harry A. Johnson
Hq Tenth Air Force
Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

Dear Harry:

This is in reply to your 25 October letter on the specific subject of the loss of maintenance people at Selfridge.

Although I am not ready yet to remove the requirement that airmen have a change of station after about four years at a station, there will be no objection to your controlling the move of these people away from Selfridge so that the least damage will be done. The four-years rule was established primarily to break up the cliques and very long stays at one station which had grown up in the past years. There were cases where NCO's had been at good stations like Langley, Hamilton and Mitchel throughout the war. General Whitehead wanted especially to break up these things. After we get them broken up, which will be within the next two or three months, the rotation of airmen will go on an individual basis based on a general four-year tour. In the meantime, as I said a moment ago, there is no objection to your handling the four-year moves out of Selfridge on an individual basis now. We will probably call on you for an official report some time later as to just what the situation is.

Although I do not doubt the need for qualified senior NCO's as 747's and 750's, the records do not show the situation to be as bad as it might be at Selfridge. The Tenth Air Force is manned 210% in Master Sergeants, 96.7% in 747's and 750's combined. Since you are to get a proper share of these people from Dow, and of course from other sources as they become available, I do not think reasonable transfers now are any greater problem there than anywhere else.

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ConAC airmen assignment priorities are being raised very considerably over what they have been in the past. We have already felt the effect of this in the withdrawal of a considerable overseas shipment of Communications specialists yesterday. We may expect more people to come in to us now.

Please keep on bringing matters of this nature to my personal attention. It is hard to ferret them out any other way.

Sincerely,

CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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HEADQUARTERS TENTH AIR FORCE
Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base
Indiana

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL 25 OCT 1949

Major General Charles T. Myers
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Dear Charlie,

Recent overseas shipments and expected turnover of Jet Maintenance personnel within the 56th Fighter Wing in the next two months due to four year rotation policy as set forth by your headquarters will seriously hamper the Wing in meeting General Whitehead's policy of maintaining 80% of their assigned aircraft in commission. This condition was reported in TWX AFIOPPE 1141, 24 October 1949.

The following figures are furnished to substantiate the above:

JET MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

Total Auth	Total Asgd as of 30 Sept 49	Losses on o/s shipments Nov & Dec	No due to be lost thru 4 yr rotation policy-Nov & Dec	Total remaining assigned
201	152	21	38	93

The above figures indicate a total shortage of 108 airmen within the Wing in Jet Maintenance personnel by the end of December.

This headquarters requested that forty-three (43) airmen in SSN 747A and 750A be assigned to the 56th Wing from personnel available from Dow and Grenier AFB and Pipe Line channels. This personnel was to be available for assignment in October and November, however, as yet none have arrived. Even if this personnel is transferred as previously scheduled a serious shortage will still prevail.

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Assuming that your headquarters has not other means of affording early relief for this critical condition, it appears most desirable that the four year rotation be relaxed, at least temporarily. Accordingly, I would like to be authorized to effect the release of the jet personnel due for rotation in such manner and over such period of time as will prove least harmful to the operational efficiency of the 56th Fighter Wing.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY A. JOHNSON
Brig. General USAF
Vice Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

19 January 1949

Major General K. B. Wolfe
Director, Procurement and Industrial Planning
Headquarters Air Materiel Command
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

Dear K. B.:

The recommendations and suggestions for placing qualified operational officers in your Aircraft Section, Procurement Division, as set forth in your letter of 13 December 1948 are sound.

I have referred the text of your letter to the Commanding Generals of the Air Defense Command and Tactical Air Command for their comments. Both have indicated that the idea of an exchange of tactically experienced officers from the tactical commands to the Air Materiel Command is sound. There is no question but that such an arrangement should produce better equipment not only for my command but for the United States Air Force as a whole.

You are undoubtedly well aware of the fact that my command is now undergoing reorganization. The resultant movement of various Air Force headquarters, transfers of personnel, and assumption of additional responsibilities make the personnel situation very acute. While it is very difficult to predict at this time what my eventual shortages of qualified personnel will be, I know that I cannot now spare anyone for assignments of the nature proposed in your letter. The type of officers you desire must be of the highest quality, and extremely well qualified along the lines you indicated, else the idea will not produce the desired results. The shortage of this type of officer is presently critical within my command, and it appears very unlikely that the situation will improve for some time to come.

It is with much regret, therefore, that I must say that I cannot provide suitable officers for this worthy project at this time.

It has been a pleasure to have heard from you again.

Sincerely,

t/ GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

P 210

24 April 1948

SUBJECT: Request for Assignment of General Officers

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration.

1. There exists an urgent need for the assignment of six additional general officers to this command. Request that general officers, qualified to fill the following positions, be assigned to this command in order of priority as listed:

Deputy Commander, Operations, Headquarters, Air Defense Command.
Deputy Commander, Personnel and Administration, Headquarters, Air Defense Command.
Deputy Commander for Operations, Headquarters, First Air Force, or Commander, Air Defense Division, First Air Force.
Deputy Commander for Operations, Headquarters, Fourth Air Force, or Commander, Air Defense Division, Fourth Air Force.
Deputy Commander for Operations, Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force.
Deputy Commander for Operations, Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, (to be assigned to Second Air Force, Offutt Air Force Base, pending reorganization of ADC).

2. In the light of current conditions and the accordingly increased significance of assuring effective air defense of the United States, it is essential to the proper accomplishment of my air defense mission that these general officers be provided.

3. These requirements are well within the current authorization of general officers to the Air Defense Command, as shown by ADC Personnel Voucher No. 25, dated 19 March 1948. I have just recently been informed that general officers will be available for assignment to fill the above requirements.

t/ GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.F.
Commanding.

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS FIRST AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
Fort Slocum, New York

21 June 1949

Lt. General Ennis C. Whitehead, USAF
Commanding, Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force,Base, New York

Dear Ennis:

I don't believe that you noticed the Army's announcement of the nomination of Colonel Frank A. Allen, Jr., for promotion to permanent Brigadier General, in the June 11th issue of the "Army-Navy Journal".

I bring this inconsequential fact to your attention only because it serves to illustrate the sharp contrast which exists between the ability of the Army to apply directly personnel resources to the Civilian Component problems, and the relativaly weak effort of the Air Force in the same Direction.

General Allan is the Executive Officer of the New York-New Jersey Military District, which is commanded by Major General Jaynes. Major General Keating has his headquarters in Boston, which is charged with the responsibility for Civilian Component matters for the New England States.

When the new program is underway, I will have three (3) full Colonels who will devote all of their time to Civilian Component matters. Two (2) of these Colonels will be AFRTC Commanders. Only one (1) of the three (3) is a permanent Colonel.

Our inability to match the Army Generals with Colonels is indicative of the still greater disparity we would find if we pursued this comparison to officers of lower grade. It is a thought-provoking condition that brings these questions to my mind:

Is the allocation of personnel by the Air Force to the Reserve Program in consonance with General Quesada's estimate of its importance?

Is the Civilian Component Program of the Army more difficult, from the standpoint of administration and training?

Are the three (3) Colonels working full-time on Civilian Component matters in the First Air Force superment

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I can assure you that the answer to the last two questions is "No"!.

I do not expect you to answer this letter, nor do I expect that you will be able to place me in the enviable position General Smith holds with respect to his Reserve, National Guard and R.O.T.C. responsibilities. If the Air Force, however, is considered to be in a competitive position with the other Armed Services, I would like to leave the impression with you that the results we achieve must be measured to a very great extent by the ability of the Air Force to support its programs with adequate personnel.

Yours sincerely,

s/t/ ROBERT M. WEBSTER,
Major General, U.S.A.F.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

21 September 1949

SUBJECT: Letter from Major General Robert M. Webster

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. The statements in the attached letter from Major General Webster are acknowledged as covering certain fundamental obstacles to the development of a more effective reserve forces program. These obstacles are not the result of low interest in reserve activities but are attributable to limited capabilities of the USAF in meeting world-wide manning needs with available resources. The price of an effective Air Force in being, with particular emphasis on vital strategic striking force units, has been the relatively lower precedence of the reserve forces.

2. A brief summary of requirements for the various senior officer grades is being furnished herein. This analysis, it is hoped, will aid in your understanding of problems confronting this Headquarters in trying to meet world-wide demands for higher grade officers.

a. Generals. The ceiling on general officers for Fiscal Year 1950 is 228, based on the 48 Group Program. The full number has been tentatively allocated, with many more requests still to be considered. This necessitates a continuing review of overall general officer requirements to determine those positions which can be filled and still stay within budgetary limitations.

As a guide in distribution of general officers, it appears that brigadier generals will be available only for assignment to positions which are responsible for the operation of two combat wings at below numbered Air Force level. Since the demand for general officers far exceeds the supply, it is impossible to maintain in some instances a parity of rank with other services in positions of correlated responsibility.

b. Colonels. Since January 1949, all commands have been operating under a reduced manning allotment of officers in the grade of colonel. Assigned officers of this grade total only 74% of the number required for authorized troop spaces. The present colonel strength of Continental Air Command is in excess of the percentage of colonels available world-wide.

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There are only 565 permanent colonels in the Air Force. One hundred (100) of these officers are serving in a general officer grade, which leaves but 465 permanent colonels for assignment world-wide. A full proportionate share of permanent colonels has been assigned to Continental Air Command.

If the reserve program requires a greater percentage of senior colonels, it is recommended that Continental Air Command divert officers of that category to reserve activities, utilizing the more junior colonels in positions within the command where seniority is not a prime requirements.

c. Lieutenant Colonels and Majors. As of 30 June 1949, the percentage of lieutenant colonels and majors assigned to major ZI commands as compared to total assigned officers was as follows:

Command	Percentage
Strategic Air Command	13
Continental Air Command	21
Military Air Transport Service	13
Air Training Command	14

The above analysis indicates that the position of Continental Air Command with respect to assigned field grade officers compares favorably with that of other ZI commands of similar size. This Headquarters is taking action as indicated below to provide additional officers for duty with the reserve forces.

(1) Instructions were forwarded to your command on 2 September 1949 which provide for full implementation of Air Force Letter 45-11. A limited number of well-qualified officers, including field grade, may be recalled by your Headquarters for specific assignment to Air Force Reserve Training Centers. In addition, reserve officers now on active duty are eligible to apply for such assignments. Officers selected for this program will be designated Category "R" personnel and will serve a three year tour of duty in one locality. This will provide a high degree of stability of personnell assigned to Reserve Training Centers.

(2) A constant screening is being conducted by this Head- to obtain qualified instructors for the Air National Guard and Air ROTC programs.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/st/ I. H. EDWARDS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel

1 Incl:
Ltr fr Maj Gen Webster,
First Air Force, dtd
21 June 49.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington

24 November 1948

Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer
Commanding General
Air Defense Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, N. Y.

Dear Strat:

In connection with your letter of 18 November I can see no objection to personal letters, or letters directed to my specific attention, from senior commanders with reference to personnel cases that seem to require special consideration. I have found, as you have, that with the changes in personnel that necessarily take place on any staff, at times there is apt to be strict adherence to policy when such policy should be tempered with common sense to fit a specific case. I do believe, however, that policies should serve as a guide, and that exceptions to policies should be founded on a justifiable basis. I know you will limit letters requesting exceptions to these cases which require special consideration because you realize that such letter, is received in considerable numbers, lessent the value of any one letter.

The subject of general officers takes up a large percentage of my time. Despite the fact that there may be little difference betweeen the pay of a colonel and a general, when any bill involving officer personnel is presented to Congress, the number of general officers is the subject of much discussion. Our little group is easy to put the finger on. Right now there are well over 300 positions which appear to warrant the assignment of general officers. But should any attempt be made to secure such a number, we would be the subject of much adverse criticism as well as being the instigator of further requests by both the Army and the Navy for an increase in their top rank.

* * * *

Sincerely,

s/t/ I. H. EDWARDS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel

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18 NOVEMBER 1949

FROM: C/S USAF

REFERENCE AFCVC 50776

TO: CG AMC, CG AFG, CG ATRC, CG AIRU, CG CAIRC, CG ALAIRC, CG ADC, CG FEA, CG USAF SEC. SVC, CG MATS, CG SAC, CG 3d AIR DIV, CG USAFE

1. The AF budget for FY 1950 is undergoing intensive re-examination by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It has become apparent that this Hq must assess the effect of officer personnel reduction in all commands. This information is vital not only to our FY 1950 program but also to subsequent programs. It is imperative that the information requested in the succeeding paragraphs be furnished this headquarters by 30 November in order to avoid possible "across the board" reductions.

2. It is requested that the effect of a 10 percent officer cut in your command, be analyzed, using the following assumption:

a. The strength against which the reductions will be assumed is that authorized to your command as of 30 Jun 50 in the Department of the AF Troop Program 48 groups revised, dated 1 Aug 49, as modified by PAVS and AG letters through 30 Oct 49.

b. No reduction will be made in the capability of your tactical units to carry out their combat missions below that possible under planned 30 Jun 50 strength mentioned in para 2a above.

c. No reduction will be made in planned training loads.

d. Airmen authorizations may be substituted for officer authorizations when such substitution is more desirable than complete elimination of the activity or function.

3. Review the activities and functions now being performed in your command and recommend in order of priority those which should be eliminated or reduced in order to effect the officer reduction mentioned above with the least reduction in your capability to perform your basic mission. The functions or activities listed may include those being performed as a result of directives from within your command or directives from this headquarters.

4. Each activity or function listed should identify the associated numbers of officers and airmen. Where reductions are recommended in T/O&E, specific SSNs and grades should be listed. Accompanying each listed activity, function or T/O&E to be reduced must be a statement as to the specific damage of that reduction to your program.

5. This headquarters is cognizant of the pipeline drains that are constantly acting to hold actual strengths in units and activities below authorized strengths and that this sapping of strength is acting to reduce the capability of commands as a whole. Nevertheless, it is mandatory that the information requested in the preceding paragraphs be developed so that cuts can be assessed withe the least possible damage to the AF program.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

CG 320.3 1 December 1949

SUBJECT: Reduction in Officer Troop Space Authorizations for ConAC

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference:

a. Message, Headquarters, USAF, AFCVC 50776, 18 November 1949.

2. a. Under the assumptions contained in paragraph 2a, of the above cited message, I compute the authorized officer strength for my command as of 30 June 1950 to be 3,722 officers authorized for my T/O&E units and 4,020 officers authorized in my non-T/O&E allocations (not including Hospital Squadrons at General Hospitals) for a grand total of 7,742 officer authorizations. This means that under your "10 percent officer cut program" I will be subject to losing 774 officer space authorizations.

b. My interpretation of your assumptions contained in paragraph 2b, above cited reference, and my study of the problem indicates that I cannot reduce the number of authorized officers in any of my T/O&E units without affecting the capability of my tactical units to perform their combat missions. The only possible way to effect any reduction in T/O&E unit officer authorizations would be to inactivate complete units. I do not recommend such action.

c. This means that I must apply the proposed cut of 774 officer spaces against my non-TO&E authorization of 4,020 spaces.

3. During my eight months service with the Continental Air Command, I have reviewed all activities and functions of this command and I have caused my Air Force commanders to do the same. On this basis, I have already effected a saving or reduction of 186 officer spaces (see Inclosure #1). I have recently directed my Station Hospital commanders to restudy their requirements for officers at their hospitals; this may effect a further reduction of officer authorizations to approach those reflected in AF Letter 160-33 (Manning Guide, 24 October 1949). Some of these reductions are already reflected in the figure 186 mentioned above. Except as indicated in paragraph 4, below, I cannot

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accept a further reduction without seriously affecting my capability to perform my assigned missions, tasks and functions. In this connection, I am taking cognizance of the assumptions contained in paragraphs 2c and 2d of above cited reference.

4. I believe I can, with your concurrence, effect a further saving in officer authorizations as indicated below, without seriously affecting USAF operations or my capability to fulfill my responsibilities with regard to these activities and functions:

a. Forty (40) officer spaces from those programmed as the requirement for Air National Guard Instructors. See paragraph 2b, of my 1st Indorsement, 16 October 1949 to letter, your headquarters, subject: "Assignment of Instructors to the Air National Guard," 18 August 1949.

b. Seven (7) officer spaces by eliminating the liaison officers which my Air Force commanders maintain at Army Headquarters.

c. Twenty (20) officer spaces by reducing the membership from five (5) officers to three (3) officers on each of the ten (10) Air Force Physical Evaluation Boards which you have recently directed me to establish.

d. Twelve (12) officer spaces by inactivating Marshall Air Force Base (I have recommended this to your headquarters by messages AFConACP&O 38493, 21 October 1949 and AFConACP&O 39662, 4 November 1949).

e. Inactivate Sherman Air Force Base with an authorized strength of 12 officers, 139 airmen and 30 civilians and place it on a caretaker status with caretaker, weather and AACS detachments.

f. Inactivate Lawson Air Force Base with an authorized strength of 20 officers, 156 airmen and 72 civilians and place it on a caretaker status with caretaker, weather and AACS detachments.

5. With regard to the instructions contained in paragraph 3, above cited reference, all of the missions, tasks and functions currently assigned to my command I consider essential to the interests of the Department of the Air Force. Therefore, I cannot, from this level, recommend the elimination of any of them.

6. In effecting the reductions outlined in paragraph 3, above, and

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the proposed reductions covered in paragraph 4, above, it is essential that Headquarters, USAF:

a. Man all of my activities and units, both T/O&E and non-T/O&E, at 100 percent of the authorized officer strdngth.

b. Reduce my annual turnover ofofficer personnel, within units, to a maximum of 30 percent, and establish pipe line personnel to accommodate for absentees on TDY attending service schools.

t/ ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Commanding

2 Incls:

1 - Reductions in Off Auths already Effected by ConAC
2 - Off Pers Auths for ConAC Current & Proj thru 30 Jun 50

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REDUCTIONS IN OFFICER PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN EFFECTED WITHIN ConAC

ACTIVITIES OR FUNCTIONS	NUMBER OF OFFICERS REDUCED
Headquarters, ConAC	45
Headquarters Numbered Air Forces (Six)	10
T/DAs for Tactical Wings	12
T/Ds (Air Base Groups, etc)	40
T/Ds (AFRTCs)	79 *
TOTAL:	186

* This represents a ten percent reduction for each AFRTC and the 79 officer spaces so obtained are being applied towards fulfilling a minimum of 180 officer spaces necessary to meet the minimum requirements for liaison personnel with the Volunteer Air Reserve Training Units.

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OFFICER PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS FOR ConAC BROKEN DOWN BY ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS

CURRENT AND PROJECTED THROUGH 30 JUNE 1950

ACTIVITIES OR FUNCTIONS	TOTAL AUTHORIZATIONS BY ACTIVITIES OR FUNCTIONS
T/O&E Units	3722
Air ROTC Program	553
VAMTU Program	180
Air Force Physical Evaluation Boards	60 *
Air Liaison Officers at Army Hqs	7 *
Air Explorers	12
Aviation Cadet Procurement	54
Inactive Reserve Records	12
Apprehension Program	12
Joint Public Relations	5
Tow Target Squadron	60
Assault Squadron	39
T/DAs (Wing Augmentations)	289
T/D Units (AFORDS, Air Base Gps, WAF Sqs etc)	416 *
AFRTCs	711
ANG Instructors	197 *
Caretaker Units	13
ConAC Headquarters	327
Hq Air Defense Forces	76
Hq Air Defense Command	69
Hq Tactical Air Command	70
Six (6) AF Headquarters	858
TOTAL:	7742

* See paragraph 4, basic letter for further recommended reductions in these functions and activities.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

12 December 1949

Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead
Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, L.E., New York

Dear Ennis:

We are giving thought here in Headquarters to making the Auditor General responsibile for the performance of all audits of both appropriated and non-appropriated funds and for the examinations of cost accounts required by AFR 170-11, 31 August 1949, for the Zone of Interior commands. This would relieve the commands of all audit responsibility.

Responsibility for efficient operation and maintaining adequate records would, of course, remain with the command. In this connection, it is my proposal that the Auditor General establish a resident audit staff on every base, where the workload will warrant, to perform the property audits which he now does, the non-appropriated and appropriated funds audits, and audits or examinations of the cost accounting records. This would give the commander an audit service on which to call at any time for interim or emergency audits. In view of the policy of the Department of Defense to have all auditing performed on an independent basis to the greates extent practicable, I believe this plan is appropriate to put into effect about 1 February 1950.

In assuming the above types of audit responsibilities, it will be necessary to transfer from the commands to the Auditor General the personnel and spaces used by the commands in performing these functions.

I would, however, like to have the benefit of your personal thoughts on this subject before making a final recommendation. It merely means that we are trying to place the Air Force out front in the field of independent checks on financial activities, which, as you are aware can cause so much unfavorable publicity, when even some minor thing goes wrong.

Sincerely,

s/t/ E. W. RAWLINGS
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
MITCHEL AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

4 January 1950

Dear Ed:

Reference your letter of 12 December in regard to the auditing function. In arriving at my views, I have given consideration not only to the advisability of avoiding unfavorable publicity for the Air Force but also to the equally important matter of sound principles of command (management) which in themselves prevent bad situations arising and causing unfavorable publicity.

Your proposal to transfer certain responsibilities (and equal authority) from the chain of command below Headquarters USAF level to the Auditor General, who is outside that chain, raises questions as to the purpose of auditing or examining various accounts and records.

Audits of accounts and records made for the protection of the government against loss of money or property through error or fraud on the part of those responsible for the custody or expenditure of money or property, and the supervisors of such custodians should, of course, be made by outside auditors. It is my understanding that audits are now made by your Auditor General and by the General Accounting Office of such records, including those pertaining to the execution of contracts, the accountability for and sales of government property, reimbursement billing of one operating agency against another, and funds in the custody of disbursing and sales officers.

Accounts and records pertaining to the general administration of a commander's responsibilities and the management of his activities and resources, other than the accounts and records pertaining to the custody or expenditures referred to in the preceding paragraph, seem to me to belong to an entirely different category. These nonaccountability records pertain to the procedures and systems by which command responsibilities in general are administered and by which nearly all activities and resources are managed. A large number and wide variety of individuals, from major headquarters down to and including bases, participate in this administration and management. I realize that inefficiency on the part of these various individuals is likely to cause far greater loss or waste than error or fraud on the part of persons directly accountable for property or cash.

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But I believe that the loss or waste due to inefficiency can be prevented or minimized only be education, indoctrination and training within the chain of command in the operation of prescribed procedures and systems. Frequent examinations of accounts and records pertaining to these procedures and systems are essential. But they should be made by those responsible for supervising the procedures and systems and for the training and supervision of the individuals charged with operating them. Additional examinations by an independent agency would be an unnecessary duplication. To have the independent auditors do the training and supervising would be to expand the auditing function far beyond that necessary to achieve its basic purpose of verification.

The Budget and Fiscal and the Cost Reporting Systems of the USAF are not only relatively new but are in a state of active development. We know without formal audit that there is considerable deviation in the use of appropriated funds from the pattern set forth in annual estimates. This is due chiefly to non-receipt of clear, coordinated and timely programs from Hq USAF, frequent changes in programmed activities, operations and organization, and the lack of experience and training of the commanders and staffs charged with all sorts of activities and who keep the fiscal accounts and records related to them. Similarly in the field of cost reporting the system is required to deal with constantly changing activities and organizations and is carried out by changing personnel still untrained in handling the complex provisions of the system. I feel that the cure for both of these conditions is constant training within the chain of command and greater stability of operating personnel, neither of which would be accomplished by further independent audits. The provision of adequate civilian personnel and travel funds (as now seems to be assured for the 3rd quarter of FY 50 at least) to permit more field examinations should be most helpful in accomplishing the functions you propose to give to the Auditor General.

In regard to nonappropriated funds, the situation is still different. While the commanders at all levels are responsible for safeguarding these funds and for the management of the activities to which they pertain, this responsibility is greater toward the individuals who contribute these funds than it is to the government. The main Air Force consideration is the managerial competance of the commanders at all levels who are responsible for the proper conduct of non-appropriated fund activities as essential elements of our entire organization. As far as CenAC is concerned, I feel that routine audits under supervision of commanders at all levels are both necessary and sufficient to assure satisfactory management of non-appropriated funds and their

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related activities.

From the foregoing, you may conclude that I do not concur in the relief of commanders of all audit responsibility as proposed in your letter. The supposition that a resident audit staff, stationed as a tenant on an installation of a major command, but responsible to the Auditor General would provide a satisfactory staff service to the installation and higher commanders seems, from my experience, to be unwarranted. The needs of a base commander would of necessity be secondary to the requirements of the Auditor General. I doubt that such staffs would be capable of responding to requests by base commanders for interim or emergency audits or would be capable of devoting sufficient time to the field examination of or training in administrative procedures and systems such as the Budget and Fiscal and Cost Reporting Systems.

There is a growing tendency, which I think is wrong and of which your proposal seems to be a part, to organize the USAF into vertical compartments from top to bottom and to nibble away at the authority and responsibility of subordinate commanders in connection with their respective activities and responsibilities. This trend is evident in the status of the Air Force Medical Service, the Air Judge Advocate system, the Chaplain's and the Inspector General's functions. This tendency is likely to result in the unnoticed but actual return to the Air Force of the disadvantages of separate services, such as the Army used to have, but which we have thus far so successfully and wisely avoided. Such separate services can be created in fact, though disguised in appearance, by relieving commanders of certain functions inherent in their responsibilities and transferring such functions to staff or service agencies even though we do not give such agencies distinctive uniforms, distinctive insignia or independent status. I am a firm believer in centralized control but am equally convinced of the necessity for decentralized operation. I believe this can best be brought about by the adoption of clear, well coordinated, and simple systems of administration in the Air Force, the publication of clear directives and manuals governing administrative procedures, and giving subordinate commanders full authority and responsibility to carry them out.

Sincerely,

DENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Commanding.

Lieutenant General N. W. Rawlings
Comptroller, Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D.C.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

30 September 1949

Brigadier General Harry A. Johnson
Vice Commander, Tenth Air Force
Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

Dear Harry:

* * *

Regarding your statement that your requisitions are filled "when and if available," it is necessary to point out that all such personnel requisitions are forwarded to Headquarters USAF as this is our only source of obtaining replacement personnel. Continental Air Command has held a very low priority with Headquarters USAF inasmuch as we have been over-strength in officer personnel whereas other major commands have been under-strength. This situation requires that the requisitions from other major commands be filled first. We constantly strive to screen and readjust personnel within this command to level off the requirements of our Air Forces and we do believe that within the next sixty days we will find ourselves in a very favorable position, with the exception of some of the more critical MOS's.

* * *

Sincerely yours,

/t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

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26 March 1949

Lt General Curtis E. LeMay
Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Hq, Offutt Air Force Base

Dear Curt:

Since your telephone conversation with Jack Doyle yesterday I have had an analysis made of the officers we have withdrawn from the First Fighter Wing as well as from the other organizations at March AFB since 1 March 1949. That date was selected since it was about that time that it became apparent that March AFB and the First Fighter Wing would be transferred to you soon. The figures which follow come from General Upston who commands the Fourth Air Force in whose area March AFB is, and my own headquarters.

I find that since 1 March 1949 we have withdrawn the following officers from the First Fighter Wing:

One Lieutenant Colonel for duty with my Deputy for Materiel.
One Captain for duty with the Deputy for Operations, Fourth Air Force.
One Captain as Statistical Control Officer 62nd Troop Carrier Wing to replace a Major who is required for duty in the Comptrollers Office, Fourth Air Force.
One Major for duty as Asst Judge Advocate, Fourth Air Force. (Four Judge Advocates remain at March AFB. This is more than there are in the Fourth Air Force Headquarters.)
Six other officers on overseas requisitions.

During the same period we have reassigned a total of sixty-eight (68) officers from the various Continental Air Command organizations at March which are being inactivated. These units are the 506th Tactical Control Group, the 7th Liaison Squadron, the 87th Tactical Rec Group, and the 933rd Signal Battalion. These units and officers of course are of no concern to you since they do not come to you with the transfer of the base. We have to build up our other units from these. Some of these people are scheduled for assignment to First Fighter Wing.

A few days ago a quota of two field officers and seven company grade officers for ROTC assignments was given to March AFB. The units from which these people are to come were not specified since it is necessary that they come from whatever units in which qualified officers are found. I do not know yet which organizations are actually furnishing these people. It is mandatory however that the quota be met.

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Ltr to Gen LeMay fr Gen Stratemeyer dtd 26 May 49

My Director of Personnel visited March AFB a few days ago. The The usual protests were made to him that the First Fighter Group was extremely short of various types of people and that it must have help in order to carry out its mission. The facts are that that group was overstrength when I received it from the Tactical Air Command and that it is now manned to some 20 percent above the average manning level in this Command. When the Tactical Air Command was merged with the old Air Defense Command to form the present Continental Air Command, I undertook to balance the manning level for the entire Command since that was one of the principal reasons for the reorganization. I favored of course the Tactical Air Command fighter organizations since they are the framework for air defense and ground support. We have reduced the manning level of the First Fighter Group somewhat, but as you can see from the above, very little and nothing like as much as the remainder of this Command. There will be no further withdrawals from the First Fighter Group other than mandatory USAF requisitions which you would have to meet yourself were the group already in your Command.

I hope this information will allay your fear that we may have been making undue withdrawals from combat organizations soon to be transferred to you. I am sorry the question arose but I feel, and I am sure you will agree from the foregoing, that it was entirely unwarranted. You may be assured of the fullest cooperation and assistance from the Continental Air Command, not only in this instance, but in any other relationships which we may have. Please do not hesitate to let me know if any other instances of this nature come to your attention.

Sincerely,

/s/t/ GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
4TH FIGHTER WING
Langley Air Force Base
Virginia

P 200.3 30 September 1949

SUBJECT: Assignment of Personnel

TO: Commanding General
Ninth Air Force
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Reference is made to letter, your headquarters, subject, "Utilization of Personnel," dated 16 September 1949. In accordance with priorities established therein, the tactical units, this base, have been manned to one hundred per cent (100%) with airmen and officer personnel, with the exception of those critical shortages shown on Inclosure No. 1.

2. Personnel assigned to these units will, of necessity, require considerable OJT prior to being considered fully qualified and thereby improving the combat efficiency of the individual airmen and the organization as a whole.

3. The filling of existing shortages in tactical organizations assigned this Wing has resulted in the following conditions in the support activities which adversely reflect on the accomplishment of the mission of this Wing:

a. The Base Flight Section is currently short the following maintenance personnel which are considered to be the absolute minimum required to fulfill the mission of the Base Flight Section:

17 Airplane Engine Mechanics (747)
12 Airplane Maintenance Mechanics (750)
2 Radio Mechanics (754)

This headquarters has no source of supply for the above personnel other than through normal personnel requisition channel; therefore, your aid is requested in immediately procuring additional maintenance personnel as indicated above in order that this department can accomplish its mission.

4. In order that the essential mission of the Base Flight Section can be carried out, six (6) B-26 and seven (7) L-13 type aircraft have

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P 200.3
Subject: "Assignment of Personnel," Hq 4th Ftr Wg, Langley AF Base, Va

been placed in temporary storage until additional personnel are available to properly maintain subject aircraft.

5. In addition, the Maintenance Section of the 4th Maintenance Squadron is currently short the following personnel who are critically needed to carry out the support of the tactical units and the special F-86 Fuel Cell Inspection. This additional program has increased the workload of the Maintenance Section by 11,200 manhours. Assuming subject personnel are supplied in the immediate future, this project can be completed in a minimum of ninety (90) days. The personnel listed below are considered critical requirements in the Maintenance Section:

1 Airplane Hydraulic Mechanic (528)
14 Airplane Sheet Metal Workers (553)
5 Fabric & Dope Mechanics (548)
6 Airplane Electrical Mechanics (685)
10 Airplane & Engine Mechanics (747)
13 Acft Maintenance Technicians (750)
1 Draftsman (070)

6. Continued action is being taken in the selection of airmen and officers possessing critical skills listed in AF Regulation 35-34, 16 March 1949, with a view to filling all MOS vacancies listed on the current TO&E and 30 September 1949 TDA. It is respectfully pointed out that the 30 September 1949 TDA has reduced the support units of this Wing by nineteen (19) officers and one hundred fifty-six (156) airmen. Information was received from the Continental Air Command Manpower Survey Team that this reduction of military personnel would be returned plus one hundred seventy-two (172) airmen in the new TD now under consideration at Continental Air Command Headquarters. Due to the above, it is requested that the reporting of critical overages of personnel be delayed until the new TDA's now being reviewed at Continental Air Command Headquarters are approved. The approval of this request would prevent unnecessary shuffling of overages of personnel to other bases and would permit the retention of critical skills in the very units augmented by TDA's.

1 Incl
List - Pers
Shortages (in trip)

t/ BELA A. HARCOS
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

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Hq 4th Ftr Wg, Langley AFB, Va.
Subj: Asgmt of Pers 30 Sep 49

9AF 200.3 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, 13 Oct 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel AFB, New York

1. This Headquarters is aware that replacements of enlisted personnel are normally made to this Command on the basis of statistical reports compiled in your Headquarters. This procedure, however, does not insure that many important key vacancies are filled. It is, therefore, requested that this indorsement be considered a special requisition for enlisted personnel made under unusual circumstances. This action is strongly indicated in view of the emphasis being placed by your Headquarters upon the manning of tactical squadrons and those maintenance and supply squadrons in immediate support of tactical groups. Officer personnel mentioned in basic communication and inclosures have been requisitioned in separate communications in accordance with the provisions of ConACR 36-4.

2. This Headquarters has filled by the allotment of airmen or their transfer all those airmen vacancies listed in basic communication and Section A, Inclosure 1, insofar as the capabilities of the Command permit. There follows a consolidated requirement for airmen personnel to fill vacancies which cannot reasonably be filled through on-the-job training or reassignment; those vacancies which this Command can fill through reassignment or on-the-job training methods are not included. Airmen to fill the positions outlined are not assigned to this Command nor does a study of the past flow of personnel to this Command indicate that they will be furnished in the near future unless some particular attention is given to this project.

MOS	Number Required
Photogrammetrist 004	4
draftsman, topographic 076	5
Photolithographer 107	2
lithographic pressman 167	2
ap hydraulic mech 528	1
ap sheet metal worker 555	15
fabric and dope mech 548	5
intelligence specl 631	2
ap elec mech 685	4
ap and engine mech 747A	27
ap maint tec 750	25
radar mech, IFF 862	3
camera tec 941	2
TOTAL	97

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Hq 9th AF, Langley AFB, Va.
Subj: Asgmt of Pers
9AF 200.3

3. With reference to paragraph six, basic communication, this Headquarters concurs in the presentation of the circumstances concerning approval of table of Distribution augmentation. This Headquarters has authorized the Commanding Officer, 4th Fighter Wing to temporarily retain airmen who now appear to be surplus until personnel authorizations can be stabilized.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl:
n/c

st/ CHARLES E. ADAIR
Major, USAF
Asst Adj General

cy furnished:
CO: 4th Ftr Wg

Mil Pers-H 200.3 (30 Sep 49) 2d Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 22 Oct 1949

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Shortages of enlisted personnel within the 4th Fighter Wing are similar to those existing in all ConAC organizations. Therefore, personnel are not presently available for assignment to this organization at this time.

2. Request is being retained in this headquarters, and personnel will be assigned as they become available.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

1 Incl:
n/c

st/V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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A 322 Res 12 April 1949

SUBJECT: Shortage of Officer Personnel - Air Force Reserve Training Centers.

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

1. A letter was forwarded to your headquarters on 21 September 1948, stressing the serious situation with respect to the assigned officer strength at all Air Force Reserve Training Centers in this Command. This situation has suffered further deterioration. It is now estimated that the mean daily effective officer strength at these activities is not more than 47% of the authorized strength.

2. It has become manifestly impractical under the foregoing condition for Air Force Reserve Training Center commanders to conduct in a reasonably efficient manner, either the administration and training of the Air Force Reserve or the base operational functions with which they may be charged. To further point up the existing situation, a personnel study of the 2231 AFRTC, a unit which is considered typical, is attached for your information (Incl. #4.)

3. These activities are now producing mediocre results. They will continue to do so until sufficient numbers of qualified officer personnel are assigned.

ROBERT M. WEBSTER
Major General, U.S.A.F.
Commanding

4 Incls:
#1 - Pers. Status of 1AF Trg. Centers
#2 - Ltr 1AF, PP 210.3, dtd 21 Sep 48
#3 - 1st ind ATC, PP 210.3, dtd 1 Oct 48
#4 - Pers. Status - 2231 AFRTC

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Shortage of Officer Personnel - Air Force Reserve Training Centers
MPl Pers-E210 (12 Apr 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York 24 May 49

TO: Commanding General, First Air Force, Fort Slocum, New York

1. The manning of the AFRTC's of your command has been a cause of serious concern to this headquarters for some time. It was presumed that action was contemplated by your headquarters to bring the manning level of these units to at least that of the overall level of your command; however, further review as of 31 March 1949 discloses that though First Air Force was eighty nine percent (89%) manned, the AFRTC's were seventy three percent (73%) manned.

2. The following figures are supplied to permit a comparative analysis:

a. Officer manning levels as of 31 March 1949:

	COMMAND WIDE				AFRTC'S		
	AUTH	ASGD	%	ATDG SCHOOLS	AUTH	ASGD	%
1AF	1508	1335	89	96	197	144	73
4AF	1711	1830	107*	153	160	151	94
9AF	1323	1178	89	59	194	157	81
10AF	974	333	91	72	260	270	104
12AF	749	761	102**	102	143	149	104
14AF	2163	1946	90	181	200	204	104
Hq ConAC	469	382	81	35	--	--	--

* Transfer of March AFB brings this level to approximately 89%.

** Overage due to large number of navigators and bombardiers assigned 47th Bomb Wing to fill Navigator-Bombardier positions thereby resulting in two officers being used to fill one position. Reassignment to SAC of rated officers other than pilots will reduce this level to approximately 93%.

3. A comparison of the foregoing figures reveals that due consideration may not have been given to manning smaller units which are more greatly affected by shortages and absences of officers on TDY. The fact that the AFRTC's are supplying twenty-one (21) of the ninety-

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Shortage of Officer Personnel - Air Force Reserve Training Centers G/100
AG 210 Pers-E (continued)

six (90) officers attending schools from your command apparently indicated that smaller units are absorbing the brunt of the shortages and school quotas.

4. Due to the uncertain future of some of the AFRTC's, no action should be taken to reallocate personnel to these units by your command until further notice from this headquarters. For such other small units whose workload is excessive as compared with their manning level, every effort should be made to assign additional personnel from those units whose level exceeds the First Air Force average. Further, quotas for such schools as Air Tactical School should be allocated in proportion to the assigned strength and in such a manner, if possible, that a selectee for such school is replaced by a returning graduate. Even if this is accomplished, it is realized that some gap between the departure of the selectee and the return of a graduate will result; however, the period involved would normally not be sufficient to have a serious effect on operations.

5. It is expected that the ConAC-wide personnel shortages will continue to exist until higher priority requirements are filled. Full utilization of available personnel must be made. Interim measures must be improvised to insure the accomplishment of the mission by all units and activities.

4 Incls
n/c

R.C. CANDEE
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force
Acting Vice Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DP 200.3 10 November 1949

SUBJECT: Apparent Assignment Discrepancies SSN 750 and 747

TO: Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

1. Attached is a list of apparent assignment discrepancies in SSN 750 and 747 reported in Personnel Accounting Charts submitted by Tenth Air Force units as of 31 October. It appears from the discrepancies noted that there is little relation between reported established authorizations and actual need for these SSN's, a situation which cannot be tolerated. The Personnel Accounting Chart totals and the numerical summary of the Form 127 should be in exact agreement. The Form 127 is the basic factor in the Air Force personnel replacement system. If the Personnel Accounting Chart presents an erroneous picture reflected by the Form 127 the entire Air Force training and replacement schedule may be unbalanced. The serious consequences of such a situation is apparent.

2. It is essential that you give close and constant attention to the utilization of airmen particularly in the critical maintenance field. Unit commanders must be taught and required to take maximum advantage of their available personnel resources. Assignment of personnel must be monitored closely, apparent malassignments investigated, and actual malassignments eliminated.

3. Each combat squadron will be assigned and maintained at its full T/O authorization of 750's before surplus in this SSN is permitted to accumulate elsewhere.

4. Report of action taken with regard to attached list of apparent assignment discrepancies is requested.

t/ CHARLES T. MYERS
Major General, United States Air Force
Vice Commander

1 Incl
List of Appar
Discrepancies

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

DP 200.3 10 November 1949

SUBJECT: Manning of Combat Squadrons

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. Analysis of the 30 September 1949 CNC-AP-P16 personnel reports discloses an unsatisfactory distribution of Airplane Maintenance Technicians, SSN 750. Although there is a general overage of 750's, many combat squadrons are not fully manned therein. Analysis of aircraft operational status shows that those squadrons which have the prescribed number of 750's have the best, and those which are undermanned in 750's have the poorest, aircraft operational status.

2. It is directed, therefore, that each combat squadron will be fully manned in 750's and so maintained, before any overmanning in this SSN is permitted elsewhere.

9AF 320.4 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, 21 Nov 1949

TO: Commanding Officer, 4th Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

1. It is directed that a complete survey be made of the distribution of Airplane Maintenance Technicians 750 within your command and that immediate action be taken to reassign these airmen as outlined in basic communication. In addition, your attention is invited to letter this headquarters, file 9AF 322, subject: "Manning of Tactical Units," 25 July 1949.

2. Request a report of completed action be furnished this headquarters not later than 25 November 1949.

s/st/ WILLIS H. HALE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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B/Ltr: Hq, ConAC, Mitchel AFB, N.Y., 10 Nov 49
Subj: "Manning of Combat Squadrons"

PA 220.4-

2nd Ind

Headquarters, 4th Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Va., 23 Nov 1949

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Langley AFB, Va.

1. With a few exceptions, Combat Squadrons were fully manned in 750's as of 31 Oct 49. The exceptions were corrected 22 Nov 1949.

2. The slight overages in 750's at this time are being reflected in the Combat Squadrons at the expense of the Air Base, and Maintenance & Supply Groups. Overseas commitments in the month of December will reduce these overages to shortages, at which time a further readjustment of personnel will be made to maintain the Combat units at 100% strength.

3. Constant effort is being exerted to fully maintain the Combat units in conformance with the policy outlined in basic communication, on each accounting date, i. e., 15th and last day of each month.

s/t/ GEORGE F. SMITH
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

9AF 320.4

3d Ind

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, 30 Nov 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Forte Base, New York

1. Attention is invited to preceding indorsement.

2. The combat squadrons, this command, are presently manned at 100 per cent strength. Athorough study will be made each month of the Personnel Accounting Charts to insure proper distribution and utilization of Airplane Maintenance Technicians 750 within this command.

s/t/ WILLIS H. HALE
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

PPE 220.3 16 August 1949

SUBJECT: Utilization of Airmen, SSN 953

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. In an effort to fill the critical SSNs 849, 850 and 955 within this command, surplus airmen, SSN 953, (listed AFR 35-34 as critical) of the 505th Aircraft Control & Warning Group were screened and those found adaptable have been placed on-the-job training to qualify in these SSNs.

2. Since the above SSNs are vital to the operation of troop carrier and all weather fighter wings and your headquarters has been unable to provide airmen in these specialties, it is requested that this headquarters be authorized to retain these on-the-job trainees until they are fully qualified and to waive the provisions of paragraph 3a, AFR 35-34, for the purpose of reclassifying airmen to appropriate primary SSN.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ R. S. BARNARD
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

Mil Pers-H 200.3 (16 Aug 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 25 Aug 1949

TO: Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California.

Paragraph 3a, AF Regulation 35-34, does not prohibit the action taken by your headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITSHEAD:

st/ RICHARD W. GEUSS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PP-E210.3 29 March 1949

SUBJET: Replacement of Personnel

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Fort Slocum, New York
(Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, Fourteenth AF's)

1. Within recent months subordinate commands have been frequently required to furnish officer quotas for mandatory requisitions, such as those forOperations Vittles, overseas assignments, the Strategic Air Command and this headquarters.

2. The curtailment of the broad troop program of the United States Air Force and the resultant reduction in the flow of replacements and recalls to active duty has placed and will continue to inflict unusual demands uponthis command. Disruption of operating efficiency has resulted in many cases through the loss of key staff officers for whom there were no adequate understudies.

3. It devolves upon Air Force Commanders to insure that each officer who may be so requisitioned has an understudy available to assume his duties or be replaced from within the respective command by another similarly qualified officer. It is desired that commanders concerned make a study of this problem to develop and maintain an understudy program with a view toward preventing further undue interruption and confusion in operating efficiency.

4. This headquarters will obtain the necessary authority as required for change of station, under the provisions of AF Regulation 35-59, 22 April 1947.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

st/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PP-E210.3

14 April 1949

SUBJECT: Replacement of Personnel

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Incloaed herewith for your information is copy of letter, this headquarters, subject as above, 29 March 1949, which evaluates the problem this command has encountered in recent months as pertains to replacement of officers occupying key staff positions and sets forth the adopted plan for overcoming similar situations in the future.

2. The establishment and maintenance of an understudy system of replacement will be of material benefit to this command but will entail certain factors which deviate from the ordinary. It will be necessary to more frealy waive that provision of AF Regulation 35-59 which requires an eighteen (18) month tour of duty at a station prior to reassignment to another station. Likewise, it becomes necessary to subject individual officers to considerable personal hardship by reason of the understudy replacement system.

3. The foregoing policy has been effected to enable this command to fill mandatory requisitions for officer personnel. Pending receipt of approval to waive the provisions of AF Regulation 35-59, this headquarters will continue to reassign personnel as required, to accomplish the mission prescribed for this command.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl:
cited letter

st/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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Subject: Replacement of Personnel

PP-8210.3 1st Ind. AFPMP-1

Dept. of the Air Force, Hq. USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 27 May 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

1. The principle of understudy indoctrination is strongly endorsed by this headquarters. It is considered, however, that adoption of such a system does not in itself necessarily involve an increase justification for waivers of Paragraph 1d, AF Reg. 35-59.

2. With respect to Paragraph 3, basic letter, the procedures set forth in AF Reg. 35-59 must be strictly adhered to.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/st/ CHARLES D. SONNKALB
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Military Pers

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

12 May 1949

Lieutenant General B. W. Chidlaw
Vice Commander, Air Materiel Command
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

Dear Ben:

Additional to our conversation last weekend in regard to personnel for materiel staff positions, I should like to suggest, for your comment, the proposal that you nominate a Colonel whom you regard as proficient or expert in matters pertaining to the Air Materiel Command for assignment as Deputy for Materiel (or A-4) in each of the six ConAC Air Forces. If such officers are now in AMC (and I presume they would be), I would of course expect to furnish you an equal number of Colonels acceptable to you, though obviously they would not have the same qualifications as those whom I seek. If I had officers of the kind I desire, I should of course not suggest we get them from you.

Underlying this proposal is my belief that senior staff officers who supervise activities related to any one service should not only be extremely familiar with, and expert in, the functions and activities of that service but should be regarded by the service itself as one of its people. This is the situation in an organization in which officers arecommissioned or belong to a separate or distinctive arm, branch or service, as used to be the case in the Air Corps, and still is in the Army. Since we have discontinued separate branches (except Medical and Chaplain) in the Air Force (which I think is entirely proper), we have been detailing officers to staff duties dealing with specialized services in accordance with general proficiency, familiarity with the duties involved, or availability. I believe we can return to the old principle of providing specialists for staff assignments which call for experience in respective staff jobs without returning to the undesirable feature of creating staff corps whose members are commissioned in or permanently assigned to such corps. This is one of the underlying reasons for my suggestion.

Of equal or even greater importance is the need that the Deputy for Materiel in major or intermediate commands be re-

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garded by the Materiel Command as one of its family. It would be desirable of course to have even larger numbers of staff officers with this qualifidcation, but as an initial step, I should like to try to put it into effect with regard to the Deputy for Materiel in this headquarters and each of its air forces.

What do you think?

Sincerely,

t/ ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
EASTERN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

EADF 210

7 December 1949

SUBJECT: Primary & Duty SSNs of Air Defense Officers

TO : Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

1. The Headquarters Eastern Air Defense Force has been forced, by circumstances, to assign certain officers to duty foreign to their primary specialties (as indicated on personnel records) in three specific instances as follows:

a. Captain Clinton D. Swan, 10224A, USAF PMOS 4419, Quartermaster Supply Officer, on duty as Chief, Ground Observer Section, Civil Defense Branch.

b. Captain Robert W. Gorton, AO1 042 821, USAF, PMOS 5000, Special Services Officer, on duty as Chief, Filter Center Section, Civil Defense Branch.

c. Captain John A. Franklin, AO 568 198, USAF, PMOS 4832, Aircraft Maintenance Officer, on duty as Chief, Training Literature and Standard Procedures Section, Civil Defense Branch.

2. Each of the above named officers is performing duty as staff officers on an operational sub-command level in the general project of organizing, manning, training, and operating a Ground Observer Corps and Civil Air Raid Warning System. Although there appears to be no current MOS to fit the actual duties being performed by this group, the duty SSN-0115, Aircraft Warning Ground Observation Officer, has been assigned arbitrarily for personnel reporting purposes.

3. Each of these officers has been under intensive training in their current duty assignment, since 10 July 1949, under Colonel William M. Talbot, USAF-Ret, (recalled to active duty for period April - November 1949, for this specific organizational and training task), including a tour of duty as Filter Center officers during Exercise LOOKOUT. The training of these officers, under stress of time elements, and without the blanket of historical precedents, has been unique, invaluable, and irreplaceable. With one other Captain of this staff, and one Captain of WADF staff, these officers comprise the entire USAF cadre of truly experienced officers in the Ground Observer - CARW fields.

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Basic Ltr: Hq EADF, subj: "Primary & Duty SSNs for Air Defense Officers.", dated 7 December 1949. (Cont'd)

4. The mission assigned to this command includes the task of selecting, preparing, manning, training, and operating the equipment and personnel of 19 or 20 Filter Centers in a permanent Ground Observer Corps--Civil Air Raid Warning System. Chief of Staff, USAF, has imposed definite target dates for the accomplishment of this task. Any further disruption to the assignment and employment of this small group of officers will seriously interfere with the prompt and orderly organization of the Ground Observer Corps--CARW System.

5. Request authority to retain these officers on their present duty, to meet air defense requirements, without regard to routine personnel manual dictates applicable to the primary MOS involved.

t/ GEORGE R. ACHESON
Brig. Gen., USAF
Deputy Commanding General

FPM-K 210.01 (7 Dec 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 27 Dec 1949

TO: Commanding General, Eastern Air Defense Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. Authority is granted to retain officers cited in paragraph 1, above, in their present duty assignments.

2. The provisions of AF Regulation 35-34, 16 March 1949, AF Letter 36-22, 9 September 1949 and message AFPTC-3745, Headquarters USAF, 8 October 1949, are waived in this instance.

3. Request future officer assignments not be made if they will conflict with the above cited directives.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Pers Man-R 200.3

21 November 1949

SUBJECT: Utilization of Airmen

TO : Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California
(Ident Ltr sent to All ConAC AFs)

1. The shortage - surplus pattern in airmen SSN's has not changed materially within ConAC during the past six months. The capability of this command to meet all its shortages from within its current personnel resources has decided limits, of course. However, a maximum effort to relieve our airmen SSN shortage by making full use of our airmen overage has not been made in the past and in view of the continuing trend evidenced in 30 Sept statistical reports is not being given sufficient emphasis at present.

2. Every effort will be made by this headquarters to equilize shortage - surplus conditions within ConAC Air Forces through appropriate assignment of airmen received from USAF and appropriate allocation of quotas of airmen to be withdrawn from ConAC to meet USAF's personnel drafts upon this command. Similarly, your headquarters, with due consideration given to manning priorities must insure that assignments and withdrawals of airmen to and from your units are made in a manner to equalize or reduce conditions of shortage or surplus. It is essential that you insure that your units utilize surplus airmen in a manner which will help alleviate current MOS shortages through:

a. Duty assignments in a needed secondary MOS.

b. On-the-job training in a higher or allied MOS for which there is a need.

c. Taking full advantage of school quotas.

d. Appropriate and timely reclassification procedures.

3. Analysis of unit personnel accounting charts indicates that many of our airmen are improperly utilized. Examples of probable poor utilization taken from the consolidated personnel accounting chart for 30 Sept of one ConAC Air Force follows:

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Pers Man-R 200.3, Utilization of Airmen

a. Despite a surplus of 50 Aerial Engineers, SSN 2750, 47 additional airmen were assigned to duty in this MOS.

b. Despite a shortage of 169 Airplane and Engine Mechanics, SSN 747, 90 airmen carrying this MOS as a primary were assigned to duty in other MOS's. Of this group, 6 were assigned to duty as Clerk Non-Typist (055), 1 to duty as Auto Equipment Operator (345), 1 as Control Tower Operator (552), 3 as Air Force Police (677), 1 as Supply Clerk (835) and 2 as Aerial Engineers (2750).

c. Despite an overage of 169 Administrative Specialists, SSN 502, 26 additional airmen were assigned to duty in this MOS.

4. Since similar examples of probable poor utilization of airmen can be found on most of the unit personnel accounting charts, the utilization of airmen by unit commanders merits closer scrutiny. The shortage - surplus airmen problem can never be resolved unless each echelon of command gives close attention to the assignment and utilization of airmen. There is reason to believe that this command will enjoy a higher USAF priority in the assignment of airmen in the future. However, the entire personnel resources of USAF cannot resolve an internal problem compounded by mal-assignment and consequent poor utilization of airmen.

5. It is requested that you forward the outline of a positive program aimed at meeting your internal airmen shortage - surplus problem and submit a report on the success of the program on 1 February 1950.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Mil Pers-F 220.3

1 July 1949

SUBJECT: Assignment and Utilization of Personnel

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Slocum Air Force Base, Fort Slocum, New York

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, 2 March 1949.

2. Latest statistical reports at this headquarters indicate that a shortage of cooks, SSN 060, exists throughout Continental Air Command, while at the same time an overage of Mess Sergeants, SSN 824 and Food Service Technicians, SSN 1824, exists. In order to obtain maximum efficient utilization of all such personnel, it is directed that surplus Mess Sergeants and Food Service Technicians be utilized to fill vacancies existing for SSN 060 within your command and that all remaining overages be reported to this headquarters for further disposition.

3. Airmen possessing SSN 521 should be encouraged to apply for school training to qualify as cooks, SSN 060, in order to eliminate our present shortages.

4. Continuing surveys should be made by your command to determine that personnel of this type are being utilized to the fullest extent and that surpluses are reported for reassignment in accordance with existing directives.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/st/ FREDERICK W. GERHARD, JR.
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PF 210.3

14 January 1949

SUBJECT: Air Force Letter 35-45, 19 February 1948

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Personnel trained in a technical specialty are required to be utilized in that specialty, thus reducing the current world wide shortage for that particular specialty. When graduates are lost to this specialty, the whole purpose for which they have been trained is defeated, and an investment has been made for which no benefit will be gained; and further, the time, effort and facilities of the Air Training Command have been wasted. This is particularly true in cases involving individuals recalled to active duty for the purpose of attending technical training courses. It is believed that in order to prevent the above, AF Letter 35-45 was promulgated.

2. It is the opinion of this headquarters that paragraph 2b of AF Letter 35-45, appears to be ambiguous. It infers that an officer is awarded an MOS upon graduation, which he is not, but rather the MOS is recommended only. Therefore, in the case of a gaining organization this paragraph as presently written cannot be violated, since a recommended MOS is not reflected on an officer's DA AGO Form 66 when he reports for duty from a technical school.

3. In this connection, it is recommended that paragraph 2b, AF Letter 35-45 be amended to require assignment to duties in the SSN for which trained as a principal duty upon graduation, since assignment to such duties as an additional duty precludes the awarding of the MOS. Further recommend that AF Letter 35-45 be amended to require the recommended MOS be entered in pencil in Item 24, DA AGO Form 66, upon graduation to insure proper assignment.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ FRANCIS S. TENNANT
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PT-K 210.3 21 April 1949

SUBJECT: Air Force Letter 35-45, 19 February 1948

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 14 January 1949.

2. Request status of recommendation made by this headquarters in paragraph 3 of cited letter. (Copy attached)

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl
Cy ltr cited above

s/st RICHARD W. GEUSS
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen.

1st Ind AFPMP-11

Dept of Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C., 29 June 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Air Force Letter 35-45,"Assignment of Officer Graduates of Technical and Administration Courses", 19 February 1948 is being rewritten and will be distributed in the near future.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl
n/c

s/st/ WILLIAM L. TUDOR
Major, USAF
Office, Director of Military Pers

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

19 October 1949

Pers Man K 210.01

SUBJECT: Classification of Officers

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York (Ident Ltrs sent to all AF ConAC Comdrs)

1. Pending the amendment of referenced directives and AF Manual 35-1, officer graduates of formal training courses training toward award of an MOS, in addition to an appropriate entry in Item 17, DA AGO Form 66, the MOS for which trained will be awarded by a permanent entry in Item 24. This entry will be made by the USAF Training Agency, i.e., Air Training Command The Air University, or Air Materiel Command, upon successful completion of the course. For graduates of a generalized training course, the reporting SSN (AF Letter 35-110 in process of Amendment) will be awarded in Item 24, with title of the course under the caption "Designation".

2. In addition to the normal entry in Item 28, DA AGO Form 66, and after this item has been closed out to reflect successful graduation, the training agency will make the following entry under "Duties" caption: "Directed duty Assignment per AF Letter 35-22. Under the caption "SSN" will be entered the SSN (or reporting SSN) awarded in Item 24, above. Orders reassigning the graduate from school to gaining unit will specify the directed duty assignment SSN.

3. The command to which the graduate is first assigned or subsequently assigned, for a period of one year, after graduation will:

a. (1) Assign the graduate as a primary duty the specialty for which trained or to a staff position supervisory to that specialty.

(2) Report the graduate in appropriate strength reports in the "Directed duty assignment SSN" established above.

b. This reporting instruction is not applicable to graduates while in pipeline status. Only authorized exceptions are outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 below.

4. In those cases where a graduate of a generalized training course

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is assigned duty in one of the MOS's in which he is potentially qualified (See Item 42, DA AGO Form 66; Training Prospectus; and AF Letter 35-110), he will be reported in that duty.

5. A Graduate possessing a critical MOS as listed in AF Regulation 35-34, who has been trained for a non-critical MOS will be assigned duty in the critical MOS. For these graduates, paragraph 2 above, will apply. Paragraph 3 above, will not apply.

6. Commanders will especially observe the performance of duty of graduates for a probationary period of four (4) months immediately subsequent to graduation. For those graduates who do not demonstrate full qualification during the period in the MOS for which trained, or in one of the MOS's for which potentially trained, a special effectiveness report will be rendered in accordance with paragraph 7c (7), AF Regulation 36-10. This paragraph will apply to all graduates with the exception of those referred to in paragraph 5 above.

7. For those officers who have received formal training in other services of the Department of the Defense, entries as directed in paragraph 1 and 2 above, will be made by the USAF base of initial assignment after such training.

8. The provisions of this letter, which exception of paragraph 6 above, are retroactive in effect to 1 January 1949. Commanders will make appropriate entries on the DA AGO Forms 66 of all officers graduating after the above date for whom proper entries have not been made by the training agency. For these officers, Item 28 will not be closed out after the entry directed in paragraph 2 above, has been made. Forms 66A will br rendered however.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WEBSTER:

st/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt. Col., AGD (USAF)
Asst Adj Gen

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CG CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

to CGs, All numbered ConAC Air Forces Unclassified

23939 . In the past this hqs has allocated pipline pers to the Air Forces of this comd in SSNs who are surplus totheir requirements. In numerous cases requests have been received to reallocate this pers to other Air Forces of this comd where such pers could possibly be utilized. This hq is aware of the shortages and surplus of pers within the Air Forces of this comd. Pers in surplus SSNs as well as needed SSNs have to be asgnd by the fastest means possible to relieve the congestion at Air Force Assembly and Processing stations. In the majority of cases surplus pers are allocated to an Air Force located nearest the Assembly and Processing Station from which that person is located in order to reduce the travel of the individual, and thereby decreasing the amount of funds spent for travel of pers. In this connection attention is invited to msg this hq, AFConAC Mil Pers-H 22672, 29 Aug 49. In the future it is requested that this hq not be asked to relieve your comd of the asgmt of an individual because he is surplus. In the event there is some administrative error that may occur in this hq and pers who are considered critically short are given to your comd, and their services are not desired, it is requested that this hq be notified, so that your hq may be relieved of furnishing asgmt instructions. All asgmts for individuals will be furnished with the least practicable delay to this hq to prevent the retention of pers in an Air Force Assembly or Processing Station for an excessive period of time.

(9 Sept 49)

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

10 August 1949

Major General Charles T. Myers
Vice Commander, Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Dear Charlie;

One of the most frequent topics of discussion is stability of personnel. We get the same comments from every phase of our activities, whether it be unit commanders or civilian institutions. It is difficult to attach the problem. General statements are of little value, so I'm taking the liberty of inviting your attention to a specific case.

The Wing Commander of the 78th stated he was losing two flight commanders (scarce individuals in his Fighter Group) to Eglin Field on TDY because they had theatrical experience. We must send eight officers to Eglin Field on September 4, 1949, on TDY for 75 days to participate as actors in skits to be presented during air indoctrination course. Instructions and qualifications were listed in your AFCONACMILPERS-X 18494. The officers meeting the requirements in some cases were key officers in the organization. Our commanders lose officers for many causes, but losing them to "Participate as actors in Skits" to be presented at Eglin is a bit difficult for some of them to understand, and frankly I'm unable to explain it to them.

Any help you can give us towards stability will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

s/t/ HUGO P. RUSH
Brigadier General, USAF
Vice Commander

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BASIC: Ltr fr Hqs ConAC, Mitchel AFB, N Y, dtd 21 Nov 49, subj: Utilization of Airmen

AFIOPTe 200.3

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS TENTH AIR FORCE, Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan, 3 Feb 1950

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. In compliance with paragraph 5, basic communication, this Headquarters has prepared a plan to improve the shortage-surplus condition of airmen within this Command. This program cannot be a one-time solution, but must and will be continually followed up and supervised on a month-to-month basis. The problems which influence proper utilization of airmen, and the plan which this Headquarters is employing, are outlined below:

a. Problems:

(1) Lack of stabilization of authorization. Tables of Distribution are constantly being remade to indicate changes in authorization, both military and civilian due to changes in mission and budgetory and personnel ceilings. Each change produces a different picture and brings a new manning problem.

(2) Lack of control over discharges. Policy of higher Headquarters regarding leniency in the approval of hardship discharges and the policy evolved through passage of the Career Compensation Act have greatly accelerated discharges.

(3) Lack of control over assignments into the Command. Airmen are being assigned by assignment orders, your headquarters, from distribution stations, and in many cases overages have been assigned which aggravate an already existing unbalance.

(4) Demands for special details, such as Operation "Portrex", "Air Indoctrination School", etc. Fully qualified personnel must be sent on these details, and in most cases extremely short notice is received. Airmen must be assigned immediately into necessary positions for which they many not be well qualified, to replace personnel detailed.

(5) Mandatory School Quotas for training into SSN's not authorized or already surplus to this Command.

(6) Reenlistees' option to select station of their choice.

(7) USAF Critical SSN's allocated this Command in surplus to established requirements.

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AF10PPO 200.3 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Utilization of Airmen

b. Plan: The following actions have been taken, copies of pertinent directives are inclosed:

(1) Letter directing all Tenth Air Force Unit Commanding Officers that they are personally responsible for implementation of the Plan to resolve the proper utilization and assignment of airmen in the future. Further, that Commanding Officers will familiarize themselves with the current On-The-Job Training, Utilization, Classification and Reclassification of airmen or procedure and regulation thereto. (Inclosure #1).

(2) T/X to all units, this Command, regarding the proper submission of the Personnel Accounting Charts, with instructions that one copy be forwarded this Headquarters. In this connection it was stressed that the Personnel Accounting Chart must agree with the Morning Report, Form 127, and 846 Reports.

(3) Regulation pertaining to On-The-Job training program, established by one of the units under this Command. (Inclosure #2).

2. In connection with the above, it is considered appropriate to invite your attention to the following drawbacks incident to the implementation of the proposed action under paragraph 1b:

a. An unavoidable and substantial increase of airmen transfers within this Command.

b. An adverse morale effect upon those airmen who are well up the career ladder but who may find themselves reclassified because they are in surplus MOS's. Such reclassification may cause the individuals affected to have to begin all over again in a career field in which they have had no training and for which they/have little interest or aptitude.
may

3. This matter will be one of continued and constant follow-up and study.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

2 Incls:
1 AG ltr to Comdrs
2 Regulation

s/st/ HQ. ALLISON
Colonel, USAF
Air Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE
BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS

PPM3

DEC 6 1949

SUBJECT: Utilization of Airmen

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

200.3 Utilization

1. In accordance with instructions contained in letter, your headquarters, Pers Man-R 200.3, dated 21 November 1949, subject as above, the following report of action taken by this headquarters to effect a proper utilization of airmen is submitted.

a. The Classification Audit Team has prosecuted a continuous program for the proper classification and utilization of airmen since April 1949 by means of semi-annual audits of the units of this command. Each organization has been audited twice since this time.

b. The Personnel Accounting Charts of each organization have been reviewed monthly since the inception of this report in May of this year. Where necessary, letters have been directed to the units concerned with instructions to correct any malassignment of airmen or to justify such assignment if possible. This action has produced very favorable results which are obvious upon comparison of the charts from month to month. An example of the type of communication forwarded to the units is attached as Inclosure #1.

c. Attached, as Inclosures #2 and #3, are copies of letters forwarded to all units of this command on 21 July 1949 and 11 August 1949. These are indicative of the type of action taken in the past to insure the proper utilization of personnel.

d. Twelfth Air Force Letter 50-2, dated 3 May 1949, copy attached, was published for the information and guidance of unit commanders in the training of personnel.

2. Some difficulty has been experienced in selecting airmen for training into the SSN's in which the major shortages exist, i.e., Basic specialties in the Super Specialty, Communications and Airplane Maintenance Fields. The SSN's in which a surplus exists are filled with airmen, for the most part, in the first three (3) grades. For this reason, they are

No further action required
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AFRTC
Subject: Utilization of Airmen

not adaptable nor is it fair to these individuals to train them into SSN's, not commensurate with their present rank, and in a different functional field.

3. The above problem is augmented by the assignment of technical school graduates to commands where no vacancies exist in the MOS for which trained. A case in point is the assignment of a relatively large number of 505-Ammunition Supply Technicians to this command when there was already a surplus of airmen qualified in this MOS. These airmen were immediately reported as surplus to the requirements of the command, however, we were informed that they were not required elsewhere. The only solution to this problem was to retrain these airmen into a different specialty in the Armament or Supply Fields, in order that their school training not be completely wasted.

4. Personnel Accounting Charts often reveal malassignments during the period immediately preceding reclassification by board action. For instance, an airman is received from an outside source classified as a 747-Airplane and Engine Mechanic. After utilizing this airman for a period of time as a 747, it is determined that he is not qualified in the MOS nor is he suitable for further training. He is given a new assignment and recommended for reclassification. Until he is actually reclassified, he will show on the Personnel Accounting Chart as a malassignment.

5. The action outlined in paragraph 1, above, will be intensified in the future with particular emphasis on the utilization of airmen within the functional field of qualification. It is anticipated that, by 1 Feb 50, not more than 5% of the airmen of this command will be questionably utilized. The figure of 5% is used because of the enforced utilization of airmen in such programs as the AFROTC and Apprehensions, where primary MOS is not the primary consideration in the assignment of personnel. A report on the success of this program will be submitted based on the 31 December 1950 personnel accounting charts of units of this command. Report will be submitted to arrive your headquarters on or before 1 Feb 50. A supplemental report will be submitted based on the 31 Jan 50 charts and will arrive your headquarters on or before 17 February 1950.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

B. FILLOW
Major USAF
Asst Adj Gen

4 Incls:
1. Ltr to 2586 AFRTC
2. Ltr to 81st Ftr Wg
3. Ltr to 47th Bomb Wg
4. 12AFL 50-2

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CA 220.3 (Ho ConAC) (6 Dec 49) 2d Ind
Subject: Personnel Assignment Analysis

HQ 26TH AIR DIVISION, Roslyn, New York, 13 January 1950

TO: Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. The squadrons referred to in sub-paragraph 1b, d & e have ceased to be under the administrative control of this headquarters due to the recent reorganization on 8 December 1949, therefore, no corrective action has been taken for those units.

2. Corrective action in the form of Classification Board action is being taken to correct the airman possessing SSN 766 and working in SSN 405. Although it is realized that this headquarters is reporting an overage in SSN 405, it is desired to point out that the T/O&E and General Order for this organization is not adequate to its needs. However, the requirement exists and must be met even though overages will be reflected.

3. In those malassignments cited in sub-paragraph 1c, with the exception of 1c(3), the same reason as stated in preceding paragraph applies. The unit concerned is not authorized certain MOS's necessary to accomplish its assigned mission, or in other instances not authorized a sufficient number, yet the mission of the organization is such that the requirement exists. Squadron Commanders are aware that malassignments as shown in basic communication, are not in accordance with current directives. However they must perform the unauthorized job requirement with those available personnel possessing experience or training that would enable them to perform efficiently, regardless of their primary classification. Such action results in his reporting those personnel in one of two ways, neither of which is desirable. They may be reported as working out of their primary classification, as are the cases shown, or they may be reported falsely as working in their primary MOS.

4. This headquarters is attempting to correct malassignments of the nature shown, by a method of assigning such individuals dual responsibilities. It is believed that this action will stay within the spirit of current classification directives as well as enable the units to perform their mission.

5. The above solution appears to be the only method available until such time as the T/O&E is altered to include the MOS's and a sufficient number thereof to avoid the necessity of malassignments.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

t/ JACK G. HOLMES
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas 8: 11 Aug 49

DP 200

SUBJECT: Utilization of Personnel

TO: Commanding Officer
47th Bombardment Wing
Barksdale Air Force Base
Louisiana

1. The economical utilization of personnel assigned to this command is one of the most vital of important matters to be thoroughly understood by every commander and by every officer and airman. Obviously, complete knowledge of every phase of personnel employment, management, and control is essential to the proper operation of any military organization.

2. Personnel redistributions and reductions are continually occurring, while missions remain constant or production requirements are increased. The accomplishment of essential results under such conditions can be attained only by continual study of the various jobs being performed by individual officers, airmen and civilians.

3. There has been much evidence of improper attention to personnel matters in this command. In many instances critically short specialists have been assigned to duties completely foreign to their particular field. Duplication of assigned duties has been not uncommon. Personnel accounting has not been accurate and reports which are in error have given distorted pictures of personnel situations.

4. Now is the time for honest, conscientious effort to so arrange your personnel operating procedures that there will be no question whatever concerning your knowledge of how, why, when and where each person under your command is being utilized with no reflection on the proper utilization of each assigned individual.

5. Staff visits by officers of this and higher commands will be made frequently to obtain information concerning personnel of your command. It is desired that you take action to insure that questions relating to your personnel are accurately answered and that information is immediately available to visiting officers.

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DP
Subject: Utilization of Personnel

6. Important personnel matters are listed for your attention:

a. Maintenance of records to accurately show the number of officers and airmen authorized, assigned, and present for duty each day.

b. Proper form recording of shortages of officers and airmen.

c. Complete justification for any indicated need for personnel over authorized strength.

d. Proper daily reporting procedures to positively insure that the reason for each absence from duty is known, and justified, not the following day but on the day the absence occurs.

e. The assignment of each individual of your command to a duty wherein his skills may be used to the greatest productive advantage.

f. The assignment of each officer and airman to duty for which he has been trained or to a parallel or higher field of endeavor. It is important that no person who possesses an MOS or SSN declared critical be utilized in any other field and that no person who possesses an MOS or SSN declared acutely short be utilized in any other capacity other than as a trainee in a parallel or higher field of endeavor.

g. Rated officers are not to be selected to attend Service Schools where the course of instruction is of purely administrative nature not related to duties required of rated personnel.

h. Personnel who possess a critical MOS or SSN not authorized your command will be declared excess.

i. Overages in authorized strength will be reported to this headquarters or completely justified.

j. Grade spreads will be in accordance with authorizations.

7. The points listed above are not of such nature as to be considered a one-time effort to improve utilization of personnel. Each matter should be constantly reviewed and applied to your daily procedures.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL BARCUS:

t/ G. C. JAMISON
Brigadier General, USAF
Vice Commander

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(300.3) 431

PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT OF AIRMEN UTILIZATION IN FOURTH AIR FORCE

1. Full compliance, through personal attention of all commanders, with the following 4th Air Force directives, which place particular emphasis on cross-training or re-training of surplus personnel to alleviate current MOS shortages, and on reporting of surplus personnel: (copies attached)

a. Ltr, Hq 4th AF, subject: "Cross-training and Utilization of Personnel", dated 7 June 49.

b. Ltr, Hq 4th AF, subject: "Classification and Reporting Personnel", dated 29 July 49.

c. Paragraph 4, 4th AF Regulation 39-1, Surplus Airmen, dated 26 Oct 49.

2. All commanders are being directed to report immediately to this Headquarters any obstacles which preclude full compliance with existing directives pertaining to the utilization within MOS of assigned personnel.

3. An amendment to 4th AF Regulation 35-5, 2 Aug 49, is being published to more clearly define, and increase, the responsibilities and functions of Wing Audit Teams, with a view toward more effective utilization of 4th AF Audit Teams.

4. A check list is being prepared for commanders, Wing Audit Teams, and classification personnel as a means to further standardize maintenance of basic personnel records and derivative reports. A current listing of all directives, pertaining to every phase of personnel classification, utilization, and reporting procedures will be attached thereto for ready reference, and subsequent changes will be promptly published in 4th AF Bulletins.

5. Commanders' attention is being directed to Sec VII, ConAC Classification Bulletin 38-1, November 1949, with specific instructions to correct any of the errors noted in preparation of Personnel Accounting Charts.

6. Full use will be made of IG Inspection Teams and officers making special staff inspections, to supplement activities of the 4th AF Audit Teams, and to maintain a constant check on proper utilization of personnel to equalize or reduce conditions of shortage or surplus.

7. Continued close coordination with Statistical Services will be observed to insure a higher degree of accuracy in personnel accounting reports, and to obtain the greatest possible benefit from combined knowledge and study of shortage-surplus trends.

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AIR MAIL

Utilization of Airmen
Pers Man-R 220.3 (21 Nov 49) 1st Ind
220.3

Headquarters, Fourth Air Force, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California.

19 DEC 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York.

1. In compliance with paragraph 5, basic communication, indicated below is the action taken to improve utilization of personnel in this command.

a. The Personnel Accounting Charts and USAF Forms 127 are being carefully analyzed for malassignments, improper utilization and training, overages and shortages. Where indicated, this headquarters is directing the responsible commander to take remedial action; when necessary, re-assignments to other units of this command will be accomplished as in the past.

b. A directive is being dispatched for the personal attention of all commanders, re-emphasizing the importance of careful classification and assignment of personnel in order to utilize skill and ability to the best advantage of the unit, and pointing out again the constant necessity for accurate personnel reporting methods. Further, commanders are being instructed to insure implementation in subordinate units of the cross-training or re-training of surplus airmen possessing non-critical MOS's through the media of on-the-job training or school training, to fill existing vacancies within the organization.

c. A current 4th Air Force Regulation requires that airmen surplus to the needs of an organization be reported to this headquarters; in turn, airmen surplus to the needs of this command are reported to your headquarters for disposition.

2. It is intended that the responsibilities and functions of Wing Personnel Audit Teams be broadened, thereby relieving Fourth Air Force Personnel Audit Teams of many time-consuming details and permitting more effective investigation of actual utilization of personnel as reflected in personnel accounting reports and through interviews.

3. Reference paragraph 3, basic communication, the following specific report is submitted regarding apparent improper utilization of airmen: During the recent heavy withdrawals of airmen, this headquarters, of a necessity, assigned airmen possessing SSN's 2750 and 750 (without regard to suffix) to units having the greatest shortage of maintenance personnel. Some on-the-job training was necessary in most of these cases to qualify personnel for duty on the type equipment available at the station concerned. This would account for any discrepancy in this command noted in your paragraph 3a. A review of personnel accounting reports for September reveals the only other error to be assignment of three (3) additional airmen to duty

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AIR MAIL

Utilization of Airmen
Pers Man-2 [illegible] (22 Nov 49)

19 DEC 1949

in SSF 502 in spite of the obvious surplus. This has been corrected.

4. The utilization, classification and assignment of airmen has been a subject for special study and consideration within this Headquarters and subordinate units. Maximum efforts are being exerted to utilize all available manpower to the fullest extent possible, within the concept of directives of higher headquarters and the mission of this Command.

5. An analysis of the November personnel accounting reports in this Headquarters indicates there are no outstanding discrepancies in the utilization of personnel within the command at the present time, which are not justified by training-in and training-out or anticipated withdrawals and allocations.

6. Attached hereto is an outline of a program for the improvement of airmen utilization in this command, which is now being effected and will be continuously stressed. A report of the success of this program will be submitted on 1 February 1950, as requested.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

James L. Sloan

JAMES L. SLOAN
WOJG USAF
Asst Adjutant Gen.

2 Incls:
Incl 1 - Program for Improvement of Airmen Utilization in AAF. w/3 Incls.
Incl 2 - Sample letter to commanders

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AIR MAIL

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COPY

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE
HAMILTON, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:

DP 320.2/61

7 June 1949

SUBJECT: Cross-training and Utilization of Airmen

TO: Cmdr, each Air Div, Wing and AFRTC Fourth AF; ea FMSRT, Sr ANG Instr and Ln Off, Fourth AF Area

1. It is anticipated that few, if any, allocations of additional personnel will be made to this command in the near future. In fact, it is indicated that a steady flow of withdrawals will be made which will place units of this command below the authorized strength, and in this connection your attention is further invited to Classified Letter EOATP, GP-1-353/15, 18 May 49. This letter in no way relieves the commanders concerned from the responsibilities of submitting ordinary and emergency requisitioning of personnel.

2. It therefore becomes vitally necessary that a concentrated and vigorous program of on-the-job training, together with cross-training and cross-utilization of personnel be initiated immediately, particularly in those skills which are critical, acute, or short within the unit. It is realized that this program has been undertaken within Fourth Air Force units to some extent, however, surveys show that in most cases, only the barest minimums are being met. It therefore behooves each commander to take stock of the situation within his organization and institute the necessary action to attain the highest operational standard with the minimum number of personnel. It is contemplated that drastic reforms will be necessary and action to this end must begin immediately.

3. Under the assumption that current classification directives are followed and commanders are not awarding high SSN's to the unqualified, the following are examples of how personnel in the higher SSN brackets may be cross-trained or cross utilized in the different specialties within their career fields.

ADMINISTRATIVE FIELD		RELATED OR ALLIED SSN'S
502 (Adm. Specialist)	May be used or trained as:	213-Statistical Clerk 268-Accountant or Auditor 275-Classification Specialist 622-Finance Technical Clerk 673-Medical Administrative Spec.
SUPPLY FIELD		
821 (Supply Tech)		826-AF Supply Technician 581-Comm Supply Technician 815-Ordnance Supply Technician 594-Pers Equip Technician 825-Medical Supply Technician

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FP 320.2/61 (7 June 49)
Subj: Cross-training and Utilisation of Airmen

MAINTENANCE FIELD

750
(Ap Maint Tech)
925
(Ap Engineering Tech)

RELATED OR ALLIED SSN'S
528-Airplane Hydraulic Mech
684-Airplane Power Plant Mech
685-Airplane Elect Mechanic
687-Airplane Prop Mech
737-Flight Engineer
762-Airplane Engine Repairman
925-Airplane Engine Tech
956-Airplane Carburetor Rep
964-Airplane Supercharger Rep
995-Rotary Wing Mech

COMMUNICATIONS FIELD

754
(Radio Mech, AF)
756
(Radio Op AF)

542-Communications Technician
644-Radio Repairman
649-Radio Repairman, Fixed Sta
759-Radio Op, CNS
792-Radio Rep, teletype
933-Instrument Landing Equip
993-Radio Mech PQ Target AP

The above examples show what can be done, and there exists ample opportunity to apply this rule to the many specialty fields enumerated in USAF Manual 35-1 together with the application of current directives pertinent to classification and utilisation of personnel, particularly AFR 35-34. All skills must be exploited to the utmost to insure maximum efficiency, economy, and distribution, with on-the-job and cross training as prerequisites. Classification and Assignment Officers are charged with the responsibility of interviewing present and new assignees to determine hidden skills not reflected on basic records. Increased emphasis will be placed on the accuracy of DA AGO Forms 20 and 66 in order that these records will project a true and up-to-date picture of the background of schooling and practical experience of each individual and that all personnel reports compiled from these records reflect the true situation within the unit reported. Personnel well qualified in a high MOS should be screened for possible use as inspectors whenever shortage exists. Greater care must be exercised in requesting school training only in those skills requisite to the mission of the organization to indicate the current status with regard to such utilisation and training.

4. A requirement also exists for the cross-training of combat crews whereby each combat crew member is trained to perform or assist in the performance of the functions of other crew members. (Pilot transition restricted to authorized personnel.) All co-pilots should be trained to perform the duties of first pilot and become familiar with the duties of other crew members. Pilots and co-pilots should be trained to perform the duties of aerial engineer where applicable. Navigators of troop carrier wings should become familiar with

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PP 320.2/61 (7 June 49)
Subj: Cross-training and Utilization of Airmen

the duties of the enlisted crew members.

5. Special attention of the Fourth Air Force inspection and Personnel Audit systems will be given to this subject.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL UPSTON:

/s/ Otis C Johnson
OTIS C. JOHNSON
1st Lt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
20 cys ea Air Div & Wg
5 cys ea AFRTC
3 cys ea remainder of addressees, plus
2 cys DP, this hq

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
HAMILTON AIR FORCE BASE
HAMILTON, CALIFORNIA

29 July 1949

IN REPLY REFER TO:

PPE220.3

SUBJECT: Classification and Reporting Personnel

TO : (This letter addressed to commanders of each Air Division, Wing, Control Group, AFRTC, and separate units.)

1. Recent surveys of statistical, inspection, classification Audit Teams, and staff visit reports indicate that the provisions of AFM 35-1, ConAC Reg 14-1, and 4AFR 39-5 are not being complied with and adequate personnel management procedures are not being practiced by units of this command. Statistical reports have indicated that units of this command have sufficient qualified personnel available to perform the assigned mission, while on the other hand, inspection or other reports tend to show that the unit's mission cannot be efficiently performed due to shortage of qualified personnel or because personnel assigned are not qualified in their military occupational specialty.

2. The impending implementation of the Airman's Career Program makes it doubly important that all personnel be slotted into a career field and positive action taken to insure that they are qualified in that field.

3. It is desired that Wing and separate unit commanders take action to initiate an immediate survey within their commands to determine the following:

a. The correctness of the primary and secondary SSN of each assigned airman as indicated on DA AGO Form 20, including the degree of skill (i.e. SSK, SK) and date this skill was attained. This check will also indicate whether airman is qualified in these SSNs. When airmen are found unqualified in an SSN, immediate action will be taken to qualify the airman or remove the SSN. Continuing action will be taken to award SSNs to airmen only after their immediate commander or supervisor has certified that they are qualified under existing standards.

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PPE220.3

SUBJECT: Classification and Reporting Personnel

b. That airmen are performing duty in SSN as reflected on the DA AGO Form 20 and Personnel Accounting Chart and that action is being taken to insure that these entries reflect the current duty assignment of the individuals at all times.

c. That a system is being followed by commanders preparing the AF Form 127 or Personnel Accounting Chart, to compile these reports from data shown on the DA AGO Form 20.

4. Proper classification, assignment and utilization of personnel are personnel management tools inherent in command and wisely used, contribute to the morale, efficiency and retainability of personnel in the organization concerned.

5. Commanders will personnally acknowledge receipt of this letter, indicating any additional action being taken to improve classification, assignment and statistical reporting procedures of their command.

JOHN B. UPSTON
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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4AF REGULATION)
39-1)

39-1, 2 Pages
Page 1

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California
26 October 1949

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Assignment of Regular AF Enlistees or Reenlistees, Technical School Graduates & Reporting Surplus Enlisted Personnel

(This Regulation supercedes 4AFR 39-1, 12 Jul 49 and 39-14, 26 Aug 49)

* * * * * * *

4. Surplus Airmen:

a. Airmen possessing primary or secondary SSNs as listed critical in AFR 35-34 who are surplus to the authorized needs of the organization will be reported to this headquarters for reassignment, furnishing information required by par 6b, AR 615-200 and par 3b, ConACR 35-1.

b. All other airmen assigned to an organization of this command who are surplus within the unit in his specialty field and who cannot be retrained into an SSN authorized and short within the organization will be reported to this headquarters for reassignment furnishing information required by par 4a above.

(1) Personnel having less than six (6) months to serve in current enlistment will not be reported to this headquarters for reassignment.

(2) Surplus personnel for whom an anticipated vacancy in his specialty field will exist within a ninety (90) day period should not be reported to this headquarters for assignment.

c. Department of Army personnel for whom a SCARNAF or ARNAF position vacancy does not exist will be reported to this headquarters in accordance with par 5, AFR 39-5.

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

PPM-K 220.3 13 January 1950

SUBJECT: Reclassification and Utilization of Airmen

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. An extensive personnel study which has been conducted in this headquarters for the past several months reveals an undesirable picture of personnel utilization and reclassification. It shows that little progress is being made to improve the situation.

2. Excessive surpluses in certain specialties and shortages in others stand out in sharp contrast. The situation is complicated by the loss of personnel in the short specialties through expiration of term of service and the fulfillment of overseas quotas, and by the continued influx of specialists already surplus. It is aggravated by an uneven distribution of shortages and surpluses among the various units within the command thus limiting maximum effective utilization being made of both short and surplus specialists within the units. Analysis of Personnel Accounting Charts reveals many instances in which personnel possessing MOS's short in the unit are assigned to duty in specialties surplus in the unit. Surplus specialists are being utilized in their primary specialties when great need exists in the unit for these specialists in secondary MOS's in which these surplus specialists are qualified.

3. The continued loss of personnel in specialties which are short must be anticipated and plans made accordingly. It must be assumed that the influx of personnel in surplus specialties will continue at least temporarily as in the past. However, a major portion of the problem can and must be solved internally through the judicious assignment to duty of presently assigned personnel and a more equitable distribution of this personnel among all units of your command. In this connection, specific reference is made to paragraphs 1203, 1203.1, 1203.1a and 1203.1b, AF Manual 35-1.

4. It is desired that immediate action be taken to implement the following program designed to relieve the current shortage-surplus problem.

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PPW-K 220.3 Reclassification and Utilization of Airmen (Cont)

a. Thoroughly screen all personnel possessing primary MOS's which are surp lus both in ConAC and USAF-wide for the purpose of:

(1) Reclassification of those found not fully qualified.

(2) Reclassification of those found qualified but for whom no authorized T/O&E, T/D or T/DA vacancy exists.

b. Utilize all Basic Airmen, SSN 521, in SSN's in which shortages exist in ConAC and within the individual units. Reference is made to paragraph 4c, letter this headquarters, O&T 200.3, 11 January 1950, subject, Utilization and Training of Airmen. (Copy inclosed)

c. Utilize all surplus personnel to the maximum extent possible in SSN's which are short both in ConAC and within the individual units. Reference is made to paragraph 511.2, AF Manual 35-1, and to paragraphs 4a, b, c, e and f, letter this headquarters, O&T 200.3, 11 January 1950, subject, Utilization and Training of Airmen.

5. The following implementing action will be taken by all commanders to accomplish the objectives cited in 4a above.

a. All airmen who possess the following primary MOS's which are surplus both in ConAC and USAF-wide will be brought before a Classification Board convendd in accordance with the provisions of ConAC Regulation 14-1, 7 January 1949, forthe purpose of determining through exhaustive study and interview, the degree of qualification of each airmen.

014 078 502 505 824

b. Those individuals found not fully qualified in their primary MOS will be reclassified to another SSN in which fully qualified, including Basic Airmen, SSN 521, and utilized in accordance with paragraphs 4b and c above. Such individuals who possess one of the following MOS's, short within ConAC, as a secondary MOS will be reclassified in these secondary MOS's without delay and shall, except when the Air Force Commanding General decides otherwise in exceptional cases, be utilized in the secondary MOS. The old primary MOS's of these individuals will be removed from qualification records.

060	187	345	647	686	850	957
062	212	510	648	687	853	958
070	237	514	650	759	862	1383
117	242	528	677	766	941	2756
144	268	548	684	805	953	9870
166	275	555	685	849	955	

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c. Those individuals found qualified in their primary MOS's will then be reassigned to duty in their primary MOS's only insofar as actual T/O & E, T/D or T/DA authorizations permit. Inter-squadron transfers of this personnel, on the same station, will be made to the extent necessary to fill all authorized vacancies which may exist on a station or which are created as a result of reclassification effected in accordance with paragraph 5b, above. The remainder of these individuals who possess one of the MOS's listed in b above as a secondary MOS will be reclassified in these secondary MOS's without delay and shall, except when the Air Force Commanding General decides otherwise in exceptional cases, be utilized in the secondary MOS. However, the old primary MOS's of these individuals will remain on qualification records as a secondary MOS.

d. The remaining airmen in these surplus SSN's who desire formal school training in the aircraft and electronics maintenance fields and who possess reasonable aptitude may be sent to an appropriate ATrC (TDY) school and return to the same base. Should the ATrC school require PCS, this headquarters believes that approval of the return of this personnel to home stations can be secured.

e. The remaining airmen in the surplus SSN's will be placed in on-the-job training in one of the SSN's listed in b above.

6. The following implementing action will be taken by all commanders to accomplish the objectives outlined in paragraph 4b above.

a. No further awards of the MOS's listed in paragraph 5a above will be made to basic airmen except when the Air Force Commanding General personally decides to the contrary.

b. Basic airmen will be utilized to the maximum extent possible to fill shortages in the SSN's listed in paragraph 5b above. However, selection of basics for on-the-job training in specific MOS's will be made only after careful consideration of the overall personnel situation in the unit. Reference is again made to paragraph 511.2, AF Manual 35-1.

c. Inter-squadron transfers of basics, on the same station, will be made to the extent necessary to achieve their maximum effective utilization in the short SSN's.

d. Basics will be given priority, after NCO's being retrained from surplus SSN's, in the fulfillment of quotas to technical schools not requiring prerequisite qualifications.

7. The following implementing action will be taken by all commanders to accomplish the objectives cited in paragraph 4c above.

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PPM-K 220.3 Reclassification and Utilization of Airmen (Cont)

a. Determine through continual analysis and review of squadron Personnel Accounting Charts that all surplus personnel are being utilized to the utmost in filling vacancies in short specialties within the units.

b. Determine through continual analysis and review of all personnel reports that equitable distribution of both short and surplus specialists is being effected through inter-squadron transfers of surplus personnel on the same station.

c. Perform a continual analysis and review of all T/O&E's, T/D's and T/DA's and take action to recommend changes where necessary.

d. Conduct a program of continual analysis and study of the shortage-surplus pattern and take action to insure that training being conducted is in consonance with air force needs.

e. Require Classification Audit Teams to devote specific attention during the course of regular personnel surveys to compliance with the above requirements.

8. The SSN's listed in paragraphs 5a, ConAC-USAF surpluses, and 5b, ConAC-USAF shortages, will be amended from time to time by this headquarters. Lists of SSN's appearing in letter this headquarters, O&T 200.3, 11 January 1950, Subject, Utilization and Training of Airmen, which appear to conflict with lists contained in this letter will be disregarded. They will, however, be used as a general guide in the utilization and training of airmen when not in conflict with SSN's appearning herein.

9. USAF and ConAC records are only as good as the data received from the units in the field. Headquarters USAF must establish all ATrC training quotas from this data. Records from the field must portray the situation. Unnecessary delay in the reclassification for example, of 502's to 275's causes USAF to establish school quotas for 275's when there are more than enough 502's available who, in a brief OJT period, can be fully qualified as 275's. There are many similar examples which could be given.

10. I shall expect you, your general staff officers and wing and group commanders to be able to answer any of my questions on this subject when I next visit these activities.

1 Incl
Ltr Hq ConAC
O&T 200.3

t/ ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
MITCHEL AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

AG 461

22 DEC 1949

SUBJECT: Airman Overage and Shortage Costs

TO : Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The attached two (2) inclosures indicate the cost to ConAC of the lack of balance between authorized and assigned airmen by SSN as of 30 November 1949.

2. The lack of balance is evident from a glance at the inclosures. A summary of the actual cost follows:

a. Inclosure No. 1 is a partial list of SSN's in the automotive, administrative, clerical and supply fields as of 30 November 1949. ConAC was over strength 5948 airmen in these SSN's which included an average of 1423 basic soldiers (521's). While some of these airmen are being used effectively in allied SSN's in which ConAC is short, most of these men cannot be used at even fifty per cent efficiency in some other SSN. I estimate that at least forty to fifty per cent of this annual payroll rate of about $10,100,000 is a complete loss to the USAF.

b. Inclosure No. 2 is an almost complete list of the shortages and overages by SSN in the operations and maintenance fields of aircraft, communications and radar (both early warning and airborne). The net shortage is 2944 airmen; an annual payroll rate of approximately $5,000,000 which on 30 November 1949 was not being provided ConAC to carry out its mission.

ENNIS C. WHITEHEAD
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
Commanding

2 Incls
1. Airman Overages,
30 Nov 49
2. Airman SSN's,
30 Nov 49

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ConAC 30 NOVEMBER 1949 AIRMEN OVERAGES AUTHOMOTIVE, CLERICAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY FIELDS

SSN	MOS	AUTH	ASSIGNED	OVER
0014	Auto Equip Mech	668	1125	457
0014V	Auto Equip Mech	0	16	16
0050	Carpenter	250	378	128
0055	Clerk Non-Typist	1694	1769	75
0059	Construction Tech	92	156	64
0078	Electrician	106	234	128
0114	Machinist	107	172	65
0301	Investigator (CID)	1	42	41
0359A	Asphalt Rock Crusher	19	59	40
0359V	Const Mach Opr	61	132	71
0359C	Shovel Opr	7	33	26
0359D	Grader Opr	1	28	27
0359E	Well Drill Equip	0	11	11
0359F	Misc Equip Opr	137	145	8
0359	Const Mach Opr	225	408	183
0405	Clerk Typist	3254	3472	218
0502	Adm Spec	2338	3542	1204
0505	Amm Supply Tech	36	167	131
0505V	Amm Supply Tech	0	73	73
0521	Basic Airman	6	1429	1423
0566	Duty NCO	223	348	125
0620	Para Rigger & Repair	131	182	51
0622	Finance Tech Clk	135	174	39
0791	Air Opns Spec	403	582	179
0821	Supply Tech	745	1010	265
0824	Food Service Stewards	257	596	339
0826	AF Supply Tech	607	899	292
0835	Supply Clerk	1432	1515	83
0931	Hvy Auto Equip Opr	332	407	75
0945	Photo Lab Tech	173	250	77
0965	Automotive Rep	318	352	34
	Total	13758	19706	5948

* Estimating average airman pay and allowances at $1700 per year ConAC has 5948 x $1700 or $10,111,600 in annual airman payroll for airmen who are entirely or partially non-productive.

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COMAC 30 NOVEMBER 1949 STATUS OF AIRMEN SSN'S BOTH OVER AND SHORT IN A/C RADAR, RADIO, OPERATIONS, AND MAINTENANCE SSN'S

MOS	SSN	AUTH	ASSIGNED	OVER OR SHORT
0327	Teletype Operator	268	176	- 92
0338	Lineman T&T	280	186	- 94
0339	Teletype Mech	111	94	- 17
0510	Info Center Operator	460	289	-171
0514	Radio Oper, (HS)	820	644	-176
0528	AP Hydraulic Mech	169	77	- 92
0542	Gunn Tech	238	352	86
0548	Fabric & Dope Mech	133	78	- 45
0550	AP Woodworker	39	49	10
0555	AP Sheet Metal Worker	348	315	- 33
0559	Glider Mech	46	38	- 8
0573	AP Welder	105	101	- 4
0574	MS & Auto Pilot Repair	8	9	1
0575	Remote Cont Turret Repairman	0	1	1
0580	Remote Cont Turret Mech-Gunner	2	2	0
0581	Gunn Supply Tech	77	75	2
0602	Leather & Canvas Wk	9	7	- 2
0612	AP Armor Gunner	3	21	18
0620	Para Rigger & Repair	131	182	51
0637	Info Center Tech	26	19	- 7
0646	T&T Equip Repairman	25	24	- 1
0647	Radio Repair Equip	101	54	- 47
0648	Radio Repairman	460	189	-271
0648A	Radial AP Power Plant Mech	414	168	-246
0648B	In-Line AP Power Plant Mech	72	47	- 25
0648C	Jet AP Power Plant Mech	205	129	- 76
0648E	B-25 & P-10 Power Plant Mech	16	0	- 16
0648	AP Power Plant Mech	707	344	-363
0665	AP Elect Mech	260	206	- 54
0666	AP Instr Repairman	162	127	- 35
0667	AP Prop Mech	163	88	- 75
0737	Flight Engineer	2	17	15
0747A	P-80, 84, 51, 82, 47 Eng Mech	909	635	-274
0747B	F-6, 63 Eng Mech	98	190	92
0747C	C-54, 47, 46, 82, 74 Eng Mech	1198	524	-674
0747D	B-29, 50, C-97, P-13, B-17, Eng Mech F-9, B-24, F-7	19	41	22
0747E	B-45 Eng Mech	68	39	- 29

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SSN	MOS	AUTH	ASSIGNED	OVER OR SHORT
0747G	B-26, 25, F-61, F-15, Eng Mech	308	201	- 107
0747H	OA-10,9, PBM Eng Mech	0	1	1
0747I	C-45, T-6, 13, 7, 17, 11, L-4, 5, 13, 15, F-2 Eng Mech	636	728	92
0747V	Recent Grad, Eng Mech	0	82	82
0747	AP Eng Mech	3236	2441	- 795
0748	Flt Maint Gunner	26	44	18
0750A	AP Maint Tech B-29, F-13	772	626	- 146
0750B	AP Maint Tech B-32	192	285	93
0750C	AP Maint Tech B-17, F-9	923	867	- 56
0750D	AP Maint Tech B-24, F-7	7	62	55
0750E	AP Maint Tech B-25, F-10	50	95	45
0750F	AP Maint Tech B-26	41	59	18
0750G	AP Maint Tech P-7, F-3	279	361	82
0750H	AP Maint Tech A-26	0	1	1
0750I	AP Maint Tech P-38	721	939	218
0750R	AP Maint Tech Helicopter	17	27	10
0750	AP Maint Tech	3002	3322	320
0754	Radio Mech AF	387	500	113
0756	Radio Opr AF	70	109	39
0756V	Radio Opr AF	0	21	21
0759	Radio Opr GNS	373	239	- 134
0760	Radio Opr AACS	0	8	8
0766	Radio Opr HS Man	452	273	- 179
0768	Intercept Cont Tech	21	48	27
0776	Radio Opr LS	39	78	39
0792	Rad Rep Single Chan	16	5	- 11
0805	Crypto Tech	127	73	- 54
0849	Radar Mech TC	52	8	- 44
0850	Radar Mech NF	45	18	- 27
0853	Radar Mech Nav	98	12	- 86
0862	Radar Mech IFF	54	11	- 43
0866	Radar Obs SS	33	11	- 22
0868	Radio - Tele Mech	10	1	- 9
0911	Armament Mech	515	502	- 13
0925	A/C Eng Tech	254	278	24
0950	Wire Rep VHF	16	4	- 12
0951	Radio Rep VHF	10	1	- 9
0953	Rad Rptg Eq (DS)	196	170	- 26
0955	Rad Rep AB Eq (DS)	101	28	- 73
0957	AP Elect Inst Mech	46	10	- 36
0958	AP Eng Elec Acc Rep	60	24	- 36
0959	AP Mech Instr Rep	0	3	3
0960	Remote Cont Tur Mech	7	10	3
0961	AP Gyro Inst Rep	1	0	- 1
2747	Flt Mech Tech	677	1006	329
2756	Radio Opr Mech	247	211	- 36
	Total	22263	19319	-2944

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington

Secretary of the Air Force
Personnel Council

5 October 1949

Lieut. General Ennis C. Whitehead
Commanding General, Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, New York

Dear Ennis:

For some time I have been urging the powers-that-be to call a meeting of all Air Force and Major Commanders to discuss "Vitalization" of our officer cadre--or in plain language, that which we have always referred to as "reclassification."

In lieu of this meeting, I believe--and Id Edwards concurs--that a personal letter may explain some of the problems the Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council faces in helping you, the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Air Force to get rid of substandard officers.

First, let me explain, if you don't already know, that the Personnel Council is an administrative organization which might best be described as a "holding company" for various boards. It functions directly under the Secretary and is responsible to him for its actions and decisions. We do, however, consider ourselves intimately associated with the headquarters of the Chief of Staff and especially with his Deputy for Personnel. In this way, Edwards is free to use us for many purposes which otherwise would require special boards. This dual capacity is, at times, not too enviable a position as I will show below.

I have been called in by the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff and asked why my Personnel Board was not going along with the Major Commanders in certain instances in getting rid of officers whom they considered substandard. On the other hand, I have been called into the Secretary's office and told that the evidence and the official documents concerning each case must be such as to demonstrate clearly that the individual in question is unfit to hold his commission or commissions. In fact, in certain cases, the Secretary has not agreed with you or my Board and has over-ruled both of us. I most certainly do not intend any criticism of his actions in these cases. We who have been in the old Army Air Force and the present Air Force of the United States have seen over the years how poorly old Section 24b of the

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National Defense Act was administered; and, therefore, we are liable to give perhaps too much weight to the mere fact that the officer in question has been considered by his Commanding Officer as unfit to hold his commission. Perhaps we have not given enough attention to the actual evidence against him--or for him. Anyway, I believe that it is well for the good name of the Air Force to have the civilian viewpoint as the final authority when an officer, who is also a citzen of the United States, is to lose his commission in the Service.

Perhaps, by the above, I might appear to be laying all our disapprovals of your recommendations on the Secretary's doorstep. This impression, if given, is not a fact. The removal of "probationary officers" comes under Section 23 of the National Defense Act; and of Reserve officers under another section. Section 23 allows removal from office "under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe." These regulations (AFR 36-2) have, of course, been prepared by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, and approved by the Chief of Staff before final approval by the Secretary. We of the Personnel Board are not policy makers but are, in a sense, a judicial body which interprets the principles set forth in regulations. All of which leads to some concrete examples as to how we act on those cases which come not only from your command but from all the other commands.

Take the case of an officer who was involved in one incident of drinking to excess. He was not reprimanded under the 104th AW, but was placed before a Board of Fitness. Hearsay evidence was introduced in an attempt to show that his drinking is "habitual intemperance." We, sitting on our Board, may believe in our own minds that the officer would not have been put before the Board of Fitness had not there actually been other incidents of excessive drinking. Yet no direct evidence is introduced to show this probability to be the truth; there is no record of admonitions or reprimands, or even of this drinking having been called to the attention of the officer by anyone in authority. In our judicial capacity, we must disabuse our minds of what our years of experience in such cases tend to make us considere the man as guilty; and to find on the evidence presented that there is no record of "habitual intemperance" which 36-2 states is a cause for removal.

Take one more example and then I would like to give you some of my ideas and ask you for comments on these ideas:

An officer is brought before a Board of Fitness on various allegations. Only one of these allegations is sustained by the evidence; and this one which is substantiated is that he did not receive a certificate of graduation from the Command and Staff School which he had left about eight months before. Now failure to graduate from a school is listed in 36-2 as a cause for "investigation with a view to elimination" etc. In this investigation, it is believed that consideration must be

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given to the circumstances which surrounded the failure. For instance, what is his educational background and what evidence is there that although he failed a particular school, he may not be, both now and potentially, a capable officer in some other line of Air Force endeavor? Did he or did he not apply himself at the school, etc. Evidently in this particular case we are discussing, the officer's Commanding Officer did not consider his failure at the school to be cause, when taken alone, to bring him before a board. In fact, in the next few months, he received a fine Efficiency Report. Therefore, when we considered the case, we decided that evidence was insufficient to warrant the sustaining of any allegation other than said failure, and that the potentialities and past record of the man indicated his continued usefullness to the Service.

Then to my humble suggestions. I believe that you people in the field should carefully select the personnel to sit on your Boards of Fitness. They should be mature officers who are not disturbed by the ravings and ranting of civilian attorneys. They should be carefully instructed by your personnel officer or someone well versed in Board proceedings and in the aim of AFR 36-2. Then you, or whoever appoints the Boards, could well forget about the record of the proceedings and forward them pro forma with no comments. If you find the Board is consistently wrong, get a new Board but do not reverse their decisions unless the case is very flagrant—and even then we will take care of the case up here if you don't. Thus you will make each Board of Fitness feel its responsibility and they will not consider that they are figureheads and that you are in fact making the final determination.

Finally, I shall welcome any suggestions, criticism, comments, etc. which you care to make to me either in writing or in person when you happen to be in Washington. I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss the matter generally with you or your representative and/or to go over in detail any specific case (or cases) in which our recommendations have been contrary to yours.

A similar letter has been transmitted to the Commanding General of each Major Air Force Command.

Sincerely,

s/t/ E. B. LYON
Major General, USAF
Director

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPMP-4 21 March 1949

SUBJECT: Air Force Vitalization Program

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

1. An evaluation of the experience gained through actual operation of Section II, Air Force Regulation 36-2 (Revocation of Commission or Removal from the Active List) now enables this Headquarters to furnish each major Air Force commander with certain additional salient points of guidance. It is intended that these points of guidance provide for more effective prosecution of the entire vitalization by elimination program thereby permitting positive results in each case to be achieved more expeditiously:

a. The necessary records involved in each case must be so compiled as to support clearly, sufficiently, and completely the order to "show cause". Such documents should be prepared before it is determined that an officer should "show cause" and not subsequent to such action. In other words, records of derogatory incidents should be completed as they occur.

b. The basic difference between Air Force Regulation 36-2 and court-martial action is that, whereas, the former is an administrative tool, the latter is a punitive one. The two systems, although they may be identical in accomplishing the end result of eliminating an officer from the service, are not and do not even remotely approach the status of being interchangeable. However, one or more convictions by courts-martial or punishment under Article of War 104 may rightfully be the basis for Board of Fitness action. The final standard to be employed in determining whether Board of Fitness action or court-martial action should be initiated is, "If, on the basis of all the evidence available in the case of an officer being considered for elimination, it is the judgement of the commander concerned that a reasonable probability exists of effecting the discharge of the officer concerned under other than honorable conditions (DA AGO Form 399) and such officer should be eliminated under other than honorable conditions, then court-martial action should be initiated. If, on the other hand, a reasonable probability exists that the discharge of the officer concerned can

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be effected with type of discharge certificate limited to either honorable discharge certificate (WD AGO Form 55) or a general discharge certificate (under honorable conditions) (DA AGO Form 398) and the commander concerned believes that the discharge of the officer concerned should be effected with the award of an honorable discharge certificate or a general discharge certificate, then initiation of Board of Fitness action is appropriate".

c. Before any commander selects an officer to appear before a Board of Fitness to "show cause" such a commander must be convinced that there exists a reasonable probability that the final elimination of the officer selected to "show cause" should, could and would be effected. Revocation of commission, and not any less stringent measure such as demotion, must be the logical objective of the commander at the time an officer is selected to "show cause".

d. The selection of the membership of Boards of Fitness should be made from among those available officers who have maintained the highest possible stand ards of conduct and performance of duty. It is not considered desirable that probationary Regular officers be appointed as members of a Board of Fitness.

e. Any officer appearning before a Board of Fitness is doing so for the purpose of showing to the Board members good and sufficient cause as to why his commission should not be revoked. The order to "show cause" is based upon documents presented to the respondent. The derogatory items presented in these documents and upon which the Air Force case is founded must be rebutted by evidence other than a simple denial by the respondent.

f. The convening authority who appoints Boards of Fitness should make every effort to furnish each such Board with a qualified legal adviser. (Such legal adviser is not to be confused with the respondent's legal counsel). This legal adviser is to be a non-voting member of the Board of Fitness and shall perform such duties as the Senior Member, Board of Fitness, directs.

g. If the individual members of the Board of Fitness are satisfied that the statement of reasons why the officer has been selected to "show cause" is substantiated by competent evidence and would, if not refuted, constitute a sufficient basis for revocation of commission, and the evidence presented during all stages of the hearings does not effectively rebut or refute the statement of reasons to "show cause", a recommendation of revocation of commission should be made.

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Subj: Air Force Vitalization Program

h. The evidence and testimony presented to Boards of Fitness will be extended to include any form or matter which the Board of Fitness considers relevant to the case at hand. This extension may rightfully result in the development of additional reasons as to why the commission of the respondent should or should not be revoked.

i. The findings of the Board of Fitness must be consistent with the evidence contained within the documents supporting the "show cause" order and any testimony heard during any and all of the proceedings of this Board.

j. The recommendations of the Board of Fitness must be just and furthermore must definitely support and be compatible with the findings. If the recommendation is based on leniency, the circumstances which warrant such leniency must be included in the report to the Board.

2. Further amplification of paragraph 1c, above, is contained in the Supplemental Letters of Instructions to Selection Board-1 (Public Law 810, 80th Congress) which is attached as Inclosure #1.

3. There is in the process of being prepared a guidance manual for the use of Boards of Fitness. It is intended that this manual will contain solutions to a majority of the problems which may possibly confront such Boards.

4. Inasmuch as AFR 36-2 is in the process of complete revision - but with no changes in the basic principles - it is requested that you forward to the Chief of Staff (Attention: Director of Military Personnel, AFPMP-4D) any changes to this regulation which you considere desirable and essential.

5. It is further requested that this letter be brought to the attention of all members of Boards of Fitness and the respondents appearning before such Boards of Fitness.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl
Sup Ltr of Instr to
Sel Bd-1 (PL 810)

s/t/ B. L. BOATNER
Major General, USAF
Asst Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

19 January 1949

SUBJECT: Supplementary Letter of Instructions to Selection Board-1 (PL 810)

TO : Personnel Concerned

1. An analysis of the implementation to date of Public Law 810 (80th Congress) and Section 23 of the National Defense Act makes it imperative that your original letter of instructions be amplified.

2. It is desired to emphasize herein the important part that your Board will play in the implementation of Public Law 810. Since your Board will make the initial selections of officers under the elimination provisions of this Act the decisions you make will have a far-reaching effect on the success of our announced program of eliminating unfit and unproductive officers.

3. In order to minimize any misunderstanding or misinterpretation of your responsibilities, the following information is furnished for your guidance:

a. The criteria prescribed for removal (Air Force Regulation 36-2) are very general and non-definitive. The proper interpretation and application of these criteria for removal will necessarily require sound judgement based on the broad experience of the Selection Board to insure that the best interests of the Air Force are protected without jeopardizing the rights of the individual.

b. An officer should be selected to "show cause"for failure to achieve generally acceptable standards required for officers of his grade rather than for failure to qualify for retention on a "best qualified" basis. Selection to "show cause" under the provisions of Public Law 810 pertains to removal from the active list and under Section 23, National Defense Act pertains to revocation of commission.

c. The broad statement that an officer has failed to achieve certain acceptable standards must be supported by specific incidents of such failure. A single isolated incident of such failure may be indicative of but not conclusive evidence that the officer concerned should be selected to "show cause".

d. Consideration should be given to the recency and relative seriousness of derogatory remarks or incidents. Incidents or remarks of a derogatory nature may be definitely overshadowed and outweighed by

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subsequent performance of duty and conduct. Attendant circumstances minimize the seriousness of such incidents.

e. Although corrective or punitive action already taken against an officer is not a bar to further action under the provisions of Public Law 810 (80th Congress) or Section 23 of the National Defense Act, such action should be given full consideration in reaching a decision as to whether or not such officer should be selected to "show cause". Similar consideration should be given an officer who has been placed in a deferred status by action of a Selection Board convened under the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

f. The inequities and short-comings of the past and present efficiency reporting systems are well known to each member of this Board. It is believed unnecessary to emphasize the injustices possible resulting from an unjudicious use of this aid.

g. In determining whether or not an officer should be selected to "show cause", cognizance should be taken of the equity the Government may have in the officer concerned in the form of service, education and training. Manifestations of undesirable characteristics by officers during their probationary period, and immediately thereafter, should be particularly scrutinized. Such officers should be eliminated before they have been too long in the service and the Government has spent too much money in keeping them on the rolls. On the other hand, the fact that an officer has a relatively large amount of service should not debar him from being elirinated if he has become unfit or unproductive. The best interest of the Air Force may require that the equity in these latter officers be written off as a bad investment.

h. For administrative reasons, the Secretary of the Air Force has decided that cases involving disloyalty or subversiveness do not at this time fall within the scope of the criteria for removal as outlined in AFR 36-2.

i. The provisions of Public Law 810 and Section 23 of the National Defense Act should not be utilized for the purpose of clearning the record of an officer. Other means are being made available to accomplish the task of clearning derogatory remarks from the records of officers.

4. In essence, it is emphasized that your Board should select to "show cause" all those officers, but only those officers, for whom a reasoneble probability exists that their final [redacted] elimination can and will be effected. Only by the elimination of a high percentage of those officers required to "show cause" can the Air Force foster and develop confidence in its desirable program of eliminating unfit and unproductive Air Force officers.

(Signed)
I. H. EDWARDS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel

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OES-A-29

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

25 March 1949

Dear Van:

I was tremendously interested in your letter of 21 March reference the supervision and training of our junior officers. You must know that I feel exactly as you do on this subject. If we fail to develop a sense of responsibility among our juniors today, we will not have the leadership we will need, should we fight again.

There are, I believe, a few things in this connection which you alone can do, and which, if done, will go a long way toward achieving our end -- the development of future leaders. I think the morale of our officer corps needs a real shot in the arm. Individuals should have greater stability in regard to length of service at a single station. The constant moves in which an officer and his family are subjected are in themselves costly and, by tearing an officer away from his job about the time he has learned it, are not only upsetting to him but create a sense of futility in the mind of his immediate superior, who must then train another replacement in addition to doing his own work.

I feel that we have set our standards too low in the integration of regualr officers, particularly from the educational viewpoint. It is too late now to remedy the blunders of our too rapid integration into the regular service. We are still, however, more interested in filling arbitrary, predetermined quotas in our officer candidate and aviation cadet schools than in securing real quality. Of course, we look for quality but in the end we fill the quotas with anyone who meets the minimum requirements. Such practice tends to alienate the college graduate who, reasonably proud of his education, feels that he should find something better than the partly educated man. By overemphasizing security of the job instead of the opportunity for service to the country, we attract a plodding type of individual who is afraid to take a chance, and who in the service habitually relies on others for direction in minute detail.

Housing and pay are, of course, adverse factors well known to you, and on which I know you are working hard to correct.

The principal setback to attracting the kind of youth we want in the officer corps and to developing a proper spirit in our junior officers, is the continual sniping at the officer in the public press.

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General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, page 2

Tell a man often enough that he belongs to a discredited group and such is the power of the press in our country that nothing his seniors can do will change his mind. The officers who brought us up, old timers during World War I, grew up in an atmosphere of dignity and distinction. An officer in those days, was, in proportion to his age, a respected member of a social group. Today many civilians say to our better youngsters, "Why on earth do you stay in the service?" This seems to be an outgrowth of the wartime USO viewpoint that "We are interested in the servicemen, the officers can take care of themselves."

The only possible cure for t is is a long and carefully planned campaign of news articles, magazine stories and radio broadcasts calculated to inform the public of the service the Air Force officer renders, to explain the advantages of professional training as opposed to the uninformed enthusiasm of the wartime volunteer, and in all ways to restore in the public mind, and t erefore in the minds of our junior officers, the unshakable belief that service career is indeed an honorable one of the highest professional standing, even though we must seek our reward in other than dollars.

I have again written to my commanders along the lines suggested in your letter, and I promise you that they and I will do everything we can to establish a sense of responsibility and leadership and the close supervision that you desire.

Sincerely,

GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

4 March 1949

AFPMP-3B

SUBJECT: Active Duty for Air ROTC Graduates

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Hempstead, L.I., New York

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, subject: "Air ROTC Graduates," dated 24 March 1948 and letter, this headquarters, subject: "Pilot Training Examinations, Air ROTC Students," dated 27 September 1948.

2. The following policies will apply to Air ROTC students graduating during the remainder of FY 1949 who request active duty:

a. Active Duty for Pilot Training.

(1) All qualified applicants will be accepted.

(2) Tour of duty will consist of three years from date officer enters active duty.

(3) Applicant should indicate availability for assignment to one of the following classes: 29 June 1949, 10 August 1949, 20 September 1949, or 1 November 1949.

(4) Applicant should indicate his desire for call to active duty in a non-flying capacity in the event he should be found disqualified for pilot training or in the event his assignment to a pilot training class should be delayed for some reason.

(5) An Air ROTC graduate eliminated from pilot training may continue his three-year active duty tour in a non-flying status or be relieved from active duty at the time of elimination.

b. Active Duty for Technical and Administrative Specialists (Non-Flying).

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Ltr to Continental Air Command, Subj: "Active Duty for Air ROTC Training"
Cont'd.

(1) All qualified applicants will be accepted.

(2) Tour of duty will consist of three years from date officer enters active duty.

(3) Applicant normally will be given a duty assignment commensurate with his civilian experience and academic pursuits for a period of one year prior to being eligible for additional technical schooling or overseas assignment. This will apply generally to those officers tendered regular commissions as Distinguished Military Graduates.

3. It is desired that your headquarters insure complete dissemination of information on active duty opportunities for Air ROTC graduates, in order that the maximum number of such officers may be entered on active duty.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

a/st/ HERBERT M. WEST, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Executive
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPMP-1-L

14 April 1949

SUBJECT: Procedure for Call to Active Duty of Air ROTC Graduates

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

1. This letter establishes procedures for the call to active duty of voluntary Air Force ROTC applicants.

2. Until further notice, all qualified graduates of the Air Force ROTC program will, upon application, be accepted for a tour of extended active duty with the USAF, provided they meet the following qualifications:

a. Hold a commission as Second Lieutenant, USAF Reserve.

b. Apply for extended active duty not earlier than ninety (90) days before graduation nor later than ninety (90) days after graduation. Applicants not applying for active duty within time limits specified above will not be subject to the same criteria and restrictions then in effect for all officers of the Reserve Forces.

c. Meet physical qualifications as outlined in Paragraph 7, AFR 45-4.

3. Applications for extended active duty will be submitted on AF Form 125 (Application for Extended Active Duty with the United States Air Force), as modified by Inclosure #1 to this letter, and will be indorsed by the Professor of Military Science and Tactics, the Assistant Professor of Military Science and Tactics for Air, or other appropriate military superior. Forwarding instructions are as follows:

a. The AF Form 125 for officers applying for pilot training in commissioned officer grade will be submitted as an Inclosure to AF Form 131 (Application for Pilot Training in Commissioned Officer Grade), and forwarded to this Headquarters (Attention: Aviation Cadet Branch). The application will be submitted in the manner prescribed in letters, this Headquarters, Subject: "Air ROTC Graduates", dated 24 March 1948; Subject: "Pilot Training Examinations for Air ROTC Students", dated 27 September 1948; and Subject: "Active Duty for Air ROTC Graduates", dated 4 March 1949. Application for pilot training and completed standard Forms 88 and 89 will be reviewed and retained by this Headquarters if applicant is qualified. Instructions for active duty orders assigning applicant to a pilot training class will then be forwarded your Headquarters.

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b. The AF Form 125 for officers applying for non-rated duty assignments will be indorsed as indicated in Inclosure #2 and forwarded to this Headquarters (Attention: AFPMP-1). This Headquarters will provide station assignments instructions to your Headquarters for issuance of active duty orders.

4. It is contemplated that officers accepted for duty in a non-rated status will either be assigned to stations for duties at squadron level or entered into technical school courses for which qualified, and for which Air Force requirements exist. Consequently, the qualifications or aptitudes of the applicant should be carefully considered by the Professor of Military Science and Tactics, The Assistant Professor of Military Science and Tactics for Air, or other officer making assignment recommendations.

5. It is requested that all Air Force advanced ROTC students be fully informed of extended active duty opportunities in order that the maximum number of qualified officers may be procured from the Air Force ROTC program.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ ANNE W. TINGES
Major, USAF
Office, Director of Military Pers.

2 Incls:
1-Supplementary Instrs, AF Form 125.
2-Sample Indorsement.

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

138

210.455 AD Officers

AG 210.455 Pers-B-S

26 AUG 1949

SUBJECT: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New Rochelle, New York, 4th AF, 9th AF, 10th AF, 12th AF, 14th AF.

1. In contrast to previous years, the recall program will not be designed as a process to meet current strength requirements. It is, rather, designed primarily to provide the USAF with an input of Reserve officers in an age range and of a quality that will constitute both a source of selection for regular commissions and an addition to M-Day resources of maximum future value. As a result of limitations imposed from time to time by the annual Troop Program, this headquarters will at various intervals announce the selected portions of this letter that are to be considered applicable.

2. Rated non-regular officers who have been off active duty for more than two years and who have not maintained proficiency through active participation in the Air Reserve or Air National Guard Programs will be required to include with their application for extended active duty a Flying Evaluation Board decision as to their fitness for flying status on such extended active duty. Such officers will meet the Flying Evaluation Board at the active USAF base most convenient for this purpose. A copy of this board proceeding will be attached to the application for extended active duty.

3. Based on the above considerations the call and recall program will operate along the following lines:

a. College Graduates Under 30 Years Old. - Any officer holding an Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard commission who is a college graduate will be considered for call or recall upon application providing he was under age 30 as of 1 July of the year in which he applies. Prior service officers with less than three years active duty will be accepted for further active duty if their efficiency rating for the last twelve months of duty was excellent or above. Prior service officers with more than three years of active duty must have an overall efficiency index of 40 if of company grade or 43 if of field grade for the last three years of their active duty in order to qualify for further active duty. In addition, prior service officers must have a record clear of derogatory or disqualifying information as listed in 3b (4).

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

Mil Pers/OM/333
11 Aug 40

(b) Show a minimum efficiency index based on the last two years of service of AR 12 or company grade and AR 13 of field grade.

(c) Possess a college degree. Request for waivers of this requirement will be accompanied by recommendation from appropriate General Officer of the command AGO shall have power to waive the requirement and prescribe any test applicants could apply against which is considered.

(d) Have a general view of the following character information which will reasonably determine all applicants for commission before any inspection of other qualifications:

(a) Habits or traits of character which affect the applicant's suitability as an officer.

(b) An unsatisfactory record as evidenced by court martial conviction, or more than one instance of disciplinary action under AW 104.

(c) Evidence of criminal or subversive institutions.

(d) Failure in any assignment (except where an officer was selected for a position or school which entitled such assignment)

(e) Evidence of mental or nervous instability (based on physical records in AGO file).

(f) Demonstrated unfitness as evidenced by prolonged record of unsatisfactory service without marked improvement.

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Adjutant General's Central File Copy

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

(d) Other distinguishing devices worn

(a) Officers commissioned in Corps Area Service Units of AUS whose branch has been changed by reason of AUS Memo Number 605-5, dated 5 Jun 43, from Army Service Forces to Army Air Forces, may wear the distinctive insignia of their former branch for a period of one year after commissions.

(b) Applicants and recruits in Army Air Forces Reception Centers, Classification & AF Units [illegible] are authorized [illegible] Air Medical Corps [illegible]

(c) Officers who are changing [illegible] of AUS [illegible] Identity Card AGO Form No. [illegible]

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL [illegible]:

V. H. MURPHY
LT. COL., USAF
ASST Adj GEN

-3-

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPMP-1-L 15 April 1949

SUBJECT: Recall to Active Duty of Navigators

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

1. Reference is made to letter, this Headquarters, dated 14 March 1949, Subject: "Interim Procedure: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty".

2. You are requested to effect the recall to active duty of forty (40) officers qualified as navigators (SSN 1034) for assignment to Mather Air Force Base, California (Project Ellington) reporting for duty not later than 15 July 1949.

3. Officers recalled must meet the criteria specified in Inclosure 2 to letter cited in paragraph 1. Grades desired are as follows: 10 captains, balance first and second lieutenants.

4. These officers willundergo training at Mather Air Force Base as instructors. At the completion of twenty-two (22) weeks training, they will be reassigned as instructors to the USAF Navigation School, Ellington Air Force Base.

5. Experience of this Headquarters with recalls to active duty has been that an appreciable proportion of applicants request revocation of recall orders when such are actually issued. It is important that a minimum of forty(40) officers actually report on 15 July for this assignment. Therefore, there will be no objection for your command allowing for revocations by actually issuing orders for the recall of fifty (50) officers for this assignment.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/ JOHN J MOORE
t/ ANNE W. TINGES
Major, USAF
Office, Director of Military Pers

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Mil Pers-E-2 210.455 14 September 1949

SUBJECT: Procedure for Call or Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty

TO : Commanding Generals, Continental Air Command Air Forces

1. Letter, this headquarters, dated 26 August 1949, subject: "Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty", consolidated, revised and supersedes policies set forth in the following communications from this headquarters relative to:

a. Letter, Headquarters United States Air Force, 14 March 1949, subject: "Interim Procedure: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty", forwarded your headquarters by 1st indorsement, PP-E 210.455, 5 Apr 1949.

b. Letter, Headquarters United States Air Force, 14 April 1949, subject: "Procedure for Call to Active Duty of Air ROTC Graduates", forwarded your headquarters by 1st Indorsement, PP-E 210.455, 6 May 1949.

c. Letter, (Classified), Headquarters United States Air Force, 4 May 1949, subject: "Estimated Numbers and Types of Officers to be Recalled to Extended Active Duty 1 July 1949 - 30 September 1949", forwarded your headquarters by 1st indorsement, PP-E 210.455, 20 May 1949.

d. Letter, Headquarters United States Air Force, 12 May 1949, subject: "Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty", forwarded your headquarters by 1st indorsement, Mil Pers-E 210.455, 27 May 1949.

e. Letter, this headquarters, Mil Pers-E 210.455, 21 June 1949, subject: "Recall to Active Duty for Reserve Officers with College Degrees".

f. Letter, Headquarters United States Air Force, 13 June 1949, subject: "Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty," forwarded your headquarters by 1st indorsement, Mil Pers-E 210.455, 20 June 1949.

g. Letter, Headquarters United States Air Force, 24 June 1949, subject: "Procedure for Call to Active Duty of Air ROTC Graduates", forwarded your headquarters by 1st indorsement, Mil Pers-E 210.455, undated.

h. Message this headquarters, AF ConAC Mil Pers-E- 17378, 13 July 1949.

i. Message this headquarters, AF ConAC Mil Pers-E-18139, 20 July 1949.

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2. All applications for call or recall from officers who meet criteria will be forwarded from the numbered Air Forces through this headquarters, to Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, AFPMP-1, for station assignment. A note of caution is interjected. Attention is drawn to the phrasing in letters, this headquarters, dated 26 August 1949, subject: "Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty", which, by its very connotation, specifically states that, although applicant completely satisfies criteria for call or recall, no assurance or commitments can be given that call or recall will automatically follow. This necessarily results from strength limitations imposed from time to time by the Annual Troop Program.

3. Periodically a critical skill list will be forwarded for information. This will of necessity change from time to time depending upon the requirements of the Air Force.

CURRENT CRITICAL SKILL LIST

SSN	TITLE
0110	Aircraft Warning O, Ground Reporting Equipment
0130	Aircraft Warning O, Airborne Equipment
0140	Radar Officer
0141	Electronics Officer
0145	Radar Maintenance & Repair Officer
0500	Radio Officer
0503	Radio Officer, VHF
1037	Navigator-Bombardier
1045	Guided Missile Electronic Flight Officer
4402	Maint & Repair O, Airborne Signal Equipment
4415	Signal Equipment Maintenance & Repair
7888	Radar Observer, RCM
8219	Weather Officer
8220	Weather Officer Reconnaissance
8503	Photo-Interpreter

4. The following information will be extracted from the 201 file and forwarded with the completed current issue of AF Form 125:

a. Total service on extended active duty status.

b. Aeronautical ratings and status of proficiency. Total flying time and date of most recent flights.

c. MOS's additional to any shown on the AF Forme 125.

d. Technical and Service Schools completed with dates of attendance.

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5. Procedure for call or recall to active duty of legal officers is clarified by Inclosure #1.

6. Applications for call or recall to active duty or United States Air Force Medical Service officers will not be considered under the provisions of the letter heretofore mentioned, but will be expeditiously forwarded to Headquarters USAF, Attention: Surgeon General, for action. Until further notice, applications for Reserve appointments in the Medical Service, USAF, from individuals who submit concurrently a request for call to active duty will be forwarded to Headquarters, USAF, Attention: Surgeon General. Applications for Reserve appointments in the Medical Service, USAF, from individuals who do not submit concurrently a request for call to active duty will be processed by the numbered Air Forces under the provisions of current directives.

7. Supplementary instructions that pertain only to Air ROTC graduates in Inclosure #2 will be complied with and submitted under Item 19 (Remarks). A sample indorsement is shown in Inclosure #2 whereby PAS&T officers will make recommendations as to eligibility and duty assignment.

8. Any officer who has previously refused recall orders for other than valid compassionate considerations, has been previously separated under provisions of AF Letter 36-3, or has been denied signature of Air Force Service Statement will be ineligible for recall consideration.

9. Upon approval by Headquarters USAF of an officer's application for call or recall to active duty, assignment instructions will be issued to this headquarters for use in calling or recalling officer concerned. After the numbered Air Force receives the officer's acceptance of call or recall and issues orders, a copy of such orders will be immediately forwarded to Director of Military Personnel, Attention: AFPMP-1, for record. A negative report will be submitted if officer concerned declines acceptance of call or recall to active duty orders.

10. Upon completion of processing for recall, copy of the recall special orders will be placed in the master personnel record file, which will be retained pending receipt of Form 0177, (Report of Entry on Active Duty), and statement by officer of physical condition, (Reference: Reserve Administrative Instructions No. 4, 24 May 1949) which are accomplished at the first duty station and are returned for inclusion in the master file. Upon completion of the foregoing, disposition will be made as prescribed in AFR 45-5.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

2 Incls
1 - Procedure for Recall to AD
2 - Supplementary Instructions

s/t/ NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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PROCEDURE FOR RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY OF LEGAL OFFICERS

1. General: Recent revision of court martial procedure has enhanced the USAF need for legally trained and qualified officers. In order to meet this need, it is necessary to make use of the resource represented by the reserve officers not currently on extended active duty. Applications for recall should be encouraged by all reasonable means and all applications on hand should be processed as specified below.

2. Processing of applications for recall:

a. Applications for recall to extended active duty should be screened for legal education and experience at the numbered Air Force level.

b. All applications showing such education and experience should be referred to the numbered Air Force Staff Judge Advocate for determination of the applicant's suitability for recall to active duty for legal duties.

c. Based on the above examination, the Staff Judge Advocate General will recommend on recall for legal duties either affirmatively or negatively. If the recommendation is affirmative, the numbered Air Force Staff Judge Advocate will complete a brief profile of the officer's legal background using the following outline:

(1) Name, grade, AFSN, date of rank, age, aeronautical rating and all SSNs held.

(2) Source of legal education and date of graduation.

(3) Membership(s) in bar(s), good standing and date(s) of admission.

(4) Summary of civilian and military legal experience.

(5) Recommended type and level of legal duty if recalled.

d. The case will then be transmitted to Headquarters USAF, AFPMP-1, for final determination as to recall and for station assignment instructions. Forwarded with this referral will be the profile referred to in paragraph 2c(5), above.

3. Applicants for recall to active duty for legal duties must meet the general eligibility criteria referring to age, grade, efficiency index and derogatory information plus administrative factors currently in effect for all officers.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

20 May 1949

SUBJECT: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

1. Reference is made to letter, this Headquarters, dated 29 April 1949, Subject: "Application for Pilot Training from Air Force Reserve Officers on Inactive Status", which established the policy of accepting for extended active duty for pilot training in grade, all former officer applicants in the grade of Lieutenant who have received a college degree.

2. Effective herewith, this policy is further extended as follows:

a. Restriction of recall for pilot training to applicants in the grade of Lieutenant is removed. Any officer grade is acceptable providing the applicant meets the age requirements for pilot training.

b. Any former officer who is a graduate of an accredited college will be accepted for extended active duty upon application regardless of whether he desires pilot training providing he satisfies the following qualifications:

(1) Has received a bachelor's or higher degree.

(2) Has not reached his 30th birthday prior to 1 July of the year during which he is applying for active duty.

(3) Meets the general eligibility criteria established in Inclosure 2 to letter, this Headquarters, dated 14 March 1949, Subject: "Interim Procedure, Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty".

3. Officers meeting the above qualifications will be assigned against recall quotas currently received by your command from this Headquarters if these quotas provide a suitable assignment. If no suitable assignment quota vacancy is available in your command at the time of application, the officers' applications will be forwarded to this Headquarters with request for station assignment instructions referring to this letter as authority.

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4. Former officers who have graduated from college but do not satisfy the age requirement established in paragraph 2b (2), above, will be afforded no preferential treatment but may be accepted for active duty under the instructions governing recall of Reserve Officers in general.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/st/ FREDERICK J. SUTTERLIN
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE, ADC
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
ORLANDO, FLORIDA

16 May 1949

SUBJECT: Procurement of Regular Air Force Officers

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. It has come to my attention that there are presently enrolled in the civilian colleges and universities throughout the country a number of students with World War II experience as officers of the United States Air Force. It is believed that these students constitute a pool of especially desirable potential regular officer material that is not being fully exploited.

2. It is highly probable that a number of these former officers either failed to apply for or failed in being selected for regular commissions largely because of their lack of formal education at the time applications and/or selections were being made. The fact that, of their own volition and through utilizations of their own funds, they are completing their college education indicates a spirit of aggression and sense of responsibility that is highly desirable in an officer. At least a portion of them are still interested in the Air Force as a career, as indicated by requests I have received from them for recall to extended active duty. It seems unfortunate that, under present policy, I am forced to tell them that the Air Force has no need for their services. We are doing a good thing in sending a large number of our young regulars to universities to complete their undergraduate work at government expense. The graduating men with prior service are often the same type of men and might well be reconsidered for regular commissions.

3. I fully realize that the present troop basis will not permit recalls (unless we accelerate forced attrition of less desirables) but I urge serious consideration of the thoughts expressed herein in the event the present troop basis is enlarged.

/s/t/ RALPH F. STEARLEY
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

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Procurement of Regular Air Force Officers
MIl Pers-E 210 (18 May 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 2 Jun 49

TO: Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida

1. This headquarters is in receipt of information from Headquarters USAF that effective immediately, any USAF Reserve officer not on extended active duty who is a graduate of an accredited college, will be accepted for extended active duty provided he satisfies certain qualifications.

2. Detailed information on the foregoing procedure is now being compiled at this headquarters and will be dispatched to all Continental Air Command Air Forces in the immediate future.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/s/t/ J. B. O'ROURKE
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

21 July 1949

MilPers-E 210.455

SUBJECT: Recall of Reserve Officers to Extended Active Duty

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Slocum Air Force Base, Fort Slocum, New York
(Also sent to Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth & Fourteenth AFs)

1. It has been brought to the attention of this headquarters that the numbered air forces of this command in some instances are operating the recall program only on the basis of specified needs for highly specialized personnel. This is a misinterpretation of current criteria since the program has been expanded to include certain other qualified individuals as set forth in letter, this headquarters, MilPers-E 210.455, subject: Recall to Active Duty for Reserve Officers with College Degrees, 21 June 1949.

2. In the event there are some portions of the redall policy that are not clear, request referral be made to this headquarters for clarification prior to release of information which may prove erroneous and/or misleading. Strict adherence to this procedure will prevent anAir Force from being subjected to considerable embarrassment as the result of releasing conflicting information to agencies outside of the National Military Establishment.

3. There has existed in the past in some instances a considerable time lag between release of information by Headquarters USAF and receipt thereof by the Continental Air Command Air Forces. To accelerate transmission of policy changes this headquarters will, in the future, condense this information and communicate it by electrical means to the field. This will in effect serve as advance notice of impending changes and will be implemented in detail by letter dispatched via air mail at the earliest practicable date.

4. Request receipt of this correspondence be acknowledged by separate communication.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Personnel

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH AIR FORCE
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

15 July 1949

PR 210.455

SUBJECT: Recall to Extended Active Duty

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base,
Mitchel Field, New York

1. In accordance with paragraph 5c, ConAC Ltr 45-1, dated 9 May 1949, the following is submitted with reference to Ltr, your Hq, Subject: Recall to Active Duty of Officers With College Degrees, dated 21 June 1949.

2. An initial review of the 51 applications that qualify under the provisions of above cited letter reveal that 25 of the applicants satisfied all administrative requirements for recall to extended active duty except for efficiency index.

3. A study of these rejected cases indicates that the majority are young rated officers with two to three years service, who entered the service late in the war and who, after receiving aeronautical ratings, were assigned to technical schools, replacement training units or other advanced schools. These assignments did not offer opportunities to the affected officers to serve in a stabilized assignment where their capabilities could be channeled into a line that would indicate their true value. During this period, most of the young officers were interested in expeditious completion of an assigned task and not in demonstrating the qualities of leadership and professional proficiency necessary for an officer of the USAF in peace time. Further, the standard rating awarded by rating officers of schools and training units was "Satisfactory" and "Very Satisfactory" due to the large number of personnel passing through these organizations and the inability of the rating officers to completely acquaint themselves with the conduct of the rated officers and their potentialities. Many of these officers since separation from the service have returned to college or universities to continue their education. A mature reflection upon the advantages of a military career has intensified the desire of many to return to active duty status. Cases on file indicate that the same Reserve Officers involved have changed their field of study in order to more fully prepare themselves for a career in a phase of aeronautics. Many of these officers are just graduating or will graduate in the near future with B.S or M.S. degrees.

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210.455
Subject: Recall to Extended Active Duty

4. Recommend that college graduates be considered for recall to extended active duty under the same efficiency index requirements as any other officer of equal rank. In those cases where Reserve Officers do not meet efficiency index requirements but have completed a course of study for a college degree in fields that would enhance their value to the Air Force, it is recommended that the applications and allied papers be forwarded to your Headquarters for consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

t/ H. L. FULLER
Lt. Col., USAF
Adjutant General

MilPers-E 210.455 (15 Jul 49) 1st Ind

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York, 29 Jul 1949

TO: Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters, United States Air Force Washington 25, D. C.

1. Recommendation contained in paragraph 4, basic communication, is concurred in.

2. Inclosure No.2, to letter your headquarters, subject: Interim Procedure: Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty, 14 March 1949, establishes considerably lower minimum efficiency indices whereas USAFR officers with College degrees must possess minimum index of 40.00 and 45.00 for company and field grades respectively.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

st/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt. Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen.

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210.455
Subject: Recall to Extended Active Duty

2nd Ind.

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C. 11 August 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Mitchel Field, New York

1. Paragraph 3a of attached letter, this headquarters, Subject: "Recall of Officers to Extended Active Duty", dated 5 August 1949, will clarify and assist in many instances the situations described in paragraph 3 of basic letter.

2. With regard to company grade recalls, college graduates under 30 years of age are required to have an overall efficiency index of 40, whereas officers with scarce skills may have a minimum efficiency index of 38. This seeming discrepancy has a basis in the reserve officers on active duty under 30 years of age are helping to perpetuate the Air Force while simultaneously having an opportunity to apply for the regular establishment. Consequently, it is the desire of this headquarters to maintain high standards of selection on input of young America, and if possible assure that all applicants for regular commissions are of the highest caliber obtainable. Officers with scarce sckills are just what the title implies. To find older individuals who have years of training and experience in fields that are vital in carrying out the assigned functions of the Air Force is a problem os some magnitude. Since these individuals are not considered youthful accessions or future regular Officers, it is felt that some relaxing of an efficiency index is in order.

3. In light of the revised policy as outlined in paragraph 3a of the aforementioned letter, it is felt that individuals who still fall short of meeting requirements are unacceptable despite the acquisition of a college degree. Although such a policy may in some instances render an injustice, generally, experience has indicated that college is not the panacea of low efficiency.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl:
Ltr Hq USAF dtd 5 Aug 49.

s/t/ CHARLES D. SONNKALB
Colonel, USAF
Office, Dir of Mil Pers

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IRS
Subject: Separation of Reserve Officers at the ORD's

No. 1 2 Nov 49 DP to VC

1. Reference your question about USAF separating Reserve officers at the ORD's, whose service statements had not been extended bytheir units, a telephone call was made to Col Sennkalb for further clarification this date. Col Sennkalb points out that they realize that it is rough action but that when an officer reports to the ORD, whose service statement has not been extended to cover his overseas tour, it is necessary for the ORD to send his request for extension to Hq USAF. Hq USAF thoroughly screens the officer's record and if it is found that the officer does not meet present criteria standards that it is mandatory that they disapprove the request for extension. This then means that USAF returns the request with instructions that the officer will be separated within 30 days of receipt of the disapproved request. They further realize in Hq USAF that 30 days notice of separation is too short and they are taking action to permit 60 days notice.

2. Col Sennkalb points out that the only protection we can give Reserve officers is to make certain that their service statement is extended bytheir unit commanders prior to reporting to the ORD. He emphasizes that they realize this is rough treatment but due to the "blitz" that is on in Hq USAF to eliminate personnel who do not meet the present criteria standards, he feels there is nothing he can do at this time but continue to be cold blooded.

3. The Director of Military Personnel, this hq, is again emphasizing to the six conAC AFs that Reserve officers must have their service statements extended prior to departure from their units to the AFORD's.

s/t/ LANDON

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

30 November 1949

Mil Pers-D 210.456

SUBJECT: PROJECT FEB- Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York
(Also to CG's, 4th, 9th, 10th 12th & 14th AF's)

1. Attached hereto is prepublication copy of AF Letter 36-26, Budgetary limitations require further reduction in the officer strength of the Air Force. This reduction has been programmed for monthly releases beginning in February 1950. Your quota for release in February 1950 is indicated in Inclosure #1. Succeeding monthly quotas will be announced later. It is anticipated that each will be somewhat less than the February quota.

2. In this reduction in officer strength the pilot strength of the Air Force will be reduced to a total of 24,000. Those pilots who remain on flying status therefore must be the most fully or potentially qualified to perform pilot duties under combat conditions. At this time only pilots will be applied to the tabulation and additional selections outlined in paragraph 5c, AF Letter 36-26.

3. Nomination of officers to meet quota set forth in Inclosure #1 should be weighted by consideration of the availability of replacements for scarce specialties (reference AF Regulation 35-34). Nominees may be male and female, rated and non-rated, on extended active duty, including Medical Service Corps officers, but excluding all other Medical Service officers. Officers recently selected for conversion to a permanent non-rated status under provisions of AF Letter 36-3 will be considered on thesame basis as other non-flying officers. No officer will be nominated unless sixty days have elapsed since his last PCS. Graduates of certain specialized training courses, for example, must be carefully scrutinized in consideration of Air Force wide requirements. Names of officers who have completed the following courses of training within the past three years will be forwarded by this headquarters to Headquarters USAF prior to final action on separation or conversion:

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Mil Pers-D 210.456
Subject: PROJECT FEB - Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26

Atomic Energy Training Courses, 73144 and 73148
Aircraft Warning Officer Course, 01106, Keesler
USAF Bombardment School, Mather
Radiological Defense, 73145, Treasure Island, Keesler,
Edgewood Arsenal
Factory Familiarization in Armament

Non-regular Air Force colonels will be selected for separation or conversion by this headquarters.

4. Your attention is invited to the fact that you hold a grave responsibility in selecting nominees for this project. Careful planning is of the utmost importance. You are cautioned that submission of an officer's name is tantamount to final selection by the Board at this headquarters.

5. It is desired that you submit to this headquarters not later than 12 December 1949, attention: Director of Military Personnel (SA), by air mail or air courier a roster showing name, rank and service numberfor officers nominated to fill your quota for February 1950. This roster will list officers in order of priority as to desirability for retention with the least desirable at the top of the list. In addition, a "Career Brief" will be prepared on each officer in the format and including information shown on Inclosure #2. Reports Control Symbol assigned this report is AF-AP-F193.

6. A Continental Air Comand Selection Board will convene at this headquarters on or about 15 December 1949 to select officers for conversion or relief from active duty. The names of officers selected will be forwarded to your headquarters as soon as possible; letters will be mailed not later than 28 December 1949 (Inclosures #3 and #4) to individual officers concerned. You are authorized to Multilith these letters prior to receipt of final list from this headquarters in order to expedite mailing.

7. No officer will be nominated to this headquarters under quota established in this letter on which your headquarters has reassignment instructions. Officers nominated will be frozen in present assignment until completion of Continental Air Command Selection Board action. If Headquarters USAF, or this headquarters, should, without specific reference being made to pending action under this letter, order transfer or school assignment of any officer concerned, you will immediately

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Mil Pers-D 210.456
Subject: PROJECT FEB - Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26

notify this headquarters, attention: Director of Military Personnel (SA), and will take no further action to effect transfer or school detail of the officer concerned until further instructions are received from this headquarters.

8. Acknowledge receipt of this letter by radio.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Personnel

5 Incls
1. Quota for Feb
2. Format, Career Brief
3. Ltr to offs being separated
4. Ltr to offs being separated or placed on non-flying status, w/1 Incl
5. Cy AFL 36-26

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

18 Jan 1950

SUBJECT: Officers Released Under Air Force Letter 36-26

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

1. Each officer separated under provisions of Air Force Letter 36-3 is being sent a letter by this headquarters from the Chief of Staff.

2. Similar letters are inclosed for delivery to each officer separated under the provisions of Air Force Letter 36-26 by the commander having jurisdiction over the officer concerned at the time of separation.

3. There are also inclosed green coordination copies which, upon dispatch of the letter to officers concerned, should be forwarded in groups to The Air Adjutant General, Headquarters United States Air Force for inclusion in the officer's basic 201 file as each quota is completed.

4. The Chief of Staff personally desires that this matter be given high priority to insure that:

a. Officers already separated under AFL 36-26 are forwarded a copy of subject letter without delay.

b. Officers to be separated under AFL 36-26 are furnished a copy prior to or upon the date of their actual separation.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Incl.
Ltr signed by C/S for officers separated under AFL 36-26

s/t RUSSELL L. WALDRON
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personne

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Office of The Chief of Staff
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington, D. C.

I regret that it has been necessary to select you as one of the hundreds of competent Air Force officers to be released from extended active duty. We have had to take this action because of budgetary limitations on the Air Force which makes a reduction in the number of officers on active duty mandatory.

The Air Force appreciates the outstanding contribution which you have made towards the accomplishment of our mission in World War II, as well as the reorganization in the post-war years. You can be justly proud of the part you have played in helping to establish the Air Force as a vital member of the team to which our country looks for its defense.

We hope that you will continue your association with the Air Force through active participation in such reserve units as the Air Reserve and Air National Guard. Your service in such activities not only will keep current your knowledge of Air Force matters, but will enable personnel in those units to draw upon the experience which you have acquired.

In behalf of the Air Force, I extend to you best wishes for success in whatever activities you may undertake, and again express our sincered regret that circumstances necessitate your release at this time.

Sincerely,

s/t HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPMP-11

25 November 1949

SUBJECT: Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26.

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

1. At this time, only Pilots will be applied to the tabulation and additional selections outlined in paragraph 5c, AFL 36-36. The pilot strength of the Air Force must be reduced to a total of 24,000. The 24,000 who are to remain on pilot status must, therefore, be the most fully or potentially qualified to perform pilot duties under combat conditions.

2. Selection of officers to meet the quotas set forth in Inclosure 1, attached, should be weighted by consideration of the availability of replacements for scarce qualifications. Graduates of certain specialized training courses for example must be carefully scrutinized in consideration of AF wide requirements. The names of officers who have successfully completed courses of training within the past three years in any of the following will be forwarded to this Headquarters prior to final action toward separation or conversion:

Atomic Energy Training Courses, 73144 and 73148
Aircraft Warning Officer Course, 01106, Keesler
USAF Bombardment School, Mather
Radiological Defense, 73145, Treasure Island, Keesler, Edgewood Arsenal
Factory Familiarization in Armament.

All officers serving in grade of colonel considered for separation or conversion will be reported to this Headquarters prior to final selection.

3. The quotas of officers to be separated for the month of February 1950 as indicated herein will be strictly adhered to insofar as numbers of officers are concerned. Grades shown for conversion indicate the most desirable grade spread and will be followed insofar as the procedures outlined in paragraph 5, AFL 36-26 will permit. Quotas for the months of March, April, and May will be used as planning figures, but action will not be taken in these numbers until such time as further instructions are received from this headquarters. Budgetary limitations require central control of the Air Force-wide number of separations and conversions to be effected. Quotas indicated for February will be considered final. Com-

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pleted action, to include separation or conversion, must be effected prior to the last day of the month for which quotas are issued. Your command will be notified in each instance of the quotas upon which action will be taken 60 days prior to the first day of each month indicated above.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl
Quotas for your
Command

at/ HERBERT M. WEST, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Executive
Office, Director of Mil Personnel

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CONAC

A. Number of Officers to be Separated from Active Duty.

Grade	Feb	March	April	May	June	Total
Colonel	2	1	1	1	-	5
Lt Col	11	6	2	2	1	22
Major	36	20	7	6	5	74
Captain	94	53	19	15	12	193
1st Lt	91	52	18	15	13	189
2d Lt	25	14	5	4	3	51
TOTAL	259	146	52	43	34	534

B. Number of Pilots to be Converted to Non-Flying Status.

GRADE	Feb	March	April	May	Total
Lt Col	1	1	1	1	4
Major	6	5	5	5	21
Captain	29	22	22	22	95
1st Lt	40	29	30	29	128
2d Lt	25	18	18	18	79
TOTAL	101	75	76	75	327

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 Nov 1949

AFPMP-11

SUBJECT: Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26.

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel AF Base, N. Y.

1. Reference is made to paragraph 2 and Incl 1 of letter, subject as above, this Headquarters, dated 25 Nov 49, and AFL 36-26. All Colonels and Lt Colonels will be selected for separation and conversion through means of a Central Section Board in this Headquarters. It is, therefore, requested that lists by grade of all Reserve Colonels and Lt Colonels who are assigned to your command be submitted so as to reach this Headquarters not later than 14 Dec 49. These lists should indicate:

a. Those officers whose retention on extended active duty is most contributory to the best interest of the Air Force by virtue of their outstanding qualifications.

b. Those officers who have a relatively limited potential value for future utilization.

c. Those officers who, in light of your present mission, can best be spared and whose loss will have the least disruptive affect upon your command. Pilots included in 1b and c who are recommended for retention on a non-flying status will be so indicated.

2. The distribution of the names of the officers in each grade should approximate the following:

a. 25% fall in group a.

b. 50% fall in group b.

c. 25% minimum must fall in group c.

3. The lists must include current duty assignment, station to which each officer is assigned, identification of those officers who have been

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Ltr to ConAC "Relief of Rated & Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from EAD & Conversation of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26"

assigned to your command for a period of less than sixty days, and availability of replacement from within your command. Lists will be held Confidential until notification of action taken by this Headquarters has been received in your command.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ D. C. STROTHER
Major General, U. S. A. F.
Director of Military Personnel
Office of DCS/P

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

30 January 1950

SUBJECT: Separation of Reserve Forces Colonels and Lt. Colonels

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

1. Reference is made to the provisions of Air Force Letter 36-26, dated 29 November 1949 and to letter, this Headquarters, subject: "Relief of Rated and Non-Rated Reserve Forces Officers from Extended Active Duty and Conversion of Rated Reserve Forces Officers to Non-Flying Status under Provisions of AFL 36-26," dated 29 November 1949. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the second referenced letter, a Central Selection Board composed of senior Air Force officers convened at this Headquarters to review the records of those officers reported by the major commanders for consideration. As a result of approval of this board's action on 26 January 1950, the officers listed in Inclosure #1 will be processed for release from active duty in accordance with instructions and procedures outlined in Air Force Letter 36-26 and the provisions of paragraph 2, below.

2. The release of all officers listed in Inclosure #1 will be effected on that date which is sixty (60) days from the date officer is notified of his selection unless:

a. The officer requests release at an earlier date.

b. An emergency situation exists such as hospitalization of the officer or hospitalization of dependents whose health would be seriously and adversely affected by immediate separation. Each such emergency situation will be investigated by the major commander and reported to this Headquarters for final decision if a postponement is considered advisable. Reports will include name of officer, grade, service number, present assignment, complete explanation of circumstances requiring the retention of the officer beyond the effective date of release, and the recommendation of the major commander.

c. The present mission of your command requires a limited extension of the separation date of the officer concerned. Final action on such extension will be made only by this Headquarters based on proper justification by major command concerned.

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d. The officer will meet the eligibility requirements for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Section 202, Title II, Public Law 810, 80th Congress prior to 26 January 1951 in which case separation date will be extended (if the officer concerned so desires) to that date upon which he meets such requirements. (See AR 605-245).

e. The officer will complete ten (10) years of active federal commissioned service towards eligibility requirements for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Section 202, Title II, Public Law 810, 80th Congress, prior to 26 January 1951 in which case separation date will be extended (if the officer concerned so desires) to that date upon which he completes such service. (See AR 605-245.)

f. The officer will attain the age of sixty (60) prior to 26 January 1951 in which case separation date will be extended (if officer concerned so desires) to that date upon which he attains age sixty (60). (See AFR 45-7.)

3. Within five (5) days of receipt of this letter, a report in ten (10) copies as required by paragraph 10, Air Force Letter 36-26, will be submitted to the Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C., on those officers listed in Inclosure #1.

4. Major commanders are enjoined to aid individual officers in effecting readjustment into civilian status by liberal leaves, provision of space available air transportation whenever possible and any other reasonable assistance which may be rendered.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1 Incl.
List of Officers
To be Released

s/t/ RUSSELL L. WALDRON
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

1 February 1950

SUBJECT: Extension of Separation Date for Officers to be Released from Active Duty under Provisions of AFL 36-26

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

1. Confirming message AFPMP-4, 18625, this Headquarters, dated 27 January 1950, the normal separation date of any Reserve Force officer selected for release from active duty under the provisions of Air Force Letter 36-26 will be extended (if requested by the officer concerned) until:

a. He meets the eligibility requirements for voluntary retirement, under the provisions of Section 202, Title II, Public Law 810, 80th Congress provided he meets such requirements within one (1) year after date of his approved selection,

b. He completes ten (10) years of active federal commissioned service providing he is within one (1) year of completing ten (10) years active federal commissioned service on the date of his approved selection, or

c. He attains the age of sixty (60) provided he is within one (1) year of attaining sixty (60) years of age on the date of his approved selection.

2. The above extensions were adopted to preclude the release from active duty of any reserve forces officer who, within a reasonable length of time, would meet the eligibility requirements for retirement established in Section 202, Title II, or Section 302, Title III of Public Law 810, 80th Congress (JAAF Bul 29, 15 July 1948).

3. Date of approved selection is not to be confused with date of notification. Date of approved selection is the date the major commander concerned actually approves the recommendations of the board convened by him under the provisions of AFL 36-26 to select officers for relief from active duty.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ RUSSELL L. WALDRON
Colonel, USAF
Office, Director of Mil Pers

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Hq Continental Air Command — Unclassified

CGs All numbered AFs — Routine

Mil Pers-D 2145 . Fol Msg fr Hq USAF, AFPMP-4 18625, 27 Jan 50, is quoted for your info and approp action: "Provided off concerned so desires, normal sep dt of any R/P off selected for Rel fr AD UP AFL 36-26 dtd 29 Nov 49 shall be extended until (1) he meets eligibility rqmts for voluntary ret UP Sec 202, Title II, PL 810, 80th Congress provided he meets such rqmts w/i 1 yr after dt of his aprvd selection. (2) He completes 10 yrs act Fed commissioned sv provided he is w/ilyr of completing 10 yrs act Fed commissioned sv on dt of his aprvd selection, or repeat or (3) he attains age of 60 provided he is w/i 1 yr of attaining 60 yrs of age on dt of his aprvd selection." Acknowledge receipt of this msg.

31 Jan 1950

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

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FunAC Form No. 4G-A
25 March 1948

Adjutant General's Central File

SUBJECT: Airmen Career Program.

: Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, Washington, D. C.

1. Informal exchange of correspondence with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff - Materiel, your headquarters, indicates that a new program for the training and advancement of airmen in technical skills is under consideration at your headquarters. It has been suggested that this command submit certain recommendations for inclusion in the program.

2. a. From the experience in the Continental Air Command, we have concluded that it is often a waste of time to send recruits from the indoctrination center directly to technical schools in peacetime. Classification methods and aptitude tests being what they are, this training is often wasted on individuals not suited to receive it. Furthermore, time is wasted at the technical schools in teaching that which any good apprentice would learn on the job and semi-skilled men drawn from the field are often forced to attend instruction in matters in which they have already become proficient.

b. There is no uniform method at present for dis-rating an individual who fails to maintain his technical qualification. It is true that this may be done through the cumbersome and uncertain process of a reduction board. It is also true that promotion can be withheld from individuals who fail to progress, but human nature being what it is and supervisory personnel at lower levels being in the main inexperienced, we have many airmen today who are coasting on an incomplete knowledge acquired during the early years of the war.

3. It is recommended:

a. That newly enlisted airmen be sent from the indoctrination center to the various units of the Air Force where they will receive apprenticeship training in the field for which they are best suited and where an error of classification can be most readily discovered and corrected, and that students for the technical schools of the Air Force be drawn exclusively from the field from men who have earned the right to receive such training and who have proven their capacity and aptitude therefor.

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

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Form Form AG-AG 5
25 March 1948

Adjutant General's Central File Copy

1-48-248

Firmen Career Program (Cont'd)

b. That an examination, either annual or semi-annual along the lines of the old air mechanic examination, be required of all enlisted technicians and the firm policy established that the first failure to pass such an examination be in itself sufficient grounds for reduction of the individual concerned, if in the opinion of the organization commander desirable, and that the second such failure result in mandatory reduction.

c. That the recommended procedure apply only in peacetime.

H. M. TURNER
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Vice Commander

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

APPTP-3A 25 April 1949

SUBJECT: Retraining of Classification Personnel to Implement Certain Phases of the Airmen Career Program.

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base,
New York

1. In order to secure a realistic inventory of skills and skill level available to the Air Force, certain phases of an overall personnel program will be implemented in the near future.

2. An analysis of all warrant officers and airmen jobs has just been completed. New job descriptions, a new job code and career progression charts will bepublished and distributed in Air Force Letters of the 35-430 series. The job descriptions are published for familiarization and information only.

3. In July 1949, it is planned to begin a conversion of all warrant officers and airmen from the old jobs and job code to the new job and job coding system. This conversion will be accomplished by local classification boards guided by instructions to be issued at a later date. A record of the new job title and job code is to be entered on the basic record of each individual. This conversion action is not authority to change the present use of 33N's in personnel reports or for other purposes. The present system of reporting, transfer and assignment will remain in effect.

4. Approximately 1 November 1949 a supplemental monthly report will be initiated to tabulate and inventory the Air Force skills based upon the conversions to the newjob titles and job code. It is anticipated that the bulk of the conversions can be completed within four (4) months, but classification boards will continue until all hospital, pipeline and other personnel have been reclassified. At a date to be announced later, when other phases of the personnel program have been completed, the new job coding system will be placed into effect.

5. The reclassification of all enlisted men is a most important step in the overall personnel program. The conscientious manner in which the conversion is carried out by local classification boards will determine the accuracy of the skill level inventory. The inventory will permit the

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AFPRP-5A
Subj: Retrng of Class Pers to Implement Certain Phases of the Airman Career Program .

Air Force to objectively train individuals to fill actual Air Force skill requirements. It will not be possible to make conversions through written instructions alone since the new system has changed many elements of the old system. Retraining of presently qualified classification personnel, both officers and airmen, will be required to aid and guide classification boards in making the SSN conversion.

6. Therefore, it is planned to provide training, initially, for at least one (1) key officer and a minimum of two (2) key airmen at each major air command and division, numbered Air Force or equivalent, and installation. It is realized that these personnel cannot perform all the work required, but will be qualified to guide the efforts of personnel accomplishing conversion action. Officer and airmen selected for this training should be the best qualified classification personnel who will remain available for duty in their present assignment to accomplish the conversion. To the maximum extent practicable, the following prerequisites will be observed in selecting the personnel:

a. Officer:

(1) Presently assigned to duty as a Classification and Assignment Officer, SSN 2110, or have had twelve (12) months experience in this duty.

(2) Twelve (12) months service remaining in present assignment upon completion of course.

b. Airmen:

(1) Qualified Classification Specialist, SSN 275, skilled with at least six (6) months experience at group or higher level.

(2) AGCT score - 110, or aptitude index score of at least six (6) in Cluster VII. (See AFL 35-390.)

(3) High school education or GED equivalent.

(4) Have eighteen (18) months service remaining - mandatory.

7. Officers and airmen selected for training under the provision of paragraph six (6) above, should be alerted pending receipt of reporting instructions to the four (4) week course, which will be conducted at Lowry Air Force Base.

8. It is anticipated that the first officer class will open in June

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1949, with subsequent classes convening weekly or bi-weekly thereafter. The Airmen course will open on or about 15 July 1949, with classes convening weekly or bi-weekly thereafter. Following these initial classes which will provide minimum qualified personnel to accomplish the SSN conversion of all airmen, the course will be continued to meet USAF trained personnel requirements for these specialists.

9. The total numbers of personnel for which initial training is required by your command will be furnished this Headquarters, Attention AFPMP, not later than 1 May 1949. Reports control symbol RCS AF-AP P 174 is authorized. Upon receipt of the requirements of your command, quotas and reporting instructions will be furnished your Headquarters. Additional requirements of your Command may be submitted under the provision of AFL 150-2.

10. This letter supplements instructions contained in Message AFPMP-2B 17992, this headquarters, dated 18 April 1949.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/C/ GEORGE D. CAMPBELL, Jr.
Colonel, US Air Force
Office, Director of Military Personnel

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
FOR
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

File _____ SUSPENSE _____

Subject: _____

FROM: _____ TO _____

	Dep for Pers. and Admin.	X
	Ass't Dep for Pers. and Admin.	
X	Director of Personnel	
	Director of Welfare	
	Chaplain	
	Judge Advocate	
	Surgeon	

Coordination _____

Note & Return _____

Action _____

See Me _____

File _____

REMARKS:

1. Reference par 2a, AF Ltr 35-390, 18 Jan 49, is the opening gun in the implementation of the "Airman Career Program." (Copy AFL 35-390 attached - please return)

2. Reference par 2b, personnel who cannot maintain proficiency in their respective specialty are required to meet a Classification Board for removal of their awarded skills. This is provided for by par 4j2, AFM 35-1, and ConAC Reg 14-1, 7 Jan 49. Appropriate action by these boards is monitored thoroughly by AF Audit Teams and Audit Team from this hq as required by ConAC Reg 35-3, 24 Mar 49.

3. Reference par 3b, believe the career program is taking into account the points outlined in this paragraph.

4. Informal information from USAF indicates the Career Program will not be fully launched before 1 Jan 50.

HOWARD L. HALSEY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Personnel

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

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HISTORY

OF THE

CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

1 December 1948 - 31 December 1949

SECTION FIVE: SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE and MATERIEL

Prepared by: Dr. Donald W. Mitchell
Directorate of Historical
Services

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PREFACE

In writing a history on Materiel, several problems presented themselves to the author. One major problem was the question of what to include. Because the writer has been working against a deadline of time which has obliged him to research a field involving much that is technical and almost simultaneously to write about it, he has necessarily had to leave much out of this History. The list of subjects involved in Materiel is a long one. Laundry and Messing arrangement are equally a part of the Materiel Field, along with Radar and Fighter Planes. It being impossible within the time limit assigned to give adequate treatment to much of the Materiel Field, the writer has arbitrarily decided to treat first things first. Since the mission of the Continental Air Command is primarily defensive he has, therefore, given major attention to questions affecting aircraft and their maintenance and supply, lesser but still marked attention to Radar and other aircraft warning devices, and as much time and space as possible to other and less important phases of the subject.

Generous acknowledgement is made to aid received from many sources. The writer's three colleagues: Mr. J. J. Lichman, Mr. William R. Hochman and Mr. Thomas A. Sturm, assisted

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by answering many questions and providing an introductory orientation of inestimable value. To the many Officers, commissioned, non-commissioned and Warrant, who have answered technical questions, read portions of this manuscript dealing with their field and supplied criticisms, thanks are also due. Major R. D. Salter was particularly useful in providing information regarding his specialty -- aircraft engines. Secretarial aid was furnished by Mrs. Helen R. Niwell, Mrs. Rosalie A. Merkle, Miss Dorothy Wickie and Private First Class Ethel P. Fulton. To all these persons who have so generously assisted, must go a major share of the credit for whatever virtues this volume may possess. For its deficiencies the author accepts full responsibility.

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CHAPTER ONE

SUPPLY - GENERAL PROBLEMS

The field of supply within the Continental Air Command is an unusually large one. Besides the upkeep of the numbered air forces with their tactical units, the Air Defense system of the United States is one of the prime responsibilities of Continental Air Command. The Air Reserve and Air National Guard units must also look to it for logistic support. A fair indication of the complications involved is afforded by the large number of types of airplanes operated by Continental Air Command. While other commands commonly function with two to four main types, Continental Air Command flies large numbers of four models of fighters (F-80, F-82, F-84 and F-86), one bomber type (the B-45), numerous models of cargo and training planes, besides small numbers of miscellaneous bombers and fighters (F-51s, B-29s, etc.), a scattering of liaison craft, special types, helicopters, and gliders. In all, twenty-six types of planes operated in the Continental Air Command during Fiscal Year 1950.[1/] Logistic support of so varied an assemblage of types involved far more supply difficulties than were experienced by the average air command.

1/ ConAC, Preliminary Allocation of Flying Hours, Fiscal Year 1950 By Aircraft Model and Utilization. Contained in CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq ConAC, To: Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Hq USAF, 27 September 1949.

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To attempt to tell the whole story of supply would be impossible. This chapter does not make such an attempt. Its purpose is the more limited one of examining some of the more important general problems of supply as they developed on a relatively high level.

One of the most difficult situations as regards supply, was encountered in the case of the Air National Guard and Air Reserve Units. The supply situation in these Units was basically different, in that they not only were not given top priorities for available material but were forced to content themselves with a lower priority level than any Regular unit of the Continental Air Command. Thus the item in short supply for the regular units of Continental Air Command was often completely unavailable for Air Reserve or Air National Guard Units. Many items obtainable by regular units were extremely short for Air Reserve organizations.[2/]

This unsatisfactory situation was repeatedly called to the attention of higher headquarters. For example in the First Air Force it was disclosed that:

> "approximately 75% of the stock replenishment requisitions for ORC units on all classes of property are being returned with the notation that material is available in the 'First Three Priorities Only'.

2/ 1. Ltr 2242d Air Force Reserve Training Center, Hq. Selfridge AFB, Subject: Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations, To: CG, 10AF, 26 July 1949
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq 9AF, Subject: Radar Equipment Authorization for the 123rd AC&W Sq, ANg, To: CG, ConAC, 28 July 1949

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> As a result of this number, normal stock levels are disappearing, AOCP rates are climbing and the ORC units are existing on a 'day to day' basis for their spare parts . . . A survey of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers at Hanscom Airport and Griffiss Air Force Base disclosed that stock levels on C-46 spares are almost non-existent. Seventy-five to eighty percent of all requisitions for these spares are being returned as ' Available in First Three Priorities Only.' Inclosure 1-12 indicate five items received from a total of sixty-three items ordered. The Unit could not retain satisfactory operational efficiency with 75% of the required spare parts being supplied on a 'First Three Priority Basis'. AOCP rates will soar and the entire Reserve Program will suffer if assistance is not furnished in procurement of adequate stock levels of ORC Units." 3/

Similar testimony was presented from the Tenth Air Force. Here the newly activated 439th Troop Carrier Wing (Reserve) found it virtually impossible to obtain minimum equipment requirements. Requisitions to Distribution Depots brought little or no action. It was pointed out that unless equipment to carry out the mission was made available, personnel would become demoralized to the extent of dropping completely out of the Reserve picture. Some Reservists were inclined to compare the effectiveness of Air Force Supply Procedure with that of commercial supply agencies -- much to the detriment of the former. The shortages from which these Units suffered included tools, office supplies, typewriters, chairs, desks, hangar equipment, training aids, clothing, rulers and-not least-aircraft.

3/ Ltr, Hq 1st AF, Subject: Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units, To: Hq, ConAC, 11 March 1949.

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It was suggested that one of the chief causes for supply deficiency was unfamiliarity with Reserve Program needs upon the part of individuals working in supply channels. These persons would frequently impose cuts in amounts requested because they did not believe the statement of the Supply Officers concerned. Another reason was found in the complicated system governing supply at Base level. This involved a reimburseable system of issuance, extra accounting procedures, and numerous restrictions governing the transfer of regular Air Force stocks to Reserve stocks.[4/]

Successive indorsements to the above communication indicated that the supply picture which it presented was substantially correct. Spares for C-46 aircraft were virtually unobtainable for Reserve Units and most of the requisitions for T-11 and T-6 stock supplies had also been cancelled. It was admitted that the system of accounting for ORC property was complicated, and increased the paper workload at the Base Supply.[5/]

Headquarters, Continental Air Command, however, maintained that supply difficulty in the Air Reserve Program were being eliminated gradually. Spares for C-46 aircraft were being made available by Air Materiel Command which was transferring them

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4/ Ltr, 2242d AFRTC, Hq Selfridge AFB, Subject: Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations, To: Co, 56th Ftr Wg, Selfridge AFB, 26 July 1949

5/ 1st Ind., Hq 2242d ARTC, SAFB, 15 August 1949 to ltr, 2242d AFRTC Hq, Selfridge AFB, Subject: Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations, To: CG, 10AF, 26 July 1949

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from regular Air Force stocks. This, it was admitted, was a slow process since it involved first of all, determination of the Air Force needs before transfer could be made. Maintenance, housekeeping and administrative equipment, as well as training aids were on procurement from Fiscal Year 1949 funds and deliveries were being made. While it was true that separate accounting procedures for Reserve Corps and regular Air Force property were required by law, Continental Air Command was attempting to have certain of these legal provisions amended in order to simplify accounting procedures. While it was felt that the United States Air Force would accept the suggestions made, it was also pointed out that a complete overhaul of accounting procedures would involve legislative action and this in turn would take time. 6/

Regular Air Force Units were not, of course, as badly affected by shortages as were the Reserves. However, enough shortages were experienced and felt to be capable of remedial action, to cause United States Air Force to issue a statement of policy governing the issuance of T/O&E equipment. This document had the effect of tightening up on existing supply procedures. It pointed out that strict economy must be exercised to insure that expenditures were based on current war plans. Units not scheduled for early deployment or those scheduled for combat

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6/ 3rd Ind, Hq, ConAC, 28 September 1949 to Ltr, 2242d AFRTC, Hq, Selfridge AFB, Subject: Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations, To: CG, 10AF, 26 July 1949.

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training need not be completely equipped. On the other hand great care was to be exercised in providing for T/O&E units. The policy to apply in the future was:

a. Overseas units to be 100% T/O&E equipped

b. Units of the Strategic Striking Force to be 100% T/O&E equipped

c. Units scheduled for deployment between D and D/8 months to be 100% T/O&E equipped

d. Units not scheduled for deployment piror to D/8 will utilize base T/A equipment and necessary individual items of equipment from the appropriate T/O&E

e. The remainder of the T/O&E equipment for units covered by par. 3d will be maintained in AMC stocks subject to procurement loadtime. 7/

Since none of the T/O&E units measured up to the level of preparedness described by Headquarters, United States Air Force, the Continental Air Command on 1 July 1949 wrote to the Commanding Generals of the First, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth and Fourteenth Air Forces directing "that continued aggressive action be taken by your headquarters to insure that all T/O&E shortages pertaining to organizations in your Command be eliminated at the earliest practicable date." The directive revoked all authority previously granted for suspension of requisitioning of shortages. The Commanding Generals were ordered to be sure that their organizational records accurately reflected the status of property on hand, that all equipment shortages be accurately maintained on active requisition and that vigorous follow-up action be taken in

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7/ SECRET ltr, Hq USAF, Subject: Policy Governing Issue of T/O&E Equipment, To: CG, ConAC, 23 June 1949.

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liaison with the various supply depots to insure that equipment available be properly redistributed. Should these possibilities of action be exhausted without eliminating a particular shortage, Continental Air Command could then be called upon for assistance.[8]

On 1 July 1949 one other change in the supply situation occurred. On that date, Air Reserve Officer's Training Corps (AROTC) activities were formally divorced from Army activities at Army Bases. Supply was also separated and satellite stations were made dependent on Air Force Bases wherever possible.[9]

Faced by shortages in many fields, the Continental Air Command took several steps to insure increased efficiency in handling supplies at the Base level. During the early months of 1949 the Air Materiel Areas were faced with an unmanageable and increasing backlog of reparable items. Analysis revealed that many of these items consisted of articles damaged beyond economical repair which should have been condemned at base level. Mediocre inspection had also resulted in many items being turned in which were in no need of repair. Other items received required repairs which could have been effected at Base level. In still other cases items sent in were not correctly identified and

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8/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Status of Organizational Equipment for all Active USAF Combat and Supporting Units, To: CGs, 1st, 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th AF's, 1 July 1949.

9/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Supply and Services for Satellite Stations, To: CGs, SAC, 14 April 1949.

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tagged or had been damaged in shipment due to improper packing. The Continental Air Command called this to the attention of the Commanding Generals of its numbered Air Forces and directed the taking of positive action to eliminate such irregularities. Should any local situation be so bad that repair was beyond base capacity the establishment of a second repair shift was suggested.[10]

Later in the year it was discovered that planes at the base level were frequently poorly distributed. Aircraft were marked AOCP (Aircraft Out of Commission, Parts) when in many cases the needed supplies and equipment were actually available but not in the hands of the Supply Officer concerned. In other cases maintenance was retarded due to the fact that "Not-in-Stock" slips were issued pertaining to items that were not found in Base Supply but were nevertheless available in bench stocks maintained by other organizations on the same field. To eliminate these irregularities, Wing Commanders were directed to make frequent checks on the supplies available on the base.[11]

The Continental Air Command called the attention of the Air Material Command to another supply problem. This arose in connection with local purchase procedure for repairs and utilities supplies. Instructions in paragraph 403 and 406, Section 31, Air Force Manual 67-1, June 1948, were far from clear and caused con-

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10/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Reparable Property, To: CGs, 1st, 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th AF's, 11 February 1949.

11/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Redistribution of Available Supplies at Base Level, To: CGs each ConAC AF, 15 August 1949.

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siderable difficulty to local Commanders, who did not know, in many cases, whether to make local emergency purchases or file requisitions at the nearest Air Material Area. As a result of the hazy wording in the Air Force Manual, emergency local purchases were at times being made in such small quantities that the cost of processing the necessary paper work involved exceeded the cost of the items being purchased. In other cases where local purchases should have been made, a requisition to an Air Material Area was used instead. In too many instances the requisitions were then returned by the Air Material Areas authorizing local purchase. During this unnecessary paper work, highly paid labor might be idly awaiting receipt of the supplies in order to carry out its work. In order to improve this situation Continental Air Command urged the clarification of emergency local purchase procedures and the authorization of immediate local purchases for known stock items not ordinarily available in Supply Depots.[12]

Continental Air Command made a serious attempt to improve supply organization with a view to promoting greater mobility for its airplanes. Planes appearing from a given airfield had often been handicapped when circumstances forced them to operate in an airfield in a different part of the country. The F-86, for example, found it extremely difficult to operate from bases which were stock-

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12/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Local Purchases Procedure for Repairs and Utilities Supplies, To: CG, AMC, 17 October 1949.

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ed with parts for P-80s. Since shortage of essential parts had not permitted the stocking of each Continental Air Command Base with equipment needed for every type of plane flown by the Command, it was decided to establish "Enroute Kits". These would consist of essential aircraft spares, special tools and special ground handling equipment which could be used in maintaining tactical aircraft for as long as fifteen days after an alert order and before the receipt of regular Air Materiel Area support. Each tactical organization was directed to prepare a list of items for inclusion in such a kit. From the replies received, lists of essential equipment would be drawn up for each type of tactical plane operated by the Command. In cases where items used in the kits were in critical or short supply they were frozen for the specific purpose and could not be used for another. As a supplement an additional plan was evolved to provide logistic support beyond the fifteen day period covered by the "Enroute Kit".[13]

The persistence of criticism of supply procedure on the base level as well as action by Continental Air Command in suggesting changes, encouraged the Department of the Air Force to evolve

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13/ 1. Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Continental Air Command Tactical Organization Supply and Mobility Plan, To: CG, 1st AF, 4 August 1949

2. Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Continental Air Command Tactical Organization Supply and Mobility Plan, To: CGs all ConAC AF's, 12 August 1949.

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new supply procedures which would be implemented in 1950. How well these new procedures work is hardly relevant in point of time from the standpoint of this history. It should be noted, however, that the key note of the new supply system was that of simplicity and the elimination of as many forms and reports as possible. It was believed in Washington that consolidation and elimination of much exhausting paper work could reduce a workload which "has been permitted to seriously interfere with supply operations."[14/]

A supply problem of unusual character was occasioned when bases were inactivated. During this period Air Force Bases at Dow, Grenier, Orlando and Greenville were closed. Lockbourne was inactivated, while Air Force Units were withdrawn from two Army Bases, Fort Slocum and Fort Benjamin Harrison. These moves involved a considerable maintenance problem involving excess property. The policy to be followed in such instances was set forth by Continental Air Command. Property was to be screened against the outstanding and anticipated future requirements of other bases and organizations under the jurisdiction of each Continental Air Command Air Force and necessary account was to be taken to transfer such items as were required. Items which were known to be in critical short supply in Air Force stock but not

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14/ Ltr, Hq USAF, Subject: New Supply Procedures, To: CG, ConAC, 27 October 1949.

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required for redistribution within the Air Force where the base was located would be reported directly to Continental Air Command Headquarters.[15] Carrying out this policy frequently necessitated solving some difficult problems in finance and logistics. In the closing of the Greenville, South Carolina, Air Force Base, difficulty was experienced in disposing of 3,500,000 pounds of surplus equipment at the time when all C-82s were committed and no other planes readily available. In this case the problem was solved only by using the resources of the Tenth, Ninth, Twelfth and Fourteenth Air Forces as well as Reserve units. Most of the equipment concerned was shorthauled to Warner-Robins, Middletown and Dayton.[16]

In the case of Dow Air Force Base operating equipment was transferred to other Continental Air Command Bases, to the Air Materiel Command, to the City of Bangor and the Maine Air National Guard. In most instances a considerable amount of material had to be disposed of by salvage methods. It was seldom indeed that this type of operation could be depended upon to yield a profit. The Post Exchanges lost money heavily when bases were closed, declared surplus or inactivated. Illustrative of this was the fact that for the first six months of fiscal year 1950 the Continental Air Command had a dividend deficit of $120,034.01. Of this deficit

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15/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Redistribution of Excess Property, To: CGs, all ConAC AF's, 22 March 1949

16/ IRS, DO to C&F, Subject: Move of Fourteenth Air Force, 28 September 1949.

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$57,000 was incurred at exchanges on Bases which were inactivated or declared surplus.[17]

It is one of the truisms of military operations that a given situation never looks precisely the same when it is viewed from different levels. Fortunately it is possible to view the problem of supply and maintenance from not only the Continental Air Command level but the Air Force and Base level as well. Drew Middleton in his History of the Fourteenth Air Force during 1949 provides an excellent indication of how supply and maintenance problems looked from this level. When requisitions were turned in for supplies, they went through several headquarters with the possibility of being refused and revised on each level by personnel successively less familiar with the local situation. Even if the local base was fortunate enough to escape having its requisitions greatly changed, long waits of four to eight weeks were required before the items concerned made their appearance -- provided they were "in stock". When the type of plane operated by a given base changed, maintenance was badly affected because a complete stock of new parts could seldom be obtained at once. While the parts maintained for the early model types showed up less frequently, supplies were also limited by the unavailability of warehouse space and on occasion some supplies not needed locally had to be stored at nearby bases. If local maintenance was deficient, as higher

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17/ Narrative Historical Information - History of MS&S Exchange Branch for month of January 1950.

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headquarters frequently pointed out, the local base could truthfully claim that it lacked sufficient qualified technical personnel. On the average, Fourteenth Air Force units had only 45% of their authorized strength in technical categories.[18]

In closing it might be noted that supplies during 1949 fell short of the ideal to about the same degree that personnel and equipment were themselves inadequate. As pointed out, the Commanding General of Continental Air Command made repeated efforts to raise the efficiency of supply operations in cases where malfunctioning of supply organizations became apparent.

18/ Middleton, D. W., History of the Fourteenth Air Force During 1949, pp. 123-28.

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CHAPTER TWO

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE: THE F-84

The advent of jet airplanes has tended to emphasize and complicate certain problems of maintenance. While the tools of maintenance have improved steadily since the 1930's, the requirements in terms of personnel skill have also advanced. The modern jet fighter makes extremely high demands in terms of specialized knowledge and skill. Because of the very high speed of operation, mistakes either upon the part of pilots or maintenance personnel frequently have fatal results.19/

One of the more difficult maintenance problems with which the Air Force has dealt involved the F-84 "Thunderjet", manufactured by Republic Aviation Corporation. While other jet planes had given many maintenance difficulties, in few or no cases were the troubles so persistent as those pertaining to the F-84.

Typical of the difficulties experienced with this particular plane was the experience of the Ninth Air Force. In February 1948 F-84 aircraft were assigned to units of this Air Force. At once serious operational and maintenance problems presented

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19/ 1. Interview with Major R. D. Salter, 5 June 1950
2. "Aircraft Out-of-Commission", study prepared by Major Donald E. Hamilton, 363d Air Base Group, Langley AFB, Va., 25 February 1949. This study contained in letter Hq 4th Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Va., To: CG 9AF, 16 May 1949.

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themselves and to a considerable extent limited both the availability and usefulness of the plane. By January 1949 no less than 337 unsatisfactory reports had been presented relative to the F-84 by Ninth Air Force Units.

The difficulties were of two types: a) maintenance and b) operational. Among the maintenance troubles were failures due to cracking of the Flap Bearing Plate, failure of the Outer Aileron Rib, trouble with Landing Gear Retracting Cylinder Universals which in turn caused failure of the Landing Gear, and inaccessibility of many parts of the plane which required constant maintenance attention. This last defect resulted from an awkward design and produced serious maintenance difficulty. Since many of the components of the airframe and the engine, most of which required frequent examination and adjustment, were not easily accessible, a heavy and unnecessary expenditure of man hours was required.[20]

Operational limitations of the F-84 were equally serious. Planes were limited to an acceleration of not more than six G's and an indicated air speed not in excess of 500 mph. They were forbidden to participate in air shows. When the tip tanks and elevator bob-weights were installed, restrictions were even more severe. Still another restriction limited the F-84 to bombs

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20/ SECRET ltr, CG 9AF, Subject: Operational and Maintenance Difficulties on F-84 Aircraft, To: Hq ConAC, 18 January 1949

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weighing no more than 250 pounds. Excessive stick force in flying was productive of fatigue upon the part of pilots. Due to a poor location of the fuel filler neck, excessive time was required for refueling operations, while the excessive take-off and landing distances needed limited the F-84 to use in permanent type installations with long runways.

To counteract these bad conditions Major General William D. Old urged that a factory modernization program, previously recommended by the Air Materiel Command, be adopted as quikly as possible.[21]

After these recommendations were concurred in by Continental Air Command, the Department of the Air Force added a second indorsement, in which it explained that it was establishing a contractor modification program for the improvement of some 382 F-84 B and C aircraft. It was believed that modification applied to approximately 120 items would correct most of the operational and maintenance difficulties including the wing structure which was spoken of as requiring reinforcements.[22]

The modernization program urged by General Old was quickly adopted for B and C aircraft of the F-84 series. By 1 November 1949 Shaw and Dow Air Force Bases had each delivered seventy-

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21/ SECRET ltr CG 9AF, Subject: Operational and Maintenance Difficulties on F-84 Aircraft, To: Hq ConAC, 18 January 1949

22/ SECRET 2nd Ind., Hq USAF, 4 March 1949 To: ltr, 9AF, Subject: Opefational and Maintenance Difficulties on F-84 Aircraft, To: CG, ConAC, 18 January 1949

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three F-84Bs to Republic. Turner Air Force Base had turned in seventy-eight F-84Cs and Otis Air Force Base forty-seven F-84Cs, a grand total of 271 planes. Other planes were to be taken care of later.[23]

During the remainder of 1949 F-84 weaknesses manifested themselves with disturbing frequency. On 31 March 1949 the Air Materiel Command noted that changes of engines required too long and were exceedingly difficult to accomplish. Numerous alterations had been made to decrease engine change time which was, however, still excessive. It was also noted that the F-84 had a strong nose-down tendency which was manifested upon the release of bombs. This had caused the limitation of 250 pounds in size of bombs carried. This particular weakness the Air Materiel Command hoped to overcome by a bomb pylon installation, which in practice had given satisfactory bomb carrying and dropping characteristics. This device was scheduled for installation on F-84Bs and Cs during the modification period. The starter generator of the F-84 was also giving difficulty as its brushes required inspection after every twenty-five hours of operation -- a change which required the removal of the engine to accomplish.[24]

23/ Hq., ConAC, Command Diary, 4 November 1949

24/ CONFIDENTIAL, Hq AMC, "Action Taken on Deficiencies Affecting Operational Suitability and Deployment of Jet Aircraft", Eighth Interim Report, 31 March 1949

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One of the major difficulties experienced with the F-84 lay in its engine. The model used in most of the planes in the F-84 series was the J-35A-13. When a plane operated at altitudes in excess of 30,000 feet, the engine showed a tendency to heat rapidly.[25] The Fourteenth Air Force reported fifty-two instances of engine malfunction during a total of 3,974 hours flown. In this, roughly two-thirds of these engine failures were occasioned by bearing failures, while the remainder were due to cracked nozzle diaphrams. Engine failures occurred at an average rate of one per 76.4 flying hours. However, during several weeks of mid-summer the average rate had been one per 38.2 flying hours. These failures appeared to be due to improper lubrication and poorly engineered bearings. The 20th Fighter Wing at Shaw Air Force Base urged that a different lubricating system be installed and that all present bearings be replaced by a new type of silver bearing. The problem of hot engines at altitudes in excess of 30,000 feet had also given trouble and a restriction of 35,000 feet had therefore been placed upon the F-84D. Significantly it was noted "we are requiring the aircraft to perform each assigned mission, and feel that it cannot withstand this type operation without excessive engine failures and we would not be able to conduct large scale sustained operations

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25/ Ibid Ninth Interim Report, 30 April 1949

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with this present J-35-13A engine.[26]

These engine failures, coming as they did with little advanced warning, had important effects upon operation. It had been necessary to restrict flying to local areas as well as to eliminate most night flying, navigational training flights and transition training.[27]

Interestingly enough, it was not only at altitudes above 30,000 feet that the F-84 was a "hot" plane. Turbines which were supposed to cool the cabin during low altitude operations were failing to operate effectively. The result was that cockpit temperatures were excessive during low altitude operations. Many pilots returned from missions in so marked a state of exhaustion that it was believed that their condition might have contributed to some of the jet accidents which had occurred.[28]

Shaw Air Force Base also reported great difficulty in getting F-84Ds equipped with rocket racks into the air on warm days. An attempt was then made to get the J-35-13A engine replaced with J-35-17A's. However, not enough of this latter type was available as it had formerly been designed for F-84Es.[29] Disturbed by such incidents, Headquarters, United States Air Force, undertook

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26/ SECRET ltr, Hq 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, Subject: Malfunction of J-34-13A Jet Engine in F-84D Type Aircraft, To: CG, ConAC, 29 July 1949

27/ SECRET ltr, Brig Gen Ralph F Stearley, CG, 14AF, To: Maj Gen Chas T Myers, VC, ConAC, 2 August 1949

28/ Ibid

29/ SECRET, IRS, Hq ConAC, DM to DO, 22 July 1949

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an investigation of F-84 accidents occasioned by inability of pilots to raise the nose wheel off the ground in cases where normal take-off speed had been reached.[30]

Considerable difficulty was also experienced with the armament equipment of the F-84. The troubles encountered with carrying bombs in excess of 250 pounds have already been noted. Gunnery experiments and practice likewise gave poor results. Between 30 September and 14 October 1949 the 84th Fighter Squadron, Jet, engaged in aerial gunnery practice at March Air Force Base. Gunnery scores were highly unsatisfactory and showed no improvement during the entire period. At first this weakness was attributed to lack of experience. However, when after a reasonable amount of practice, no one improved his score, a careful examination was made of armament equipment. After much experimenting, a number of defects were discovered. It was found that the angle of attack for the various air speeds, as given by the Table of Operations (T.O.), set up for boresighting, the F-84D was incorrect by as much as thirty-five mils. This could cause an error of as much as eight feet in the distance of a bullet fired at 1,000 feet. The A-1B component gun sight did not compute sufficient lead for the prescribed angles. By much experimentation and the application of some excellent reasoning, it was established in what respects this equipment was defective. After discovering that the

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30/ ConAC, Command Diary, 15 June 1949

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sight did not operate effectively, the Squadron returned to the older focused sight and obtained good results. It then recommended:

"a. That a complete and accurate table be furnished as to the correct angle of attack for any given air speed.

b. That the nose gun installation be redesigned to permit boresight at higher angles of attack than 25 mils, or that a new system be advanced which will compensate for the bullet deflection caused by the force of the flight of the aircraft acting against line of flight of the projectile.

c. That the A-1B gunsight be so calibrated as to compute the correct lead in the F-84D." 31/

A slight though significant operational weakness was discovered by the 20th Fighter Wing. This organization found that complete servicing of the tip tanks resulted in the appearance of a slight wrinkle in the front edge of either wing approximately four feet from the wing tips. Fearing (with abundant justification, as later events were to prove) that this condition might cause damage to the wing structure, the Base adopted the policy that no aircraft would be left standing overnight with more than thirty gallons of fuel in each tank, except in the case of an emergency or early morning take-off. 32/

Wing weaknesses appeared to be standard among F-84s. Inspection at Dow Air Force Base revealed that 95% of the aircraft

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31/ SECRET ltr, Hq 84th Fighter Squadron, (Jet), Hamilton AFB, Subject: Results of Gunnery Experiments with the F-84D, To: CO, 78th Fighter Group, 24 October 1949

32/ TWX, Hq ConAC, To: AMC - undated

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inspected showed cracks beyond allowable tolerances appearing in the wing flap bearing plates. These planes were at once grounded. Other Headquarters were notified and ordered to make a thorough inspection -- action which resulted in extensive additional groundings of defective planes until replacement parts were obtained.[33/]

Several accidents involving F-84s were contributed to brake failure, which resulted from brake lining assemblies being improperly installed or worn excessively thin. Hoping to hold down the accident rate from this failure, the Continental Air Command directed that brake lining assemblies be inspected daily, also outlining in detail the steps to be taken in accomplishing this inspection.[34/]

Although the F-84Bs and Cs were regarded as being "difficult" planes it was hoped that the F-84D would prove to be a definite improvement on earlier types. Service tests were conducted by the Air Materiel Command from 14 March to 1 April 1949 and included long range ferrying, simulated combat mission, endurance missions, formation flights, and bombing and gunnery tests. These service tests resulted in fourteen unsatisfactory reports. However, some

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33/ Hq. ConAC, Command Diary, 10 June 1949

34/ TWX, Hq ConAC To: CG's 1st, 4th and 14th AF's. Undated.

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80% of the conditions that had been reported defective during the test of early F-84 aircraft appeared to have been eliminated.[35]

As a matter of fact, many of the deficiencies of the F-84 were remedied in the F-84D. Certain difficulties were experienced such as gun blast tube plugs which broke in flight.[36] Items causing AOCP studies for F-84 included fuel pumps, casing nose wheels, shroud, turbine cables, indicators, linings, and hydraulic fluid.[37] However, most of these were of a routine nature and did not in themselves indicate any particular deficiency upon the part of the plane concerned.

Unfortunately one very significant defect of early planes of the F-84 series was repeated in the F-84D. That was the structural weakness in the wings. Because of this weakness it became necessary to adopt a protective fix as a temporary method of adding strength. When the F-84E came into use it was hoped that this weakness had been corrected. Unfortunately, all conclusive testimony proved that such was not the case. In November the F-84Es were added to the modification program and wing repair kits were made available as a stop gap measure.[38]

35/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, AMC, Subject: Progress Report of Aerial Service Tests Being Conducted by the AMC 15 Mar-1Apr 1949, To: C/S, USAF, 11 April 1949

36/ Ltr, AMC, Subject: Gun Blast Tube Plugs of F-84 Aircraft, To: CG, ConAC, 16 June 1949

37/ Ltr, Hq AMC, Subject: AOCP Items of F-84 Aircraft, To: CG, ConAC, 10 August 1949

38/ Hq ConAC, Command Diary, 30 Nov & 1 Dec 1949

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On 23 November 1949, Major General Ralph F. Stearley, Commanding General of the Fourteenth Air Force, wrote Lieutenant General Whitehead as follows:

> "Enclosed is a copy of a letter that I sent to your headquarters concerning the F-84s. The picture isn't good. The one thing that hurt me most was that one of our F-84Es at Turner developed a crack. I had hoped that the Es, with the new wing, would be alright. I remember in our telephone conversation that you predicted that we would have the same trouble. However, I still held out and hoped against hope that the cracks wouldn't develop. There is only one thing for us to do and that is for us to go ahead with the preventive fix on the Es as well as the Ds." 39/

A month prior to General Stearley's letter the operational suitability of the F-84E had been tested by the Air Proving Ground Command. It reported that the F-84E was an efficient day interceptor, differing but little in its characteristics from the F-84D. It was capable of intercepting a bomber 100 miles from radar sight, providing it was scrambled when the bomber was 230 miles distant. It was found to be better than the D in climb, maximum speed and acceleration. In certain respects it was found to be better than the F-80C or the F-86A due to provision of separate racks for armament and its external fuel tanks. It was also able to carry a greater pay load to the target. Air-to-ground gunnery, however, proved difficult and hazardous due to the very brief time when the plane was within firing range and the high stick forces encountered during pull-

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39/ SECRET ltr, Maj Gen R.F.Stearley, To: Lt Gen E.C.Whitehead, 23 November 1949.

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out. Certain defects were noted which included heavy strain on the pilot, difficulty of control, insufficient cockpit lighting, etc.[40]

Just when it might reasonably have been thought that difficulties in connection with the F-84 had finally been surmounted a spectacular accident occurred at Hamilton Air Force Base in California. An F-84D being flown in the No. 3 position in a string formation experienced a wing failure which caused an immediate and fatal accident. This particular plane had not been modified for the purpose of strengthening it. An investigation was directed to include a careful inspection for loose rivets, wrinkled skin or other indications of undue stresses.[41]

A grounding of F-84s was ordered on 10 December 1949 pending a careful maintenance inspection of the aircraft.[42]

The investigation and subsequent action which followed the F-84D crash, lasted well into 1950. However, on 18 December 1949 a report of the sub-investigation was sent to the Inspector General United States Air Force. It was found that the crash had occurred while a formation of which the wrecked plane was a part, was performing a series of loops and rolls in rapid succession,

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40/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq APG, Subject: Interim Report of APG Project No. 6498 --- 5, Operational Suitability Test of the F-84E Airplane, To: Dir of Req, USAF, 25 October 1949

41/ SECRET, TWX, Hq ConAC To: CG, 14AF, 10 December 1949

42/ SECRET, TWX, Hq ConAC To: CG, 4AF, 10 December 1949

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with no opportunity for wing men to regain normal spacing except by cutting corners at about 7,000 feet. The No. 4 man in the formation saw plane No. 689 begin to break up below him. The left wing broke first and was the immediate cause of the accident. The failure appeared to have been caused by the application of pull-out loads in excess of the limitation permitted for the airplane. The right wing was badly crushed by impact with the ground. However, it revealed a crack in the camera opening aerial -- a defect which had been epidemic with the F-84 airplane. The cracking of the left wing skin was regarded as immediately responsible for the accident. Workmanship on the wrecked plane appeared to be excellent, but the design of the wings left much to be desired. Pilot indoctrination regarding the F-84 appeared to have been insufficient. Most pilots wrongly assumed that the F-84 was as capable of withstanding strains as the early F-80. This was simply not true. The F-84 had not been designed to withstand the strains that its missions involved. Whenever pilots imposed loads varying from 7.5 to 10.5 G's on a plane designed for 7.33 G's, an epidemic of wing failures accompanied by fatal accidents were inevitable results.[43]

The investigation also investigated certain other deficiencies. Although the use of the elevator trim table for maneuvering was prohibited, pilots had been accustomed to use it. The wing guns,

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43/ SECRET, Dept of the Air Force, Hq, USAF, Subject: Report of Special Investigation of F-84D Aircraft Accidents, Fourth Air Force, To: Insp. Gen, USAF, 18 December 1949.

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it was found, could not be harmonized to converge at ranges closer than 2,000 feet without the necessity for reboresighting the guns each time they were removed for cleaning. Oxygen masks for high altitude flying were insufficient to equip the pilots available. A-6 air targets were critically short. Finally, lack of personnel stability, an excessive number of pilots and the flow of inexperienced pilots into the group, were believed to have reduced combat effectiveness. The report ended with eight conclusions and eleven recommendations:

"CONCLUSIONS:

1. Assuming that materiel tests now in progress do not indicate sub-standard materiel, it is concluded that the failure of the left wing of Airplane No. 48-689 (No. 3 in this flight) resulted from load factors in excess of the design maneuver load factor of 7.33, and is believed to have been in the order of 11 or more G's.

2. The power plant, trim tables, tip tanks, maintenance, and workmanship are not believed to have been contributing factors.

3. The numerous wing skin cracks occurring in F-84D aircraft are attributed to an area of stress concentration which fails in some airplanes when subjected to maneuver load factors believed to be in the order of 5.5 to 8Gs.

4. Unsigned statements obtained from fifty-seven pilots of the 78th Fighter Group indicates that twelve pilots have exceeded the design load factor on this airplane by imposing loads varying from 7.5 to 10.5 G's on various occasions, and twenty pilots have exceeded a speed of .82 each by 5 mph. to 40 mph. at altitudes varying from 8,000 feet to 38,000 feet. The pilots recalled four airplanes that had exceeded 7.33 G's and a check of these planes revealed that one had the typical

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right wing skin crack. (See Tab Q) The Board is certain that the aircraft have been operated beyond design limitations, and believes there is a lack of appreciation by pilots and other personnel of design limitations.

5. The A-1B Gun, Bomb, Rocket sight is unsatisfactory for tactical use in its present configuration. This problem was not investigated in detail because it is known that the deficiencies are under investigation by the Air Proving Ground, Air Materiel Command, and other agencies.

6. Supply problems are most critical from the standpoint of brake putts, A-6 type flag targets, and proper instruments for link trainers.

7. Aircraft maintenance in this group is better than average.

8. Operational difficulties as influenced by personnel are created by too many pilots being assigned and attached for tactical flying for the number of aircraft assigned and flying hours allocated. Approximately 160 pilots are assigned and attached with 61 assigned aircraft. The 78th Fighter Group has been allocated 3628 flying hours for the first quarter of 1950, less than ten hours per pilot per month.

"RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Board recommends that:

a. All F-84D aircraft be limited to 4.5 G at all altitudes prior to modification to prevent wing skin cracking.

b. All acrobatics in formation, including string formation, in F-84B, F-84C and F-84D aircraft be completed above 15,000 feet altitude.

c. F-84D Airplane No. 48-741 be repaired locally and flown to SMAMA for D.I.R.

d. A static test of an F-84D wing, without reinforcement, be made to determine load factor producing cracks. This same wing, then modified and tested to destruction to determine ultimate load and adequacy of modification.

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e. A continuing program be established for installing recording accelerometers in several aircraft per fighter group (all types) to provide a permanent record of loads being imposed on fighter aircraft.

f. The techniques and requirements of ground support missions be analyzed to determine whether changes should be made in the basic methods for performing these missions during training in order to protect the aircraft from excessive acceleration loads. It is evident that the F-84D aircraft are being overstressed in performance of ground gunnery, dive bombing, rocket firing, and low altitude aerial gunnery missions.

g. An Air Force wide educational program be established through the medium of Flying Safety, Training Films, Air Training Command, and

h. A study be made to determine the feasibility of relocating the aileron boost mechanical disconnect and canopy emergency jetison switch on the F-84D aircraft, for better accessibility under high load factors or other emergency conditions.

i. Technical instructions be issued requiring pressure on F-84 aircraft tip tanks at all times.

j. Accelerometers be redesigned to eliminate fictitious high readings due to gust loads and ground operations. Pending availability of such redesigned instruments, all fighter pilots should be indoctrinated on the limitations and interpretations of present instrument readings.

k. A summary of this report be brought to the attention of all F-84 pilots." 44/

The accident at Hamilton Air Force Base was actually only the culmination of a long series of mishaps attributable to wing failure. Previously there had been five instances of complete wing failure and forty-five cases of skin cracks. Most of

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44/ Ibid

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the latter had developed under the right wing at Station #62 and some had spread to approximately eleven inches in the course of a single flight. Test experience seemed to indicate that the wings hardened to some degree with service and that there were more failures among new wings than among those subjected to service conditions. Nearly all F-84 wings appeared to display the same general weakness, though the D and E wings appeared to be a little stronger than others of an earlier series. There appeared to be nothing to do but thoroughly test the wings in use, strengthen them through fixes, and attempt in later models of aircraft to build craft of greater structural stability which could more successfully stand abuse upon the part of pilots.[45]

45/ SECRET ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: F-84 Wings, To: CG, AMC, 24 December 1949

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CHAPTER THREE

MAINTENANCE OF OTHER AIRCRAFT

F-80:

During 1949 no other type of aircraft gave as much maintenance trouble to the Continental Air Command as did the F-84. Nevertheless most of the maintenance effort was expended on other models of planes. These included three other types of Fighters: the F-80, F-82 and F-86; the B-45 Bomber; several types of cargo and troop carrying planes of which the C-45, C-47, C-54, C-82 and C-119 were the most numerous, many models of training planes and a considerable number of miscellaneous types, helicopters and gliders.

The plane most used in terms of total flying hours by the Continental Air Command was the F-80.[46] This plane had been in operation for several years with the result that earlier "bugs" had been eliminated. In its Continental Air Command use during recent times it had given an excellent account of itself from the standpoint of simplicity of design, ruggedness of construction and ease of maintenance. With a speed of approximately 575 mph. and an extreme ceiling of 45,000 feet, it was a serviceable workhorse, rightly noted for reliability.[47]

46/ Ltr Hq, ConAC, Subject: Flying Hours, To: Dep C/S, USAF, 27 September 1949

47/ 1. SECRET ltr, Hq, USAF, Subject: Staff Study of a Penetration Fighter, To: Hq, TAC, 7 July 1949

2. CONFIDENTIAL IRS, DM to CG, 22 July 1949

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Despite the good characteristics of this plane, it left something to be desired from the standpoint of being up to date. Therefore, a modification program was adopted on 8 December 1948. This included provisions for rocket launching, an improved gunsight, de-icing equipment, redesign of the canopy, reworking of the elevator rudder, relocation of the engine drain valve, provision for installation of JATO, and a few other changes.[48]

About the same time as the adoption of the modernization program for the F-80, maintenance troubles developed on two fronts. The 50 calibre, M-2 and M-3 machine guns on occasion failed to fire. This deficiency appeared to be caused by primer failure, which in turn was due to the firing pin springs having a permanent set. In some cases maintenance crews had also used the wrong machine guns. M-2's were designed for use in the F-80A and M-3 guns for employment in the F-80B. In cases where the M-3 was installed in the F-80A, damage resulted to the nose structure. In other cases there was an improper backplate adjustment. The Continental Air Command took note of these deficiencies and quickly sent out directions for their correction.[49]

48/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Modernization of F-80 Aircraft, To: CG, 56th Fighter Wing, Selfridge AFB, 8 December 1949

49/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: F-80 and F-84 Armament Systems, To: CGs all AF's, 1 December 1948

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Some difficulties were also encountered in the operation of the J-33-A-23 engines employed in the F-80C and TF-80C aircraft. Considerable trouble was encountered in attempting to start the planes and Air Material Command sent out a long procedure designed to familiarize operational personnel with the best methods. Prior to attempting to start these two planes it was urged that an adequate auxiliary power source should be attached to the dual connection on the aircraft. 50/

The other major difficulty was the occurrence of "Flame Outs." These were also encountered by later jet planes. They were particularly apt to occur in the case of planes which did not have low pressure filter alcohol de-icing systems installed in the fuel system. During cold weather in particular ice crystals tended to form on the low pressure fuel filter. When improper procedures were used in transporting and servicing JP-1 Fuel into F-80 planes, the condition was aggravated. A partial "Flame Out" of the F-33A-23 engine combustion chambers often occurred during an idle descent of the plane. This trouble apparently resulted from poor atomization properties of the fuel nozzles at low fuel flows. On occasion as many as eight out of fourteen combustion chambers flamed out with the result being extremely low idle speeds and subsequent tailcone rubbing. Air Material Command, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Allison all busied themselves

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50/ RESTRICTED TWX, AMC to ADC, 1 December 1948

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with this deficiency and prepared to convert the J-33A-23 engines to the low pressure fuel system.[51]

Another trouble common with jets which was experienced by the F-80 lay in the failures of the turbine buckets. Frequently these chipped and broke after a very little service and kept their plane "Out-of-Commission" until they could be replaced. These buckets also appeared to be defective from another angle in that they rubbed on the exhaust cone shroud ring. Though the manufacturers supplied thicker buckets this did not eliminate the trouble. All deliveries of buckets were stopped except for certain experimental batches.[52]

Two other difficulties comparatively minor in character were also reported in the Ninth Interim Report on Jet Aircraft. These were defective wheel alignment which resulted in excessive and uneven tire wear, and excessive vibration failures of the electronic equipment which occurred when the M-3 type machine gun was operating in the same compartment. None of these deficiencies

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51/ 1. TWX, AMC to Hq ConAC, 11 January 1948

2. CONFIDENTIAL, AMC, Action Taken on Deficiencies Affecting Operational Suitability and Deployment of Jet Aircraft, Eighth Interim Report, 31 March 1949

3. CONFIDENTIAL, AMC, Action Taken on Deficiencies Affecting Operational Suitability and Deployment of Jet Aircraft, Ninth Interim Report, 30 April 1949

52/ CONFIDENTIAL, AMC, Action Taken on Deficiencies Affecting Operational Suitability and Deployment of Jet Aircraft, Ninth Interim Report, 30 April 1949

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proved especially difficult to correct.[53]

A demonstration of effective maintenance occurred in September 1949 when fifteen F-80s flew from Selfridge Field, Michigan to Furstenfeldbruck, Germany. The route taken was across the north Atlantic with refueling stops at Maine, Labrador, Greenland, Iceland, Scotland and England. Logistic support was afforded by two C-47s, a C-54 and a B-29. Air rescue B-17s were also stationed enroute. However, they were not needed. The flight from Michigan to Germany was accomplished without any difficulty or serious maintenance problems.[54]

F-82:

The relatively favorable position of the F-80 as regards maintenance was not shared by the F-82 or "Double Mustang" as it was known in the service. This plane, described by those familiar with it as "by long odds the most complicated fighter that has ever been built," was productive of maintenance headaches and a high out-of-commission rate wherever it was located. From the maintenance standpoint it was an extremely difficult, complicated and expensive plane.[55]

On repeated occasions during the time covered by this study the inherent deficiencies of the F-82 prevented or greatly hin-

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53/ Ibid

54/ SECRET ltr Hq, ConAC, Mission Report; F-80 Aircraft to Germany, To: CG, IAF, 21 September 1949

55/ CONFIDENTIAL IRS, DM to CG, 26 July 1949

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dered successful accomplishment of the mission of the organization to which it was attached. The first occasion of this kind arose in December 1948 when a TWX from the Continental Air Command prohibited the employment of F-82's on gunnery missions until modifications on the machine guns had taken place. Precautionary measures were outlined, to be followed by operating personnel.[56]

Other troubles occurred with considerable frequency. The pressure valve assembly including the bellows pin failed to function correctly and necessitated corrective action.[57] The AN/APG-28 radar also worked erratically and information was requested regarding its performance.[58] The two deficiencies noted above were the predecessors of an extremely vigorous report on the deficiencies of F-82F aircraft operating in the 52nd Fighter Wing. This Unit had experienced continual headaches with the F-82 and attributed many of them to lack of proper preliminary action upon the part of higher headquarters. It noted:

> "The aircraft should have been more carefully cared for while they were in storage; spares should have been procured and placed in depots, and technical orders, manuals, stock lists, etc., should have been published and placed in stock ready for immediate issue . . . It is further believed that had the aircraft been given an adequate service test many of

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56/ TWX, Hq ConAC to CG's 1st and 4th AF's, 7 December 1948

57/ TWX, AMC to CO, 152nd Maintenance Squadron, Mitchel AFB, 13 December 1948

58/ TWX, Hq 1AF to CO, 52nd Fighter Wing, Mitchel AFB, 17 February 1949

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the failures and malfunctions that have caused this group so much trouble would have been discovered and corrected." 59/

The problems encountered fell into five general categories. The most numerous deficiencies were experienced in engineering. Of eighteen single engine landings, five were caused by failure of the propellor shaft control which resulted in automatic feathering of the propellor. This failure grounded the affected aircraft for nine days, while new type shafts were being procured. Three landings were caused by a failure of the oil pressure systems to which no adequate solution had been found. Six resulted from failure of coolant lines or connections. Three landings were caused by the failure of the speed density pumps which resulted in complete power loss to the engine affected. Other engineering difficulties involved the explosion of the coolant expansion tank which resulted in major damage to the fuselage, a power failure on take-off, and inoperative main inverters which prevented operation of the automatic pilot. It was also noted that the slave gyro compass was unreliable, that engine charge heat units were out-of-commission on eleven of thirty-one aircraft, that the temperature control unit boxes which control

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59/ Ltr, Hq 52nd Fighter Wing, All Weather, Mitchel AFB, Subject: Status of F-82 Aircraft, To: CG, IAF, 7 April 1949

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anti-icing heat on the wings were out of order in fourteen aircraft, that some of the bearings on all engines were either rusty, flaked or chipped, that the lock spanner nuts on the auxiliary supercharger had become loose, resulting in stripping threads on the shaft and that there had been numerous failures of the induction manifold thermo bulbs. Thirteen out of sixty-four engines originally received had had to be changed. There had also been a 38% over-assignment of aircraft coupled with a 76% assignment of authorized maintenance personnel. Out of twenty-four authorized engine mechanics, only four had actually been assigned, and of four electrical specialists, only two were assigned, whereas at least eight were needed.

The armament of several planes had been found to be defective. Malfunction of a Retainer Spring on a 50 calibre machine gun in one airplane had resulted in shooting away a large part of the leading edge of thecenter section. Upon inspection a like failure was discovered on two other airplanes. A radio compass had given a great deal of trouble and appeared to require considerable maintenance, as did the airborne radar set.

In operations a number of defects had also developed. An alternating gyro compass was considered desirable but could not be installed due to lack of room on the instrument panel of the cockpit. The slave compass and the automatic pilot behaved so erratically that pilots had lost confidence in their accuracy. The marker beacon light was installed in a very poor position

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for either daylight or night visibility. Controls were so sensitive as to cause abrupt changes in altitude with extremely slight pressure. All these deficiencies added up to an in-commission rate ranging from 54% in January to a low of 29.1% in March.[60/]

Continued experience with the F-82 failed to endear it to the First Air Force. The high out-of-commission rate gave no promise of changing. In spite of extensive cannibalization it was found impossible to keep even a large proportion of the F-82 aircraft in operational condition. The difficulties causing this situation were: (1) lack of parts and extreme delays in the receipt of items which had been placed on order and, (2) an excessive number of man hours required (33 for each hour in the air) for maintenance. Out of ninety-four items outstanding on priority three requisitions, sixty-one were unavailable within the local Air Materiel Area. In maintenance an excessive amount of time was required for trouble shooting.

> "Approximately 75% of the time spent in the correction of failures and malfunctions, which are innumerable, is spent in trying to learn the cause of the trouble. While the North American Representative has been of invaluable assistance, even he is puzzled at times. To cite one example, the carburetor speed density pump is a source of trouble that he cannot analyze."

60/ Ibid

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On one recent instance, it was calculated that seventy-two man hours were spent on one plane, in order to do sixteen man hours of work -- the fifty-six extra hours being devoted to locating the cause of the trouble. Maintenance personnel was still short despite an on-the-job training program. There were far too few radar repairmen and power-plant mechanics.[61]

After communicating with the Air Materiel Command, the Continental Air Command notified the First Air Force that little aid could be expected in the immediate future. The supply of engine accessories, and engine and aircraft spares was found to be critically short. Brakes, wheels and linings, all urgently needed, were on contract though appreciable delivery could not be anticipated for two months. Left-hand rotating starters were also in extremely short supply. The personnel problems were being given constant attention with a view to: (1) reducing the man hours required for maintenance and, (2) making available personnel with a higher degree of maintenance training.[62]

During the summer of 1949 the supply situation grew slightly worse not only for F-82 but for other types of planes as well.

61/ SECRET, ltr, Hq 52nd Fighter Group, All Weather, Subject: Detailed Remarks on U-13 Report, To: CO, 52nd Fighter Wing, All Weather, Mitchel AFB, 9 May 1949

62/ 1. Hq, ConAC, Subject: Logistical Support of F-82 Aircraft, To: CG, IAF, 11 May 1949
2. SECRET, IRS, MAS to C&T, 8 June 1949

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The reason for this was a strike upon the part of employees of the Bendix Corporation. This limited the supply of certain types of aircraft parts. Largely to minimize the effects of this partial cutting off of the source of supply, instructions were issued placing limits on the flying hours permitted to certain types of aircraft. Aircraft of the F-82E, F, G and H series were restricted to an average of twenty hours for the month of August. Other types of aircraft effected were F-80s, F-86s and B-50s. It was believed that the part situation would remain critical for the F-82 until at least 1 October 1949.[63]

As a matter of fact, maintenance of F-82s slightly improved its record during the Fall of 1949. The 52nd Fighter Wing had an in-commission rate of 41.8% for August, 48% for September and 55.8% for the first half of October. This improvement may be attributed to increased experience with the F-82 and more effective utilization of local resources. However, at the same time that it was improving the in-commission status, the 52nd Fighter Wing registered bitter complaints regarding the difficulty of their task. It was pointed out that the F-82 required enormous and excessive maintenance in electronics, electrical and power system. For each hour of flight, thirty-three hours were expended on maintenance. Major maintenance problems appeared to be: (1) sludge formation in the oil system to which the Allison

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63/ CONFIDENTIAL, TWX - USAF to All Major and Overseas Commands, 29 July 1949

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B-1710-143 engine appeared to be particularly subject, (2) the Bendix speed density unit, (3) brake assemblies which were out rapidly and could not be replaced, (4) extremely complicated electrical systems, with no less than twenty-six separate circuits, (5) radar troubles, (6) restricting of all relief valves on all water injection pumps and (7) personnel needs. It was felt that at least 120 days instruction and specialized work on the F-82F were necessary before maintenance personnel was genuinely competent to handle this plane. Due to the heavy personnel turnover it was impossible to assure maintenance personnel of this level of know how. It was, therefore, recommended:

1. That authorized skilled personnel be assigned to the group and frozen in their assignment
2. That steps be taken to insure a supply of critical items sufficient to maintain the stock levels established as requested. 64/

Despite some improvement in the Fall of 1949, to which allusion has been made, the maintenance situation as regards the F-82 continued to give trouble. The 325th Fighter Wing, All Weather, stationed at Moses Lake Air Force Base, Washington, had an experience much like that of the 52nd Fighter Wing in the East. As a matter of fact, its experience differed slightly in that the aircraft out-of-commission for parts (AOCP) rate went

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64/ SECRET ltr, Hq, 52nd Fighter Group, All Weather, Subject: F-82 Aircraft, To: CO, 52nd Fighter Wing, All Weather, Mitchel AFB, 26 August 1949

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upward during the Fall months. In September 15.3% of its planes were AOCP; October 24.6%; November 42.4%. Some of these planes had been on AOCP status from 120 to 344 days. The average aircraft in-commission rate for this period was 40.6%.

Due to the shortage of parts, cannibalization had taken place and it was only this factor that enabled the 325th Wing to show even as high an in-commission rate as 40.6%. In extremely critical shortage were such items as control assembly speed density unit, engines, wheels, brakes, propellor assemblies and regulator assemblies. When Continental Air Command called these shortages of spares to the attention of Air Materiel Command the latter headquarters replied that every effort was being made to eliminate existing shortages but that the supply situation had still not improved to any great extent. Further, since existing plans envisioned replacing the F-82F with F-94s, it was highly improbable that the maintenance situation would be greatly benefited in the immediate future.[65/]

F-86:

The most recent type of fighter operated in any number by Continental Air Command during 1949 was the F-86. This plane was intended to be a good high level jet interceptor.

65/ SECRET, Hq USAF, Subject: Staff Study of Penetration Fighters, To: Hq, TAC, 7 July 1949

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With a top speed of approximately 670 mph., ability to climb rapidly and a ceiling of between 50,000 and 60,000 feet, the F-86 appeared to be well designed to fulfill its mission.[66]

While the F-86 has not been as thoroughly tested as earlier models, the indications, according to several aircraft maintenance specialists, are that maintenance will prove decidedly easier than in the case of either the F-82 or F-84, though it is also quite likely that the performance of the F-86, regarded from the maintenance standpoint, will not be as good as that of the F-80.

Difficulties encountered have been, roughly, of three general types. First, there have been certain general difficulties. Secondly, the F-86, like earlier models, has suffered from engine troubles. Finally, certain limitations have arisen because of the nature of the F-86 mission as a high altitude plane.

The engine troubles encountered by the F-86 will not be discussed in this chapter, since they appeared to be due to weaknesses inherent in the J-47 engines, rather than merely characteristic of the F-86 as a plane.

The general deficiencies and weaknesses noted in the F-86 were fairly numerous, though not particularly serious. Some of them appeared to have been occasioned by the fact that the

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66/ SECRET ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Non-Availability of Maintenance Spares for F-82 Series Aircraft, To: Dir Maintenance, Supplies & Services, USAF, 10 December 1949.

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number of pilots and mechanics who had complete F-86 training was always comparatively small.[67] The Interim Reports on the Operational Deficiencies of Jet Aircraft mentioned such deficiencies as a slight endency toward structural weakness, the base configuration of external drop tanks, too sensitive a steering mechanism, poor throttle action, nose gear failure and occasional flame outs when the engine was rapidly accelerated at altitudes of 20,000 feet. In early models there was also a tendency towards contamination which resulted from a small fuel leak. Somewhat more dangerous than these was a weakness in auxiliary landing gear, which on several occasions resulted in major damage when the aircraft landed. Other general deficiencies were bolt failures and a failure of a starter generator.[68]

Most of the above difficulties had not proven especially serious and were capable of remedial action through either the Air Materiel Command or the manufacturer.

The third general types of maintenance problems was that occasioned by the F-86's extremely high altitude operations.

67/ CONFIDENTIAL - IRS, DM to CG, 26 July 1949

68/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL, Report, Hq AMC, Action Taken on Deficiencies Affecting Suitability and Deployment of Jet Aircraft, Eighth Interim Report, 31 March 1949
2. CONFIDENTIAL, Report, Hq, AMC, Action Taken on Deficiencies Affecting Suitability and Deployment of Jet Aircraft, Ninth Interim Report, 30 April 1949

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The Eighth and Ninth Interim Reports, to which frequent allusion has been made, mentioned a tendency towards frosting of the canopy when the plane reached an elevation of 36,000 feet. This difficulty was easily met by the installation of a tube defrosting arrangement and gave no permanent difficulty.[69]

Another problem in connection with high altitude operation developed in the dropping of pressure in the cockpit when guns were fired at high altitude. This maintenance deficiency could have been serious in practice since heavy pressurization was required for extremely high altitude operation. During the period covered by this study, the tendency towards dropping of pressure had not been corrected, largely because there had not been enough experience in operation to make it certain what the cause or causes were.[70]

Some of the operational limitations, as well as the strengths of the F-86, became apparent during the summer of 1949. For several weeks beginning 8 April a program of tactical flying., transition gunnery testing, and radar testing of the F-86 occurred. During this extensive trial, close attention was given not only to the operation of the F-86 at altitudes up to 55,000 feet, but also to the effect on personnel and the type of equipment which might be most valuable for high altitude operations. This operation had several phases.

69/ Ibid

70/ SECRET ltr Hq ConAC, Subject: Cockpit Pressure Drop in F-86 Aircraft, To: CG, SAF, 4 November 1949

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The tactical flying and gunnery testing was undertaken first of all. The equipment carried by the pilot (including an anti-G suit, oxygen mask, life vest, gloves, parachutes, emergency bail-out bottle, etc.) proved satisfactory for its purpose. However, it was bulky and required much time for putting on and adjusting. The pilot was also extremely hot while awaiting take-offs. The 50 calibre M-3 guns worked satisfactorily. The plane itself gave an excellent performance and displayed good handling characteristics. It proved possible to climb to 40,000 feet in fourteen to sixteen minutes during which the plane actually travelled 150 miles. Descent from over 40,000 feet to sea level for a landing could be done in under two mintues. However, neither radio nor radar gave entirely satisfactory service. When the plane was at an altitude of over 20,000 feet radio transmission became blurred and hard to understand. The CPS-4 radar at Ft. Custis proved very unreliable beyond a ninety mile range and often reported hostile planes (F-86s) flying at 50 to 55,000 feet when the actual altitude was 42,000 feet.[71]

One of the most interesting of the several interesting reports to emerge from the trials of the F-86 was that of the Sur-

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71/ 1. SECRET ltr, 336th Fighter Squadron, 4th Fighter Group, Subject: Weekly Operational Service Test Report on F-86A Fighter, To: CG, ConAC, 1 August 1949

2. SECRET, ltr, Hq 26th Air Division (Defense) Subject: Test Reports (Rosebud) To: Cg, 26th Air Divn (Def) 28 September 1949.

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geon General of the United States Air Force. According to this report the test indicated both the need for improvement in type of equipment and for adequate advance indoctrination of personnel. Most of the personnel equipment available to the pilots was regarded as adequate in most respects. However, misuse resulted in pilots complaining of hypoxia, altitude dysbarism, loss of visual acuity, and in one case of hemorrhoids. Oxygen masks had not received proper care in handling and moreover were not available in sufficient numbers. Survival equipment was lacking -- a limitation that might easily prove fatal in case of bail-outs undertaken over water. Although altitudes in excess of 53,000 feet were reached on occasion, the policy was established to limit the maximum altitude of all missions to 52,000 feet until such time as pressure suits or other protective mechanisms were available. For pilots without masks the maximum altitude should be not over 10,000 feet. Because of the risk of bail-outs at high altitudes indoctrination of pilots in the use of the oxygen bottle was necessary. Pilots were also to hold their breath as long as possible and refrain from opening their parachutes until they had reached levels where injury from extreme cold was less likely.[72]

72/ SECRET ltr, 4th Fighter Group, Subject: Flight Surgeon's Report, Project "ROSEBUD", To: Surgeon General, USAF, 9 September 1949

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BOMBERS:

Although fighters are more important in the operations of the Continental Air Command than any other type of plane, they are by no means the only type essential to its work. B-45 jet bombers are maintained for bombing, ground support, and reconnaissance work while other bombers such as the B-29 are available for miscellaneous duties such as the towing of targets and radar calibration. Thus the problem of bomber maintenance, while not a major one of the Continental Air Command, is nevertheless a matter of some importance.

Maintenance gave some difficulties during the period covered by this study. B-26 aircraft which had been transferred to the Air Reserve were sent to contractors for re-conditioning. The result left much to be desired. Upon return from the contractors, a large amount of maintenance was required before the planes were once more placed in service. Among deficiencies were leaking fuel tanks, and fuel tanks excessively corroded, a condition which indicated that maintenance had not been performed and numerous technical orders had not been complied with. A survey was therefore undertaken for the purpose of insuring future good work upon the part of the contractors or of providing a basis for breach of contract suits in the case of contractors failing to keep their agreements.[73]

73/ Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Condition of C-46,C-47 and B-26 Aircraft Transferred to the Air Reserve, To: CGs all AF's, 21 August 1949

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The major maintenance problem of Continental Air Command, as far as bombers were concerned was the B-45 jet bomber. Since this bomber, like the F-86, was equipped with a J-47 engine some of the difficulties encountered were similar to those faced in maintenance of a fighter plane. There was a tendency for after-burning to take place immediately following engine shutdown. Excessive oil losses also were frequently encountered. Some engine inspection reports indicated that combustion chambers encountered fatigue, failure on the forward fuel drain line and drain bosses.[74]

The 47th Bombardment Group at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, reported difficulty of a somewhat different character, This included the tearing of exhaust cone blankets, deep cuts in main landing gear, casings, leakage of the fuselage with resultant danger to several electrical assemblies, and several difficulties in connection with electrical maintenance.[75]

During the latter part of 1949 the inspection at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, of B-45A aircraft revealed that the

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74/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL, AMC, Action Taken on Deficiencies Affecting Operational Suitability and Deployment of Jet Aircraft, Eighth Interim Report, 31 March 1949
2. CONFIDENTIAL, AMC, Action Taken on Deficiencies Affecting Operational Suitability and Deployment of Jet Aircraft, Ninth Interim Report, 30 April 1949

75/ Ltr, Hq 47th Bombardment Group (L), Subject: B-45A Airplane Maintenance and Mechanical Difficulties, To: CO, 47th Bombardment Wing, 29 April 1949

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nacelles themselves were being subjected to excessive heat, probably from the backflow of hot gasses. In some cases the heat was sufficient to char and blister the section.[76]

While some of the foregoing difficulties were suffered in a routine manner others were sufficiently persistent to give the B-45 something of a bad reputation from the standpoint of excessive maintenance.[77]

Despite its maintenance difficulties the B-45 proved useful in many ways and no less than 119 B-45s were at first assigned to Continental Air Command. The delivery of some of these planes was delayed far into 1950 in order that modifications might be incorporated.[78]

One minor difficulty was encountered in connection with the B-26. The lighting of the instruments in the cockpit proved definitely unsatisfactory. Some of the instruments were lighted insufficiently while others reacted so poorly to fluorescent lighting that it had become necessary for the pilots to employ flash lights. The Twelfth Air Force therefore recommended that flame dampeners be installed and that fluorescent lights be relocated on the side of the cockpit. The repainting of all instruments with red luminescent paint, light-proofing of the in-

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76/ TWX, CO 363rd Tactical Ren Grp To: CG, AMC, 15 November 1949

77/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, USAF, Subject: Delivery of B-45 Type Aircraft to Your Command, To: CG, ConAC, 24 March 1949

78/ 1. Ibid
2. CONFIDENTIAL, TWX, USAF to Hq ConAC, 17 November 1949

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strument panel and a few other minor changes were also felt to be desirable.[79]

CARGO PLANES:

C type planes played an important part in the operations of the Continental Air Command during 1949. They were used for both troop carrier and cargo purposes as well as for occasional specialized missions of other types. Although many types were operated by Continental Air Command those most noteworthy from the standpoint of maintenance were the C-54, C-82 and C-119s.

From the maintenance standpoint, C-82s probably gave the greatest difficulty. This type of plane had not only been well known from the standpoint of maintenance troubles but it was being transferred out of Continental Air Command during the period covered by this study. As C-54s from the Berlin Airlift flew back to the United States, they largely replaced the C-82s, the latter then going to United States Air Force in Europe or to Reserve Units. The situation as regards parts during the year was somewhat tight but could hardly have been described as critical.

79/ SECRET ltr Hq 12AF, Subject: Aircraft Cockpit Lighting, To: CG, ConAC, 14 April 1949

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Action of bases in failing to report reparable carburetors forced a shortage in that category.[80]

Certain miscellaneous difficulties were experienced in the operation of cargo planes. The loading ramp for C-46 cargo planes proved difficult to carry with the result that modifications were necessary.[81] The conversion program which replaced C-82s with C-54s and C-119s also caused temporary difficulties due to the unfamiliarity of maintenance personnel with the new planes. Finally the difficulties alluded to previously in connection with cockpit lighting were also presented in the case of cargo planes. The compliance of contractors with technical orders in the case of C-46 and 47s being transferred to the Air Reserve was no better than in the case of B-26s previously mentioned. All the "C" type planes upon report from contractors manifested precisely the same type of difficulties.[82]

80/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq 14AF, Subject: Transition Program for C-119B Aircraft, To: CG, 314 Trp Car Wg, Smyrna AFB, 14 July 1949
2. SECRET, TWX, Hq ConAC to USAF, 22 July 1949
3. SECRET, IRS, O&T to DO, 23 August 1949
4. CONFIDENTIAL ltr Hq ConAC, Subject: Aircraft and Engine Parts for C-82 Aircraft, To: CG, 12AF, 15 April 1949
5. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, AMC, Subject: Monthly Report on Aircraft Spare Parts and Components, To: CG, 12AF, 18 April 1949

81/ Middleton, D.W., History of the Fourteenth Air Force, p. 146

82/ 1. SECRET, TWX, Hq ConAC To: USAF, 22 July 1949
2. SECRET, ltr, CG, 12AF, Subject: Aircraft Cockpit Lighting, To: CG, ConAC, 14 April 1949
3. Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Condition of C-46, C-47 and B-26 Aircraft Transferred to Air Reserve, To: CGs all AF's, 21 August 1949

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Although the C-119 was comparatively new to Continental Air Command, it gave promise of a large number of future maintenance headaches. An extensive program of replacements of C-82 with C-119s was adopted for the latter half of 1949 and early 1950. General Whitehead alluded to difficulties encountered earlier and prophesied:

> "The re-equipping outlined above will reduce Continental Air Command troop carrier capabilities by 30 to 50% during the next six months . . . Continental Air Command has directed an accelerated training and maintenance program at Smyrna Air Force Base in order to learn and correct C-119B aircraft difficulties in as short a time as possible. I am not familiar with the C-82 difficulties when these were first used in an operating unit. I do estimate that C-119B difficulties will be at least as numerous as those encountered by C-82s. At best the group which receives C-119B will be at 25% to 35% efficiency from late August 1949 until February to March 1950" 83/

Presumably General Whitehead had been impressed by a report issued a few months earlier at the time a C-119B was given a preliminary inspection. At that time Air Materiel Command turned out a thirty page report listing scores of changes to be made by the contractor. 84/

TRAINERS, GLIDERS and HELICOPTERS

For the most part the difficulties with advanced trainers were the same as those of a respective type of aircraft. Thus

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83/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr Hq 14AF, Subject: Transition Program C-119B Aircraft, To: CG, 314 Troop Car Wg, Smyrna AFB, 14 July 1949
2. SECRET, TWX, Gen Whitehead to C/S, USAF, 22 July 1949

84/ Report, AMC, Subject: Report on Subject Acceptance Inspection of C-119B Airplane, 26 April 1949

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the operator of a T-33 (trainer phase of the F-80) encountered somewhat the same maintenance difficulties as in the case of the F-80. For this reason, little attention will be given to the situation of trainer planes as an independent type. During the year the type C-3 Link Trainer, which was considered obsolete, was replaced with type AN-T-18. This, therefore, was the main change in a rather uneventful training plane picture.[85]

The situation as regards helicopters and gliders is similar. A small number of helicopters was operated by Continental Air Command, and for certain specialized operations gave good service. On one occasion during the F-86 test, helicopters were requested for the ferrying of personnel from Langley Air Force Base to Fort Custis, Virginia. Some use was made of gliders during tactical exercises. The maintenance picture as regards gliders was hardly a good one. Sixty-eight gliders at Bergstrom Field were finally declared excess when it became evident that they could not be effectively maintained due to lack of maintenance personnel.[86]

MODERNIZATION PROGRAM:

One of the more important problems of aircraft maintenance was that of modernizing the older types of planes. Air Materiel Command notified Continental Air Command in February that it

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85/ RESTRICTED, ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Aircraft C-Type Trainers, 24 January 1949

86/ RESTRICTED, ltr, Hq ConAC, To: CG, AMC, undated
RESTRICTED, ltr Hq, ConAC, Diary, 16 February 1949

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would be in a position to establish a program for reconditioning of those "in-service" aircraft which required modernization. A preliminary survey, on the part of Continental Air Command, indicated an unusually large number of planes requiring this service. The preliminary survey revealed that approximately; 34 C-82; 40 B-26; 60 F-47N; 2 F-81D; 60 C-47s; 32 B-25s; 20 C-45s; 48 T-11s and T-7s; 100 T-6s and 62 G-15As, were in need of such reconditioning. These figures did not include large numbers of F-84s, which were placed upon a different program.[87]

The above schedule was for the remainder of fiscal year 1949 and was made possible because United States Air Force had finished a great many of its projects on higher priority. At the end of fiscal year 1949 this program was completed.[88] In April 1949 a reconditioning program for fiscalyear 1950 was drawn up. As shown below, it is to be noted that no less than 896 aircraft were scheduled to be reconditioned on this program:[89]

Schedule for F/Y 1950

Precedence	Type of Aircraft	No. Reconditioned
1	C-47	130
2	T-11	200
3	T- 6	200
4	B-26	125
5	B-25	45
6	C-45	150
7	T- 7	12
8	C-82	34
	TOTAL	896

87/ SECRET ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Conditioning of Assigned Aircraft, To: CG, IAF, 11 February 1949

88/ Ibid

89/ RESTRICTED, Hq ConAC Diary, 11 April 1949

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AIRCRAFT OUT-OF-COMMISSION:

One of the standard tests of whether maintenance is working well is to be found in the number of aircraft out-of-commission. Throughout the period covered by this study the number of AOCP's was regarded as being considerably too heavy, and strenuous efforts were expanded to bring the number down to a reasonable figure. The factors contributing to a high percentage of aircraft out-of-commission received much discussion throughout the year.

Probably of greatest importance was a critical shortage ofmaintenance personnel. As of 31 December 1948, the Continental Air Command was short of approximately 1300 aircraft maintenance personnel. Most of this deficiency was accounted for by critical shortages of communication specialists, etc. Some Groups were almost denuded of personnel in those categories. Many Units, therefore, placed as many as one-third of their assigned aircraft in flyable storage.

A bad personnel situation was made even more critical because of the frequency of transfers. Between 1 January and 1 April, Continental Air Command lost 813 aircraft maintenance personnel in addition to normal attendance transfers to school and overseas assignments, etc. Since the total gained for the same period was approximately 318, the total shortage appeared to be about 1800. On-the-job training proved of limited value because trainees were lost or transferred almost as soon as train-

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ing was completed. This heavy personnel turnover did nothing to help the continuity of working management and kept all units in a state of confusion.[90]

While personnel was the major factor in the high out-of-commission rate it was not the only one. Large transfers of aircraft caused transferring units to concentrate personnel on such projects in order to complete them on schedule. As a consequence routine maintenance suffered. Maneuvers and special operations demanded continual operation under bad maintenance conditions. Aircraft assigned to such projects were usually neglected until their return to home base. They were then placed out-of-commission pending receipt of reports of compliance with accumulated TO's and inspections. The assignment of new types of aircraft contributed difficulties since the new planes were frequently received void of necessary ground handling equipment, spare parts and personnel. Finally, lack of parts was a cause of varying importance. Although it was not serious in the cases of most types of planes during early 1949 it played an important role later in the year, particularly with the B-45, F-82 and F-84.[91] The aircraft out-of-commission problem looked somewhat different from the standpoint of operating

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90/ 1. SECRET ltr, Hq 2238 AFRTC, Andrews AFB, Washington, D.C., Subject: Aircraft Out-of-Commission, To: CG, 9AF, 6 May 1949
2. SECRET ltr CG, ConAC, Subject: Aircraft Out-of-Commission, To: CG, 9AF, 25 February 1949

91/ 1. Ibid
2. SECRET, TWX, Hq ConAC, to 9AF, 17 February 1949

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units in the field. At Langley Air Force Base it was felt that old aircraft with structural weaknesses, insufficient supply stocks and lack of unit facilities were also very important contributing factors.[92]

By far the best study made of the aircraft out-of-commission problem was performed by Major Donald E. Hamilton of the 363rd Air Base Group at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. In a fifteen page study, he carefully examined the factors of equipment, personnel, training and supply. For thoroughness and care of examination, this report is almost in a class by itself and is completely reproduced among the documents at the end of this volume. Major Hamilton found equipment to be in better shape than ever before. The quantity of personnel was likewise sufficient. However, Major Hamilton did not believe that the personnel was being used with maximum effectiveness. He believed that non-commissioned officers frequently were not adequately prepared for their positions and that too large a share of maintenance work was done by civilians. Personnel policy, beginning with the War and continuing to the present time, had emphasized the need for specialization at the expense of broad training and proficiency. Enlisted men, trained in one specialty, resented having to do any other type of work and were

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92/ 1. SECRET ltr Hq 2235, AFRTC, Byrd Fld, Richmond, Va., Subject: Aircraft Out-of-Commission, To: CG, 9AF, 3 May 1949
2. SECRET ltr Hq 2239 AFRTC, Andrews AFB, Washington, D.C., To: CG, 9AF, 6 May 1949

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poorly fitted for doing it. Major Hamilton also felt that the Air Force had never realized the full possibilities of an educational program as an agency for improving its personnel. The factor of supply was not rated with as much adequacy as others because Major Hamilton did not feel competent to discuss it. However, he did believe that aside from certain high priority items, the supply system was unnecessarily slow and complicated.[93]

It would be unfair to leave the subject of aircraft out-of-commission without noting once more that even in the most critical types such as the F-82 previously discussed, some improvement in the out-of-commission rate was experienced during the Fall of 1949. Since the personnel situation as a whole did not especially improve, and since the slightly increased availability of parts dated only to the Fall months, there is a clear indication that this brighter picture was occasioned by better management at the Base level, plus the efforts of the Continental Air Command to improve a situation which in the earlier half of 1949 was admitted on all sides to be unsatisfactory from many standpoints.

93/ SECRET ltr Hq, 4th Fighter Wing, Subject: Aircraft Out-of-Commission, To: CG, 9AF, 16 May 1949

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CHAPTER FOUR

AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT and SUPPLIES

As noted in the Preface, it has not been possible within existing time limits to completely treat all or even all important items pertaining to aircraft supply and equipment. The author has, therefore, sought to give an extensive treatment to aircraft and radar. Other items affecting aircraft have been treated in as much detail as time permitted, with as many subjects being given attention as possible. This chapter is therefore something of a scrap-basket in which are to be found a number of things pertaining to aircraft though other subjects, some of equal interest and importance, had to be omitted.

GUNSIGHTS:

As indicated in Chapter Two one of the more troublesome materiel problems was that of providing effective airplane sights. The A-1B gun, bomb, and rocket sight was thoroughly discredited by the experiments conducted at Hamilton Air Force Base. Even before this took place, however, there had been complaints against the employment of this sight on the B-45 aircraft and the 31st Fighter Group at Turner Air Force Base and the 20th Fighter Group at Shaw Air Force Base had expressed a strong dislike.[94]

94/ 1. SECRET ltr, Hq USAF, Subject: A-1 Sighting System for B-45 Aircraft, To: TAC, 21 June 1949
2. Interview with Captain F. F. Foster, 12 July 1950

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Following the expose of the deficiencies of this sight on the Pacific Coast, the 20th Fighter Group at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, likewise expressed strong disapproval of this particular piece of equipment, terming it "thoroughly unsatisfactory for tactical use." The specific objections raised were not precisely the same as those at Hamilton. It was pointed out that:

a. The reticle has a different position for aiming each type of ordnance which makes it impossible to fire more than one type of ordnance on a single pass with any degree of accuracy. A requirement exists in air to ground attack to fire more than one type of ordnance in a single pass, i.e., machine guns and bombs and/or machine guns and rockets. With the present sight this is impossible because the reticle drops approximately 3.3 degrees for firing rockets, thereby leaving no reference for firing machine guns accurately, and drops approximately 7 degrees for bombing.

b. The bomb release mechanism releases the bombs from the negative acceleration of a "push over" rather than from the positive acceleration of a "pull through." Release of bombs during negative acceleration presents the following difficulties:

(1) Directional control is difficult when the airplane is undergoing negative "G" forces, thus causing difficulty in directional control and correction for errors in deflection.

(2) Visibility (forward and downward) from the airplane is poor in a "push over," making it difficult to align the aircraft accurately on a target along the proper axis from a high altitude.

(3) Alighment on a target along the proper axis through broken clouds is more difficult from a "push over" than from a diving turn and "pull through" due to the fact that visibility is poor forward and downward from present low wing fighter aircraft in other than a diving turn.

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(4) Pilot discomfort is greater and pilot capabilities are lower in a "push over" than they are in a "pull through."

c. The machine gun computing mechanism and bomb aiming and release mechanism are one and the same unit and not separate units which could be turned off or on without affecting each other. This combination of mechanism in a single unit causes the sight to be a complicated and bulky device which is difficult to maintain and operate. Furthermore, failure of any one component of the sight renders the entire sight inoperative.

d. The long warm-up period (15 to 30 minutes) before the sight is fully operative renders the sight totally unsatisfactory for use in an interceptor or short range fighter. The maximum time for warm-up should not exceed the time required to start engines and take off.

e. The sight image vibrates excessively during continuous firing, making the sight totally unsuitable for aerial gunnery.

f. Low light intensity of reticle makes the sight image difficult to see on a bright day.

g. Operation of the manual spanning control causes severe oscillation of the sight image in size and lead thus making it impossible to span accurately at other than extremely short or extremely long ranges.

h. Low position of sight image on windshield makes it necessary for the pilot to "duck" to see entire image.

i. Hard landings, excessive "G" forces, or rough treatment will cause the sight to be jarred out of proper boresight alignment.

j. The sight reticle becomes invisible with slight movement of the pilot's head. This is probably caused by the small diameter of lens in the sight head.

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k. This sight is so complicated that it requires constant maintenance by highly skilled personnel which are not authorized in current tables of organization.

3. It is believed that the above mentioned deficiencies render the A-1B-G.B.R. sight operationally unsatisfactory, thus reducing appreciably the combat effectiveness of any organization so equipped. 95/

This emphatic critique was productive of action, although final action was not obtained during the period covered by this study. The Air Proving Ground likewise conducted tests and these confirmed most of the objections made in the field. At this time a new sight was being developed by the Sperry Corporation, but unfortunately many of the faults of the A-1B sight were being incorporated in the new instruments. Deficiencies which could be expected to continue in the new sight would include an over sensitive ranging, insufficient radical brilliancy, fluxeating electrical power source and vibration. Since this was regarded as unsatisfactory, Air Material Command undertook a modification program of both A-1B and A-1C sights on thirty F-84D aircraft assigned to the 20th Fighter Wing and thirty F-84E aircraft assigned to the 31st Fighter Wing. 96/

95/ SECRET ltr Hq 20th Fighter Group, Subject: Deficiencies of the Gun, Bomb and Rocket Sight A-1B, To: CO, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, 25 October 1949

96/ SECRET, 1st Ind, 20th Fighter Wing, 17 Nov 1949, to SECRET ltr, Hq, 20th Fighter Group, Subject: Deficiencies of the Gun, Bomb and Rocket Sight A-1B, To: CG, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, 25 October 1949
SECRET 2nd Ind, Hq 14AF, 30 Nov 1949 to SECRET ltr, Hq 20th Fighter Group, Subject: Deficiencies of the Gun, Bomb and Rocket Sight A-1B, To: CG, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, 25 October 1949

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Unfortunately, pronouncing the A-1B gun sight unsatisfactory did not at once provide Continental Air Command with a satisfactory substitute. Testing of the A-1C indicated that it was somewhat better than its predecessor but still highly unsatisfactory. At a meeting in Washington on the 9th and 10th of November group commanders expressed a unanimous desire to return to K-14 sights in order to have a fairly satisfactory instrument for use in the gunnery meet which was to be held in March 1950. The problem came to a head over the question of what to use for new F-86 airplanes. A not very satisfactory compromise was arranged whereby the new planes were equipped with both K-14B and A-1C sights. Neither of these was particularly satisfactory and the presence of two sights within the same squadron greatly complicated maintenance and training problems during the last days of 1949. At the end of the year strong consideration was being given to using K-13 sights for all F-86s. Meantime improved modifications of the A-1B and A-1C were under development. It should be noted that General Stearley did not join in the very common deprecation of the A-1C sight. He felt that it was definitely superior to the K-14 sight for ground spot targets, that it offered few maintenance problems, and he urged that modification of these sights be continued

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with a view to using them to equip the F-84E aircraft of the 31st Fighter Wing.[97]

ENGINES:

Aircraft engines presented a number of difficult maintenance problems. Some of the difficulties encountered resulted from the adoption of the turbo-jet type engine. This engine was new in both operation and maintenance and radically different in design and principle of operation from earlier engines used by the Air Force.

Of engines of this type there were three principal types in use. The J-33 was used principally for the F-80, the RF-80 (the reconnaissance type of the F-80) and the T-33 (trainer type of the F-80). The J-35 was employed in F-84s and in a few early B-45s. The J-47 was mostly used in F-86s and B-45s. Of the planes in Continental Air Command using Turbo-jet engines as of April 1950, 118 were equipped with the J-33, 231 with the J-35, and 261 with the J-47.

As its number implies, the J-33 was the first engine of

97/ 1. SECRET Memorandum, General Thatcher to Colonel Muehleisen, Subject: A-1B, A-1C, Gun, Bomb, Rocket Sight Situation, 14 November 1949
2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, ConAC, Subject: A-1B, Gun, Bomb, Rocket Sight, To: AMC, 14 December 1949
3. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, AMC, Subject: Set Fighter Sights, To: Deputy Chief of Staff, Material, USAF, 27 December 1949
4. CONFIDENTIAL, ltr, Hq IAF, Subject: Gunsight Installation on F-86 Type Aircraft, To: CG, ConAC, 14 November 1949
5. Interview with Captain F. F. Foster, 12 July 1950

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the turbo-jet series to be used in Continental Air Command. From the first, experience with it indicated the presence of difficulties which would require elimination. Selfridge Air Force Base on 18 July 1949 reported too much vibration from the engine and complained that the turbine buckets were easily broken off, the cause of failure unknown. At the same base twenty-eight cases developed of engines using excessive amounts of oil. Other unsatisfactory reports listed cracking of the nozzle diaphragm and flame outs at 26,000 feet due to dirty fuel filters.[98/]

Experience with engines of the J-35 series was similar at Shaw Air Force Base. Failures of this particular type of engine were almost epidemic. There was an average of one failure per forty-two flying hours. Most of these engine failures, some of which were due to defective main bearings, came with very little warning and necessitated reduction in the number and duration of training and tactical flights. In general, the difficulties displayed by the J-35 engine were much the same as those of the J-33. They included cracked turbine Buckets, overheating and flame outs.[99/]

98/ ConAC History of the Major Difficulties that have been Co-curring with All Types of Aircraft Engines by this Command, 11 April 1950

99/ 1. Teletype, Shaw AFB To: Hq ConAC, 26 July 1949
2. Interview with Major R. D. Salter, 7 June 1949

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Difficulties with the J-47 are of greater recency and have not been so thoroughly studied. In general, however, they are similar though not identical with those experienced by the other two turbo-jets. One special difficulty was failure of the discharge assembly in EC-2 emergency fuel regulator - a problem which forced Continental Air Command to order operation of B-45s with the emergency fuel system switches in the off position.[100]

Continental Air Command gave close attention to the unsatisfactory engine situation and by means of a careful study and the orientation of operating personnel on lower echelons was able to materially reduce difficulties as well as to lengthen the time required for general overhauls. In December it was able to report that the last fifteen new engines had given an average of 216 hours prior to refuel and return to overhaul.[101]

Turbo-jets, to be sure, were not the only engines which gave trouble to Continental Air Command, Reciprocating en-

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100/ 1. Ibid
2. RESTRICTED, TWX, Hq. ConAC, To: CG, 12AF (undated)

101/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL 2nd Ind Hq 78th Fighter Wing, Hamilton AFB, (undated) To: ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Hours Flown Before Overhaul -- Jet Engines, To: CG, 4AF, 6 December 1949
2. SECRET ltr, AMC Subject: Increasing Engine Life Between Overhauls, To: CG, ConAC, 12 September 1949

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gines of the V-1710-143-145 and R-4360-35, -49 series also caused some difficulty. These engines showed a tendency toward excessive heating, resulting in the wearing or warping of valves and reduction of engine operational life. The R-33-50 series engines installed in the B-29 also gave some difficulty. However, since Continental Air Command used very few B-29s these engines were not a major maintenance problem.[102/]

JATO UNITS:

The introduction of jets presented a new problem from the standpoint of airport maintenance in that jets required a considerably longer runway prior to getting into the air than was the case with other standard type planes. A tentative standard for length of runways at air force bases was set at 6,000 feet for overseas bases and 8,000 feet for permanent bases in the case of bombers. Clearly runways of this size would be extremely expensive from the standpoint of original construction and upkeep. On the other hand by using rocket engine attachments with higher nitric acid for the oxidizing agent or solid rockets it would be possible to get jets into the air with greater ease and without requiring such long runways. Continental Air Command therefore showed con-

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102/ 1. Ibid

2. CONFIDENTIAL ltr, ConAC, Subject: R-3350 Series Engines Installed in B-29, To: CG, 4AF, 10 December 1949

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siderable interest in JATO units since these would permit the use of countless air bases overseas which were not otherwise useable. It was felt that supply and maintenance of JATO units would be negligible while the high cost would prove more economical in the long run than would a wholesale program of lengthening runways. On the other hand, it was pointed out by Captain F. F. Foster of the Continental Air Command that the JATO units were extremely dangerous, so expensive that at $200 to $1000 a piece they could not be used for training, and that because of these characteristics they were most likely to be employed in an emergency role in cases where a bomber was forced to take off with a very heavy load or from a short runway.[103]

AMMUNITION:

During the period covered by this study, ammunition was not one of the important materiel problems of Continental Air Command. No marked shortage was experienced during the year and supplies proved adequate for tactical purposes. The only problem involved was the question of safe storage. Shaw

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103/ 1. SECRET ltr, AMC, Subject: Study of Optimum Method of Takeoff for Military Aircraft, To: CG, ConAC, 25 January 1949.

2. SECRET 1st Ind, CG, ConAC, 8 April 1949 to SECRET ltr Hq ConAC, Subject: Study of Optimum Method of Takeoff for Military Aircraft, To: CG, 10AF, 9 February 1949

3. Interview with Captain F. F. Foster, 12 July 1950

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Air Force Base experienced some difficulties due to safety considerations which caused the removal of five inch rockets HVAR from that base to Anniston Ordnance Depot at Anniston, Alabama. In a few other instances the more dangerous types of ammunition were removed from their bases to other areas for safekeeping. Directions were also sent out from Continental Air Command prescribing safe methods for the handling of supplies of this type.[104/]

Storage of ammunition was highly decentralized with nearly 100 establishments being used for storage purposes. However, most of these did not contain munitions in large quantity. Most of the small arms, for example, were stored at Dow, Andrews, Goodman, McChord, Selfridge, Langley, Shaw, Turner, Hamilton, March and Mitchel Air Force Bases. Nearly all HVAR rockets were stored at Dow, JATO units at Turner, and bombs and small rockets at Adams Field, Camp McCoy, Selfridge Air Force Base, Great Lakes, Ellis, Sioux City, Geiger Field, Jacksonville Airport, Dow, Floyd Bennett Field, Hancock Field, Westchester Airport, Hamilton Air Force Base and March Air Force Base.[105/]

104/ SECRET ltr, CG, ConAC, Subject: Storage of Combat Reserve Ammunition, To: CG, TAC, 16 December 1948

105/ SECRET ltr, CG, ConAC, Subject: Report of Establishments Which Handle and Store Explosives, Ammunition and Dangerous Materials, To: CG, AMC, 10 January 1949

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BOMBS:

So far as indicated by the records, bombs also did not prove to be a major problem in Continental Air Command. There was only one maintenance problem of any importance in connection with the bomb supply. This concerned the 110 gallon jettisonable fuel tanks carried by the F-84 aircraft which could be used for ignition and dropping as a fire bomb. In some cases the igniter of this fuel tank contacted the fuselage of the F-84 after release of the tank. As it happened, no damage was done on such occasions. However, as a temporary corrective, the tail igniter was eliminated and only one igniter used -- this one in the filler cap opening of the tank. Procedures were then put under way to improve further this rather primitive remedy.[106]

TARGETS:

Far less satisfactory were conditions regarding supply of targets. During 1949 the standard target in Continental Air Command was the A-6B Banner Target. The supply of this model was largely erratic and seriously affected the gunnery program of the command. This deficiency was further heightened by a high rate of destruction from anti-aircraft fire. Repeatedly installations complained of lack of targets and accepted anything that could be made available.

106/ Ltr, ConAC, Subject: Modification of Fire Bombs for F-84 Aircraft, To: Air Proving Ground, 26 October 1949

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This target was also unsatisfactory for reasons of performance. It was made of plastic and tended to become brittle at high altitudes. The tow rigs available for carrying the targets required "snaking from the ground" -- a procedure which resulted in too many torn targets. Finally the targets could not stand up to high speed action but had to be towed at the rate of 140-150 miles per hour, a rate ridiculously unrealistic in terms of combat conditions. This unsatisfactory situation was called to the attention of Air Training Command and Air Materiel Command though no corrective action was taken during 1949.[107]

MOTOR VEHICLES:

Though cars, trucks, jeeps and the like are not, strictly speaking, a part of aircraft supply, they are indispensable to the running of an Air Base and therefore are entitled to consideration in a discussion such as the present one. In the automotive field the policy set up called for the disposition of a large backlog of excess machines. From 30 April to 31 December 1949 the number of vehicles at Continental Air Command was reduced from 10,636 to 5,859. The total on the latter

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107/ 1. TWX, Hq, 12AF, To: CG, ConAC, 20 April 1949

2. SECRET, ltr, USAF Subject: Report of Special Investigation of F-84D Aircraft Accidents -- Fourth Air Force, To: Inspector General, USAF, 18 December 1949

3. Interview with Captain F. F. Foster, 12 July 1950

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date was actually 312 less than the T/O&Es and T/As for the command. This extremely heavy cut of some forty-forty-five percent made for easier and improved maintenance, if only because maintenance personnel was not reduced in the same proportion. Of the excess vehicles, approximately seventy-five percent were to be placed on sale and twenty-five percent returned to Air Materiel Area depot stocks. In line with the economy program of Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, orders were also issued calling for the reduction in utilization of motor vehicles.[108]

MISCELLANEOUS:

It would be impossible to enumerate all the problems and accomplishments within the materiel field in the Continental Air Command during 1949. A quick system for the refueling of jet aircraft was developed on a test basis at Dow Air Force Base. The hydrant refueling system, as this was known, consisted of 3,000 feet of portable pipeline with hydrants installed at designated intervals. The pipe was connected with base storage facilities and refueling accomplished by means of portable carts containing intake hoses, meters and filters. An effort was made to improve armament maintenance

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108/ 1. Hq ConAC, MS History of the MS&S Motor Transportation Division, January 1950

2. Hq ConAC, MS History, Directorate of MS&S, undated

3. Ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Reduction in Utilization of Vehicles, To: CGs all ConAC Air Forces, 26 September 1949

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and place it on a systematic basis throughout the establishment through an armament inspection and maintenance system. Efforts were made to eliminate critical shortages of type C-2A life rafts, type A-13A oxygen masks, type J-3 attitude indicators, parachutes for hydraulic fluids and numerous others.[109]

109/ ConAC ME History of the Directorate of MS&S

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CHAPTER FIVE

RADAR and ELECTRONICS

"Words would be impossible to describe how poor it (the air warning defense system) is . . . it is almost a blank". . .General Saville on 10 February 1949. 110/

GENERAL BACKGROUND and POLICY:

From the standpoint of the welfare of the United States it is doubtful whether the above quotation should be classed as SECRET. One of the principal defenses against possible hostile attack from a nation possessing the atom bomb should not be in a condition justifying description as "almost a blank". Yet the frank recognition of weakness is in itself a step toward improvement of conditions.

The story of radar in Continental Air Command between 1 December 1948 and 31 December 1949 is a complicated one to relate. Not only are the terms technical and unfamiliar but the subject itself involves many varieties and types of the same thing. Such terms as Loran, Shoran, UHF, Rosebud, jamming, Mark X, IFF and many others in common use in the electronics field are, to put it mildly, strange to the average reader while the types of radar as well as the fields of radar use are

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110/ SECRET, 1st Ind, Hq, TAC, 28 February 1949 to SECRET ltr, Hq, 9AF, Subject: Operational Effectiveness of the 502nd Tactical Control Group, to: CG, ConAC, 31 January 1949

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both numerous and varied.

In the performance of two of its three main missions, air defense and the tactical air support of ground troops, the Continental Air Command makes extensive use of radar. The latter mission involves reconnaissance, plus the tactical control of bombers and fighters and involves photography, gun laying, use of radar in bombing, etc.

For the purposes of air defense the use of radar may be broken down into two general fields. The first involves the radar fence, or Air Control and Warning Groups. These units perform the three functions of (1) detection (2) identification, and (3) control. Each function involves its own types of radar. For detection, search radars and height finders are employed; for identification the modern IFF system as well as older types; and for control purposes various types of air-to-air and air-to-ground radio. The second big field of air defense, fighter interceptor action, involves day and night fighters employing electronics for identification, gun laying and communication.

The above breakdown is made along functional lines. However, the electronics program may also be described as to type, a method which the author has chosen to employ in this chapter. From this standpoint radars may be classed as (1) airborne (2) ground. The former group would then embrace such navigation aids as Loran and Shoran, search, gun laying and bombing radars such as the AN-APG-30 and the APX-24 (the latter standard in B-25 bombers).

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and identification radars such as the IFF. Airborne electronic devices likewise include communications radios of the High Frequency (HF), Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) types, the latter being in the developmental stage.

Ground radars include the types employed in the Aircraft Control and Warning system (search, height finder and identification), communications devices, and homing beacons. In each of the above classes there are numerous kinds of existing sets. The most recent search radar CPS-6B, however, is a hybrid which not only serves for search purposes but acts as a height finder as well. Related to the radar program in many ways is the anti-radar program consisting of numerous kinds of jammers for possible application to enemy radars as well as other devices designed to counteract jamming.[111]

Official policy during 1949 heavily emphasized identification or IFF radar. In a secret statement on 8 December 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared:

> 1. The IFF Mark III shall be replaced at the earliest practicable date by a new system known as IFF Mark X, based on the principles of IFF Mark V/UNB and existing L band beacon developments; this system to be operational by 1 July 1952.
>
> 2. In accomplishing this replacement, the following shall be the order of priority:

111/ The above information was obtained by interviewing Captain A. C. Goodson, 11 July 1950

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a. The adoption and installation of the basic functions of IFF Mark V/UNB and L beacon techniques to provide beacon assist in the tracking and control of high speed aircraft including the operating modes of IFF, Personal Identification (PI), Flight Leader Identification (FLI), and Emergency of the IFF Mark V/UNB.

b. The development and adoption of fast coding techniques and such techniques that will provide more satisfactory operational security and will extend the life of the replacement system, IFF Mark, X, until a fully satisfactory system can be developed.

3. The minimum operational requirement of the IFF Mark X will be the identification of air targets to ground and surface positions. The services may adopt such additional functions of the IFF Mark V/UNB as may be required to fill their individual operational requirements. It is desired that the coordinator of this policy be informed regarding additional functions adopted.

4. Increased efforts should be directed immediately to the development of a full satisfactory system that satisfies all military characteristics.

5. The Joint Communications-Electronics Committee shall be the coordinating agency for this policy.

The purpose of the new system was also set forth to provide:

1. A system capable of furnishing assistance in the radar tracking and control of aircraft.

2. Such improved IFF operations as may be accomplished by the employment of the three interrogation modes and the emergency reply mode of the IFF Mark V/UNB System. The above modes may be redesignated as modes 1-2-3 and Emergency. The minimum operational requirement shall be the identification of friendly air targets to ground and surface positions.

3. The capability of supplementing the primary modes as listed above with security (cryptography, pulse-time coding, etc.). The military characteristics of this security feature will be covered in a supplementary document.

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This system shall replace the IFF Mark III System.

1. The basic components of the system shall consist of modified AN/APX-6, AN/APX-7, AN/CPX-4, AN/UPA-16, and AN/UPA-15 of the IFF Mark V/UNB System with suitable interconnection equipment. Additional components of the IFF Mark V/UNB may be adopted to satisfy individual service requirements, providing such adoption does not preclude joint service operation.

2. The airborne transponder of the system shall be capable of installation in all combatant type aircraft. The airborne interogator-responsor shall be capable of installation in all combatant type aircraft fitted with pulse type radar. The basic components of the system shall be capable of being installed where deemed necessary by the Services.

3. The basic components of the system shall be capable of interconnection with such radars as shall be specified by the Services.

4. The data presentation of the IFF Mark X System shall be capable of correlation with the data presentation of the parent radar. 112/

Following this declaration of policy from the highest level, United States Air Force, in consultation with the Air Defense Command, reviewed the requirements for the ground electronics portion of the Air Defense System for the United States, in order to establish a standard against which the current program could be evaluated. It then adopted an order of relative priority and time at which the end products would be required for operational use. This resulted in a general program of development as follows:

112/ SECRET ltr, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Subject: Joint Military Characteristics for the IFF Mark X System, To: CGs, USAFE, FEAF, AAC, CAC, PAC, ConAC, AU, Chief Signal Office, Chief, Ordnance and Chief, Army Field Forces, 6 December 1948

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1. IFF

2. Modernization and improvement of post war radars now in production (i.e., higher powered "S" and "L" band components, etc.).

3. Anti-Jamming techniques.

4. New ground control radar with significantly improved performance (Volir).

5. Automatic Interceptor Director System.

6. Automatic Controller Computer System.

It should be noted that while IFF was given top priority the others pertained mainly to search radar. The discussion of each item which followed is also so important to an understanding of the problem that it is reproduced below:

1. The ADC requirement for IFF coincides with the Air Force and joint requirement. With respect to IFF, the Air Defence Command's requirement is for a rapid electronic identification system patterned along the same operating principles as such systems as Mark V and L-band beaconry to be made secure by the addition of cryptographic techniques. The present Mark X development program, plus Watson Laboratories investigations in the field of short interval identification systems, show considerable promise of fulfilling this requirement eventually.

2. With respect to modernization of radars now under procurement, such as the AN/CPS-6B and the AN/FPS-3, present development and more sensitive receivers are headed in the right direction. Anything else by way of engineering improvement of these basic radars which will produce results in the next 2 or 3 years, before the arrival of such radically new radars as the Volir in operational quantities, is considered as falling into this category of development.

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3. The intercept problem using either piloted aircraft or guided missiles can be completely upset by enemy jamming of our radar and communication links, consequently anti-jamming development must proceed along with, or ahead of any new development in GCI radars or computers.

4. With respect to the new GCI radar, the USAF research and development on Volir and Volscan, and the Navy's work with AN/SPS-2(XDQ) apply. Every effort should be made to get these equipments into the production stage at the very earliest moment.

5. With respect to the Automatic Interceptor Director System, the air defense system requires that the delays and inaccuracies inherent in the human computation of interception courses and human command of the intercepting system must be eliminated. It is therefore required that an automatic course computer and guidance system for providing direction information to the defending interceptor aircraft or missile be developed. Additionally, for the complete intercept control system some means must be provided for the course computer to receive continuously information on the position and motion vector of the enemy target being intercepted. A command system for guidance of the interceptor aircraft or missile, which not only guides the defending weapon (aircraft or missile) but also verifies by another independent method that it is actually following the ordered course, is required. Any partial solution of providing a simplified course, computer, whose output can assist the human controller, may materially improve the overall system's performance during the transition period from manual to semi-automatic to full automatic GCI.

6. The Automatic Controller Computer is, with respect to time, the least urgent of these development projects, although it is an absolute must in guided missile operations when the delays introduced by human controllers can no longer be tolerated. This program should be undertaken on a study basis immediately with development leading to a prototype completed in about 4 years. 115/

115/ SECRET ltr, USAF, Subject: Development Program for Air Defense Ground Electronic Systems and Equipment, To: CG, AMC, 8 February 1949

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Stating a policy is one thing; implementing it quite another. The policies enumerated above were not carried out without extensive delays. In a procurement program as highly technical as that of radar, a delay could be occasioned by the non-availability of a single item. One of the highest priorities of the Air Defense Command was for high-powered components for modification of radars of the AN/FPS-3 type then in production. In this program one of several delays was caused by the non-availability of a high powered magnetron. This particular item was being developed for the Navy Department in connection with its own radar program. However, because the Navy Department was in no particular hurry, the development was progressing more slowly than desired by Continental Air Command. It, therefore, urged that the control of this particular development program should be transferred from the Department of the Navy to the Department of the Air Force.[114/]

The radar plans progressed at an uneven rate during the summer, with an increase in interest upon the part of the several Air Force commands being one of the principal achievements. Continental Air Command showed little interest in a lightweight AFX-7 for interceptor planes. On the other hand, Strategic Air Command was interested in exactly this type of equipment for use

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114/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Delays in High Power "L" Band Radar Development Program, To: Dir of R&D, Hq, USAF, 7 June 1949

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in bombers. It was believed that Watson Laboratories would be able to obtain a more useful type of ground interrogator-responsor than the model currently in production. Langley Field which had been working on the program of modification of existing radar equipments to work with the IFF Mark X was ready to start tests on the operational suitability of their equipment. The radars in jet fighters were also being modified. The new IFF Mark X together with S band Beacon was working very well at Langley Field. On the other hand the program for installation of ground interrogator-responsors had not been carried out. All of these radar programs were handicapped to a considerable degree by shortage of equipment.[115]

The operational tests at Langley, mentioned above, have been alluded to in Chapter III in connection with the trials of the F-86 fighter plane. The radar portion of the testing, labeled "Operation ROSEBUD", involved the testing of Beacon radar as compared to the IFF Mark X. As a result of the exercises Watson Laboratories were given an order for the building of two ground stations to operate Mark X and six airborne radar sets to work with them. From this in turn there developed a makeshift Mark X system which could operate until better sets were available.[116]

115/ SECRET Memorandum, C/S, USAF, Subject: IFF Program Report As of 22 August 1949, 25 August 1949

116/ 1. Interview with Captain A. C. Goodson, 11 July 1950
2. SECRET ltr, Hq, 26th Air Divn (Def), Subject: Test Reports (ROSEBUD), To: CG, 26th Air Divn (Def), 28 September 1949

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Some delay to the implementation of the ground radar program occurred because of inadequate equipment with which to test new sets. This was particularly true for the AN/CPS-5 and AN/TPS-1B radar. Only one piece of equipment in use, the Echo Box TS-172/UP was used for conducting checks on the radio frequency sections. Since this one was not well designed for its mission there was a clear need for further equipment in order to enable operating Aircraft Control and Warning Organizations to perform their functions successfully. The Proposed radar coverage air defense plan called for the employment (among other types) of twenty-three AN/CPS-5 and twenty-three AN/TPS-1 radar sets in overlapping coverage, but this system was based on the premise that each set operated in accordance with design specifications -- a condition which only the employment of testing equipment could determine.[117]

Late in 1949 the radar program was given higher priority and progressed with greater rapidity, doubtless as a result of Russia's possession of the A-bomb. Alterations were effected for the purpose of speeding up the tempo and increasing the coverage of the radar preparedness program. Foreseeing the need of substantial buildings to house larger and better future radars, Continental Air Command pointed out the need for replacing the

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117/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr and 1st Ind, Hq First AF, Subject: Radar Test Equipment "L" Band, To: CG, ConAC, 2 November 1949

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small proposed "Type I" Operations Building with the larger "Type II", where this could be done in planning stage.[118] It also pointed out the desirability of acquiring MTI equipment for use with the AN/CPS-6 radar since tests had shown that by the utilization of techniques permanent echoes to a distance of seventy miles from the set would be eliminated, thus enabling an operator to more effectively track planes through this clutter area.[119]

AIRBORNE RADAR:

By the terms of Air Force Letter 101-3, dated 29 December 1948, subject: "Fitting and Carrying of IFF in Air Force Aircraft" the policy was set for the Continental Air Command of requiring tactical aircraft to carry IFF radar. Exceptions were, however, permitted in the case of F-80s from which antenna AN-95-C and Group B parts of SCR-695 might be removed during local flight but had to be held in Squadron or Group Supply marked for the individual aircraft from which they were removed.[120]

118/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Redesignation of "Type I" Operations Buildings for the Permanent Radar System, To: Dir of Req, Hq, USAF, 8 December 1949

119/ SECRET ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Additional AN/CPS-6 MTI Equipment Kits, To: Dir of Req, Hq, USAF, 8 December 1949

120/ SECRET ltr, Hq 56th Ftr Wng, Subject: Removal and Storage of Mark III IFF Equipment, To: CG, ConAC, 10 January 1949. In the case of the 56th Ftr Wng the Commanding Officer had ordered the removal and storage of this equipment on the ground that, since it could be installed at an hour's notice, it was more nearly operational than if left in the plane and damaged in operations. This view was finally concurred in by Hq, 10AF and by ConAC.

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Despite occasional failure to keep radar equipment within the plane for which it was intended, a survey of actual field conditions indicated that most tactical aircraft were equipped with radar:

1. Information available within this directorate indicates the following field conditions to exist in regard to airborne components of the Mark III IFF system:

a. All combat aircraft within this command with the exception of the F-80 and F-84 are equipped with group A & B parts of the SCR 695 Mark III IFF components and may be made operational by organizational and field level maintenance within the respective Wing Base organizations.

b. All of the F-80 Jet type aircraft were originally supplied with Group A & B components of the SCR 695, Mark III IFF and may be made operational by reinstalling the AN-95C antenna which has in some cases been removed due to a limited number of cases of bending and breaking of this antenna due to high speed manoeuvering.

c. The first series of F-84 Jet Type Aircraft were originally equipped with Group A & B components of the SCR 695 Mark III IFF and may be made operational by reinstalling the AN-95C antenna which has in some cases been removed due to a number of cases of bending and breaking of this antenna due to high speed manoeuvering. The later series have been supplied with certain Group A & B parts less the following items:

(1) AN-95C antenna
(2) Doubler Plate
(3) Antenna coax lead-in and fittings
(4) Conduit bulkhead fittings
(5) Miscellaneous installation hardware

d. It is believed that approximately 50% of the F-84 Jet Type Aircraft SCR 695 Mark III IFF equip-

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ment may be made operational by reinstalling the AN-95C antenna which has been removed. The remaining 50% of F-84 Jet Type Aircraft SCR 695 Mark III installations would constitute a retrofit program involving AMC authorization and supply of antenna kits and would impose a considerable work load on Tactical Field units. It is not believed thatthis additional retrofit would be justifiable in view of the fact that the Mark III IFF system is due to be replaced by the Mark X IFF and Beacon system. AMC estimates that some Mark X installations will become available in approximately 18 months although the complete Mark X system will not be operational until after July 1952.

2. Information has been obtained from AMC that the AN-95C antenna may be installed on F-80 and F-84 aircraft at the discretion of this command as no improved replacement for this antenna is contemplated. In view of the above, it is not believed that reinstallation of this antenna would constitute a flying hazard. Hq, USAF has directed AMC to place all Mark III Ground IFF equipment in a serviceable condition.

3. This Hq, has already established the policy that Mark III IFF will be made operational in all combat aircraft having that system installed during the period of transition to Mark X IFF. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that the attached (draft) letter be dispatched to air forces, amplifying and clarifying the interim use of the Mark III IFF system within ConAC. 121/

It may be observed that no mention of bombers appears in the above. Most or all Continental Air Command bombers carried radar. In August 1949 as the earlier B-45s were being delivered their electronics program was likewise set up. Thirteen of thirty-five B-45s then delivered were to receive the AN-APQ-24 as were sixty-one others scheduled for early delivery. The

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121/ SECRET, IRS, Comm to DM-O&T-DAD-DO, 13 July 1949

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RB-45s were also to be equipped with Group A parts of Shoran, with the Group B parts included in a Shoran Flyaway Kit. Twenty-four AN/APA-54 Shoran Reconnaissance Recorders were earmarked for the B-45 by Air Materiel Command. The B-45A was also to have Shoran but on a retrofit program, beginning in May 1950. Also scheduled for 1950 retrofit on the B-45As was the A-1 Fire Control System which included the AA-1 Visual Sighting System and AN/APC-27 gunlaying radar.[122/]

About the same time that B-45 requirements for radar were set up a lively discussion was taking place regarding the equipment needs of single place tactical reconnaissance planes. Air Materiel Command favored equipping such planes with equipment which included:

a. UHF Command Set AN/ ARC-33
b. Radio Compass, AN/ARN-6
c. Omni-directional Range Receiver AN/ARN-14
d. Radar Altimeter AN/APN-22
e. Liaison Radio AN/ARC-26A
f. Marker Beacon Receiver AN/ARN-12
g. IFF Mark Ten AN/APX-6
h. Distance Measuring Equipment AN/APN-34
i. Arbitrary Course Computer AN/ARA-21
j. Wire Recorder AN/ANQ-1A
k. Tail Warning Radar

Regarding this list Headquarters, United States Air Force offered pertinent explanations and comments and requested comment from Continental Air Command:

122/ CONFIDENTIAL, TAC Project CSL-10: Radar Equipment Program for B-45 Aircraft, undated.

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a. AN/ARC-33 will be the standard Command set for new production aircraft after 1 September 1951.

b,c. AN/ARN-14 will be installed in tactical reconnaissance aircraft in lieu of AN/ARN-6 when sufficient ground omni-directional equipment is available to assure adequate world wide coverage.

d. AN/APN-22 operates from zero to 9950 ft. Developed under Navy jurisdiction, experimental models weighing 23 lbs are now undergoing tests.

e. Liaison Radio AN/ARC-25A is a remotely tunable set consisting of transmitter AN/ART-13 and receiver AN/ARR-15. For optimum range this set requires the use of a trailing wire antenna, which to date has not proved satisfactory in high-speed aircraft.

f. Marker beacon receiver AN/ARN-12 has not previously been specified for tactical aircraft, since its application is restricted to peace-time flying in the Z/I.

g. Mark Ten IFF will be installed in all USAF aircraft when sufficient stocks are available. Future tactical reconnaissance aircraft will be equipped in the production line.

h, i. Distance Measuring Equipment and the Arbitrary Course Computer, combined with the omni-range receiver, will form the basis for future navigation and traffic control on the airways of the United States. Use of the system in tactical operations would be limited to line-of-sight range from the ground stations.

j. Recorder AN/ANQ-1A will permit the pilot to record visual observations for future reference, thereby reducing the amount of information which must be entrusted to memory.

k. There is no tail warning equipment either available or under development which will meet USAF requirements during the next three years.

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AN/APS-13, developed during the last war has proved completely unsatisfactory because of its short range and spurious alarms. 123/

Continental Air Command concurred in most of the recommendations of Air Materiel Command but expressed doubts regarding a few items. The AN/APN-22 radar altimeter was not felt to be satisfactory since there were requirements for radar altimetry up to 35,000 feet. Objection was also raised to AN/ARC-25A on the ground that its size and complexity in a single place aircraft outbalanced the gain to be derived from continuous air-ground communications beyond UHF or VHF range. Distance-Measuring Equipment AN/APN-34 was not required and its inclusion would merely complicate a serious space and weight problem. Other equipment listed was approved with the understanding that it must be kept as small and light as possible. Continental Air Command also expressed the view that two or more place tactical reconnaissance aircraft should include all of the equipment used in one place aircraft besides (1) AN/APX-24 equipment which would, it believed, not only serve the needs of radar scope photography but provide a system for the accurate delivery of photoflash bombs and a system of precision all weather navigation over the entire tactical operation

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123/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq USAF, Subject: Electric Equipment for Single Place Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft, To: Hq, ConAC, 16 August 1949

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radius of the aircraft, (2) Electric Countermeasure equipment.[124]

From the foregoing discussion it might appear that the status of aircraft radar left little to be desired. Actually, this was very far from being true. Much of the better equipment was on order -- not on hand. Furthermore, as will be shown later, maintenance was far from effective owing both to the lack of spare parts and the absence of sufficient personnel.[125]

One of the unsolved problems of radar was that of enabling the Troop Carrier planes to drop their men more accurately. Errors, possible due to imperfections of the EAGPT radar, might result in delivering men dozens of miles from their intended destination in the case of a long haul. Missouri Research Laboratories Inc., was detailed to study this problem whose solution was believed to lie in a combination of Automatic Navigator and Dual Ranging Fixing Equipment.[126]

124/ 1. CONFIDENTIAL ltr with 1st Ind, Hq ConAC, Subject: Electric Equipment for Single Place Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft, To: Hq, USAF, 3 November 1949
2. CONFIDENTIAL, IRS, DTAC to LCTAC, 26 September 1949

125/ 1. SECRET 1st Ind, Hq TAC To: CG, ConAC, 28 February 1949 to SECRET ltr, Hq 9AF, Subject: Operational Effectiveness of the 502nd Tactical Control Group, To: CG, TAC, 19 March 1949
2. Ltr, Gen Stratemeyer, Subject: Regular Air Force Officers in the Field of Aircraft Control and Warning, To: C/S, USAF, 16 March 1949

126/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, AMC, Subject: Ground Position Fixing Equipment of the Dual Ranging Type, To: Hq, USAF, 9 March 1949

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Another problem was that of providing greater accuracy in the dropping of bombs in Close-Cooperation Radar. The present model AN/MSQ-1 was too inaccurate and failed to provide an automatic bomb computer. The earlier model AN-MPQ-2 was more accurate but considerably less speedy. In such a case considerable development work appeared to be indicated.[127]

GROUND RADAR EQUIPMENT:

The quotation from General Saville at the beginning of this chapter indicates what a responsible observer thought of ground radar at the beginning of 1949. Despite clear indications of improvement during the latter months of the year the overall conditions of the aircraft warning system left much to be desired.

To begin with, existing ground radars were at times incapable of being coordinated with those in planes. Most of the radar equipped fighters of Continental Air Command were equipped with AN/APG-28 radar sets. The beacon facilities of these sets could not be used in conjunction with radar beacons AN/CPN-6 which comprised most of the radar aids to air navigation in the United States. In order to provide for coordination, Continental Air Command urged the installation of S-band type radar beacons AN/CPN-6 at such locations as would provide complete

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127/ CONFIDENTIAL, ltr, Hq TAC, Subject: Accuracy and Bomb Dropping Computer Requirements for Close Cooperation Radar, To: CG, ConAC, 25 March 1949

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radar beacon coverage for areas within which the fighter units would be operating. First priority was urged for Mitchel, Westover, Grenier, Dow, Rome, Selfridge, Spokane, Moses Lake and McChord Air Force Bases; and second priority for Osceola, Hamilton, Mather, Castle, Kirtland, Roswell, Biggs and Williams Air Force Bases. The Airways and Air Communication Service was suggested as the operating agency.[128]

Another difficulty under which Continental Air Command suffered was uncertainty as to when it could expect to receive new equipment. For example, UHF equipment had originally been scheduled for delivery in 1950. However, delays in the UHF program indicated that substantial supplies would not be forthcoming prior to 1953. Continental Air Command which had sent in its requirements for the equipment in the hope that delivery would be reasonably prompt was forced to rescind its requirements and request instead VHF radios which could be supplied in substantial numbers from the Fall of 1949 through 1950. It was this type that was adopted as the basic ground radio for continental air defense.[129] The very vital question of whether this radio would prove suitable for jet aircraft detection was being tested by the 502nd Tactical Control Group as

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128/ SECRET ltr, CG, ConAC, Subject: Request for Radar Aids to Air Navigation, To: C/S, USAF, 5 January 1949

129/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Air/Ground Communications Requirements for the Aircraft Control and Warning System of the United States, To: C/S, USAF, 1 March 1949

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well as by the Air Proving Ground Command.[130]

RADAR MAINTENANCE:

Akin to the need for new equipment were tremendous difficulties in getting spare parts for maintenance purposes. The best illustration of many which might be cited was the 505th Aircraft Control and Warning Group stationed at McChord Air Force Base in the strategic Northwest. This unit was equipped with aged radars of World War II vintage which it had received in 1947. One by one they had broken down and, despite heroic efforts to manufacture locally the parts they needed, had become inoperational. Strenuous efforts to obtain replacement parts, in some cases during a period of eighteen months, were unsuccessful. At last, when it was reduced to a single operational radar which had no height-finder (the three height finders allotted to the Unit also being inoperational) a frantic appeal was sent out for help. Interception without the aid of height finders was, of course, a very dubious proposition. So badly off was this unit that one indorsement to the basic letter noted, "This situation renders the defense of the Northwest Area virtually ineffective."

In this particular case Continental Air Command was able to order remedial action - seven weeks after the original cry

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130/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Project to Determine Suitability of Existing Ground Radar for Jet Aircraft Detection, To: C/S, USAF, 31 January 1949

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of distress. A height finder was supplied from Orlando Air Force Base where the need was less acute and a request made to Headquarters, United States Air Force for the establishment of a top priority on repairs of the ailing radars. While repairs were taking place a standby radar was secured.[131] However, the length of time from the original request to the time when remedial measures actually took effect is not known to this historian.

If the regular Aircraft Control and Warning Units were starved in this manner what of the National Guard units?

To this query answers are available in the form of two very interesting letters. The first, sent from Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, complained that radar equipment shipped to the 123rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Air National Guard, had been sent minus major operating components. Furthermore, the equipment sent was of so utterly obsolete a character that a complete set would have been as useless as one that was incomplete. Not enough experienced personnel were present to operate radars, while the lack of up to date equipment prevented the training of new personnel. Morale was quick to suffer in units whose members realized that their training was over-

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131/ SECRET ltr, with 4 Inds, Hq 505th AC&W Grp, McChord AFB, Subject: Supply Difficulties, To: CG, 25th Air Division, Everett, Washington, 11 August 1949

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ing only 30% of their operational responsibility.[132]

The second letter, a personal note from the Adjutant General of California to General Whitehead was similar. After expressing appreciation of the high opinion which General Whitehead had given of the 62nd Fighter Wing, Air National Guard, the writer observed dryly:

> "We are fortunate in having been able to attract a very high type of personnel to our air units. However, their enthusiasm and willingness to improvise cannot continue indefinitely as a substitute for the equipment that is essential for completion of their training and combat readiness."

The letter then went on to complain of the radar sets issued to the Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons. The sets were entirely obsolete with a range of only fifty miles and moreover, were in poor condition. For either training purposes or performance of the M-Day mission they were useless.[133]

Radar maintenance during 1949 seldom ran smoothly. This was due to a combination of factors, most of them beyond the ability of Continental Air Command to control. Nearly all of the equipment used was of World War II vintage and with increasing age was rapidly wearing out. Due to age and wear and tear, maintenance became steadily more difficult and time-consuming. Since there had been no major restocking on either Organizational or Depot level since the initial procurement, many stock

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132/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq, 9AF, Subject: Radar Equipment Authorization for the 123rd AC&W Sq, ANG, To: CG, ConAC, 28 July 1949

133/ Ltr, The Adj Gen, State of Calif, to Gen Whitehead, 30 August 1949

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levels were "zero" on spare parts items. There was no real possibility of keeping a reserve of equipment for replacement. All was needed for actual operations and needed at once as the radar program expanded. Faced with urgent supply needs, Continental Air Command requested Air Materiel Command to give the highest priority to the supply of spares and components.[134/]

Allusion has been repeatedly made to the lack of skilled technicians in the electronics field. As of 1 August 1949 the 47th Bombing Wing at Mitchel Field was authorized twenty-eight radar mechanics but had only two fully qualified men on hand. Fourteen Airborne Radar Repairmen were authorized but only six assigned. Forty-nine Navigator Bombardiers were authorized but only one was assigned. While the situation of this organization was somewhat worse than that of others (this was a Reserve Unit) it was nevertheless illustrative of a general condition. Practically every organization was far below its authorized strength in the technical specialties and the lack of adequate maintenance care resulting still further accentuated the shortage of material.[135/]

134/ 1. SECRET 2nd Ind, Hq, ConAC, 17 October 1949 to SECRET ltr Hq. ConAC, Subject: Radar Out-of-Commission for Parts (ROCP), To: CG, AMC, 12 September 1949
2. Ltr Hq, ConAC, Subject: Personnel Requirements for Certain ConAC Units, To: DC/S, Personnel, Hq, USAF, 8 September 1949

135/ Ltr Hq ConAC, Subject: AN/APO-28 Airborne Radar Set, To: CG, AF, 4 February 1949

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In the latter half of 1949 there were many signs that the importance of radar was at last being more widely recognized. In order to b e better informed on the status of its radar sets, Continental Air Command established a reporting system whereby notice would be sent, by operational priority teletype in case any radar or component part became inoperative and thereby threatened to interfere with performance of the radar stations' primary mission.[136] Three months later the Air Materiel Command in conjunction with Continental Air Command undertook a program of logistical support. Seven million dollars had then been made available for ground radar parts, the first considerable allotment for this purpose in many years.[137] The logistical support program which would ultimately consume this money was to be undertaken as follows:

a. Performance check
b. Condition of equipment
c. Spare parts availability
d. Technical Order Compliance
e. Siting
f. IFF
g. Adequacy of authorized test equipment (particularly with regard to AN/CPS-5)
h. Quality and experience of assigned personnel
i. Communications [138]

136/ SECRET ltr, Hq ConAC, Subject: Reporting Radar Operational Status, To: CG, 12AF, 28 July 1949

137/ SECRET, 3rd Ind, Hq, AMC, 25 November 1949 to SECRET ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subject: Radar Out-of-Commission for Parts (ROCP) To: Hq AMC, 12 September 1949

138/ SECRET ltr, Hq, Middletown Air Materiel Area, Subject: Logistic Support for the Aircraft Control & Warning Defense Plan, To: CG, ConAC, 31 October 1949

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Not to be overlooked in the new emphasis on radar was an improvement on the standard Mark X IFF system. This was the Short Interval Identification (SII) System which consisted of a series of attachments on the Mark X. The SII would provide secure identification, individual identity, and command functions. It appeared so desirable that Continental Air Command recommended a high priority to be placed on development of the first function.[139]

MISCELLANEOUS DEVELOPMENTS:

The development of jamming and anti-jamming devices, and practice in their use was a matter of some concern to Continental Air Command. Early in March 1949 request was made to Headquarters, United States Air Force, for training aids which would permit radar operators and technicians to recognize jamming and counter it. Twenty-one trainers were requested for "L" band radars and eleven trainers of this type (also of the general types) were requested for the "S" band radars in use.[140] This program was changed somewhat as a result of studies undertaken by Headquarters, Tactical Air Command which emphasized the need of a training device or devices with the characteristics listed below:

139/ SECRET ltr Hq ConAC, Subject, Mark X IFF System, To: Dir of Req, USAF, 2 March 1949

140/ CONFIDENTIAL Hq ConAC to C/S, USAF, Subject: Requirements for Trainers, 3 March 1949

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a. Capable of jamming all frequencies now utilized by radar sets authorized a tactical control group, such as the MEW, AN/CPS-4, AN/CPS-5, AN/MPS-5, AN/TPS-1B, AN/MPQ-2 and AN/TPS-10 and all frequencies of radar equipment being developed or procured, which might be authorized a tactical control group.

b. Capable of jamming the radar equipment mentioned in paragraph 2b at a distance of up to fifteen (15) miles on the ground and up to fifty (50) miles in the air, with a variable attenuated output.

c. Small in size, portable, and capable of being operated in a 1/4 ton vehicle or in an airplane.

d. Sturdy in construction and simple in design, which would require no special training to maintain or operate.

e. Capable of being self contained, or if impracticable, capable of being operated from a 6 or 12 DC Volt source of a vehicle or a 28 DC Volt source of an airplane.

3. The quantity of proposed training aids for operating ground radar equipment under jamming conditions would be five (5) each trainers per Tactical Control Group and two (2) trainers per Radar Calibration Unit." 141/

Late in November plans were put under way for the setting up of regular jamming units as part of the Aircraft Control and Warning System:

2. The structure of the Aircraft Control and Warning System lends itself naturally to the effective and economical operation of ground based jammers.

141/ CONFIDENTIAL, Hq TAC, Subject: Requirements for ECM Trainers, To: CG, ConAC, 29 April 1949

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Chain of command will flow from Aircraft Control and Warning Group to Squadron to Radar Detachment to ECM jamming units; control of jamming, from Air Defense Control Center to Radar Detachment to ECM jamming unit - as centrally controlled by this headquarters. Authorization of personnel and equipment by the addition of another column to TO&E 1-600 will insure flexibility. As unusual circumstances dictate, other cellular teams of TO&E 1-600 can be added to support the ECM Team. The integration of jamming operations in the Aircraft Control and Warning structure avoids the costly superstructure for administration, logistics, communications, command, and liaison for control that would be present in any other type of organization.

a. Request for amendment to TO&E 1-600 to include the ECM team will be submitted at afuture date, together with amendments for other purposes.

3. The jammers will be effective to line-of-sight range, and will find their greatest usefulness in the areas where GCI capabilities exist and are planned. Jammer units, therefore, are correlated to GCI radar sets, and initially are to be assigned on the basis of one jammer unit per GCI radar.

a. The present nebulous state of development of the jammer makes the establishment of exact requirements for materiel and personnel impossible. However, the urgency of the situation demands an estimate of requirements which will, of course, be subject to modification.

b. It is estimated that the following personnel will be required for each jammer unit:

(1) Eight (8) Equipment Operators (SSN 514 or equivalent)
(2) Five (5) Radar Mechanics (SSN 955, 953, 852 or equivalent)
(3) One (1) ECM Officer (SSN 7888)

c. The procurement of equipment and personnel should be phased as realistically as possible with the establishment of GCI stations. An Estimate of that phasing is as follows:

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Requirements (Accumulated)

	Jan '50	Jul '50	Jan '51
Jammer Units	26	35	52
Equipment Operators	208	280	416
Radar Mechanics	130	175	200
ECM Officers	26	35	52

4. Request for authority for necessary troop spaces will be submitted soon.

5. It is requested that development and procurement of the jammers be accelerated to meet the requirements stated in paragraph 3c, above. 142/

Continental Air Command engaged in still other radar activities during 1949. On 28 February 1949, Headquarters, United States Air Force approached Continental Air Command with a proposal for storm detection, as an aid to the Air Weather Service but cautioned that a bare minimum of funds must be used. 143/ A certain number of B-29s were also kept in the command for purposes of radar calibration.

All in all, 1949 saw radar reach a post war nadir, but also witnessed an increased interest certain to lead to marked development in the near future.

142/ SECRET ltr, Hq, ConAC, Subject: Ground Based Jammers, To: Dir of Comm, Hq USAF, 25 November 1949

143/ CONFIDENTIAL ltr, Hq, USAF, Subject: Installation of Ground Radar Storm Detection Equipment, To: CG, ConAC, 28 February 1949

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LIST of SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER ONE

Document Number	Classification	Type	Subject	Date
1	Confidential	Ltr	Flying Hours	27 Sep 49
2-1		"	Supply for Air Reserves	26 Jul 49
2-2	Confidential	"	Radar Equipment	28 Jul 49
3		"	Supply Situation in CRC	11 May 49
5		"	Air Reserve Supplies	15 Aug 49
6		"	" " "	28 Sep 49
7	Secret	"	Policy on T/O&E Equipment	23 Jun 49
8		"	Status of Equipment	1 Jul 49
9		"	Supplies for Satellite Stations	14 Apr 49
10		"	Reparable Property	11 Feb 49
11		"	Redistribution of Supplies	15 Aug 49
12		"	Local Purchases	17 Oct 49
13-1		"	Supply Plan	4 Aug 49
13-2		"	Supply Plan	12 Aug 49
14		"	Supply Procedures	27 Oct 49
15		"	Excess Property	22 Mar 49

CHAPTER TWO

20	Secret	Ltr	F-84 Maintenance	18 Jan 49
26	"	"	F-84 Engines	29 Jul 49
27	"	"	Gen Stearley to Gen Myers	2 Aug 49
31	"	"	Gunnery Experiments	24 Oct 49
32		TWX	ConAC to AMC	Undated
34		"	ConAC to AF's	"
35	Confidential	Ltr	Service Tests	11 Apr 49
36		Ltr	Gunnery Components	16 Jun 49
37		"	ACCP Items	10 Aug 49
39	Secret	"	Gen Stearley to Gen Whitehead	23 Nov 49
40	Confidential	"	Test of F-84	25 Oct 49
41	Secret	TWX	ConAC to 14AF	10 Dec 49
42	"	"	ConAC to 4AF	10 Dec 49
43	"	Ltr	F-84 Investigation	18 Dec 49
45	"	"	F-84 Wings	24 Dec 49

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LIST of SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (continued)

CHAPTER THREE

Document Number	Classification	Type	Subject	Date
47-1	Secret	Ltr	Fighter Study	7 Jul 49
47-2	Confidential	IRS		22 Jul 49
48		Ltr	Modernization of F-80s	8 Dec 49
50	Restricted	TWX	AMC to ADC	1 Dec 48
51-1		"	AMC to ConAC	11 Jan 49
51-2	Confidential	Rpt	Jet Aircraft	31 Mar 49
51-3	"	"	" "	30 Apr 49
56		TWX	ConAC to 1, 4AF's	7 Dec 48
59		Ltr	F-82F Status	7 Apr 49
61	Secret	"	U-13 Report	9 May 49
62-1	"	"	Support of F-82s	11 May 49
62-2	"	IRS	M&S to O&T	6 Jun 49
63	Confidential	TWX	USAF to Major Commands	29 Jul 49
64	Secret	Ltr	F-82 Aircraft	26 Aug 49
66	Confidential	"	Spare Parts	10 Dec 49
70	Secret	"	Cockpit Pressures	4 Nov 49
71-1	Secret	"	Service Report on F-86s	1 Aug 49
71-2	"	"	Test Reports	28 Sep 49
72	Secret	"	Flight Surgeon's Report	9 Sep 49
73		"	Condition of Planes	21 Aug 49
75		"	B-45 Maintenance	29 Apr 49
79	Secret	"	Cockpit Lighting	14 Apr 49
80-1	Confidential	"	C-119 Aircraft	14 Jul 49
80-2	Secret	TWX	ConAC to USAF	22 Jul 49
80-4	Confidential	Ltr	Spares for C-82s	15 Apr 49
87	Secret	Ltr	Condition of Aircraft	11 Feb 49
90-1	"	"	AOCP	6 May 49
90-2	"	"	AOC	25 Feb 49
91	"	TWX	ConAC to USAF	14 Feb 49
92-1	"	Ltr	AOC	3 May 49
93	"	"	"	16 May 49

CHAPTER FOUR

95	"	Ltr	Sight Deficiencies	25 Oct 49
97-1	"	Memo	Gen Thatcher to Col Muehleisen	14 Dec 49
97-3	Confidential	Ltr	Sights	14 Dec 49
99	Secret	TWX	Shaw AFB to ConAC	undated
100-2	Restricted	"	ConAC to 12AF	"
101-1	Confidential	Ltr	Overhaul of Engine	6 Dec 49
101-2	Secret	"	Increased Engine Life	12 Sep 49
103-1	Secret	"	Take-Offs for Aircraft	25 Jan 49
103-2	"	1stInd	" " " "	8 Apr 49
105	"	Ltr	Storage of Explosives	10 Jan 49

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LIST of SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER FIVE

Document Number	Classification	Type	Subject	Date
112	Secret	Ltr	IFF System	6 Dec 48
113	"	"	Ground Radar Development	8 Feb 49
114	Confidential	"	"L" Band Radar	7 Jun 49
115	Secret	"	IFF Progress Report	25 Aug 49
117	Confidential	"	Test Equipment	2 Nov 49
118	"	"	Operations Buildings	8 Dec 49
119	Secret	"	Equipment Kits	8 Dec 49
120	"	"	Radar Storage	10 Jan 49
121	"	IRS	Comm to DM	13 Jul 49
123	Confidential	Ltr	Electrical Equipment	16 Aug 49
124-2	"	IRS	DTAO to LOTAC	26 Sep 49
126	"	Ltr	Ground Radar	9 Mar 49
127	"	"	" "	25 Mar 49
128	Secret	"	Radar Aids	5 Jan 49
129	Confidential	"	AC&W System	1 Mar 49
130	"	"	Ground Radar	31 Jan 49
131	Secret	"	Supply Troubles	11 Aug 49
133	"	"	Adj Gen of Calif to Gen "hitehead	3 Aug 49
134-1	"	"	ROCP	12 Sep 49
135	"	"	Airborne Radar Set	4 Feb 49
136	"	"	Radar Status	28 Jul 49
138	"	"	Radar Logistics	31 Oct 49
139	"	"	IFF System	2 Nov 49
140	Confidential	"	Trainers	3 Mar 49
141	"	"	ECM Trainers	29 Apr 49
142	Secret	"	Jammers	25 Nov 49
143	Confidential	"	Storm Detection Radar	28 Feb 49

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS NUMBERS 1 - 50

Documents 51 - 143 are bound separately.

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452.1

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MSE/211

Allocation of Flying Hours
O&T 452.1 (19 August 1949) 1st Ind 27 Sep 1949

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

ATTENTION: Assistant for Programming

1. The flying hour allocation for this command for FY 1950 has been reviewed in light of past experiences, planning factors cited in AF Letter 150-10 and present aircraft allocation figures. This Headquarters in general concurs with allocation cited in inclosure to basic correspondence except that:

a. Allocation for B-29 aircraft should be increased to 10,800 hours in order to accommodate eight (8) B-29 aircraft utilized for radar calibration.

b. Allocation for B-26 aircraft can be reduced. Present plans in this Headquarters call for a total assignment of forty-four (44) B-26 aircraft for tactical and MIT flying. This would reduce the flying hours to 20,360 hours (9,280 Tactical - 10,080 MIT).

c. This command has no requirement for C-46 flying hours in the regular establishment.

d. The command no longer has any requirement for allocation of flying hours for F-47 aircraft.

2. This command will take all action possible to match allocation of flying hours with actual performance. It is requested that this headquarters be informed of any changes in planning factors in order to facilitate concurrent planning commensurate with directives from Headquarters, United States Air Force.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ V. E. Murphy
t/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

PRELIMINARY ALLOCATION OF FLYING HOURS

FISCAL YEAR 1950

BY AIRCRAFT MODEL AND UTILIZATION

Model	Total	Unit Training	Minimum Individual Training	Radar Calibration and Administration
Grand Total	460,700	265,935	170,079	24,486
B-29	1,700	-	-	1,700
B-17	970	-	-	970
B-25	37,800	-	37,800	-
B-26	43,205	6,125	37,080	-
RB-26	5,865	5,865	-	-
B-45	16,935	16,935	-	-
RB-45	995	995	-	-
F-47	3,240	-	3,240	-
F-51	7,200	-	7,200	-
F-82	18,685	18,685	-	-
F-80	63,440	63,440	-	-
TF-80	5,525	5,525	-	-
RF-80	5,835	5,835	-	-
F-84	52,948	52,948	-	-
F-86	34,055	34,055	-	-
C-45	40,715	-	40,715	-
C-46	360	-	360	-
C-47	57,785	3,245	32,724	21,816
C-54	38,880	38,880	-	-
C-82	18,255	18,255	-	-
C-119	14,645	14,645	-	-
C-122	560	560	-	-
C-125	2,790	2,790	-	-
T-6	28,635	17,475	11,160	-
L-13	7,025	7,025	-	-
H-5	415	415	-	-

NOTE: Air Force Reserve Training Centers are excluded from this allocation.

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326TH AIR FORCE RESERVE TRAINING CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
SELFRIDGE AIR FORCE BASE,
MT. CLEMENS, MICHIGAN

26 JUL 1949

MC 402.3

SUBJECT: Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations

THRU: Commanding Officer
56th Fighter Wing
Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan

TO: Commanding General
Tenth Air Force
Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base, Indiana

1. Information is requested from your Headquarters as to the extent of supply support presently available to the newly-activated 439th Troop Carrier Wing located on this base. Certain items of equipment are needed immediately in order to meet training requirements established by your Headquarters. Minimum equipment requirements have been placed on requisitions to distribution depots; however, to date little or no action has been taken regarding shipment. It is apparent that the United States Air Force stands to lose a great deal of time, money and prestige in this sector unless corrective measures are taken immediately to alleviate critical supply conditions. This factor alone can mean the difference between a good and bad program.

2. What very well can and might happen is that unless equipment needed to carry out the mission to which the Wing is assigned be made available, personnel will become demoralized to the extent of dropping completely out of the Reserve picture. It is the desire of Reservists to have an effective program and most are willing to spend more time on the job than actually required in order to get the program started. Organizations cannot function effectively without proper logistical support.

3. Most Reservists are not familiar with supply procedures, channels and its complex structure. Some are prone to compare its effectiveness with that of commercial supply agencies. The average layman understands only one thing - - if an organization is activated and placed into being with an assigned mission, supplies and equipment should be made available in sufficient quantities. The following are items authorized and should have been on hand to meet minimum requirements:

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BASIS: Ltr Hq 2242D AFRTC file M3 402.3 dtd 22 Jul 49, Subj: "Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations."

a. 54-T-4811, Typewriter, non-portable, 11" carriage, 23 each.

b. 53-P-35950, Perforator, 2 hole, non-adjustable, 10 each.

c. 53-T-1785, Tray, desk, wood, 50 each.

d. 54-M-30918, Machine, numbering, automatic 6 wheel 4 movement, 4 each.

e. 54-S-13000, Sharpener, pencil, office, transparent, 15 each.

f. 26-C-430, Cabinet, filing, steel OG, insulated 1 hour heat resist with combination lock, cap size, 1x4 drawer, 4 each.

g. 26-C-2796, Chair, typewriter, posture office type, metal, 13 each.

h. 26-C-3335, Chair, office, metal, swivel type w/arms, 23 each.

i. 26-D-267, Desk, office steel OG, flat-top, single, 23 each.

j. 26-D-311, Desk, office steel OG, typewriter, drop left, 25x34", 23 each.

k. 26-S-5485, Section, furniture, steel, upright OG, 1x4 drawer, letter size, 13 each.

4. The listing above covers only a few items of housekeeping equipment. Other items, such as tools, flying equipment, certain office supplies, aircraft spares, aircraft accessories, hangar equipment, special purpose vehicles, and training aids have been requisitioned with little or no result.

5. In comparison with what was actually needed and what was actually on hand on the first training day, the following items were made available to the wing commander:

a. Seven (7) desks, three (3) of which were withdrawn from reparable stock in Base Supply.

b. Two (2) tables, both withdrawn from reparable stock in Base Supply.

c. Fifteen (15) sections, furniture, wood, of which fourteen (14) were withdrawn from reparable stock in Base Supply.

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BASIC: Ltr HQ 2242D AFRTC file MO 402.3 dtd 22 Jul 49, Subj: "Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations."

d. Thirty (30) rulers, of which twenty-five (25) were in salvageable condition.

e. Thirteen (13) typewriters.

f. Ten (10) pencil sharpeners.

g. 25% of C-46 type aircraft without initial stock of spares.

h. 75% of T-11 type aircraft with depleted stocks of spare parts.

i. 100% of T-6 type aircraft with depleted stocks of spare parts.

j. Beds, mattresses, lockers, sheets, etc. available in sufficient quantities.

k. 25% of flying clothing and equipment.

l. 10% of training aids such as mock-ups and synthetic training devices.

6. The percentage of training publications on hand is unknown at this time. Some are not available. Requisitions have been submitted for maximum requirements, however, past experience has shown that supply action is very slow in some instances. Concrete examples can be given if desired.

7. Revised property tables as promised by Manual, USAF, subject: "Air Reserve Program for Fiscal Year 1950," are not on hand, nor has information been received that such tables exist.

8. Some of the chief causes for supply deficiencies in the Reserve Program are caused by personnel who work in supply channels that Reserve Forces are dependent upon for supply support. The majority of these individuals are not familiar with the Reserve Program, its overall strength or its mission. For example, certain items of supplies and equipment drawn are issued on the basis of the number of individuals assigned and attached to reserve organizations. On numerous occasions, cuts in amounts requested have occurred primarily because editing personnel did not believe the statement made by the Supply Officer inasmuch as they were not cognisant of the Reserve Program.

9. Another reason that can be attributed to supply deficiencies in the Reserve Program is the complex system governing supply at base level, such as the reimbursable system of issue, restrictions governing the transfer of regular Air Force stocks to reserve stocks, extra accounting procedures, and additional directives that reserve supply agencies must conform to. Consuming

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BASIC: Ltr Hq 2242D AFRTC file MD 402.3 dtd 22 Jul 49, subj: "Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations."

elements should be relieved of as many complexities as practicable and if such procedures must be used, let them be handled by higher supply agencies.

10. Attached hereto are true copies of requisitions submitted through Base Supply; some showing action taken, others no action at all. These represent a few examples only of outstanding requisitions. Assistance is requested to expedite the procurement of authorized and required supplies and equipment.

13 Incls:
1 - I/S #4-21-2
2 - I/S #4-22-3
3 - I/S #4-22-4
4 - I/S #4-22-28
5 - I/S #5-5-43
6 - I/S #5-5-44
7 - I/S #5-5-45
8 - I/S #5-5-46
9 - I/S #5-5-47
10 - I/S #5-6-13
11 - I/S #6-2-16
12 - I/S #6-2-18
13 - I/S #6-3-17

H. W. GRAY
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

13

H-500 (AnD)

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

28 Jul 1949

9AF 413.44

SUBJECT: Radar Equipment Authorization for the 123rd AC&W Squadron, ANG

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. Information received at this headquarters through the Annual Air Inspection of the 123rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron indicated that radar equipment allocated this unit was shipped less major operating components. Investigation of this situation confirmed the reported discrepancies and also revealed that replacement of missing items (Antenna Assembly for SCR-270) had not been requested by the unit as the operating personnel of the squadron had determined that a complete set of this type would be of as little use as the incomplete set. This conclusion is true for all practical purposes due to the fact that the operating frequency of the set (frequency (MC-SEC): 102 to 112) is in the FM television band, thus preventing even the limited periodical operation required in training an aircraft control and warning squadron.

2. In this regard, your attention is invited to Continental Air Command Regulation 49-1, 10 December 1948, which cannot be complied with beyond "classroom instruction" level unless adequate radar equipment can be made available to Air National Guard Aircraft Control and Warning Units. The shortage of experienced radar operators and maintenance personnel within aircraft control and warning units of Air National Guard, due to non-availability of adequate equipment with which to properly conduct training, was readily apparent to ORT inspection teams from this headquarters during the recently concluded Air National Guard encampment at Dover AFB and Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania. In addition to limiting the training potential of aircraft control and warning personnel, this shortage of equipment has an adverse effect on the over-all morale of the unit by causing general dissatisfaction through the knowledge that their training covers only thirty percent (30%) of their operational responsibility.

3. It is, therefore, the considered opinion of this headquarters that definite and concise action should be taken to correct not only discrepancies in the shipment of authorized items made available to the Air National Guard, but also toward the allocation of more adequate equipment commensurate with the ultimate training and operational responsibilities of such aircraft control and warning units.

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(413.44)

9AF 413.44
SUBJECT: Radar Equipment Authorization for the 123rd AC&W Squadron, ANG

4. In order to assure full coverage of all phases of operational training and subsequently revive and retain the interest of assigned individuals, procurement and distribution to the Air National Guard of more suitable radar equipment such as AN/TPS-1B light-weight long range search radar and AN/TPS-10 light-weight radar for height finding is considered essential. Such action will serve a dual purpose in that it will also prepare for the immediate integration of Air National Guard Aircraft Control and Warning Units into the existing USAF Aircraft Control and Warning System with a minimum of time lost should an emergency occur.

/t/ WILLIAM D. OLD
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
FORT SLOCUM, N.Y.

MS 400 11 May 1949

SUBJECT: Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units

TO : CG ConAC Mitchel AFB NY

1. Reference second ind., your hqs., to letter from 2230th AF Reserve Training Center, file 400.312, 15 Dec 1948, Subject: "Critical Supply Situation."

2. A recent check made on status of supplies, including spare parts of Air Force Reserve Training Center units of this command discloses alarming deficiencies in stock levels being maintained by the units. Approximately 75% of the stock replenishment requisitions for ORC units on all classes of property are being returned with the notation that the material is available in the first three priorities only. As a result of this practice, normal stock levels are disappearing, AOCP rates are climbing and the ORC units are existing on a "Day to day" basis for their spare parts.

3. It is recognized that the new Reserve program will tend to alleviate the supply situation on common items by consolidating the stocks of the de-activated Reserve units with the Reserve units still in existence. There still remains the problem of spare parts for aircraft that have not been in the Reserve program prior to the present time and consequently no stock exists of these spare parts for transfer from de-activated Reserve units with the Reserve units still in existence. There still remains the problem of spare parts for aircraft that have not been in the Reserve program prior to the present time and consequently no stock exists of these spare parts for transfer from de-activated Air Force Reserve Training Centers.

4. A survey of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers at Hanscom Airport and Griffiss Air Force Base disclosed that stock levels on C-46 spares are almost non-existent. Seventy-five to eighty percent of all requisitions for these spares are being returned as "available in First Three Priorities Only." Inclosure 1 to 12 indicate five items received from a total of 63 items ordered.

5. A unit cannot retain a satisfactory operational efficiency with 75% of the required spare parts being supplied on a "First Three Priority" basis. AOCP rates will soar and the entire Reserve Program will suffer if assistance is not furnished in procurement of adequate stock levels of ORC units.

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Subj: Critical Supply Situation in ORC Units (cont'd)

6. It is requested that action be taken by your headquarters to assist the Air Force Reserve Training Centers in obtaining adequate operating stocks and insuring that an uninterrupted source of supply is made available to maintain such stocks.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

R. J. ERICKSON
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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B/Ltr, MQ 402.3, Hq, 2242nd ARTC, SAFB, Mich, 26 Jul 49, subj: "Supply Support for Air Reserve Organizations"

D/M 402.3 1st Ind 15 Aug 1949

HQ, 56TH FIGHTER WING, Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan

TO: Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base, Indiana

1. All items mentioned in paragraph 1, basic communication, were requisitioned on the applicable depot from the ORC sub-section of the stock record account (105F-6). Requisitions were processed immediately upon receipt by the Air Force Supply, this base.

2. It is realized that a large percentage of Reserve Officers are not familiar with supply procedures and channels and that they expect almost immediate action when requisitions are submitted. It is felt that part of the training they receive under the Reserve Program should be that of the policies and capabilities of a supply which is furnishing necessary equipment for the Reserve Program. In all cases FY 1949 funds were exhausted at depot level. Likewise, ORC funds were exhausted at the same level. It should be pointed out to Reserve activities also that present regulations prohibit the issue of Air Force property to ORC except for ADCP aircraft. ORC requisitions were submitted; however little supply action was taken by the depot concerned except to cancel some requisitions for re-submission in ninety (90) days. Upon receipt of this information the base then issued what Air Force property (105F-2) was available on a temporary loan basis pending receipt of the ORC property.

3. The shortage of aircraft spares is a serious problem. All C-46 aircraft spares can be requisitioned on one of the first three priorities only. By far, the greater majority of all T-11 and T-6 ORC stock replenishment requisitions have been cancelled by the depot and are available on the first three priorities also. Publications are requisitioned on AF Forms 104-B and 91 by the ORC through the Base Supply to the depot.

4. It is true that the system of accounting for ORC property is complex and greatly increases the paper work load on the Base Supply. The requirement for the maintenance of a separate stock record card (105F-6), replenishment procedures, separate requisitions, cost accounting, etc., is a definite bottleneck in the supply support program for the ORC; however, supply personnel of this base are making an extreme effort to expedite all requisitions covering items connected with the Reserve Training Program.

13 Incls
n/c

ROBERT A. BRUMER
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Material

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ROUTING	COORDINATION	STAFF ACTIVITY
		CG
		VC
		DAD
		DTAO
		LOTAO
		IG
		A Insp
		PM
		PIO
		AG
		COMP
		Aud
		Budg
		Fin
		Prog
		Stat
		HP
		Chap
		JA
		Pers
		Surg
		WAP
		Serv
		DO
		Int
		Comm
		O&T
		P&R
		LM
		Mat P
		Mat S
		M&S
		Instl
		DRF
		Res
		ROTC
		ANG

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ConAC Form Hq-AG 5
28 March 1946

Supply Support for Air Reserve Organs.
AMS 400 (26 Jul 47) 3rd Ind.

28 SEP 1948

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

TO: Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, Benjamin Harrison Air Force Base, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

1. This headquarters realizes the difficulties encountered in obtaining certain supplies and equipment for Air Reserve units and AF Reserve Training Centers, and it is believed the information shown below will be of assistance to your headquarters in understanding the complex problems involved in equipping Air Reserve units and AFRTC's, as well as in the determination of an adequate and simple solution to complex accounting procedures.

2. Supply difficulties in the Air Reserve program are being eliminated gradually. To the best knowledge of this headquarters, the Air Materiel Command is furnishing adequate supply support for T-6, T-7 and T-11 aircraft assigned to Air Reserve wings. The difficulty in furnishing adequate supply support for assigned C-46 aircraft has been due to the fact that no Class 01-C items (air frame spares for C-46 aircraft) have been available in AF stock to establish adequate stock levels. AFRTC's were restricted by Headquarters Air Materiel Command from requisitioning normal stock levels of Class 01-C spares for C-46 aircraft, but this restriction has since been lifted. All Air Forces have been requested to direct submission of requisitions from AFRTC's for adequate stock levels of all classes and sub-classes of AF property required for the support of Air Reserve aircraft.

3. Engine spares, aircraft accessories, aircraft hardware, and aircraft instruments are being supplied the 22nd AFRTC and other AFRTC's equipped with C-46 aircraft, by automatic shipments from the Air Materiel Command zonal depots. Information available to this headquarters is to the effect that this equipment is now being received at Selfridge Air Force Base.

4. The Air Materiel Command is presently in the process of transferring quantities of Class 01-C air frame spares from regular AF stock to Air Reserve stocks. Action on this is slow, inasmuch as regular AF requirements for each item must be determined before this transfer can be effected. Many of the items being transferred to Air Reserve stocks are reparable. The Air Materiel Command is taking action to expedite the repair of these items.

5. Records available to this headquarters indicate that the AOCP rate for C-46 type aircraft assigned the 22nd AFRTC has declined from a high of one (1) AOCP aircraft of the four (4) assigned on 6 Sept 49, to a leveling off of one (1) AOCP aircraft for the twelve (12) presently assigned. These records also indicate that AOCP rates for T-11 aircraft

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Supply Support for Air Reserve Groups.

have leveled off to approximately 8%, and AOCP rates for T-6 type aircraft have leveled off to approximately 5%.

6. Additional maintenance, housekeeping and administrative equipment, and training aids for the support of the Air Reserve program are on procurement from FY 1949 funds. Deliveries of training aids are now being made on contracts negotiated during the last half of FY 1949. The Air Materiel Command, in coordination with this command, is now preparing to take an inventory of all equipment that has been issued to the Air Reserve wings in order to facilitate the efficient expenditure of those FY 1950 funds that are made available.

7. Reference paragraph 7 of basic communication, firm authorization for equipment for support of AFRTC's including training programs, are included in T/A 1-85 and 1-86, 17 May 1949. In addition, proposed T/A's 1-85 and 1-86 have been prepared by this headquarters and forwarded by letters, file MAS 400.3A, subject, "Proposed Revision of Table of Allowances 1-86", 6 July 1949 and "Proposed Revision of Table of Allowances 1-85", 17 May 1949, "Air Force Reserve Administration and Maintenance", 5th August 1949, which were implemented in message this headquarters, AFOOHAGMAS 28501, 15 September 1949, to all Continental Air Command Air Forces for distribution to AFRTC's under their jurisdiction. Information was furnished in the above mentioned letters that items of equipment listed in the proposed T/A 1-85 and Part III of proposed T/A 1-86, that are not included in the current T/A's 1-85 and 1-86, were to be requisitioned in accordance with paragraph 53, Part I, AF Manual 67-1.

8. Separate accounting procedures for organized reserve corps and regular AF property are outlined in AF Manual 67-1 and other pertinent publications, because such procedures are required by law. This headquarters, through Headquarters USAF is endeavoring to have certain of these laws amended to provide for as simple an accounting procedure as possible. To date, a project for carrying all RAU equipment on the 10576 stock record card, irrespective of original source, is nearly completed and requires only minor clarification of certain points by Headquarters USAF. The above mentioned procedure when placed into effect, would specify that all requisitions for RAU equipment required for AFRTC's located at installations other than regular AF bases, would constitute a reserve requirement. The plan further provides that upon initial implementation of this project, all RAU equipment would be transferred to the 10576 stock record card, irrespective of original source. This program is not yet effective, however, the reply from Headquarters USAF is expected within the next few days and the implementing directive will be published shortly thereafter. It must be realized however, that to change all of the existing procedures for supply accounting for Air

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25 March 1946

Supply Support for Air Reserve Organs.

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Reserve property will require legislative action in many instances, and this will necessarily take time. This headquarters is endeavoring to expedite as much as possible, all phases of the Air Reserve program in order that such program may attain the highest proficiency, in the simplest possible manner. Message referred to in paragraph 4, preceding Indorsement, was not intended as a criticism but mainly to provide information for this headquarters that the AFRTC referred to was receiving all possible supply support. Detailed information furnished in the preceding correspondence is appreciated and will be utilized by this headquarters in the present plan for simplifying accounting procedures and expediting the supply of required equipment.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WEBSTER:

13 Incls
n/c

M.G. FERGUSON, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Director, Maintenance & Supply

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DEPARTMENT of the AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D.C.

23 June 1949

SUBJECT: Policy Governing Issue of T/O&E Equipment

TO : CG ConAC

1. Present fund limitations and lack of adequate warehouse facilities at AF bases make it imperative that strict economy be exercised to insure that expenditures are based strictly on current strategic war plans. The expenditure of funds to completely equip units scheduled for combat crew training and units not scheduled for early deployment cannot be justified.

2. Currently, all T/O&E organizations are required to have 100% T/O&E equipment on hand. In most instances, equipment authorizations under Tables of Allowances have provided sufficient equipment for the T/O&E unit while stationed at a permanent Air Force base. This results in outside storage and attendant rapid deterioration of duplicate T/O&E equipment at many AF bases.

3. To correct the above unsatisfactory condition, the following policy will apply for the future equipping of all T/O&E units:

a. Overseas units to be 100% T/O&E equipped.

b. Units of the Strategic Striking Force to be 100% T/O&E equipped

c. Units scheduled for deployment between D and D/8 months to be 100% T/O&E equipped

d. Units not scheduled for deployment prior to D/8 will utilize base T/A equipment and necessary individual items of equipment from the appropriate T/O&E

e. The remainder of the T/O&E equipment for units covered by par. 3d will be maintained in AMC stocks subject to procurement leadtime.

4. This policy does not effect current directives pertaining to the equippage of Air Force units committed to "short or war" plans.

5. To implement the above policy, it is desired that your command, with the least practicable delay, submit a list of specific units that will come under the classifications as stated in paragraphs b,c and d above. This list will be submitted to this Hq, Attention: Director of Plans and Operations, DCS/O, for inclusion in the next revision of the Precedence List of USAF Functional Activities.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/ W.E. FARTHING, Brig Gen, USAF
Dir Maint. Sup & Serv, D/CS-Mat

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

M&S 400 1 Jul 1949

SUBJECT: Status of Organizational Equipment for All Active USAF Combat and Supporting Units

TO : Commanding Generals, First, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Fourteenth AFs

1. Reference message, this headquarters, AFCONACMS 12, 4 January 1949; letter, this headquarters, MS 400, subject as above, 14 February 1949; letter, this headquarters, DM 319.1, 15 February 1949, subject: "Submission of Reports" and letter, this headquarters, MS 400, 13 May 1949, subject as above.

2. It is directed that continuous aggressive action be taken by your headquarters to insure that all T/O&E shortages pertaining to organizations under your command are eliminated at the earliest practicable date.

3. All authority previously granted by this command in official messages, or by other means for the suspension of requisitioning of shortages of T/O&E equipment is hereby revoked.

4. The directive contained in paragraph 2 above will be implemented by insuring that organizational records accurately reflect the status of property on hand, that all equipment shortages are maintained on active requisitions and that follow-up action is being taken in accordance with the provisions of AF Manual 67-1, by redistribution of equipment available within your command and by the establishment of an efficient system of liaison with the various supply depots.

5. When your headquarters has exhausted all possibilities of eliminating a particular T/O&E equipment shortage or group of shortages, this command will be called upon for assistance. Requests for assistance will contain a complete resume of all action taken at base and Air Force level to obtain the item or items concerned to include requisition numbers, dates of requisitions, depots to which forwarded, date and message references of follow-ups and information received from the supply depot. Copies of requisitions and other correspondence should be furnished. Separate correspondence will be prepared for each supply class or sub-class to expedite handling at depot level.

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Status of Organizational Equipment for All Active USAF Combat and Supporting Units (Cont'd)

6. Request acknowledgement of receipt and understanding of this letter and an outline of the action to be taken by your headquarters to implement the provisions thereof.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/t/ V. E. MURPHY
Lt Col, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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HEADQUARTERS, TENTH AIR FORCE
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

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AF10MM 400 CLP/fh

SUBJECT: Supply and Services for Satellite Stations 14 April 1949

THRU: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
Mitchel Field, New York

TO: Commanding General
Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

1. Authority is requested under paragraph 5, TM 38-400 for small units of the Tenth Air Force, such as AROTC Detachments and unit instructors with National Guard to be satellited upon bases of your command for supplies and services as listed in inclosures, this Satellite Supply Plan to be effective 1 July 1949.

2. At the present time, nearly all detached personnel in this command are obtaining clothing and other supplies and services from Army installations for the reason that they are being carried on the rolls of the joint Army-Air Force ROTC detachments, and consequently are served by the same supply source that provides for Army personnel. Instructor personnel with the Air National Guard, however, are generally served by the nearest installations, Army or Air Force, as most convenient.

3. Effective 1 July 1949, when AROTC activities at installations are separated from Army activities, it is felt that supply should be separated and that AROTC detachments should be satellited on Air Force bases wherever possible. Separate supply will be particularly necessary when the new Air Force uniform becomes available for issue.

4. Geographical distribution of AROTC and ANG detachments in the Tenth Air Force area is wide, consequently, the basing of such units on the nearest Air Force installation, regardless of major command jurisdiction, appears to be the most practicable and economical.

5. Request favorable action at an early date to enable this Headquarters to complete its supply plan for the fiscal year 1950.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

2 Incls. (in dup)
Incl. 1 - List Smoky Hill AFB
Incl. 2 - List Offutt AFB

H.C. ALLISON
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

11 Feb 1949

SUBJECT: Reparable Property

TO : Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Greenville Air Force Base, Greenville, South Carolina

1. It has been forcibly brought to our attention that an impossible backlog of reparable items is on hand at the Air Materiel Areas and is continuing to increase.

2. Action to effect the repair of these items has been hindered by the following factors under our control:

a. Many items that are obviously damaged beyond economical repair and should have been condemned at base level are being shipped to the Air Materiel Areas as reparable items.

b. Many items not in need of repair are being turned into Air Materiel Area Depots, indicating a lack of proper inspection at our bases.

c. Many items are being received that have not been identified and tagged in accordance with AF Regulation 15-50, 22 October 1945, AF Manual 67-1, and AF MCS Directive 65-1, 20 December 1945.

d. Aircraft engines are being received that are incomplete due to failure of shipping activities to comply with the provisions of T.O. 02A-1-14, 10 March 1948.

e. Many reparable items are being received that have been further damaged in shipment due to improper packing.

f. Many reparable items are being received that could easily have been repaired at base level.

3. It is desired that positive action be taken to eliminate such irregularities and to insure that every effort be made to accomplish locally maximum repair possible without allowing a backlog to accumulate. Correction of deficiencies such as those cited can be expected only when all concerned, down to the junior mechanic and stock clerk, understand our procedures, the reasons for them and the importance of compliance therewith.

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Reparable Property
MS 400

4. As part of a study to determine possible solutions to this problem it is requested that, if the volumne of items which can be repaired locally under existing regulations exceeds the capacity of any base, you inform this headquarters of the feasibility of the establishment of a second shift and the additional funds that would be required. Your estimate of extra capacity which such a base may have above its own needs, as the result of employment of second shift, will be included.

5. This situation requires concerted action by all echelons to avoid extreme supply shortage in the immediate future when our serviceable inventories, on which we have existed since the war, are exhausted.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

/s/t/ JOHN P. DOYLE
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Materiel

Note: Same Ltr to 1st, 4th, 10th, 12th, and 14th AF's, ConAC

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

M&S 400 15 Aug 1949

SUBJECT: Redistribution of Available Supplies at Base Level

TO : Commanding General, Each ConAC Air Force

1. It is believed that many aircraft become AOCP for supplies and equipment that are actually available on bases of this command but not in the hands of the supply officer concerned. It is also believed that maintenance is often retarded due to issue slips marked "Not-In-Stock", pertaining to items that are not available in Base Supply but which are available in the bench stocks maintained by other organizations on the field.

2. To eliminate this irregularity, it is desired that Wing Commanders at all bases under the jurisdiction of this command, accompanied by Maintenance and Supply Group Commanders and maintenance personnel who have received issue slips coded "Not-In-Stock", make frequent checks of all supplies available on the base for the purpose of determining whether a source of supply exists for the particular item or items.

3. Items that are located will be called to the attention of the responsible supply officer, who will be directed to check all possible sources of supply prior to marking issue slips as "Not-In-Stock".

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/t/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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M&S 400

17 October 1949

SUBJECT: Local Purchase Procedure for Repairs and Utilities Supplies

TO : Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton,

1. Reference is made to 2nd Indorsement, this headquarters, July 1949, to letter, Headquarters Smyrna Air Force Base, ABAI 400, 22 June 1949, Subject: "Supply for Repairs and Utilties Purposes", and letter, your headquarters, 1 June 1949, Subject: "Supply for Repairs and Utilitites Purposes."

2. The instructions outlined in paragraph 403, and 406, Section XXXI, Air Force Manual 67-1, June 1948, are such as to cause considerable misunderstanding and misinterpretation at installations within this command. The provisions of letter, your headquarters, referred to in the preceding paragraph which purport to clarify the situation regarding Repairs and Utilities supply treats too briefly of local purchase in that it refers to emergency conditions only.

3. The position of this headquarters with regard to local purchase of Repairs and Utilities supplies has been taken previously in 2nd Indorsement referred to in paragraph one. To date no reply has been received. Present local purchase instructions create a situation anomalous to governmental economy. For example, emergency local purchases are being made in quantities so small that the cost of processing the paper work involved exceeds the cost of the items being purchased. Further, interpretation of an emergency condition is so stringent that many local purchases are not being made when they should be made. Rather, attempts are made to obtain required items by requisitioning for fear of violating a regulation. In many cases the requisitions are then returned by Air Materiel Areas, after considerable passage of time, authorizing local purchase. In consequence, high priced labor stand idly by awaiting receipt of supplies needed to perform their various functions, whereas, if present procedures were rewritten as to give the installations an opportunity to buy not only for the immediate need, but for such replenishment quantity as would carry the installation until requisitioned supplies were received and, whereas, if the interpretation of an emergency were left to the discretion of the Air Installation Officer a large saving would accrue to the government and a more efficient supply operation obtained.

4. In addition to a clarification of emergency local purchase procedures, immediate local purchase should be authorized, without prior submission of a requisition, for non-standard items which due to thier nature are not listed in any supply catalog for requsitioning on supply depots.

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Local Purchase Procedure for Repairs and Utilities Supplies (cont'd)

5. The following paragraph is recommended for inclusion in Section XXXI, Air Force Manual 67-1.

a. Local Purchase:

Local purchase may be made of those items which are listed in Air Force Maintenance & Supply Directive 70-9 and those non-standard items required for Repairs and Utilities purposes which due to their nature are not listed in any supply catalog for requisitioning on supply depots. Emergency local purchase will be made upon certification by the Air Installation Officer that an emergency pertaining to the maintenance and operation of real property exists. A work stoppage involving the tying up of high priced labor wherein a delay in obtaining supplies will result ultimately in considerable loss to the government may be considered an emergency at the discretion of the Air Installation Officer. Local purchases will be made in standard package lots, when practicable. To eliminate recurrent purchases of small lots of identical items wherein the cost of processing the purchase request is ofttimes greater than the cost of the item involved, local purchases may be made not only for the immediate need but for that quantity which will meet the needs of the installation until replenishment is received from the supply depot. Established station control levels must not be exceeded except whenprocurement is standard package lots is the feasible procedure.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

2 Incls:
1-Ltr, Hqs Smyrna AFB,
21 Jun 49, w/2 Inds
2-Ltr Hqs AMC, 1 Jun 49

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

4 August 1949
(undtd)

M&S 400

SUBJECT: Continental Air Command Tactical Organization Supply and Mobility Plan

TO: Commanding General, First Air Force, Slocum Air Force Base, New Rochelle, New York

1. The mission of the Continental Air Command requires that aircraft of tactical units assigned to this command be highly mobile, subject to being dispatched without delay upon receipt of alert movement orders, and capable of operating from any designated base within the Continental United States.

2. To accomplish effectively the mission of the Continental Air Command a requirement exists to establish an "Enroute Kit" to consist of essential aircraft spares, special tools and special ground handling equipment to be utilized in maintaining tactical aircraft enroute and on designated operational bases for a 15-day period, subsequent to alert movement orders and prior to receipt of normal Air Materiel Area supply support or a Table II for the particular type aircraft involved, whichever is determined necessary by this headquarters, and Headquarters, Air Materiel Command.

3. It is directed that each tactical organization of First Air Force prepare a list of recommended items of aircraft spares and supplies; a list of essential special tools and equipment considered necessary to support its aircraft for a period of 15 days while away from home base. The lists will be prepared in accordance with instructions as follows:

a. Lists of essential aircraft spares, special tools and special ground handling equipment to comprise a 15-day Enroute Kit will be estimated and prepared by qualified supply and maintenance personnel of tactical squadrons. The lists will be estimated and established on the basis of a probable need rather than a possible need so that all items of the proposed Enroute Kit required to support one (1) Fighter Squadron may be transported in two (2) C-47 transport type aircraft. In the case of light bomber and troop carrier squadrons, the aircraft space will be provided by the organizational aircraft of the squadrons.

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b. Brown line copies of Supply Table II, pertinent to the type aircraft assigned to each base, as furnished by this headquarters, will be used for computation and the listing of 15-day level of aircraft spares and supplies for the Enroute Kit thereon. One (1) such copy, indicating recommended quantities for each item desired for inclusion in the list to comprise contents of the Enroute Kit will be forwarded upon completion to this headquarters for screening and consolidation. It will be a responsibility of each individual base to add the stock number and nomenclature to the brown line copy of Supply Table II, any item, not listed thereon, which is deemed essential to their requirements for inclusion in the Enroute Kit. Recommended quantities of each item listed will be determined from previous consumption data rather than an arbitrary figure such as one-half (1'2) of the quantities authorized for Table II spares for 30-day level. It is imperative that the selection and computation of quantities of items for the Enroute Kit be made on the premise of airlift space to be made available.

c. To indicate items of special tools and equipment required for the kit, a unit essential equipment list will be prepared and submitted to this headquarters along with the list of aircraft spares and supplies. The list will be made up of T/O&E equipment now in use and will include a minimum of items required to maintain aircraft for a 15-day period, and non-essential tools, etc., omitted to conserve space in the supporting transport aircraft, and to reduce the number of items to be assembled for transport, thus permitting more rapid initial movement of the organization.

4. Estimated lists submitted to this headquarters by organizations will be screened and consolidated into standard Enroute Kits for each type tactical aircraft assigned to Continental Air Command. Approved lists will be forwarded to organizations with instructions for assembly, storage and utilization of the Enroute Kit.

5. Request immediate action be taken to accomplish the requirements outlined in paragraph 3a and b herein, and copies of the lists showing recommended items of aircraft spares and supplies; special tools and equipment be forwarded to reach this headquarters not later than 31 August 1949.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

/t/ W. R. PURPUS
Major, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

3 Incls:
1-Brownline for F82F
(52 Fighter, Mitchel AFB)
2-Brownline for F84D, in lieu of F-84B
(14th Fighter, Dow AFB)
3-Brownline for F84E, in lieu of F-84C
(33rd Fighter, Otis AFB)

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SUBJECT: Continental Air Command Tactical Organization Supply and Mobility Plan

TO : Commanding General, First Air Force, Slocum Air Force Base, New Rochelle, New York

(CC: 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, 12th and 14th AFs)

1. Reference is made to letter from this headquarters dated 4 August 1949, subject as above, requesting tactical organizations of First Air Force to estimate items of aircraft spares and special equipment required to effectively support assigned aircraft for a 15-day period when operating away from home base. The above information is needed to supplement the proposed mobility program of Continental Air Command, details of which are outlined in Part I and Part II of this letter.

PART I

ENROUTE KIT PLAN

2. This headquarters has established a requirement for an Enroute Kit to be utilized by tactical organizations when operating aircraft away from home base. The kit will contain items of aircraft spares and special equipment pertinent to the type aircraft assigned each tactical organization and will be assembled, stored and utilized as follows:

a. AIRCRAFT SPARES AND SUPPLIES LIST. A predetermined approved list of Air Force and Army procured AF supplies within the T/O&E considered adequate to support the field operation of tactical aircraft for a period of 15-days enroute to and at an operating base. Upon receipt of alert movement orders, the supplies comprising this predetermined list will be withdrawn from the normal 45-day level of supply maintained at the home base of the tactical organization and airlifted to the designated operating

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

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(Cont'd):

base. At no time are the items shown on the Aircraft Spares and Supplies List to be considered as frozen stock or stock to be pre-packed in anticipation of a movement, with the exception of certain items which are in critical short supply. These critical items which are procured by special arrangement with Air Materiel Command and are shipped to a station marked for retention for use with the Enroute Kit will be frozen for that specific purpose and will not be used for any other purpose, including the removal of an aircraft from "AOCP." Like items required for an "AOCP" will be requisitioned in accordance with paragraphs 9b(3) and 10, Section II, Part I, AF Manual 67-1. Use of the made-up Enroute Kit, as described herein, will be restricted unless authorized by Deputy for Materiel, Headquarters, Continental Air Command.

b. Necessary supply action will be taken to requisition Enroute Kit items short in the present 45-day level of supply. Complete follow-up action in accordance with AF Manual 67-1 will be initiated on all requisitions returned by Air Materiel Command. In the event follow-up action by base and air force headquarters concerned is ineffective, the assistance of this headquarters will be requested by showing complete stock numbers, nomenclature, quantities, depot action or comments, dates and complete follow-up action by all echelons.

c. Upon receipt of warning order for a move, and Kit authorization from Deputy for Materiel, Continental Air Command, aircraft spare parts and supplies comprising the 15-day level of supply will be withdrawn from the 45-day stock level at the home base, packed and airlifted as prescribed herein. While Enroute and in use at the new base, the 15-day level of supplies comprising the Kit will be considered as a service stock for sub-base operations and accountability, will be retained at the home base. At such time as deemed necessary, accountability may be transferred in accordance with provisions of AF Manual 67-1.

d. A priority will be established, to become effective upon receipt of alert movement orders, authorizing the tactical organizations of Continental Air Command to airlift from the Air Materiel Area any supply items of the Enroute Kit which are short in the base supply of the unit. It is desirable that contents of the Enroute Kit be supplied from base stocks in its entirety; however, circumstances may require certain items to be drawn from the AMA and, therefore, priority authorization is considered essential to assure complete assembly of the kit when so required. The priority will be limited to use as specified.

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

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COORDINATION
STAFF ACTIVITY

CG
VC
(Cont'd):

e. UNIT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LIST. A predetermined approved list of essential individual equipment to be issued to air crew, ground crew and other personnel on mobility move, and a predetermined list of organizational equipment to be prepared by the squadron for airlift in supporting aircraft. This list of equipment will include only items required to maintain aircraft for a 15-day period. Non-essential tools, etc., will be omitted to conserve space in the supporting transport aircraft, and to reduce the number of items to be assembled for transport, thus permitting more rapid initial movement of the organization. This equipment will be made up of T/O&E equipment now on hand and in use and not requisitioned and held in storage for possible moves.

f. Aircraft spares packing boxes will be designed and prefabricated to accommodate all items of the Kit requiring protection in transit. A list of the items to be stowed in each box will be affixed to the lid to facilitate packing in an emergency, and to readily locate parts upon arrival at a new base. Prefabricated boxes will be stored and maintained so that a minimum of time will be required for utilization. Boxes will not be used for any purpose other than herein specified.

PART II

PREPACKED AIRCRAFT SPARES AND SUPPLIES PLAN

3. To maintain aircraft of tactical units of Continental Air Command beyond the 15-day support provided by the utilization of Enroute Kit, it will be necessary to establish a supply plan to meet this requirement. The following plan is considered adequate to the needs of this command.

a. One (1) pre-packed Table II, plus predpaks covering design changes, for each type tactical aircraft within Continental Air Command will be located in a Western depot, preferably Ogden Air Material Area, and one (1) such Table II for like aircraft will be located in an Eastern depot, either Warner Robins Air Material Area or Middletown Air Material Area. Instructions from Air Material Command to the AMAs will direct shipment of the prepacked Table IIs to organizations requiring this form of supply support during emergency operations. Table II quantities and their location as described herein are considered adequate to provide temporary supply support to organizations of Continental Air Command in emergency and until such time as a normal supply pipeline is established. The plan involves a minimum of aircraft spares and supplies restricted from current use, thereby relieving to a certain extent, the present day critical supply situation.

FOR DIRECTORATE USF
Prepared by
Coordinated with
JUSTIFICATION/EVALUATION
New Record
Permanent
Temporary
Until

Comdt Form No 40-5
24 March 1942

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AG 506 (1-6)

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SECTION	COORDINATION	STAFF ACTIVITY
		CG
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FOR DIRECTORATE USE

Prepared By Lewis

Coordinated With

EVALUATION

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Hq ConAC, M&S 400, "ConAC Test Orgn Supply and Mobility Plan" (Cont'd):

b. Table II, and all components, thereof, stored at the depots and designated for use as outlined herein will be restricted from any other usage and released only upon authorization from Air Material Command after due notification from this headquarters that an organization has been assigned a mission requiring the utilization of the pre-packed Table II to support its aircraft beyond the 15-day period provided by the Enroute Kit.

4. Request your comments and suggestions regarding adequacy of the proposed program and any recommendation for improvements thereto.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

R. [illegible]URPUS
[illegible]USAF

Morgan

ConAC Form No. 46-5
28 March 1944

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

27 October 1949

SUBJECT: New Supply Procedures

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, N.Y.

1. The purpose of this letter is to preview new base supply procedures which are scheduled for implementation early in 1950.

2. A new simplified stock record card has been approved and will be distributed to all bases on or before 1 February 1950. The new AF Form 105F-2 was designed with a view to effecting economies by simplifying our present complicated supply procedures and correspondingly reducing Supply overhead. The card has only three (3) balance columns; Serviceable, Reparable and Work Order.

a. The present balances in Column 15 (on M/R) will be transferred to AF Form 90-A (being revised) which will become a part of the plant account. At many bases the balances in Column 15 (on M/R) do not agree with the recorded balances on AF Form 90-A or with the documents in the M/R jacket files. Representatives of the Auditor General's Office will inspect M/R accounts by 1 January 1950, to insure that M/R Stock Record Balances have been conformed to jacket file account balances. A monetary value below which M/R items will be considered as expended will be established. Inventory of Plant Account Property will be conducted annually. Present requirements for preparation and signature of M/R's for a majority of plant account items will be modified, eliminating overhead.

b. The present service stock balances in Column 14 will be dropped from item accountability on the AF Form 105F-2 and controlled on the Bin Card, AF Form 84B. Bench stocks of selected expendable nonrecoverable items will be established at or near points of consumption and accountability terminated on issue from base supply. Issues of expendable items (either recoverable or nonrecoverable) having a unit cost of less than $1.00 will not be recorded on AF Form 81A, "Daily Recapitulation of Issues from Service Stock."

c. Balances in TOC (Column 18) will be transferred to either serviceable or reparable column on new card, depending on degree of maintenance required to return the item to a serviceable condition.

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Subj: New Supply Procedures

3. A system of controlling inventories by dollar value is being service tested at one of our key bases. Basically the system does not alter our present item control system; however, dollar control will permit relaxing our present restrictive item accounting procedures by providing overall management control dollarwise.

4. As a by-product of machine accounting at the AMA's, base reordering and stock balance reporting workloads will be greatly reduced.

5. AF Manual 67-1 will be revised to provide ready reference to procedures for the three basic supply echelons; squadron, base and depot supply. A squadron supply manual is now under review and will be distributed early in 1950. Changes in the stock record card will materially affect the present Part I of the manual. The Depot Section of the manual will be rewritten to incorporate mechanized accounting procedures being installed at all AMA's.

6. A continuing study of all forms and reports now in use is being made with a view to positive reduction in their numbers. Major commands can materially assist bases under their jurisdiction by careful review of existing base supply reports, and by consolidation and elimination can reduce a workload which has been permitted to seriously interfere with supply operations.

7. The information in the above paragraphs should be reviewed by major commands and passed to all bases. Detailed procedures will be issued at a later date via separate directives.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/t/ W. E. FARTHING
Major General, USAF
Director, Maintenance, Supply & Services
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel

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MS 400

ACP:285

SUBJECT: Redistribution of Excess Property 22 March 1949

TO: Commanding General: Each ConAC Air Force

1. When a Continental Air Command organization is inactivated with in your air force, it is desired that your headquarters take necessary action to insure that all property on hand at the inactivated organization is screened against the outstanding and anticipated future requirements of other bases and organizations under your jurisdiction and necessary action taken to transfer such items as are required.

2. In accordance with paragraph 187, Part I, AF Manual 67-1, Air Force commanders are authorized to transfer, between bases under their respective commands located within one Air Materiel Area, authorized T/A equipment to meet emergency needs and authorized T/O&E equipment as required to insure proper distribution.

3. Requests for authority to transfer equipment between Air Materiel Areas will be submitted to the Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, through this headquarters, for approval prior to effecting transfer. This does not pertain to Ordnance and Chemical items of ammunition or general supply.

4. Requests for authority to transfer regulated items will be processed in accordance with paragraphs 167 and 168, Part I, AF Manual 67-1.

5. All items on hand at the organization being inactivated that are known to be in critical short supply in Air Force stock and not required for redistribution within your air force will be reported to this headquarters for possible redistribution to organizations of other Continental Air Command air forces.

6. The following listed items will not be disposed of in any instance without authority from this command:

Redistribution of Excess Property (Cont'd)

a. Air Force Class 26 and Class 28 Training Aids
b. Class 19-B Refueling Equipment
c. Class 19-B Crash and Structural Fire Fighting Equipment
d. Lumber
e. Breathing Oxygen Cylinders

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Redistribution of Excess Property (cont'd)

f. Ethylene Glycol
g. Aircraft paint remover
h. Aircraft steam cleaners
i. Supply storage bins
j. TO 19-25C-2 Kits
k. B-26, C-46, C-47, F-80, T-6, and T-11 tow bars
l. Maintenance stands, all types
m. Jacks for B-26, C-47 and C-46 aircraft
n. Spares for F-47 aircraft
o. 8300-380400 Helmet, Flying, Pilot
p. Oxygen masks, type A-13A
q. Electromatic Typewriters
r. Light sedans
s. Class 16 Supplies and Equipment

(1) 16-A Airborne Communications Equipment
Countermeasures
Radar System Components
Radio Sets Components
Test Sets - Special purpose for airborne and/or ground communications equipment

(2) 16-B Ground Radio Equipment
AIDs - Navigational
Radio Fighter Control Systems VHF
Radio Sets and Components

(3) 16-C Ground Radar Equipment
AIDs - Navigation
Countermeasure
Beacons
Identification Equipment
All other items of ground radar equipment

(4) 16-E Radio and Radar Maintenance Parts
All maintenance parts for ground and airborne radar equipment and major items of ground radio equipment.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STRATEMEYER:

JAMES H. HACKETT
1st Lt. USAF
Asst Adj Gen

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MMA

JAN 1949

9AF 452.11

SUBJECT: Operational and Maintenance Difficulties on F-84 Aircraft

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

1. This Air Force has made an examination of the employment of the F-84 aircraft, and serious limitations as to the usefulness of this aircraft still exist due to operational and maintenance problems which are summarized for your information.

2. Since February 1948, when the F-84 aircraft was assigned to the Ninth Air Force, serious operational and maintenance problems, principally attributable to design, have been experienced, and which to a considerable extent have limited both the availability and the usefulness of this aircraft. As a measure of these problems, it should be mentioned that up to January 1949, three hundred thirty-seven (337) Unsatisfactory Reports have been presented relative to the F-84 aircraft by units of the Ninth Air Force.

3. Attention is also invited to T.O. 00-10-1, dated 5 September 1947, revised 20 October 1948, which lists one hundred forty-four (144) individual items of difficulty on the F-84 aircraft.

4. Analysis of all information available to Headquarters, Ninth Air Force as of 26 January 1949, indicates current serious difficulties which are enumerated below under the general headings of operational and maintenance limitations, and which are considered to be of major significance:

a. MAINTENANCE LIMITATIONS:

(1) Failure of Flap Bearing Plate - F-84B Aircraft

(a) This item, of which there are eight (8) on each aircraft, was cast from magnesium and has cracked at the rearmost plate attaching rivet. T.O. 01-65AA-23 recognized this problem, but only permits the replacement of those plates that may be found cracked

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upon examination. As additional plates become cracked on the same aircraft, the entire corrective action as provided in T.O. 01-65BJ-23 must be repeated, thereby producing a great loss of maintenance man-hours, much of which could have been eliminated by a complete change of plates on each aircraft at the same time.

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that T.O. 01-65BJ-23, dated 6 January 1949 be immediately revised to allow a complete one-time change of flap bearing plates from the installed magnesium plates to new aluminum alloy plates, at the first instance of cracking on an individual aircraft.

(2) Failure of Outer Aileron Rib on F-84B Aircraft

(a) This item which is now beginning to make itself evident on the F-84B aircraft is covered by item 84, listed on page 22 of T.O. 00-10-1, revision dated 20 October 1948. It is anticipated that the ailerons on F-84B aircraft of the Ninth Air Force will require the corrective action described in the above listed T.O., and which will involve a considerable expenditure of man-hours for both removal, repair, and reinstallation of ailerons on aircraft.

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that Air Materiel Command initiate the necessary procurement for the replacement of all F-84B ailerons with the reinforced ailerons supposedly now being installed on the new production units at the Republic Aircraft Plant. It is thought that this newly designed aileron, rather than the presently repaired ailerons, will better meet the F-84 operational requirements when tip tanks and rocket installation are utilized.

(3) Landing Gear Retracting Cylinder Universals, P/N 0123-30038291-1 and 0123-30038298

(a) This item which upon failure results in failure of the landing gear of the F-84 aircraft, is still failing although the corrective action has been taken as recommended by Air Materiel Command in T.O. 01-65BJ-30, dated 26 November 1948, which replaced

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61-65BJ-30, dated 5 October 1948. Headquarters, Ninth Air Force TWX 564, dated 18 November 1948 to Air Materiel Command provided information as to the failure and requested information as to corrective action that would eliminate additional failures. To date, no reply has been received.

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that this item be redesigned to incorporate strength characteristics which will prevent failure or malfunction under normal operating conditions.

(4) Inaccessibility

(a) Design characteristics of the F-84 aircraft are such as to produce serious maintenance difficulties involving the excessive expenditure of man-hours due to the inaccessibility of components of the airframe and the engine, many of which require frequent examination, adjustment, and/or replacement. Some examples are as follows:

1. The removal and re-installation of the engine requires that the dive flaps be removed, followed by the inner and outer sections of the air ducts forward of the engine. At least forty (40) man-hours are required to complete the basic engine change, and this is normally increased to approximately seventy-two (72) hours, when required accessory adjustments and inspections are included.

2. Removal of the engine is required for any change of the generator differential relay.

3. Removal of the engine is required when the dive brake actuator motor is replaced. Frequent replacement is necessary as failures are numerous.

4. The accessory section is regarded to be greatly inaccessible, necessitating in many cases the removal of the engine when work is to be accomplished on the accessory section.

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f. The aft fuselage must be removed when work is required on the radio compass unit.

g. Removal of radio equipment is required to allow servicing of the aircraft battery.

b. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS: The usefulness of the F-84 aircraft in the Ninth Air Force is seriously limited because of T.O. limitations and other factors associated with the operation of this aircraft. The most significant of these limitations are listed below:

(1) Flight Restrictions - F-84 Aircraft

(a) T.O. 01-65AA-16, dated 22 November 1948, supplemented by TWX from TAC O-0363, dated 7 December 1949, limit the F-84 aircraft to an acceleration of not more than 6G's, indicated air speed not in excess of 500 MPH, at 5,000 ft. altitude, no use of trim tabs to lighten stick forces in maneuvers except in emergencies and restricts the aircraft from participating in air shows. The above restrictions are for aircraft without tip-tanks and with elevator bob-weights installed. Restrictions for aircraft equipped with tip tanks are even more severe.

(2) Bombing Restrictions

(a) T.O. 01-65AA-21, dated 19 May 1948. This T.O. restricts the F-84 aircraft to bombs weighing not in excess of 250 lbs each.

(3) Restrictions to VFR

(a) T.O. 01-1-318, dated 3 August 1948. This T.O. still restricts the F-84 aircraft to VFR, because of unsolved excessive turn errors in the type J-1 attitude gyros, and which difficulty was not corrected in the depot modification referred to in T.O. 01-1-318.

(4) Excessive Stick Forces Producing Pilot Fatigue

(a) T.O. 01-65AA-32, dated 22 December 1948, installation of bob weight in the elevator control system. Aircraft control prior to installation of bob weight was considered to be too sensitive.

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W/h fr Hq Ninth AF File: AAG.11 to CG, TAC
Subject: Operational and Maintenance Difficulties on F-84 Aircraft

However, rear compliance with T.O. 01-45B4-32 has resulted in excessive stick loads, which are extremely fatiguing to pilots during gunnery or maneuver operations.

(5) Excessive Take-Off and Landing Distances

(a) T.O. 01-45BB-1, dated 5 July 1948, operating instructions for F-84, aircraft restricts the use of F-84 aircraft to permanent type installations with long hard-surfaced runways.

(4) Refueling Time

(a) Because of what is regarded to be a poor position of the fuel filler neck, an excessive period of time is required for refueling operations due to the time required for safe displacement of air.

5. A factory modernization program which has been recommended by Air Material Command, would greatly lessen the present maintenance workload, as indicated by par 4.a. above. This Headquarters recommends the factory modernization be effected as soon as possible.

WILLIAM D. OLD
Major General, USAF
Commanding

5 Incls
1. Ltr fr TAC, dtd 16 June 48
2. Ltr fr Shaw AFB, dtd 6 Jan 49
w/1st Ind
3. Ltr fr Turner AFB, dtd 5 Jan 49
4. Ltr fr Shaw AFB, dtd 11 Jan 49
w/1st Ind
5. Ltr fr CAG, dtd 27 Dec 48
w/1st Ind

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Operational and Maintenance Difficulties on F-84 Aircraft
AF 452.11 (20 Jan 49) 1st Ind. FEB 1 RMC-284

HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND, Mitchel Air Force Base, N. Y.

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

This headquarters is cognizant of action presently being taken or contemplated to eliminate the difficulties on F-84 type aircraft outlined in basic communication and in all inclosures thereto. However, since most of these difficulties are attributable principally to the design of subject aircraft, and since these conditions and restrictions are seriously limiting the operational usefulness of this aircraft, the recommendation contained in paragraph 5, basic communication is concurred in.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

5 Incls -
n/c

/s/ R. TRAVIS
Col., USAF
Asst Adj Gen

OTHERS
WAC STAFF DIR.
TIAG
TSUSA
STAFF COMPT.
RECRUITING
C.M.
PUBLIC REL.
PERS MAN
PERS SERV
PERS APP
VRB
SAFE & MARKING
QA
FIN
ENGINEER
CHEM
CHAP
S & P
ANTI-AIRCRAFT
AIR INSP
ADJ GEN
AAF Tech Sch
AC/S-4-G
AC/S-3-A
AC/S-3-B
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EXEC OV C/S
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EXEC DEP COMDR
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B/Ltr fr Ninth AF, Greenville, SC to ConAC, Subj: Operational and Maintenance Difficulties on F-84 Aircraft

AFMMT 2d Ind

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Wash 25, D.C. 4 March 1949

TO: Commanding General, Continental Air Command, Mitchel Air Force Base, Hempstead, New York

This Headquarters is in the process of obtaining sufficient funds to establish a contractor modification program of approximately 382 F-84B and C aircraft. Approximately 120 items will be included in the modification program which will correct the major portion of the operational and maintenance deficiencies, including a reinforced wing structure.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

5 Incls
n/c

C. S. RAYMOND, Col. USAF
For WALTER W. WISE, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Maintenance Division, D/MSS
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel

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HEADQUARTERS 20TH FIGHTER WING
Shaw Air Force Base
South Carolina

CO 29 July 1949

SUBJECT: Malfunction of J35-13A Jet Engine in F-84D Type Aircraft

THRU: Commanding General
Fourteenth Air Force
OAFB, Orlando, Fla

TO: Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel AFB, New York

1. This station has flown a total of 3974 hours in the F-84D type aircraft since their assignemnt to Shaw Air Force Base. Out of this number of hours flown, there have been 52 instances of engine malfunction necessitating engine changes. Of the total number of manlfunctions, 37 were removed due to bearing failure and 15 due to cracked nozzle diaphrams. The engines are failing at an average rate of 76.4 flying hours, however, during the last three weeks, the average rate has been one per 38.2 flying hours.

2. Although a flow of replacement engines is now being received, it is not felt that it has allevisted the problem since the high rate of replacement has created a tremendous workload on the maintenance personnel, thereby creating a backlog of engine changes.

3. A conference was held at this station on 25, 26, and 27 July, by members of AMC Headquarters, Allison Division of General Motors Corporation, and Republic Aviation Corporation to inspect and disassemble all the engines on hand that had been removed due to bearing failures. Upon disassembly, it was found that the conditions indicated that bearings were failing due to improper lubrication and poorly engineered bearing. It was recommended that a new type lubricating system be installed and that all present engine bearings be replaced by a new type silver bearing. To accomplish this, a team from Oklahoma City AMA will arrive here on 31 July to make a complete replacement of all bearings. We feel that this will improved the situation but will not solve the problem of improper lubrication.

4. The problem of "hot engines" at altitudes was also discussed and no immediate fix is anticipated, since all representatives agree

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Subject: Malfunction of J35-13A Jet Engine in F-84D Type Aircraft

that the engines run hot due to a design error and no changes could be made on this present engine. To prevent excessive exhaust gas temperatures, a restriction of 35,000 feet has been placed on the F84D aircraft, since this is the critical altitude.

5. It is felt that the high engine failure rate at this station can be contributed to poorly designed bearings and improper lubrication, and also to the type operations which we are conducting at the present time. (Dive bombing, rocket firing, aerial gunnery, and formation flying.) We are requiring the aircraft to perform our assigned mission, and feel that it cannot withstand this type operation without excessive engine failures and we would not be able to conduct large scale sustained operations with this present J35-13A engine.

6. We feel that the new type silver bearing will alleviate our situation somewhat, but will not constitute a complete fix on this type engine, since we are experiencing a large number of Jet nozzle diaphram failures and bearing failures due to improper lubrication, and no satisfactory remedial action has been suggested to date.

1 Incl
Minutes of Conference

F.K. MORRILL, JR
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE
ORLANDO, FLORIDA

2 August 1949

Major General C. T. Myers
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Dear Charlie:

As you have no doubt heard, we are having a great deal of trouble with the J35-A-13A Engine installed in the F84D aircraft at Shaw Air Force Base. Failure of main bearings #2, 3, and 4 is occurring at a rate which is far too high in my opinion. As a result, the operational training of the group at Shaw Air Force Base has been seriously affected. This matter has been covered in detail in a communication which has been forwarded your headquarters under date of 1 August 1949. This report is considered complete, and I would suggest that you read it carefully when received at your headquarters.

The frequency of these engine failures has steadily increased. The present rate averages one (1) failure for every forty-two (42) flying hours. These failures, which have been occurring, give very little warning, and the imminence of these failures can only be detected by pilots who have had better than average experience with this type aircraft. As a result, it has been necessary to restrict flying to the local area as well as eliminating, to a large degree, night flying, navigational training flights, and transition training in the F84D aircraft.

As a result of a conference held at Shaw Air Force Base between representatives of AMC, the Allison Division of GMC, and the Republic Aircraft Corporation, steps have been taken to procure and install a new type silver bearing at the points mentioned above. A supply of bearings has been shipped to Shaw Air Force Base and at least one (1), and possibly two (2) installation teams, with equipment, will arrive at Shaw from the Oklahoma City Depot. It appears to be the consensus that this may not be the answer to this bearing trouble. Personnel attending the above referred to conference were of the opinion that the oiling system of these bearings should be revamped and the Air Materiel Command, together with the Allison and Republic people are looking into this phase now.

If the installation of the new bearings in engines on all grounded aircraft goes forward at the predicted rate, it is hoped that

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B/L to Major General C. T. Myers, ConAC, Mitchel AFB, NY, fr Brigadier General R. F. Stearley, 14AF, dtd 2 Aug 49

the 20th Fighter Group can resume unrestricted training on a limited scale by 3 August. The in commission status, however, at Shaw may remain low for a period of two (2) weeks due to the backlog of engine changes resulting from these failures. It is hoped that by the end of this period we will be able to resume full scale training.

Another item which we feel will affect the combat efficiency of personnel is the high rate of failure of cabin cooling turbines. The failure of this turbine results in excessive temperatures in the cockpits during low altitude operations. In view that the primary mission of this group is fighter-bomber, the training schedule calls for a great deal of work at low altitude. Various instances have occurred with pilots who have returned from missions with rather a marked state of exhaustion due to high temperatures, and it is believed that this condition may have been a contributory factor in some of the jet accidents which have occurred.

Unsatisfactory Reports have been submitted by Shaw on these cabin coolers and, in addition, this matter will be submitted in a detailed report now being prepared by Shaw Air Force Base.

I know that General Whitehead is on a trip to the West. I know that both of you are especially interested in all things that affect the operational efficiency of my wings.

Sincerely,

/t/ RALPH F. STEARLEY
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
84th Fighter Squadron Jet
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

24 October 49
Secret
by auth of CG 4AF
NOV 10 1949

FF

SUBJECT: Results of Gunnery Experiments with the F-84D

TO : Commanding Officer
70th Fighter Group
Hamilton Air Force Base
Hamilton, California

1. During the period 30 Sep 1949 to 14 Oct 1949, this Squadron, with 18 pilots and 10 F-84D's, fired aerial gunnery at March Air Force Base. Gunnery scores were unsatisfactory with no improvements during the entire period. At first the lack of hits was attributed to pilot technique since most of the pilots had never fired aerial gunnery and the experienced pilots had fired little or no gunnery in Jet type aircraft. When, after a reasonable length of time and practice, even the experienced pilots, all graduated from accredited gunnery schools, had failed to improve their scores, attention was turned to the equipment. Boresighting procedures were checked and found to be according to T.O., and guns fired in and found to be hitting within the prescribed patterns. However, after much experimenting the following facts were noted.

a. The angle of attack for the various airspeeds as given by T.O. set up for boresighting the F-84D was incorrect. The error was as high as 35 mils which could cause as much as an 8 foot error in the planned destination of a .50 calibre bullet at 1000 feet. With a margin of only three feet for line error when firing at a 6(feet) x 30(feet) target, this error is excessive.

b. The A1B Computing gunsight does not compute sufficient lead for the prescribed angles off and ranges.

A discussion of the method used to arrive at the above conclusions is outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. Angle of Attack.

a. Interpolating from the information given in TO 01-65 BJB-2 the angle of attack for 355 mph indicated is 10 mils nose high. An aircraft was boresighted under this condition. If the angle of attack were correct, it can now be assumed that the sight, levelled along the expected line of flight would be pointed to the horizon at an indicated airspeed of 355 mph in straight and level flight. This, however, was not the case. At 355 mph indicated the gunsight pipper was from 35 to 40 mils above the horizon, indicating that that angle of attack at the airspeed was in the vicinity of 40 mils instead of ten mils. This same experiment was conducted in several aircraft with the same results.

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H-104 (4-A)

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Subject: Gunnery Experiments, Continued

2. Angle of Attack

b. To further check this theory an aircraft was levelled at 0 mils nose high and an inclinometer placed on the floor of the cockpit. The inclinometer indicated 1 mil nose high, which reading could be subtracted from the readings to be taken in the air. The aircraft was then flown and the altitude checked against the inclinometer at the various stages for straight and level flight. The reading at 18,000 feet for 325 mph was 39.6 mils, but 350 mph was 36 mils and 375 mph was 31 mils. Although it is realized that these tests could not be exact, the results bore out those obtained by experimenting with the gunsight.

c. Now that the angle of attack problem was solved, it was discovered that the nose guns could not be brought on the line of flight with the aircraft at a nose high altitude of greater than 26 mils. If the aircraft was boresighted in a condition of greater than 26 mils nose high, it would be impossible to close the gun deck because of the changed position of the ammunition cam feed chutes. However, it was conceded that with the aircraft boresighted at 25 mils nose high, the original line of error of around 8 feet would be reduced to less than 3 feet. Four aircraft were boresighted at 25 mils nose high and taken up on actual firing tests using the fixed sights. The results were highly satisfactory. All four pilots came back with scores of from 20 to 40 percent. Heretofore, they had been hitting less than 5 percent. Successive tests proved that the boresighting at 25 mils was a sound theory so all ten aircraft were boresighted at 25 mils nose high with the planned firing speed to be 376 mph. The immediate results for inexperienced pilots were gratifying.

d. It is important to note that, if the present 25 mils nose high is the correct boresighting angle for 425 mph indicated, a great error will be induced while firing at extreme altitudes at which this aircraft is intended to operate. With the present nose gun installation it is impossible to boresight the aircraft for the lower airspeeds at which the aircraft will be forced to fly at 30,000 feet and above.

3. The A1B computing Gun Sight.

a. During this entire period no hits were obtained by using the computing sight correctly as a computing sight. Thirty-six hits out of 200 rounds were obtained by a pilot using the computing sight in the detent position as a fixed sight. In this position the sight was theoretically computing for 700 feet and the pilot was firing at 700 feet as he was borne out by his film. Thus if the gunsight had been computing correctly he should have missed the target completely.

b. It was decided to set the computing range for the sight at 1600 feet and to fire at less than a thousand feet to further rest the theory that the sight was underleading. This was done and some hits were scored in the aft section of the target. Theoretically the bullets should have passed well in front of the target.

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Subj: Gunnery Experiments, Cont'd

c. Having tentatively established the fact that the sight was under leading, an attempt was made to discover why. It is significant to note that decidedly fewer "G" forces are pulled in flying a correct curve of pursuit in a Jet as compared to the old conventional fighter. Thus a possible reason could be that the sight is not set to compute under the relatively few "G" forces imposed upon it by the F-84 in a normal gunnery pass.

d. In view of the fact that the sight does not operate satisfactorily, the Squadron returned to the fixed sight (Manual cage position) and obtained satisfactory results.

4. Recommendations.

a. That a complete and accurate table be furnished as to the correct angle of attack for any given airspeed.

b. That the nose gun installation be re-designated to permit boresighting at higher angles of attacks than 25 mils or that a new system be devised which will compensate for the bullet deflection caused by the force of the flight of the aircraft acting against line of flight of the projectile.

c. That the A-1B gunsight be so calibrated as to compute the correct lead in the F-84D.

s/ PHILIP E. JOYAL
Major, USAF
Commanding

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H-184(4-C)

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PF
Subj: Results of Gunnery Experiments with the F-84D (24 Oct 49)

GF

HEADQUARTERS, 78th Fighter Group, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton California
26 Oct 1949

TO: Commanding Officer, 78th Fighter Wing, Hamilton Air Force Base, Hamilton, California.

1. Results of the gunnery experiments conducted by this Group at March Air Force Base prove that with the sight in a fixed position this Group will qualify almost every fighter pilot within the Group by the end of January 1950.

2. As can be seen from the above correspondence, this will be at altitudes up to 20,000 feet. Firing above this altitude, which an interceptor group must, cannot be accomplished unless the recommendations above are carried out.

3. The A1B sight does not meet the requirements for the Fighter Group. By firing in a fixed position we are going backwards instead of forward in gunnery. Unless this is alleviated immediately, we are defeating our purpose.

4. UR's are inclosed with these recommendations and if carried out should at least make the airplane combat ready at all altitudes even with the A1B sight.

3 Incls:
1 - UR 49-375
2 - UR 49-376
3 - UR 49-378

BRIAN O'NEILL
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

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H-104(4-D)

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C O P Y
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HQ CONTINENTAL AIR COMD MITCHEL AFB N Y N/C

CG FIRST AF FT SLOCUM NY
CG FOURTH AF HAMILTON AFB HAMILTON CALIF ROUTINE KRL/127
CG FOURTEENTH AF ORLANDO AFB ORLANDO FLA
x

AFConAC M&S 14910 . Several accidents involving F-84 type acft have been attributed to brake failure resulting fr brake lining assys (Pucks) not being properly installed or worn excessively thin, allowing the puck to become dislodged fr the brake assy causing susequent brake failure. It is directed that inspection of brake lining assys be accomplished daily on all F-84 type acft to prevent future brake failure. Daily inspection will be accomplished as follows: remove six screws and inspection plate from outboard side of the landing gear fairing. Apply brake , visually check the piston pins protruding from each piston assembly in the brake cylinder housing. Excessive variance between the protruding pins or indication of excessive inboard travel of any or all piston pins will be investigated immediately to determine if an unsatisfactory brake condition exists. END

CG ConAC

OFFICIAL BUSINESS:

N/C

s/t/ L. J. WINDSOR
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

M&S Maj K.E.Lewis, Ext 1124

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C O P Y
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HQ CONTINENTAL AIR CMD MITCHEL AFB NY

N/C

CG AIR MATERIEL CMD
Wirght-Patterson AFB Dayton O ROUTINE KRL ROUTINE KRL
X

Lt Col F G Jones
Liaison Offr, AMC

AFConAC M&S 13373 . Par 1 of ltr received from 20th Ftr Wg, Shaw AFB SC, is quoted for action deemed nec. "It was discovered that on F-84B and F-84C type acft with fully serviced tip tanks installed, a slight wrinkle was noticeable in the leading edge of either wing approx four feet inboard from wing tips. It is not known if this condition would cause any damage to the wing structure providing the acft remained static overa period of hours or days. As a safety measure, the policy in this orgn is that no acft will stand over night with more than thirty gallons of fuel in each tank, except in case of an emergency or early morning take-off." Complete correspondence being forwarded your hq this date. END

CG ConAC

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

N/C

st/ L. J. WINDSOR
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

M&S 452.1 121
Major K R Lewis/1124

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

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

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

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Copy Furnished
to Chief
AC, AAF

F. O. CARROLL
Major General, USAF
Director, Research and Development

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C O P Y
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HEADQUARTERS
AIR MATERIEL COMMAND
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

MCMMXT/ARV/elw

16 June 1949

SUBJECT: Gun Blast Tube Plugs on F-84 Aircraft

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base
New York

1. It is requested that your command conduct an inspection of F-84 series aircraft to determine the fit of the gun blast tube plugs. Several unsatisfactory reports have been received on the plugs breaking in flight and being lodged against the air inlet screen of the engine. These plugs ordinarily do not cause any trouble when broken in small places by gun blast.

2. Upon completion of the inspection, it is requested that the following information be compiled:

a. Aircraft model and serial number

b. Location of the malfitting blast tube plugs.

c. Extent and nature of malfitting blast tube plugs

3. It is desired that the above information be forwarded this command, attention: MCMMXT64, not later than 18 July 1949.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/ Robert V. Ball,
Major, USAF
for EDWARD G. KIEHLE
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Maintenance Technical Section
Maintenance Division

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MCMSXB31/LEP/dmm

HEADQUARTERS
AIR MATERIEL COMMAND
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

MCMSXB

10 August 1949

SUBJECT: AOCP Items, F-84 Aircraft

TO : Commanding General
Continental Air Command
Mitchel AF Base
New York

1. A review of AMC-SC-A51E reports submitted by the activities operating F-84 Aircraft has been made for the week ending 7 August 1949. This study indicates that only eight (8) items are of a re-occurring nature. A brief resume of the current supply position of these items and the action taken to alleviate unsatisfactory conditions follows:

a. Part Number 3900-208500 Casing Nose Wheel. There is no record of an AOCP extraction to this Headquarters for the above item. Latest stock balance information indicates that approximately 500 each this item is available in stock at Mobile and San Bernardino.

b. Past Number 4827-A5075 Fuel Pmp. This pump, currently installed on the "B" and "C" series of F-84 Aircraft, is failing at a high rate primarily due to the fact that it is of a dual configuration, serving both as a booster and emergency pump. The high pressure or emergency portion of the assembly is the part that is failing. This condition will be eliminated as the aircraft are processed through the modification line being established at Republic Aviation Corporation. Upon modification of the aircraft this pump is being changed to a single duty unit, the emergency portion being blocked off. As an interim measure arrangements have been made to satisfy immediate requirements through cannibalization of the aircraft that have been delivered to Republic for modification. In connection with the above, action has been taken to ship 20 each of these pumps direct to Turner AF Base in an effort to relieve the extremely critical condition reported by that base. Quantities have also been shipped direct to Dow and Otis AF Bases.

c. Part Number 0123-30F87208-1 Shroud. Numerous reports have been received by Maintenance Division this Headquarters indicating this part is being chafed by the tail pipe. Replacement in

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such instances has completely depleted the stock of serviceable assemblies. In order that this condition will be alleviated, the Maintenance Division this Headquarters has initiated Messageform MCMSXT12-8-6 dated 5 August 1949 outlining procedures to be followed in the repair of this assembly at base level. The above Messageform was sent to all bases operating F-84 Aircraft for action.

d. Part Number 4504-52021-60 Turbine. Adequate quantities of this item were initially provisioned in support of F-84 Aircraft; however, due to the fact that overhaul facilities necessary to repair this item have as yet not been established the stocks of serviceable items are rapidly being depleted. As an interim measure until such time as maintenance facilities can be established, an attempt is being made to establish a service contract with Air Research to have all reparable units put in a serviceable condition.

e. Part Number 0123-30D25103-3 Cable. This item is coded depot manufacture and is not procured.

f. Part Number 6126-17825 Indicator. This item has been replaced by 6145-128850 Indicator Type K-7. Limited quantities of the new Indicator are now being received from contractor and are available at SAAMA and Middletown under the first three supply priorities. Inasmuch as the contractor is now making deliveries this item should be available in adequate quantities within the next 60 days.

g. Part Number 4109-9510959 Lining. Goodyear advises that 1000 each this item will be available by 22 August 1949. In view of the critical shortage of this item at Shaw AF Base, that activity was requested per our MCMSXB25-B-8-55 dated 3 August to arrange pilot pick up from the contractor's plant. Shaw has not advised of their intentions to date.

h. Part Number 7500-516800 Hydraulic Fluid. Records indicate adequate quantities of this item are available both in stock and from procurement.

2. The items on the attached list were reported as having grounded F-84 Aircraft during the same period, 1 thru 7 August 1949. These items were of a non-re-occurring nature, the majority having appeared once during the period and reported by only one operating activity. A summary of the supply position follows:

a. Latest stock balance information indicates items 1, 3, 5, 11 thru 14, 16 thru 19, 21, 25 29 thru 31, 33 thru 38, 40 thru 44,

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46 thru 48, 52,55 and 56 are available in stock and from procurement in adequate quantities to prevent AOCP's.

b. Items 23, 50, 51 and 53 are on contract and can be expedited upon receipt of request at this Headquarters.

c. Items 57 and 58 are on procurement. As a matter of information items 57 has been superseded by item 58. These items will not be available in sufficient quantities to maintain a stock level for approximately six (6) months.

d. Part Numbers appearing on attached list as items 2, 6 thru 10, 24 and 26 thru 28 are not stock listed and are not procured. Request a re-check of your requirement for the above items be made and this Headquarters advised of any particular difficulties being encountered.

e. Item 4 has been transferred to Clas 03-L and should be requisitioned under Part Number 5600-650000 Tank.

f. Item 15 is a local manufacture item.

g. Item 20 is applicable to the "E" series of F-84 aircraft only.

h. Item 22 has been superseded by Part Number 0123-300 65372-21. Both part numbers are available in stock.

i. Item 32 is not available as a complete assembly; however, component parts are available in stock and from procurement for repair of this assembly.

j. Item 39 can be substituted with Part Numbers 4832-1P739CA1, 4832-1P739CA and 4832-1P739CAD. All substitutes are available in stock.

k. Item 45 is not currently available in stock. This pump, type B-19, is being removed from F-80 Aircraft in modification, each modification generating two (2) pumps. It is expected that an adequate quantity will be available within 30 days.

l. Item 49 is superseded by 6125-1159U8-03 Indicator. See sub-paragraph "b" above and item 53 on attached list.

m. Item 54 is superseded by 1600-34734000 Inverter which is available in stock.

3. A project has been initiated at this Headquarters to research all items grounding F-84 Aircraft as reported by the operating activities

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on thiir AMC-SD-A51E reports. Every effort will be made to correct unsatisfactory supply conditions as revealed by this study.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/t/ R. W. FINN
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Aircraft Section
Supply Division

1 Incl
List of AOCP Items

cc:
WRAMA
MOAMA
14th AF Attn: (A-4) Colonel Johnson
OCAMA
SMAMA
MAAMA

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Office of the Commanding General
HEADQUARTERS, FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE
Robins Air Force Base
Georgia

23 November 1949

Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead
Headquarters, Continental Air Command
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

Dear General Whitehead:

Inclosed is a copy of a letter that I sent to your headquarters concerning the F-84's. The picture isn't good. The one thing that hurt me most was that one of our F-84E's at Turner developed a crack. I had hoped that the E's, with the new wing, would be alright. I remember in our telephone conversation that you predicted that would have the same trouble, however I still held out and hoped against hope that the cracks wouldn't develop. There is only one thing for us to do and that is for us to go ahead with the preventative fix on the E's as well as the D's.

We are doing everything we can to get these craft operational and I believe we will make it. Exercise "Portrex" is upermost in my mind. We are scheduled to have the two fighter groups in that exercise with 50 craft each. We will make it.

Yesterday I was at Benning on a "Portrex" meeting with Admiral Wright and General Clarkson. We must get the preliminary plans in for all Forces by December 15. I have sent to your headquarters, working with General Lee and General Wolfenbarger, several messages regarding personnel that we need for that exercise. The Army and the Navy are not pushed as hard as we are for personnel. The Army has the Fifth Corps to call on, which is more or less idle except when engaged in maneuvers, and the Navy has the whole Atlantic Fleet. However, we are going to make it.

I am sending you this copy direct - I thought your staff might work on it some before it came to your attention and I know of your intense interest in the matter.

Sincerely,

RALPH F. STEARLEY
Major General, USAF
Commanding

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b. Take-off performance of the air [illegible] the interceptor-fighter configuration (full internal fuel and ammunition, no external load) indicates that a group of F-64 aircraft can be launched [illegible] from 5,000 foot runways, and 7,000 foot runways with external [illegible] 230 Allison MW-1 tip tanks.

c. Assuming that interceptor-fighters in an air defense system will not be operated at bases [illegible] suitable landing field, the F-64 has sufficient endurance to cope with the worst condition that could be experienced [illegible] that is, at least 40 minutes at 100 percent power after arrival at 40,000 feet and 30 minutes cruise at 40,000 feet, in addition to climb and a 20 percent power after let-down over base.

d. The F-64 is superior to the F-84 in climb, maximum speed, and acceleration. A mach number of .82 can be approached in level flight at all altitudes as compared with .76 for the F-84. The time to climb to 40,000 feet from a complete position of [illegible] interception missions was approximately 12 minutes or [illegible] less for the F-64 than for the F-84. Take-off [illegible] was made without [illegible] or water injection.

e. Frosting of the rear side [illegible] encountered at altitudes above 20,000 feet. The canopy defrosting [illegible] preventing or removing this frost. Pilots reported that adequate [illegible] visibility was maintained for the entire interception, and particularly for an attack after interception was [illegible].

f. Climb and endurance data for [illegible] or escort-fighter have produced the following [illegible]:

g. Rate of Climb. [illegible] the basing radius of [illegible] the aircraft can be expected to [illegible] utilizing [illegible] external [illegible] the center of gravity [illegible] carried in the [illegible] external tanks [illegible] were released at [illegible] percent [illegible] 40,000 [illegible] 40,000 [illegible] serve [illegible] (approximately [illegible] phase [illegible] duced to compensate [illegible] ...stute [illegible].

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

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

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installation not be flown at speeds in excess of [illegible] mph. This
condition is being investigated further.

[illegible] automatic ranging [illegible]

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

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7. The following maintenance items were noted:

a. Starter-Cooler Unit:

(1) Starter-Cooler ... located ... It is necessary to remove ... connect and ... exit valve to eliminate removal of ... entire console, cost and ... for access purposes.

(2) Garrett-Cleveland temperature control ... Sold-1: This unit is located ... able and to gain access it is necessary to remove the canopy, pilots seat and blue access plate to ... wiring, tension plugs, etc. The automatic temperature control is unreliable. It is recommended ... be done to increase the reliability of the automatic control.

(3) Garrett-Cleveland ... 157-1-2: It is necessary to remove the aft ... fuselage section, engine, all air ducts, and drain ... main frame in order that fuel lines be ... to gain access to the element. It is recommended that a study be made ... adjacent to the refrigeration turbine outlet ... the starter ... access plate.

b. Engine Adapter Mounting ... Access to the top inboard mounting ... difficult. It is recommended that the mounting bolts be aligned vertically ... vertically inboard. ... one hour and thirty minutes. If this ... of a rocket wrench with proper ... should not exceed 15 minutes ...

c. Air Pressure ... has been broken several times ... canopy removal. It is recommended ... the [illegible].

d. Tip Tank ... Corporation: The plunger ... the actuating ... to [illegible]. ... the plunger eye bolt ... eliminated the possibility of the plunger turning within the solenoid.

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e. [illegible] Tank Wiring: [illegible] necessary to lift the tank to a point sufficiently far inside the wing tip. [illegible] side rail so that wiring [illegible] is recommended that a single [illegible] connection.

f. Fuel Tank Filler Neck: There is a requirement for a "scupper" drain to allow drainage of condensation, rainfall and overflow fuel that collects in the recessed filler neck.

g. Fuel Tanks: Fuel strainers must have been severely damaged by [illegible] from the wing tank. This item is difficult to replace because the entire aft [illegible] must be removed. A temporary fix has been accomplished by using a stainless steel [illegible].

h. Voltage Regulator: A power [illegible] for the volts regulator but foreign [illegible] can easily collect on the unit. This would result in a short circuit.

i. External Power Receptacle: The receptacle is located in the fuselage [illegible] to the pylon. Although negative, possible [illegible] external fuel tanks is practical, it is difficult and dangerous to connect or disconnect the outside power source. It is recommended that the receptacle be repositioned.

j. Canopy: The handle for external opening of the canopy is difficult to reach. It is necessary to stand well forward on the leading edge of the wing to effect the [illegible]. This action positive mechanic or pilot can easily tell. It is recommended that an alternate external opening and [illegible] switch similar to that of the [illegible] be located on the fuselage.

k. Liquidometer Float: [illegible] the float in the aircraft fuel cell has been experienced, [illegible] the pilot an erroneous indication. It is recommended that float design be changed.

l. Thermocouple Wiring: The thermocouple leads wiring, beginning at the terminal block and terminating at the engine fire seal, has been damaged during aft section removal and installation due to limited clearance between engine and fire seal rings. It is recommended that the portion of wiring that passes over the turbine [illegible] be engaged in stainless steel tubing.

m. Thermocouple Probes: Failure of thermocouple and thermocouple harness wiring has been experienced. It is recommended that a more dependable harness be developed.

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

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FROM: (Originator)

HQ CONAC, MITCHEL AFB, NEW YORK

TO:

CG, FOURTEENTH AF, ROBINS AFB, GA

INFO: CG, AIR MATERIEL COMMAND, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB, DAYTON, OHIO
CG, 20TH FTR WING, SHAW AFB, SUMTER, S.C.
CG, 33D FTR WING, OTIS AFB, MASS

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RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
Earl E. Fraikley

OFFICIAL TITLE
Duty Officer

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TO: CG CONAC MITCHLE AFB NY REF. # 4 AFC 1514

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AG Files
dated 31 July 1958
by Jonathan Wainwright

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CONAC Form 444 A
Revised 20 November 1948

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 December 1949

SUBJECT: Report of Special Investigation of F-84D Aircraft Accidents - Fourth Air Force

TO : The Inspector General, USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

I. AUTHORITY

1. Letter, Hqs. USAF, Office of the Inspector General, Subject: (Restricted) Special Investigation of F-84D Aircraft Accidents - Fourth Air Force, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1949 to Brigadier General Hugo P. Rush (Tab A.)

II. SCOPE

1. To determine the cause of an accident involving F-84D No. 48-689, 94th Fighter Squadron, 78th Fighter Group, at Hamilton Air Force Base, 12 December 1949, and to inquire into the operational difficulties being experienced by units equipped with F-84D type aircraft. Inquiry was made into all factors considered relevant to the accident and to operational problems peculiar to units equipped with F-84D type aircraft.

2. The Board, consisting of the officers designated in authorizing letter (Tab A.) met at Hamilton Air Force Base 12 December 1949. The Board examined the wreckage of aircraft No. 48-689, which was arranged in its original configuration as far as possible. Civilian engineers from Air Material Command, Republic Aviation Corporation, and Allison Division, General Motors Corporation also examined the wreckage to determine the manner and sequence in which the structure had failed.

3. Testimony was taken from all of the civilian experts, together with that of the president of the local accident investigation board to obtain their expert opinions as to the cause of the accident.

4. The commander and staff of the 78th Fighter Group, the flight commander, and the two surviving members of the flight were interviewed to determine the events leading up to the accident, and the manner in which the aircraft was being flown at the time. Inquiry was made into the psychological make-up of the deceased pilot and his flying habits, particularly with regard to his use of trim tab in maneuvers, and his determination to stay in formation at all times.

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Ltr, Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Wn D.C., Subj: Report of Special Investigation of F-84D Aircraft accidents - Fourth Air Force. 18 Dec. 49

5. An unsigned questionnaire was accomplished by 57 pilots of the 78th Fighter Group to determine the manner in which they are accustomed to using trim tabs and the amount of G forces which are being imposed on the aircraft during normal training.

6. The commanding officer and staff of the 78th Fighter Group were interviewed to inquire into the following matters:

a. Operational problems of the F-84D
b. Personnel problems
c. Allotment of flying time for training
d. Engineering, maintenance, and supply problems

7. The Board did not feel it was necessary to visit other groups equipped with F-84D aircraft because information received from representatives from AMC and Republic Aviation Corporation indicated that the wing areas in these groups were similar to those in this group. However, information regarding operational difficulties was solicited from the 20th and 53rd Fighter Groups.

III. DISCUSSION

Crash of F-84D 48-689.

1. Investigation discloses that this airplane crashed as a result of a broken left wing. The airplane was being flown in the No. 3 position in a "string" formation.

a. While descending from altitude, the formation performed a series of loops and rolls in rapid succession with no opportunity for wing men to regain normal spacing except by cutting corners. At about 7000 ft. while recovering from a 45° loop followed by a roll, the Number 4 man in the formation saw No. 689 begin to break up ahead of and below him. The leader reports that he recovered at about 7000 feet and never went over 4.5G and 475 m.p.h. The Number 2 man states that he "greyed out" several times during the execution of the loops and thought he went to 5.5 or 6G. Number 4 was apparently not following through in detail with the other three aircraft due to the pace being set.

b. Examination of the wreckage establishes that the left wing broke first so far as can be determined, and certainly before the tail, rear fuselage, or engine. (See Mr. Bowman's statement (Tab.J) and photographs.)

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c. The failure of the left wing appears to have been caused by the application of pull out loads in excess of the permissible limits for the airplane. Exactly what caused the pilot to put excessive "g" on the aircraft cannot be determined, however, the cracked and buckled condition of the Number 2 airplane indicates that if No. 3 was a determined pilot bent on keeping his position regardless of maneuvers, he may very well have pulled sufficient G to break the wing (Pull required at estimated speed, altitude and loading - not over 100 pounds) (See Tab J).

d. While the right wing was badly crushed on impact, it remained with the front part of the aircraft. It showed the same type of crack in the camera opening area as has been epidemic with the F-84D airplane. Since the left wing broke rather than the cracked right wing, it is not considered that the wing skin cracking was responsible for the accident. The right wing of No. 2 airplane was also badly cracked, but did not fail.

e. Evidence indicates that the speed of the aircraft at the time of the accident was not in excess of the allowable. The tip tanks do not appear to have been the primary cause of the accident, since neither had collapsed due to unbalanced pressure, and the manner of their departure from the wing indicates that the yaw involved could only result from a wing or tail failure.

f. Careful examination of the engine indicates that the engine did fail prior to impact with the ground, but that such failure was the result of the wing failure and resulting fuselage disintegration rather than the cause of same. (See Bowman, Allen, and Menard testimony (Tabs. J, K and M.)

G. Careful examination of the wreckage indicates excellent workmanship in the construction of the airplane. Samples of the spars, skin, and rivets are being forwarded for testing to check tensile strength and physical properties. A thorough check was made of the maintenance history of airplane 48-689 and of other aircraft in the group. Technical order compliance was found to be current, and maintenance above average. Examination of the history of 48-689 indicated no previous accident or occurrence which is considered pertinent to the accident.

h. The Board could not determine whether the use of a "G" suit would have prevented the accident, but concludes that should "G" suits be prescribed a comprehensive indoctrination program would have to be accomplished

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to prevent inadvertent over stressing of the aircraft.

2. Wing cracking at camera gun opening:

a. Evidence indicates that the cracking of the right wing is caused by a concentration of load in the area due to poor design. The rivet spacing is too close and the amount of skin left to carry a heavy load around the camera cutout is inadequate. Questioning of all available pilots as to highest G's they have placed on the aircraft indicates that during pull outs from dive bombing, ground and aerial gunnery, as well as on routine flights 7 - 8 Gs have been pulled many times. In a specific instance a pilot pulled 8 G after a gunnery pass, and upon landing, verified his suspicion that he had cracked his right wing. It, therefore, appears that the epidemic of cracking is being caused by the application of loads between 5.5 and 8 G. It appears that the contemplated fix for this stress concentration has a good chance of doing the job, however, it is believed desirable to prove its adequacy by static test.

3. Use of elevator trim tab:

a. While Technical Orders specifically prohibit the use of the elevator tab as an aid in maneuvering, it appears that many pilots of this group have been accustomed to use it in that manner. It has now been carefully explained to this group that the tab should never be used to change attitude, ie, pull out of a dive or pull into a turn, but that the purpose of the tab is to trim the aircraft after the new attitude has been reached, ie, after completion of pull out or establishment of desired degree of turn.

b. All pilots operating F-84 aircraft should be instructed that the only positive indication of the load being placed on the aircraft other than black out or visual check of the accelerometer is the pull required by the pilot. Use of the tab can reduce the pilot's required pull to zero. It should be pointed out, however, that while Lieutenant Sharpe was known by his fellow officers to have been in the habit of using the tab incorrectly, the check of the tab mechanism in his aircraft indicates that the tab setting was practically zero, hence it is not believed that this particular failure can be attributed to the use of the tab.

c. Testimony and discussions with pilots indicates a general misunderstanding of such things as design maneuver load factor when compared with ultimate strength, the proper use of trim tabs in maneuvering flight, critical mach, high speed stalls, stick forces per G, and the effect of altitude on stick forces and possible acceleration. Practically all pilots assigned to the 78th Fighter Group have had previous experience with

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F-80 aircraft, and there is a general tendency to believe that the F-84 aircraft will withstand the same loads and manouvers which the F-80 will stand. Some of the most experienced pilots in the 78th Fighter Group expressed a belief that the wings on a fighter could not be broken solely by control forces applied by the pilot.

4. General operational and technical problems of the local Fighter Group.

a. Interviews with supervisory personnel and pilots assigned to the 78th Fighter Group indicate that ground gunnery has been accomplished with a 600 foot foul line, resulting in excessive acceleration forces on the pull-out due to the high rate of closure and dive angle. A large number of pilots report greying out and accelerations up to 8G on pull-out on these missions. The foul line has recently been increased to 800 feet, but this is still considered to be too close to prevent excessive accelerations during pull-out. Air-to-air gunnery is being accomplished at 12,000 feet with a target speed of 150 MPH IAS because the A-6 type flag target becomes too brittle at low temperatures and tears at higher speeds. Firing at such target speeds is completely unrealistic when the speeds of present fighter aircraft and probable actual target speeds are considered.

b. Al-B sight: Discussion with the Fighter Group Commander and his staff indicates that the Al-B Sight is unsatisfactory for tactical use under present conditions. Some use of the sight has been made for dive and glide bombing, but gunnery is conducted with the sight in the fixed position. It was stated that although two men were sent to the Sperry School for the sight, no T/O and E authorization exists for gun sight mechanics. It was also stated that maintenance of the sight could not be accomplished even with the two Sperry-trained mechanics.

c. Alignment of the Wing guns: It was stated that the two wing guns cannot be harmonized to converge at ranges closer than 2000 feet without the necessity for reboresighting the guns each time they are removed for cleaning.

d. A-6 Targets: The supply of A-6 type flag targets is critically short.

e. Oxygen masks: Although 190 pilots are assigned or attached to the group for flying, only 81 A13-A oxygen masks are authorized and available.

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f. Instruments in Link Trainers: The link trainers available to this fighter group do not contain identical types of instruments to those installed in the F-84D. This condition renders the training obtained from these trainers much less valuable than it would be with the same type instruments. The above applies particularly to the J-3 Gyro-horizon.

g. Personnel: The lack of personnel stability, an excessive number of pilots and the uncoordinated flow of inexperienced pilots into the group are definite factors in reducing combat effectiveness.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. Assuming that materiel tests now in progress do not indicate sub-standard materiel, it is concluded that the failure of the left wing of airplane No. 48-689 (No. 3 in this flight) resulted from load factors in excess of the design maneuver load factor of 7.33, and is believed to have been in the order of 11 or more Gs.

2. The power plant, trim tabs, tip tanks, maintenance, and workmanship are not believed to have been contributing factors.

3. The numerous wing skin cracks occurring in F-84D aircraft are attributed to an area of stress concentration which fails in some airplanes when subjected to maneuver load factors believed to be in the order of 5.5 to 8 Gs.

4. Unsigned statements obtained from fifty-seven pilots of the 78th Fighter Group indicates that twelve (12) pilots have exceeded the design load factor on this airplane by imposing loads varying from 7.5 to 10.5 G's on various occasions, and twenty (20) pilots have exceeded a speed of .82 Mach by 5 mph to 40 mph at altitudes varying from 8,000 ft. to 38,000 ft. The pilots recalled four airplanes that had exceeded 7.33 G, and a check of these planes revealed that one (1) had the typical right wing skin crack. (See Tab Q) The Board is certain that the aircraft have been operated beyond design limitations, and believes there is a lack of appreciation by pilots and other personnel of design limitations.

5. The A-1B Gun Bomb Rocket sight is unsatisfactory for tactical use in its present configuration. This problem was not investigated in detail because it is known that the deficiencies are under investigation by the Air Proving Ground, Air Materiel Command, and other agencies.

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6. Supply problems are most critical from the standpoint of brake putts, A-8 type flag targets, and proper instruments for link trainers.

7. Aircraft maintenance in this group is better than average.

8. Operational difficulties as influenced by personnel are created by too many pilots being assigned and attached for tactical flying far the number of aircraft assigned and flying hours allocated. Approximately 160 pilots are assigned and attached with 61 assigned aircraft. The 78th Fighter Group has been allocated 3628 flying hours for the first quarter of 1950, less than ten hours per pilot per month.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Board recommends that:

a. All F-84D aircraft be limited to 4.5 G at all altitudes prior to modification to prevent wing skin cracking.

b. All acrobatics in formation, including string formation, in F-84B, F-84C, and F-84D aircraft be completed above 15,000 feet altitude.

c. F-84D Airplane No. 48-741 be repaired locally and flown to SIMAR for D.I.R.

d. A static test of an F-84D wing, without reinforcement, be made to determine load factor producing cracks. This same wing, then modified and tested to destruction to determine ultimate load and adequacy of modification.

e. A continuing program be established for installing recording accelerometers in several aircraft per fighter group (all types) to provide a permanent record of loads being imposed on fighter aircraft.

f. The techniques and requirements of ground support missions be analyzed to determine whether changes should be made in the basic methods for performing these missions during training in order to protect the aircraft from excessive acceleration loads. It is evident that the F-84D aircraft are being overstressed in performance of ground gunnery, dive bombing, rocket firing, and low altitude aerial gunnery missions.

g. An Air Force wide educational program be established through the medium of Flying Safety, Training Films, Air Training Command, and

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Ltr, Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Wn D. C., Subj: Report of Special Investigation of F-84D Aircraft Accidents - Fourth Air Force. 18 Dec. 49

h. A study be made to determine the feasibility of relocating the aileron boost mechanical disconnect and canopy emergency jetison switch on the F-84D aircraft, for better accessibility under high load factors or other emergency conditions.

i. Technical instructions be issued requiring pressure on F-84 aircraft tip tanks at all times.

j. Accelerometers be redesigned to eliminate fictitious high readings due to gust loads and ground operations. Pending availability of such redesigned instruments, all fighter pilots should be indoctrinated on the limitations and interpretations of present instrument readings.

k. A summary of this report be brought to the attention of all F-84 pilots.

HUGO P. RUSH
Brig. General, USAF
Chairman of the Board

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
MITCHEL AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

MS&S-M 452.11

24 December 1949

SUBJECT: F-84 Wings

TO : Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
ATTENTION: MCREXA

1. Considerable apprehension is evident among pilots and commanders alike as to the reliability of the F-84 wing. The history of failures of the wing certainly is not conducive to confidence. It is clear that corrective action with respect to the wing and/or operating personnel is required.

2. This headquarters has conducted a review of the information available. This is summarized as follows:

a. There have been five (5) instances of complete wing failure. (See Incl #1)

b. There have been 45 instances of skin cracks:

Left wing	Right wing
5 at sta. #45	6 at sta. #15
	34 at sta. #62

c. While the bulk of the cracks have appeared under the right wing at station #62 and some have developed to approximately 11 inches in the course of one flight, the most recent wing loss was of a left wing which parted at station #62.

d. Replies to questionnaires prepared in secret by F-84 pilots indicate conclusively that the restrictions published in T.O. 01-65BJ-16 are not being strictly observed. (see Incl #2 for details)

e. Air Materiel Command engineers advise that:

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MS&S-M 452.11
Subject: F-84 Wings (Cont'd)

(1) Test of two (2) "D" wings, one (1) reinforced in accordance with T.O. 01-65BJB-34 and one not reinforced, is being initiated.

(2) The "D" wing is expected to prove stronger than the "C" wing.

(3) Test experience indicates that wings which have been subjected to service conditions are stronger than new wings, due to work hardening.

(4) Wings which have been operated above published limits, but which do not show any damage externally, are sound.

3. Since there appears to be no pattern to the circumstances surrounding either cracking or complete failure, it may very well be that all F-84 wings in this command have been weakened through abuse, abuse to which these pilots were accustomed to subjecting the P-80 without penalty.

4. It is, therefore, requested that a typical service F-84 wing be thoroughly tested in the laboratories at Wright-Patterson AFB in precedence to the two (2) new wing tests understood to have been initiated. Aircraft, S/N 48-653, presently assigned to the 78th Fighter Group, Hamilton Air Force Base, is considered typical in that the airframe time on it is approximately equal to the average of Hamilton AFB F-84s, and it is known that the aircraft has been operated above published limits.

5. It is further requested that structural engineers from your headquarters conduct a detailed visual inspection of the following additional F-84s at Hamilton AFB which are known to have been flown beyond published limits and which are grounded pending this inspection: 48-652, 660, 667, 688.

NEAL J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Air Adj Gen

2 Incls
1. F-84 Wing Losses
2. Summary (Questionnaires)

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D.O

Hq, USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

Subject: Penetration Fighter Study 7 July 49

AC 452.1 (7 Jul 49)

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Hq, Tactical Air Command, Langley AF Base, Virginia 18 JUL 1949

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Attached hereto is one (1) copy of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, staff study as requested in the basic letter.

2. Attention is invited to the fact that the basis of evaluation of the three aircraft available for this study is not identical. It was, therefore, necessary to indicate the most suitable current penetration fighter-bomber from data based upon flight tested data of two (2) types and contractor estimated performance data of the other type.

3. In view of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the inclosed staff study, it is recommended that extensive comparative flight tests be conducted on a F-80C equipped with pylon bomb racks and retractable rocket launchers, and on a F-84E to obtain a more accurate appraisal of these two types.

1 Incl
Staff Study

ROBERT M. LEE
Major General, U.S.A.F.
Commanding

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Mitchel AFB, NY
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Staff Study
Penetration Fighter

I. Statement of the Problem.
II. Factors.
III. Assumptions
IV. Discussion.
V. Conclusions.
VI. Recommendations.

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ANNEX A

A. Desired characteristics for a tactical fighter.

B. Specific characteristics of the F8U3, F8U-2 and F8U-1.

C. Evaluation of the current types.

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2. Technical Order 01-75FC3C-1.
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4. Air Proving Ground Command, Report Number 6493-5, 28 March 1949.
5. Republic Aviation Corporation Estimates on the F84E.
6. Air Proving Ground Command, Report Number 6492-5, 11 April 1949.
7. Air Material Command, Flight Test Division Memorandum Report Number TSFTB-8004, 26 July 1947.
8. Air Material Command, Report on Jet Aircraft, 28 Feb 1949.

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I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

A. To determine which of the current AF jet fighter, i.e., F86C, F86E and F86A, is best suited for the penetration fighter-bomber role.

II. FACTORS:

A. Pending availability of a suitable tactical fighter, the type selected will represent the best available interim penetration fighter-bomber.

B. The airplane selected must be capable of effective air to air and air to surface operations to include any or all the following missions; interception, offensive air to air combat, bomber escort, dive bombing, strafing and rocketry.

C. The airplane selected must provide the best characteristics available with respect to speed, range, maneuverability, rate of climb and take-off.

D. The airplane must be capable of delivering effective air to air armament and large loads of air to surface armament at long ranges.

III. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The characteristics for the desired prototype tactical fighter as outlined will be accepted as the basis for evaluation of current types.

B. No evaluation is proposed concerning all weather requirements.

IV. DISCUSSION:

(Attached as Annex A)

V. CONCLUSIONS:

It is concluded that:

A. No one current type completely fulfills the desired requirements for a tactical fighter.

B. The F86A is incapable of accomplishing the air to surface operations with desired armament loads and at desired ranges.

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C. The F-80C in its present configuration is considered incapable of adequately accomplishing in its entirety, all the air to air and air to ground operational requirements.

D. The potentiality of the F-80C to accomplish interim penetration fighter-bomber requirements could be substantially increased by the installation of pylon bomb racks, retractable rocket launchers and tip tanks of greater fuel capacity and improved aerodynamic design.

E. Based upon the contractor performance data contained in this study, the F-84E, as compared to the F-80C and F-84A as they exist today, is considered to be the most suitable interim type to perform the air to air and air to ground tactical operational requirements.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that:

A. The F-84E be considered the best available interim penetration fighter-bomber until a more suitable type can be obtained from development and production.

B. Continued effort be directed towards improving the air to surface armament and combat radius of action of the F-84E.

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(4) Combat radius - of at least 1,000 miles with a 2,000 pound bomb load.

(5) Operate from 6,000 feet or shorter runways.

(6) A high degree of maneuverability and good handling characteristics are mandatory.

(7) Capable of sustained dives at steep angles with bomb loads, and sharp pull out after bomb release.

b. Armament:

(1) Provisions for carrying the following alternate loads:

(a) Sixteen (16) 5" HVAR or comparable loadings of alternate size rockets or;

(b) Eight (8) 5" HVAR or comparable loadings of alternate size rockets plus 2,000 pounds of bombs or;

(c) 4,000 pounds of bombs.

(2) The best available air to air armament.

(3) Sufficient ammunition for twenty (20) seconds of fire per gun is required.

c. Equipment:

(1) Best electronic control and intercept equipment available.

(2) Best available dive bomb and gunsight.

(3) Reflector beacon and IFF.

d. Design:

(1) Space and weight provisions for required armament.

(2) Space and weight provisions for required equipment.

(3) Simplicity of design, rugged construction, and ease of maintenance.

(4) Single point refueling; air to air and surface.

(5) Accessibility to afford quick rearming.

(6) Good all around visibility. Forward downward visibility over nose shall not be less than 12°.

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ANNEX A

DISCUSSION

A. Desired Characteristics for a Tactical Fighter

It is apparent to all concerned that a suitable fighter type aircraft capable of effective air-to-air and air-to-ground operations is a basic requirement in tactical air operations. Since tactical fighters form the greater part of the tactical force, it is of utmost importance that this aircraft be designed and equipped to perform the many and varied missions associated with air-to-air and air-to-ground tactical operations. In effect, the tactical fighter must be capable of performing interception, offensive air-to-air combat, bomber escort, dive bombing, strafing and reconnoitering. In order to evaluate the F-80C, F-84D and F-84E to determine the type most suitable to fulfill the requirement as an interim penetration fighter-bomber, a basis for comparison and analysis must be established. Inherent in this analysis and evaluation of tactical aircraft and equipment requirements with respect to the jobs to be done, provision must be considered to be the desired characteristics of a prototype tactical fighter which is outlined as follows:

1. In the design and manufacture of tactical aircraft constant consideration should be given to simplicity of construction, flexibility of operation, economy of production, and lightness of weight.

2. Performance

(1) [illegible] speed of [illegible] than enemy penetrating fighter-bombers, but less than enemy interceptor fighters, would be desirable.

(2) Rate of climb of a fighter greater than enemy penetrating fighters and tactical bombers.

(3) Climb to 35,000 feet in 8.0 minutes.

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It is believed that these characteristics represent a suitable basis for comparison and evaluation of current types with respect to their suitability for the penetration fighter-bomber role. It is realized that the prototype represents the ideal configuration and that a strictly comparative analysis of current types with respect to this prototype will reveal that any or all of the three aircraft types under consideration are unsuitable; however, the analysis will also indicate which aircraft type more closely approximates the desired characteristics required for a tactical penetration fighter-bomber.

B. Specific Characteristics of the F-80C, P-84B and F86A

Outlined as follows are the specific characteristics provided for in each of the current aircraft types under consideration. This data was obtained from specifications, AMC estimates and tests, APGC suitability tests and contractors estimates:

1. F-80C

a. Known Facts.

(1) Maximum speed. .8 Mach or 575 MPH

(2) Combat ceiling. 45,000 feet

(3) Climb (as interceptor) 30,000 feet in 8.8 minutes

(4) Combat radius:

* (a) 2 x 1000# GP Bombs (less tip tanks) 110 Miles

* (b) 2 x 1000# GP Bombs (less tip tanks) 180 Miles

* (c) 10 x 5" HVAR (less tip tanks) 180 Miles

(d) [illegible] Mission) [illegible] Miles

(e) Maximum endurance 3 + 20 Hours

(5) Take-off (sea level) without jato:

(a) Maximum gross weight condition 3100 feet

(b) With 2 x 1000# (less tip tanks) 3000 feet

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(6) Stability of design, ruggedness, maneuverability and ease of maintenance considered satisfactory.

(7) Accessibility to effect quick running inspection satisfactory.

(8) Visibility considered satisfactory.

b. Estimated data (computed from data obtained from AAF Proving Ground Command)

(1) Take-off (sea level) without jets:

(a) Tip tanks plus 2 x 1000 # 4000 feet

(b) Tip tanks plus 2 x 1000# or 6 x 5" rockets 3700 feet

* (2) Combat radius:

(a) 2 x 1000# bombs (plus tip tanks) 990 Miles

(b) 2 x 1000# bombs or 6 x 5" rockets (plus tip tanks) 440 Miles

(c) 6 x 50 Cal. guns only (Strafing Mission) 500 Miles

2. XP-81

a. Estimated data (contractor estimates)

(1) Maximum speed. .82 Mach or 630 MPH

(2) Combat ceiling 43,000 feet (F.S.)

(3) Climb (as interceptor) 30,000 feet in 12 minutes

* (4) Combat radius:

(a) 2 x 1000# GP Bombs and 6 x 5 inch HVAR 960 Miles

(b) 2 x 1000# GP Bombs 700 Miles

(c) 6 x 5 inch HVAR 900 Miles

(d) 6 x .50 Cal guns only (Strafing Mission) 900 + Miles

(e) Maximum endurance 4 + 20 Hours

(5) Take-off (sea level) less jets:

(a) With tip tanks only 3900 feet

(b) With tip tanks and 2 x 1000# GP Bombs 6000 feet

* Optimum altitude out, drop tanks and return, 5 minutes combat on the deck.

* Out at 30,000', drop tanks, 2 minutes at 12,000 feet, 1 minute on the deck, return at 39,000'.

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(c) With tip tanks, 4 x 5 inch HVAR, plus two drop tanks [illegible]

(d) With tip tanks, 6 x 5 inch HVAR, plus two drop tanks [illegible]

(6) Simplicity of design, rugged construction and ease of maintenance is considered excellent.

(7) Accessibility to afford quick rearming is considered satisfactory.

(8) Visibility is considered excellent.

3. F-86A

a. Known Factor:

(1) Maximum speed. .9 or 670 MPH

(2) Combat ceiling. 45000 feet

(3) Climb (as interceptor) 30,000 feet in 6.8 minutes

(4) Combat radius:

*(a) 2 x 1000# GP Bombs or 16 x 5 inch HVAR 120 Miles

*(b) 2 x 500# GP Bombs 130 Miles

±(c) 6 x .50 Cal guns only (Strafing Mission) 440 Miles

(d) Maximum endurance. 2 + 45

(5) Take-off (sea level) without factor:

(a) With drop tanks 2900 feet

(b) With 2 x 1000# GP Bombs or 16 x 5 inch HVAR 2200 feet

(c) With 2 x 500# GP Bombs 1700 feet

(6) Simplicity of design and ease of maintenance is presently an unknown factor.

(7) Accessibility to afford quick rearming is excellent.

(8) Visibility is excellent.

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* Cruise out at 10,000', 5 minutes on deck at maximum power, return at 10,000'.

± Optimum altitude out, drop external tanks, 5 minutes on deck at maximum power, return at optimum altitude.

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C. Evaluation of the current types.

An examination of the data contained in paragraph 2 above with respect to the suitability of the F86C, F84E and F86A as compared to the desired prototype, reveals that, no one current type completely fulfills the desired requirements. Therefore, the selection of the most suitable interim type must be determined on the basis of which type more closely approximates the characteristics considered necessary to: (1) live in the air; (2) provide delivery of effective armament; and (3) possess effective range. Certainly, the determination of the suitable type will be predicated upon compromises. In our opinion, a suitable solution would be to select the aircraft type that will accomplish, to a limited extent, all three of the basic requirements previously outlined, rather than select a specialized type that will effectively accomplish one or two of the basic requirements and be incapable of accomplishing the remaining requirements. Outlined as follows is a evaluation of each of the aircraft types under consideration, with respect to the three basic requirements.

1. F-80C

The moderately high speed, rate of climb, combat ceiling and maneuverability characteristics of this aircraft are considered satisfactory for interim air to air operations. In addition, the centrifucal type power plant provided in this aircraft is the least vulnerable to gun fire and occupies a smaller percentage of total aircraft area than axial flow type engines. Simplicity of design, rugged construction, ease of maintenance and accessability for quick rearming is exceptional. Continuous operational employment of this aircraft confirms these opinions. The armament loadings of 2 x 1000 lb bombs, or 2 x 500 lb bombs or 10 x 5 inch rockets is acceptable. However, the disadvantage of this aircraft is essentially its inability to carry mixed loadings of bombs, rockets and napalm tanks, in that these loads must be suspended from the wing tips.

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The wing tip tanks and armament are alternate installations that render this aircraft incapable of carrying large armament loads and sufficient fuel to obtain desirable radius of action and endurance. The installation of retractable flush type rocket launchers on the 276th F80C in production will improve this aircrafts versatility considerably; however, its capabilities will still be substantially less than those estimated for the F6J-1. Further, the AMC computed performance data quoted for the F80C equipped with pylon bomb racks and retractable rocket launchers does not favorably compare with the contractors estimates of the F6J-1.

2. F-6J-2

Of the three aircraft under consideration this type provides the greatest radius of action and the largest air to surface armament loads. Provision is made for mixed or alternate loadings of air to surface armament. Speed, rate of climb, combat ceiling and maneuverability of this aircraft are considered satisfactory for survival in the air. The maintenance and accessability for re-arming characteristics of the F6J-2 has been considerably improved and is presently comparable to the F80. The take-off estimates quoted for this airplane with heavy loads appears excessive for day to day operation from average AF Bases with runway lengths of 5000 - 6000 feet. Sufficient data is not presently available to determine whether range and load penalties may be imposed upon this aircraft to permit safe continuous operation from average air fields without take-off assistance. From the performance estimates and data available the F6J-2 configuration provides more capabilities with respect to performing the varied air to air and air to ground tactical air requirements. In effect, this airplane is capable of: (1) living in the air; (2) delivering effective air to surface armament; and (3) operating at effective ranges.

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3. F-86A

Although this airplane provides exceptional characteristics as an interceptor and is certainly considered capable of living in the air, the extremely limited combat radius of action and small air to surface armament provisions precludes selection of this aircraft as a suitable penetration fighter-bomber. Speed is admittedly one of the basic fighter requirements to insure survival in air to air operations; however, the F86A offers practically no advantages for air to surface operations at ranges that are currently considered essential.

In view of the above discussion of the capabilities of the three aircraft, it is evident that the F84E possesses the most desirable characteristics for an interim penetration fighter-bomber. The speed and rate of climb of this aircraft, although considerably less than that of the F86A, is considered satisfactory for interim air to air operations. The armament carrying capacity of this aircraft far surpasses the capabilities of the other two types and in doing so, it almost doubles the radius of action of its nearest competitor, the F80C. It is believed, that with this interim aircraft type, tactical units can accomplish the air to air and air to surface requirements in a manner that will be satisfactory to all concerned.

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1. This concerns flying time which probably can be obtained from F-80, F-82 and F-86 types, presently restricted due to Bendix strike, between now and 1 October 1949.

2. F-82.

a. The flying time which can be obtained from these airplanes has always been governed by maintenance factors primarily, and is not yet being limited by availability of supplies. This seems to be a contradictory statement, but I am convinced that it is true. An average time per assigned aircraft has been approximately 17 hours. Twelve hours is necessary in order to give assigned pilots 60-2 time and stay within the restriction imposed by Hq USAF.

b. Insofar as the 52nd Ftr Gp is concerned, they repeat statements previously made that if the personnel assigned were really skilled in their SSN and if the personnel turn-over could be minimized, that the spare situation today would permit a higher in-commission percentage than is the case. If this same situation is not true in the 325th Ftr Gp, it can very easily be made so by any adjustment of spares between the two groups, which is indicated.

c. Maintenance is the prime factor because the F-82 is by long odds the most complicated fighter that has ever been built.

d. Overhauled engines are being received at Mitchel AFB in adequate quantities.

e. The list of critical supplies remain the same, but it can be assumed that the build-up of stocks since the strike ended will be the same as the rate of previous stock expenditures. Therefore, it is safe to recommend to USAF that the restriction on flight of F-82s be changed to allow a maximum of 16 hours per month until all restrictions are removed.

3. F-80. Experience of the F-80s maintenance-wise has been good. It is comparatively easy to keep a high percentage in commission and the limiting factor in the case of these airplanes is the supply situation. Consumption of spare parts is not excessive. Considering

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probable build-up rate of Bendix built accessories, it is considered safe to recommend to USAF that the limit on F-80s be increased to 20 hours per month per assigned aircraft.

4. F-86.

a. Utilization of F-86s has been low so far because of the small number of transitioned pilots and the small number of mechanics who have completed F-86 training. So far the average seems to be ten hours per month per assigned airplane.

b. In view of the fact that F-86 use within this command has been too light to make any great dent in the initial stock level of spares furnished, it is suggested that there need be no restriction on F-86 time if USAF assumes that the supply situation will have become normal by 1 October.

5. I repeat what I have told you previously, that AMC has recommended immediate lifting on the restrictions of B-45 and F-51 type aircraft, and expects to be able to lift all restrictions by 1 October.

6. Regarding F-82s, it is interesting to remember that the consumption of accessory parts is extremely high, that there are only three groups that have F-82E and F, which are identifical except for radar, and that one of these groups is assigned to SAC. The SAC group experiences no supply difficulty. Their priority guarantees this, but it also guarantees that the supplies for the ConAC groups are seriously short because consumption has exceeded that planned. In addition, there is impounded a large quantity of F-82 spares in a SAC flyaway kit, following the usual SAC practice.

7. The low in-commission reports during the months of June and July, in the case of the 52nd Ftr Gp and perhaps in others, are due to the airplanes being held out of commission for extra or backlog maintenance because time restrictions would not permit their being flown away.

8. A list of critical F-82 items is attached for your information.

/s/t/ R. V. WILLIAMS
Col., USAF
DM - Ext. 6101

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HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

HDAS-M 452.1 8 December 1949

SUBJECT: Modernization of F-80 Aircraft

TO : Commanding Officer, 56th Fighter Wing, Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan

Inclosed listing of F-80 type aircraft modifications is forwarded for your information.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WHITEHEAD:

s/ HERMAN LANDER
Captain, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl
F-80 Acft Modernization List (dup)

Info cy to
CG, Tenth AF

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F-80AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION
Work Requirements

The following listed items have been selected for accomplishment:

Item 1 - Rocket Launching Provision (MCR-429)

This item will be accomplished on F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. Kits are on procurement. Install in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin included in each kit.

Item 2 - Gasoline Burning Provisions

This item will be accomplished on F-80A, F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. Kits are available in AF Supply. a. Install B-12A Fuel Pump in accordance, with T.O. 01-75BJ-65. b. Install Vent Line Reroute in accordance with T.O. 01-75BJ-62. c. Install Explosion Resistant Wing Flap Relay in accordance with T.O. 01-75BJ-61.

Item 3 - K-14 Gunsight (MCR-467)

This item will be accomplished on F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. Kits are available in AF Supply. Install in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin included in Kit.

Item 4 - Fuel, De-Icing (MCR-519)

This item will be accomplished on F-80A, F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. Kits are available in AF Supply. Install in accordance with T.O. 01-75BJ-64.

Item 5 - Canopy Redesign (MCR-489)

This item will be accomplished on F-80A, F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. Kits are available in AF Supply. Install in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin #44.

Item 6 - Tail pipe Scupper Drain

This item will be installed in F-80A, F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. No kits required. Local manufacture authorized in accordance with Lockheed Drawing #206487.

Item 7 - Elevator Rework (SI-81)

This item will be accomplished on F-80A, F-80B and F-80C aircraft. Kits are on procurement. Install in accordance with Lockheed Service Instruction #81 included in kits.

Item 8 - Rudder Rework

This item will be accomplished on F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. Kits are on procurement. Rework in accordance with Lockheed Service Instruction #80 included in kits.

Item 9 - Current Limiter Mounting (MCR-475)

This item will be accomplished on F-80A, F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. Kits

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are on procurement. Install in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin #48 or T.O. 01-75NJB-23.

Item 10 - Provisions for Jato (MCR-311)

This item will be accomplished on F-80B aircraft. Kits are on procurement. Install in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin #25.

Item 11 - Manual Aileron Oil Boost Shut-off Valve (MCR-512)

This item will be accomplished on F-80A, F-80B and F-80C type aircraft. Kits are on procurement. Install in accordance with Technical Orders 01-75PJA-22, 01-75 NJB-32 and 01-75 NJC-22.

Item 12 - Landing Gear Selector Valve

This item will be accomplished on F-80A type aircraft. Kits are available in AF Supply. Rework in accordance with T.O. 01-75PJA-20-2.

Item 13 - Engine Drain Valve Relocation (MCR-349)

This item will be accomplished on F-80A type aircraft. Kits are available in AF Supply. Relocate in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin #17 included in kit or T.O. 01-75PJA-2B-9.

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MESSAGE FORM

FROM: Hq AMC, Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio
TO : CG, ADC, Mitchel AFB, N.Y.

MCSSXT21-12-1. In view of recent starting difficulties encountered on J33-A-23 engs installed in F-80C and TF-80C Acft, the following starting procedure is recommended for use and supersedes the instructions contained in T.O.01-75FJB-1 dtd 1 May 47 revised 1 May 48; 01-75FJB-2 dtd 1 Apr 47 Revised 1 Jul 48; 01-75FJC-1 dtd 15 Aug 48; 01-75FJC-2 dtd 2 Aug 48, and will be used until further notice. Prior to attempting to start the F-80C and TF-80C acft an adequate auxiliary power source shall be connected to the dual connection on the Acft to insure that at least 9% speed will be obtained for starting all F-80C and TF-80C acft that have not been winterized for use of standard gasoline an-F-48 in the left leading edge fuel tank group for starting purposes, will use both left and right leading edge fuel tanks for starting purposes. The tanks presently containing kerosene an-F-32 will be drained and filled with gasoline an-F-48, with the fuel lines purged to the engine by the following procedure.

A. Throttle in "OFF" position
B. Wing and Drop Tank fuel switches in "OFF" position
C. Fuselage fuel tank and by-pass switch in "BY-PASS" position
D. Leading edge fuel tank switch in "ON" position
E. Ignition switch in "OFF" position

MCSSXT21/RJD/kb 12/1/48

s/ W.F.Barns, Major, USAF
for EDWARD G. KIEHLE, Col., USAF
Ch, Maint.Tech.Sec., Maint.Div

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MCRMXT 21-12-1 cont'd

F. Starter switch - push to "START" position, hold for three seconds, and release.

G. Throttle - move to "IDLE" position and allow engine to continue to rotate for two minutes in this position.

H. Starting fuel switch - move to "AUTO" position

I. Throttle - move to "OFF" position and allow engine to continue to rotate for 1/2 minute in this position; then push the starting fuel switch, the leading edge fuel tank switch, and fuselage fuel tank and by-pass switch to the "OFF" positions.

J. Allow the engine to continue to rotate for two minutes to clear engine fuel. Then push the starter switch to "STOP-START" position and release. To drain any excess fuel from the tailpipe, tip the acft to a tail down position and hold until the fuel stops draining from the tailpipe. Then return the acft to a normal attitude. Be certain that all fuel has drained from the eng and tailpipe before attempting a start to eliminate the danger of a hot start or fire.

K. Return the ignition switch to the normal "ON" position and the Acft is ready for operation. Prior to initiating eng start, it is again desired to caution that an adequate auxiliary power source must be connected to the dual connection on the airplane to insure that at least 9% speed will be obtained for starting.

The following automatic starting procedure will be used for starting on an-F-48 gasoline.

A. Throttle in "OFF" position

B. Wing and drop tank fuel switches in "OFF" position

C. Fuselage fuel tank and by-pass switch in "BY-PASS" position

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D. Leading edge fuel tank switch in "ON" position

E. Ignition switch in "ON" position

F. Starter switch - push to "START" position, hold for three seconds and release. The starter motor should bring the engine up to about 10% speed. Do not attempt to start the engine below 9% speed as it will cause serious damage to the engine. In any instance that the 9% speed cannot be obtained, push the starter switch to the "STOP-START" position and release. Then secure an adequate source of auxiliary power prior to attempting a restart of the engine.

G. At 9 to 10% speed turn the starting fuel switch to "AUTO" position. The engine should start and accelerate automatically to a stabilized speed of approximately 20-25%. This stabilized speed varies with ambient air temperature.

If exhaust tailpipe temperature reaches 1000°C and stays there for more than three seconds, turn the starting fuel switch immediately to the "OFF" position and push the starter switch to the "STOP-START" position. Do not repeat the starting operation until after the engine completely stops rotating.

If ignition does not occur within 10 seconds after the starting fuel switch is turned to the "AUTO" position and release, allow the engine to stop rotating and then check the ignition system before attempting to make another start.

H. At 19-20% speed place the throttle in the "IDLE" position. This automatically turns off the automatic starting control and allows the engine to operate on the normal engine fuel system. Do not disconnect the

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auxiliary power source dual cables until the throttle is moved out of the "OFF" position (with the battery switch in the "OFF" position) or the engine fuel supply will be cut off. If the engine stops when the throttle is opened there is something wrong with the normal engine fuel system. Investigate the difficulty and correct.

It is recommended that the starting fuel switch be turned off by pushing the guard down to avoid the possibility of turning to the "manual" position instead of the "OFF" position. This switch must be in the "OFF" position at all times, except during actual starting and stopping operations. If this switch is left in the "AUTO" position the automatic starting system would be energized whenever the throttle was placed in the "OFF" position, and fuel would be supplied to the engine. If it is left in the "MANUAL" position both the normal and emergency fuel systems would be supplying fuel. Under these conditions there is no governor protection and overspeeding is very likely to occur.

I. At not less than 30% speed push the fuselage fuel tank and by-pass switch the "ON" position. This changes the engine fuel supply from gasoline an-F-48 to kerosene an-F-32 for normal operation of the engine.

J. With the throttle in the "IDLE" position check the following:

(1) Idling speed - 34% plus-minus 2%

(2) Exhaust tailpipe temperature - 600°C maximum

(3) Fuel pressure - 50 psi or more

(4) Oil pressure - 2 PSI minimum

K. Disconnect the external power source and turn on the battery switch.

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The following stopping procedure will be used on F-80C and TF-80C Acft using gasoline An-F-48.

A. Upon parking the acft move the throttle to the "IDLE" position, push the leading edge fuel tank switch to the "ON" position; the fuselage fuel tank and by-pass switch to the "BY-PASS" position; and the remaining fuel tank switches to the "OFF" position. Push the starting fuel switch to the "AUTO" position. Allow the engine to idle for two minutes on gasoline and pull the throttle to the "OFF" position. The engine will continue to run on the starting control. After 1/2 minute operation push the starting fuel switch to the "OFF" position. This procedure will purge the engine fuel system of kerosene an-F-32 providing gasoline for the next start.

B. Turn all switches to the "OFF" position.

The gasoline an-F-48 carried in the leading edge fuel tanks will be used for starting and stopping purposes only. However, in case of an emergency when the acft fuel system is nearing exhaustion this gasoline may be used for normal operation of the engine by moving the leading edge fuel tank switch to the "ON" position and in the case of the acft winterized for use of the left leading edge fuel tank for starting and stopping, move the left hand leading edge fuel tank switch to the "ON" position.

The decal presently on the filler caps of the leading edge fuel tanks on acft not winterized will be "GASOLINE AN-F-48" placed on the decal. The present designation currently on the filler caps "kerosene an-F-32" will be removed on the filler caps of the leading edge fuel tanks on acft not winterized.

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MCRMKT21-12-1 cont'd

A decal will also be added inside the cockpit above the fuel switches on acft not winterized stating "the leading edge fuel tanks are serviced with gasoline an-F-48" in the leading edge fuel tanks, and will be started and stopped on gasoline regardless of ambient air temperatures.

The above information will be incorporated in Technical Orders AN01-75NJB-1, -2, and AN01-75FJC-1, -2 as soon as revisions are completed.

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4	419.01	Dec/48-Dec/49	2	2	Continental Air Command.	U	
252	"	Dec/48-Dec/49	3	1	"	U	
543	"	Dec/48-Dec/49	3	2	"	U	
838	"	Dec/48-Dec/49	4		"	U	
1131	419.01	Dec/48-Dec/49	5	1	Continental Air Command.	U	
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